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Documentary, first broadcast in 1966, that tells the history of the superbomb, exploring the race by scientists to imitate the nuclear reactions of the sun and build the first thermonuclear weapon. The film reveals how the careers and reputations of some of the scientists involved were seared in the process.
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00:36THE END
01:00August 9th, 1945.
01:03A B-29 bomber was returning from Nagasaki
01:06after delivering the second atomic bomb.
01:12Whatever else it was,
01:14it was the bomb that brought peace to the world.
01:19Five days after Nagasaki, Japan surrendered.
01:26The scars on the victims of prison camps
01:28were no less terrible than the scars
01:30on the victims of Nagasaki and Dresden.
01:35The consequences of war were foul.
01:51Yet within ten years,
01:53the same men who built the bomb
01:54to bring to an end tyranny
01:56which had respect for neither men's bodies nor minds
01:59would be involved in the production
02:01of a far more terrifying weapon,
02:03the hydrogen bomb.
02:06They would be men whose daily lives were remote from war,
02:10university teachers, lecturers, research workers.
02:13The chief characters would be men
02:14who had been deeply involved
02:15in the production of the first atomic bomb.
02:18One of them, Robert Oppenheimer,
02:20the so-called father of the atom bomb.
02:21In that sense, it was not innocent.
02:23The first bomb we set off,
02:24they all had fissionable material.
02:26The first bomb we set off was dirty.
02:29It was set off practically at ground level,
02:31a fireball touched the ground,
02:32and a great deal of radioactive contamination
02:35for those days was in fact spread.
02:37It was a very dirty bomb.
02:39The bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were clean.
02:42They were exploded high in the air.
02:44No casualties were produced by fallout.
02:48There may have been a few on a global scale,
02:50a handful,
02:51but all the hundreds of thousands of people
02:53who were died
02:53and others who were maimed and injured
02:56from radiation and from blast
02:57did this without benefit of fallout.
03:00Nevertheless,
03:01I vastly prefer that dirty bomb
03:03to those clean ones.
03:05Another to be intimately concerned
03:07with the hydrogen bomb
03:08would be a man of vastly different character
03:10and views from Oppenheimer.
03:11In his turn,
03:12he would be known as the father of the hydrogen bomb,
03:15Edward Teller.
03:16We must have the clean weapons
03:17to save the innocent bystanders,
03:20to save our allies,
03:21and when we defend ourselves
03:23against enemy attack,
03:25to save our own people.
03:27We must have these clean weapons
03:29and stoppage of nuclear tests
03:32would prevent us effectively
03:34from developing them.
03:37By trying to be super cautious now,
03:40we may unnecessarily sacrifice
03:42millions of human lives
03:44in a dusty nuclear war later.
03:47The story of the hydrogen bomb
03:49begins in a more innocent scientific age,
03:52if not a more innocent political one.
03:54Some of the ideas behind it
03:56can be traced back
03:57as far as the early 1930s,
03:59as far back as Stalinist Russia,
04:01and to this man,
04:03George Gamow,
04:04then 27 years old.
04:06Gamow had lectured
04:07to the Soviet Academy
04:08describing how vast sources of energy
04:10could be derived
04:11not from the uranium atom,
04:13as in the case of the atomic bomb,
04:15but from fusion,
04:16the joining together
04:17of atoms of hydrogen,
04:18the reaction which takes place
04:20on the sun.
04:21After the lecture,
04:22an official offered
04:23to put the electric works
04:25of Leningrad at Gamow's disposal
04:26so that he could experiment
04:28with these thermonuclear reactions.
04:31But the dictatorships
04:32of Central Europe
04:33had created a climate
04:34of restricted freedom
04:35in which scientists,
04:36like many others,
04:37preferred not to work.
04:39Gamow joined the trail
04:40of refugees eventually
04:42to the United States,
04:43taking his ideas with him.
04:49In America,
04:50he was to meet others
04:51interested in thermonuclear reactions.
04:54Enrico Fermi, for example,
04:55who used Sweden
04:56and the award of the Nobel Prize
04:58as a convenient escape route
05:00from Mussolini's Italy.
05:02At the ceremony,
05:03Fermi refused to give
05:04the fascist salute
05:05to the King of Sweden.
05:07It was a gesture
05:08condemned in Italy
05:09as being
05:10un-Roman
05:11and unmanly.
05:15Hans Betta,
05:17a refugee
05:17who left Germany
05:18during the Nazi persecutions
05:20of 1933,
05:22was another physicist
05:23interested in the thermonuclear problem.
05:26And so was the Hungarian,
05:28Edward Teller.
05:30It was Teller
05:31who was most enthusiastic
05:32at the prospect
05:33of turning this work
05:34on atomic fusion
05:35into a weapon.
05:36He had fallen passionately in love
05:38with the ideals
05:39he believed his new country stood for.
05:41He had brought to America
05:42an intense fear of Russia.
05:45I believe
05:46that the Russians
05:47have acquired this knowledge.
05:49He was ebullient
05:50and over-forthright.
05:51He inspired devoted followers
05:53in the scientific field
05:55but antagonized others.
05:57In 1943,
05:59he went to the atomic bomb laboratory
06:00at Los Alamos
06:01to work on theoretical problems.
06:04The director of this laboratory
06:06was Robert Oppenheimer,
06:07the young American scholar
06:09who had distinguished himself
06:10in European universities
06:11and was now working
06:12under the military administration
06:14of General Leslie Groves.
06:16Oppenheimer did not discourage
06:17the new theoretical work
06:18which a number of scientists
06:20and, in particular,
06:21Teller,
06:22were keen to work on.
06:23But for him,
06:24a new thermonuclear weapon
06:25was only of secondary importance.
06:27Oppenheimer's job
06:28was to make an atomic bomb
06:29and he refused to be deviated
06:31from this task
06:32by the interest of Teller.
06:33As an administrator
06:34and as a scientist,
06:36he did his job brilliantly.
06:38By July 1945,
06:41he was able to watch
06:42the result of his work
06:43come to fruition
06:43in the Alamogordo desert
06:45of New Mexico.
