00:07Hi and welcome to episode 2 of the SAM Conversations. I am Mane Rastogi and today we'll be discussing
00:14the ongoing US-Israel war against Iran as it's entered its third month. Joining me
00:20is Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar, one of the India's foremost strategic affairs expert
00:26and a leading voice on geopolitics and foreign policy. He has served over 37 years of service
00:32in the Indian Navy and currently he serves as the Director of the Society for Policy Studies
00:37in New Delhi and has previously headed major think tanks including the Institute for Defence
00:42Studies, Analyzes and the National Maritime Foundation. Sir, it's a privilege to have you
00:49with us. Thank you, thank you for asking me to join you.
00:55Should we begin with the question, sir? Please, please.
00:59Sure. Sir, despite sustained escalation, neither Iran nor Israel appears to be pursuing a classical
01:06decisive military victory. Would you argue that this conflict is fundamentally about altering
01:12deterrence equations and regional hierarchy rather than outright military success?
01:19Yes. If you look at the genesis of this war, what the United States has called as epic fury,
01:26it began on the 28th of February, the last day in February and now we are in the third month
01:34and there has been no definitive military outcome. Meaning the United States has not won this war militarily
01:43to the extent that Iran has been forced to capitulate. On the other side, Iran has demonstrated an extraordinary
01:55degree of resilience, but it has not been able to alter the tactical situation. Meaning it's been subjected to
02:06an enormous aerial bombardment both by Israel and the United States. Currently, the US Navy has blockaded Iranian ports and
02:16Iran is on the defensive.
02:19Its economy is in shambles and the people are undergoing extraordinary hardship. So there's been no outcome. The objective of
02:28any war, any military intervention is a political object.
02:32And yes, this war did not begin in isolation. You recall in 2025, Israel had carried out an attack on
02:40Iran. And at that time, the reason given was that they wanted to
02:45completely destroy Iran's nuclear capability. The anxiety that Iran was trying to acquire a nuclear weapon. And this is at
02:55one level paradoxical,
02:56not an ironical, but a reflection of real policy that Israel has nuclear weapons. But the United States and the
03:04allies accept an Israel with nuclear weapons. But they are unable to
03:11consider that Iran could have a nuclear enrichment program because Iran has repeatedly said that we are not pursuing the
03:18weapon, but we want our rights as a non-nuclear weapon state that has signed the NPT.
03:26So that's the background. So that's the background. So you're right about the current stalemate, that there is no clarity.
03:32And the consequence of this war is on the whole world, particularly those in the global south, countries that are
03:40dependent on the straits of Hormuz,
03:43both for hydrocarbons, both for hydrocarbons, that is energy and the general trade routes, you know, from the Hormuz, the
03:50Persian Gulf towards the Indian Ocean, you can see the impact in countries like India.
03:55We know what is happening to India. We know what is happening to the common citizen in terms of the
03:59price of gas cylinders.
04:02And we are seeing the kind of cost that the Indian oil companies are paying to keep the price of
04:10diesel and petrol at the 28th February 11th.
04:15So there is a global impact on human security. And as of now, there is no clarity about how the
04:24next few days are going to proceed because U.S. President Donald Trump has been changing the goalposts ever so
04:31often.
04:32Mania?
04:36Mania?
04:36Mania?
04:36Yes, sir.
04:37Sir, as you mentioned, the impact of the war on the global south countries, especially India, so my next question
04:44would simply be dwelling around India primarily.
04:48So it is that India today is simultaneously investing in the Chabahar port in Iran, is strengthening defence ties with
04:57Israel and deepening a strategic cooperation with the U.S. and the Gulf monarchies.
05:02In the context of the current crisis, is New Delhi's multi-alignment strategy becoming increasingly difficult to sustain? What do
05:11you think, sir?
05:12Yeah, I think the word I would use is it's becoming increasingly complex, meaning, as you rightly pointed out, India
05:22has got a partnership, a robust partnership with the United States.
05:27It also had a very, very important security partnership with Israel. You will recall that Prime Minister Modi had visited
05:38Israel just two days before the war began, Epicure, in the end of February.
05:45Concurrently, India also has a robust partnership with countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and traditionally it had what
05:57I might call as a very, very important, stable partnership with Iraq over the decades, from 1979 onwards when we
06:07had the revolution there and the emergence of Ayasullah Khomeini first and the clerical regime.
06:13So, to that extent, India had what you might call as a multi-alignment policy, but in recent months, it's
06:21becoming both difficult and complex, because in the perception of the region, India has leaned or India's orientation is more
06:32towards the United States and Israel.
06:35You will remember that India was not able to condemn, even in diplomatic protocols, the assassination of Ayasullah Khomeini soon
06:47after epic fury began.
