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00:01V-1, rotate.
00:03As Air Algeria Flight 6289 lifts off from Tamanrassit, Algeria...
00:09Gear up.
00:10...air traffic controllers hear an explosion.
00:21The plane crashes into the desert.
00:24102 people are killed.
00:28Investigators examine engine debris found on the runway.
00:33Looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guideway.
00:35They know an engine failed, but not why the pilots couldn't recover.
00:40Pilots are expected to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing where they've lost an engine.
00:46The investigation reveals a crew that was struggling, not with the plane...
00:51Let go. Take your hand away.
00:52I let go. I let go.
00:54...but with each other.
00:55Which one of them is actually flying the plane?
01:00Oh, fuck.
01:20¡Suscríbete al canal!
01:36Seatbelts. Seatbelts.
01:40There are 97 passengers on board.
01:43Among them, members of the local football team headed to a tournament and military personnel.
01:49Seatbelts. Seatbelts.
01:51Though there are some European nationals, almost everyone on board is Algerian.
02:06Now the instrument transfer switches. Normal.
02:13In the cockpit, pre-flight checks are underway.
02:17Your damper. On.
02:22Today's flight is operated by Air Algerie, a state-owned national carrier.
02:28Air Algerie is a publicly-owned company that is owned by the country of Algeria.
02:33The country takes a lot of pride in this particular airline because it is the face name of the country
02:43as it goes all around the world.
02:4762.89, casting latest weather.
02:50Yes, the wind is calm. Temperature 23. Q&H 1020. QFE 965.
02:58Copy. We'll call you back for engine start.
03:0244-year-old Fatima Yousfi is the first officer of this flight.
03:07She is Algeria's first female commercial pilot.
03:12The female first officer was one of the first women to be hired in an airline in Algeria,
03:19which would be a big deal in such a male-dominated field, especially in that country.
03:25As the first woman to pilot a Boeing 747 trans-oceanic flight, Lynn Rippelmeyer knows what it's like to blaze
03:33a trail.
03:37Aviation was then and still is in some cases a boys' club.
03:44Back in the beginning of when women were initially beginning in aviation here in the States,
03:50maybe it's like it was for her, that it was unusual.
04:00Tamaracet, 62.89. We request clearance for Khardaya.
04:04Received. We will call you back.
04:10Hey, Buala.
04:11Hey.
04:12We've got some Tamaracet football players back there.
04:15Oh. Tell them we're rooting for them this weekend.
04:1848-year-old captain Bualem Benawicha has over 10,000 flying hours.
04:25A thousand of those hours are on the Boeing 737.
04:28The captain was highly experienced, had been flying for over 20 years
04:32and then flown all kinds of aircraft from small aircraft to large jetliners.
04:3762.89. Tamaracet.
04:40Go.
04:41Start approved. Call back for taxi.
04:43Roger.
04:46At 3 p.m., the pilots get clearance to start up the engines.
04:52Okay, before I start checklist.
04:54Fuel quantity.
04:569,800 kg.
04:59Pumps.
05:02On.
05:05Flight 62.89 is a Boeing 737-200, an early generation of the popular twin-engine jetliner.
05:15The Boeing 737-200 is one of the most common types of commercial airliners in the world,
05:21and there are different variations of it.
05:24The Boeing 737-200 is an original version of the 737,
05:30so it's an older model,
05:32and it's not as highly sophisticated in technology as the current 737s.
05:42Flight 62.89 will be departing from Tamaracet,
05:46with a scheduled stop in Gardaia,
05:49and then on to the capital, Algiers.
05:52The total flying time is approximately three hours.
06:01That is taxi, Air Ageri, 6289.
06:066289 Tamaracet, taxi onto runway 02 and backtrack.
06:11Wind 030 at 10 knots.
06:14Roger.
06:15Taxing for runway 02, then backtracking 6289.
06:22As they taxi to the runway, passengers settle in for the journey.
06:39We are ready, 6289.
06:446289 Tamaracet, cleared for takeoff runway 02.
06:47Wind 3-3-0 at 12 knots.
06:50Clear for takeoff on runway 02 at Ageri, 6289.
07:03You have 90 knots.
07:05100 knots.
07:29But seconds after takeoff...
07:32Gear up.
07:35A loud explosion rocks the airplane.
