- hace 4 horas
El 9 de enero de 2021, el vuelo 182 de Sriwijaya Air se inclinó a la izquierda y entró en una barrena de pérdida cinco minutos después de despegar del Aeropuerto Internacional Soekarno-Hatta, murieron las 62 personas a bordo. La causa del accidente fue un error del piloto al no reconocer la simetría de empuje del acelerador automático defectuoso, y una desorientación espacial.
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00:00¡Bank angle! ¡Bank angle!
00:02It takes only 25 seconds for Sriwijaya Air Flight 182 to spiral out of the sky
00:14and into the Java Sea.
00:17The airplane's acceleration was nearly approaching the speed of sound on the way down.
00:22The forces just literally shattered the airplane.
00:25All 62 people on board are dead.
00:30As the investigator in charge, I have the responsibility to answer to the families
00:34what caused this accident.
00:37When investigators examine the flight data...
00:40It all started here.
00:42...they discover an issue never flagged by the airline.
00:46So the system allowed a defect to slip through the cracks.
00:51Looks like it.
00:52It's actually quite startling.
00:55Whoa.
00:55I just don't understand how they could have missed that.
01:00D-D, D-D.
01:04Cool.
01:04Up.
01:21¡Suscríbete al canal!
01:46¡Suscríbete al canal!
02:08¡Suscríbete al canal!
02:36Fly over the Java Sea to reach its destination of Ponteana on the island of Borneo.
02:42In Indonesia, air travel is a mainstay of transportation.
02:48Because there are so many islands, customers use air transportation as a routine means of getting from one place to
02:55another.
02:57The crew performs last-minute checks before take-off.
03:01Auto-throttle.
03:04Arm.
03:06Flaps.
03:09Five.
03:10Stabilizer trip.
03:12Set.
03:13They're flying a 26-year-old Boeing 737-500.
03:17In an island archipelago like Indonesia, the 737-series airplanes is perfect.
03:25It operates well on and off of shorter runways.
03:29It was built for short-haul flights.
03:32It is very common for 737s to fly 8, 10, 12 legs in a day.
03:39It's a workhorse.
03:44Spirajaya 182.
03:45Runway 25R cleared for take-off.
03:49Runway 25R cleared for take-off.
03:51Spirajaya 182.
03:56Ready?
03:59Ready.
04:00The crew gets ready for a busy day.
04:03Take-off thrust set.
04:05They're scheduled to fly several legs by the end of their shift.
04:09Speed increasing.
04:1180 knots.
04:18V1.
04:19Rotate.
04:23V2.
04:25Positive break.
04:26Gear up.
04:32400.
04:34Flaps one.
04:36Just after liftoff...
04:38L1.5.
04:40Captain Afwan engages the autopilot.
04:47Flaps up.
04:50Most pilots really enjoy having the automatic system engaged as soon as possible, because of course they're not actually hand
04:56-flying at that point.
04:57So they have a little bit more awareness of what's going on with the airplane.
05:02Heading select.
05:04Two minutes into the flight, the captain adjusts the plane's course, and the autopilot turns the plane east towards its
05:13destination.
05:20In the cabin, passengers settle in for the 90-minute flight.
05:27As the plane continues its ascent, the captain switches the engine power setting from take-off thrust to climb thrust.
05:39Jet engines, like any other engine, sustain more wear at very high power settings.
05:45So once you get airborne, you reduce to a climb thrust setting, so that you're reducing wear on the airplane.
05:58Uh, captain?
06:00Almost three minutes into the flight, the first officer spots something concerning.
06:04Looks like it might get rough ahead.
06:08You always try to give the passengers the smoothest ride that you can, so we don't fly through thunderstorms.
06:14Let's turn a bit further east to be safe.
06:17Check of heading 075 is open.
06:19Yes, captain.
06:21Request heading 075 degrees to avoid weather, Svirajaya 182.
06:26Svirajaya 182, heading 075 approved.