07:12He quoted the Hindu poet,
07:14I am become death,
07:16the destroyer of worlds.
07:19He had delivered the goods.
07:22Everything was ready
07:23for Hiroshima.
07:29When the Hiroshima
07:31and Nagasaki bombs
07:32had done their work,
07:34Oppenheimer told Teller
07:35that he believed
07:36that this was no longer
07:37the time or climate
07:38to go ahead
07:38with plans
07:39for a new thermonuclear bomb.
07:58The price of peace
08:00was inestimable.
08:01The price of the atomic bomb
08:03was $2,000,000,000.
08:06And just as Piccadilly Circus
08:07and Times Square
08:08shouted out its success,
08:10so did the bomb laboratories.
08:11The people who had built it
08:13in their secret hideaways
08:14in New Mexico and Tennessee
08:15celebrated victory.
08:17But the celebrations
08:18of these men,
08:19men like Robert Oppenheimer
08:21and Enrico Fermi,
08:23were tinged with a feeling
08:24of revulsion
08:25at the results of their work.
08:26It was work which
08:27some succeeding generations
08:29would condemn.
08:31Some scientists,
08:33Sir George Thompson,
08:34for example,
08:34talked about the consequences
08:36of their fellow scientists' work
08:37at literary luncheon parties.
08:40If, which God prevent,
08:43there is another war
08:44and atomic bombs are used,
08:47I do not believe
08:48that the number of people killed
08:50will necessarily be greater
08:52than in this war.
08:54It may well be less.
08:56Now at least,
08:57we know what to expect.
08:59And I believe
09:00that the knowledge
09:01will be the greatest force
09:02on the side
09:03of peace and sanity.
09:08But Professor Jode's concept
09:10of sanity
09:11differed from that
09:12of the scientist.
09:13I think that this is
09:15the greatest single disaster
09:17in the history of mankind.
09:19Will nobody ever stop
09:21the scientists?
09:22Will somebody put them
09:23in a bag and tie them up?
09:25Or into a lethal chamber?
09:29Before they've completed
09:31our destruction.
09:32There has, I think,
09:34run through the country
09:35an almost universal reaction
09:38of fear and horror.
09:42There's a woman I heard,
09:43the lips attendant at Hampstead,
09:45saying on the two mornings
09:46after it was announced,
09:48makes it wonder
09:50what's going to happen
09:50to one's kiddies
09:51in 20 years' time.
09:53It does indeed.
09:55They know or they feel
09:57that of all the countries,
10:00we have the most to lose
10:01and the least to gain
10:03by this thing.
10:04Russia and America
10:05might survive it.
10:07We should go down
10:08in a wilker of devastation
10:10directly the next war
10:12was declared.
10:14To some,
10:15the continuation
10:16of the manufacture
10:17of atomic weapons
10:18seemed pointless.
10:19The cream of the physicists
10:20could well afford
10:21to leave the shacks
10:23and the prefabricated buildings
10:24where they had performed
10:25their most intense work.
10:27Now was the time
10:28to turn their backs
10:29on the old schoolhouse
10:30in the New Mexican mountains
10:31for their homes
10:32in the university towns
10:34of Princeton,
10:35Berkeley, Oxford
10:36and Cambridge
10:36and to take up
10:38their teaching
10:38and university research.
10:44War was over.
10:46The bomb laboratories
10:47were allowed to run down
10:49in strength and purpose.
10:50In 1945,
10:52the Atomic Club
10:53had only one member,
10:54the United States,
10:55who suspected
10:56that Britain had enough
10:57information to become
10:58the second member.
11:00Britain was the United States' ally.
11:02There were no mutual fears.
11:04Russia was an ally,
11:05but there were fears.
11:11The balance of power
11:13was in the West.
11:14Would it always remain there?
11:16General Groves,
11:18the garrulous military head
11:19of Los Alamos
11:19and the man under whom
11:21physicists such as
11:22Oppenheimer and Teller worked,
11:23estimated that it would take
11:25Russia 20 years
11:26to produce an atomic bomb.
11:27It might once have been
11:28thought of as a threat,
11:29but it was now a sideshow.
11:32On Groves' reckoning,
11:33it would be 1965
11:34before Russia could make
11:35a repeat performance
11:36of Hiroshima.
11:40Could the American
11:41general's estimate
11:42of the Russian marshal's
11:43atomic potential
11:44be inaccurate?
11:46Of two things,
11:47there was no doubt.
11:49Stalin had both
11:50the physicists
11:50of the required calibre
11:52and he had the resources
11:53of power and materials.
11:55But did Stalin's physicists
11:56have the knowledge
11:57with which to make
11:58an atomic bomb
11:59from these resources?
12:01There were some
12:02who believed that he did
12:04and that this knowledge
12:05had been given scot-free
12:06by the United States
12:08in a document issued
12:09in August 1945
12:10by the Secretary of War.
12:12This report
12:13was virtually a recipe
12:15for the preparation
12:16of an atomic bomb.
12:17It was on sale
12:18in the United States
12:20at 40 cents a copy
12:21and in Britain
12:22at half a crown.
12:31In December 1945
12:33the three foreign ministers
12:34Burns, Bevin and Molotov
12:36agreed to invite
12:38France, China and Canada
12:39to sponsor with them
12:41a resolution
12:42proposing to the
12:43General Assembly
12:43of the United Nations
12:44the creation of a commission
12:46for atomic energy
12:47which would attempt
12:48to take steps
12:49to prevent the use
12:50of nuclear power
12:51for destructive purposes.
12:55But atomic testing
12:57was still being carried out
12:58to the extent
12:59that the United States
13:00was accused of seeking
13:01international control
13:02with one hand
13:03and testing bombs
13:04with the other.
13:06Atom diplomacy
13:07was the cry.
13:09Underwater tests
13:10were planned
13:11for Bikini Atoll
13:12in the South Pacific.
13:13A few feared
13:14these tests.
13:15Some feared
13:16that they would annihilate
13:17all the fish
13:18for miles around
13:19or even that they
13:20would start
13:21a chain reaction
13:22in the seawater
13:22which would kill
13:24all life on earth.