07:43Bismillah, what's going on?
07:45The pilots assess the situation.
07:48Let go, let go.
07:49I let go, I let go.
07:53Passengers sense something has gone wrong.
07:58We have a small problem, 6289.
08:016289, come at answer.
08:06The 737 is approaching a stall.
08:166289, are you in emergency?
08:30The pilots make desperate attempts to recover the aircraft, but their efforts are in vain.
08:38The plane, the plane goes into a freefall.
08:42The passengers brace themselves.
08:54The plane bursts into flames and skids across the desert just outside Tamaracet Airport.
09:02Emergency response is immediately activated and firefighters rush to the scene.
09:15The impact and fire that ensued afterwards made survival very unlikely for the passengers in the aircraft.
09:24But then, against all odds, rescuers discover a survivor.
09:29Not within the wreckage, but lying in the distant sand, clinging to life.
09:35A gentleman seated all the way in the back that didn't have his seatbelt on.
09:40So when the airplane crashed and broke apart, he was thrown free.
09:45He shows only faint signs of life as an ambulance rushes him to hospital in critical condition.
09:53Defying all expectations, the man's condition soon stabilizes, and he begins to recover.
09:59This passenger's luck cannot be overstated in what was Algeria's worst aviation accident at the time.
10:08He is the sole survivor out of 103 passengers and crew.
10:14While the country mourns the tragic loss of a football squad, Algerian and French families grieve their loved ones and
10:23soon demand answers.
10:29The investigation into the crash of Flight 6289 is conducted by a commission of inquiry established by the Algerian Ministry
10:39of Transport.
10:40They receive support from several international agencies, including the NTSB, America's National Transportation Safety Board.
10:51I was the U.S. accredited representative for this accident to assist the Algerians.
10:56Initially, I wasn't going to travel to the scene.
10:58However, the U.S. ambassador to Algeria requested our assistance.
11:05While Algerian investigators await the arrival of their American colleagues, they interview the Taman-Rasset air traffic controller.
11:16Did the pilots indicate that there was an issue?
11:21The first officer called only seconds after takeoff.
11:26We have a small problem, 6289.
11:30Pilots typically are hesitant to call Mayday, Mayday, or announce some type of emergency, particularly if they really don't know
11:40what the situation and the critical nature of the situation is.
11:46And what was the problem?
11:48They didn't say.
11:49But I heard something that sounded like an explosion.
11:54Seconds later, the plane was falling out of the sky.
11:59You said an explosion.
12:02That's what it sounded like.
12:05Like a bomb?
12:10Couldn't say.
12:15So in 2003, Algeria was not the safest place.
12:18There was bombings and terrorist activities because they were coming out of 11 years of civil war.
12:26When the plane fell, was it in one piece?
12:29Yes, it was.
12:32Investigators found the airplane intact.
12:35There are no claims of responsibility by terrorists.
12:38So it pretty much ruled out that there was some type of nefarious means to bring the aircraft down.
12:44Can you describe how the plane fell?
12:48It was nose up and crashed near the threshold of runway 20.
12:57The controller and other witnesses saw that the airplane was struggling to climb, had a nose-high pitch attitude, and
13:06then impact the ground.
13:09Eyewitnesses recall that the plane struggled to gain enough lift to remain airborne, an indication it was in a stall.
13:18One week after the incident, Algerian investigators are joined by a member of the NTSB.
13:27Air traffic controller and witnesses described seeing a stall, and one witness remarked that the landing gear was down.
13:36If the landing gear is still down while the aircraft is trying to climb, it creates a lot of drag
13:43on that airplane.
13:44It takes a lot of thrust and a lot of power to maintain the climb to overcome all that drag
13:50from the landing gear.
13:52That would affect a plane's ability to climb, but that alone wouldn't cause a stall.
13:58That has to mean something else.
14:00To the load sheets?
14:01Yes, right here.
14:04One of the big questions is about the aircraft weight, because if you're too heavy, you won't climb as well
14:10as if you're within the weight envelope.
14:14Investigators review the plane's load sheet to see if the plane was overweight before takeoff.
14:19Looks like the first officer made some corrections here.
14:24While reviewing the load sheet, the first officer notices the fuel weight is wrong, and changes it from 8,800
14:32kilograms to the correct amount of 9,800 kilograms.
