- 2 days ago
Malaysia’s policy of active non-alignment keeps us open to global investments from all sides. But can this pragmatic balancing act hold as tensions rise? Cynthia Ng and a panel of experts break down the real trade-offs between economic growth, territorial claims, and regional accountability under ASEAN
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00:06Hello, you are watching Awani Talk series. My name is Cynthia Ng. Now, for the longest time,
00:12Malaysia's foreign policy has been summed up as friends to all, enemy to none. Now,
00:17that has been a comfortable approach, one that we have enjoyed for decades, but the
00:22global landscape is shifting. Now, we are becoming more competitive and the blocks
00:27are becoming more fractured. Prime Minister Dato Sri Anwar Ibrahim has said this,
00:32we are not passive, but instead we are pursuing what he now terms as active
00:37non-alignment, arguing that we are no longer just sitting on the fence, but we
00:42are strategically expanding our space. Today, we will be exploring what it really
00:48takes to maintain that balance when trade and politics and when public sentiment
00:54are all pulling in different directions. And for this discussion, I am a
00:58privileged to have with me today three panelists who are very experts in their
01:04respective fields and have different perspectives on this issue. I will start
01:07from my right. With me is Ms. Altaf Deviati. She is the Secretary of the Human Rights
01:12Commission of Malaysia, Suhaka. Welcome. And next to me on my left is we have Associate
01:17Professor Dr. Kuo Ying-Hoy from the Department of International and Strategic
01:21Studies, University of Malaya. And rounding up the panel, we have Kamlis Kumar, Associate
01:26Director at Asia Group of Advisors. Thank you so much for being here and welcome to
01:31the program. Alright, I would like to start with a reality check, take on where we
01:36stand at the moment and for that I would like to go to Professor Kuo. When we look
01:41at global power blocks today, it has become more rigid, more competitive. Can Malaysia
01:48realistically remain friends with everyone? Are we forced to choose sides more often than
01:56we want to admit at this point?
01:58Thanks, Cynthia. Well, I think earlier on you were mentioning that our Prime Minister was
02:03using the term active non-alignment. And I think that itself reflects how the global order
02:09has changed. And I don't think it is that rigid. Because when we look at how the global order
02:16is, and especially on the Malaysia side, they have played in quite an active role. And I
02:23wouldn't say choosing sides because when we are talking about foreign policy, there's several
02:29terms that always come into mind. People are always arguing whether are we balancing the power
02:34or are we actually hedging the power. While in the scholarship, people always say it's hedging,
02:40but I don't quite agree fully we are actually hedging in all of the issues. Because in some
02:45of the issues, I think we are balancing in which we might be aligned with certain powers
02:49in order to counter another power as well. So I think we are playing issue-based alignments,
02:55based on the issues. If we look at the Gaza crisis, Ukraine crisis, we might be vocal in certain
03:01issues, but we are not vocal or take on other issues. Similar with the refugees, we are quite
03:06selective when it comes to the issues as well. So I think, yes, active non-alignment in a way,
03:13but selective also in a way.
03:16Okay. And we'll get to what does that mean for us Malaysians, right? Okay. I'd like to get to
03:22the comments because when we hear Malaysia's positioning as a neutral, open economy, that has helped us
03:28immensely. Look at investments, what we're seeing into Johor, into Penang, the MNCs data centres. How much of
03:35that, in your opinion, is driven by Malaysia's foreign policy? Or is it more about industries
03:42and companies finding workarounds because of the trade restrictions, the US-China decoupling? What
03:51is it that's making us a bit more attractive than others?
