- 18 hours ago
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00:02Controllers in Islamabad watch as Air Blue Flight 202 head straight towards a massive hill.
00:09He's not turning.
00:14They issue urgent warnings.
00:17Turn left immediately.
00:18But fail to prevent a disaster.
00:20Terrain, ahead.
00:21You're going down!
00:30It's the worst accident in Pakistan's aviation history.
00:36When investigators listen to the CVR, they hear the pilots realize they're in danger.
00:42Terrain, sir!
00:45Took steps to avoid it.
00:47Turning left.
00:49But were unable to save the lives of 152 people.
00:54Why aren't we turning left?
00:56The crew knew what they had to do.
01:00They had reported that they were doing what they were supposed to do.
01:04And yet, the aircraft continued to fly in the wrong direction.
01:09BD, BD!
01:14Oh, fuck!
01:17I need a one-zero gravity.
01:18I need a one-zero gravity.
01:19I need a one-zero gravity.
01:34Air Blue Flight 202 begins its early morning descent towards Islamabad, Pakistan.
01:46There are 146 passengers and six crew on board the Airbus A321.
01:57A-Blue 202, expect arrival to ILS runway 30, followed by circling a post to land runway 12.
02:05Understood.
02:05It'll be ILS down to minima, and then left-down wind.
02:10Okay.
02:13Captain Parvez Chowdhury is one of the airline's most experienced pilots.
02:20Najam Qureshi is a former Air Blue pilot who flew with Captain Chowdhury.
02:26Captain Chowdhury had a lifetime of experience flying with the Pakistan International Air
02:31Line.
02:32He had a very successful carrier, and he was pretty much approaching the end of his carrier.
02:36Air Blue 202, clear to 3900 for ILS approach to runway 30, followed by circling approach
02:42to land on 1, 2.
02:45First officer, Syed Ahmed, has less commercial experience.
02:49He's a former F-16 fighter pilot and squadron leader in Pakistan's Air Force.
02:56Air Blue 202, clear to 3900 for ILS, 230.
03:03Clear to descend to 3900.
03:10He had about 300 hours on the type, so just brand new, learning the differences between
03:15the Air Force flying and the commercial flying.
03:20Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, is a city of more than 800,000 people.
03:26It's surrounded by the Himalayan foothills to the north and northeast.
03:34The mountainous terrain means the only approach to Islamabad's runway is from the south.
03:41Due to the wind direction today, planes are landing on runway 1, 2.
03:46They must circle the airport and make a visual approach to the other end of the runway.
03:54It is always safer to land with a headwind as compared to a tailwind.
03:59When the winds change beyond a certain limit, the air traffic controller will switch the runways.
04:05That will ensure the plane lands in a headwind.
04:11Thick clouds envelop the airport, making landings difficult.
04:17China Southern is going around and diverting back to Urumqi.
04:20China Southern confirming, diverting back to Urumqi.
04:31If at any point you lose sight of the airfield, you should abandon the approach completely and
04:39carry out the missed approach procedure.
04:44Flight 202 is now less than 10 minutes from landing.
04:54Gears down.
05:00Gear down.
05:04The plane reaches the minimum altitude to which the pilots can descend without the runway in sight.
05:12As soon as you see the runway, you turn right, and then after that you're supposed to keep the runway
05:17in sight.
05:19Commencing right turn, heading 3, 5, 2.
05:25Call it in.
05:28Air Blue 202, maintaining 2, 500, and turning right, heading 3, 5, 2.
05:35Air Blue 202 confirming, at 2,500, turning right, heading 3, 5, 2.
05:46Captain Chowdhury initiates the first turn of the circling approach.
05:51Air Blue 202.
05:53Continue on the circle for landing on runway 1, 2.
05:57Caution, low clouds and visibility.
05:59Maintain visual with the airport.
06:03Even in the poor weather, it is up to the pilots to decide whether they should continue the approach or
06:09not,
06:09depending whether they have it on the inside.
