00:07Welcome to SAM Conversations. I am Jeea Srivastava. Our topic for today is one of the most important
00:14issues in India's foreign policy, India's Indo-Pacific assertion and the At-East policy
00:20in action. To understand this better, we welcome Group Captain Praveer Purohit, an Indian Air
00:26Force veteran who served in various command, instructional and staff appointments over more
00:32than 32 years and is now a well-known voice on geopolitics, defense and strategic affairs.
00:38Thank you so much, sir, for joining us today. Thank you. My pleasure.
00:43Thank you, sir. So let's start with my first question. So my first question to you is that
00:49as an Indian Armed Forces veteran and now a strategic analyst, how do you view India's
00:55threat perception in an uncertain global order? So the overall matrix of threat today is not
01:04just limited to military coercion or military force. Traditionally, one associates threats
01:11from either across the borders and mainly in the kinetic domain, that is in the military
01:16sphere. Today, the threats have increased multifold and we talk about multi-domain warfare, we talk
01:23about multi-domain threats. And what are these? Let me list out one by one. The military threat from
01:28our two neighbors, that is China and Pakistan continues. I mean, it remains. There is no denying
01:34the fact that they act in collusion with each other. And the primary purpose is to keep India confined
01:41into South Asia and not let it increase its influence outside the region of South, South Asia. The next
01:50part is that apart from this, now when we talk about India's interests, whether they are military
01:57interests, diplomatic interests, economic interests, our interests are served only if we span out. That is,
02:02we look at the global map, our trade comes from the west, goes to the east and vice versa. So
02:10which means the sea
02:11lines of communication are very important. Geography has given us, we are blessed with good geography. And
02:18therefore, when India actually, when you look at the map, it actually juts out into the Indian Ocean. And the
02:25trade,
02:26commerce, your movement of people, etc., resources, they are all into the oceans, most of them. So therefore, a free
02:35flow of
02:36trade, commerce, unimpeded flow, which is not subject to geopolitical risks and geopolitical coercion is very
02:45important for India. Now, if you have a country that tries to weaponize trade, weaponize economic
02:55dependence, and we know, I mean, we are talking about China primarily, which has done this, then that puts at
03:05risk our growth, it puts at risk our economic security, it puts at risk our food security for food that
03:12we wish to
03:14import. It puts to risk raw materials that we require for our growth, for our manufacturing, for our
03:20industry. And therefore, that also becomes a major security threat to the nation. Because any threat or any
03:29move by any nation which seeks to constrain India's rise, and that's a peaceful rise, which seeks to
03:36constrain India's growth, whether in terms of GDP, whether in terms of economy, whether in terms of outreach,
03:42is a security threat. The third particular threat is what I see is in the information domain. And we have
03:50seen it consistently that how information is being weaponized. We know the abundance of fake news, false
03:59propaganda that exists, we saw it during Operation Sindhu also being conducted across from across. So that
04:05itself is a threat because it strikes at the very roots of our, of our republic, of our democratic ideals.
04:11It creates a condition wherein people now start doubting their own government. And this is
04:18regardless of what government or which party is in power, it is to do with governance basically,
04:23and institutions. So therefore, these are the three main threats that I see to the nation. And if we
04:29analyze deeply, you find that and when I say information, I and let me add, I also include the
04:35cyber domain into that because cyber is a major, major threat. We've just seen Kudankudalam was,
04:42there was a cyber attack and a data breach there. And this has been happening. We saw it during the
04:50Ladakh crisis over the period of three, four years, when there were consistent cyber attacks from across
04:55across the country. And that was attributed to the northern neighbor. So therefore, these are the main,
05:01these are the broad main threats that we have. These are the external ones. So when I, when I look
05:07at
05:07the entire matrix, a common thread runs in between that. And that is one particular country, which is,
05:13which is, you find that country is, has a footprint in all these threats.
05:19And that is what I, that is what is a concerning feature, because we need to, so when we talk
05:25about overcoming these threats, we have to have a multi-dimensional, multi-domain approach.
