Antropólogo e mundialmente renomado negociador e mediador de conflitos, William Ury relembra os bastidores da histórica negociação entre Menachem Begin, ex-primeiro ministro de Israel, e Anwar Al Sadat, ex-presidente do Egito, em 1979, durante o encontro promovido por Jimmy Carter em Camp David, nos Estados Unidos.
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00:00And, Bill, you said something very important in the book that you need this third side or a third eye in this negotiation.
00:10And you were the third side in this part, you know, because the two countries were going toward a conflict and you played this role of the third side.
00:21And this, to me, sounds very, very important because, in a way, all this creative mind to try to find the tone of the victory speech, if you bring this to a government, you'll be bombarded by people in the government saying, well, that doesn't work.
00:40That's futile.
00:41That's childish.
00:43They would try to undermine all your creative effort to find a path.
00:48So, do you think this is the most important role of the third side in order to come to the conflict?
00:56Think creatively, think in a creative way in order to find a better solution that this minimal common denominator appears?
01:07I do think so.
01:09I think it's, you know, the third side can be a mediator, which we think of, but it doesn't actually have to be a mediator.
01:16There's often going to be two players from both sides who can work together and constitute a third side.
01:23You know, for example, in my, in the, in the conflict that I helped with, with your, with Abilio, with Abilio Denise.
01:32You know, I was working for Abilio, but I constructed a relationship with someone who was the mentor of Abilio's former business partner, David, it was David de Rothschild, the French banker.
01:50And together, he and I were able to construct a third side that allowed for, to, to build a golden bridge that, that resolved that Titanic business conflict between Abilio and Jean-Charles Naurie.
02:02So, yes, I do believe that it's very useful to, in these really difficult situations to, to look for, where's the third side?
02:12The third side are people who can stay on the balcony and can have the creativity and the intelligence, but also the inside knowledge to be able to build those golden bridges.
02:22And when the other example was Camp David, I think Camp David is a great example because in this age of polarized politics, then we think it's impossible to find a medium ground between parties.
02:37That's exactly what happened in that historical encounter where, where Menahem Begging from Israel and, and Anwar Sadat from Egypt for the first time, bitter enemies became actually not friends, but they have a, a formal relationship that was fantastic for the Middle East.
02:58Could you tell us a little bit, could you tell us a little bit, the scenario, the scene setting for the Camp David to provoke such a historical agreement as it was Camp David in the 1979?
03:12Yes.
03:13So if you recall in the, in the seventies, there were four wars between Egypt and Israel.
03:20They were the two most powerful military adversaries in the Middle East.
03:23And everyone as today thinks the Middle East is the hardest, most impossible conflict.
03:29So there was that feeling back then too.
03:32And then, uh, Jimmy Carter had tried to try and mediate, but it didn't seem like it was working.
03:41And as a last ditch effort, uh, at the suggestion of his wife, Rosalind, actually, uh, he decided to see, invite them to a beautiful place out in nature, which was Camp David, which is a presidential retreat outside of Washington and, uh, see if, what they could do.
03:59And, you know, and Menachem Begin and Anwar and Sadat, there wasn't good chemistry between them.
04:06In fact, there was kind of like fire between them.
04:09And so from the very first day after the first meetings, they decided to keep them separate in separate cabins.
04:15Uh, and then the question was, how do you build the golden bridge here?
04:19Um, and, uh, Egypt came with a, its position, which was, they wanted the entire Sinai, which had been occupied by Israel in the war and the 67 war was occupied.
04:33They wanted the entire Sinai peninsula back.
04:36That was their position.
04:38Israel's position was also clear, but Begin wanted to keep a good slice of the Sinai as a buffer.
04:45Uh, a security buffer.
04:47Um, and it seemed like, okay, are we going to draw a line in the sand in the, in the desert there?
04:54And there was no way both sides were so stuck in their positions and their, and their, and their peoples and so on.
05:02There was no way that was going to work.
05:03And so after three days, uh, the Carter and the American secretary of state, Cy Vance, turned to another idea,
05:12which was an idea actually that, that my colleague, Roger Fisher and I had sent in a draft memo and a memo to Cy Vance just before the Camp David summit.
05:24And it was a very simple kind of a creative idea of a process for how to break a deadlock.
05:30How do you build a bridge?
05:32And we call it the single negotiating text procedure.
05:35So we call it the one text.
05:36It's a very simple process, which is instead of starting from the positions, you start from the interests, right?
