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Disaster Transbian episode 27
Transcript
00:00Are you ready to tell him?
00:20Holy shit!
00:30Holy shit!
00:33God bless you, Father.
00:35Amen!
00:37Amen!
00:40Amen!
00:45Amen!
00:48Amen!
00:56Amen!
01:00The Iroquois Theater Fire was a catastrophic building fire in Chicago, Illinois that broke
01:23out on December 30, 1903 during a performance attended by 1,700 people.
01:31The fire caused 602 deaths and 250 non-fatal injuries.
01:38It ranks as the worst theater fire in the United States, surpassing the carnage of the Brooklyn
01:44Theater Fire of 1876, which claimed at least 278 lives.
01:50For nearly a century, the Iroquois Theater Fire was the deadliest single building disaster
01:56in American history.
01:58Only the destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 claimed more lives in
02:04a disaster affecting an American building when 1,466 office employees died in World Trade
02:11Center 1 and 626 office workers in Tower 2 with the additional loss of life of over 400 firefighters
02:20and public safety professionals in both buildings.
02:27So, let's go over it now!
02:28Oh my God!
02:29Thank you, God!
02:30Oh my God!
02:32Thank you, God!
02:33Oh!
02:34Oh my God!
02:35Oh!
02:36Oh!
02:37Oh!
02:38Oh!
02:39Oh!
02:40Oh!
02:41Oh.
02:42Oh.
02:43Oh.
02:44Oh!
02:45Oh!
02:46Oh!
02:47Oh!
02:48Oh!
02:50Oh!
02:51Oh!
02:52Freedom itself was attacked itself by a baseless power, earth and freedom will be defended.
03:15Despite being billed as absolutely fireproof, the Iroquois Theater, which opened a month
03:21before the fire, exhibited numerous deficiencies in fire readiness that contributed to the
03:27high death toll.
03:29Some of these deficiencies were known by city officials tasked with public safety.
03:35The resulting scandal resulted in changes in building safety codes and code enforcement
03:41in the United States and throughout the world.
03:45The fire broke out at about 3.15 p.m. while the Iroquois presented a matinee performance
03:51of the musical Mr. Bluebeard.
03:53A broken arc lamp ignited some muslin curtains, which stage managers were unable to douse.
04:01An attempt to lower the safety curtain to contain the fire was unsuccessful.
04:06Despite attempts by Eddie Foy to calm the crowd, audience members frantically rushed for the
04:12exits, only to find the fire exits were locked or hidden.
04:17The largest death toll was at the base of stairways, where hundreds of people were trampled, crushed
04:23or asphyxiated.
04:26Some people jumped to their deaths from the fire escapes.
04:29The Iroquois had no fire alarm box or telephone, which hampered initial rescue efforts.
04:36It is estimated that 575 people were killed on the day of the fire, dozens dying afterward.
04:44The vast majority of those killed were audience members.
04:48Two features, the safety curtain and fire dampers, were either not present or not working at the
04:54time of the fire.
04:56Other contributing factors included a lack of exit signs, emergency lighting or fire preparedness.
05:04Doors that opened inward or were latched shut, confusing exit routes, icy fire escapes and the
05:11presence of ornamental doors.
05:14The Iroquois Memorial Hospital was built as a memorial to the fire, and Chicago held an
05:20annual memorial service.
05:22The Iroquois fire prompted widespread implementation of the panic bar, asbestos fire curtains, and
05:29doors that opened outward.
05:31The theater was rebuilt and operated until 1925, when it was replaced by the Oriental Theater.
05:39The Iroquois Theater was located at 26 West Randolph Street, between State Street and Dearborn
05:46Street.
05:47The syndicate that bankrolled its construction chose the location specifically to attract
05:52women visiting the city on day trips, who would be more comfortable attending a theater
05:58near the police patrolled Loop Shopping District.
06:01And the wife, every time shopping came up, she got really excited, oh, shopping on the
06:06internet.
06:07How about a little online shopping, Anne?
06:09Oh, shopping sounds good.
06:10I can never pass up a bargain.
06:12The theater opened on November 23rd, 1903, after numerous delays resulting from labor unrest.
06:19And according to one writer, the unexplained inability of architect Benjamin Marshall to complete required
06:26drawings on time.
06:28Upon opening, the theater was lauded by drama critics.
06:32Walter K. Hill wrote in The New York Clipper, a predecessor of Variety, that the Iroquois was
06:39the most beautiful in Chicago, and competent judges state that few theaters in America can
06:45rival its architectural perfections.
06:49The Iroquois had a capacity of 1,602 with three audience levels.
06:55The main floor, known as the orchestra or parquet, had approximately 700 seats on the same level
07:02as the foyer and grand stair hall.