13:48But as far as
13:49the general public
13:50was concerned
13:51there was apathy
13:52towards the rights
13:52and the wrongs
13:53of continued manufacture
13:54of atomic weapons.
14:00The mushroom
14:01was becoming
14:02an acceptable fungus
14:03in man's garden.
14:05In America
14:06a group of scientists
14:07tried to waken
14:08the general public
14:09from this apathy
14:09and founded a periodical
14:11in which they tried
14:12to explain
14:12the social
14:13and political consequences
14:14of atomic power.
14:16Its cover design
14:17became a clock
14:18approaching midnight.
14:19As the time
14:20for atomic scientists
14:21and the world
14:22ran out
14:22its hands
14:23neared the end
14:24of time.
14:28Another group
14:28wrote a book
14:29giving descriptions
14:30of Hiroshima
14:31along with a terrifying
14:32account of an imaginary
14:33attack on New York.
14:34It made clear
14:35that even the pillars
14:36of Manhattan society
14:37would not survive
14:38nuclear bombardment.
14:40But Manhattan
14:42like the rest of the world
14:43had no wish
14:44to believe
14:44that it was skating
14:45on thin ice.
14:51In Washington
14:52a special committee
14:53under Senator
14:54Brian McMohan
14:55had begun
14:56to consider evidence
14:57to decide
14:57whether there should
14:58be civilian
14:58or military control
15:00of new atomic developments.
15:02The army
15:03were suspicious
15:03of the egghead's motives
15:04as much as the scientists
15:06were frightened
15:06by the possibility
15:07of military control.
15:10The test
15:11of an atomic bomb
15:12on ships of war
15:14represents a forward step
15:16in military thinking.
15:18We know what the bomb
15:20did in Hiroshima
15:21and Nagasaki.
15:22We must know
15:23in times of peace
15:25what it will do
15:26to ships
15:26in time of war.
15:28We must find out
15:29whether the day
15:30of heavy warships
15:31and amphibious landing
15:33is now history.
15:35The scientists won.
15:36In July 1946
15:38the McMahon bill
15:39was approved
15:40and a commission
15:40of civilians
15:41was charged
15:42with the responsibility
15:43for all problems
15:44of atomic energy.
15:45Dean Acheson
15:46the acting secretary
15:47of state
15:48had appointed
15:48a special board
15:49to outline
15:50the conditions
15:50under which
15:51the United States
15:52would agree
15:52to share its secrets
15:54if secrets they were
15:55with the rest
15:56of the world.
15:57Acheson appointed
15:58to head this board
15:59the man who had
16:00concluded
16:01the Tennessee Valley
16:01Authority deal
16:02with Wendell Wilkie
16:04in 1939
16:05and who was now
16:06the chairman
16:07of the authority.
16:08He was David Lillianthold.
16:10Thanks Dave.
16:11That's a lot of money
16:12for a couple old
16:13Indiana boys
16:13to be handling
16:14and for that
16:15I'm going to give you
16:16a deed for all
16:17of our Tennessee
16:17Electric Power Company
16:18properties.
16:21Good luck Dave.
16:23The report Lillianthold
16:25was to produce
16:25was to become known
16:27as the Acheson
16:28Lillianthold Report.
16:30But there was no doubt
16:31that Robert Oppenheimer
16:32the one time head
16:33of Los Alamos
16:34was the person
16:35on the board
16:35who best understood
16:36the issues involved.
16:37The success
16:38of the atomic bomb
16:39project had made
16:40Oppenheimer before the war
16:41an unknown young physicist
16:43into a public figure.
16:44He had become
16:45widely known
16:46as the principal author
16:47of the atomic bomb
16:48in his own words
16:49more widely
16:50than the facts warranted.
16:51He was deluged
16:52with requests
16:53to take part
16:53in scientific
16:54and public affairs.
16:56The Acheson Lillianthold
16:57report was produced
16:58under his quiet
16:59but strong influence.
17:01This report
17:02was the basis
17:03of proposals
17:04presented not by a scientist
17:05but by the ageing
17:06Wall Street
17:07speculator-turned-statesman
17:08Bernard Baruch
17:09a man with the reputation
17:11of a miracle worker.
17:14He presented it
17:15at the first session
17:16of the Atomic Energy
17:17Control Commission
17:18of the United Nations
17:19in June 1946.
17:21We propose this.
17:24One manufacturer
17:26of atomic bombs
17:27shall stop.
17:29Two existing bombs
17:32shall be disposed of
17:33pursuant
17:34to the terms
17:35of the treaty.
17:37And three
17:38the authorities
17:40shall be in possession
17:41of full information
17:42as to the know-how
17:44for the production
17:46of atomic knowledge.
17:48We are here
17:50to make a choice
17:51between the quick
17:53and the dead.
17:55That is our business.
17:58It was thought
17:59at the time
18:00that uranium sources
18:01were scarce
18:02throughout the world.
18:03Russia
18:03with the resources
18:04of the Ural Mountains
18:05at her disposal
18:06knew differently
18:07and had little time
18:08for these utopian suggestions.
18:10The American plan
18:11was rejected.
18:12It was the beginning
18:13of the haggling
18:14over atomic control
18:15which was to go
18:16on and on
18:17for years.
18:19Delegates walking
18:20out of disarmament
18:20conferences
18:21became a familiar
18:22and bizarre sight.
18:28It was not only
18:29between Russia
18:30and the United States
18:31that there was a gulf.
18:32The McMahon Act
18:33had prevented
18:33any further military cooperation
18:35with the wartime allies
18:36Britain and Canada.
18:38But there was no way
18:39of preventing any country
18:40going it alone.
18:42In Britain
18:42a research establishment
18:44at Harwell
18:44was already scarring
18:46the Berkshire Downs.
18:47And if Britain
18:48was taking steps
18:49towards an atomic bomb
18:50what then of Russia?
18:52If Russia was lagging
18:54six years behind
18:55the American atomic effort
18:56when the war ended
18:57how far was she behind
18:58now?
18:59There were still
19:00no signs whatever
19:01of any form
19:02of international control.