03:54I think now, if you look at it around the region, Malaysia politically, I think we are a bit more
04:00stable
04:00than the rest of them. I think with Prabowo in Indonesia, things are a bit flipped, as well as
04:05Thailand. So we seem a more attractive place to invest, as well as I think in the past five years,
04:12we have had stability in politics. And now, when the trade cruxes happen, and especially when the world
04:19kind of has to re-shift and pivot their ways, Malaysia seems like a more attractive market because
04:26we are friendly to both sides, we can export to both sides, and essentially we have trade from both
04:33sides, from China and US especially. So I think we seem more and more attractive, and especially
04:38now in Malaysia, having to move up the food chain, we are wanting to move up even the semiconductor ladder
04:45as well. So it seems more attractive for investors to come and put their money here as well.
04:50I think the question then would be, how long will this sustain? Because the trade blocks are getting
04:55more defined. Sure, we are building more alliances with non-traditional partners like BRICS,
05:02for instance, to hedge in some ways. But if it comes to a point where Washington or Beijing turns around
05:09tomorrow and say, hey, you either choose our technology or their market, what is the situation for Malaysia?
05:16I think especially like what Professor said now, I think Anwar, and especially the Prime Minister,
05:22is picking and choosing. And I think that will essentially, and I think what we have gone on in
05:28the past six months to a year is that what benefits Malaysia the most. And I think that will be
05:32the
05:33crux of the decisions that have been made at that juncture of what actually benefits the market.
05:37Alright, thank you for setting the stage. Now, I would like to get to ourself, because we need to bring
05:42this home, external pressures, our foreign policy, they all eventually filter into our domestic
05:47conversations. How do we make sense of the selective considerations that Professor has alluded to
05:54earlier when we choose our trade partners? For instance, we are very clear with Israel,
06:00no trade ties, no diplomatic connections, none at all. But Malaysia also do have diplomatic and trade
06:07relations with countries that do have sketchy or documented human rights concerns. What is your take
06:17between economic pragmatism as well as the values that Malaysia should be upholding?
06:23Okay, that's a tough one to look at. I think to build on what Prof has said, I mean, it's
06:29not,
06:30like she's mentioned, it's not new. Malaysia has always been balancing our foreign policy even before,
06:35and I think it was even tougher before during the Cold War, the Iron Curtain and so forth,
06:38and I think now at least economically we're in a better position. But there is one key challenge
06:43that has arisen that's made it really more challenging, or making Malaysia walk on a bit of a
06:50tightrope, and that is the rise of the digital space. And when you're talking about the rise of
06:56digital space, it's digital security or scrutiny. The public now has more access to what's happening
07:03globally at the tip of the fingers in a second. And this does influence, like it or not,
07:10foreign policy. I mean, one best example is how global solidarity and movement in the issues of
07:19Gaza, the genocide and so forth. But then this also brings home also other issues for things that
07:27are happening in other countries. So the thing that rises now is that what is our standard? What's
07:34our baseline? How does the government balance between who we trade based on what human rights
07:41standard? Because let's face it, a lot of countries have sketchy human rights standards. We historically
07:46also had issues as well. So having to choose that. So what then makes it difficult for the government is,
07:53one, as I think, what you need to project internationally, and second is domestically.
08:00And that, I think, is the challenge. And because unfortunately, when you're having digital scrutiny,
08:05that comes in with a moral lens. And that's really tough when it's coming with foreign policy, how
08:11foreign policy is not dictated on a moral lens. It's about pragmatism. And this pragmatism
08:17is something that really needs to be balanced well.
08:21So is this a point of consistency? Because, okay, when states take differing positions on
08:28international issues, global issues, does that create confusion or even cynicism among the public?
08:35Well, definitely, if the public, I mean, I would think if the public sees that there's double standards,
08:41if there's no consistency, as you mentioned just now, on how we move from one issue to another,
08:45I think the pragmatism even among public knows that we are walking a tightrope. We can't have too much of
08:52a high
08:55benchmark in that sense. But then, how do you explain to the public the transparency that comes with it
09:01is more important than ever. I don't think you can just brush things aside. The public does want some
09:07accountability and transparency on how we choose certain, how we make certain decisions.
09:11I'm going to ask you a right-of-point question. How do you think we're doing at this point?