07:05The second level, the dress circle, or first balcony, had more than 400 seats.
07:11The third level, the gallery, had about 500 seats.
07:15There were four boxes on the first level and two on the level above.
07:20The theater had only one entrance.
07:22A broad stairway that led from the foyer to the balcony level was also used to reach the
07:27stairs to the gallery level.
07:30Other designers claimed that this allowed patrons to see and be seen regardless of the price
07:36of their seats.
07:38However, the common stairway ignored Chicago fire ordinances that required separate stairways
07:44and exits for each balcony.
07:47The design proved disastrous.
07:49People exiting the gallery encountered a crowd leaving the balcony level and people descending
07:55from the upper levels at the orchestra level patrons in the foyer.
08:00The backstage areas were unusually large.
08:03Dressing rooms were on five levels and an elevator was available to transport actors down to the
08:09stage level.
08:11The fly gallery, where scenery was hung, was also uncommonly large.
08:16After the fire, the Iroquois Theater was renamed and reopened as the Hyden Baymans Music Hall in
08:21September 1904.
08:24In October 1905, it was rechristened as the Colonial Theater and remained active until the
08:30building was demolished in 1925.
08:34In 1926, the Oriental Theater was built on the site.
08:38In 2019, the Oriental Theater was renamed the Nederlander Theater.
08:44Fire readiness deficiencies noted before the fire.
08:47Despite being billed as absolutely fireproof in advertisements and playbills, numerous deficiencies
08:54in fire readiness were apparent in the theater building.
08:58An editor of Fireproof Magazine toured the Iroquois during construction and noted the absence
09:06of an intake or staged draft shaft, the exposed reinforcement of the proskinium arch,
09:13the presence of wood trim on everything and inadequate provision of exits.
09:20Chicago's Fire Department, CFD, Captain Patrick Jennings performed an unofficial tour of the
09:26theater days before the official opening and noted that there were no sprinklers, alarms,
09:32telephones, or water connections.
09:35The captain and the theater's fireman, William Salers, discussed the deficiencies.
09:40Salers did not report the matter directly to the fire chief, William Mushom, concerned that
09:45he would be dismissed by the syndicate that owned the theater.
09:49When Captain Jennings reported the matter to his commanding officer, Battalion Chief John
09:54J. Hannon, he was told that nothing could be done as the theater already had a fireman.
09:59The on-site firefighting equipment consisted of six KillFire fire extinguishers.
10:06KillFire was a form of dry chemical extinguisher also sold for dousing chimney fires in residential
10:13houses.
10:14It consisted of a 2-by-24-inch tube of tin filled with about 3 pounds of white powder, mostly
10:22sodium bicarbonate.
10:23The user was instructed to forcibly hurl the contents on the tube at the base of the
10:30flames.
10:31The fire began high above the stage, so the KillFire, when thrown, fell uselessly to the
10:38ground.
10:39On Wednesday, December 30th, 1903, the Iroquois presented a matinee performance of the popular
10:45Drury Lane musical Mr. Bluebeard, which had been playing at the theater since opening night.
10:51The play, a burlesque of the traditional Bluebeard folktale, featuring Dan McAvoy as Bluebeard
10:58and Eddie Foy as Sister Anne, a role that showcased his physical comedy skills.
11:04Dancer Bonnie Megan was also in the cast as Emer Dasher.
11:09Attendance since opening night had been disappointing as the result of poor weather, labor unrest,
11:15unrest, and other factors.
11:18The December 30th performance drew a much larger, sellout audience.
11:23Tickets were sold for every seat in the house, plus hundreds more for the standing room areas
11:29at the back of the theater.
11:31Many of the estimated 2,100 to 2,200 patrons attending the matinee were children.
11:38The standing room areas were so crowded that some patrons sat in aisles, blocking the exits.
11:44Shortly after the beginning of the second act, eight men and eight women were performing the
11:50double-octet musical number in the pale moonlight, with the stage illuminated by blue-tinted spotlights
11:56to suggest a night scene.
11:59Sparks from an arc light ignited a muslin curtain, possibly as a result of an electrical short circuit.
12:06Lamp operator William McMullen testified that the lamp was placed too close to the curtain,
12:13but that stage managers had failed to offer a solution when he had first reported the problem.
12:19McMullen clapped at the fire when it started, but the flame quickly raced up the curtain and
12:24beyond his reach.
12:27Theater fireman William Salers tried to douse the fire with the kill fire canisters, but
12:32by that time it had spread to the fly gallery, high above the stage, where several thousand
12:38square feet of highly flammable painted canvas scenery flats were hung.
12:43The stage manager tried to lower the asbestos fire curtain, but it snagged.
12:50Early reports stated that the asbestos curtain was stopped by the trolley wire that carried
12:56acrobats over the stage.