06:15The controller expects to see the lights of the airbus as it flies past the airfield.
06:29Radar, I can't see Air Blue 202.
06:31What's his current location, please?
06:33He's approaching the no-fly zone north of the airfield.
06:36Instruct him to turn left immediately.
06:41Flight 202 is much further north than expected and needs to turn left for the approach to runway 1, 2.
06:50Air Blue 202, turn left heading 1, 8, 0.
06:56Confirm he has visual with the ground.
06:58If not, instruct him to climb and execute a missed approach.
07:02Air Blue 202, confirm you have airfield in sight.
07:07The controllers had radar.
07:09They could see what the aircraft was doing.
07:12They could see that the aircraft was not doing what the procedure said they should be doing.
07:19Ask again.
07:21Air Blue 202, please confirm you have visual with the ground.
07:33Air Blue 202, visual with the ground.
07:37He's confirming visual.
07:41He's not turning.
07:45Controllers can see that Flight 202 is rapidly approaching the hills north of the airport.
07:56In the cockpit, the pilots are struggling to turn their plane away from the mountains ahead.
08:04Why aren't we turning left?
08:10North.
08:16Why is it turning left?
08:18Terrain ahead.
08:20Pull up.
08:23Terrain ahead.
08:23Terrain, sir.
08:26Instruct him to turn left immediately.
08:30The controllers can't believe what they're seeing.
08:34Here's a guy with 25,000 hours, and he's flying directly towards a mountain.
08:41In the cabin, passengers have become aware that something's not right.
08:51They're approaching the 5,000-foot Magala hills.
08:56Terrain ahead.
08:58Pull up.
08:58Sir, we are going down.
09:00Sir, we are going down.
09:02Sir, we are going down.
09:02Messages from radar turn left immediately.
09:04Terrain ahead.
09:06Pull up.
09:06We are going down.
09:07Pull up.
09:21Flight 202 has crashed into the Magala hills, seven miles from the airport.
09:32Flight 202 has crashed into the Magala hills, seven miles from the airport.
09:41We couldn't get access to it with a car or a truck.
09:46Even with helicopters, there was no place to set down.
09:51So the only way to get to the accident site was with a long, slow climb.
09:58It takes more than half an hour for rescuers and volunteers to make their way up the steep hill
10:04to the crash site in hopes of finding survivors.
10:17When crews do reach the site, they find a scene of complete devastation.
10:35It's the worst accident in Pakistan's aviation history.
10:45Why did a modern airplane fly into well-known mountains north of the airport in Islamabad?
11:00Investigators arrive at the accident site to study the wreckage of Air Blue Flight 202.
11:09When an aircraft flies into mountains, there are really two areas that we're looking at
11:14in terms of the root cause.
11:17One is a sudden and unexpected loss of control.
11:22The other would be the aircraft has actually stayed in control of the pilots
11:27and still somehow been flown into a mountain.
11:34An analysis of the engines shows that they were fully functional at the time of impact
11:39and capable of producing maximum thrust.
11:46Okay, good work everyone.
11:48Start heading back down.
11:50Right, so the stabilizer was set at 3.5 degrees nose up.
11:55Landing gear was down, engines at climb power.
11:59So configured for landing, but climbing at full power.
12:06An examination of the electrical and mechanical components that we could find.
12:11There was no obvious damage or mechanical failure.
12:32For an approach that was supposed to be a very tight approach because of the existence of the hills,
12:40that is extraordinary.
12:43They were approaching from the southeast for a landing here on runway 1-2.
12:56Scattered clouds, rain.
13:00Visibility was at 3.5 kilometers.
13:04Challenging conditions.
13:08Could the cloudy conditions have been a factor in the accident?
13:14When an aircraft flies into high ground,
13:17one thing that is almost certainly a factor is poor visibility.