06:50Subsequently, India even took some time, it was hesitant to sympathize and offer condolences for the Iranian sailors who had
07:01died when a US submarine had attacked the Iranian ship Dina.
07:06So, these are some of the indicators that India is seen to be more oriented or leaning towards the US
07:13and Israel, and that in turn has raised some questions about India's credibility, which till recently was seen as a
07:22non-aligned nation that did not take any sights,
07:25but was yet able to project itself as an important voice, but was yet able to project itself as an
07:30important voice, both for peace and for contributing towards the cessation of hostilities in any part of the world.
07:38I mean, that was India's profile, that has currently now, I would say, been diluted, and therefore, there is a
07:46challenge for India.
07:47It has to look after its own energy security and the well-being of its citizens, 1.4 billion Indians,
07:54and at the same time, the United States and Iran are locked in a very, very difficult position,
08:01as far as far as the Hormuz is concerned, in terms of international law, customary practice, and the fact that
08:09today the Hormuz is blocked and no ships are transiting.
08:13So, India, like other countries, is paying a very heavy price. So, you are right, India's engagement is difficult, is
08:21complex, and there is no clarity about how Iran and the United States are going to proceed over the next
08:28few days.
08:29Thank you for your response, sir, going on to the next question.
08:36Sir, even after sustained U.S. military involvement and deployment across the Gulf, the continuous conflict has expanded geographically from
08:47Gaza to Lebanon to Red Sea and Hormuz.
08:50Does this reveal the limits of American deterrence in West Asia today? What do you think?
08:56Yeah, definitely. I think the way in which this war has unfolded very tragically, with a lot of destruction and
09:06death, many deaths in the thousands across the very geographies that you mentioned, Gaza, starting with October 7th, which in
09:15many ways is the precursor to what we are seeing today.
09:19Subsequently, the U.S.-Israel military action against Iran, and then the way in which Israel has accorded unto itself the
09:30right to attack Lebanon.
09:32So, as a result, what we are seeing is that the Iranian response, which was not expected by both the
09:40U.S. and Israel, as we can now make up, has in a way created enormous anxiety and insecurity among
09:48the U.S. allies, such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain.
09:54And this has demonstrated that until recently, until the Iranian response, the general belief and perception was that the American
10:04security umbrella, which was being provided to the Gulf countries and the allies, was considered to be completely impregnable.
10:15Meaning that the assurance given by the United States that with U.S. protection, the allies will not be attacked
10:24or they will not have any degradation of their domestic security.
10:30That assurance has now been stood on its head.
10:33If you look at the U.S. bases in the region, in Saudi Arabia, in UAE, and Bahrain, and the
10:39attacks that have taken place, it has shown, number one, the ability of Iraq to respond in an offensive manner,
10:47use their own missiles and drones.
10:48And on the other side, the flip side is the inability of the American defense system, whether it is the
10:56missile shield or the early warning, have not been able to protect in a credible way the assets of the
11:04United States and the domestic nations involved, U.S. partners like Saudi, UAE.
11:11And that has caused a complete, I would say, question mark, discussed or raised a question mark on the credibility
11:18of the United States as a security partner and the ability of the U.S. to use its military to
11:28impose deterrence, meaning that Iran will not attack or Iran will not be able to attack or if it attacks,
11:36it will be blunted or foiled.
11:38All three have been, in a way, in a way, stood on their head.
11:42So in that sense, yes, I think America's own profile has had an adverse kind of impact in terms of
11:51how the region now sees the U.S. umbrella.
11:57Yes, sir.
11:58Vanya?
12:00Now, adding on to the same thing, while Washington remains militarily consumed by the conflict,
12:06China has largely stayed away from the direct confrontation while continuing its economic engagement with Iran and the Gulf.
12:15Is Beijing quietly emerging as a strategic beneficiary of this prolonged crisis?
12:21What view do you have on this, sir?
12:24I would say that if you look at the big picture, today, in terms of global geopolitics, there is a
12:33certain rivalry between the United States, which is the number one power, what is called as the current hegemon.
12:41And China is number two, which is aspiring to equal the United States, or perhaps even overtake.
12:49This is an aspiration for China to be counted as a major global power in the first instance, as an
12:55equal of the United States.
12:57And subsequently, everyone agrees that China would like to be right on top as the number one power.
13:04And China knows that in the next 10 to 15 years, it's expected to become the world's number one GDP.
13:11And the United States will be a close second.
13:15And by the way, in the same hierarchy, it is expected that India will be a distant third, if we
13:21don't count the European Union, because it's a conglomerate of many countries.
13:25So this is the likely geopolitical or at least the global GDP picture.