06:32075, Svirajaya 182.
06:34The crew is given permission to divert to the right around the weather.
06:39But the new route is very busy today.
06:42Svirajaya 182, stop climbing at 110.
06:45To avoid other aircraft, they're instructed to level off at 11,000 feet.
06:52Stop climbing at 110.
06:54Copy Svirajaya 182.
06:56Captain, change altitude to 110.
07:00110.
07:03The Boeing 737 continues its right turn.
07:12Three and a half minutes into the flight...
07:17Approach at 110.
07:19...it nears the target altitude.
07:22110.
07:23110.
07:25110.
07:32In the cabin, the passengers begin to sense the plane banking left.
07:38It continues until the plane is on its side.
07:53Back in Jakarta, the controller realizes Flight 182 is suddenly going off course and radios the crew.
08:01Svirajaya 182, what's your heading?
08:04She gets no response.
08:08At that moment, Flight 182 is diving towards the Java Sea at an incredible speed.
08:15Captain, what's it?
08:19Captain Afwan is desperately trying to regain control of the plane.
08:24Captain, Captain!
08:27Captain!
08:28But his efforts fail.
08:31No!
08:41The airplane's acceleration was nearly approaching the speed of sound on the way down.
08:47The forces just literally shattered the airplane.
08:50A little more than four hours after Sriwijaya Air Flight 182 disappears from radar,
08:57search and rescue teams reach the plane's last reported coordinates,
09:0111 nautical miles northwest of Jakarta, over the Java Sea.
09:08The team finds only an oil slick, small pieces of debris, and human remains.
09:16The Boeing 737 has disintegrated, and all 62 people on board are dead.
09:23With over 700 aviation fatalities in the last decade,
09:28Indonesia is already considered one of the deadliest aviation regions in the world.
09:34This accident needed to be resolved fairly quickly.
09:37People needed to understand it to gain confidence of flying in that region.
09:42Divers soon discover that most of the wreckage is buried in mud, 50 feet below the surface.
09:48The scope of the wreckage was very wide, and it was monsoon season in Indonesia,
09:54where heavy rain and strong wind.
09:56So it was challenging for us to recover the wreckage.
10:00It's up to the team of investigators from Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee, the KNKT,
10:08to find out why the 737 plunged into the sea.
10:14The KNKT's lead investigator, Ray Nekayo, reviews video of the crash site of Flight 182,
10:22looking for the first clues as to what went wrong.
10:26The KNKT, the KNKT, I'm looking at the video now.
10:31Pieces are really small.
10:34What's the distribution area of the wreckage?
10:38Mm-hmm.
10:4080 meters by 110 meters?
10:43Okay.
10:44All right, thanks.
11:08¡Suscríbete al canal!
11:18¡Suscríbete al canal!
11:45¡Suscríbete al canal!
11:47¡Suscríbete al canal!
12:18¡Suscríbete al canal!
12:20¡Suscríbete al canal!
12:34¡Suscríbete al canal!
12:51¡Suscríbete al canal!
13:03¡Suscríbete al canal!
13:06¡Suscríbete al canal!
13:28¡Suscríbete al canal!
13:38¡Suscríbete al canal!
13:45¡Suscríbete al canal!
13:56¡Suscríbete al canal!
13:58¡Suscríbete al canal!
14:00¡Suscríbete al canal!
14:11¡Suscríbete al canal!
14:15¡Suscríbete al canal!
14:28¡Suscríbete al canal!
14:38¡Suscríbete al canal!
14:42¡Suscríbete al canal!
14:46¡Suscríbete al canal!
14:50¡Suscríbete al canal!
15:00¡Suscríbete al canal!
15:01Continuó sifting through the mud to find it.
15:05¿Vale el datos de la data de la data para determinar por qué los pilotos perdieron control de la flight
15:11182?
15:15¡It will take us two to five days to read the record!
