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Liberator of Asia - The True Story of Ngo Dinh Diem
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00:00:32Monday, November 4th, 1963, over the weekend the coup in Saigon took place, culminated
00:00:43three months of conversation about a coup, conversation which divided the government
00:00:52here and in Saigon.
00:00:55I was shocked by the death of Zim and Nu.
00:01:02I feel that we must bear a good deal of responsibility for it.
00:01:08I began talking to former Viet Cong and also to North Vietnamese POWs and also communist
00:01:15political cadre.
00:01:16What was amazing to me that they had a rather high opinion of Zim.
00:01:21They would constantly tell me he was the only true nationalist on the Saigon side.
00:01:28It's so ironic that he would be accused of being corrupt.
00:01:32There wasn't a corrupt bone in his body, which is probably what cost him his life.
00:01:36They started with me on Jim, you remember.
00:01:39Yeah.
00:01:40He was corrupt and he ought to be killed.
00:01:42So we killed him.
00:01:43We all got together and got a goddamn bunch of thugs and we went in and assassinated him.
00:01:48We really had no political stability since then.
00:01:56The war goes into a tailspin immediately after the coup and it's a tailspin that they never really recover from.
00:02:06It became increasingly difficult in the last months.
00:02:09Nevertheless, over a ten year period, he'd held his country together.
00:02:13He was an extraordinary character.
00:02:19If he had not been in politics, then we would be perhaps sitting here talking about his holiness, his spirituality,
00:02:33what I would call mysticism.
00:02:44From the last few months, he had not been in politics.
00:02:54I was a wonderful team.
00:02:59He was a successful leader in the Vietnam War.
00:03:24The New York Times and Washington Post was their destruction of Diem
00:03:29and undoing his government that caused the Vietnam War.
00:03:34The impact of this on today in America cannot be ignored
00:03:38because out of that was created what we call the Orthodox School of the Vietnam War History.
00:03:44All the professors and whatnot who teach this history within universities, it became sacrosanct.
00:03:51This idea where everything had to be bad about Diem
00:03:55in order to justify the fact that it was their actions in undermining Diem
00:04:02that required the American troops to go in.
00:04:06So it all goes back to Diem, how you see the note in Diem.
00:04:23In Vietnam, the Catholic faith survives through a spirit of resilience inspired by the Vietnamese martyrs.
00:04:30In over a 300-year period, 300,000 Vietnamese Catholics give their life for the faith,
00:04:38including the family of Ngo Dinh Ca, the father of Diem.
00:04:42He is studying for the priesthood in the late 1870s
00:04:45when an anti-Catholic mob burned down his village church, killing most of his family.
00:04:51Ngo Dinh Ca leaves the seminary in order to marry and continue the family name.
00:04:56But the harrowing experience forms a profound understanding of sacrifice and duty.
00:05:03The Molding family constantly talk about it and identify themselves with the martyrs.
00:05:11That image never disappears from their memory.
00:05:15And that is the legacy of the faith and of courage and of really loyalty to God
00:05:24that brought all of us, including all my uncles,
00:05:29to believe that we need to hold on to our faith and be faithful to the church.
00:05:38Ngo Dinh Ca passes on to his ten children a devout Catholic faith.
00:05:44He also passes on a dream for an independent Vietnam.
00:05:48In 1883, Vietnam surrenders its independence to France.
00:05:53Ca becomes the court minister of rights and grand chamberlain to Emperor Thanh Thay.
00:05:58But the emperor is frustrated by the restraints placed on him by French colonial rule.
00:06:04When the French demand Ca sign a letter supporting the abdication of Thanh Thay,
00:06:09he refuses and resigns his position.
00:06:12When all the Mandarians finally were convinced by the French
00:06:17to sign a petition asking the emperor to abdicate,
00:06:21he was the only one to refuse to sign that.
00:06:27And by not signing that petition, he was a throwout of a court and Ngo Dinh Ca become a commoner.
