Kissinger Parte 2 (RTP, 2026)

CETICOS

*Kissinger*, uma nova biografia dividida em duas partes, apresenta um retrato incisivo de Henry Kissinger, o enigmático articulador político que atuou no mais alto escalão da diplomacia americana. Seja celebrado ou odiado, as contradições de Kissinger refletem aquelas presentes no cerne da política externa dos EUA durante a segunda metade do século XX, um período em que o país se tornou a superpotência mundial incontestável mas frequentemente adotou políticas em desacordo com seus próprios ideais mais elevados.  Quando Henry Kissinger faleceu, em 29 de novembro de 2023, jornais dedicaram páginas inteiras ao seu obituário e inúmeros líderes mundiais exaltaram o seu legado. No entanto, a simples menção de seu nome pode despertar tanto um desprezo profundo quanto uma admiração reverente.

Transcript

00:00:00Fordy, Jair Bolsonaro

00:00:09A CIDA

00:00:09Ferris

00:00:10Ferris

00:00:11Richard Nixon is getting his daughter married at the White House.

00:00:18In the meantime, behind the scenes,

00:00:23this fellow Daniel Ellsberg has leaked the secret history of the Vietnam War

00:00:27to the New York Times.

00:00:30E na mesma jornada,

00:00:32onde há a foto de Tricia Nixon se margou,

00:00:35há uma história sobre o Pentecostal da Penalhão do Pentecostal.

00:00:39Pentecostal da Penalhão do Pentecostal,

00:00:42técnico exatamente da história dos Pentecostais do Pentecostal,

00:00:45A top-secret study of Vietnam policy.

00:00:48Pentagon Papers were 7,000 pages of secret history of the war in Vietnam,

00:00:53commissioned by Robert McNamara, the former Secretary of Defense,

00:00:57who became disillusioned with the war and wanted a full record

00:01:01of how we got into it and how it went wrong.

00:01:06Nixon reads his newspaper and his daily briefings and doesn't care about it.

00:01:11Most of the Pentagon Papers are about Johnson and Kennedy.

00:01:13They're not about him.

00:01:14Hello?

00:01:15Mr. President, I have Dr. Kissinger calling you.

00:01:17Okay.

00:01:18But for some reason, Henry Kissinger reads this story in the New York Times and goes ballistic.

00:01:25It's treasonable. There's no question. It's actionable.

00:01:28I'm absolutely certain that this violates all sorts of security laws.

00:01:33What do we do about it?

00:01:35Kissinger is convinced that Daniel Ellsberg, if he had access to the Pentagon Papers,

00:01:41has access to what's going on in Cambodia.

00:01:44And he's obsessed that Ellsberg's next step is to release information about the secret bombing campaign in Cambodia.

00:01:52Ten years in prison was very cheap if they could contribute to ending this war.

00:01:57Ellsberg was the Kissinger protege.

00:01:59And so Kissinger is worried that the finger eventually is going to come back at him.

00:02:05Kissinger describes Ellsberg as unhinged.

00:02:09Of course, that son of a bitch. I know him well.

00:02:11You know him?

00:02:12Oh, well, from early 69 on, he just went off his rocket.

00:02:16Just totally wild.

00:02:18And he's moved into a more and more entrancy, radical position.

00:02:23So it's Kissinger that gins up Nixon about Ellsberg.

00:02:28Just get a son of a bitch in the dream.

00:02:29We've got to get here.

00:02:31We've got to get here.

00:02:34Kissinger's frantic, self-protective reaction to the exposure of the Pentagon Papers

00:02:39drives Nixon to a place which eventually becomes the first step towards work.

00:03:12Kissinger's frantic, self-protective reaction to the Pentagon Papers

00:03:14Kissinger's frantic, self-protective reaction to the Pentagon Papers

00:03:45Kissinger was running all the major elements of foreign policy.

00:03:49The three major immediate objectives were all with communist countries,

00:03:53China, Russia, and Vietnam.

00:03:56The broad strategy was to know where you want to go over the long run

00:04:01to see how the pieces fit.

00:04:03So what you did with one country, how it would affect another country.

00:04:06And I think Kissinger felt you have to reconcile the just with the possible.

00:04:21Vietnam to Kissinger and to Nixon was a thorn in their side.

00:04:24They wanted it off page one so they could get to all the kind of things that Nixon had on

00:04:29his very expansive and aggressive foreign policy plate.

00:04:33You couldn't do those until you had the Vietnam question settled.

00:04:39The United States seemed hemmed in in Vietnam.

00:04:42We seemed unable to do anything right.

00:04:47But Kissinger recognized that there was a lot of power in taking the initiative.

00:04:51He was willing to take risks and he was able to manufacture opportunities where they did not exist before.

00:05:07Before they came to power, both Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger thought what might be done with China.

00:05:17I think it took the two of them spending time together contemplating the great chessboard of the Cold War

00:05:24to realize that if we can only establish some communications with China,

00:05:30that could be helpful in a number of ways.

00:05:34It could help you with the Vietnam problem, but it could also help you with the Soviets.

00:05:41We had, for the last few decades, assumed that communism was a seamless hold.

00:05:45Well, suddenly not so much.

00:05:47In the late 60s, you started to see friction and then clashes

00:05:50between the Soviets and the Chinese along border areas.

00:05:53And you had people in the intelligence community saying,

00:05:57hey, rather than being on the same team, these guys are in different teams.

00:06:01There's actually a split, which we began to call the Sino-Soviet split.

00:06:06A disputed frontier between the dragon and the bear.

00:06:10A war broke house.

00:06:13A border dispute between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

00:06:17More importantly, there was an ideological battle for leadership of the communist world.

00:06:25This was the setting within which Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger developed,

00:06:32perhaps the boldest ploy in all of Cold War statecraft.

00:06:41Mao's China was probably the most closed country in the world.

00:06:46There were very few people who went in there.

00:06:49So it really was this place on the moon.

00:06:52Nobody really knew what was going on inside.

00:06:56Mao's policies had reduced China to one of the lowest standards of living in the world.

00:07:10I was born in late 1959, 10 years after the communists took over China.

00:07:19Mao was our red sun, was the savior of China.

00:07:23We were schooled on all this anti-Western propaganda.

00:07:30I grew up seeing these famous Korean war movies called Heroic Children.

00:07:36And in it, you see American soldiers played by Chinese actors with fake noses and white powder.

00:07:47And they were incredibly ridiculous creatures who would be mauled down by Chinese machine guns.

00:07:55So that was the very cartoonish picture of Americans that we had in our head.

00:08:05As we came into office, one week after his inauguration...

00:08:09You, Richard, Milhouse, Nixon...

00:08:12Nixon sent a memo to Kissinger and said,

00:08:14get in touch with the Chinese, see what we can do.

00:08:16One week, you can see his priority.

00:08:19This is where the story gets the most cloak and the most dagger.

00:08:25The process of trying to get in touch with Beijing started almost immediately in 1969.

00:08:31But it was extremely difficult because the Chinese were extremely hard to get to.

00:08:37The Chinese had no diplomatic representatives anywhere in the world.

00:08:40Even having an address where you could confidentially and reliably communicate with the Chinese didn't exist.

00:08:49So what they had to do is find discreet intermediaries who could play that role.

00:08:56Of all countries, it turned out to be Pakistan that made the connection happen.

00:09:04Today's highlight is the new ambassador from Pakistan and his family.

00:09:08And what would happen is that the Chinese would send a secret message,

00:09:12which would end up with the Pakistani ambassador in Washington,

00:09:15who would call on Kissinger with the message.

00:09:19In January 1971, we had sent a message, and we hadn't heard back for months.

00:09:25And indeed, we got quite nervous.

00:09:27Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier, were great believers in the subtle approach.

00:09:35And so the faintest of signals were sent out from Beijing

00:09:40to the effect that there might possibly be a conversation worth having.

00:09:49In April of 1971, in Japan, an American ping-pong team was playing in international ping-pong matches.

00:09:58And one of the participants in that was the People's Republic of China.

00:10:04What happened was there was a young, sort of a hippie ping-pong player

00:10:08with long hair and tie-dyed shirts, and he got on the wrong bus.

00:10:12It was the Chinese bus, and met their star player.

00:10:18And they kind of got to be friends.

00:10:22And on the basis of that, I think Zhou Enlai saw a little flash of light.

00:10:29One of the coaches from the People's Republic approached the Americans

00:10:33about the possibility of them coming to China to play exhibition.

00:10:37This was an extraordinary moment, and received incredible coverage in the American media.

00:10:44The first films are now coming out of red China,

00:10:47of the visit by the first U.S. group ever invited by the Chinese communists.

00:10:51The day Premier Zhou Enlai met the visiting players,

00:10:54he told them their visit opens a new door.

00:10:57It was a signal that, yes, there was an opportunity to send an American representative to Beijing.

00:11:07The question was, who would that be?

00:11:10Secrecy was crucial, and that meant that Nixon could only really entrust it

00:11:16to the one person who already knew that this was his cherished goal,

00:11:21and that was Henry Kissinger.

00:11:23I knew nothing about China.

00:11:27That's a great qualification for a secret mission, but it happens to be true.

00:11:31I had the same thought in the 50s that everyone else had did,

00:11:35that the Chinese were revolutionary near-madmen.

00:11:45We had to set up what the cover store would be.

00:11:50So we go on a public trip to four countries.

00:11:56And we stop, of course, in Pakistan.

00:11:59Henry's cover was going to be that he's got a stomachache.

00:12:03Presidential advisor Henry Kissinger is staying an extra day in Pakistan

00:12:06because of an upset stomach.

00:12:09And at 2 a.m. we're driven to the Islamabad airport by the defense minister.

00:12:16The four of us get on the plane.

00:12:20And so here we are flying toward Beijing.

00:12:23None of the world knows where we are.

00:12:26We were exhilarated and anxious.

00:12:27I mean, this was a gamble.

00:12:29This is no sure thing.

00:12:35He landed in a military airport in Beijing.

00:12:38And, of course, we drove in automobiles where the curtains were down.

00:12:43Nobody could see us.

00:12:46Kissinger was deeply impressed by Zhou Enmai, the Chinese premier.

00:12:50And this was one of the great meetings of minds that happened in his career.

00:12:58He was a man of extraordinary intelligence.

00:13:01One of the most intelligent people I've ever met.

00:13:05He had an extraordinarily expressive face.

00:13:08He understood English, though he did not admit it.

00:13:11So his face registered while you talked to him.

00:13:17The driving force was hopes that if we could pull China more into our orbit,

00:13:22we could resolve the Vietnam War.

00:13:26Most of the military equipment going to North Vietnam was coming through China.

00:13:32I remember him telling Zhou Enmai,

00:13:34we don't want to wake up in the morning in the second term

00:13:37reading battlefield reports from Vietnam.

00:13:40One term was enough.