15:19Hopefully, everything will be fine y el misterio de este incident puede ser revelado!
15:28Within days of finding Sriwijaya Air Flight 182's flight data recorder,
15:33investigators review the plane's flight parameters.
15:37Look at that.
15:38The thrust levers should always be moving together, but they split,
15:43causing the right engine to stay at full power, and the left moved to idle.
15:48The team discovers the thrust levers powering the left and right engines
15:53were at significantly different settings.
15:57Finding the thrust lever split was a breakthrough to the investigation.
16:01It answered our questions why the aircraft fit from the flight path and dived in such ways.
16:10That amount of split will push a plane on its side.
16:19There was a lot more thrust on the right side of the airplane than the left side of the airplane.
16:25But what could have caused the thrust levers to split?
16:30It all started here, when they changed from take-off mode to climb mode.
16:37Two and a half minutes into the flight,
16:39the captain switches the autopilot and auto-throttle settings to reduce engine power.
16:46Less power is needed,
16:48so the auto-throttle should be pulling both thrust levers back.
16:53But the right one doesn't budge.
16:57To reach the lower combined engine power,
17:00the auto-throttle pulls the left thrust lever much further back than normal
17:04to compensate for the stuck right thrust lever.
17:09Clearly, something was preventing it from coming back,
17:13whether the auto-throttle was not commanding it properly,
17:15or was there something mechanical holding the throttle from not coming back.
17:22But even if the auto-throttle caused an asymmetry,
17:25pilots are trained to deal with this kind of issue.
17:30During the investigation,
17:33one of our questions was,
17:35why such significant differences
17:38between left and right thrust lever
17:41resulting in the catastrophic event?
17:44A minute after the split starts,
17:47the plane starts rolling left.
17:50And then it takes about 15 seconds before the pilot
17:52disengages the autopilot and takes control.
17:59That's not the only strange thing.
18:02Instead of leveling the plane,
18:04the captain turned it into a steeper left bank.
18:16Why would the captain turn the control wheel the wrong way?
18:32The autopilot held the control wheel right to fight the left roll.
18:45With the right engine creating more thrust,
18:48it caused the plane to bank to the left.
18:51The autopilot fought to level the plane,
18:54but it ultimately failed.
19:01Maybe when the captain looks at the control wheel,
19:04he thinks the plane is turning right.
19:07The captain grabs the control wheel,
19:09disengages the autopilot,
19:11and turns left.
19:15But of course this was exactly the opposite action
19:18that they should have taken.
19:19The left turn quickly becomes an irreversible left roll.
19:23Bank angle, bank angle.
19:25Bank angle!
19:26Captain!
19:34Eight seconds before plunging into the water,
19:38the captain tries to salvage the situation.
19:41Captain! Captain!
19:44Captain!
19:45Captain Afwan finally brings the right thrust lever to idle,
19:48but it's too late.
19:50Captain!
19:50What would have been a minor overbank condition
19:54resulted in a loss of control in flight
19:57that resulted in the loss of the airplane.
20:14Why did the pilots end up in this situation in the first place?
20:21Investigators still need to find out
20:23what caused the right thrust lever to jam at take-off power.
20:27But with most of the plane's wreckage still on the bottom of the sea,
20:31they'll have to look elsewhere for clues.
20:37The investigation into the crash of Sriwijaya Air Flight 182
20:41now focuses on the aircraft maintenance log
20:44to explain why the aircraft's right thrust lever didn't move back.
20:49So you've got the records there?
20:51Yeah, but it's going to take a while to get through these.
20:54The records date back to 2012,
20:57the year Sriwijaya Air leased the then 18-year-old Boeing 737.
21:02Aircraft maintenance logs are a great source of history
21:06that lets you recreate the overall health of the airplane
21:10and ensure that it's being maintained correctly.
21:15After every flight,
21:16a technician checks the maintenance log.
21:19It lists issues the pilot reported during the flight
21:22and the action taken to address them.