13:23Low cloud, fog, call it what you will.
13:28Visibility would have been an issue.
13:30But you don't need to see the Margala Hills to know that they're there.
13:39Everyone knows towards the north, east of the runway, there are mountains.
13:43They're clearly marked on the maps.
13:46Terrain ahead.
13:47Start with it going down!
13:49Pull up.
13:51Pull up.
13:57Can the controller explain why the crew of Flight 202 couldn't avoid the mountains?
14:05Radar control informed him he'd be doing the circling approach to runway 1-2.
14:09A blue 202 expect arrival at ILS 3-0, followed by a circling approach to land runway 1-2.
14:17And he understood the approach.
14:19Yes, sir.
14:20He did.
14:22Understood.
14:23It'll be ILS 3-0 down to minima, and then left downwind.
14:30And then?
14:31That's when I assumed control.
14:34As he began the right turn to the circling approach.
14:41The circling approach involves four carefully timed turns.
14:46The first to the right, followed by a left turn that takes the plane parallel to the runway.
14:53The two final turns line the plane up for the landing on runway 1-2.
14:59Pilots must keep the runway in sight for the duration of this approach.
15:07After about a minute, I expected to see him fly by.
15:13But he never did.
15:16I asked the crew if they had the runway in sight, and they confirmed that they did.
15:21Air Blue 202, please confirm you have visual with the ground.
15:28Air Blue 202, visual with the ground.
15:32But he kept flying further and further away from the airport.
15:36Directly towards the hills.
15:40After breaking off from the approach, they were supposed to turn after 30 seconds.
15:45Instead, they kept going for almost two minutes.
15:49We tried to stop him several times.
15:54It was too late.
15:57Message from radar, turn left immediately.
16:08We couldn't prevent...
16:13what happened.
16:20It's all here on the radar track.
16:29Crew knew what they had to do.
16:32They had reported that they were doing what they were supposed to do.
16:36And yet, the aircraft continued to fly in the wrong direction.
16:42Terrain ahead.
16:45Pull up.
16:47How could the pilots have ended up so dangerously off course?
16:58Investigators look into the background of Flight 202's pilots to determine if the approach into Islamabad was mishandled.
17:09The captain had years of experience with major airlines.
17:15Captain Chowdhury has been flying for more than 40 years.
17:19He has accumulated more than 25,000 flying hours throughout his career.
17:25But only about 1,000 of those were on the Airbus.
17:33The first officer, however, is a whole different story.
17:38First officer, Syed Ahmed, had far fewer hours than the captain.
17:43The former fighter pilot had recently joined the airline and had accumulated only 286 hours on Airbus A320 airplanes.
17:56Two very different pilots.
17:59One, during the end of his career, with thousands of hours of experience.
18:04And the other, just starting off his commercial career.
18:08But neither of them had a ton of experience with the Airbus A321.
18:16Did the pilot's lack of experience on this type of plane play a role in the accident?
18:25Experience is generally considered to be an asset.
18:29The only potential downside is that, of course, if you've got a lot of experience of one particular thing,
18:36it actually might be more difficult to learn how to operate this new type of aircraft.
18:49OK, so they're supposed to perform their approach within this area.
18:54Anything beyond this is outside the airport's 4.3-mile protection zone.
19:00OK, let's see his track.
19:04Investigators examine Flight 202's radar track to see how the pilots set up their approach.
19:11All right.
19:13So they make their first turn here.
19:19And then head straight out of the protection zone.
19:25And this left turn takes them directly into the Marukkala Hills.
19:31The radar track shows that the pilots flew closer and closer to the mountains surrounding Islamabad.
19:39Wouldn't they have gotten a warning that they're approaching the hills?
19:48Yes, sir.
19:50It should have sounded 60 seconds before impact.
19:56The enhanced ground proximity warning system looks downward to see the height that you're at above ground.
20:05But it also looks ahead to see any terrain that you're flying towards.