05:46You look at what does each side really want?
05:48And then you create a draft piece of paper, a document in which you have a wild, you know, an idea for how to build the bridge, but it's not a position.
06:00It's a very unofficial document, which then you, in an iterative process, you keep on getting criticism on until you, until it becomes a document that actually didn't work for both sides.
06:13And this is the way it worked in Camp David was the Americans went to the Israelis and said, okay, we understand your position.
06:20We're not asking you to change your position.
06:22Just tell us what you really want.
06:24What is your interest?
06:25The Israelis said, it's very simple security.
06:28Egyptian tanks have attacked us four times in the previous 30 years.
06:32We don't want that happening again.
06:34The Americans then went to the Egyptians, asked the same question.
06:37We understand your position.
06:39You want the entire Sinai back?
06:41Why?
06:41What's the, why do you want it?
06:43What's, what's the interest there?
06:45Sovereignty.
06:46The land has been ours since the time of the pharaohs.
06:49We want it back.
06:50So then the Americans asked this magic question, which is, you may not be able to reconcile the positions, but how do we satisfy the Israeli interest in security and at the same time, the Egyptian interest in sovereignty?
07:05And there was an idea floating around that was kind of an interesting idea, which was a creative idea, a bridge, a golden bridge, which was a demilitarized Sinai, a Sinai where the entire Sinai would go to Egypt.
07:23The Egyptian flag could fly everywhere.
07:25But it was demilitarized, no Egyptian tanks, no Egyptian troops.
07:29So Israel got its security.
07:32So Israel would actually get more security with the demilitarized Sinai because it's the entire Sinai.
07:39It's not just a slice.
07:40And Egypt would get more sovereignty because they would get the whole thing back.
07:43So this is what you look for.
07:46It's those kind of creative ideas.
07:47Now, it's one thing to have a creative idea, but it's another thing to make it operational and really pass the muster of all the skeptics and so on.
07:56So the Americans drafted up a piece of paper and they went to the Israelis and the Egyptians and said, look, here's an idea.
08:02Don't consider this a formal American proposal.
08:04It's not.
08:05It's just a wild idea.
08:06We don't want you to accept it.
08:08We don't want you to say yes or no.
08:10All we want you to do is criticize it.
08:13Well, no one likes to say yes to a tough decision.
08:18No leader.
08:19But everybody loves to criticize.
08:22So the Egyptians criticized it.
08:24Israelis criticized it.
08:25The Americans said, fine, fine, fine.
08:27And then they went back and said, how do we make this idea better?
08:32What changes can we make to address the Egyptian concerns, to address the Israeli concerns?
08:36And they went to draft number two.
08:38Then they went back and said, no decision, just more criticism, please.
08:45They went to draft number three.
08:47In 10 days, they went through 23 drafts.
08:5223 drafts.
08:53Each time to the point where they could make it no better.
08:56That one text.
08:57And then at that point, Carter took it to Begin and to Sadat and said, look, this is the best
09:04we can do.
09:05Do you want it or not?
09:06And then President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin were faced with a very different decision
09:12than having to make a very painful concession.
09:15No one wants to make concessions.
09:17No one wants to be the first to make concessions.
09:20No one wants to appear weak.
09:21But this time, instead of having to make a number of painful concessions, all they have
09:26to do is make one decision.
09:28Do we want it or not?
09:29Only when they can see exactly what they're going to get in return for it.
09:34Sadat could see he was going to get the entire Sinai back, which is what he wanted.
09:39Begin could see that he was going to get security and an unprecedented peace with Egypt.
09:45And on those conditions, both leaders agreed.
09:49That was the Camp David Agreement.
09:51That was the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, which has endured to this day more than 45
09:59years later through wars, through assassinations, through all the changes that treaties endured.
10:06And it was an example for me of where creativity, collaboration, having a battle,
10:15balcony place like Camp David, you were able to take a seemingly impossible war situation
10:22and transform it into a peace.
10:25Now, is the conflict over between Egypt and Israel?
10:28No, it still goes on.
10:30But it's changed from a destructive form of war to a more constructive form.
10:34And that, to me, is what we need to do now in the Middle East.
10:38We need to do it now in the Ukraine.
10:40We need to do it now between, you know, United States and Europe.
10:44Wherever you look, we need that same kind of possibilist kind of thinking to be able to
10:52transform conflicts, not end them.
10:54We may not end the conflict, but we can transform the way we deal with them.
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