00:06:36Ngo Dinh Ziem at that time was a very small child, but he had already to work in the rice
00:06:44field.
00:06:44So that influenced a lot on my uncles and my mother's life that you have to be ready to lose
00:06:58everything,
00:06:59even your life, because you know what the truth is.
00:07:20This was always his first love, was with the farmers in the villages.
00:07:24And this remained with him even when he became president later.
00:07:28So it was a very, very early on, this sense of dedication and duty,
00:07:34which was very, very much a Confucian ethic.
00:07:41After completing his university education at the top of his class,
00:07:46Ziem enters the civil service as a district chief.
00:07:49He develops a reputation for incorruptibility and as a proponent of Vietnamese nationalism.
00:07:54Over the next decade, he rises to oversee 300 villages.
00:08:00He pushes for more autonomy for peasants at the village level
00:08:03and for greater action to be taken against a spreading communist ideology.
00:08:08But Ziem's pleas go unheard.
00:08:11In 1933, he accepts Emperor Bao Dai's invitation to serve as minister of the interior.
00:08:18However, Ziem complains bitterly to the French about the lack of authority
00:08:22and legitimacy of the Vietnamese government.
00:08:25When it becomes obvious, the French will not support any reform,
00:08:29like his father before him.
00:08:32Ziem resigns.
00:08:34The minute the co-option happened, he said, nope, not doing that.
00:08:37He was always principled.
00:08:41He kept to the truth no matter what.
00:08:43And he wouldn't deviate from that.
00:08:46And it was this, you know, going back to the Confucian idea
00:08:50that if you lose sight of the truth, then all things will start to unwind.
00:09:01For the next decade, Ziem lives a quiet life in Hue under close French surveillance.
00:09:08Prayer and daily mass form his life of solitude.
00:09:12He sleeps on a simple army cot and is sustained by a diet of fish and rice.
00:09:17He becomes known for giving whatever money he has to the poor.
00:09:21It is a lifestyle grounded in self-denial and sacrifice that forges an indomitable will
00:09:27and that appeals to Vietnamese seeking authentic leadership.
00:09:33Their social order in some ways is reversed for us.
00:09:36The moneymaker is way down on the list.
00:09:38Only below him is the bin.
00:09:40They're the soldiers.
00:09:40They're the lowest, the social order.
00:09:43Then the merchants, the moneymen.
00:09:45Then quite a ways up on that ladder and very important are the farmers, the peasant farmers.
00:09:52And then up from there, you have the educated Mandarin.
00:09:59And right at the top was the dirt poor, the immaculate poor scholar thinker.
00:10:15When the Japanese invade Indochina during the Second World War, Ziem sees a glimmer of hope.
00:10:22He asks Japan to support Vietnamese independence and forms a secret political party to further his dream.
00:10:29This angers his French overlords who declare Ziem as subversive and order his arrest.
00:10:34Ziem goes into hiding.
00:10:36And when Japan topples French colonial rule in March of 1945, he turns down the invitation to become prime minister,
00:10:45realizing it will be a puppet regime.
00:10:47When Japan surrenders to the United States in August of 1945, the nation's future is up for grabs.
00:10:54But Ziem now confronts a new obstacle to his hopes for a free and independent Vietnam, the spectacle of communist
00:11:03totalitarianism.
00:11:13Ziem was exceedingly intelligent and he sent out initially in the 30s and he started forming the communist party.
00:11:22But Ho Chi Minh was clever enough to create a front and to hide his own ambition.
00:11:32Ho Chi Minh recognized in Ziem the true authority that came from the Mandarin class in a way, appealed to
00:11:40the ordinary Vietnamese.
00:11:42Ho himself was a bit of an imposter because he didn't come from that back of a very bright man.
00:11:47But the whole thing about Uncle Ho and growing the Ho Chi Minh beard and all that was to appeal
00:11:52again to that Mandarin sense in the Vietnamese.