21:35The plane flew an average of seven flights per day.
21:40Adds up to over 10,000 pages.
21:43OK.
21:44Let's get to it.
21:48It will take time to review each record.
21:51Meanwhile, the victim's families are desperate for answers.
21:58As the investigator in charge,
21:59I have the responsibility to answer to the families and the public
22:03what caused this accident.
22:06Such tragic accidents need a good explanation
22:09for the family to understand why they lost their loved ones.
22:17We found something.
22:19After several weeks of searching maintenance logs,
22:22investigators discover an alarming pattern.
22:25The accident aircraft enters Sriwijaya's fleet
22:28in the spring of 2012
22:29and crashes 2021.
22:33On November 7th, 2013,
22:36a pilot reports an autothrottle malfunction.
22:39From then until five days before the accident flight,
22:43there are 64 more reports of autothrottle malfunction.
22:49That's a lot.
22:51And none of the reports are very detailed.
22:54In fact, not a single pilot report
22:57mentions the thrust levers splitting.
23:01The autothrottle system was routinely written up
23:04as either unserviceable or causing problems.
23:08There was not a lot of specific information.
23:12How did they follow up?
23:14They tried a number of things.
23:17Most of the time,
23:18they only cleaned the connectors on the autothrottle computer,
23:21checked the computer systems,
23:22the bare minimum.
23:24When maintenance gets back a report
23:27that the autothrottle malfunction,
23:28their first action is to verify
23:31if the computing system is working or not.
23:35To do that,
23:36technicians disconnect the autothrottle computers
23:39from the system,
23:40clean the electrical connectors,
23:42and then reattach them.
23:48They then perform a computer test in the cockpit
23:51that detects and diagnoses faults.
23:57TCAS test.
24:01So they'd clean the connectors,
24:03do a test,
24:04get a no-fault result,
24:07and consider the case closed.
24:11But the autothrottle problems kept on happening.
24:15The quick fix work,
24:17such as screening and reconnecting,
24:20is not the correct action for the problem.
24:23The line maintenance engineers
24:24should go to the next step to fix the problem.
24:28Did they try anything else?
24:30Yes.
24:32From 2014
24:34up until a week before the accident flight,
24:37they replaced various computers
24:39and other components,
24:41and then they would do the same test,
24:43get a no-faults report,
24:45and put the plane back in service,
24:48only for the same autothrottle problem
24:50to pop up again
24:50within a few weeks or less.
24:54So why wasn't the computer test
24:56catching the problem?
24:58Because the test has limits.
25:03The post-maintenance test
25:05only checked the autothrottle systems
25:07computers and power supply.
25:11It wasn't capable of finding any faults
25:13in the autothrottle mechanical systems,
25:15like the cables to the engines.
25:20They were doing
25:21what I would consider
25:22limited troubleshooting.
25:24They were utilizing
25:25the flight management computer,
25:27but interrogating
25:28a very small portion of the system.
25:41We double-checked the logs
25:42to see if they ever
25:43inspected the cabling
25:45all the way to the engines.
25:48And?
25:49They never did.
25:52Was there a persistent
25:53mechanical malfunction
25:55that Sriwijaya's maintenance
25:57department failed to detect?
26:00With much of Flight 182's
26:03shattered wreckage
26:03still sitting on the floor
26:05of the Java Sea,
26:06the Indonesian investigators
26:08come up with a novel way
26:10of finding the answer.
26:13Does Sriwijaya have any other
26:14737-500s like this one?
26:17Let me check.
26:23They do.
26:27Same age,
26:28enter the fleet,
26:29same time.
26:31Let's check its logs
26:32and see if it's plagued
26:33with similar issues.
26:36Could the examination
26:37of a similar Sriwijaya plane
26:39explain why Flight 182's
26:42right thrust lever jammed?