12:59But later investigations showed that the curtain had been blocked by a light reflector that protruded
13:04from under the proscenium arch.
13:06A chemist, who later tested part of the curtain, stated that it was composed mainly of wood pulp
13:13mixed with asbestos and would have been of no value in a fire.
13:19Foy, who had been preparing to take the stage, attempted to calm the crowd from the stage,
13:24first ensuring that his young son was in the care of the stagehand.
13:28He later wrote,
13:30It struck me as I looked out over the crowd during the first act that I had never before
13:35seen so many women and children in the audience.
13:39Even the gallery was full of mothers and children.
13:42Foy was widely considered a hero after the fire for his courage in remaining on stage and
13:49pleading with patrons not to panic, even as large chunks of burning scenery landed around him.
13:55The brief moment of calm was over.
13:58Chaos ensued.
13:59By this time, many of the patrons on all levels were attempting to flee the theatre.
14:05Some had found the fire exits hidden behind draperies on the north side of the building,
14:10but discovered that they could not open the unfamiliar bascule locks.
14:15Bar owner Frank Houseman, a former baseball player of the Chicago Colts, defied an usher who
14:22refused to open a door. He was able to open the door because his icebox at home had a similar lock.
14:29Houseman credited his friend outfielder, Charlie Dexter, who had just quit the Boston
14:35beam eaters with forcing open another door. A third door was opened either by brute force or by a blast of air.
14:44But most of the other doors could not be opened. Some patrons panicked, crushing or trampling others
14:52in a desperate attempt to escape. Many were killed while trapped in dead ends or while trying to open
14:59windows that appeared to be doors. The dancers on stage were also forced to flee, along with the
15:05performers backstage and in the numerous dressing rooms. Several performers and stage hands escaped
15:13through the building's main rear exit, which consisted of a large set of stock double doors,
15:19normally used for moving large fly sceneries and set pieces or props into the background area.
15:26When the door was opened, an icy wind blast rushed inside, fueling the flames with air and causing the
15:34fire to grow substantially larger. Many performers escaped through the coal hatch and through windows
15:41in the dressing rooms, and others tried to escape via the west stage door, which opened inward and became
15:48jammed as actors frantically pressed toward the door. A passing railroad agent saw the crowd pressing
15:56against the door and unfasten the hinges from the outside, allowing the actors and stage hands to escape.
16:03As the vents above the stage were nailed or wired shut, the fireball instead traveled outward,
16:10ducking under the stuck asbestos curtain and streaking toward the vents behind the dress circle and gallery,
16:17fifty feet away. The hot gases and flames passed over the heads of those in the orchestra seats,
16:25and incinerated flammable materials in the gallery and dress circle levels, including patrons still
16:31trapped in those areas. Those in the orchestra section exited into the foyer and out of the front door,
16:38but those in the dress circle and gallery who escaped the fireball could not reach the foyer,
16:43because stairwells were blocked by high layers of fallen victims.
16:51Although iron grates that blocked secondary stairways during performances to prevent patrons
16:58in the cheaper seats from sneaking downstairs to the more expensive lower levels were still in place,
17:05first responders found very few victims near the gates. The largest death toll was at the base
17:12of the stairways where hundreds of people were trampled, crushed, or asphyxiated. People who were able to
17:19escape using the emergency exits on the north side found themselves on fire escapes, one of which was
17:26improperly installed causing people to trip upon exiting the fire escape door. Many jumped or fell from the icy,
17:35narrow fire escapes to their deaths, and the bodies of the first jumpers broke the falls of those who
17:41followed them. Students from the Northwestern University building north of the theater tried bridging the gap
17:48with a ladder and then with some boards between the rooftops, saving those few able to manage the
17:55makeshift crossover. The Iroquois had no fire alarm box or telephone. The CFD's Engine 13 was alerted to the fire
18:04by a stagehand who had been ordered to run from the burning theater to the nearest firehouse. On the way to the scene,
18:13at approximately 3.33 p.m., a member of Engine 13 activated an alarm box to call additional units.
18:21Initial efforts focused on the people trapped on the fire escapes. The alley to the north of the theater,
18:29known as Couch Place, was icy, narrow, and full of smoke. Aerial ladders could not be used in the
18:36alley and black nets concealed by the smoke proved useless. The Chicago Police Department became involved
18:44when an officer patrolling the theater district saw people emerge from the building in a panic,
18:50some with clothing on fire. The officer reported on the incident from a police box on Randolph Street,
18:56and police summoned by whistles soon converged on the scene to control traffic and aid with the evacuation.
19:03Some of the city's 30 uniformed police matrons were summoned because of the large number of female
19:10casualties. Mass panic ensued, and many of those trapped inside tried climbing over piles of bodies
19:17in order to escape. Corpses were stacked 10 feet high around some of the blocked exits.