00:13:43The Chinese had two major goals.

00:13:45One was to balance the Soviet Union, which is increasingly threatening them.

00:13:50And the other was coming out of diplomatic isolation.

00:13:54The key issue, of course, we had to get around was the Taiwan issue.

00:13:59And so Kissinger made it clear to the Chinese

00:14:01that the United States would withdraw some of its forces from Taiwan

00:14:05if the Vietnam War came to an end.

00:14:12Toward the end of the talks, it was finally raised

00:14:15that President Nixon would come to China.

00:14:19I think Kissinger did have a recognition something big had happened.

00:14:24After all, he had gotten to the top of China.

00:14:28And he had, in effect, triggered an invitation for Nixon himself.

00:14:37I do remember how jubilant he was when he returned from his secret trip.

00:14:42I had never seen him like that before.

00:14:44He was just vibrating with excitement.

00:14:49Kissinger briefs Nixon, and Nixon schedules a national television speech.

00:14:55Good evening.

00:14:56The secrecy was such that people thought it was about Vietnam.

00:15:00It hit the nation on a Sunday night as a complete surprise.

00:15:05I have taken this action because of my profound conviction

00:15:09that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions

00:15:15and a better relationship between the United States

00:15:19and the People's Republic of China.

00:15:23Details of Henry Kissinger's secret trip, which led to that announcement,

00:15:26were spelled out today in a factual account,

00:15:29which makes most detective story fiction seem bland.

00:15:32Henry, can you just tell us,

00:15:33do you feel encouraged as a result of your trip to Peking?

00:15:37I think we made some progress.

00:15:41The Taiwanese ambassador was visibly upset.

00:15:44I got a 20-minute notice last night.

00:15:48I couldn't believe it.

00:15:50We think that's not the kind of thing a friend and an ally

00:15:53should do to another.

00:16:00Observers may argue over whether Dr. Henry Kissinger

00:16:03is a secret swinger or a square masquerading as one,

00:16:06but there's no doubt he is the deputy president on this trip.

00:16:10The brilliant, elusive intellectual

00:16:12who has structured the substance of the top-level talks

00:16:14will be at the president's side throughout.

00:16:19We heard this official announcement

00:16:21that Nixon was coming to China.

00:16:25I still remember rounds of school briefings

00:16:28to prepare in case you should encounter

00:16:31any Americans on the street.

00:16:34The correct attitude

00:16:36is not too arrogant

00:16:38and not too obsequious.

00:16:43And I remember when Nixon actually landed,

00:16:47somehow I have a sense

00:16:49this was a super important moment

00:16:52that's going to, in some ways,

00:16:55change your life.

00:16:56The first American president ever to do so

00:16:59steps onto Chinese soil.

00:17:07The meetings with Mao Zedong took place

00:17:09in an area adjacent to the Forbidden City

00:17:12called Zhongnanhai,

00:17:13and that's where Mao held court.

00:17:16The fact that Chairman Mao arranged

00:17:17an immediate meeting

00:17:18with the American chief of state

00:17:20in his home

00:17:20is considered significant

00:17:22by diplomatic observers.

00:17:23Just to be there

00:17:25was to be in the most forbidden,

00:17:28inaccessible place on earth.

00:17:30I think it must have been quite exhilarating.

00:17:34It's one of those few experiences

00:17:37you have when you are an adult

00:17:39which have some of the quality

00:17:41of childhood about them

00:17:43that everything is totally new.

00:17:46We were used to these

00:17:48elegant Mandarin discourses

00:17:50by Zhou Enlai.

00:17:51What we got from Mao

00:17:54was laconic phrases,

00:17:56allegories,

00:17:57either that were brilliant

00:17:58and we stupid Westerners

00:18:00couldn't understand

00:18:00or he was slightly senile.

00:18:04Mao was a great performer.

00:18:06He said a Chinese phrase.

00:18:09He said,

00:18:10the wind and rain are coming,

00:18:13so the swallows are busy.

00:18:16Kissinger's reaction was,

00:18:17oh, that was so deep.

00:18:19It would take me several days

00:18:21to fully grasp that.

00:18:23But in fact,

00:18:24there's a very tacky,

00:18:26trite Chinese,

00:18:27you know,

00:18:28sort of saying.

00:18:29Kissinger ate it right up.

00:18:32Joe and Nixon

00:18:33sit down for conversations

00:18:35which last for more than 30 hours.

00:18:37The result

00:18:38is the Shanghai communique.

00:18:40You can see the mastery

00:18:41of Kissinger's diplomacy

00:18:43by looking at what's called

00:18:44the Shanghai communique,

00:18:45which is

00:18:46how do you get around

00:18:47the problem

00:18:48that the United States

00:18:49basically thinks

00:18:49Taiwan is the real China.

00:18:52So what did they do

00:18:53to put the Taiwan question aside?

00:18:56They agreed on this

00:18:57very guileful solution

00:18:59where the United States,

00:19:01there's a word in Chinese,

00:19:03they said it was,

00:19:06we acknowledge,

00:19:07we take note of the fact

00:19:10that China says Taiwan

00:19:12is part of China.

00:19:15It's masterful

00:19:17in its obfuscation

00:19:18and vagueness,

00:19:20but it somehow

00:19:21satisfied everyone.

00:19:25It was a dream come true

00:19:28for Richard Nixon himself

00:19:30and also for Henry Kissinger.

00:19:33This was good news

00:19:36after an unremissing diet

00:19:38of bad news

00:19:39over Vietnam

00:19:40and over Cambodia.

00:19:42It felt as though

00:19:44they were changing

00:19:45the subject

00:19:45of the American conversation.

00:19:48We have witnessed

00:19:50through the miracle

00:19:51of satellite television

00:19:53the sights and sounds

00:19:56of a society

00:19:58that has been closed

00:19:59to Americans

00:20:00for over two decades.

00:20:03Opening to China

00:20:04was maybe

00:20:05in the 20th century

00:20:06the most strategic move

00:20:08that any president

00:20:09has ever made.

00:20:11It was the height

00:20:12of the Cold War.

00:20:13China and the Soviet Union

00:20:15were allies

00:20:16and we peeled off China.

00:20:19It was that simple.

00:20:21I think to see

00:20:23the real politic

00:20:24played out

00:20:25was very sobering.

00:20:28The whole thing

00:20:29was part of a geopolitical game

00:20:31to balance

00:20:32the Soviet Union.

00:20:34Nixon and Kissinger

00:20:36had no interest

00:20:37in helping improve

00:20:40the political situation

00:20:42in China.

00:20:44They had no thoughts,

00:20:46not a iota

00:20:47of thoughts

00:20:48about human rights.

00:20:51At one level,

00:20:52how could I expect

00:20:54anything more?

00:20:56I think it's a mistake

00:20:58to see Kissinger's

00:20:59realpolitik

00:21:00as an absence

00:21:01of morality.

00:21:02What he sees

00:21:04as the moral good

00:21:05is the preservation

00:21:07of American security.

00:21:09Where I think

00:21:10we begin to enter

00:21:12into a moral

00:21:13grey area

00:21:14for Kissinger

00:21:15is what means

00:21:17are acceptable

00:21:18in order to achieve

00:21:19that end.

00:21:20and I think

00:21:21he had

00:21:23very few limits.

00:21:26Every president,

00:21:28every national security

00:21:29advisor

00:21:30takes decisions

00:21:31in which

00:21:32there are priorities

00:21:34accorded to countries

00:21:35and in which

00:21:36evils are ranked

00:21:37not just according

00:21:38to their

00:21:39moral magnitude

00:21:40but more importantly

00:21:42according to their

00:21:43strategic

00:21:44magnitude.

00:21:50The East Pakistan

00:21:53crisis erupted

00:21:55at the time

00:21:57that Pakistan

00:21:58was our only

00:21:59channel of

00:22:00communication

00:22:00to China.

00:22:02We were in the

00:22:03process of

00:22:05arranging

00:22:06my secret trip

00:22:07in the precise

00:22:09period that West

00:22:10Pakistan was trying

00:22:12to put down

00:22:12the uprising

00:22:14in East Pakistan.

00:22:17The partition

00:22:18of British India

00:22:19had produced

00:22:20a strange situation

00:22:21in which there

00:22:22were essentially

00:22:23two parts to

00:22:24Pakistan.

00:22:25What we know

00:22:26today as Pakistan

00:22:28was West Pakistan.

00:22:29What we know

00:22:30today as Bangladesh

00:22:31was East Pakistan.

00:22:34East Pakistan

00:22:35and West Pakistan

00:22:36did not share

00:22:36a language,

00:22:37they did not share

00:22:38culture,

00:22:38they did not share

00:22:39history.

00:22:40It's a complete

00:22:41recipe for conflict.

00:22:44in 1970

00:22:46the residents

00:22:47of East Pakistan

00:22:48voted overwhelmingly

00:22:49for a different

00:22:51government

00:22:51from the West

00:22:52Pakistanis.

00:22:54The eastern

00:22:55portion is beginning

00:22:56to revolt

00:22:57against the authority

00:22:58of the West

00:22:59Pakistani government.

00:23:01It's got its own

00:23:02elected parliament,

00:23:03its own elected

00:23:04leadership,

00:23:05a man named

00:23:06Mujib,

00:23:06and it's on the

00:23:08verge of civil war.

00:23:09and it's on the

00:23:10government.

00:23:11Anybody?

00:23:12Anybody?

00:23:15Yahya Khan

00:23:16is the channel

00:23:17through which

00:23:18Nixon and

00:23:19Kissinger

00:23:19are communicating

00:23:20with China

00:23:21and it's

00:23:22absolutely vital

00:23:23that he remain

00:23:23in power.

00:23:25President Yahya Khan

00:23:26of Pakistan

00:23:27flies to East

00:23:28Pakistan tomorrow

00:23:29to try to talk

00:23:30his opposition

00:23:30into obeying

00:23:31the central

00:23:32government.

00:23:33In Dhaka

00:23:35I was the

00:23:35junior political

00:23:36officer.

00:23:38At 1.26

00:23:40in the morning

00:23:41of the 26th

00:23:42of March

00:23:43all hell

00:23:45broke loose.

00:23:46The West

00:23:47Pakistani military

00:23:48were unleashed

00:23:49with a vengeance.

00:23:51Automatic weapons

00:23:52right outside

00:23:53of our bedroom.

00:23:56The Pakistanis

00:23:58murdered large numbers

00:23:59of the opposition

00:24:01politicians

00:24:01in their beds

00:24:02at night

00:24:03killed their

00:24:04families

00:24:04raked Dhaka

00:24:06the capital

00:24:07of East

00:24:08Pakistan

00:24:08with artillery

00:24:10wantonly

00:24:11killing

00:24:11innocent civilians.