14:42So, with those corrections, the weight at takeoff would have been 48,708 kilograms.
14:48And the maximum weight allowed at takeoff would be 49,500 kilograms.
14:54The first officer noticed that there was a 1,000 kilo difference, and passenger count was a little bit off,
15:01which didn't make a whole lot of difference in the overall weight and balance, but did show that she was
15:06very attentive in her duties.
15:09The aircraft weight was right up against the maximum takeoff weight.
15:13Even though it was heavy, the aircraft weight shouldn't have affected the performance too much.
15:19What about mechanical failure?
15:21I'll get the maintenance reports.
15:26Investigators make sure that the maintenance is clean, and the aircraft has a clean bill of health prior to the
15:31flight.
15:36It was up to date in its maintenance cycle.
15:38No work deferred, no technical exemptions.
15:42The maintenance reports provide no leads.
15:46Maybe there was an environmental factor at play.
15:51Take a look at this.
15:53Did the location of the airport have something to do with the stall?
15:59Temperature's 23 degrees Celsius.
16:01So it's hot.
16:04Tamarissat is in a harsh desert climate, and the high temperatures can affect the aircraft's performance and climb.
16:11And the airport sits at 4,518 feet above sea level.
16:16At this altitude, the air is already thin.
16:19If you factor in the heat, it's high-density altitude that affects the performance of the airplane.
16:26So it's generating much less lift over the wings, so it takes longer to get the airplane airborne.
16:33So just a few pounds below max takeoff weight, high elevation airport, high temperature, landing gear extended.
16:40That could definitely cause a plane to stall.
16:44But that doesn't explain the explosion.
16:47Right.
16:48What are we missing?
16:56Investigators study the crash site of Flight 6289 for evidence that could explain the explosion heard seconds after takeoff.
17:06So, the first point of impact is here.
17:135,396 feet from the takeoff point.
17:17Skidded through the airport perimeter fence, across the road, and came to rest here, less than 300 feet outside of
17:25the airport.
17:34The plane is destroyed by the fire, but the main wreckage is practically in one piece, except for the rear
17:39section.
17:40And look at this debris.
17:43This was on the runway, right about here.
17:49Engine debris.
17:52On the runway, we found a large quantity of engine debris, which is indicative of an engine shelling.
17:56When a large quantity of engine blades are thrown out the back end of an engine.
18:04It's an old adage in accident investigation, what fails first, falls first.
18:12So, if they find debris prior to finding the wreckage, then they know that happened prior to the accident.
18:18So, one of the engines blew out.
18:20That must have been the explosion the controller heard.
18:25What caused the engine failure?
18:29We needed to get our eyes on those engines to determine which failed and why it failed.
18:35Investigators begin a visual inspection of the plane's engines, starting with the right one.
18:41Take a look at the fan blades.
18:44Heavy deformation.
18:47It was definitely rotating at the time of impact.
18:51On the right engine, we showed that it was turning at impact.
18:54We don't know exactly what level of thrust it was rotating at.
19:00If the right engine was operating on impact, then did the left engine fail?
19:10These turbine blades have far fewer deformations than the right engine.
19:14Looks like it was barely moving.
19:17The hot section is completely torn apart.
19:21In an engine's hot section, fuel is ignited in a combustion chamber,
19:26generating a powerful stream of hot air that spins the turbine blades.
19:33The damage is evidence that the left engine failed.
19:37We knew that the failure was in the hot section,
19:40so we had to follow every lead that we could to determine where the failure occurred.
19:51There's a bunch of blades missing from the hot section.
19:55The missing pieces are most likely the debris that we found on the runway.
20:00We found that the hot section was basically corn-cobbed, as we say.
20:04There was not many blades left in the hot section,
20:07and there was metal all over the place.
20:10What caused the blades to break?
20:13Let's get some of these parts out on the table.
20:16And we wanted to further tear down the engine.
20:19We wanted to look at the failures under the microscope.
20:21We wanted to look at the metallurgical aspects of the failure.
20:24We wanted to look to see if there was a bird strike.
20:28Investigators begin by examining components from the hot section
20:31in search of pre-existing defects.
20:36Managed to remove the sediment from the nozzle vein.