09:16Okay. I think at one point, we're pretty good, I think, especially in issues where we have global
09:22solidarity. But our challenge is when it hits home, when we need to localize it. And I think this is
09:28where we're having, and the refugee issue is exactly that. Because the refugee issue is smack in our own
09:33backyard. And we're having a serious difficulty from a philosophical angle to a pragmatic policy
09:43angle on how to deal with this. And the lack of a framework on refugee issue itself, or not wanting
09:49to touch it, is really now hurting the country.
09:51And it's not just a human rights issue that we are, how do I put it, more selective in the
09:57way,
09:58how strong our stance is. For instance, let's get issues closer to home like South China Sea, like the
10:03Myanmar conflict, and Thailand, Cambodia. And we often refer to ASEAN centrality as the overarching
10:10response to this sort of issues. Professor Kuo, how can we understand Malaysia's position when all these
10:19issues are happening close to our backyard? But we're sometimes maybe not taking a clear stance
10:25because, is it because we can't afford to? Or is it, again, it's a strategic
10:32measure from the government? Well, actually, I would like to open this up in a much broader sense
10:38before I move to the ASEAN centrality. Just now, when you were asking questions about the domestic
10:43politics, actually, all of the countries, when it comes to the foreign policy, is drafted and the
10:48priorities based on what the domestic politics are. What are your principles? What are your
10:53values? And this is where I think that misalignment happens. Hence, I prefer to use selective, you know.
11:00But the identities of how we're actually championing our foreign policies is a kind of model. It is not
11:07fixed and consistent. I wouldn't say we are that consistent because we are really moving into, you know,
11:13different timing. We might play it differently. And moving to ASEAN centrality, I see almost a similar
11:20pattern sometimes, depending on the issues. For South China Sea, I think Malaysia has just raised the
11:26statements about, you know, our sovereignty as well on the maritime borders. And Myanmar is one of the
11:32longest issues that has been there. And our minister just went there recently and that has created some of
11:38the debates. Are we actually building the relationship with the military junta after the
11:44Shebu ASEAN summit? And I think those are the things that can be controversial when it comes to
11:51questioning about where are we actually moving to. If we really do something based on just issue-based,
11:57then we lost the Malaysia's way of, you know, every country nowadays like to say we are non-alignment.
12:04But what non-alignment means, what neutrality means, I don't see any country that actually
12:09can be neutral in all of the issues, including Malaysia as well. So when it comes to Cambodia,
12:14Thailand, the tension that you earlier mentioned, we somehow also open up the space for external
12:21powers to come in. And that itself might actually dilute a little bit of your ASEAN centrality and
12:28create some controversies back then the last year as well. And until today, Cambodia,
12:33Thailand issue has not been resolved and they have many internal tensions as well. And this year is
12:39Manila as the ASEAN chair and I think these three issues or South China Sea is one of the priority
12:46of
12:46Manila. But these three issues maintain while ASEAN centrality is something that the ASEAN always
12:53champion. We have our agencies and things. But I guess we are trying to do that but we have not
12:59been
13:00there yet because of many factors and I would like to see the main factors as in the issues that
13:07we
13:07have not been able to move forward by looking at non-interference consensus in a more creative way.
13:15Rather, we have allowed the door to open for certain issues to come in that is unnecessary.
13:21How would you like to say it? Give us a sense of when you say you want things better, how
13:26would that
13:26look like?
13:27Well, I think when it comes to ASEAN, of course, now we have 11 members, not only 10. People always
13:33say
13:33that non-interference is one of the principles that we always have. But I think in the past,
13:38in ASEAN history, there are certain incidents that we have actually banned the rule. And what we really
13:45need is the leaders who can actually ban that rule. We banned the rule when it comes to Rohingya
13:50refugees once, but only very briefly. And that becomes something that is just based on episode,
13:57but we are never consistent with what ASEAN stance should be. And I think it really needs the ASEANs
14:05to come together and also maybe give a little bit more power to the ASEAN secretariat itself,
14:10not just leave it to every year we change the ASEAN chairmanship, you know. Every country has
14:16different national interests to protect, national issues to protect. And that makes the ASEAN become,
14:24can be ineffective when it comes to the issues like Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, South China Sea.