00:24:14The Pakistani

00:24:15army

00:24:16went into

00:24:17Dhaka University

00:24:18and just

00:24:20rounded up

00:24:20academics

00:24:21including

00:24:22my uncles

00:24:23and disappeared

00:24:24them.

00:24:26I mean

00:24:27what was

00:24:27happening

00:24:28was

00:24:28genocide

00:24:29before our

00:24:30very eyes.

00:24:32we are in the

00:24:33process of

00:24:34attempting to

00:24:35negotiate a

00:24:36ceasefire

00:24:36in the

00:24:37Dhaka area

00:24:37in order to

00:24:39be able to

00:24:39evacuate the

00:24:40Americans.

00:24:41The Nixon

00:24:42administration

00:24:43had lots of

00:24:45information

00:24:45about what's

00:24:46happening.

00:24:47They're getting

00:24:48real-time

00:24:48reporting from

00:24:50the U.S.

00:24:51consulate

00:24:51in Dhaka.

00:24:53These foreign

00:24:54service officers

00:24:55have seen that

00:24:55kind of violence

00:24:56before and

00:24:57they're saying

00:24:57this is in a

00:24:58completely

00:24:59different category.

00:25:01We've never

00:25:02seen anything

00:25:03like this.

00:25:05There's enormous

00:25:07pressure on

00:25:08Nixon and

00:25:08Kissinger to

00:25:09cut aid and

00:25:11military support

00:25:12for Pakistan

00:25:13but they choose

00:25:15not to do

00:25:15that.

00:25:16We were

00:25:17absolutely

00:25:18mortified that

00:25:19our government

00:25:20was not

00:25:20responding in

00:25:22what was a

00:25:23humanitarian

00:25:25disaster inflicted

00:25:26by a government

00:25:27that we

00:25:27supported.

00:25:28So a number

00:25:30of us,

00:25:30especially younger

00:25:31officers,

00:25:32felt that we

00:25:32needed to

00:25:33send in an

00:25:34expression of

00:25:35dissent.

00:25:37Our government

00:25:38has failed to

00:25:39denounce the

00:25:39suppression of

00:25:40democracy.

00:25:41Our government

00:25:42has failed to

00:25:43denounce atrocities.

00:25:45Our government

00:25:46has evidenced

00:25:47what many will

00:25:48consider moral

00:25:50bankruptcy.

00:25:51We've been

00:25:52in touch of course

00:25:53with the Pakistanis

00:25:54through messages

00:25:54that were sent

00:25:55to President

00:25:56Yahya.

00:25:57And incidentally,

00:25:58he's been very

00:25:58forthcoming.

00:25:59We can't be

00:26:00blamed for.

00:26:01There are many

00:26:01areas in the

00:26:02world that we

00:26:04just can't,

00:26:05we can't be

00:26:06responsible for.

00:26:08I was shocked

00:26:09by the lack of

00:26:10reaction from

00:26:11Kissinger and

00:26:12Nixon.

00:26:13They seemed

00:26:16unaffected by

00:26:17it, except in

00:26:19the sense that

00:26:20they wanted it

00:26:21to go away.

00:26:23As far as

00:26:24Kissinger was

00:26:24concerned, these

00:26:26lives in South

00:26:27Asia, they just

00:26:28didn't matter.

00:26:31We've never

00:26:31covered the bodies

00:26:32of my uncles.

00:26:35There could have

00:26:36been an arms

00:26:37cutoff, there

00:26:38could have been

00:26:38stronger measures

00:26:39taken against

00:26:40Pakistan, which

00:26:41were not taken.

00:26:44Ultimately, it

00:26:45comes down to

00:26:45Kissinger's

00:26:46assessment that

00:26:48what matters is

00:26:48China, and

00:26:51what happens in

00:26:52East Pakistan is

00:26:53almost a footnote

00:26:54relative to these

00:26:55larger objectives.

00:26:58There are

00:26:59governments in

00:27:00power that may

00:27:02not meet all our

00:27:04criteria for

00:27:04democratic principles,

00:27:06but the

00:27:07alternative to

00:27:08which are likely

00:27:09to be positively

00:27:10hostile to our

00:27:11interests, to

00:27:12manipulate the

00:27:14domestic politics of

00:27:15another country, is

00:27:16always an extremely

00:27:18complicated matter.

00:27:20And you can start

00:27:21a process which you

00:27:22cannot control, and

00:27:24you may not know

00:27:24how to do it.

00:27:30My first encounter

00:27:31with the great man

00:27:33was when there was

00:27:36a luncheon at our

00:27:37residence.

00:27:39My father was

00:27:40running a first

00:27:40minister, and in

00:27:42this luncheon, there

00:27:43was a big debate,

00:27:45and Kissinger says,

00:27:47look, I don't care

00:27:48about Latin America.

00:27:49I don't care about

00:27:51your development.

00:27:52History doesn't go

00:27:54through the South.

00:27:55History comes from

00:27:56Russia to Japan to

00:27:59Europe and to the

00:27:59United States.

00:28:00The South has no

00:28:01importance.

00:28:07Kissinger called

00:28:08Chile a dagger pointed

00:28:10at the heart of

00:28:10Antarctica.

00:28:11He did not think that

00:28:13Latin America was

00:28:14important.

00:28:15He, in fact, said

00:28:16Latin America is not

00:28:17important.

00:28:18Chile was probably the

00:28:20country that first had

00:28:22a stable democracy in the

00:28:23region.

00:28:24We had a democracy even

00:28:26before some European

00:28:27countries.

00:28:29Salvador Allende was a

00:28:30person who had

00:28:31represented the hopes of

00:28:34the poor in Chile for

00:28:35decades.

00:28:36And poor people felt that

00:28:38he was their leader.

00:28:41Allende was head of the

00:28:43Socialist Party.

00:28:44He believed in the need

00:28:46for social change,

00:28:48redistribution of wealth,

00:28:49and that this could be

00:28:50done through the ballot

00:28:51box.

00:28:52There is a sense in

00:28:54Kissinger that Allende's

00:28:56example could proliferate

00:28:58all over the continent.

00:29:00And he considers that one

00:29:02must stop the contagion.

00:29:05Allende made no secret of

00:29:08his determination to bring

00:29:11about a revolutionary

00:29:12transformation.

00:29:14Nobody wanted another

00:29:15Cuba.

00:29:16And so when any left-wing

00:29:18leader showed signs of

00:29:19coming to power in a Latin

00:29:21American country, the red

00:29:24lights started flashing on

00:29:26the dashboard in the

00:29:27situation room.

00:29:30In the Cold War, every inch of

00:29:33territory matters.

00:29:35It's a zero-sum game.

00:29:37Any victory for the

00:29:39communists is a loss for the

00:29:41United States.

00:29:43And so all eyes were on

00:29:45Chile on September 4, 1970,

00:29:48as this election took place.

00:29:57The presidential election in

00:29:59Chile in 1970 is a three-way

00:30:01race in which Salvador Allende

00:30:04wins 36.6% of the vote.

00:30:09But this must be ratified by

00:30:10Congress.

00:30:12So there is a chance for

00:30:13those who are against Allende

00:30:15to try to find a way to stop

00:30:17Allende from becoming president.

00:30:21Kissinger talks to CIA director

00:30:23Richard Helms on the phone and

00:30:24basically says, we cannot let

00:30:26Chile go down the drain.

00:30:27And Helms says, I'm with you.

00:30:29And they start to plot out how

00:30:32they are going to keep Allende

00:30:33from actually being inaugurated

00:30:35as president.

00:30:37Allende!

00:30:39Allende!

00:30:40Kissinger says, I don't see why

00:30:42we should let a country go

00:30:43communist just because of the

00:30:44irresponsibility of its own

00:30:46people.

00:30:50President Nixon called in to

00:30:52Richard Helms and Kissinger to

00:30:54the Oval Office, and Helms took

00:30:56handwritten notes on Nixon's

00:30:58orders.

00:30:59Save Chile.

00:31:00Don't tell the ambassador.

00:31:02Make the economy scream.

00:31:0448-hour game plan.

00:31:06Nixon authorizes two tracks,

00:31:09and then Kissinger carries these

00:31:10out.

00:31:11Track one is essentially an

00:31:13attempt to bribe the Chilean

00:31:15members of Congress from

00:31:16ratifying Allende.

00:31:18Track two is what becomes

00:31:20infamous.

00:31:21It is an effort to help the

00:31:24Chilean military institute a coup

00:31:26against Allende.

00:31:29The Chilean consultants that the

00:31:32CIA had and Kissinger had at the

00:31:36time recommended the kidnapping

00:31:38of the commander-in-chief of the

00:31:40armed forces.

00:31:42That meant General Schneider.

00:31:45General René Schneider, head of

00:31:47the Chilean armed forces, was

00:31:49pro-constitution.

00:31:50He was the principal obstacle to

00:31:52any coup plot involving the

00:31:54military.

00:31:55And so he had to be removed,

00:31:58neutralized, eliminated.

00:32:02They sent machine guns through the

00:32:03pouch of the American embassy and

00:32:06and $30,000 for the general who was

00:32:08in charge of the Santiago.

00:32:13On October 22nd, General Schneider

00:32:15got into his car.

00:32:17The car drove three or four blocks.

00:32:19It was intercepted by several other

00:32:22vehicles filled with thugs.

00:32:25One thug got out with a sledgehammer

00:32:27and started smashing in the windows.

00:32:30General Schneider had a gun and he

00:32:33tried to defend himself and they killed

00:32:35him.

00:32:36Henry Kissinger gets on the phone with

00:32:39Richard Nixon as General René

00:32:41Schneider lies dying in a military

00:32:44hospital.

00:32:45And he says, the first step of the coup

00:32:48plot took place, but such an

00:32:49incompetent bunch, these Chilean

00:32:51military officers, that the rest of

00:32:53the plot is not going forward.

00:33:00The shock that this murder produced in

00:33:04China society, instead of weakening

00:33:07Allende, gave an enormous strength to

00:33:10the election of Allende.

00:33:13Allende, therefore, was proclaimed

00:33:15president ten days later.

00:33:19Kissinger does not give up.

00:33:21He wants Allende out of there.

00:33:24So there's an American effort to

00:33:26undermine his government.

00:33:28And that includes cutting off loans

00:33:31and aid, funding opposition parties,

00:33:35opposition media, and fomenting

00:33:37strikes.

00:33:39The first thing that Nixon said after

00:33:41the election of Allende was, make the

00:33:44economy scream.

00:33:45In fact, the economy screamed.

00:33:48A country becomes tense, becomes

00:33:51polarized, and then you have a society

00:33:53which was a healthy society in

00:33:55political terms, that becomes

00:33:58absolutely out of control.

00:34:02Army, Navy, Air Force, and National

00:34:05Police stage the coup that ends 46

00:34:07years of democratic rule in Chile.

00:34:10The military moves in.

00:34:11The palace is surrounded.