20:44Nozzle guide vanes direct the hot air flow in the combustion chamber
20:49to the blades of the high-pressure turbine, causing them to spin.
20:59Interesting.
21:14Looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guide vanes.
21:19Investigators find evidence of fatigue cracks
21:22in two of the left engine's nozzle guide vanes.
21:25This type of cracking occurs over time, and as the engine ages,
21:29these cracks get slightly larger, and eventually they will fail,
21:34and it will destroy the entire engine.
21:38If this was a progressive failure, why wasn't it caught earlier?
21:45This type of cracking is typical of an older engine,
21:47and it's a progressive failure.
21:49So that gets us into the question of what was the maintenance history,
21:52what was the inspection criteria that was used by the operator.
21:57Investigators look into the engine's repair history.
22:02It looks like the left engine was completely overhauled four years ago.
22:07When would have been the last time they looked at the nozzle guide vanes?
22:10During the hot section maintenance inspection, which was last year.
22:15Any mention of cracking?
22:17Any work done on any of them?
22:21Inspections of the hot section are meant to catch fatigue cracks.
22:25So why weren't these found?
22:28Since this was an Algerian-registered aircraft,
22:31it falls under the authority of the Algerian Civil Aviation Authority
22:35for oversight of the inspection,
22:37not the FAA, which typically has more stringent requirements.
22:42The crack formed at some point.
22:44It was missed during the inspection last year.
22:47It grew and grew until a point of failure,
22:49and then blew out at takeoff.
22:51That explains why the engine failed.
22:54Not why the plane stalled.
22:57Pilots are expected to demonstrate their ability
23:00to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing
23:05where they've lost an engine.
23:07Investigators examine the crew's training records
23:10to determine if they knew how to handle
23:12a single-engine failure on takeoff.
23:17The first officer's last exercise in engine failure during takeoff
23:21was four months ago.
23:22The captain's training was even more recent,
23:24only two months before the crash.
23:26They both should have known what to do in this situation.
23:31They've got the airplane veering to the left.
23:35There's no way they didn't know that engine failed.
23:39So what did they actually do?
23:46Investigators prepare to listen to the cockpit voice recorder
23:49from Air Algerie Flight 6289.
23:54It was very important for us to listen to the CVR
23:56to determine how the pilots dealt with this engine failure.
24:00Got it queued up to right before takeoff.
24:07V1, rotate.
24:19They hear the sound of the engine failing
24:22five seconds after takeoff.
24:25Bismillah, what's going on?
24:29Let go, let go.
24:30I let go, I let go.
24:35They transferred control in the middle of an emergency.
24:39That didn't even sound like a proper transfer.
24:41He just took the controls.
24:43For another pilot to take control
24:46from the pilot who is flying,
24:49the pilot needs to say,
24:50I've got it.
24:51Taking control of the airplane
24:53without saying he was taking control
24:55made things worse for him
24:56and for the first officer.
24:58The captain is the pilot monitoring.
25:00He shouldn't be taking over.
25:01He should be diagnosing the problem.
25:04So, do either of them identify a left engine failure?
25:10After handing over control to the captain,
25:12the first officer realizes
25:14they aren't properly configured
25:16to climb with only one engine.
25:20Get up or are we okay?
25:22But there's no response from the captain.
25:27We have a small problem, 62-89.
25:2962-89, time and last time.
25:34Just seconds after the engine failure,
25:36the situation deteriorates
25:38as the plane begins to stall.
25:45There are no attempts by the pilots
25:47to work together
25:48to identify or troubleshoot the problem.
25:52Let go, take your hand away.
25:53I let go, I let go.
25:54Let go, take your hand away.
25:56I let go.
25:57Don't sink.
25:59Seconds later,
26:00the ground proximity warning activates,
26:02indicating the plane
26:03is getting dangerously close to the ground.
26:08Please, take your hand away.
26:11Both pilots really didn't know
26:13what the other was doing,
26:14didn't know what the other expected of them,
26:16and may well have been working
26:18at cross purposes.
26:19And as a result of that,
26:21the team performance broke down.
26:32I don't hear a single mention of engine failure.
26:35And why was he telling her
26:36to let go so many times?
26:37Was she trying to take back control of the plane?
26:40Which one of them is actually flying the plane?
26:42When all was said and done,
26:45the pilots did not work together.