20:14If they got a warning, why didn't they try to pull up or turn to avoid it?
20:25Did the pilots of Flight 202 get any warning of an impending collision?
20:32The crew would have been given pictures on their navigation display of the approaching terrain,
20:38and they would have been given oral warnings.
20:42So since they flew directly into the terrain,
20:46has the enhanced ground proximity warning system completely failed?
21:14The cockpit data shows that in the final minute of the flight,
21:19the crew got 21 separate warnings about the rising terrain ahead.
21:29Okay, so that answers that.
21:34Over 21 times, we saw terrain, terrain, pull up, terrain ahead, pull up.
21:40There's no way that the captain missed that warning.
21:43The enhanced ground proximity warning system was working properly.
21:49If the warning system was operating,
21:52why would the pilots ignore it and allow the accident to happen?
21:56Terrain ahead, pull up.
21:58If you hear a full terrain pull-up warning from the EGPWS,
22:03the reaction should be immediate.
22:05It should be to apply full power, pull the nose of the aircraft up,
22:09get it moving away from the ground.
22:11And that should be done before any questions are asked.
22:19Why didn't the crew of Air Blue Flight 202 act on terrain warnings
22:24and steer their plane away from the mountains?
22:28Islamabad, Air Blue 202.
22:31Investigators listen to the cockpit voice recording.
22:34What are current conditions, please?
22:36Air Blue 202, visibility is now 3.5 kilometers with rain.
22:40Wind, 1, 6 knots, 0, 5, 0 degrees.
22:44Runway 1, 2, currently in use.
22:47They focus on how the crew set up for landing.
22:51It'll be runway 1, 2.
22:53Yes, and visibility is correct.
22:58The weather was marginal,
23:00and marginal weather makes you nervous
23:02because you don't know whether you're going to be able to see anything at all,
23:07and the captain clearly was nervous about this approach.
23:13Did the captain proceed with an approach he wasn't comfortable with?
23:18Set waypoints for runway 1, 2.
23:21Radial 0, 2, 6.
23:23Five miles abeam.
23:32Mate, stop.
23:35Why is he asking him to input a course to the runway?
23:40This is supposed to be a visual approach.
23:45It didn't make any sense for the captain
23:47to be entering waypoints into the flight management system.
23:51The circling approach is, by definition, a visual approach,
23:55so there is no way that any pilot would normally do this.
24:01Then, just two miles from the airport,
24:04the pilots of Air Blue Flight 202
24:07hear of a flight landing ahead of them.
24:23That could have caused the pilot to say,
24:25hey, if they can get in, we can get in, too.
24:29Wait, stop, sir.
24:30So, he starts his turn later than usual,
24:35half a mile from the runway.
24:42Instead of breaking off early,
24:44they had to continue on because of the low visibility
24:46and low ceilings.
24:48And they did not break off to the right
24:49until the last possible point,
24:51which was at the end of the runway.
24:55Concerned with poor visibility,
24:57Captain Chowdhury makes a baffling decision.
25:00Switch into nav mode for managed approach
25:03to runway 1, 2.
25:05There he goes, switching to nav mode.
25:07He can't be visual.
25:11Carrying out the circling approach
25:13using the autopilot to navigate
25:15is a violation of procedures.
25:20As soon as you select the nav mode,
25:22the plane starts to fly the pre-programmed waypoints.
25:26And at this point,
25:29Captain Chowdhury is a normal flying visual approach.
25:44Chowdhury insists he can see the runway,
25:47but investigators are certain he could not.
25:51They can't see the airfield any longer
25:53because they've just got to the far side of it.
25:55There is no airfield inside.
25:59So, instead of turning left
26:02to fly parallel with the runway,
26:05he keeps flying in this direction,
26:08moving further and further from the airport.
26:12Sir, we're reaching higher ground.
26:16Terrain ahead.
26:18Terrain ahead.