00:34:14September 11, 1973, the Chilean

00:34:18military undertook a very violent

00:34:20coup.

00:34:21They launched rocket attacks

00:34:23bombarding the Moneda palace.

00:34:35Allende was there in the presidential palace.

00:34:37Ele começou a falar no rádio

00:34:40Viva aqui! Viva aqui!

00:34:43Ele persuadiu o resto dos pessoas que estavam dentro de casa

00:34:46de deixar o palácio

00:34:49Quando eles estavam deixando o palácio

00:34:50um dos docentes de Allende

00:34:52decidiu que ele voltaria

00:34:54para onde estava o presidencial

00:34:57e ele viu a Allende

00:34:59sentindo com a arma de máquina aqui

00:35:01e ele se encontrou.

00:35:06Não há evidência de que ele não sabia

00:35:10que ele se encontrou no rádio

00:35:10que ele não sabia de que ele tinha um tempo

00:35:12de que ele não sabia de que ele esteja

00:35:13e que ele não sabia de que ele toque.

00:35:16Mas eles estavam felizes

00:35:17que a Allende estava descoberto

00:35:19e que eles colocaram o apoio da Pinochet.

00:35:24Augusto Pinochet

00:35:25foi o comandante-in-chief do governo

00:35:27no momento que o problema aconteceu.

00:35:29Viva, Reginaldo Olinda!

00:35:32Pinochet chegou tarde para a conspiração para organizar um coup.

00:35:37E para persuadir aqueles que estavam, desde o primeiro momento, em favor da coup,

00:35:43ele tinha que ser mais brutal do que eles quando ele tomou o poder.

00:35:50Pinochet começou a se juntar leftistas e suspeitos subversivos,

00:35:55criaram-se em uma série de centros de detenção, incluindo o Estadio Nacional Nacional de Estadio,

00:36:01e começou o processo de executar muitos deles.

00:36:06Muitos foram torturados por informação,

00:36:08muitos outros foram torturados simplesmente por o purpose de instalar a população do Chile com medo.

00:36:16Houve milhares de pessoas mortas, milhares de pessoas torturadas,

00:36:20milhares de pessoas que tinham que viver para o mundo inteiro.

00:36:22I would say that it is incomparable to any other event in our history.

00:36:30After the coup, Nixon seems preoccupied that the United States might be exposed.

00:36:36And Kissinger says, we didn't do it.

00:36:38I mean, we helped them, quote,

00:36:40create the conditions as best as possible.

00:36:46You would think that as a refugee from Nazi Germany,

00:36:49that Kissinger would be deeply committed to democracy.

00:36:53But he seemed to think that it was not a problem at all

00:36:56to have dictators be on the side of the U.S.

00:36:58in the struggle against communism.

00:37:00And in cases like Chile,

00:37:02he was clearly willing to subvert democracy.

00:37:06The argument that Kissinger makes

00:37:08is that everything that he is doing

00:37:10is in the service of the best outcome for the world.

00:37:13He's thinking about the global chessboard.

00:37:16And the fact that there are going to be people

00:37:18suffering, dying on the ground,

00:37:20that to him is a necessary consequence

00:37:23of pursuing policies that are going to result in global stability.

00:37:38The Soviet Union, at the beginning of the Nixon administration,

00:37:43had good reason to think that they were winning the Cold War.

00:37:46The United States was bogged down in Vietnam,

00:37:50but that wasn't its only problem.

00:37:52With every passing year,

00:37:55the Soviets built more nuclear weapons

00:37:57until they achieved parity

00:37:59and then overtook the United States

00:38:01in terms of the size of their nuclear arsenal.

00:38:05From 1945, from Hiroshima,

00:38:08until the early 70s,

00:38:11it's a breakneck race to build more nuclear weapons.

00:38:14This was a very unstable situation,

00:38:16and there was no obvious end to it.

00:38:20When the decision of peace and war

00:38:22involves the survival of tens of millions of people,

00:38:25you're no longer playing power politics

00:38:27in the traditional sense.

00:38:29To conduct confrontation politics

00:38:32when the stakes are going to be determined by nuclear weapons

00:38:35is the height of irresponsibility.

00:38:38This is what we mean by detente.

00:38:41Detente is a French word

00:38:43that really just meant improving relations.

00:38:47It was about buying some time,

00:38:50reducing the risk of World War III,

00:38:53and trying to recover from what was becoming

00:38:56the insolvable problem of Vietnam.

00:39:02Kissinger definitely saw a role for the Soviet Union

00:39:05in the resolution of Vietnam,

00:39:07and he is very clear

00:39:11that he's interested in getting help from them

00:39:14in bringing this to a close.

00:39:17Kissinger would creatively suggest

00:39:19the possibility of a summit meeting,

00:39:21and the Soviets would say,

00:39:23niet.

00:39:25This changed with the opening to China.

00:39:30When we opened to China,

00:39:32the Soviets suddenly realized

00:39:34that we had to pick a canvas to paint on

00:39:37than they had calculated,

00:39:39and in that sense there was leverage.

00:39:43The Soviets who are looking at the world stage

00:39:45are saying, wait a minute,

00:39:46we've just been outflanked,

00:39:49and if we don't get into talks with the Americans

00:39:52and strike a deal

00:39:53that makes us an equal superpower,

00:39:57the Chinese are going to replace us.

00:39:59Good evening.

00:40:01President Nixon has announced

00:40:02that he'll be going to Moscow next May

00:40:04for a summit conference with Soviet leaders.

00:40:06It will be the first trip to the Soviet Union

00:40:09by an American president

00:40:10since Franklin Roosevelt journeyed to Yalta

00:40:12in the waning days of World War II.

00:40:17Kissinger and Nixon accepted an invitation

00:40:20to stay in the Kremlin.

00:40:23I mean, whether you as president of the United States

00:40:26would have wanted everything you did

00:40:28in your guest room bugged and photographed,

00:40:31I don't know,

00:40:32but that's what Henry agreed to do.

00:40:36So they stayed in the Kremlin.

00:40:40The Soviet leadership had installed Leonid Brezhnev,

00:40:44not the sharpest knife in the drawer intellectually,

00:40:46let's put it that way.

00:40:48Brezhnev is a classic Communist Party apparatus

00:40:51who's risen to the top

00:40:53by being very careful

00:40:55at playing all sides against each other.

00:40:59He's not a thug.

00:41:01He's not very far from a thug.

00:41:09The most surreal moment in their relationship

00:41:12must have been

00:41:13when Brezhnev treated Kissinger

00:41:15to a visit to his hunting lodge.

00:41:20Henry Kissinger was not the kind of person

00:41:23who goes shooting wild boar

00:41:25as a recreational pastime.

00:41:28They put out the food.

00:41:30You sit in the tower

00:41:31and shoot the poor bastards

00:41:32as they come by to feed.

00:41:35When he got chilled about

00:41:36three poars a gun out for the house,

00:41:40he unpacked the picnic

00:41:41and said,

00:41:42look, I'm going to talk to you privately.

00:41:44And he said,

00:41:45look, you would be a partner.

00:41:46You would be a good enough to work.

00:41:49I participated in a meeting with Brezhnev

00:41:51at his dacha.

00:41:52It was an evening devoted to Vietnam.

00:41:56The meeting was just three

00:41:57or four top Soviet leaders,

00:41:59including Brezhnev,

00:42:00took turns lambasting Nixon

00:42:02about his Vietnam policy,

00:42:05all of which was to show Hanoi

00:42:07how tough they were.

00:42:09And we met for four hours.

00:42:11And I remember Nixon

00:42:12leaning over to Kissinger saying,

00:42:14you know, Jesus Christ,

00:42:15we've got to get out of here.

00:42:16At that point, Brezhnev says,

00:42:18well, now we're going upstairs for dinner.

00:42:23The whole mood changed.

00:42:25Everyone got half drunk.

00:42:27And then toward the end of that dinner,

00:42:29President says to Nixon,

00:42:31I think Kissinger should go off

00:42:32and negotiate with my people

00:42:33on the SALT agreement.

00:42:37SALT was the first treaty

00:42:40ever negotiated

00:42:41to limit the growth

00:42:43of what were euphemistically called

00:42:46strategic arms.

00:42:51We go back to Moscow.

00:42:53We needed a Xerox assault treaty

00:42:55because it was being signed.

00:42:57And suddenly the Xerox machine

00:43:00wouldn't work anymore.

00:43:01And so Henry goes to the Xerox machine.

00:43:04He grabs the treaty.

00:43:05He holds it up to the chandelier.

00:43:08And he says, General Antonov.

00:43:10Antonov was our KGB minder.

00:43:11He said, General Antonov,

00:43:13can I have six copies of this, please?

00:43:19SALT 1 was signed.

00:43:21One of the results

00:43:22was the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,

00:43:24an agreement to shell

00:43:25the elaborate and expensive

00:43:27anti-ballistic missile apparatus

00:43:28in the US and the Soviet Union.

00:43:31The first SALT agreement

00:43:34was not a trivial achievement.

00:43:36Of course, it didn't stop the Soviets

00:43:39building nuclear warheads.

00:43:41But I think from Kissinger's point of view,

00:43:44you created a new basis

00:43:46for the relationship

00:43:47and you'd at least created

00:43:49a mode within which

00:43:51arms limitation

00:43:52could be achieved.

00:43:56The psychological impact

00:43:58was powerful.

00:44:00Powerful because

00:44:01we're acknowledging

00:44:03we're vulnerable to each other

00:44:04and we're saying,

00:44:05hey, this is crazy

00:44:07to keep spending money this way

00:44:09and threatening each other.

00:44:12My recollection is

00:44:13they let Nixon go

00:44:14on Soviet television,

00:44:16which was unheard of.

00:44:18We couldn't believe it.

00:44:33The SALT agreement

00:44:35at the time

00:44:35was seen almost

00:44:36as the end of the Cold War.

00:44:38To many Americans,

00:44:40the idea that the Soviets

00:44:41and the Americans

00:44:42could actually meet

00:44:43and negotiate

00:44:44about their arms

00:44:45signaled that

00:44:47we were not headed

00:44:48toward nuclear destruction.

00:44:51What it really did

00:44:52was establish

00:44:53a relationship of trust.

00:44:54They weren't two enemies

00:44:56on either sides

00:44:58of the barricades anymore.

00:45:01But detente did not

00:45:03end the Vietnam War.

00:45:04The Vietnamese Communist Party

00:45:06was not going to abandon

00:45:07the idea of reunifying Vietnam

00:45:10simply because

00:45:11Moscow said so.

00:45:12I think Nixon and Kissinger

00:45:14and a lot of other people

00:45:15saw the North Vietnamese

00:45:17as being linked to

00:45:19and run by

00:45:20the Russians

00:45:20and the Chinese

00:45:21and they weren't.