26:47Investigators turn their attention
26:49to another 737-500
26:52under maintenance
26:52in Sriwijaya Air's fleet
26:54to understand why
26:56the right thrust lever
26:57of Flight 182
26:59might have jammed.
27:00Well, we can't recreate
27:01the computer test,
27:02but we can still check out
27:04the thrust lever.
27:10There's resistance.
27:18When we know that
27:19it's hard to move
27:20the thrust lever,
27:21that means there's an obstacle
27:23or a friction on the cables.
27:27Okay, let's see
27:29what's going on.
27:30The investigators check
27:32check the inner workings
27:33of the throttle assembly.
27:34Whoa.
27:37Been a while
27:37since everyone
27:38clean this out,
27:39if ever.
27:42Let's check the condition
27:43of the cables.
27:46Looking at the thrust lever
27:48mechanisms
27:49in one particular area
27:50is not enough.
27:51You have to look
27:52at where it's originating from
27:54and where it's going to,
27:56and where it's going to,
27:56in this case,
27:56from the flight deck
27:57into the engine.
27:59Pass that up here.
28:01They examine the cables
28:02running down from the cockpit
28:04and through the equipment bay
28:05to see if they can find something
28:07that could cause
28:08thrust levers to jam.
28:11When you're in the electronic
28:12and equipment bay,
28:13you're doing two things.
28:15You're visually inspecting
28:16and you're also feeling
28:18for anything
28:18that could be binding
28:19or sticky.
28:22Check out the dried lubricant.
28:24Add some dirt
28:25and some rust.
28:27That's a recipe
28:28for cable binding.
28:32Binding.
28:33Binding prevents
28:34the thrust lever
28:36from being pushed
28:37or pulled.
28:38It's like it's pinched.
28:41So,
28:42the planes are the same type,
28:44same age,
28:46maintained in the same ways.
28:49It follows that the accident plane
28:51would have the same problem.
28:53The team assumes
28:54that the cable
28:55for the right thrust lever
28:56bound,
28:57preventing it from moving.
28:59To compensate,
29:01the autopilot
29:02had to keep pulling back
29:03the left lever.
29:05What's unclear
29:06is why Sriwijaya
29:08let the throttle system
29:09deteriorate so badly.
29:12You never let an airplane go
29:14with binding or friction.
29:16It's something
29:16that every line maintenance
29:18engineer, technician,
29:19understands that
29:20you have to isolate
29:21the problem
29:22and not accept
29:23any form of binding
29:24or friction
29:25in a controlled surface.
29:28Okay.
29:29Thanks for your time.
29:31Investigators interview officials
29:33from Sriwijaya Air
29:35to determine
29:35why the airline
29:36did not address
29:37the cable binding
29:38in the plane's throttle system.
29:43Well, that was enlightening.
29:46How so?
29:47Management didn't think
29:48the auto-throttle issues
29:50occurred frequently enough
29:51to warrant a grounding
29:53or an inspection.
29:55So they never knew
29:56that the cables
29:57weren't moving properly.
29:59How could 65 malfunctions
30:01not be considered
30:02frequent enough?
30:03because it didn't meet
30:07the regulation's definition
30:08of a repetitive defect.
30:12According to the
30:13Indonesian Ministry
30:14of Transportation,
30:16for an issue
30:17to be considered
30:18a repetitive defect,
30:19it must occur
30:20three times
30:21over 15 flights
30:23on the same aircraft.
30:25None of Sriwijaya
30:26Flight 182's
30:27auto-throttle issues
30:28met that condition.
30:31So the system
30:33allowed a defect
30:34to slip through the cracks?
30:35Looks like it.
30:40It just seems strange
30:41that the thrust levers
30:43could split so much
30:44without some warning
30:45kicking in.
30:50Does the airplane
30:51have some fail-safe mechanism
30:53for preventing
30:54thrust lever asymmetry?
30:56I'll look into it.
31:00The 737
31:00was unique
31:02by having
31:03independent thrust lever
31:04controls
31:05for the left
31:06and the right
31:06engines.