00:11:55It's a cultural appeal that Ziem had was genuine that Ho wanted.
00:12:18After a terrible trip, he finally ended in Hanoi, where he met Ho Chi Minh and where Ho Chi Minh
00:12:28allowed him to stay.
00:12:30Because Ho Chi Minh lacked contact with non-communist nationalists and he was killing all his opponents, but not yet
00:12:41Ziem.
00:12:43They had a fairly lively discussion wherein Ho said, look, you're well respected, we need you on our side.
00:12:51And Ziem said, no, I'm not going to participate in the cabinet and sitting with you when knowing that you
00:12:59have killed my brother.
00:13:01Ziem said, no, I cannot accept your offer.
00:13:06Am I still a prisoner or I am a free man?
00:13:10Ho Chi Minh said, you are a free man.
00:13:14And Ho Chi Minh did not keep him in prison, let him go.
00:13:20And they always said, you let a tiger go back to the forest.
00:13:30As Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh communists war with France, Ziem takes his alternative vision for Vietnam abroad.
00:13:37Under the threat of death, he departs for the United States.
00:13:41Ziem lives for two years at the Maryknoll Seminary in New York.
00:13:44His intelligence and character helped him forge lasting ties with influential American leaders, including New York's Cardinal Spellman, CIA Director
00:13:55Alan Dulles, and a junior senator from Massachusetts.
00:13:59Cardinal Spellman introduced Senator Jack Kennedy to Ziem out at the Maryknoll Seminary.
00:14:06You know, they came out there and Ziem was, I think he was doing the dishes at the time, and
00:14:10they were just dumbfounded that here was this man of enormous respect from Vietnam, and here he was acting like
00:14:16a servant in the quarters.
00:14:19So that sort of cemented a relationship there with Kennedy.
00:14:47Ziem stayed here till the end of February, beginning of March, 1954.
00:14:57When he stayed here among the monks, he was accepted as a secular oblate.
00:15:09What's a secular oblate?
00:15:12It's a person who is attached to the community of Benedictine monks.
00:15:21He joined the monks in prayer every day.
00:15:30He was a third order.
00:15:32It means that he didn't have to live in the monastery.
00:15:37He could wear the habit.
00:15:40I've seen him a couple of times.
00:15:42But mostly is that he needs to live the spirituality of the Benedictine.
00:15:49Ziem takes as his religious name Odillo, after his patron saint who founded All Souls Day on November 2nd.
00:15:56And who was known for opening up French churches and monasteries to the refugees of his time?
00:16:02It would be a portentous choice.
00:16:08Just two months later, the French forces fall at the Battle of Ziem Ben-Fu.
00:16:17Emperor Baodai called him in and said, listen, look at that cross.
00:16:23You are Catholic.
00:16:26You owe it to your Catholic faith to save your people.
00:16:30And you cannot refuse me anymore.
00:16:32Because he refused before.
00:16:34And you have to go back and lead your country.
00:16:41At the Geneva Conference, Vietnam is divided at the 17th parallel.
00:16:46Ziem agrees to become Prime Minister of South Vietnam under Emperor Baodai, who is living in Paris as an absentee
00:16:52head of state.
00:16:54Among his first tasks is overseeing the resettlement of one million refugees from the north.
00:16:59It would be his first of many Herculean tasks.
00:17:04The exodus and flood of close to a million people coming to South Vietnam, it puts a stress on both
00:17:11the infrastructure.
00:17:12It puts a stress on how government can adhere or basically provide aid and shelter for these people who picked
00:17:20up everything just with the clothes on their back and fleeing to South Vietnam.
00:17:25So that is one success that not a lot of people acknowledge or give him credit.
00:17:34When he came to Saigon in late June of 1954, he was really in a difficult situation.
00:17:43All, so many forces were arrayed against him.
00:17:46The French were against him.
00:17:47The South Union's army, which was pretty much under the thumb of the French, was against him.
