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00:00We're going to talk about this a little more now with John Luff, who is head of foreign policy at
00:06the New Eurasian Strategies Centre. He's on the line from London, an expert on Russia and Eastern
00:14Europe. Thank you so much for joining us. We do appreciate your time. I don't know if you listened
00:18there to our correspondent in Kyiv, Gulliver Craig. I would like to talk about that after a few
00:24initial questions, this idea of, will Russia just, you know, is it all about calling Russia's
00:30bluff? Do they not intend to sign anything? First of all, perhaps we could talk about some of the
00:36individual parts of this plan. There is this report that the European Union and Ukraine have managed to
00:46water it down somewhat. It seems that what is most unacceptable to Ukraine at the moment is the
00:54idea of losing territory. Is that the case, do you think? Is that the worst bit of it for Ukraine?
01:01I think there are three problematic areas here for Ukraine. Firstly, this notion that they should be
01:09giving up territory that they already control. Secondly, there's the question of a restriction
01:14on the size of the Ukrainian army. And this relates then to Ukraine's ability to defend itself
01:20in future because Ukrainians justifiably fear that the Russians may come again. And this leads to the
01:26third point where there's absolutely no clarity, which is what sort of security guarantees might
01:32Ukraine reasonably receive. My assumption is that it actually will receive almost no meaningful
01:38security guarantees from its Western allies because nobody wants to get into a war with Russia.
01:43So the only solution then is to build up the Ukrainian army into something that could, in fact,
01:48deter Russia in future. And that's where you don't want to have restrictions on the size of the
01:53Ukrainian army. So I think we're going to go round and round this issue. And I suspect that it's going
01:58to take some time to sort it out. So the notion that the Ukrainians are going to be forced to sign up
02:02to something very quickly, I think, is actually not realistic. President Trump seems to step back a little
02:08bit from that. But it does seem that Marco Rubio made some progress in these talks here in the American
02:15delegation in Geneva. And let's see what the next draft of this text. And it's I think it's a little bit maybe
02:23ambitious to call it a peace plan. It's a set of provisions that might ultimately go into some sort of peace
02:31agreement. You mentioned two things there. One, the idea of the capping of Ukraine's army. There are reports that,
02:40whereas in the first draft, it's 800,000 during peacetime that that would or 600,000 during peacetime,
02:46that that could be improved from the Ukrainian point of view to 800,000. Also, this idea of the peace,
02:54the security guarantee that you were saying was so vague. Give us your thoughts on this idea that
03:01instead of it being in the constitution of NATO that Ukraine could never join and in Ukraine's
03:10constitution that it would never ask to join, there might be something much vaguer on that and
03:19possibly a security guarantee that if Ukraine is attacked, that is seen as an attack on the US.
03:25And although it would not be a member of NATO, the US would undertake to help Ukraine and attack on
03:32Ukraine would be an attack on the US. I'm guessing you think that amounts to very little.
03:40Well, if the US were to make that commitment, it would be extremely meaningful for Ukraine.
03:46But there's been no indication so far that the United States is ready to do that. It sees the problem
03:52of Ukraine and Ukraine security as something fundamentally European that the Europeans need
03:57to take care of. And the problem is the Europeans won't do it without some sort of US backstop.
04:02So I don't see that this is really can be resolved easily at all. So my conclusion is that you then
04:09build up the Ukrainian army to make it something formidable. And you deploy trainers, all the equipment
04:15the Ukrainians need to turn their army into something that can genuinely deter the Russians in future.
04:21And then the Ukrainians probably have to rely on the relations with their closest neighbors,
04:27in particular with Poland, perhaps also with UK, France, Germany, also somehow to flesh out
04:35their defenses. But I don't think there's going to be any willingness on the part of this
04:40administration in the US to underwrite Ukraine security. I think that's simply off the table
04:45and the Russians know it.
04:47You were saying there that Europe is not going to, when push comes to shove, really be much
04:56use to Ukraine. Earlier, we heard the German Chancellor, Frederick Mertz, speaking today.
05:02He said Ukraine's interests align with the European Union's interests in this matter. I think we can
05:08just take a listen to that. Ukraine's interests, also Europe's common interests, and we want to
05:16safeguard them together in the long term. This means that Ukraine must not be forced to make
05:21unilateral territorial concessions. Ukraine must continue to be able to defend itself effectively
05:26against aggression in the future. And to do so, it needs strong armed forces and reliable security
05:32guarantees from its partners.
05:34Yeah, he's clearly suggesting, as you do, that it comes down to Ukraine having a very,
05:41very significant force itself, or at least a minimally significant force. The idea that the
05:48European Union with Ukraine, with the US, with Russia would have a joint enforcing body for any peace
05:58deal or any road to the end of the war. What do you think of that?
06:06Well, I mean, it's very hard to imagine that you're going to have something like the Gaza
06:09model with President Trump, you know, chairing a peace committee. The Russians won't allow that
06:15to happen. So it's not clear how any sort of peace agreement, in fact, would be implemented,
06:22whether it would be done perhaps under the auspices of the United Nations. There are certainly
06:27some sort of peace monitoring force is going to be needed, because there has to be an area that
06:34is demilitarized around the front line, where that may in future lie. And then you've got to think
06:41about where are those peace observers, or maybe even peacekeepers, where are they actually going to
06:47be drawn from? Which countries? Could China play a role here? Could India play a role? Pakistan or
06:53another country? Again, absolutely no clarity on this. But I think the key question now is whether
07:00it's going to prove possible to freeze this conflict for a while, while the I think these broader,
07:07more complicated questions are actually addressed. And that concerns also the military posture of
07:15Russia in future in Europe, because there's this idea on the part of the Russians that they need to
07:19restrict Ukraine's armed forces, in terms of their size and capabilities. But there's nothing in this
07:25draft document about what obligations might rest on Russia. So there is so much still here to be
07:31negotiated. And I don't think we're anywhere near a final outcome at present.
07:36We do sometimes see surprising results from the Donald Trump style of diplomacy. It's true that
07:44in Gaza, the bombs for the most part have stopped, thanks to that deal. Is this Russia-Ukraine thing
07:53very different, largely because neither side seems yet ready to stop this war?
08:02Well, I think the big difference here is that the United States has leverage over Israel in a way that
08:08it doesn't over Russia. More than that, President Trump still seems sympathetic to Russia's version
08:17of events when it comes to the reason for this war in Ukraine. Obviously, part of the election
08:23within the United States favors the United States disengaging from support for a war of this kind.
08:31In some ways, that's absolutely understandable. But it's a question of how the U.S. disengages
08:36and how its authority might suffer in the process, and indeed how NATO as an alliance,
08:41its credibility might suffer. So what I detect is in the administration itself, there are, I think,
08:49different views, different understandings of how this war should be brought to an end. Obviously,
08:54there's consensus that it needs to be ended. But for example, the position of the Vice President,
08:59J.D. Vance, it seems to me is very different from that of the Secretary of State and the National
09:03Security Advisor, Marco Rubio. So within the administration, I think there's an argument
09:07raging about what, in fact, can reasonably be expected of Ukraine without forcing the country
09:15to capitulate, and equally, how pressure, in fact, can be put on Russia to force Russia to make
09:21concessions. Marco Rubio has said several times throughout his time in office that there has to be
09:27compromise on both sides in order to reach a sustainable and, indeed, durable agreement.
09:35I'm afraid we're going to have to leave it there. We're out of time. Thank you so much,
09:38John Luff from the new Eurasian Strategy Centre. Thank you so much for your time. We really do
09:44appreciate your thoughts and insights on all of that.
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