26:46Without more information from the flight data recorder,
26:49we really don't know exactly
26:51what they did to control the airplane.
26:54Investigators turned to the flight data recorder,
26:57or FDR, from flight 6289,
27:00to determine how the pilots tried to recover
27:02from the loss of the left engine.
27:05Flight data recorders are important to investigators
27:08because it gives them information
27:10on how the pilots were operating the airplane
27:13and how they were managing
27:15the critical situation they were in.
27:19Not much here.
27:21Older plane, older FDR.
27:25And it doesn't actually tell us
27:26how the pilots were handling the engine failure.
27:30Because we only had five parameters on the FDR,
27:33we had to go to Boeing
27:34and ask for a detailed aircraft performance analysis
27:37to determine what happened on this accident flight.
27:43Using the FDR's limited data,
27:46Boeing's performance study
27:48includes a reconstruction of engine operations
27:51and flight controls
27:52in the final moments of the flight.
27:56So, there is the left engine
27:59losing its thrust after it blows out.
28:02That's odd.
28:03The data from the fully functioning right engine
28:07shows something unexpected.
28:09Look at the thrust from the right engine.
28:12Yes, it seems to be going up and down.
28:14But we know it was working fine.
28:17That can only mean one thing.
28:23Bismillah, what's going on?
28:25The team finds evidence of thrust
28:28being added to the right engine.
28:31Let's go, let's go.
28:32And then pulled back.
28:34I let go, I let go.
28:37When one engine fails,
28:39what you need is maximum power
28:41on the other engine,
28:43not reduce it.
28:44So, thrust is pulled down,
28:47then back up,
28:49then down,
28:50then back up again.
28:53We have a small problem, 62-89.
28:5562-89, come at our set.
29:02Let go.
29:06It's as if they were
29:07having some sort of a tug of war.
29:10It shouldn't have been.
29:12First officer did the right thing
29:14by increasing the power
29:15of the right engine.
29:17What likely happened
29:18is that the captain
29:19wasn't fully aware
29:20of which engine had failed.
29:21However, the first officer
29:23knew that the left engine
29:25had failed
29:26and was trying to push up
29:27the throttle on the right engine
29:28to keep them from stalling.
29:34Let go.
29:34Take your hand away.
29:35I let go.
29:36I let go.
29:36Let go.
29:37Take your hand away.
29:38Let go.
29:39I let go.
29:40Don't think.
29:41Don't think.
29:44The captain's basically
29:45telling the first officer
29:46to get out of his way,
29:48to leave him alone,
29:49to let him be in charge
29:53of the airplane by himself,
29:54which he was.
29:56Knowing that the left engine
29:57had failed,
29:58the first officer
29:58might have been trying
29:59to help things out
30:00by increasing the power
30:01on the right engine.
30:04Please.
30:04Take your hand away.
30:11The moment the captain
30:12reduced the thrust
30:13on the right engine
30:14and never returned it
30:15to takeoff thrust,
30:17with the gear down,
30:18it doomed the flight.
30:22Pilots should have been able
30:23to work together
30:23to recover the plane.
30:25These planes are designed
30:27to fly with a team.
30:29Pilot flying,
30:30pilot not flying,
30:31both have very specific roles
30:33that they are trained to do,
30:37but especially in emergencies.
30:39They stay in their roles,
30:40they help each other,
30:41they work as a team,
30:42and this crash
30:44could have been avoided
30:45if they would have done that.
30:48Why didn't the crew
30:49of Air Algerie Flight 6289
30:52work together
30:53to prevent the loss
30:55of 102 lives?
30:59Okay.
31:00I'll queue it up
31:01to the pre-flight preparations.
31:05Investigators return
31:06to the cockpit voice recording
31:08of Flight 6289
31:10to understand
31:11why there was a lack
31:12of coordination
31:13between the two pilots.
31:16Now that instrument
31:17starts for switches,
31:19normal.
31:21Your damper,
31:23on.
31:26They listen
31:27as the first officer
31:28works through
31:29the pre-flight checklist.
31:31They're surprised
31:32by what they don't hear.
31:35Where's the captain?
31:37Is she doing
31:38the flight preparation
31:39by herself?
31:42Visualization mode selector.
31:44Auto.
31:45Okay, flight instrument.