31:07And so that inherently
31:09provided for failure modes
31:10that could cause
31:11one thrust lever
31:12to be driven
31:12differently from the other.
31:17You were right.
31:19737 Classics
31:21have a system
31:21that disconnects
31:22the auto-throttle.
31:23The system
31:24is called
31:25the Cruise Thrust
31:26Split Monitor
31:27or CTSM.
31:28It detects
31:30any significant
31:31difference in thrust
31:32between the left
31:33and right engines.
31:35The CTSM
31:36is designed
31:37to disconnect
31:38the auto-throttle
31:38before the split
31:40gets to be so much
31:41that the autopilot
31:42can't fight it.
31:44Was the CTSM
31:45working properly?
31:47Okay.
31:49The auto-throttle
31:50is supposed to
31:50disconnect
31:51under these
31:52three conditions.
31:54The flaps
31:55are less than
31:5612.5 degrees.
31:58The difference
31:59in power
31:59between the two engines
32:00is at least
32:01700 pounds
32:02and either spoiler
32:04is extended
32:06more than 2.5 degrees
32:07for more than
32:081.5 seconds.
32:11Flight spoilers
32:12are surfaces
32:13on the wings
32:14that work
32:14in tandem
32:15with the ailerons
32:16to control
32:16an airplane's bank.
32:20Did flight 182's
32:22flight parameters
32:23meet the conditions
32:24to automatically
32:25disconnect
32:26the auto-throttle?
32:27Okay, so
32:31there are flaps
32:32who are at zero.
32:35Condition one,
32:36men.
32:40And the difference
32:42in power
32:43between the engines
32:46hits 700 pounds
32:48early in the flight.
32:52Condition two, men.
32:56The spoiler hit
32:582.5 degrees
32:59for one and a half
33:00seconds, here.
33:03Condition three, men.
33:06Except the auto-throttle
33:08disengages
33:0930 seconds
33:10after the spoilers
33:12met their condition.
33:15Investigators
33:16now know
33:16the CTSM,
33:18the plane's
33:19last line of defense
33:20against the thrust
33:21asymmetry,
33:22activated
33:23too late.
33:25The CTSM
33:26should have
33:26disconnected
33:27the autopilot
33:27and the auto-throttle.
33:29Had the alarm
33:30sounded
33:30on the auto-throttle
33:31disconnect,
33:32the flight crew
33:33members' attention
33:34would have been
33:34turned to the thrust
33:35levers,
33:36and they would have
33:37seen the split.
33:39So,
33:41why did it
33:42take 30 seconds
33:43for the spoiler
33:44to trigger
33:45the CTSM?
33:48The wreckage
33:49won't give us
33:49that answer.
33:55Even though
33:56the debris
33:57at the bottom
33:57of the sea
33:58could not tell us
33:59about the
34:00flight spoiler,
34:01we tried to find
34:03the evidence
34:04somewhere else.
34:05Investigators
34:06searched the
34:07maintenance records
34:08of the crashed
34:08737
34:09for evidence
34:10that would explain
34:11why the spoiler
34:12malfunctioned.
34:14Anything?
34:16Nothing.
34:17And it looks like
34:18there was no requirement
34:19to check in.
34:22We found that
34:23there was no
34:24instruction from
34:25the aircraft
34:26manufacturer
34:26to inspect
34:27the flight
34:29spoiler system
34:30unless there
34:31was an abnormality.
34:33As a result,
34:34the investigators
34:35have no way
34:36to determine
34:36what exactly
34:37caused the
34:38critical 30-second
34:39delay.
34:40Here's the thing.
34:42Even though
34:43the auto-throttle
34:43disengaged
34:4430 seconds
34:45later than
34:46it should have,
34:47it doesn't explain
34:48why the pilots
34:49never caught
34:50the thrust
34:50asymmetry
34:51in the first place.
34:55We need that CVR.