19:06But the general mood
19:08of a western world
19:09less than one year
19:10removed from war
19:11was not towards
19:12bomb manufacture.
19:13This was the year
19:14of justice
19:15after war.
19:23punishment was being
19:24handed out
19:25at both ends
19:26of the axis.
19:44If the war criminals
19:45trials were not
19:46distasteful
19:46the causes
19:47and the weapons
19:48of war were.
19:49A group of scientists
19:50wrote to the editor
19:51of the New York Times
19:53we would like
19:54to suggest
19:54a declaration
19:55of policy
19:56of the following
19:57nature
19:57by the president.
19:59One
19:59the United States
20:00will at once
20:01stop the production
20:02of bombs
20:02from material
20:03currently produced.
20:05Two
20:05for one year
20:06we will stop
20:07accumulating purified
20:08plutonium
20:09and uranium.
20:10But this was not
20:11the view of every
20:12scientist who had
20:13worked on the atomic bomb.
20:15At Los Alamos
20:16scientific interest
20:17in the thermonuclear
20:18weapon did not die.
20:20As a final attempt
20:21to maintain
20:21the super bomb program
20:22in April 1946
20:24a meeting of 30 physicists
20:26said that a hydrogen bomb
20:28was both feasible
20:29and practicable
20:30and could be assembled
20:31in two years.
20:34One of the physicists
20:35at the conference
20:36was a German refugee
20:37who had taken
20:38British citizenship
20:39Klaus Fuchs.
20:43The United States
20:44Atomic Energy Bill
20:46had been passed
20:46by both houses
20:47of Congress
20:48and the decision
20:49had been taken
20:50to appoint
20:50an Atomic Energy Commission
20:52and to give to it
20:53the responsibility
20:54for all problems
20:55of atomic energy.
20:57Every aspect
20:57from the crude ore
20:58to the nuclear fuel
20:59and factories
21:00would come under its control.
21:02The death penalty
21:03would be imposed
21:03for the passing
21:04of information.
21:06Truman called it
21:07the most important branch
21:08of the government
21:08to be created
21:09in a hundred years.
21:11The man who was made
21:12chairman of the commission
21:13was David Lillian, though.
21:16My four associates
21:17and I come to our
21:18new responsibilities
21:19with varied backgrounds
21:21and experience.
21:23And this very fact
21:24is probably
21:25the best assurance
21:27that we will be able
21:29to work out
21:30policies and programs
21:31for the development
21:33of atomic energy
21:33that will be
21:35in accord
21:36with the universal
21:37aspiration
21:38of the American people
21:39that this great
21:40new force
21:41shall be devoted
21:42to the enrichment
21:43of human life
21:44and the added strength
21:47and happiness
21:47of our country.
21:49Lillianthal's aims
21:50were noble enough,
21:51but his appointment
21:52was not without opposition.
21:53It was strongly
21:55opposed by the adversaries
21:56of any form
21:56of nationalization
21:57of power production.
21:58The commission
21:59had only one
22:00scientist member,
22:01Robert Backer.
22:03Another member
22:04was Louis Straws,
22:05a man who described
22:06himself as a
22:07Black Hoover Republican.
22:09From a humble childhood,
22:11Straws had risen
22:12from being a travelling
22:12shoe salesman
22:13to become a prosperous banker.
22:15During the first
22:16three years
22:17of the commission,
22:18dissenting votes
22:19were cast against
22:19only twelve
22:20formal decisions.
22:21On each occasion,
22:23a dissenting vote
22:24was cast by Louis Straws.
22:26He had become interested
22:27in the views
22:28of a number
22:29of physicists
22:29on the possibility
22:30of a superweapon.
22:32Teller was most
22:33frequently heard,
22:34but it was Robert Oppenheimer
22:35who was appointed
22:36to be chairman
22:36of Lillianthal's
22:38General Advisory Committee.
22:41Only a few months
22:43after the announcement
22:44of the appointment,
22:45the name of Oppenheimer
22:45was once again
22:46in the news.
22:49Frank Oppenheimer,
22:50Robert's brother,
22:51was headlined
22:52by the New York Times
22:53for July 12, 1947
22:55as a communist.
22:56The news seemed
22:58to have no great
22:58implication for Oppenheimer
23:00at the time.
23:04Many months
23:05had passed
23:05since bombs
23:06were used in anger.
23:08Hiroshima
23:08was far away
23:09in time and place.
23:12Now it was
23:12the silly season
23:13for weapons.
23:25Let whoever wanted
23:27to play with explosives
23:28play with them.
23:29What was the worry?
23:31The worry
23:31was a United States
23:33B-29 bomber
23:34which had returned
23:35from a scientific
23:36observation mission
23:37in the Far East
23:38in August 1949,
23:40carrying photographic plates.
23:42when the plates
23:43were developed
23:44they showed
23:44not the usual
23:45streaks from cosmic rays
23:46but large areas
23:48of fogging
23:48and other unusual tracks,
23:50tracks which could
23:51have been made
23:52by the testing
23:53of an atomic bomb.
23:56But the United States
23:58had not exploded
23:58an atomic bomb
23:59in 1949.
24:01At once aircraft
24:02equipped with radiation
24:03detecting devices
24:04were sent to investigate.
24:05The news was
24:06unmistakable.
24:08The radioactivity
24:09was a result
24:09of an atomic explosion
24:10somewhere in Soviet Asia.
24:12Russia
24:13had the atomic bomb.
24:15It was news
24:16to make the western world
24:17think and think hard.
24:19There was no doubt
24:20that some American leaders
24:21had underestimated
24:23Soviet science
24:24and overestimated
24:25the value
24:26of atomic secrets.
24:27Edward Teller,
24:28like many other scientists,
24:30found the news critical
24:31and consulted Oppenheimer.
24:33In years ahead
24:34he was still expressing
24:35the view
24:36he held in 1949.
24:38And if the relative efforts
24:41continue
24:42as they have been
24:44since the war
24:45there is no doubt
24:47that in a few more years
24:49the Russians
24:49will leave us behind
24:51and way behind.
24:53He was strongly
24:54of the opinion
24:55that this was now
24:56the time
24:56to go all out
24:57and make a hydrogen bomb.