14:29Yeah, let me get, come this in. Now we're on topic of South China Sea, for instance,
14:34I'm going to take this point because if you look at the business side of things,
14:39if Malaysia shifted from more quiet diplomacy to more, a louder, more assertive stance,
14:45for instance, South China Sea vis-a-vis China, how would that affect investments? Because we're
14:51talking about trade, investment, jobs, dollar and cents, right? So in your opinion.
14:55I think on the surface level, I guess, government to government, I think there will be a little bit of
15:00trouble. But I think Chinese companies, especially the ones who are looking out, are very pragmatic.
15:05And I think Malaysia is a very big market for them, especially when we speak the language,
15:10there's job opportunities here, we have trade, we have land mass. So I think one of the things is
15:16that they will find a way, either a localised partner or someone and kind of do trade with
15:22Malaysia. I think there has been those instances, even in Penang, back in the day where there is
15:26Tongfu, which is like the third largest semiconductor producer for China, which actually did a joint venture
15:33with AMD in the US and they set up a local entity in Malaysia to actually export to both US
15:39and China.
15:40So those kind of workarounds will be done, I think, especially when it comes to business and where
15:47the money flow is.
15:48So you would say that the pragmatism, the quiet pragmatism of dollar and cents supersedes?
15:56Yes.
15:57Okay. All right. On you still, we are seeing a lot of investment flows from various markets.
16:03Is there, again, some of these countries have very contested human rights issues.
16:10Is there a point where these issues will carry a reputational risk for Malaysia?
16:17I guess there is. There is. And I think it has happened in the past. I think when it comes
16:22to
16:22the glove industry, I think when it comes to palm oil, we have been flagged, I think, internationally
16:27before this. But I think Malaysia is very well aware of the risk. And I think we have had mitigation
16:35steps. And I think our enforcers have acted upon since then. And I think there is room for improvement.
16:42I think Altaf will agree. I see her snickering at me. But I think for business-wise, we are
16:48a palatable country. And I think we would actually kind of make the best business environment for
16:54businesses to thrive in.
16:56All right. Let's get to Altaf. When interests collide, how is that tension managed between
17:03principle and economic priorities?
17:06Altaf. Okay. I definitely agree with what I just mentioned just now. There is a limit to
17:12what we can manage what happens outside of Malaysia, of course, and with external countries, external
17:19partners. So I guess the balancing there is to what extent is our role and are we complicit
17:29in that violation or not? So it's a different kind of benchmark. So I think that if we're not
17:36complicit, it's a bit different. How does that mean? And how does that mean? Of course, it looks
17:42at the value chain and so forth and everything. I think the bigger issue would be how Malaysia
17:45treats internally and domestically. And I totally agree. I think we really have been working quite
17:51well in trying to improve our human track record. I mean, the things that we've done in the, what do
18:00you call that, palm oil industry. I know recently the US has flagged us out on the labour, but the
18:06issue
18:07of labour has been addressed continuously by the government, by civil society as well. And even
18:12with from Swagam, we've been pushing. So I do see a lot of potential to improve. And also because within
18:20ASEAN, because of our trade agreements and so forth, we are definitely complying a lot more with
18:27other regional blocs, the EU for example. And you could really see that. And the fact that the
18:33government has recently launched the National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights, I think that's
18:38clearly one good point that can be raised. So I guess what I'm trying to say here is externally with
18:46other countries. I think there's just so much of what Malaysia can do. But the key part is
18:51complicitness. But I think we should focus domestically in improving what we can do domestically.