19:25The victims were asphyxiated by the fire, smoke, and gases, or were crushed by the onrush of others
19:32behind them. It is estimated that 575 people were killed on the day of the fire and at least 30 more
19:40died of injuries over the following weeks. Many of the dead were buried in Montrose, Calvary, St. Boniface,
19:48Mount Hope, Mount Olivet, Oakwoods, Rose Hill, Graceland, Forest Home, and Waldheim Jewish cemeteries.
19:56Of the approximately 300 actors, dancers, and stagehands, only five people died. Aerialist Nellie Reed,
20:04an actor in a bit part, an usher, and two female attendants. Reed's role was to fly as a fairy over
20:13the audience on a trolley wire, showering them with pink carnations. She was trapped above the stage
20:20while waiting for her entrance, and during the fire she fell and died of burns and internal injuries
20:26three days later. The risks inherent in flammable scenery and props were recognized even in 1903.
20:37Two features, a safety curtain that confines fire to the stage area and smoke doors that allow smoke
20:44and heat to escape through the roof above the stage combined to increase fire safety in theaters.
20:50This arrangement creates negative pressure. The stage area becomes a chimney and fresh breathable air
20:57is sucked through the exit doors into the audience area. At the Iroquois, the smoke doors above the stage
21:05were fastened closed. This meant that smoke flowed out of the building through many of the same exits
21:13through which people were trying to escape. Skylights on the roof of the stage, which were intended to
21:20open automatically during a fire and allow smoke and heat to escape, were fastened closed. The curtain
21:28was not tested periodically and it became stuck when the theater personnel tried to lower it.
21:34The curtain was not fireproof. Curtains made with asbestos interwoven with wire
21:40created a strong and effective barrier against fire. The asbestos curtain at the Iroquois not only
21:47failed to lower, but also proved to be both weak and flammable. Chemist Gustav J. Johnson of the
21:55Western Society of Engineers analyzed a piece of the material after the fire. It was largely wood pulp.
22:03By mixing pulp with asbestos fiber, the life of the curtain is prolonged, the cost is cheapened,
22:09and the wire foundation may be dispensed with. It results in a curtain that may get inside city
22:17ordinances, but is of no value in a fire. Curtain material was rendered irrelevant by the 500 square
22:25foot triangular gap beneath the partly jammed curtain that functioned as a flue for the backdraft fireball
22:33that hurled into the auditorium at 3 50 pm. Eyewitnesses testified that the curtain was still in place
22:40when the fireball passed through the gap. The owners of the theater claimed that the 30 exits would allow
22:48everyone inside to escape the building within five minutes. Audiences in 1903 were aware of the hazards of
22:56fires in theaters, especially after at least 384 people died in the Ring Theater fire in Vienna, Austria.
23:06Some exit doors opened inward into the auditorium and others employed a bascule-type European latch,
23:13unfamiliar to many people that prevented the door from opening when the crowd pressed against it.
23:18When people were able to pull the doors open enough to escape, some people were then wedged in the door
23:25opening as people continued to push on the door. Today, exit doors open outward so that people trying
23:32to escape will tend to hold the doors open. There were no exit signs on fire escape exits and doors were
23:40concealed behind drapery. On the ground floor, the drapery was intact after the fire, but in the balconies,
23:48drapery was destroyed by the fireball. Theater staff had never experienced a fire drill.
23:56They were unfamiliar with exits and some refused to open locked exit doors. The theater had no
24:04emergency lighting and auditorium lights had been dimmed for the moonlight act on the stage at the time
24:10when the fire erupted. The electric switch box, located directly between the initiation point of the
24:18fire. The fire was soon destroyed, darkening the entire auditorium with the only illumination coming
24:25from the flames on the stage. During performances, some lesser trafficked stairways were blocked with
24:32iron gates to prevent people with inexpensive tickets from taking seats in other parts of the theater.
24:39On the day of the fire, there were no empty seats. Had such gates been located in primary stairways, the death toll
24:50would have been higher. First responders reported that few victims were found at the iron gates. Many of the exit
24:58routes were confusing. There were several ornamental doors that looked like exits, but were not. 200 people died in one passageway that
25:07was not an exit. Iron fire escapes on the north wall led to at least 125 deaths. People were trapped on all levels
25:20because the icy, narrow stairs and ladders were dangerous and because smoke and flames blocked the way down.
25:29The stairs on one fire escape exit from the second floor gallery had not been adjusted to accommodate a last
25:36minute engineering alteration during construction that raised the level of the gallery floor inside the
25:43auditorium. As a result, the fire escape landing was two feet lower than the theater floor causing people
25:50to stumble and fall onto the landing.
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