24:58The Atomic Energy Commission
25:00urgently needed advice.
25:01Should a crash program
25:03on a new super weapon
25:04which could dwarf
25:05the Russian atomic bomb
25:06be put into operation?
25:07They put their question
25:08to the General Advisory Committee
25:10under Oppenheimer.
25:11The committee
25:11handed back its report
25:13and said
25:13in determining
25:15not to proceed
25:16with the super bomb
25:16we see a unique opportunity
25:18of providing by example
25:20some limitations
25:21on the totality of war.
25:24The committee
25:25rejected any commitment
25:26towards the development
25:27of a hydrogen bomb.
25:30Enrico Fermi
25:31was one of two
25:32physicist members
25:33of the Advisory Committee
25:34who added a rider
25:35to the recommendations
25:36which ended
25:38we believe
25:39it is important
25:39for the President
25:40of the United States
25:41to tell the American public
25:43and the world
25:43that we think
25:44it is wrong
25:45on fundamental
25:46ethical principles
25:47to initiate
25:48the development
25:49of such a weapon.
25:51Truman did not
25:52take the scientist's advice
25:53as to what he should
25:54tell the American people.
25:56He had already told them
25:57of Stalin's atomic bomb
25:58now nicknamed
25:59in a friendly fashion
26:00Joe One.
26:02He received
26:03the Atomic Energy Commission's views
26:04based on the Oppenheimer
26:06Committee's advice
26:06recommending its opposition
26:08to the hydrogen bomb program.
26:11One of the commissioners
26:12in dissent
26:13was Louis Straws
26:14and some scientists
26:16agreed.
26:16They pointed out
26:17that Russian scientific progress
26:18should not be underestimated.
26:20They were right
26:22for reasons
26:22they did not suspect.
26:28On January 27th, 1950
26:30a passenger
26:31on the mid-morning
26:32London train
26:33from Didcote
26:33was the Harwell physicist
26:35Klaus Fuchs.
26:37Waiting to meet him
26:38at Paddington Station
26:39was a police inspector.
26:41That day
26:42Fuchs made a statement
26:44beginning
26:44I am Deputy Chief Scientific Officer
26:47acting rank
26:48at the Atomic Energy Research
26:49Establishment Harwell.
26:51My father was a parson
26:52and I had a very happy childhood.
26:55His trial
26:55at the Old Bailey
26:56was to tell
26:57what Washington learned
26:58on the day of his arrest.
27:00Fuchs had been communicating
27:01all the atomic secrets
27:03to which he had access
27:04to the Russians
27:05and Fuchs had attended
27:06early conferences
27:07on the hydrogen bomb.
27:09The news hit Washington hard
27:11and must have eliminated
27:12any doubts
27:13which remained
27:13in the President's mind.
27:18Four days later
27:19Truman overrode
27:20the recommendation
27:21of the General Advisory Committee
27:22and directed
27:23that works should go ahead
27:24with a hydrogen bomb.
27:27Many statesmen
27:29and most military men
27:30approved.
27:31The President's decision
27:33on the hydrogen bomb
27:34was a wise one.
27:37Necessary
27:38for our own security
27:41which really means
27:42the peace of the world.
27:44Let's face the facts.
27:46We tried again and again
27:48to reach an understanding
27:50but Russia refused.
27:52Russia still refuses.
27:54Unless and until
27:55we can secure world peace
27:58by sound, enforceable agreement.
28:01We must maintain our lead
28:04in the atomic field.
28:05We must not ignore
28:07or the hydrogen bomb.
28:09We owe this
28:10to our children.
28:12Louis Strauss
28:13had won his battle.
28:15That day
28:16he resigned
28:16from the Atomic Energy Commission
28:18and was able
28:19to congratulate Truman
28:20on his decision.
28:23At Los Alamos
28:24all that the physicists
28:26had behind them
28:27were eight years
28:28of thermonuclear fantasies,
28:30theories,
28:30and calculations.
28:31Now those who wished
28:33could begin work
28:34and Edward Teller
28:35set about recruiting scientists
28:36to build the hydrogen bomb.
28:39Only the previous October
28:40he had thought
28:41he had enlisted
28:41the valuable services
28:42of Hans Bethe.
28:45But still not all scientists
28:46were happy with this
28:47go-ahead for the new
28:48superweapon
28:49and Bethe was one of them.
28:52He published an article
28:53which compared
28:54the blast effect
28:54on New York City
28:55of a uranium bomb
28:56with that of a hydrogen bomb.
28:58He warned that a war
29:00fought with hydrogen bombs
29:01would be compared
29:02to the warfare
29:03of Genghis Khan.
29:05Security officers
29:06took over the plant
29:07where Bethe's article
29:08was being published
29:09and deleted
29:09classified statements in it.
29:13It had appeared
29:14only a few months
29:15after Oppenheimer
29:16had said
29:16that he still did not think
29:18that the United States
29:19should build
29:20a hydrogen bomb.
29:31The Korean War
29:32which broke out
29:33on June 25th 1950
29:35and within six months
29:37of Truman's decision
29:38hotted up the
29:39lukewarm opinions
29:40of the scientists.
29:46Communist forces
29:47were already
29:48within 20 miles
29:49of Seoul
29:49the capital of South Korea.
29:51An American soldier
29:52on the second retreat
29:53from Seoul
29:54was to call this
29:55the war we can't win
29:57we can't lose
29:58we can't quit.
30:01It was also
30:02the first war
30:03in which both sides
30:04might have access
30:05to atomic weapons.
30:15For Edward Teller
30:17this was now
30:17the crucial point.
30:18with full approval
30:20and with tight security
30:21he could put his program
30:22into top gear.
30:24He had still
30:26only a handful
30:26of scientists
30:27behind him
30:28but some
30:28who had had moral qualms
30:30about the production
30:30of the superweapon
30:31now shifted their ground.
30:35Hans Bethe appeared
30:36in order to check
30:37the group's
30:37theoretical calculations.
30:39Scientifically
30:40it was an immense problem.