18:56Okay. So thank you for bringing up ASEAN again, because this is a very interesting,
19:00we are an interesting block, right? How many people do we have? 600 over a million. And we look at
19:06everywhere around the world. South Asia is a bright, bright spot with what all the geopolitics and
19:14wars happening, right? But often when it comes to hard issues, do you feel that ASEAN is used
19:22as a cover, like a diplomatic shield for avoiding harder choices? I'm going to open this up to
19:30Dr. Koo first, Professor Koo. What are the hard issues? Well, we've mentioned about human rights
19:37issues, and we talk about US trade sanctions, offshoring is a big one. And we talk about supply
19:42chain, just how visible, how meaningful are those investigations and also monitoring of what happens
19:54in our own backyard? Yeah. Well, unfortunately, human rights is a soft issue in politics, whereby
20:02I wish it is a hard issue. Because in ASEAN, there are three pillars. The pillars is always they focus
20:09on economic, you know, economic diversification, economy, the free trade and so forth. So that is
20:16how it forms ASEAN, and that's the image that we basically have. But on the questions of how do we
20:25actually move forward, or when it comes to the issues of the hard issues that we discussed here,
20:32I think 11 members until today, although all the time the ASEAN, they somehow achieved the consensus
20:39and came up with their statement. But internally, we still see the differences. They still carry out
20:47their operations in the different ways. So statement is one thing. I mean, the tariffs by Trump is one
20:56case that we can always see, you know, the ASEAN say, okay, we're going to wait and things like that,
21:01one voice. But after that, you see different countries conduct different lobbying. So that is how the ASEAN
21:08actually move. And I seriously do not think ASEAN, while we talk about unity a lot, I think
21:17on the statement on the paper, yes. But we will still be very much diversified. I mean, many people
21:22like to compare, you know, ASEAN and EU. We are not comparable. We shouldn't compare. We are just very
21:27different. Historically, we are different. And culturally, we are also different. I think what we
21:33should perhaps embrace and see is how the ASEAN is going to be more empowered by and guided by the
21:44principles alone. And I think when we talk about regionalism, when we talk about foreign policy,
21:49that principle is very important. And that principle is not missing. But just that no one is actually
21:54following. If you look at the ASEAN charters and all the principles are there, but they are just simply
22:00not following what they have said. Why is that so?
22:04Why is that so? Because every country has different national interests. And as I earlier mentioned,
22:09I think there's always the debate of how ASEAN secretary is very weak. Yeah. And it's always left to
22:16the chairmanship to actually make the decision. And that is not a good way of moving forward as a regional
22:24organisation. Because we function in a very different way than the EU. That's why I say we can't compare
22:30with EU. EU function in a very different way. They are very united in terms of making a decision and
22:35so
22:36forth, unless we want to move that way. But I don't see in the near future we are moving that
22:40way.
22:41So we have to do things a little bit more differently by looking inside into our ASEAN secretary as a
22:48starting point first maybe. I completely agree with what Professor has to say. I think ASEAN seems a
22:56little bit more of a country club than actually having any sort of a political will or economic
23:00will. And especially when, like Prof highlighted, the Trump tariffs. I think at that time, I think
23:07Malaysia was hosting the ASEAN chairmanship. I think we didn't have the political will to see 11
23:13countries see eye to eye and say, hey, you know what, we are going to do this. We're going to
23:17start
23:17an economic task force, essentially look inwards, open up market access inwards so that we are shielded
23:22from the tariffs. But everybody didn't see eye to eye. They were like, okay, there's a wait and see
23:28approach. We will have negotiations on the side, even though we are discussing as ASEAN as a PAC,
23:34but we are having individual country negotiations. So I think that shouldn't be the way. And I think,
23:39like what Prof has said, I think the ASEAN secretary needs to have more power because
23:44every year you have shifting priorities. Countries shift, you have chairmanship shifting. I think
23:49Prime Minister Anwar did a really good job trying to like get everyone together, kind of in a way
23:55symbolise ASEAN for what it actually should be, could be, would be. But then again, there is no
24:02political will behind it. Do you think when it comes to heart issues, is it better to move collectively
24:08as a bloc or because it's, well, national interest, yes, we have to take that into consideration,
24:13but it does seem that we tend to fall back onto individual countries to countries when it comes
24:20to negotiating trade, negotiating issues. What's your thought here?