05:33Thank you, sir. That's a great perspective. So moving on, sir, India keeps signing deals with Japan,
05:40Australia and Indonesia, one at a time. China does not see for separate relationship. It sees one
05:47encirclement. So are we being naive about the Beijing, like how Beijing reads this?
05:54Not really. If we, if we deeply analyze the statements coming from Beijing and the discourse
06:00in the Chinese media, especially the official media. So this is, there is a pattern to it. Now,
06:07the problem with Chinese thinking is that it is like my growth is acceptable, but your growth is not
06:15acceptable. That is, that is the psyche with which they work. And that is because they have got a
06:20deep rooted, it's, it's some kind of like John Garver has called it, he's called it something like
06:29how an autistic person behaves, you know, it's something like that. So the problem is that China
06:35has gamed the system ever since it joined the WTO. And prior to that, when the Americans opened up to
06:41China
06:41China and China got access to American markets, they got access to European markets at much preferential
06:48terms and conditions, they actually gamed the system, they grew out of that system. And it is
06:53the very system they grew that they are criticizing. Now, the problem is that they have got maritime
06:59disputes with so many countries in the South China Sea, as well as East China Sea, Japan, South Korea,
07:07Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, even Indonesia for that matter, not Natuna Sea. So now, how is it that
07:15there is only one country which is acting belligerent, there is only one country which is,
07:19so that there is a problem with this country. And that that is because they have actually invited or
07:27they are the causes belly for the these countries to get together, establish some kind of a framework,
07:33where in no country incidentally here has said, in all these countries that I named with which China
07:39has got maritime disputes, they have never said that we need to militarize the Indo-Pacific or the
07:44South China Sea, and we need to have an armed military coalition against China. Then, yes,
07:50there are countries which are in coalition with, they have an alliance treaty with the US, but nobody has
07:57ever said that it is against China. It is China which fuels this thought that it is to contain China,
08:03which I don't think is correct, because every country has a right to grow, as long as it is
08:09peaceful, as long as it is following certain norms of international diplomacy, international norms,
08:14there is, there should be no harm in any country rising. China doesn't see it that way for the simple
08:21reason that historically they have got an anti-imperialistic, anti-Western mentality. It has got to do with history,
08:28from right from the opium wars, they have got a history with Japan. So, now history is fine, but then
08:37there are countries which have moved on. Europe fought with each other, countries within most,
08:41but today they are a European Union and they are united in many ways. They don't fight with each
08:47other like they used to do in the earlier years. So, the question is that why can't China behave
08:55responsibly and grow along with everybody. But that is because obviously they have got this feeling
09:03of that they are a great civilizational power, the centrality of China, the middle kingdom
09:10factor. And that is what is fueling this kind of belligerence from China. And this is what is
09:17creating instability in the larger Indo-Pacific region.
09:22Yes. Okay, sir. So, moving on. Sir, the Quad has been talked about for years,
09:30with a very little to show military. So, what is the one capability India should demand from the
09:36Quad in the next two years that it has been too polite to ask so far?
09:43Well, as far as the Quad is concerned now, there are differences in the way all the four countries
09:48look at Quad. There are certain convergences, but there are certain deep divergences, especially in
09:54the way we look at Quad. So, while the Quad has or is a good potential, has got good potential
10:06to
10:08kind of contain China. And contain I use with a little bit of caution because every country,
10:15no country is really said that it is to contain China. But we all know that it is to, I
10:19would
10:20put it as balancing China. The problem is that Australia, Japan are alliance partners with the US.
10:27India doesn't believe in any alliances of those kind. So, when it comes to the Pacific or in the,
10:34that is across the, when I say Pacific, I am talking across the Malacca Strait, east of Malacca
10:40Strait. There, that becomes the secondary area of interest for India. Whereas the Indian Ocean
10:47remains the primary area of interest. But for these three countries, the Pacific remains the primary
10:52area of interest because that is where China is also located. And for China to come into the Indian
10:56ocean that has got, it's not as easy as it, as they would like to, as easy as it for
11:04them to project
11:04power in the Pacific, especially the Western Pacific region. So therefore, so, so what happens is that
11:13the, there are the divergences as I see them are primarily because India had initially, if you remember,
11:20had said it's a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. Whereas the, now we've come around to that free and
11:26open
11:26Indo-Pacific. So inclusive was basically not targeted at China, but it was, it was like an open
11:33invitation. Okay, you can also join. I mean, it is not that the oceans are global commons,
11:38but also for Russia, because Russia is also to an extent of Pacific power. So it was not to leave
11:45out
11:45somebody and small groupings, which the, which is what the Chinese media frequently accuses the quarter.