30:42Not until June of 1951
30:44were some of America's
30:45leading scientists
30:46ready to meet Oppenheimer
30:47at Princeton
30:47to discuss the best way
30:49of building a hydrogen bomb.
30:51They included some
30:52who had once
30:53shown opposition
30:53to the manufacture
30:54of a thermonuclear weapon
30:56Enrico Fermi
30:57for example
30:57as well as some
30:58of the hydrogen bomb's
30:59leading proponents
31:00under Edward Teller.
31:01The meeting began
31:03with little interest
31:04in his most recent ideas.
31:06It ended
31:06with everyone
31:07without exception
31:08and including Oppenheimer
31:09being enthusiastic
31:10about the possibilities.
31:17But among
31:18air force
31:18and military leaders
31:19there were some
31:20who in spite of
31:21Oppenheimer's enthusiasm
31:22were distinctly worried
31:23about his opposition
31:24on technical grounds
31:26to their plans
31:26for atomic weapons
31:27in their strategy.
31:28The air force
31:30had decided
31:30to depend upon
31:31large fleets of bombers
31:32as its striking power.
31:35Soon after the Russians
31:36exploded their first
31:37atomic bomb
31:38this force
31:38known as
31:39the Strategic Air Command
31:41was revitalized
31:43with a new tough commander
31:44the cigar-chomping
31:45Curtis LeMay.
31:47LeMay immediately
31:48ordered the speeding up
31:49of new
31:49intercontinental bombers.
31:53He put his men
31:54on a round-the-clock alert.
31:58Many felt
31:59that the Strategic Air Command's
32:01atomic striking power
32:02might goad Russia
32:03into the development
32:04of counter-atomic weapons.
32:07Many,
32:08particularly scientists
32:09like Oppenheimer
32:10believed that
32:11the United States
32:11military forces
32:12should be primarily
32:13defensive
32:14and not offensive.
32:16The air force
32:17found this attitude
32:18disturbing
32:18because they believed
32:19that the scientists
32:20who held this view
32:21were ignorant
32:22of air power.
32:24The alternative
32:25to the Strategic Air Command
32:27was to rely
32:28on a defensive concept
32:29and Oppenheimer
32:30contributed to studies
32:32of a defense system
32:33from which emerged
32:34the Dueline,
32:35an interlocking system
32:36of radar stations.
32:38But meantime,
32:40the enthusiasm
32:40of the Princeton
32:41meeting of scientists
32:42had begun
32:43to bear its fruit.
32:44By November 1st, 1952,
32:46the atomic laboratories
32:47were ready to test
32:48the world's first
32:49thermonuclear weapon
32:51in the Marshall Islands.
32:53The test island
32:54was called Elugilab,
32:5520 miles north of Parry
32:57and Eniwetok,
32:58the two base islands
32:59of the atoll.
33:02On the small
33:04and naked island
33:04was built a shed
33:05which housed the device,
33:07a scientist's
33:08awesome box of tricks
33:10which was the result
33:11of months
33:11of bitter political wrangling
33:13and the culmination
33:14of years of work
33:15of dozens of physicists.
33:22And there was still
33:23only a 50% chance
33:25that the box
33:25would perform
33:26its most deadly trick.
33:358, 7, 6, 5,
33:404, 3, 2, 1.
34:03It had flowered
34:04into the greatest explosion
34:06on the face
34:06of the earth,
34:07at least the greatest
34:08we knew of.
34:12Elugilab
34:12had disappeared.
34:14It left behind
34:15a crater into which
34:15some cynical mathematician
34:17calculated
34:17would fit 14
34:19Pentagon buildings.
34:26Three days later,
34:27on November the 4th,
34:29the presidential elections
34:30took place.
34:34The outgoing president
34:35would be able
34:36to tell his successor
34:37that he had a new string
34:38to his atomic bowl.
34:42The hydrogen bomb
34:43had at last
34:44restored the balance
34:45of power
34:45to the side
34:46of the United States.
34:47Or had it.
34:48It was at least
34:49six years
34:50since Klaus Fuchs
34:51had given information
34:52to Russia
34:52about the American
34:53thermonuclear effort.
34:55If Russia
34:56had begun work
34:56immediately,
34:57then she might have
34:58as much as
34:59four years lead.
35:01There were new faces
35:02on the old balconies
35:04and there were new mines
35:05in the laboratories.
35:06Was it possible
35:07that in war
35:08Russia could meet
35:09an American hydrogen bomb
35:10with a similar weapon?
35:12But any immediate danger
35:14of a ding-dong nuclear war
35:15was temporarily removed
35:17by a ceasefire in Korea.
35:20On July 27th, 1953,
35:23at Panmunjom,
35:24the American general
35:25and the Russian-born
35:26Korean general
35:27silently led
35:28their delegations
35:29into a peace pagoda
35:30made of tar paper
35:31and straw mat
35:32to sign 18 copies
35:34of the armistice.
35:35Nine of these
35:36were in United Nations blue,
35:38nine in Communist red.
35:40After ten minutes,
35:41they rose and walked out
35:43without having spoken
35:44a word to each other.
35:46The Korean war
35:48was over.
35:50There was little rejoicing
35:52in the world
35:52at the news,
35:53but there was a relief
35:54of the tension
35:55between the Communist
35:55faction and the West.
35:57It was a relief
35:58which didn't last long.
36:00Six weeks later,
36:01the Russian premier,
36:02Malenkov,
36:03announced to the Supreme Soviet
36:04that the United States
36:05no longer had a monopoly
36:07of hydrogen bomb production.
36:11Dwight Eisenhower,
36:13less than a year
36:14after his election,
36:15was the first president
36:16of the United States
36:17to have to face the fact
36:18that his country
36:19could be destroyed
36:20by an enemy.
36:22The choice that spells
36:24terror and death
36:25is symbolized
36:26by a mushroom cloud
36:28floating upward
36:28from the release
36:29of the mightiest
36:31natural power
36:31are yet uncovered
36:32by those who search
36:34the physical universe.
36:36The energy that it typifies
36:38is, at this stage
36:40of human knowledge,
36:41the unharnessed blast.