00:45:22They were running

00:45:23the war themselves

00:45:24for their own

00:45:25national mission.

00:45:32This was the 17th

00:45:33private meeting

00:45:34and the fourth time

00:45:35in the last two months

00:45:36that Kissinger

00:45:37is met secretly

00:45:38with Lei Duk-Tou

00:45:39and Zuan Hui.

00:45:40He left the meeting

00:45:41grim-faced and solemn

00:45:42without answering questions,

00:45:44giving no indication

00:45:45of what happened inside.

00:45:47The pace of negotiation

00:45:49with the North Vietnamese

00:45:51picked up in 1971-72.

00:45:55A big question

00:45:57was what exactly

00:45:58Kissinger was playing for.

00:46:00Was he playing for

00:46:02the long-term survival

00:46:05of South Vietnam

00:46:06or was he playing

00:46:08for a decent interval,

00:46:10a respectable amount

00:46:11of time

00:46:12that South Vietnam

00:46:13would survive

00:46:14long enough

00:46:16for, say,

00:46:18Richard Nixon

00:46:19to get re-elected?

00:46:21Mr. Nixon

00:46:22is running

00:46:23for a second term,

00:46:24but as he does,

00:46:25what happens in the war

00:46:26is his responsibility.

00:46:30Nixon and Kissinger

00:46:32could sometimes sound

00:46:33as if they were focused

00:46:34on getting through

00:46:35the 72 election

00:46:37and after that,

00:46:37the fate of South Vietnam

00:46:38would really not

00:46:40be their problem.

00:46:42If you read

00:46:43some of the tapes,

00:46:44there's one place

00:46:45where Nixon and Kissinger

00:46:46are talking

00:46:47and Kissinger says

00:46:48to Nixon,

00:46:49well, Mr. President,

00:46:50if Saigon collapses

00:46:51before the election,

00:46:52you really have a problem,

00:46:54but if it collapses afterwards,

00:46:56it doesn't really matter.

00:46:58The question is now

00:46:59how can we maneuver it

00:47:01so that it can look like

00:47:02a settlement

00:47:03by election day,

00:47:04but if the process

00:47:05is still open,

00:47:07we can get better

00:47:09and we can screw them

00:47:10after election day

00:47:11if necessary.

00:47:14The North Vietnamese

00:47:15worried about Nixon

00:47:16getting re-elected.

00:47:17Their latest offensive

00:47:18had been blunted

00:47:19by our military response.

00:47:22They thought Nixon

00:47:23might be anxious

00:47:24for a settlement

00:47:25before the election.

00:47:27The breakthrough came

00:47:28in early October

00:47:29when Le Docto handed us

00:47:31a counter-proposal

00:47:32which essentially

00:47:33left the South Vietnamese

00:47:34government in place.

00:47:37As soon as Le Docto

00:47:39read out his proposal

00:47:40to us,

00:47:41we called for a break

00:47:42in the negotiations.

00:47:44Then Henry and I

00:47:45went outside

00:47:46in the Paris garden

00:47:47and we shook hands

00:47:49and smiled at each other

00:47:50and said,

00:47:50we've done it.

00:47:53Kissinger was overjoyed

00:47:55and he was absolutely convinced

00:47:57that the October agreement

00:47:58was a real achievement

00:47:59for American diplomacy.

00:48:03Kissinger went back

00:48:04to Washington

00:48:05and on the 26th of October

00:48:07had a famous press conference

00:48:09where he said peace

00:48:10was at hand.

00:48:12Months of secret meetings,

00:48:14days of persistent rumors

00:48:15reached their climax

00:48:17as presidential advisor

00:48:18Henry Kissinger

00:48:19met with reporters.

00:48:21We believe

00:48:23that peace

00:48:24is at hand.

00:48:27What he overlooked,

00:48:28of course,

00:48:29was whether he could

00:48:30get the South Vietnamese

00:48:31to agree.

00:48:33Henry and I

00:48:34were quite optimistic

00:48:35that with some nudging

00:48:37and reassurance

00:48:38about support

00:48:38in the future

00:48:39that President Thieu

00:48:41would be so pleased

00:48:42that we'd get him aboard.

00:48:44But we went in there

00:48:45and we ran into

00:48:46a buzzsaw.

00:48:46The Saigon government

00:48:48controlled radio

00:48:50says any separate agreement

00:48:51between North Vietnam

00:48:52and the United States

00:48:53were not concerned

00:48:54South Vietnam

00:48:55in any way.

00:48:57There were about

00:48:58100,000 North Vietnamese troops

00:49:00in South Vietnam

00:49:01at the time

00:49:02and the South Vietnamese

00:49:04government wanted them out.

00:49:06But the agreement

00:49:07did not insist

00:49:09that North Vietnamese troops

00:49:10withdraw from South Vietnam.

00:49:13The South Vietnamese

00:49:14government blows up.

00:49:15that they're absolutely furious

00:49:17and they make that clear

00:49:19immediately

00:49:20that this is

00:49:22completely unacceptable,

00:49:23it's a sellout.

00:49:25We excluded them entirely

00:49:27from the negotiation

00:49:29of their own fate.

00:49:31I mean,

00:49:31this is a negotiation

00:49:32about the future

00:49:33of South Vietnam.

00:49:34Henry Kissinger

00:49:35confirming Radio Hanoi's

00:49:36claim that October 31st

00:49:38had been tentatively

00:49:39agreed upon

00:49:39as the date for signing

00:49:40of Vietnam ceased fire.

00:49:42But Kissinger went on

00:49:43to say Saigon's

00:49:44President Thieu

00:49:45declined to go along

00:49:45until more guarantees

00:49:46were given.

00:49:48I think he believed

00:49:50that we had such leverage

00:49:52on the South Vietnamese

00:49:53and that they didn't

00:49:54really have a choice.

00:50:00Richard Nixon,

00:50:01re-elected president

00:50:02by one of the largest

00:50:03margins in history.

00:50:05The mandate he sought,

00:50:07he got.

00:50:10after the election,

00:50:11we re-engaged

00:50:12the North Vietnamese

00:50:13in negotiations

00:50:15and not only

00:50:16did we not make progress,

00:50:18but they began

00:50:18to slip back

00:50:20on some of the

00:50:20concessions they'd made.

00:50:22I was extremely depressed

00:50:24because things had reached

00:50:25a point where we were

00:50:27so close to a settlement

00:50:28and the thing

00:50:28blew up again.

00:50:29I want Hanoi

00:50:31that we would do something.

00:50:32I didn't tell them what

00:50:33because I didn't know

00:50:34what we were going to do.

00:50:36Kissinger said repeatedly,

00:50:38this raggedy-ass

00:50:39fourth-rate country

00:50:40has a breaking point.

00:50:41I'm going to find it.

00:50:43Nixon was of the view

00:50:45that something shocking

00:50:47had to be done.

00:50:49And I think Nixon

00:50:50turned out to be right.

00:50:56Nixon and Kissinger

00:50:57decide on a massive

00:50:59bombing campaign,

00:51:01the so-called

00:51:01Christmas bombing.

00:51:08North Vietnam

00:51:09has gone through

00:51:10another day

00:51:10of the most intense

00:51:11bombing in the history

00:51:12of the Indochina War.

00:51:14North Vietnamese

00:51:15officials claim

00:51:16that thousands

00:51:16of civilians

00:51:17have been killed

00:51:18or wounded

00:51:18and that large sections

00:51:19of Hanoi

00:51:20have been wiped out.

00:51:22The Christmas bombing

00:51:25inflicted

00:51:25tremendous damage

00:51:27not only to their soldiers

00:51:28but to civilians.

00:51:30It was just inflicting

00:51:31as much damage

00:51:32as you could.

00:51:34A lot of people said,

00:51:35oh, this is heartless

00:51:37and lots of innocent

00:51:38people were killed.

00:51:39Now, I'm sure

00:51:40there was some

00:51:41collateral damage

00:51:42but basically

00:51:43we did hit military targets.

00:51:49Kissinger believed

00:51:50the Christmas bombings

00:51:51actually drove Hanoi

00:51:52back to the bargaining table.

00:51:55Good morning from New York.

00:51:56Peace is not only at hand,

00:51:58it is here.

00:51:59There's to be issued

00:52:00a new order

00:52:01on the sea spire

00:52:03which is to go into effect

00:52:05roughly 36 hours

00:52:08from now

00:52:08and which we hope

00:52:10and expect

00:52:12will be implemented

00:52:13fully.

00:52:16The Paris agreement

00:52:17to end the war

00:52:18and restore the peace

00:52:19failed to do either.

00:52:21It did not end the war,

00:52:22it did not end the fighting,

00:52:23and it did not bring about

00:52:24peace and stability

00:52:25to Vietnam.

00:52:27All that it achieved

00:52:29was allowing

00:52:30the United States

00:52:31to withdraw militarily

00:52:32from Vietnam.

00:52:34Kissinger knew full well

00:52:36that the fighting

00:52:37would resume

00:52:38even before the ink

00:52:40would dry

00:52:41on the piece of paper.

00:52:44Nixon and Kissinger

00:52:44definitely knew

00:52:45the deal they signed

00:52:46in January 1973

00:52:48would condemn

00:52:50South Vietnam

00:52:51to eventual defeat.

00:53:03Ladies and gentlemen,

00:53:05the President

00:53:05of the United States.

00:53:10We stand

00:53:12on the threshold

00:53:13of a new era

00:53:15of peace

00:53:16in the world.

00:53:191972

00:53:20was the landslide victory,

00:53:22but Watergate,

00:53:24of course,

00:53:25begins to sink Nixon

00:53:26despite the massive

00:53:27re-election

00:53:28and begins to erode

00:53:31that landslide support

00:53:32almost immediately.

00:53:35There's this

00:53:36tick-tick-ticking

00:53:38coming from closets

00:53:40in file cabinets

00:53:41in the White House

00:53:42because a bunch

00:53:44of ding-dongs

00:53:45had been caught

00:53:46burglarizing the Democratic

00:53:47National Committee

00:53:48headquarters.

00:53:48The Watergate

00:53:50bugging case

00:53:50involves a bizarre

00:53:52break-in

00:53:53at Democratic Party

00:53:54headquarters

00:53:54in which two men

00:53:55connected with the

00:53:56Nixon re-election

00:53:57campaign

00:53:58were arrested.

00:54:00From that point on,

00:54:02everything else

00:54:02goes on backburners

00:54:04while Nixon

00:54:05focuses almost exclusively

00:54:06on dealing

00:54:08with this threat

00:54:10to his presidency.

00:54:12When he came

00:54:13under attack

00:54:14for Watergate,

00:54:15Richard Nixon

00:54:16hoped that his

00:54:17way out

00:54:18was yet more

00:54:19foreign policy

00:54:20success.

00:54:21And if Kissinger

00:54:22could deliver success,

00:54:24somehow Nixon

00:54:25could extricate himself

00:54:27from the scandal.