34:57Hearing what
34:58happened inside
34:59the cockpit
35:00may be the only
35:00way to explain
35:01why the crew
35:02was late
35:02responding
35:03to the split thrust.
35:08Nearly
35:08three months
35:09after the accident,
35:10the investigation
35:11gets a big break.
35:13Divers find
35:14the memory card
35:15from Sriwijaya
35:16Air Flight 182's
35:18cockpit voice
35:19recorder.
35:24We did it
35:25systematically
35:25and thank God
35:27last night
35:28at 8 o'clock
35:29we found it.
35:32Will the CVR
35:33explain why
35:34the pilots
35:35failed to notice
35:36the split
35:36in the thrust levers
35:37and why
35:39the captain
35:39turned the plane
35:40the wrong way?
35:41Okay,
35:42let's start here
35:44when the thrust levers
35:46begin to diverge.
35:47and see if they
35:48notice it.
35:53Request heading
35:55change to
35:55075 degrees
35:57to avoid weather.
35:58Sriwijaya 182.
36:01Sriwijaya 182
36:03heading 075
36:04approved.
36:09075,
36:10Sriwijaya 182.
36:21Approach at 110.
36:23110.
36:25110.
36:27Not a word
36:28about the thrust levers.
36:40It's what the investigators
36:42don't hear
36:43that stands out.
36:49They don't notice.
36:51They're not paying
36:51attention to the aircraft.
36:56This is the time
36:58when the pilots
36:58should have
36:59time
37:00to
37:01monitor
37:02the aircraft.
37:05The FDR
37:06shows the pilots
37:07had several indications
37:09that things
37:09were going wrong
37:10on Flight 182.
37:13If they had
37:14monitored
37:15their primary
37:16flight display
37:17they would have
37:17noticed
37:18that they were
37:18in a left bank
37:19instead of a right one.
37:22If they had
37:23looked at
37:23the control column
37:24they would have
37:25seen that it
37:26didn't return
37:26to center
37:27after commanding
37:28the right turn.
37:31And most importantly
37:33if they had
37:34checked
37:34their thrust levers
37:35they would have
37:36realized
37:37that they were
37:37split.
37:39These are
37:39three major
37:41breakdowns
37:41in the way
37:42the airplane
37:42is supposed
37:43to be operating
37:44any one of which
37:45should have
37:45drawn the attention
37:46of either
37:47flight crew member.
37:53They gave
37:54all responsibility
37:55for flying the
37:56plane to the
37:56autothrottle
37:57and the autopilot.
38:03Autothrottle
38:04arm.
38:06It's what
38:06investigators call
38:08the ironies
38:09of automation.
38:10Flight crews
38:11become more
38:12and more confident
38:13that the automatic
38:14system is going
38:15to fly the airplane
38:16safely.
38:17So the pilot's
38:18not really thinking
38:19that the airplane
38:20is going to be
38:21in any kind
38:21of difficulty.
38:24So when did
38:25they finally clue
38:26in to the fact
38:28that they were
38:28banking left
38:29instead of right?
38:33Okay,
38:34let's hear more.
38:38Is that standard?
38:44Survey J at 182
38:45climbing the altitude
38:46130, roger.
38:48130.
38:49130.
38:52Bank angle.
38:54Bank angle.
38:57Bank angle.
38:58Bank angle.
38:58Bank angle.
39:00Oh, sorry.
39:03Bank angle.
39:04Bank angle.
39:10They seem confused.
39:12They're totally unaware
39:13of their situation.
39:14because they're flying
39:15in clouds
39:16but not looking
39:17at the instruments.
39:18It's the bank angle
39:19warning that clues
39:20the man.
39:25The crew
39:26was clearly startled.
39:28They didn't understand
39:29what was going on.
39:33Take care.
39:34Take care.
39:48The captain
39:49hears the bank angle
39:51warning.