00:17:52The various sect armies were against him.
00:17:55Some of the political parties were against him.
00:18:03His first challenge is the entrenched power of the Bin Zwin, a criminal cartel that runs prostitution, gambling, and the
00:18:11lucrative drug trade.
00:18:12Since the days of the Viet Minh, the communists have been dependent on selling drugs to finance their operations.
00:18:20The leader of the Bin Zwin, he had a palace with a moat that was surrounded with crocodiles, and he
00:18:27ran all the gambling concessions in Saigon.
00:18:30And then he also ran the police, which the French had turned over to him.
00:18:34How could any government claim to be the legitimate government while these guys were operating?
00:18:40You couldn't, so they had to go, and they wouldn't go peacefully, so there were some major battles in Saigon.
00:18:50Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, is a battered city of destruction and death after two weeks of bloody civil
00:18:56war.
00:18:57South Vietnam's premier, Gò Dinh Diem Wright, is victorious.
00:19:01His troops have decisively downed the rebels.
00:19:11We supported him because he was the most respected nationalist and the guy that, you know, most people didn't think
00:19:18the South Vietnamese stood much of a chance.
00:19:20But Diem was the one guy who might pull it off.
00:19:23He did pull it off.
00:19:25They were a bunch of articles written in the mid to late 50s, referring to the miracle of South Vietnam
00:19:31or the miracle of Ngo Dinh Diem.
00:19:34Diem embodied a lot of the aspirations of the Vietnamese at the time.
00:19:41They really wanted a decent government, and they wanted independence.
00:20:13The
00:20:37So as a boy I had a bicycle and I was riding around Saigon, it was pretty outrageous.
00:20:42I remember going into bicycle shops or cafes or bookstores and always there'd be this picture of Diem in his
00:20:50ice cream suit.
00:20:52He was the government. He was Vietnam. It was authority. It was somebody they liked and admired.
00:21:01Despite earning worldwide acclaim for his success, Diem knows if his fledgling nation is to survive it needs real independence
00:21:09with no French interference.
00:21:10He calls for a national referendum.
00:21:15Five million voters go to the polls in South Vietnam's first free national election to choose between Premier Ngo, Dean
00:21:22Diem, and absentee emperor Bao Dai.
00:21:27For a people wracked by the agonies of war, poverty, colonialism, and communism, it is a time for decision and
00:21:34an overwhelming endorsement of Diem, who receives more than 98% of the votes.
00:21:39I think that the referendum that he organized in the fall of 55 is often misunderstood.
00:21:47It was never meant to be a kind of American style election. It was essentially a declaration of independence from
00:21:55France.
00:21:56Bao Dai, who was officially the head of state, who was very much close to the French and represented their
00:22:05interests there.
00:22:06Having an election to get rid of that was his way of proceeding then to organize the Republic of Vietnam
00:22:16with a constitution and a national assembly.
00:22:22Celebrations over the departure of the French is short-lived.
00:22:26Diem's first Republic of Vietnam faces a growing communist insurgency.
00:22:31And Diem fears his American benefactors will simply replace French colonial rule.
00:22:38One reason why I think you have these very different views of Diem is that you have two camps on
00:22:44the American side.
00:22:45One which wishes the leader of South Vietnam to be like an American politician.
00:22:50Others recognize this is a fundamentally different culture and therefore you need to have a different type of leader,
00:22:57that you can't act like an American politician in this setting.
00:23:02A lot of our diplomats were used to third world leaders who, when the American Pro Council came into town,
00:23:09bit down and kissed his ring and said, yes, sir, what do I do now?
00:23:12And Diem said, I welcome your advice as my friend, but I am the president of this country and I
00:23:18will make the final decisions.
00:23:20He was anti-communist, but he was also anti-capitalist.
00:23:24And this was the root of the problem that he had with the Americans.