36:44In its wake,
36:45we see only sudden
36:46and mass destruction,
36:47erasure of cities,
36:49the possible doom
36:50of every nation
36:51and society.
36:53This horror
36:54must not be.
37:03There was fear
37:04of the bomb
37:04and there was
37:05the fear
37:06of the enemy
37:06which might own the bomb.
37:08A senator from Wisconsin,
37:10Joseph McCarthy,
37:10set out to heighten
37:11this fear
37:12of the East
37:12by the West.
37:16In America,
37:17communists,
37:18some real,
37:18many imaginary,
37:20were being hounded.
37:22I know this hurts you,
37:23Mr. Welch.
37:33Mr. Welch here
37:35has been
37:37filibustering this hearing.
37:38He's been talking
37:39day after day
37:40about the way
37:41he wants to get
37:42anyone painted
37:42with communism
37:43out before sundown.
37:45Have you no sense
37:47of decency, sir,
37:49at long last?
37:50Have you left
37:51no sense of decency?
37:55My answer
37:56to these charges
37:57is short,
37:58simple,
37:59and direct.
38:00I am not
38:01and never have
38:02been disloyal.
38:03I am not
38:04and never have
38:05been a communist.
38:06I am not
38:08and never have
38:08been a fellow traveler.
38:10I am not
38:11and never have been...
38:12It was not good
38:12to be a citizen
38:13of the United States
38:14and to have had
38:15connections with communism.
38:17One such citizen
38:18whose brother
38:18was known
38:19to have been
38:19a communist party
38:20cardholder
38:21was Robert Oppenheimer.
38:23There were reported
38:24stronger connections.
38:26During the last two years,
38:27Oppenheimer's influence
38:28with the Atomic Energy Commission
38:29had declined.
38:30It was to decline
38:31still further.
38:32On July the 3rd, 1953,
38:35the Republican
38:36Louis Strauss
38:36was reappointed
38:37chairman
38:37of the Atomic Energy Commission
38:39under the Eisenhower administration.
38:44Before the end of that year,
38:46Strauss was discussing
38:47with Eisenhower
38:48the implications
38:49of an FBI investigation
38:50in the matter
38:51of J. Robert Oppenheimer.
38:59On December 3rd,
39:01Oppenheimer was in England
39:02delivering the BBC
39:03Wreath Lectures
39:04on Science
39:05and the Common Understanding.
39:07Within a lifetime,
39:09what we learned at school
39:10has been rendered
39:11inadequate
39:12by new discoveries
39:13and new inventions
39:14and the ways
39:16that we learned
39:16in childhood
39:17are only very meagerly adequate
39:19to the issues
39:20that we are called on
39:21to meet in maturity.
39:23On the same cold
39:25winter afternoon,
39:26a telephone call
39:27from President Eisenhower
39:28summoned Strauss
39:29to his office
39:30to direct that a blank wall
39:32be placed between Oppenheimer
39:33and any secret information
39:35until a hearing
39:36had been completed.
39:39Oppenheimer's decision
39:40to the Atomic Energy Commission
39:41was that he would submit
39:43to a hearing
39:44by a personnel security board.
39:49The board began its sittings
39:51on April the 12th, 1954
39:52in some temporary wartime offices
39:55in Washington
39:56in order to establish
39:57whether Robert Oppenheimer's
39:58security clearance
39:59should be suspended.
40:02The man who had once
40:04sat with committees
40:04to give them his advice
40:05on atomic matters
40:07now sat before one
40:08to face accusations.
40:10Accusations that he had been
40:11a communist fellow traveller,
40:13that he had contributed
40:14to communist party funds,
40:16and that his opposition
40:17to the hydrogen bomb program
40:18had slowed down
40:19its development.
40:21It was supposedly
40:22an administrative hearing,
40:23but the procedure
40:24was that of a trial
40:25with statements from
40:27and bitter cross-examination
40:28of Oppenheimer
40:29and his one-time colleagues.
40:31His 50th birthday
40:32fell in the middle
40:33of the proceedings,
40:34which revealed
40:35his private life,
40:36his thoughts,
40:37and his weaknesses
40:38in frightening detail.
40:40For 12 years,
40:42every trivial incident
40:43of his life
40:44had been pitilessly dissected
40:45by government secret agents.
40:47One close relationship
40:49with a man named Chevalier,
40:50a university lecturer,
40:51had been traced back
40:52to 1942.
40:57Chevalier had been approached
40:59by a contact
40:59who suggested
41:00that he had a means
41:01of getting technical information
41:02to Russian scientists.
41:06Chevalier secretly
41:07told Oppenheimer
41:08of the meeting.
41:09Oppenheimer,
41:10when later questioned
41:10by security officers,
41:12lied about the affair,
41:13apparently to protect
41:15this man, Chevalier.
41:19This unimportant incident
41:21took on tremendous
41:22significance
41:23at the hearings
41:23because it cast doubt
41:25on the truth
41:25of the rest
41:26of Oppenheimer's evidence.
41:30In 500,000 words
41:32of testimony,
41:33the Betters
41:33and the Fermis,
41:35as well as the Groves,
41:36all testified
41:37as to his loyalty.
41:39But it was the evidence
41:40of a minority
41:41of Oppenheimer's
41:42fellow physicists,
41:43evidence which set out
41:44to show his reluctance
41:45to a hydrogen bomb program,
41:47which ultimately condemned him.
41:48It was the evidence
41:49of men such as Edward Teller,
41:51the so-called father
41:52of the hydrogen bomb
41:53was condemning
41:54the so-called father
41:55of the atom bomb.
41:57The Personnel Security Board
41:59had reached a decision,
42:01a decision against Oppenheimer.
42:04In refusing to reinstate
42:06his security clearance,
42:07the board said
42:08that Oppenheimer
42:09had shown a serious disregard
42:10for the requirements
42:11of security
42:12and had been susceptible
42:13to influence
42:14which could have
42:15serious implications
42:16for the country.
42:17His conduct
42:18on the hydrogen bomb program
42:19was found
42:20to be sufficiently disturbing
42:21to raise a doubt
42:22whether his future participation
42:24would be in the interests
42:25of security.