11:52So as far as we are concerned from Quad, what we can expect is that there would be demands on
11:59us that
11:59in case of any crisis, in case of any severe major tensions in the Pacific region, in the South China
12:06Sea, East China Sea, they would expect certain support from India, whether it be diplomatic or material.
12:12From, from our side, what we really need from Quad is an assurance that the initiatives that have
12:19been formed under Quads, for example, the supply chain resilience initiative, the blue dot is not exactly
12:26in the Quad, but it is, is it's kind of an annexure to the Quad. These deliver, because that is
12:33what is
12:33very critical for our growth, especially in higher technology areas. So if, if the Quad is able to deliver us
12:41on
12:42those aspects, I'm sure the thinking in India would also slightly change, there would be an increase in
12:50trust factor, and the Quad can actually become a very potent organization to ensure stability and
12:59a relative balance of power.
13:02I agree. So you were talking about Malacca Strait. So I have a question, you know, regarding that also,
13:08that India has never fought a war east of the Bay of Bengal. So if a real crisis broke out
13:15in the
13:15Malacca Strait tomorrow, could India actually project power there? Or like, are we still an Indian
13:21ocean navy pretending to be Indo-Pacific one?
13:26Look, if you look at the, if you look at our naval deployments for either port visits and participation
13:33in multinational exercises, then we have gone right up to Australia for various exercises. So it's not
13:42that we have, we don't have the ability to project power, but in what, what quantity or what is the
13:50power
13:51package that we can project is, is an issue that needs to be considered, because we have also a western
13:57neighbor, which is also belligerent, which can create mischief, which has got the propensity to
14:05create mischief very often. So that I think would be something that present naval leadership would have
14:12given a thought to it. But in terms of because, but what I would like to hear, add here is
14:19that now
14:20we've got these arrangements, logistics support arrangements with certain foreign navies. Now that
14:26gives you a kind of a foothold wherein you, your ships can go, they can get what they call operational
14:33turnaround can take place. And then, a very fact that an Indian naval ship can reach into the Pacific,
14:41goes through the Malacca Strait itself is a signal of capability to various other nations that are
14:48watching it. And so therefore, it also ensures some, it gives them a sense of security that yes,
14:55there is a military power that is, has the capability to reach here. And let's not forget that,
15:01it's not only just like the Indian Navy or India would like to go and fight there.
15:07Look at disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, like in tsunami. I mean,
15:14the quad was born out of the, the whole concept came out of the tsunami wherein India, US, Australia
15:21coordinated, the navies coordinated. So, benign operations by the military, that is in this case,
15:28the navy have also got a tremendous force multiplier effect. They have got a tremendous
15:32diplomatic effect. And they are instrumental in increasing our influence across the oceans.
15:39Now, when a small country, which is say threatened by a larger country, now sees this, they do look at
15:49India with some hope, with some kind of a, that they would, there is a country that can provide solace,
15:55they can, there's a country which can provide them certain equipment, which can help defend themselves
16:01against such external threats. And we are seeing it now, we see the, we see it in the Brahmos being
16:07exported to Philippines, Vietnam, we've signed a deal with Indonesia for the Brahmos and Indonesia also for
16:13the Astra, Mk1, A217. So, I mean, actually, these are things that are wargamed at the services level.
16:23But I would only say that, yes, by the very fact that we've participated, the navies, not only the
16:32navy, the Indian Air Force has participated in X-rays right up to Australia, Japan. So, we have got that
16:38capability. And when we look at military capability, we have to look at it holistically,
16:45because power projection also involves a major thing, a major factor that is air power. And today,
16:51we have got platforms that are capable of reaching them and projecting power, whether benign or otherwise.