26:20Sir, there's terrain ahead.
26:22Sir, turn left.
26:25Terrain ahead.
26:28It should be turning.
26:30Terrain ahead.
26:31As the captain struggles
26:33to turn away from the hills,
26:35Terrain ahead.
26:36Controllers become concerned.
26:38Air Blue 202.
26:40Confirm you have airfield in sight.
26:43What should I tell him, sir?
26:45Terrain ahead.
26:46Tell him.
26:47Tell him.
26:48Pull up.
26:49The crew doesn't reply straight away.
26:52Probably because the first officer knows full well
26:55that no, they don't have visual contact
26:56with the airfield,
26:57but he waits for his captain
26:59to tell him what to say.
27:00Air Blue 202,
27:02please confirm you have visual with the ground.
27:04Terrain ahead.
27:06Pull up.
27:06Air Blue 202,
27:08visual with the ground.
27:11In the end,
27:13the crew tells air traffic control
27:15that they are in visual contact with the ground.
27:18Now, that's not untrue,
27:20but it's not the same thing
27:22as being visual with the airfield.
27:23It feels more like a reply
27:25designed to get air traffic control
27:27off their backs.
27:28Terrain ahead.
27:28Sir, we are approaching.
27:30Terrain ahead.
27:31Yes, I know.
27:32We are turning left.
27:33Pull up.
27:34Pull up, sir.
27:35Sir, pull up.
27:37The captain says he's turning left,
27:39but he keeps flying directly towards the hills.
27:48Investigators are unable to explain
27:50why Captain Chowdhury could not alter his course
27:53and steer away from the mountains.
27:58Terrain ahead.
28:00Sir, turn left.
28:02Pull up.
28:03The final minute of the CVR
28:04reveals a picture of chaos
28:06and confusion.
28:08Pull up, sir.
28:10Sir, pull up.
28:14They're applying power,
28:16trying to climb.
28:19Terrain ahead.
28:20Sir, pull up, sir.
28:23Pull up.
28:24Investigators hear
28:25First Officer Ahmed
28:26pleading with his captain
28:28to pull up.
28:29Terrain ahead.
28:29Why aren't we turning left?
28:32Pull up.
28:33Pull up.
28:35Terrain ahead.
28:37Pull up.
28:38Terrain, sir.
28:41Sir, we're going down.
28:45Pull up.
28:46Message from radar.
28:47Turn left immediately.
28:48Pull up.
28:50Sir, we're going down.
28:52Pull up.
29:01All they had to do
29:03was turn away from those hills.
29:09Despite reacting
29:10to the terrain warnings,
29:12the pilots could not
29:13steer their plane
29:14away from the mountains.
29:18I think they knew
29:19what was happening.
29:21I think they knew
29:22that they had to turn left.
29:23For some reason,
29:24the aircraft didn't turn left.
29:28Will Flight 202's
29:30flight data recorder
29:31explain why Captain Chowdhury
29:33didn't or couldn't
29:35turn and avoid
29:36the mountains.
29:37Can we see the altitude, please?
29:41The minimum altitude
29:42is 2,500 feet.
29:47Investigators can see
29:48that Chowdhury
29:49dialed in an altitude
29:50below what's permitted.
29:52There's only one reason
29:54it would drop below that.
29:58Commencing right turn.
30:00Heading
30:01three, five, two.
30:07There's no earthly reason
30:09for doing it
30:09because the minimums
30:10are there for a very good reason.
30:13The only reason
30:14why they ever break
30:15the minimums
30:16is because they can't
30:17see the ground properly
30:18and they want
30:19to get closer to it.
30:21Can we see the flight path?
30:25You see?
30:27He's way off course
30:28in heavy fog
30:30and has clearly
30:31lost visual.
30:33Let's see the autopilot modes.
30:37So,
30:39he asks the automation
30:41to take over.