00:54:29This was the moment

00:54:30when Nixon decides

00:54:32to appoint Kissinger

00:54:33to Secretary of State.

00:54:35The Senate today

00:54:36approved the nomination

00:54:37of Henry Kissinger

00:54:38as Secretary of State,

00:54:39so a country boy

00:54:41from Firth, Germany,

00:54:42becomes the first

00:54:43American Secretary of State

00:54:44ever born

00:54:45in another country.

00:54:47The time I became

00:54:48Secretary of State,

00:54:50the executive authority

00:54:51of the president

00:54:51was eroding

00:54:53at an alarming rate.

00:54:55One of my jobs

00:54:56was to give the impression

00:54:57that we were capable

00:54:58of a purposeful

00:55:00foreign policy

00:55:00in this miasma

00:55:02of a president

00:55:03who was on the verge

00:55:04of being indicted

00:55:05or impeached.

00:55:08If you're going

00:55:08to have a crisis

00:55:09in which you face

00:55:11the possibility

00:55:11of impeachment,

00:55:13Kissinger is

00:55:14the one firm thing.

00:55:15He becomes

00:55:17the indispensable man.

00:55:20October 6, 1973,

00:55:22a surprise attack

00:55:24on the holiest of days.

00:55:27With the outbreak

00:55:28of the Yom Kippur War,

00:55:30Kissinger faced

00:55:31the most complex problem

00:55:33of his career.

00:55:37The Yom Kippur War

00:55:39began with an attack

00:55:41by the Egyptian army

00:55:43crossing the Suez Canal

00:55:44and the Syrian army

00:55:45attacking in the Golan Heights.

00:55:48The Israelis

00:55:49had an inkling

00:55:50that something

00:55:51might occur,

00:55:52but they did not realize

00:55:54how effective

00:55:55the Egyptian

00:55:55and Syrian

00:55:56assaults would be.

00:55:596.30 on October 6,

00:56:021973,

00:56:03my assistant secretary

00:56:06woke me up

00:56:07and said there's

00:56:07some trouble

00:56:08on the Suez Canal.

00:56:10And if you get

00:56:11on the phone

00:56:12right away,

00:56:12you can get it

00:56:13under control.

00:56:15We're in the situation

00:56:17room with the

00:56:18Secretary of Defense

00:56:19and the Director of CIA

00:56:20and everybody's

00:56:21wringing their hands,

00:56:23including me

00:56:23in the back bench.

00:56:25Henry,

00:56:26sharing the meeting,

00:56:27says,

00:56:27there's an opportunity

00:56:29here.

00:56:30Henry always was

00:56:31looking for the opportunity.

00:56:33He immediately

00:56:35saw that

00:56:35we could use this

00:56:36if we'd play

00:56:37our cards right

00:56:38to begin negotiations

00:56:39between Israel

00:56:41and some of its neighbors

00:56:42and also to begin

00:56:43to displace

00:56:44Soviet influence

00:56:45in that region.

00:56:51There was panic

00:56:52inside the Israeli government.

00:56:54The Israelis

00:56:55were running

00:56:55short of ammunition,

00:56:57and so they

00:56:58appealed desperately

00:56:59for resupply

00:57:00from the United States.

00:57:03Kissinger wanted

00:57:04to ensure

00:57:04that Israel

00:57:06got the upper hand.

00:57:09We were trying

00:57:10to prevent

00:57:10military victory

00:57:12achieved by Soviet arms.

00:57:14So we started

00:57:16an airlift

00:57:16and put in

00:57:17overwhelming

00:57:18amounts of arms.

00:57:21Now,

00:57:22the counteroffensive

00:57:23has begun.

00:57:25Israelis claim

00:57:26to have knocked out

00:57:27most of the bridges

00:57:28the Egyptians

00:57:28laid across the canal.

00:57:30By the middle

00:57:31of October,

00:57:32the momentum

00:57:33had shifted

00:57:34in favor of Israel.

00:57:38The Israelis

00:57:39had struck back

00:57:40and they had surrounded

00:57:41the Egyptian army.

00:57:43Kissinger knew

00:57:44that if we could

00:57:45freeze that moment,

00:57:47you might have

00:57:47a psychological impetus

00:57:49on both sides

00:57:50to finally talk

00:57:51to each other.

00:57:53Kissinger said

00:57:54to the Israelis,

00:57:54you're in a very

00:57:56strong position

00:57:57right now,

00:57:58but don't overdo it.

00:58:00Take your win

00:58:01and then

00:58:02we get serious

00:58:03about the diplomacy.

00:58:06Kissinger gets

00:58:07a ceasefire

00:58:08just in time

00:58:10for the Egyptian position

00:58:12not to collapse.

00:58:13He can then

00:58:14embark on a negotiation.

00:58:20You get this phenomenon

00:58:22that becomes known

00:58:23as shuttle diplomacy.

00:58:26Kissinger is going

00:58:27back and forth

00:58:28between various

00:58:29Middle Eastern capitals

00:58:30to meet separately

00:58:32with Middle East leaders.

00:58:35He knew

00:58:36you could only

00:58:37make progress

00:58:38if you talked

00:58:39to each side,

00:58:40understood its needs,

00:58:42that it wouldn't work

00:58:43just through cables.

00:58:44This was too emotional,

00:58:45too precarious.

00:58:47You had to go

00:58:48in person

00:58:48to Sadat

00:58:49and go in person

00:58:51to go to Meir

00:58:52and then go back

00:58:53to the other

00:58:54and explain

00:58:55where they were willing

00:58:56to move ahead

00:58:57and where they really

00:58:58had a need

00:58:59to dig in.

00:59:02They negotiated

00:59:03with Kissinger,

00:59:04they didn't negotiate

00:59:05with each other

00:59:05and Kissinger

00:59:07frequently used

00:59:08American guarantees

00:59:09to get the parties

00:59:11to agree.

00:59:13Were you ever so tired

00:59:14you couldn't remember

00:59:15whether you were talking

00:59:16to Sadat

00:59:16or Barbara Walters?

00:59:18That distinction

00:59:19I never lost.

00:59:20What about that?

00:59:24But there's one thing

00:59:25that keeps you going

00:59:27which is that you know

00:59:29there's nothing more important

00:59:30you could possibly be doing

00:59:31and that has

00:59:34an exhilarating effect.

00:59:38Kissinger literally

00:59:39spends most of two years

00:59:41going from Damascus

00:59:43to Cairo

00:59:43to Tel Aviv

00:59:45and Jerusalem

00:59:45meeting with one leader

00:59:47after another

00:59:48cajoling them

00:59:49negotiating

00:59:50at a detailed level

00:59:52and as he himself says

00:59:53it's literally

00:59:54a Middle Eastern bazaar.

00:59:55Henry

00:59:56when I met him

00:59:57for the first time

00:59:58in November 73

01:00:00I found him

01:00:02quite acquainted

01:00:03with the

01:00:04minute detail

01:00:06of all the dimensions

01:00:07for that

01:00:08we didn't spend

01:00:10except one hour

01:00:11and after that

01:00:12we felt that

01:00:12we are friends

01:00:13since years

01:00:15and years before.

01:00:17the massive achievement

01:00:19for Kissinger

01:00:19was Sadat's decision

01:00:21to essentially

01:00:22throw the Soviets

01:00:23out of Egypt

01:00:24and to take Egypt

01:00:25the most important

01:00:26the biggest Arab state

01:00:27essentially

01:00:28out of the conflict

01:00:30and into friendship

01:00:32with the United States

01:00:33and eventually

01:00:34a few years later

01:00:35into peace with Israel.

01:00:37Now

01:00:37that came

01:00:39at the expense

01:00:40of

01:00:41the Palestinian question.

01:00:43He left

01:00:44this issue

01:00:45of the Palestinians

01:00:46to kind of

01:00:47fester away

01:00:47unaddressed.

01:00:50Whatever you solve

01:00:51in foreign policy

01:00:52is not final.

01:00:54It's simply

01:00:55an admissions ticket

01:00:56for some other crisis.

01:01:01Good evening.

01:01:02The news

01:01:02is dominated tonight

01:01:04by one explosive story.

01:01:06White House

01:01:06mounted an elaborate

01:01:08cover-up operation

01:01:09in the Watergate affair.

01:01:10There was

01:01:11of course

01:01:11the projects

01:01:12including

01:01:13wiretap tapping

01:01:15electronic surveillance

01:01:16and photography.

01:01:17The number two man

01:01:18in the Nixon

01:01:18re-election campaign

01:01:19today

01:01:20admitted his own guilt

01:01:21in the planning

01:01:22and cover-up

01:01:22of Watergate.

01:01:23Sources say

01:01:24there is no question

01:01:24that the president

01:01:25knew of the cover-up

01:01:26operation

01:01:27which may be

01:01:28the most damning

01:01:29accusation of all.

01:01:32As the Watergate

01:01:33scandal dragged on

01:01:34it seemed like

01:01:35the president

01:01:36and his closest aides

01:01:38were being drawn

01:01:39into the mire

01:01:40and Americans

01:01:42were relieved

01:01:43to see

01:01:44that at least

01:01:44Kissinger

01:01:45was untainted

01:01:46by the scandal.

01:01:47He survived

01:01:49Watergate

01:01:49largely because

01:01:50he was seen

01:01:51as the only

01:01:52adult in the room.

01:01:57This was the height

01:01:58of Kissinger's fame.

01:01:59This was when

01:02:00he was like

01:02:01a kind of

01:02:02diplomatic

01:02:03version of

01:02:04Superman.

01:02:06Kissinger was

01:02:07the most admired

01:02:08man in the United

01:02:09States.

01:02:10He was

01:02:11tremendously popular.

01:02:14The world

01:02:15was so happy

01:02:16that the United States

01:02:17was finally getting

01:02:17out of Vietnam

01:02:18that Henry Kissinger

01:02:20received the Nobel

01:02:21Peace Prize.

01:02:23But his Vietnamese

01:02:24colleague,

01:02:25Le Duc Toh,

01:02:26said,

01:02:26this is not

01:02:27the end of the war

01:02:27and I'm not

01:02:28accepting the Peace Prize.

01:02:32In Oslo,

01:02:33several thousand

01:02:34Norwegian students

01:02:35demonstrated today

01:02:36against the awarding

01:02:37of the Nobel Peace Prize

01:02:38to Secretary of State

01:02:39Henry Kissinger.

01:02:44I was on the playground

01:02:45and some kid

01:02:47came up to me

01:02:47and said,

01:02:48you know,

01:02:49my parents don't

01:02:49think your father

01:02:50should have won

01:02:51the Nobel Peace Prize.

01:02:53And I apparently

01:02:54replied,

01:02:56that's okay,

01:02:57neither does my mother.