31:48We found that
31:49the first officer
31:50was actually in the cockpit
31:52by herself,
31:53conducting most of the pre-flight
31:54work without the captain.
31:59It's unusual for the captain
32:02not to be present
32:03during the pre-flight
32:04because there are responsibilities
32:05that the captain has
32:07to get his side
32:08of the airplane ready.
32:09It's just inappropriate
32:11for the captain
32:12not to be
32:13in the cockpit
32:14during the pre-flight.
32:15and it's actually
32:16kind of rude.
32:18It's only after
32:19the first officer
32:20completes
32:21the pre-flight preparations
32:22that the captain
32:24enters the cockpit.
32:25The last Q&H,
32:26one zero one nine.
32:27One zero one nine, Roger.
32:30Good afternoon, Captain.
32:31How are we looking?
32:33Good.
32:34I completed
32:35the pre-flight checklist.
32:36I tested your oxygen
32:37and everything
32:39is set to go.
32:40Good, good.
32:43Captain Benwisha
32:44is late.
32:45Leaving his responsibilities
32:47to the first officer.
32:49When the captain showed up
32:50he was not
32:51in the mindset
32:51of getting
32:53brought up to speed
32:54or being part of the team
32:55of setting the cockpit
32:56up for the flight.
33:01Heading.
33:02Zero two zero.
33:04Altitude.
33:06Investigators then
33:07hear the pilots
33:08performing their
33:09before start checklist.
33:11Two eight zero.
33:12You know,
33:13I could have been
33:14on the team
33:15with those boys
33:16back there.
33:16Give me a break.
33:18Who's the third voice?
33:20Flight attendant?
33:23The only male flight attendant
33:24is the chief flight attendant.
33:28Okay, takeoff speeds.
33:31As part of the checklist,
33:33the first officer
33:33reviews the takeoff speeds.
33:38V1, 144 knots.
33:42VR, 146 knots.
33:43You're saying
33:43you were good enough
33:44to turn pro?
33:46Yeah.
33:47I was a good footy player.
33:49You wanted a scout
33:50come watch me play?
33:50Yeah, they were scouting you
33:51to mow the pitch.
33:55V2, 150 knots.
33:57Okay, that's enough.
33:58I understand.
33:59Can we go?
34:01I got it.
34:02I got it.
34:02Let's go.
34:08So the captain
34:09is just carrying on
34:09a conversation
34:10with his friend
34:10while they're doing
34:11their before start checklist.
34:13What is even worse
34:14is he cuts her off
34:14before they could
34:15even finish it.
34:18One of the most important
34:19parts of the information
34:21that she was trying
34:22to give
34:23were the takeoff speeds
34:24and then there should
34:26have been a briefing
34:28of an engine failure
34:29departure
34:31at this airport
34:32that was a special departure
34:34that needed to be briefed.
34:35It was ignored.
34:39Did the captain
34:40become more focused
34:42once they began to taxi?
34:44Roger.
34:45Taxi for runway
34:46is zero two.
34:48What investigators
34:49find most shocking
34:50is what they hear next.
34:57Where are we eating tonight?
34:59That place
34:59across from the hotel.
35:01Oh, you always go back
35:03to the same place.
35:04I like what I like.
35:06We are now cheers.
35:07Plenty of good spots to eat.
35:10They are completely distracted.
35:12They are violating
35:13every sterile cockpit rule.
35:16During critical phases
35:18of flight
35:18extraneous conversations
35:19and non-essential conversations
35:21between the crew members
35:22are prohibited.
35:23Not only is the captain
35:24dismissing the first officer
35:26he has this casual attitude
35:28about basic safety practices.
35:31It's possible
35:32he was more interested
35:33in talking
35:33to the flight attendant
35:35than reviewing the briefing
35:36with the first officer.
35:38It's possible
35:39that he had been
35:40through so many
35:40pre-flight
35:42take-off briefings
35:42that at that time
35:43he felt
35:44it was unnecessary.
35:56As a result
35:58of his dismissive attitude
35:59the captain
36:00is unprepared
36:01to properly respond
36:03when the crisis occurs
36:04shortly after take-off.
36:09Had the pilots completed
36:11their pre-flight safety briefing
36:13their response
36:14to the engine failure
36:15might have been
36:16very different.
36:24Gear up.