00:23:27He had this vision of personalism, to avoid the kind of coercive communalism of communism,
00:23:35and at the same time avoid this sort of individualistic, selfish kind of capitalist culture that he saw in the
00:23:43United States.
00:23:46Central to Diem's rule and to shaping his philosophy of personalism is his brother and right-hand man, Nodin Nu.
00:23:54Diem and Nu both desire revolutionary changes while also preserving central elements of Vietnamese culture.
00:24:01Nu wields immense power.
00:24:04He oversees the Special Forces and the Personalist Revolutionary Party, or Can Lao, through which the brothers exert political control.
00:24:13Nu's savvy and cunning compensate for Diem's high-minded idealism.
00:24:19Nu was such a kind of pure, almost naive man.
00:24:23I don't think he could have survived without his brother.
00:24:28Because Nu was, he was the one who always had his feelers out, who had his spies around the place,
00:24:34who was trying to make sure that the government was safe.
00:24:38They were a team.
00:24:40And the reason that Americans didn't like him and wanted to make a demon out of him is because Nu
00:24:48was interfering with their efforts to influence Diem.
00:24:53And they thought that if they could get rid of him, then Diem would be more supple for their purposes.
00:25:04In the late 1950s, conflicts begin to arise between Diem and the U.S. Department of State.
00:25:10In the eyes of the DOS, Diem must make his regime more democratic and less authoritarian.
00:25:17But there is a good reason Diem resents the U.S. advocating for a more Western-style democracy.
00:25:22He is contending with a growing communist incursion.
00:25:27In 1956, the Pulp Bureau made a decision to overthrow the government of South Vietnam.
00:25:32And that's an established fact.
00:25:34We know that now because of the archives that we've had access to.
00:25:40At night, they come to their home, their house, pick them out of the house and cut off their head.
00:25:47And they put their head on the stick.
00:26:02The ideal thing was to kill a government official.
00:26:05It could be a school teacher sent to a village.
00:26:08It could be a health worker.
00:26:09He'd be dragged out from the village in the middle of the night.
00:26:12And then he would be disemboweled.
00:26:13And then his family killed after they'd seen him killed.
00:26:17So the idea was to create the terror situation.
00:26:21Diem and most other Vietnamese at this time believed that you can't create a democracy overnight.
00:26:28And to try to do that opens the door to your enemies.
00:26:31So he believed in accordance with personalism and Confucianism that you needed a strong leader.
00:26:40Despite the growing threat of communist terror, U.S. Ambassador Derbrow continues to insist on democratic reforms.
00:26:48He is further emboldened by the publication in April of 1960 of the Caravelle Manifesto, a list of grievances against
00:26:56the Siem government.
00:26:58The document is the work of political rivals who had lost power after the fall of French colonial rule.
00:27:03The relationship between Siem and Derbrow soon worsens.
00:27:13A few disgruntled airmen are said to be responsible for the attack, which is regarded as an attempt to assassinate
00:27:20President Ngo Dien Diem.
00:27:29President Ngo Dien Diem escaped the attack, which demolished one wing of the palace.
00:27:35On November 11th, 1960, the Vietnamese military stages a coup.
00:27:40The attempt fails, and Siem successfully negotiates a compromise to retain power.
00:27:45But he is angered by Derbrow's less than supportive response.
00:27:50By the end of 1960, Siem faces a situation that would break a lesser man, a growing communist incursion, and
00:27:58a breach in trust with his American allies.
00:28:05To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word.
00:28:12American policy in South Vietnam is in a state of disarray when President Kennedy assumes office in 1961.
00:28:20He appoints Frederick Fritz Nolting as his new ambassador to Vietnam.
00:28:25Initially, Nolting is skeptical of Siem, but he has slowly won over.
00:28:31The way most historians wrote it was that my father went with a fixed idea.
00:28:39And I don't think that was true at all.
00:28:42I think he was gradually, completely convinced of Siem's devotion to the good of Vietnam.