01:03:00That's the most

01:03:00important goal

01:03:01any administration

01:03:03can set itself,

01:03:04is to work

01:03:05for a world

01:03:05in which

01:03:07the award

01:03:08will become

01:03:09irrelevant

01:03:11because peace

01:03:12will have become

01:03:13so normal.

01:03:15Of course,

01:03:16he was deeply honored,

01:03:18but I think

01:03:19it also presented

01:03:20a huge headache

01:03:21for him

01:03:21because he knew

01:03:23that it would not be

01:03:25well-received

01:03:26by President Nixon.

01:03:28knowing Richard Nixon,

01:03:31it must have driven

01:03:32him crazy

01:03:32that Kissinger

01:03:34was the one

01:03:34awarded the

01:03:35Peace Prize.

01:03:37He managed

01:03:39to keep his

01:03:40jealousy

01:03:41under control

01:03:42to a great extent,

01:03:43in part because

01:03:44he needed Kissinger

01:03:45more and more.

01:03:48The relationship

01:03:49between Nixon

01:03:49and Kissinger

01:03:50begins to reverse.

01:03:51There is a way

01:03:52in which Nixon

01:03:53now is almost

01:03:54pleading for reassurance

01:03:56and support

01:03:57from Kissinger.

01:03:58I haven't even

01:03:59considered the possibility

01:04:00of, frankly,

01:04:02just throwing myself

01:04:04on the sword.

01:04:05No, nothing.

01:04:06I don't think I can

01:04:07take it.

01:04:08What the hell?

01:04:09That is out of the question.

01:04:10With all due respect,

01:04:11Mr. President,

01:04:12that cannot be considered.

01:04:14You have saved

01:04:15this country,

01:04:16Mr. President.

01:04:17The history books

01:04:18will show that

01:04:19when no one will know

01:04:21what Watergate means.

01:04:24Henry Kissinger

01:04:25often said to me

01:04:27that there was

01:04:28a Shakespearean quality

01:04:30to Richard Nixon's

01:04:32presidency.

01:04:33The culmination

01:04:34of the tragedy

01:04:35is Nixon's

01:04:38final agonized

01:04:40decision

01:04:40to resign.

01:04:43One day,

01:04:44Kissinger goes over

01:04:45to the White House

01:04:46and they talk

01:04:47and there's this

01:04:49moment where

01:04:50Nixon says,

01:04:51Henry, I'm not

01:04:52a praying man,

01:04:53but pray with me.

01:04:55And you have

01:04:56this amazing scene

01:04:57of the two of them

01:04:58on their knees

01:04:59praying in the White House.

01:05:03I remember him

01:05:04coming home

01:05:04that night

01:05:06and this sense

01:05:07of sorrow

01:05:08and compassion

01:05:09that he had

01:05:11for Nixon

01:05:12at that moment.

01:05:13The human problem

01:05:15of a man

01:05:15who had spent

01:05:17all of his life

01:05:19trying to become

01:05:20president,

01:05:21whose personality

01:05:23really did not lend

01:05:24itself to politics.

01:05:25He didn't like

01:05:26to meet new people.

01:05:27He didn't like

01:05:28to give direct orders.

01:05:30He made himself

01:05:31do all these things

01:05:32and

01:05:34everything collapsed

01:05:35on him.

01:05:47And repeat after me,

01:05:48I, Gerald R. Ford,

01:05:50do solemnly swear.

01:05:51I, Gerald R. Ford,

01:05:53do solemnly swear

01:05:54that I will support

01:05:55and defend

01:05:55the Constitution.

01:05:56Gerald Ford

01:05:57was as different

01:05:58in personal,

01:06:00temperamental terms

01:06:01from Richard Nixon

01:06:02as it's possible

01:06:04to imagine.

01:06:08And yet,

01:06:09when Ford

01:06:10became president,

01:06:12one of the very

01:06:13first decisions

01:06:14that he took

01:06:15was to keep

01:06:16Kissinger on

01:06:17in both roles,

01:06:19National Security Advisor

01:06:20and Secretary of State.

01:06:24Somebody said

01:06:25that as soon

01:06:25as Nixon was gone,

01:06:26Kissinger would lose

01:06:27his Teflon position

01:06:30and become

01:06:31the lightning rod

01:06:32in turn.

01:06:34And so it proved.

01:06:36Good evening

01:06:36to all of you

01:06:37from California.

01:06:39Within a relatively

01:06:39short time

01:06:40of Nixon's departure,

01:06:42the attacks

01:06:43on Kissinger

01:06:44began.

01:06:46Dr. Kissinger

01:06:47is quoted as saying

01:06:48that he thinks

01:06:50of the United States

01:06:51as Athens

01:06:51and the Soviet Union

01:06:53as Sparta.

01:06:54The day of the U.S.

01:06:55is passed

01:06:56and today

01:06:57is the day

01:06:57of the Soviet Union.

01:06:59But peace

01:07:00does not come

01:07:00from weakness

01:07:02or from retreat.

01:07:03My father had

01:07:05played such a dominant

01:07:06role for six years

01:07:07that in the nature

01:07:09of American politics,

01:07:11it's almost inevitable

01:07:12that you become

01:07:14a focal point

01:07:15and that the

01:07:17worm turns.

01:07:25at 7.30 a.m.

01:07:27on April 17th,

01:07:281975,

01:07:29the war

01:07:30in Cambodia

01:07:31was over.

01:07:32It was a unique war

01:07:33for no country

01:07:34has ever experienced

01:07:35such concentrated

01:07:36bombing.

01:07:38On this,

01:07:39perhaps the most

01:07:40gentle and graceful

01:07:41land in all of Asia,

01:07:42President Nixon

01:07:43and Mr. Kissinger

01:07:45unleashed 100,000

01:07:47tons of bombs,

01:07:49the equivalent

01:07:49of five Hiroshima's.

01:07:52Then out of the forest

01:07:53came the victors,

01:07:55the Khmer Rouge,

01:07:56whose power had grown

01:07:57out of all proportion

01:07:58to their numbers.

01:08:00The Khmer Rouge

01:08:01was essentially

01:08:03an insignificant movement

01:08:06up until 1970.

01:08:08And the question is,

01:08:09how is it that

01:08:10this relatively

01:08:11marginal force

01:08:12were able

01:08:13to seize power

01:08:14in five years?

01:08:16The bombing

01:08:17did not create

01:08:18the Khmer Rouge,

01:08:19but it was a powerful

01:08:20recruitment tool.

01:08:22A horror began

01:08:23almost immediately.

01:08:25Phnom Penh,

01:08:26a city of

01:08:26two and a half

01:08:27million people,

01:08:28was forcibly emptied

01:08:29within hours

01:08:30of their coming.

01:08:32Within 24 hours,

01:08:34they announced

01:08:34that the city

01:08:35would have to be

01:08:36evacuated.

01:08:37They emptied

01:08:39the hospitals

01:08:39while people were

01:08:40still in the middle

01:08:41of surgery.

01:08:42Patients were

01:08:43left to die

01:08:44on the gurneys,

01:08:45and that was

01:08:47just the beginning

01:08:48of the killing.

01:08:49The Khmer Rouge

01:08:52interrogated

01:08:52and then exterminated

01:08:54anyone they suspected

01:08:55of opposing them.

01:09:01I have yet

01:09:02to find anyone

01:09:03who have not been

01:09:04affected by a loss.

01:09:07We have a Khmer word

01:09:08which is

01:09:09it's a broken spirit.

01:09:11It's that

01:09:12when the spirit

01:09:13has been so broken

01:09:15under fear,

01:09:16under terror,

01:09:18that it doesn't recover.

01:09:21I think the tragedy

01:09:22of Cambodia

01:09:23is directly attributable

01:09:25to the policies

01:09:26of Kissinger and Nixon.

01:09:28There's no question

01:09:30that our continued

01:09:30bombing of the countryside,

01:09:32which was savage

01:09:33and relentless,

01:09:34led to the rise

01:09:35of the Khmer Rouge.

01:09:38The North Vietnamese

01:09:39had bases

01:09:40in not only Cambodia,

01:09:42but Laos.

01:09:42They were coming over,

01:09:44killing American troops

01:09:45and South Vietnamese,

01:09:46and then retreating.

01:09:47So they spread the war

01:09:48to these countries.

01:09:49We did not spread it.

01:09:51You say in your book

01:09:52that you considered

01:09:53bombing North Vietnam

01:09:54so that you had

01:09:55the alternative

01:09:55of bombing North Vietnam

01:09:57and not embroiling

01:09:58Cambodia.

01:09:59Cambodia was embroiled.

01:10:01it is an absurdity

01:10:02to say that a country

01:10:03can occupy

01:10:04a part of another country,

01:10:06kill your people,

01:10:07and that then

01:10:08you are violating

01:10:09its neutrality

01:10:09when you respond

01:10:12against the foreign troops

01:10:13that are on

01:10:14that neutral territory.

01:10:15It is total hypocrisy.

01:10:17They were all

01:10:18supposed to be

01:10:19well-intended decisions.

01:10:21My father who died,

01:10:23my oldest brother

01:10:23who is still missing

01:10:24to this day,

01:10:25are they the victims

01:10:26of geopolitics

01:10:28and of decisions

01:10:29made with good intentions,

01:10:31but that led

01:10:32to disaster?

01:10:32Yes, absolutely.

01:10:35Sometimes it makes me wonder

01:10:37about the hierarchy

01:10:38of suffering

01:10:39and the unequal value

01:10:41that's attributed

01:10:42to people's lives.

01:10:44Some lives are worth

01:10:45more than others.

01:10:46Some countries

01:10:47are worth sacrificing

01:10:48in order that

01:10:50others can prosper.

01:10:55Good evening.

01:10:56The fighting is over

01:10:58for American ground soldiers

01:10:59in Vietnam.

01:11:00The extraction

01:11:01of the last combat soldiers

01:11:03is a slow process.

01:11:05While the men wait,

01:11:07they happily donate

01:11:08some of their

01:11:08leftover ammunition

01:11:10to their South Vietnamese

01:11:11replacements.

01:11:12It is now their war.

01:11:16Ultimately,

01:11:17when the United States

01:11:18extricated itself

01:11:18from the Vietnam War,

01:11:20the South Vietnamese government

01:11:22hobbled along

01:11:23for two years.

01:11:25So great was

01:11:26the South Vietnamese

01:11:26entire dependence

01:11:28upon the United States

01:11:29that in no way,

01:11:30shape, or form

01:11:30could stand on its own.

01:11:34I'm still hopeful

01:11:35that the United States

01:11:37could respond positively

01:11:39to our request for aid.

01:11:41Sir, Mr. Kissinger

01:11:41said today

01:11:42that that aid is not approved.

01:11:43The collapse of your country

01:11:45is inevitable.

01:11:45Do you share that assessment?

