00:00I was going to get your reaction to, of course, that early readout that came out from President Xi in
00:05the Beijing side as these two leaders were actually meeting behind closed doors.
00:10Would you see, I mean, we had a previous guest that said it was pretty strong language when it came
00:15to Taiwan.
00:16Would you agree? And is this some sort of new threat, you think?
00:20Well, there's nothing new under the sun.
00:22You know, since 1971, when Kissinger met with Zhou Enlai, basically, immediately Zhou Enlai talked about Taiwan.
00:30And nonstop. And it was only later that people realized that because Kissinger dismissed it.
00:35And I think the same thing in 1972.
00:37Of course, after Nixon's visit, the Shanghai Communiqué came out very strongly with wording that said the United States acknowledges
00:47that all Chinese on both sides of the strait recognize that there is one China and Taiwan is part of
00:54that China.
00:55And Taiwan is part of China.
00:58So with that wording, Beijing's strategic position has never changed since 1949 to now.
01:06They have been waiting since 1972 for this position of Washington to move forward in favor of Beijing.
01:14And it did not happen at the summit.
01:17And I think it's the best scenario we can hope for.
01:20But I think the real big difference between the two sides is that Xi has made it very clear this
01:25will be very important.
01:26And he invited Taiwan's opposition leader to visit days before this, because this is of the top, top, most important
01:34priority for the Chinese Communist Party.
01:37And they treat it strategically.
01:39On the other hand, for the United States, they have sometimes treated Taiwan as a transactional and as a bargaining
01:46chip.
01:46And that will be a mistake, because in the long term, this will continue to be the most important issue
01:52for U.S.-China relations, without doubt.
01:56Dr. Lin, this is this is David.
01:59Lots of people saw the clip of President Trump not wanting to comment on Taiwan.
02:05I believe it was also not part of the statement.
02:08Was that I don't know, was that perhaps the best form of strategic ambiguity?
02:13Of course, that's an exaggeration.
02:14But or is that in some ways the U.S. somewhat folding and respecting China's red line?
02:19I think, David, you're absolutely right.
02:21I think it was a good strategic move to avoid responding, avoid basically doing this provocatively.
02:31It's the best that the market can hope for, that the world can hope for.
02:36I mean, Taiwan's strategic importance today in the AI transformation around the world, as well as a beacon of democracy,
02:43is something that really cannot be considered in any transactional terms.
02:49So I think the fact that Trump didn't respond to it in the official statement or perhaps hopefully in private
02:56is really the best way to maintain the status quo.
03:01But more importantly, what has happened at home is also very important.
03:04At home, meaning in Washington, there was an arms package that did not go through yet.
03:11But and the United States had not approved this $14 billion arms package.
03:18And Trump at one point has said he was going to consult with Xi Jinping on this.
03:23And that's very dangerous because basically under the Taiwan Relations Act and the six assurances,
03:30the United States continues to sell arms to Taiwan.
03:33And that is very important to maintain the status quo.
03:36And as you said, to maintain strategic ambiguity, the best deterrence is to have strength.
03:42And that's important for Taiwan and for the world.
03:47Given that, you know, Beijing has seemed to be, you know, I guess you say more forthcoming or at least
03:54more, I guess, more stark in their warnings.
03:57I'm just wondering what measures do you think Beijing could potentially pull here if the U.S.
04:05in some ways doesn't comply or even, you know, in some way doesn't really, I guess, appreciate how important Taiwan
04:12is.
04:12What sort of pressure do you think Beijing could still apply here, whether it's military exercises around the island,
04:19whether it's sanctions, whether it's something more diplomatic?
04:22What form could that take, you think?
04:24Beijing has taken all of those actually actions already.
04:28So there is no, how should I say, there's no lack of assertiveness on the part of Beijing.
04:34So what really actually is, and as I said, Beijing is very consistent with its aims and policy and long
04:41term goals.
04:42I think the United States being less predictable has been problematic.
04:47And therefore, I don't think really it's a matter of what can Beijing do more.
04:52It's what can the U.S. do to make its position to maintain strategic ambiguity, but at the same time
04:59maintain that it's maintaining that position to keep the balance in the Taiwan Strait,
05:05so that there will be no chance of, as Mark Carney says, if you're not at the table, you're on
05:12the menu.
05:13And it's very important Taiwan is not on the menu.
05:15If it's in play, the whole status quo could be actually be at risk.
05:22And this risk is really important today more than ever, because in addition to the fact that Taiwan is militarily
05:29important, economically important,
05:31it's the United States' fourth largest trading partner now.
05:35And the Taiwan stock market now is at $4 trillion, surpassing London just recently and being a choke point for
05:45the AI revolution.
05:48I think it's important that nobody considers it ever being at play.
05:53And so the question about what can Beijing do more?
05:56Well, there's little Beijing would do, can do, unless the U.S. is actually agreeing to play.
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