00:29:00The Ho Chi Minh Trail was just a set of trails that were in the western region of South Vietnam.
00:29:06They began moving both troops and weapons and equipment down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
00:29:11They formed an organization in 1959, we call it the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but they called it Unit 559.
00:29:19And they were responsible for supplying all the men and weapons and equipment that were sent from North Vietnam into
00:29:26South Vietnam.
00:29:29The Ho Chi Minh Trail soon extends into neighboring Laos.
00:29:33Wanting to avoid another Korean War, Kennedy installs Avril Harriman, an experienced diplomat and former governor of New York,
00:29:41as the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.
00:29:45He charges him with finding a solution to the Laos problem.
00:29:50Harriman advises Kennedy to solve the crisis through a neutralization agreement.
00:29:54It is Nodin Siem's worst fear.
00:29:59Harriman's main way of operating was, okay, we, the powerful countries, the Americans and the Russians,
00:30:09we can work things out and we'll decide things.
00:30:12And he really resented Nodin Siem because Siem saw through all of this and resisted it and pointed out the
00:30:21problems,
00:30:21and he didn't want to see it.
00:30:24What Siem tried to get across was, he said, look, the communists will never honor this.
00:30:30They're playing you for the fool.
00:30:32Of course, that really insulted Harriman.
00:30:34He's like, I have a fingertips feeling that they'll be able to get the North Vietnamese to honor it.
00:30:42I think Avril Harriman is one of the biggest culprits in the disasters that lead the United States into the
00:30:52Vietnam War.
00:30:53In 1962, he promises Kennedy this will not be a conduit for North Vietnamese attacks on the South.
00:31:02The Americans do pull out, but the North Vietnamese never do.
00:31:06They continue to send troops, materiel, into the South.
00:31:11By 1963, this is increasingly a problem in the war.
00:31:16It's helping the communists get stronger.
00:31:18The people will eventually will refer to the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos as the Avril Harriman Memorial Highway.
00:31:26To thwart the growing communist menace, Kennedy orders more help for the South Vietnamese government.
00:31:32U.S. backing includes more than 3,000 military advisors.
00:31:36However, both Nolting and Siem want to avoid the introduction of American combat forces.
00:31:42Such a foreign military presence would undermine Siem's position and give the communists a political weapon.
00:31:49But they must contend with expectations in Washington.
00:31:54.
00:31:54.
00:31:54.
00:31:54I remember the time that Khoa Kỳ wanted to bring the army to Vietnam.
00:32:04He had a phone call for me.
00:32:10He was the president of the U.S. Department of Defense.
00:32:14He didn't want to bring the army to Vietnam.
00:32:28He didn't want to bring the army to Vietnam.
00:32:30He believed that he wanted to protect Vietnam.
00:32:33He was the president of the U.S. Department of Defense.
00:32:40He said that Vietnam was the right to rule the country.
00:32:46He was the right to protect Vietnam.
00:32:57Zia Menuh seek a solution that will avoid impending American control of his government.
00:33:02In 1962, they developed a plan for a system of fortified hamlets to protect rural peasants from communist encroachment.
00:33:11So the Strategic Hamlet Program aimed to fortify hamlets against communist intrusion.
00:33:18A lot of the villages, they built fencing around the villages.
00:33:21But that was really not what was important.
00:33:24What was really important was the self-defense forces that were built up in these hamlets.
00:33:29We now have all this material from the communist side that says, yes, in fact, the Strategic Hamlets were causing
00:33:36us great problems.
00:33:37The war was actually going well in 1962 and 1963.
00:33:43There was a lot of progress made in 1962.
00:33:49This is very much at odds with how the war was being reported by this young corps of reporters, American
00:33:58reporters in Saigon at that time,
00:34:01who were determined to bring, as David Halberstam admitted in later years, that he wanted to take credit for having
00:34:10brought down Ngolden Diem.