39:51Looks at his control
39:52wheel,
39:53sees it deflected right
39:54then turns it left
39:55making the situation
39:56worse.
39:58Did the first officer
39:59provide any assistance
40:01to the captain?
40:20The first officer
40:21isn't helping at all.
40:22He's completely
40:23forgotten all his procedures.
40:27Bank angle.
40:28Bank angle.
40:29Bank angle.
40:30The copilot
40:30did not provide
40:32significant information
40:33to the captain.
40:36The aircraft attitude
40:37whether it left
40:38or right
40:39or pitching down
40:40or pitching up
40:40as described
40:42in the procedures.
40:46Even after
40:47the autothrottle
40:48disengages
40:49it still takes
40:49the captain
40:5010 seconds
40:50to bring
40:51the right thrust
40:53lever back
40:54to idle.
40:55If the autothrottle
40:57disengaging
40:58doesn't prompt
40:59him to do that
40:59what does?
41:04It was the
41:05overspeed warning.
41:0815 seconds
41:10into the dive
41:11the plane
41:11is accelerating
41:12to near
41:13the speed
41:13of sound.
41:14It's on the
41:15verge of breaking
41:16up
41:16so the cockpit's
41:17overspeed warning
41:18sounds.
41:22With the
41:23overspeed condition
41:24that's when
41:25he finally
41:26realizes
41:26that both
41:28engines need
41:28to be at idle
41:29and they make
41:30that correction.
41:35He finally
41:36corrects
41:36the asymmetry.
41:38It's too
41:39little too late.
41:42If the aircraft
41:43flying higher
41:44maybe 30,000 feet
41:46the aircraft
41:47might have
41:48recovered.
41:56In the final report
41:58released more
41:59than a year
41:59and a half
42:00after the crash
42:01investigators
42:02highlight
42:03the many
42:03failings
42:04that contributed
42:05to the crash
42:06of flight 182.
42:10Chief among
42:11them was
42:11the failure
42:12of the pilots
42:12to pay attention
42:13to what their
42:14plane was telling
42:15them during
42:16the flight.
42:20What happened
42:21was the sense
42:22of confidence
42:23and complacency
42:24towards the
42:25automation system
42:26may have caused
42:27poor monitoring
42:28and awareness
42:29of other instruments
42:30and activities.
42:33The report
42:34also highlights
42:35the failure
42:35of maintenance
42:36both at the
42:37line and
42:38management levels
42:39in recording
42:40a history
42:41of autothrottle
42:42malfunctions.
42:43For them
42:44not to take
42:44the time
42:45to take
42:46the aircraft
42:47out of service
42:47and effectively
42:48troubleshoot it
42:49in today's
42:50air is just
42:51not heard of.
42:53You have to
42:53ensure that
42:54you're upholding
42:55safety and
42:56you're taking
42:56every action
42:57to troubleshoot
42:58and inspect
42:59the airplane.
43:03It was tragic
43:04that no pilot
43:05reported
43:06thrust lever
43:07split in
43:08their failures.
43:09They always
43:10reported them
43:10as autothrottle
43:12issues but
43:13they didn't say
43:13the words
43:14thrust lever
43:15split.
43:16If the pilots
43:18don't report
43:18the problem
43:19accurately
43:20nobody's going
43:21to fix it.
43:23Sriwijaya Air
43:24committed to
43:25improving its
43:26training for both
43:27pilots and
43:28maintenance
43:28engineers.
43:29But today
43:30the airline
43:31is a much
43:31smaller operation.
43:33Its fleet
43:34consists of
43:34four aircraft.
43:36Only one
43:37of its
43:38737-500s
43:39is still
43:40in use.
43:43This accident
43:44gave the world
43:45a valuable
43:45lesson that
43:46simple problems
43:47could lead
43:48to a
43:48catastrophe.
43:52There's our
43:53hope that
43:53this kind
43:54of incident
43:54will never
43:55happen again
43:56in the future.
44:01J44-2009