36:28Engine failure
36:29left engine
36:30fly V2 plus 25.
36:32Lowering the nose
36:34to 12 degrees
36:35V2.
36:37Gear up.
36:40Once the plane
36:40was stabilized
36:41the pilots
36:42could have returned
36:43safely to the airport.
36:45Engine failure
36:46is actually
36:46a relatively common occurrence.
36:49Every pilot
36:49needs to be prepared
36:50and trained.
36:52So instead of
36:53letting the first officer
36:54fly the plane
36:55while he diagnoses
36:56the issue
36:56he tries to do
36:57everything himself.
36:58And transferring control
36:59during an emergency situation.
37:02There was never
37:03a positive transfer
37:05of control.
37:05The captain
37:06just took
37:07the control yoke
37:08away from
37:09the first officer
37:11so he injected
37:13himself
37:13in the emergency.
37:18Let go, let go.
37:20I let go, I let go.
37:22The captain
37:23took control
37:24at the worst possible time
37:26when he was
37:27out of the loop
37:27and by not
37:29assigning responsibility
37:30to her
37:30he gave himself
37:31the responsibility
37:32of doing two things
37:33at once
37:33diagnosing
37:34the nature
37:35of the engine
37:35problem
37:36and then
37:36flying the airplane.
37:39Please!
37:40By trying
37:41to fly the plane
37:43and diagnose
37:44the problem
37:44on his own
37:45the captain
37:46took on
37:46too much.
37:49It put the first officer
37:50in a very difficult position.
37:53She's now
37:54in the
37:54supportive role
37:56the non-flying role
37:57waiting to be told
37:58what to do
37:59and he's not
38:01giving any
38:01helpful orders
38:03other than
38:03let go.
38:07Why would
38:08an experienced
38:09captain
38:09so brazenly
38:11dismiss
38:11his first officer's
38:12help
38:13risking the lives
38:14of everyone
38:15on board?
38:21Investigators
38:22look into
38:22the pilot's
38:23backgrounds
38:23in an attempt
38:24to understand
38:25why the captain
38:26took over
38:27from his first officer
38:28in the midst
38:29of an emergency.
38:31So the captain
38:32actually had
38:32twice as many
38:33flying hours
38:34as the first officer.
38:36The captain
38:37was both qualified
38:38as a captain
38:39on a 737
38:40but also
38:40as a first officer
38:41on a 767.
38:44Perhaps
38:44his attitude
38:45was that
38:46flying the 737
38:47was not that
38:48big of a deal
38:49because
38:49I fly a 767
38:51which is much
38:52more sophisticated
38:53and highly
38:53technical.
38:55But she
38:56had more hours
38:57on the 737.
38:58Not only
38:59did she have
38:59more experience
39:00flying the 737
39:01that's the only
39:02plane that she
39:03was flying.
39:05I think
39:05there's a good
39:06chance
39:06that had she
39:07been left alone
39:08she would have
39:08flown the airplane
39:10out of the scenario
39:11that we saw
39:12in this accident.
39:13The question
39:14is
39:14would he have
39:15reacted the same
39:16way if the first
39:17officer was a man?
39:20In 2003
39:21at the time
39:22of this crash
39:23here in the States
39:25female airline
39:26pilots only
39:26constituted
39:27less than 6%
39:28of the pilot
39:29population
39:30and it really
39:31hasn't changed
39:31that much
39:32in the 20
39:33years since then.
39:35The first
39:36officer was
39:37Algeria's first
39:38female commercial
39:40airline pilot.
39:41My friend
39:42male pilots
39:44in this part
39:44of the world
39:46aren't used
39:47to sharing
39:48a cockpit
39:48with women.
39:51I think
39:51Algeria's
39:52becoming
39:52fairly westernized
39:53but in
39:54some cultures
39:55there is the
39:56feeling that
39:56a man has
39:56to be up
39:57in the cockpit
39:57in case
39:58anything goes
39:58wrong.
40:00Why did
40:01this captain
40:02take control
40:02from the
40:03first officer
40:03when she
40:04was doing
40:04an okay job
40:05at that point?
40:06And I think
40:07you can't rule
40:08out the possibility
40:09that there may
40:09have been some
40:11gender stereotyping
40:12on his part
40:13that played
40:14a role in it.