30:46More than four miles
30:48off course,
30:49Captain Chowdhury
30:49makes his biggest error
30:51by switching modes
30:53on his autopilot.
30:55The captain switched
30:57from heading mode
30:58to nav mode
30:59and the aircraft
31:01turned left
31:02to heading of 3-0-0
31:07towards the mountain.
31:11The airbus
31:12now makes a left turn
31:14towards a predetermined waypoint,
31:16bringing the flight
31:17dangerously close
31:18to the mountains.
31:21He's approaching
31:22the no-fly zone
31:23north of the airfield.
31:26From this point on,
31:27air traffic control
31:28continued to urge
31:29the flight
31:29to turn left
31:31because they knew
31:32they were in the vicinity
31:33of the high
31:34mountainous terrain.
31:35Terrain, ahead.
31:37Pull up.
31:38Ablo 202,
31:39turn left,
31:40heading 180.
31:41Terrain, ahead.
31:41Why aren't we
31:42turning left?
31:43Pull up.
31:46Can we see
31:47what he's selecting?
31:51He's dialing
31:52in a left turn.
31:59Captain Chowdhury
32:00uses his heading knob
32:02to turn the plane
32:03sharply left
32:04away from the hills.
32:08But the plane,
32:09it keeps flying
32:10in the same direction.
32:12It's not turning.
32:24He's still in nav.
32:28Investigators realized
32:29the captain forgot
32:30that his plane
32:31was in navigation mode
32:33and not heading mode
32:35which is required
32:36to turn the aircraft.
32:38If the aircraft
32:39is flying
32:40in nav mode,
32:41it will keep on
32:43flying on its
32:44predetermined course.
32:45Whether or not
32:47the crew
32:47change the heading select.
32:50Terrain, ahead.
32:51Why aren't we
32:52turning left?
32:53Pull up.
32:55Captain Chowdhury
32:56doesn't realize
32:57that his inputs
32:58are futile.
32:59Pull up.
33:02In order to get
33:03from nav mode
33:04into heading mode,
33:05you pull the knob out
33:06and that engages
33:07heading mode.
33:08Pull up.
33:09He forgot
33:10to pull it out.
33:12He realizes his error
33:14and pulls the knob
33:16here
33:16at 40 seconds
33:18before impact.
33:28When Captain Chowdhury
33:30tries to correct
33:31his error,
33:32he only makes
33:32a bad situation
33:34worse.
33:36Sir,
33:36turn left.
33:38Why, sir?
33:39Turn left.
33:45Captain Chowdhury
33:47has dialed in
33:47so many left turns
33:49that his last input
33:51is now
33:51to the plane's right.
33:54The Airbus
33:54takes the shortest route
33:56to get to that heading,
33:58directly towards
33:59the Margala Hills.
34:05He's in heading mode
34:06for the rest of the flight.
34:13The investigation saw
34:14that the captain
34:15was so reliant
34:15on the automation
34:16that he was trying
34:17to turn the aircraft
34:18to the left,
34:20asking why the aircraft
34:21wasn't turning
34:22to the left,
34:22but he didn't even
34:24use his side stick
34:25and actually turn
34:26the aircraft
34:26to the left manually.
34:28Why aren't we
34:29turning left?
34:30Terrain ahead.
34:32Investigators
34:32now know why
34:33Captain Chowdhury
34:34was unable
34:35to turn left
34:36and avoid the mountains.
34:37But one question remains.
34:40Why didn't the
34:41first officer
34:41recognize the mistakes
34:43and do something
34:44to correct them?
34:45Sir, we're going down!
34:52100 knots.
34:54Check.
34:55Investigators
34:56find a possible explanation
34:57for the first officer's
34:59puzzling behavior.
35:00V1.
35:01At the very start
35:03of flight 202.
35:05Rotate.
35:07As it took off
35:08for Islamabad.
35:10The flight starts
35:12with the pilots
35:13working efficiently
35:14as a crew.