24:27Prof. I guess when it comes to negotiating like a national interest or a regional interest,
24:32I think like one, tariffs. I think that was, I think, a worldwide interest. But then again, it hit
24:37Southeast Asia hardest, I guess. And I think we should have come together as a bloc to negotiate
24:43better. So that was one of the things that could have been mobilised. So those are the issues that
24:49you should have. But I think there are issues that are difference in opinions in different countries,
24:54even in ASEAN itself. And there are issues that Malaysia feels strongly about that some neighbours
24:59don't actually feel strongly about. I think even our neighbours, Singapore, don't see eye to eye
25:04with us on several issues or several priorities. So even that itself is a difference in opinion when
25:12we are so close. So I think those are the kind of things that we need to kind of sort
25:16of study. And
25:16in a way that if there is a national priority, if there's a regional priority, those kind of things
25:21we can align as a bloc. All right. Now we are coming to us, we are almost five minutes till
25:26the end of the discussion. So I want to bring this back to a final reflection. I'm going to ask
25:31each
25:31of you for a quick closing thought to answer the question of this panel. Can Malaysia still realistically
25:38hold on to the idea that we can be friends to all and enemy to none in today's world? Let's
25:44start with
25:45Altaf. Well, I think to a certain extent, being a rather small country in a region that still is
25:55struggling to see itself as a regional bloc with shared baggage or shared security issues, it's always
26:05going to be a difficult position. And due to that, we can't afford, and especially with multipolarism
26:13coming up, we can't really afford to choose one over the other. But we can push for certain
26:20strengthenings, for instance, the strengthening of multilateralism, pushing for institutions to be
26:26stronger. And I think this is a role, and I think even Anwar last year did try to push for
26:33that,
26:33did try to strengthen in a way ASEAN, but that's going to be a big challenge.
26:40ASEAN CHANG- The statement, friends to all, enemy to none. I would like to see it not just as
26:47a
26:47slogan, but it's a strategic concept. I would like to put that down. And I think under the Malaysia's
26:56context, my last note for this session will be, I think we should see our Malaysia's foreign policy
27:04moving beyond just personalities. Rather, it should be based on the principles. Because when we actually
27:11examine the Malaysia's foreign policy from the independence days until today, sometimes it's too
27:17personality driven, which is not a good thing when it comes to the country's foreign policy. And I hope
27:23we can move beyond that and have a bit more consistencies on what Malaysia's would like to build
27:29ourselves because we also talk quite a lot about how we want to become an aspiring middle power.
27:35But to become a middle power, not to only based on issues alignment. You do need a strong identity
27:42to call yourself as a middle power, what are the issues that you champion and things like that.
27:48ASEAN CHANG- All right. Can I just round this up?
27:49ASEAN CHANG- I guess in this increasingly more difficult trade routes, I think Malaysia will have
27:55difficulties playing the middle power or walking the tightrope. But we are a traditionally trading nation
28:03and I think we are not big enough to go against any superpowers. And I think the best step I
28:09think for
28:09Malaysia, especially our location is very centralised as well and geographically we are in a very decent
28:15position. So I think we should play advantage to our advantage and be calculative and make the best
28:22decisions when it comes to trade, when it comes to both these superpowers.
28:25ASEAN CHANG- All right. Well, thank you so much for your insights. A complex conversation and clearly
28:29one that is still evolving. Now, once again, thank you to our panellists for sharing your insights and
28:35thank you so much for joining us. You have been watching Awani Talk Series. I'm Cynthia Ng and we hope
28:40to see you again soon.
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