40:16Sadly this
40:17accident
40:17was totally
40:18preventable.
40:24Investigators
40:25now have
40:25a clear
40:26picture
40:27of what
40:27led to
40:28the crash
40:28of flight
40:306289.
40:32V1
40:32144 knots
40:35VR
40:36146 knots.
40:37You're saying
40:38you were good
40:38enough to turn
40:39pro?
40:39After arriving
40:40late
40:41and allowing
40:42the flight
40:42attendant
40:43into the
40:43cockpit
40:43the captain
40:44interrupted
40:45a crucial
40:46pre-flight
40:47safety briefing.
40:49V2
40:50150 knots.
40:51Okay that's
40:52enough.
40:52I understand.
40:53Can we go?
40:55I got it.
40:56I got it.
40:56Let's go.
40:57The captain
40:58demonstrated
40:59a lax attitude
41:00towards cockpit
41:01protocols.
41:04Fatigue cracks
41:05in a nozzle
41:06guide vane
41:06in the plane's
41:07left engine
41:08were reaching
41:08their braking
41:09point.
41:10And when the
41:11guide vane
41:12failed
41:13it set off
41:14a chain
41:15reaction.
41:16High speed
41:17metal fragments
41:18ripped the
41:18engine apart.
41:21Let's go.
41:21Let's go.
41:22I let go.
41:22I let go.
41:23When crisis
41:24struck
41:25the captain
41:26decided he
41:27needed to be
41:27the one
41:28to handle
41:28the controls
41:29and took
41:30over flying
41:31from his
41:31first officer
41:32before even
41:33identifying
41:33the problem.
41:35The engine
41:36failure alone
41:37was not the
41:38cause of this
41:38accident.
41:39Engines fail
41:40and pilots
41:41are trained
41:42to handle
41:43those emergencies.
41:46Failing to
41:47retract the
41:47landing gear
41:48after the
41:49engine failure
41:49made recovery
41:51more difficult.
41:52Let go.
41:53Take your hand
41:53away.
41:54I let go.
41:54I let go.
41:55Let go.
41:55Take your hand
41:56away.
41:56I let go.
42:05It was the
42:06captain's
42:06assumption of
42:07patrol of the
42:08aircraft without
42:09properly identifying
42:10the nature of the
42:11emergency, his
42:12failure to raise
42:13the landing gear
42:14and his lack of
42:16adherence to
42:16standard operating
42:18procedures that
42:19eventually doomed
42:20the flight.
42:23As a result of
42:25this accident,
42:25Algeria's
42:26commission of
42:27inquiry makes
42:28several
42:29recommendations.
42:31They recommend
42:32that Air
42:33Algerie, along
42:34with other
42:34operators, ensure
42:36that their crew
42:36resource management
42:37training programs
42:39emphasize the
42:39importance of
42:40handover procedures
42:42and task sharing
42:43in the cockpit.
42:45But in the
42:461980s, they had
42:47captains who were
42:48trying to fly a
42:49team airplane
42:50solo.
42:53So a lot of
42:54training went
42:54into it to
42:55teach that your
42:56best resource is
42:58your team.
42:59You support each
42:59other and work
43:00together as a
43:02team for the
43:03safety of the
43:03airplane.
43:05The fact that the
43:06captain insisted on
43:07taking over control
43:07of the airplane at
43:08that critical
43:09moment cost
43:12everybody on that
43:13airplane their
43:13lives.
43:17I felt
43:17particularly
43:18affected when I
43:20saw that the
43:21accident was
43:22preventable.
43:23And I think the
43:24investigators did
43:25the best job they
43:26could trying to
43:26discover why the
43:27crew made the
43:28errors that they
43:28did.
43:29The next time that
43:30happens, people
43:30won't die as a
43:31result of that.
43:34For Lynn
43:34Rippelmeyer, it's
43:36one more example of
43:37why the industry
43:38needs to continue
43:39evolving.
43:41The airlines now
43:42are much more
43:44open to hiring
43:46women, to not
43:47having gender
43:48bias, realizing
43:49that women do
43:50have a lot to
43:51contribute to the
43:53industry.
43:55And I think it's
43:56up to women now
43:56to step up to the
43:57plate and take the
43:59opportunities that
44:00the career offers.
44:01They're amazing.
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