35:15Positive rate.
35:17Gear up.
35:23Gear up.
35:27The takeoff
35:28from Karachi
35:29is textbook.
35:33From initial
35:35pushback startup
35:36and all of it
35:37to takeoff,
35:38everything seemed
35:39normal.
35:42We are clear
35:43to climb to flight level.
35:44Explain to me
35:45why that is blue
35:46but the other symbols
35:48are white.
35:50The pilot's
35:51cordial relationship
35:53soon changes.
35:56Sir?
35:57There,
35:58on your display.
35:59Why is that symbol
36:00blue but the others
36:01are white?
36:02You should know
36:03why that is.
36:05I believe
36:06it's because
36:07the flight plan
36:08defers from
36:08the current route.
36:09No, that's wrong.
36:10It's because
36:11it's the one
36:12being navigated
36:13towards basic.
36:15Do you know
36:16how to modify
36:16this point?
36:19From the main menu?
36:21Oh, you don't
36:21need to return
36:22to the main menu.
36:23You can do it
36:24on the screen.
36:26What did they teach
36:27you in that
36:28so-called training
36:29of yours?
36:31Captain Chowdhury
36:32is heard quizzing
36:33and berating
36:34his first officer.
36:37This wasn't
36:38normal behaviour.
36:39It seems
36:40it was only
36:41really for the purpose
36:42of putting
36:43his first officer
36:44in his place,
36:46making sure
36:47he knew
36:47who was in charge
36:48and
36:49to do
36:50as he was told.
36:52What's he doing?
36:55If you don't
36:56know how to
36:56use the flight
36:57management system,
36:59then what use
37:00are you in the
37:00cockpit?
37:01You might as well
37:02go back and help
37:03the girls serve tea.
37:07Yes.
37:09Sorry, sir.
37:18What about
37:19maximum thrust
37:20available for
37:20climb?
37:21Can you at least
37:22tell me what that
37:22is?
37:23This has been
37:24going on for nearly
37:25an hour now.
37:26Told you.
37:30Radio ahead
37:30to Islamabad
37:31for the weather.
37:34You know
37:34how to use
37:35the radio?
37:35Yes.
37:39Captain Chowdhury
37:40is a very
37:41experienced pilot.
37:42He should know
37:44that this is not
37:45how he behave
37:46on the flight
37:47deck of an airliner.
38:02Investigators
38:03wonder why
38:04Captain Chowdhury
38:05would act so
38:06aggressively
38:06towards his
38:07first officer.
38:09He was recently
38:10treated for
38:10diabetes and
38:11hypertension
38:13but deemed
38:14fit to fly.
38:17Anything?
38:18Pilots who
38:19flew with him
38:20said he was
38:20demanding,
38:21sometimes difficult,
38:24but nothing
38:25at this level.
38:27Maybe it had
38:28more to do
38:28with him.
38:31Could the
38:32first officer's
38:33background have
38:34affected his
38:35captain's
38:36attitude towards
38:37him?
38:41In Pakistan
38:42there has been
38:43a hidden rivalry
38:43between Air Force
38:45pilots and the
38:47people who are
38:48in the commercial
38:48side already.
38:50They feel that
38:51Axe Air Force
38:52guys, they are
38:52taking away their
38:53opportunities.
38:58investigators believe
38:59that the captain's
39:00abusive behavior
39:01might explain one
39:03of the mysteries
39:03of this tragedy,
39:05why first officer
39:06Ahmed never took
39:07control of the
39:08plane.
39:11All the first
39:12officer had to do
39:13was to take manual
39:14control of the
39:15aircraft and fly it
39:16away from the
39:17mountain.
39:20investigators scrutinize
39:22first officer
39:22Ahmed's actions
39:24leading up to the
39:24crash of flight
39:25202.
39:27His first
39:27officer tells the
39:28captain to pull up
39:29three times and
39:30turn left.
