00:00Let's start with the most obvious question in all of this, the caveats that remain on the table when
00:06it comes to this MOU being signed. What do you make of those? Obviously, bearing in mind that
00:11we don't have a proper copy with the details of what concessions were met. I think just now,
00:21as you were speaking, they published the American and Iranian versions on different portals. So
00:29that agreement, I didn't have enough time to go through this in detail. But the major caveat here
00:37is that, well, it is a deal about the possibility of a deal. So they are yet to enter proper
00:44negotiations. And even the Strait of Hormuz is not going to reopen immediately. And also,
00:50another important circumstance here, a barrier to the deal actually taking off is the high chances
00:58that Israel will continue with its campaign in the south of Lebanon. So this would be the major points.
01:06So when it comes to the red lines that we've been speaking about since really the initiation of
01:12this war, what does this MOU tell us about the compromises that both parties were willing to
01:18negotiate on the frozen assets, the oil sanctions, the nuclear program? What concessions do you think
01:27were given at a bigger capacity? Was it by the U.S. side or the Iranian side in this MOU?
01:35Considering that this deal per se, not this memorandum of understanding, but what's to come
01:41next in the next 60 days might not materialize. I am not sure it makes sense to talk about where
01:49larger concessions were made. Because I, to be honest with you, I don't really believe that the United
01:55States is there also for diplomacy per se, for diplomatic outcomes. I rather see it as diplomacy
02:03being used as a smoke screen to shift whatever is going on to a low-intensity warfare. But the
02:11major concessions that you might talk about were about indeed unfreezing some of Iran's assets. But
02:17from what I'm hearing, they're not going to head straight to Tehran, but rather be used for purchase of
02:24goods or services. And this is just a share out of 100 billion. I think they agreed to unfreeze at
02:32this point about 14 billion, which is not so much. Also, the statement that Iran and Oman will be able
02:39to
02:39manage this trade of Burmuz together and even charge toll for the passage of ships. Though that's quite
02:48interesting to add here that we're hearing that the United States were actually paying those tolls for
02:53some of the countries like India for the passage of their ships. But that wasn't publicized very much.
02:59And also the Lebanese front, where Trump promises that on the Lebanese front, we're going to see
03:05cessation of hostilities. But I'm sure Israel is pretty unhappy about it.
03:12So yes, speaking of Israel, that was going to be my next question. Now, even hours before this
03:19agreement took place, Israel had hit the suburbs of Beirut. And so how do you think Prime Minister
03:25Netanyahu takes on all of this? And do you think that Israel would be complicit in trying to get this
03:36MOU to deteriorate or not go through the table, essentially?
03:41They keep saying, the observers keep saying that Israel is sabotaging the deal. And indeed,
03:47Israel as a whole, not just Benjamin Netanyahu, but not only the Israeli government,
03:51but I think public as a whole are pretty unhappy about this upcoming agreement. And we are hearing
03:57that they're trying to sabotage it. But as we just heard from the speaker of Iran's parliament,
04:03Mohammed, who featured prominently in these negotiations and practically Iran in the country,
04:09since the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini was killed, that the US and Israel should stop playing
04:16good cop, bad cop game. And because right now, it seems that the United States are either unwilling
04:23to stop Israel or uncapable of that. Either way, it doesn't work for Iran.
04:27So I think even in Iran, the perception is it's a good cop, bad cop kind of division. And whatever
04:35Netanyahu does is to a degree coordinated with Donald Trump.
04:41The good cop, bad cop analogy is quite interesting. And look, there's Israel, there is Iran and the
04:47United States that are all part of this, the war that has happened since late February. But then
04:53there are also the Gulf allies of the United States. GCC countries have been exposed to the Iranian
05:00attacks over the past three months or so. How do you think they take this on? And what do you
05:05think
05:05is happening behind the table or behind behind closed doors of Gulf allies speaking to President
05:12Trump? And what are they what is their take in all of this?
05:18I think the most belligerent ones, those that take Iran as a competitor and as a threat,
05:24and those that prefer to even establish alliance with Israel, like United Arab Emirates, who joined
05:31Abraham Accords, they would be more prone to pushing Trump to finish the job, so to speak with Iran,
05:38to topple the regime and to establish the more pro-Israeli, pro-American, and pro-Gulf states,
05:46accordingly, government in the region. However, from the rest of the Gulf states, and the more we saw
05:54how the war turned out, where the United States prioritized Israel and some of the Gulf allies of
06:02the United States complained of being left alone, of being left to defend themselves, and not really
06:08willing to start an open war with Iran, they started to hedge more and think about diversifying their
06:15foreign policy. So they would be, in the longer term, more receptive to sitting at the table with Iran
06:25and renegotiating the security architecture in the region, part of which is going to be the safety and
06:33stability of things in the Strait of Wormuz.
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