00:34:12This created this very negative reporting in American newspapers, which then was recycled back into South Vietnamese newspapers,
00:34:24which then undermined the authority of Ngolden Diem in his own country.
00:34:36I remember meeting journalists.
00:34:37They had a cynicism about them.
00:34:39They just had it in their minds that there was this corrupt Siem and his brother,
00:34:43and that was the end of the story, and we ought to get rid of them.
00:34:46It was the one weakness Siem had.
00:34:48He didn't understand the Western news media at all.
00:34:51He didn't understand that it actually had enormous political influence.
00:34:55That was a vulnerability that the communists themselves, though, clearly understood that, and they played to that.
00:35:03Another thing missing from the Western press is a fair comparison of Siem and communist leader Ho Chi Minh.
00:35:11While Siem is portrayed as an authoritarian despot, Ho Chi Minh gains favorable press as a grandfatherly figure whose only
00:35:19desire is independence.
00:35:21Ho Chi Minh was no more an advocate of American democratic ideals than, say, Al Capone was.
00:35:28They mentioned him very much in a nationalist light, that he was, you know, a fatherly figure.
00:35:34He was ascetic, which, again, is not true.
00:35:38He had girlfriends, one of which was murdered under very mysterious circumstances.
00:35:47You have to really look at his life in the aggregate to understand what he was.
00:35:54All of the reporters in Saigon, they had in their mind, Siem was bad.
00:36:01Siem was a dictator.
00:36:03Why?
00:36:05Is it because he fight against communism?
00:36:08Now, if that is the case, then you are fighting him because you are pro-communist, not because you are
00:36:18impartial.
00:36:19All of those guys, they are very pro-communist.
00:36:25Now, everything that the Vietnamese soldiers did was wrong.
00:36:30Everything that the communists did was right.
00:36:38The Buddhist crisis of 1963 begins in Hoi, where Siem's elder brother is the Catholic Archbishop.
00:36:47When a Catholic celebration features a Vatican flag, Siem issues an order that the Vietnamese flag should be given prominence.
00:36:55This order is in force two days later when Buddhists gather to celebrate the birth of Buddha.
00:37:01Ironically, it is a law aimed at promoting religious equality that leads Buddhists into open revolt.
00:37:14Immediately, this very crafty and brilliant politician, Thich Triquang, saw the opening.
00:37:20And he told some reporters to show up at the radio station that something very interesting was going to happen.
00:37:27So all these people had gathered in protest.
00:37:31Some terrific explosions took place at the station that, as we know from people who visited the morbs later,
00:37:38the bodies were torn apart.
00:37:40A lot of them were minus their heads and there was no signs of shrapnel or anything else.
00:37:44So we know, you know, these were not hand grenades.
00:37:47And besides that, the Arbon police didn't have those kind of hand grenades.
00:37:52The American consul, Inway, had written down to the embassy that, you know, Siem's police were brutalizing the people Inway.
00:38:01And it was absolute rot. It wasn't true at all.
00:38:04And then we get into the full-blown Buddhist crisis.
00:38:12On June 11, 1963, Malcolm Brown of the Associated Press receives a tip.
00:38:17Something spectacular was going to happen to protest the treatment of Buddhists.
00:38:23When he arrives at the scene, he watches as two young monks pour gasoline over an elderly monk,
00:38:30who then sets himself aflame.
00:38:32To be perfect.
00:38:34The full-blown Buddhist.
00:38:35You can't breathe right away.
00:38:41To be perfect.
00:38:42To be perfect.
00:38:43To be perfect.
00:38:43Actually, I cannot believe that it was voluntary.
00:38:47The old monk who emulated himself in Saigon was not doing it by himself.
00:38:58People had to help him out of a car, pour gasoline on him,
00:39:04and strike a match.
00:39:11There's some indication from what I've heard
00:39:14from some Vietnamese sources that he was also drugged
00:39:16and then parked him out at the appropriate place
00:39:19at the appropriate time to make sure Malcolm Brown was there
00:39:23and to take the pictures.