39:32Twice.
39:33But he never says
39:35he's taking control.
39:41If I were the
39:41first officer, I'll
39:43take over the
39:44control, pull back
39:45on the side stick
39:46to create the
39:47max performance
39:48maneuver, apply
39:48toga thrust, and
39:50keep climbing till
39:51I'm clear of the
39:52hills.
39:54The team believes
39:55the captain's
39:56behavior earlier in
39:58the flight explains
39:59why the first
40:00officer allowed him
40:01to mishandle the
40:02approach.
40:03If you don't know
40:04how to use the
40:05flight, you can
40:06management system,
40:07then what use are
40:08you in the
40:09cockpit?
40:12We have the
40:13captain's behavior
40:14which was so
40:15overbearing, so
40:16autocratic, so
40:18nasty, that it
40:21served to
40:21completely shatter
40:22the self-confidence
40:23of the first
40:24officer.
40:25First officer
40:27Ahmed allows
40:28procedures to be
40:29set aside.
40:30Switch into
40:31nav mode for
40:33managed approach
40:34to runway 12.
40:39and then fails to
40:41take control
40:42when his captain
40:43flies the plane
40:44directly towards the
40:45mountains.
40:47He was so worn
40:48down by the
40:48captain's harsh
40:49behavior that he
40:51just couldn't stand
40:51up to him.
40:52He became a
40:54bystander.
40:59The first officer
41:00clearly knows that
41:02what they're doing
41:02is wrong.
41:03He knows that his
41:04captain is
41:05disoriented, that the
41:07aircraft is on a
41:08collision course with
41:09a mountain, and yet
41:11somehow he doesn't
41:13have it in him to
41:14intervene.
41:17Terrain ahead.
41:18Pull up.
41:19Sir, we are going
41:20down.
41:21Sir, we are going
41:22down.
41:23Three and a half
41:24minutes after the
41:25start of the
41:25approach,
41:26Pull up.
41:27We are going
41:27down.
41:28The Airbus slams
41:29into the hills,
41:33killing everyone on
41:34board.
41:41This is one of the
41:42most extraordinary
41:44accidents I've seen.
41:48There were no
41:49technical factors in
41:51this accident.
41:53There was nothing
41:55wrong with the
41:56aircraft.
41:56There was nothing
41:57wrong with the
41:58engines.
41:59It was all a matter
42:01of human misjudgment
42:02and human error.
42:10If he doesn't try
42:11the approach in
42:12nav mode, there's
42:14no accident.
42:16All the warning
42:17signs were there,
42:19telling them what
42:19to do.
42:22It should have been
42:23easy to recover.
42:25Very.
42:27If he hadn't taken
42:28his first officer
42:28out of the picture,
42:31different outcome.
42:34Absolutely incredible.
42:41It's hard to believe
42:43that somebody of his
42:44experience would make
42:46so many errors and
42:49mishandling of the
42:51aircraft.
42:53It just defies logic.
42:58The final report into the
43:00crash of Air Blue
43:01Flight 202 makes
43:03several recommendations
43:04to Pakistani
43:05airlines, including
43:07better briefings on the
43:09circling approach
43:10procedures and better
43:12crew management
43:13training.
43:15This accident shows that
43:17cockpit management and
43:19the atmosphere in the
43:19cockpit that's set by the
43:21captain is just as
43:22important as an operating
43:24aircraft and operating
43:25engines.
43:26And in 2018, the
43:29airport in Islamabad is
43:30replaced with a more
43:31modern airport with two
43:33runways that are well
43:34away from the hills that
43:36claim the lives of the
43:37152 people on board
43:39flight 202.
43:44As I learned more, I
43:47really felt extremely bad.
43:51I felt very sad about that
43:54loss.
43:59It was a preventable
44:00accident.
44:03O
44:03that was a
44:03able
44:03transmits
44:03to
44:03of
44:03you
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