17:00Yes, so that's very insightful. Now, for my last question,
17:04how do you view the Modi's government's foreign policy in preserving national security
17:11and territorial sovereignty at a time when global equations are so fast changing?
17:18Well, territorial sovereignty is, has been always a non-negotiable
17:25aspect for every government rights and independence. And so, whenever there has been a threat to
17:31territorial sovereignty, India has pushed back and we have defended ourselves. While 62 was a little bit
17:38different, but the fact remains that the Chinese did go back. Now, there are various factors for it. And
17:46it's really out of the scope right now. But so, regardless of who, which government is in power,
17:53the Indian polity is structured in such a way that any territorial loss, or for that matter,
17:59any threat to territorial integrity will be defended by all possible means. That is number one.
18:10Secondly, as far as foreign policy is concerned, foreign policy no doubt has evolved. Our foreign policy,
18:16yes, now when we talk about strategic autonomy, right from independence, if one really reads, we always,
18:22yes, that time we did not have the material capability in terms of our economy, because we just had seen
18:32the horrors
18:32of partition, we were just growing, we had really no resources, so to speak of. So, but we still
18:40had this concept in mind of strategic autonomy, which means basically that there are certain things, certain
18:46places, certain aspects that we need to take decisions on our own, which cannot be under pressure
18:52of some other country. Strategic autonomy, unfortunately, like what we, what is commonly
18:58felt is that we will not, never compromise, never negotiate. No, it doesn't mean that. It is your core
19:05principles, your core, core aspects that guide your foreign policy are non-negotiable and uncompromising.
19:15But rest there is because it's a given thing. So, the evolution, what has happened is that now,
19:20because as our economy grew, and we've come to economy, which is now fairly well recognized globally,
19:28that yes, it is a growing economy, it has got macroeconomic factors are quite stable. So, therefore,
19:36nations, obviously, then now come to us and are interested in engaging more with India. So, that
19:44has a, so economy is also leverage in foreign policy, a good economy leverages foreign policy. Incidentally,
19:51when India's growth rate was good, consistently about seven, seven and a half percent in the
19:55early decade of this century. That is a time when China was very, very considerably passive. I mean,
20:02they were not so belligerent towards us because they knew that India is growing, economic growth is
20:08good. So, there are these factors which are being leveraged. We are leveraging diaspora in our,
20:14as part of our foreign policy. This is something which has, which we see in the last decade,
20:18which has increased substantially. Thereafter, the outreach to countries like Prime Minister Modi's visit
20:24to New Zealand was after Rajiv Gandhi. Rajiv Gandhi was the last Prime Minister. So, these outreaches
20:29have increased tremendously. They are very, very important because unless India communicates its
20:35position, India engages with the world, the world will not understand us. And to make them understand
20:42our point of view, we have to ensure that this outreach is done. We have to engage at different levels.
20:50And having said that, all these heads of government meetings which take place are all good in the
20:56sense that, yes, they are the political directions are given. But the implementation part is the hard
21:01part on ground. And that is where I feel that our foreign policy establishment, our bureaucracy,
21:07the armed forces, the armed forces, they all have to work in mission mode, so that we don't, you know,
21:14it doesn't, it should take too long to follow up on the agreements reach and translate them into concrete
21:20action. And that is where our real challenge lies. Which also brings me to one point that our foreign service
21:26needs expansion with domain experts, not just generalists who know about international relations
21:34theories and things like that. Because you, because today, foreign policy involves everything. You have trade,
21:39information domain, economics, so many things. And that is where we need to give a fillip, because that's how we
21:44will reach at the high table, along with, of course, economic growth and military capability.
21:52That is very true, sir. Thank you so much, sir, for your time and for breaking all of this down
21:57for us so clearly.
21:59So with this, we come to an end with this conversation. Thank you to the audience for
22:04joining us today. We will see you in the next episode. Till then, goodbye.
22:08Thank you. Thank you, Jay.
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