13:30So to that extent, given the rivalry between the United States and China, any dilution of American power or American
13:40credibility in the region, in West Asia, would benefit China.
13:46So that is at the strategic level over the long term, 10 to 15 years.
13:53Immediately, China is observing how American military power is not proving to be as effective as the Americans thought it
14:03would be.
14:04So here, perhaps there are some lessons that China is drawing, both for its own understanding of how military power
14:12is to be used.
14:13And the fact that the more the United States and its military is committed to West Asia,
14:19there would be a dilution in terms of the American presence in East Asia.
14:26In, for instance, the South China Sea or the entire maritime domain from Japan right down to Asia.
14:35That is a critical area for China.
14:39If the American military presence is diluted because of the focus on West Asia, that would also be of benefit
14:46to China.
14:48And the last is that China now is being seen by the global South as a more responsible power.
14:55And that's very, I would say, at one level, ironical anomalous.
14:59Because China is an authoritarian state.
15:02It's a communist country.
15:04And in China, everyone agrees that power comes from the barrel of a gun.
15:09And America is a democracy.
15:12And it was expected that democracies were upholding liberal values.
15:17And the irony or the contrast is that it is the US, along with Israel, that have actually violated international
15:23law in terms of the manner in which they attacked Iran in the end of February.
15:29So today, America, with President Trump, is being seen as a transgressor and a country, the world's number one power,
15:39that is not acting in a responsible manner.
15:42Whereas China is the contrast.
15:44So on all three tracks, I would say that China has emerged as a beneficiary.
15:52So, with this, we would come to the end question of today.
15:59It is, despite India's major economic and dice for stakes in West Asia, it still remains peripheral to the region's
16:08core security negotiations.
16:09Is India at risk of being economically present, but strategically absent?
16:16What do you think, sir?
16:17Well, I would not say strategically absent, because India has got a profile.
16:23By way of its size, as you rightly said, there is an economic kind of weight that India brings.
16:28There is a military capability that India brings to the Indian Ocean region, particularly the naval domain.
16:34And all of that gives India what you might call as an existential, strategic weight and profile.
16:43So that remains.
16:44But where I think India has definitely been on the defensive and to an extent has been pushed to the
16:52side,
16:53is in terms of the current negotiations.
16:56As we are aware, for US President Donald Trump, Pakistan and the Field Marshal Asim Muni have been the preferred
17:05so-called mediators in terms of the negotiations between the United States and Iraq.
17:12Now, we also know that this has happened because President Trump has been very upset with India and Prime Minister
17:18Modi in particular.
17:21As related to Ops Sindhu and the fact that President Trump had claimed that he was responsible for the ceasefire
17:29of last year.
17:30Now, we are also discussing this in the first anniversary of Ops Sindhu.
17:36And it's very clear that President Donald Trump is very peeved that India did not endorse the claim or support
17:45the claim that it was he who had stopped the war last year between India and Pakistan.
17:52Whereas Pakistan very enthusiastically agreed with him, welcomed the statement.
17:59And it was Asim Muni, Field Marshal Asim Muni, who said that he endorses the candidature of President Trump for
18:07the Nobel Peace Prize.
18:08And he praised him in a very, very, I would say, effusive and visible manner.
18:13Now, these are the elements that contributed to India not being given any place in terms of the table when
18:25the negotiations are taking place.
18:26And it also appears that President Donald Trump has opened a line of communication with China because he is likely
18:34to go there in the middle of May.
18:36And how to bring about a cessation of hostilities and the modus vivendi to the Hormuz dilemma is also apparently
18:47being discussed with China.
18:49So, as a result, if you look at the current status for India in a politico-diplomatic sense, India is
18:58not actively engaging with any of the processes that are currently underway.
19:05Whether it is what is happening between U.S., Pakistan and Iran, which is one triangular kind of mediation, negotiation
19:15effort.
19:16And the other is that clearly there is some kind of consultation between Russia-China on the war and on
19:26the relationship with the United States.
19:29And there also is now the likelihood of a summit meeting between the United States and China.
19:36So, on all counts, perhaps it would be fair to say that India, like the EU, by the way, the
19:42EU is also in a similar position.
19:44Because President Trump is also very, very unhappy and disappointed, as he says, with the stance of the position taken
19:50by the EU countries.
19:57So, as a result, these are two entities, the EU as a collective and India as a major power in
20:04the region, have not been as actively engaged or involved.
20:08And I think that is, to my mind, a setback.
20:12Mania?
20:15Thank you so much, sir, for the answer.
20:17Now, with this, we come to an end to this podcast.
20:20Thank you, Commodore Bhaskar, sir, for the insightful reflections and joining us today on the SAM Conversations Dialogue.
20:28And thank you to our audience for turning in.
20:30We'll see you in the next episode.
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