01:11:57If my father had one regret

01:12:00that he often expressed to me,

01:12:02it was that Congress

01:12:04prevented the United States

01:12:07from having an ongoing military

01:12:09role after the peace accords.

01:12:12He believed

01:12:14that there was a path

01:12:16for at least preventing

01:12:17the human catastrophe

01:12:19that occurred in Vietnam

01:12:21after we withdrew

01:12:23and that we failed to do that.

01:12:27We consider we have

01:12:28a moral obligation

01:12:29to the tens of thousands

01:12:31of people

01:12:32who worked with us,

01:12:34relying on us

01:12:35for 15 years,

01:12:36and we are positive

01:12:37that the American people

01:12:38will fulfill that obligation.

01:12:40Thank you,

01:12:40Mr. Secretary.

01:12:44When the North Vietnamese

01:12:46began the final assault

01:12:47in April of 1975,

01:12:49the regime

01:12:50basically disappeared overnight.

01:12:53Saigon, April the 30th,

01:12:558 o'clock.

01:12:56The last American helicopter

01:12:57on the roof

01:12:58of the American embassy

01:12:59prepares to lift off

01:13:00the last of the evacuees

01:13:02fleeing before

01:13:03the advancing communist armies.

01:13:08I felt great anger

01:13:10at the United States government.

01:13:12We had deceived

01:13:14and misled

01:13:15not only ourselves,

01:13:17but we had deceived

01:13:18and misled

01:13:18a whole people

01:13:20in South Vietnam.

01:13:26There was a chance,

01:13:27given his talents,

01:13:29that Henry alone

01:13:30might have been able

01:13:31to end that war

01:13:33much, much earlier.

01:13:36that he did not.

01:13:38I find that,

01:13:39like the rest of the war,

01:13:40rather unforgivable.

01:13:44At the end of the day,

01:13:45when Kissinger was alone

01:13:46with his own thoughts,

01:13:48I think he would have

01:13:50admitted to himself

01:13:51that South Vietnam

01:13:53did not have the ability

01:13:55to defend itself.

01:13:57I think all of the allegations

01:13:59to say that Congress

01:14:00lost the will to fight,

01:14:01that the American people

01:14:02lost the will to fight,

01:14:03that the media

01:14:04misreported that war

01:14:06was a way for him

01:14:07to assuage his guilt.

01:14:10The collapse of South Vietnam

01:14:12and the evacuation of Saigon

01:14:16was without doubt

01:14:17the saddest moment

01:14:20of my governmental experience.

01:14:23I am unreconstructed

01:14:26in my conviction

01:14:28that Vietnam

01:14:29did not have to fall,

01:14:30that we did that

01:14:32to ourselves.

01:14:35He was not a monster,

01:14:37but he was wrong,

01:14:39and the result was

01:14:40millions of people,

01:14:42not just American soldiers,

01:14:4355,000 plus,

01:14:45but millions of

01:14:46Indo-Chinese, Laos,

01:14:47Cambodia,

01:14:49South Vietnam,

01:14:49North Vietnam,

01:14:50died as a result

01:14:51of this horrendous,

01:14:52horrendous mistaken effort.

01:14:59With 272 electoral votes,

01:15:02James Earl Carter,

01:15:04the next president

01:15:05of the United States.

01:15:08Our new president

01:15:10and secretary of state

01:15:11deserve the understanding

01:15:13and the support

01:15:15of all Americans.

01:15:17I expect to lead

01:15:19a happy and full life

01:15:23once I leave the government.

01:15:28One of Kissinger's

01:15:29most impressive achievements

01:15:31was staying famous

01:15:32for 50 years.

01:15:34Secretary of State,

01:15:35Dr. Henry Kissinger,

01:15:43He institutes this kind of

01:15:44remarkable self-levitation feed

01:15:46where he stays in the public eye

01:15:48for nearly half a century,

01:15:50partly because he devotes

01:15:52his entire life

01:15:52to foreign policy.

01:15:54He's advising leaders.

01:15:57You know, I'm here

01:15:57as a private citizen.

01:15:59I'm here as a private citizen.

01:16:01I'm not speaking

01:16:02of my personal view,

01:16:03not necessarily

01:16:04Governor Reagan's.

01:16:06He's giving speeches,

01:16:08going to conferences.

01:16:09He's a ubiquitous

01:16:10presence on television.

01:16:12He was always invited

01:16:13to opine

01:16:14on whatever crisis

01:16:15is happening

01:16:16at the moment.

01:16:17I think that the warning

01:16:18of the president

01:16:19that a continuation

01:16:20of repression

01:16:21could harm

01:16:21U.S.-Chinese relations

01:16:23was correct.

01:16:24He publishes

01:16:25hundreds of articles

01:16:26and op-eds

01:16:27and many books,

01:16:28putting out

01:16:29his own version of history.

01:16:30Dr. Kissinger

01:16:31has a new book

01:16:32hitting bookstores tomorrow.

01:16:34If you looked

01:16:35at his schedule

01:16:36on any given day,

01:16:38it was packed

01:16:39with meetings,

01:16:40breakfasts,

01:16:41lunches,

01:16:42TV interviews.

01:16:43He stayed in the game

01:16:45because he loved

01:16:46international relations

01:16:48and he loved power.

01:16:52Throughout the long

01:16:53years out of government,

01:16:56Henry Kissinger

01:16:57fought to uphold

01:16:58his reputation

01:16:59against all comers.

01:17:01If an Allende

01:17:02were to come

01:17:03to power tomorrow,

01:17:04you would not feel

01:17:05that you could recommend

01:17:06such action

01:17:07as you thought

01:17:08appropriate in 1970.

01:17:09No, I'm not saying that.

01:17:11No criticism

01:17:12went unanswered.

01:17:13The statement

01:17:14Henry Kissinger

01:17:15is a war criminal

01:17:16is not a piece

01:17:17of rhetoric.

01:17:18It's not a metaphor.

01:17:19It's a job description

01:17:20and it might feature

01:17:21an indictment.

01:17:22I want to know

01:17:23how you would amend

01:17:24your testimony today.

01:17:27Why should I amend

01:17:28my testimony?

01:17:31He was determined

01:17:33that he would be

01:17:35the one to write

01:17:36his own history.

01:17:37But it really was

01:17:38a double-edged sword

01:17:39because he kind of

01:17:40made himself

01:17:41a big target

01:17:42and in many ways

01:17:44became a kind

01:17:45of scapegoat

01:17:46for all the failures

01:17:47of American

01:17:48foreign policy.

01:17:49Arrest Henry Kissinger

01:17:51for war crime!

01:17:53Arrest Henry Kissinger

01:17:54for war crime!

01:17:56When people attack

01:17:58Kissinger

01:17:58by saying

01:17:59you're dealing

01:18:00with tyrants

01:18:01or you're ignoring

01:18:02human rights,

01:18:03they don't remember

01:18:05the agonizing choices

01:18:07that had to be made.

01:18:08After all,

01:18:09preserving civilization

01:18:10is a human right

01:18:11as well.

01:18:12The average person

01:18:13thinks that morality

01:18:16can be applied

01:18:17as directly

01:18:19to the conduct

01:18:19of states

01:18:20to each other

01:18:21as it can

01:18:22to human relations.

01:18:25That is not always

01:18:26the case

01:18:28because sometimes

01:18:29statesmen

01:18:30have to choose

01:18:31among evils.

01:18:33I think he thought

01:18:34whatever he was

01:18:35sacrificing

01:18:36of American values,

01:18:38he was doing so

01:18:39for American interests.

01:18:41My view of that

01:18:42is that

01:18:43the sacrifice

01:18:43of values

01:18:45was intrinsically

01:18:47a sacrifice

01:18:48of interests.

01:18:50One of the sources

01:18:51of strength

01:18:52that the United States

01:18:52has is the story

01:18:53that we've been telling

01:18:54around the world,

01:18:55which is a story

01:18:56about freedom

01:18:57and equality

01:18:58of peoples

01:18:59and nations.

01:19:00I think Kissinger's

01:19:02theory was

01:19:02it's the credibility

01:19:04of being willing

01:19:05to use power,

01:19:06being willing

01:19:07to kill a lot of people,

01:19:08being willing

01:19:09to destroy countries,

01:19:10to send a message

01:19:11to other potential adversaries.

01:19:14This is what happens

01:19:15if you challenge

01:19:16the will

01:19:17of the United States.

01:19:19I think the fundamental

01:19:20problem with that

01:19:21is it just

01:19:22obliterates

01:19:23the credibility

01:19:23of the story

01:19:24that we tell.

01:19:25My father

01:19:26was a realist,

01:19:28but it was realism

01:19:30in the cause

01:19:31of principles

01:19:33that he believed

01:19:33in deeply.

01:19:35He was not

01:19:36just trying

01:19:37to advance

01:19:37the power

01:19:38of the United States

01:19:39in some kind

01:19:40of Darwinian struggle.

01:19:43He was advancing

01:19:45the strength

01:19:46of the United States

01:19:47in his mind

01:19:47because America

01:19:49was the last

01:19:51best hope

01:19:52of humanity,

01:19:52and he had experienced

01:19:53that personally.

01:19:56The final days

01:19:58of his life

01:19:59were deeply revealing.

01:20:02He was transported

01:20:03back to the trauma

01:20:05of his childhood.

01:20:06He was right back there.

01:20:09He was speaking German.

01:20:11He was afraid

01:20:13that pogroms

01:20:15were at the door.

01:20:16He was showing

01:20:18the deep-seated injury

01:20:20that he had experienced

01:20:21as a child.

01:20:23But there was also

01:20:25a tremendously moving

01:20:27final

01:20:30hallucination.

01:20:33He was lying

01:20:34in a bed

01:20:35looking out

01:20:36on this garden

01:20:37that he loved

01:20:38in Connecticut,

01:20:39and he imagined

01:20:40that his brother,

01:20:41who had died

01:20:42a couple of years

01:20:43earlier,

01:20:43was outside

01:20:44building a platform.

01:20:47It wasn't clear

01:20:49whether this was

01:20:49some kind of train

01:20:50stop

01:20:51or a platform

01:20:53for my father

01:20:54to ascend onto,

01:20:56but it seemed

01:20:57to give him

01:20:58a great deal

01:20:58of peace.

01:21:01At an early age,

01:21:03I have seen

01:21:04what can happen

01:21:05to a society

01:21:06that is based

01:21:08on hatred

01:21:08and strength

01:21:10and distrust

01:21:12and that I

01:21:13experienced

01:21:14then

01:21:15what America

01:21:17means

01:21:17to other people.

01:21:20It's hope

01:21:21and it's idealism.

01:21:23is

01:21:27a

01:21:28a

01:21:28the

01:21:29a

01:21:36a

01:22:03Legenda Adriana Zanotto

01:22:29Legenda Adriana Zanotto

Categoria

Transcrição

Comentários

Recomendado