42:29But the three-man board
42:31did not return
42:31a unanimous decision.
42:33The only scientist,
42:34Ward Evans,
42:35said,
42:35I personally think
42:36our failure to clear
42:37Dr. Oppenheimer
42:38will be a black mark
42:40on the escutcheon
42:41of our country.
42:42Apart from its effect
42:44on Oppenheimer,
42:45his condemnation
42:46at the hearings
42:46caused a great schism
42:47in the world's
42:48scientific community.
42:49Members of the
42:50Great Brotherhood
42:51who ten years before
42:52had drunk
42:52to the success
42:53of their work.
42:54Men who from the outside
42:55appeared to have produced
42:56their vast and terrible weapons
42:58in answer to the call
42:59of patriotism
43:00and their country's
43:01immediate needs,
43:02now found their
43:03moral quandaries
43:04and personal vacillations
43:05exposed in a stark,
43:07unflattering glare.
43:08But there was yet
43:09to be a bitter postscript.
43:12The inscrutable surface
43:14of Mother Earth
43:15was to experience
43:15her children's
43:16latest creation,
43:17a transportable
43:19hydrogen bond.
43:20It was to be
43:21750 times as powerful
43:23as the Hiroshima weapon.
43:25It was to have
43:26a premature
43:27and undesirable fame.
43:29At 5.30 in the morning
43:31of March 1st, 1954,
43:33the Japanese fishing boat
43:34the Fortunate Dragon
43:36had dropped anchors
43:3771 miles from Bikini
43:38and 14 miles outside
43:40the restricted area
43:41of the Pacific
43:42testing ground.
43:46At 6 o'clock,
43:47the crew saw flashes
43:48of fire as bright
43:49as the sun itself
43:50rising into the sky.
43:52But coming from the west,
43:566 minutes later,
43:57they heard the explosion.
44:03For a few hours,
44:04they worked at their nets.
44:06Then a fine white ash
44:07began to fall.
44:09One of the crew
44:10noticed the rubber bands
44:11holding on his cotton gloves
44:12crumbling
44:13and falling to pieces.
44:1614 days later,
44:17the fortunate dragon
44:18arrived in Japan.
44:20Its crew,
44:21by this time,
44:22suffering from
44:23radiation sickness.
44:38One man died
44:39within a few months.
44:41He was called
44:42by his countrymen
44:43the first martyr
44:45of the hydrogen bomb.
44:47But had there been
44:48another martyr,
44:51Icarus had flown
44:52too near the sun.
44:55Oppenheimer,
44:55the man who had been
44:56asked by his country
44:57to build an atomic weapon
44:58and had done the job well,
45:00had been pilloried
45:01for what he did not do.
45:04Edward Teller, too,
45:05had been asked
45:05to build a weapon
45:06and there was no doubt
45:07that he had done
45:08his job well.
45:09In 1962,
45:10President Kennedy
45:11presented him
45:11with the Enrico Fermi Award.
45:15Dr. Teller
45:16was one of a number
45:17of Europeans
45:17who came to
45:19the United States
45:19and played a
45:20most significant role
45:21in World War II
45:24and has contributed
45:26immeasurably
45:27to the security
45:27of the United States
45:28since that time.
45:30It is really wonderful
45:32for me
45:32to receive this award,
45:35most particularly
45:37because
45:39every one
45:40of its
45:42previous recipients
45:44is a man
45:48whom
45:49I admire,
45:51for whom
45:52I have
45:52a warm friendship
45:54and with whom
45:55it is the greatest
45:56honor to be
45:57associated.
45:59The Fermi Award
46:00had never been made
46:01to Robert Oppenheimer,
46:02but time in one sense
46:04is a great healer.
46:05Almost ten years
46:06after his condemnation,
46:08the political
46:08and scientific
46:09climates had changed.
46:11Twelve months
46:11after his own
46:12Fermi Award,
46:13Edward Teller
46:14added his name
46:15to the ballot paper,
46:16nominating Oppenheimer
46:17as the next recipient.
46:18Since the war,
46:21you have continued
46:23to lead
46:24in the search
46:25for knowledge
46:26and you have
46:28continued to build
46:29on the major
46:30breakthrough
46:31achieved by
46:33Enrique Fermi.
46:35You have led
46:36in developing
46:37an outstanding
46:38school
46:38of theoretical
46:40physics
46:41in the United States
46:42of America.
46:44For these
46:45significant
46:46contributions,
46:48I present
46:49to you
46:50on behalf
46:51of the
46:51Atomic Energy
46:52Commission
46:52and the people
46:54of the United
46:55States
46:56the Enrique Fermi
46:58Award
46:59of 1963.
47:08Thank you,
47:10Mr. President.
47:16And perhaps
47:17the least
47:17important
47:18to you,
47:18$50,000
47:20check
47:20from the
47:21Treasury
47:21of the
47:21United States.
47:29But the
47:30findings
47:30of the
47:30Security Board
47:31have nonetheless
47:32never been
47:33rescinded.
47:34I think
47:35it's just
47:36possible,
47:36Mr. President,
47:38that it has
47:38taken some
47:39clarity
47:39and some
47:40courage
47:41to make
47:42this award
47:42today.
47:44That would
47:44seem to me
47:45a good
47:46offer
47:46for all
47:47our futures.
47:49These words
47:50I wrote down
47:51almost a
47:52fortnight ago
47:53in a somber
47:55time
47:55that gratefully
47:56and gladly
47:57speak to me
47:58to me.
48:05Many
48:06scientists
48:06suffered,
48:07some died,
48:08building the
48:09weapons they
48:09believed would
48:10benefit their
48:11country and
48:12mankind.
48:13Yet judgments
48:13as easy
48:14as that
48:15of the
48:15common man's
48:16philosopher
48:16are still
48:17heard.
48:19Will nobody
48:20ever stop
48:20the scientists?
48:22Won't somebody
48:23put them in a
48:23bag and tie
48:24them up?
48:25Or into a
48:26lethal chamber?
48:33plus a
48:39A
48:56Anotherizi
48:57family
48:57her
48:57Phil
48:57And
48:57what's
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