00:39:26A Buddhist monk Byrne gives his life in protest
00:39:29against persecution from the Vietnamese government.
00:39:32It was absolute marvelous propaganda and not a sense of truth.
00:39:40This image is broadcast around the world
00:39:43and creates the notion that the Vietnamese Buddhists
00:39:48are being persecuted by their government
00:39:50and this starts to create concern in Washington.
00:39:55Ambassador Nolting is on vacation when the crisis breaks.
00:39:58He leaves instructions for his deputy, William Trueheart,
00:40:02to communicate with him any urgent news.
00:40:05But Trueheart is now taking orders from Avril Harriman,
00:40:08who is using the Buddhist crisis to fan the flames
00:40:10of anti-ZM sentiment.
00:40:15My father was angered by the way it was done
00:40:22and by the deed itself.
00:40:27This movement starts to create concern in Washington
00:40:29where they see these images
00:40:32and they keep pushing the South Vietnamese government
00:40:34to make concessions to the Buddhist movement.
00:40:37And ZM does some of that.
00:40:38Each time he makes a concession,
00:40:40the Buddhists then ramp up their protests.
00:40:42And in the South Vietnamese society,
00:40:45if a group continues to denigrate the government publicly,
00:40:49the government loses face.
00:40:53I think that whenever you talk about persecution of Buddhism,
00:40:57you have to understand the history of Bodin ZM himself.
00:41:03Half of his family was still Buddhist.
00:41:07He visited pagodas as much as he could.
00:41:13No one did more, and even honest Buddhists will admit this now,
00:41:17to rebuild Buddhism in South Vietnam
00:41:19because he saw it as part of the cultural history
00:41:23and heritage of Vietnam than ZM.
00:41:26Ironically, he rebuilt the very temples
00:41:28that led the charge against him.
00:41:32I think the Buddhist crisis surprised a lot of us
00:41:35because it was so virulent and so well organized.
00:41:38I think my father was suspicious that there must have been collusion
00:41:42between the Russians or the Chinese
00:41:44or certainly even the Viet Cong forces
00:41:46and the Buddhist monks.
00:41:49And I think there was evidence of that.
00:41:56Buddhism is not like Roman Catholicism.
00:41:59It's not this highly disciplined army of monks out there.
00:42:03In fact, you or I could become a monk
00:42:05simply by shaving our heads
00:42:07and donning a saffron robe
00:42:09and saying we believe in Lord Buddha.
00:42:15Then I's необход care
00:42:17because also Daddy,
00:42:29in this
00:42:30every day
00:42:31in this generation
00:42:32there is nothing
00:42:34that 1950
00:42:36has broken
00:42:37others
00:42:38as part of the leadership of the Phật giáo of Huế.
00:42:45We know from communist sources, both those contemporary and subsequent histories,
00:42:51that the communists had infiltrated the Buddhist protest movement.
00:42:55The bigger question that remains unanswered is whether Tri Quang, the leading figure in this,
00:43:02was himself aligned with the communists.
00:43:04We have evidence that would support that position.
00:43:08For example, his brother at the time was a senior official in Hanoi directing subversion in the South.
00:43:14Tri Quang had been in the Viet Minh himself earlier in his career.
00:43:18Some of his friends and acquaintances will later say that he was, in fact, a communist.
00:43:24I'm inclined to believe the weight of evidence points in the direction of him being communist.
00:43:34The New York Times and Washington Post, they were always looking for a means to criticize the government.
00:43:42And so, with the Buddhist crisis, they were able to inflame and inflate that.
00:43:53Ziem is done no favors by his sister-in-law, Madame Nou.
00:43:58A controversial and outspoken figure, she falls into a trap set by Ziem's enemies.
00:44:05They created their own dragon lady out of Madame Nou.
00:44:09What they did, she overheard the newsman and the American newsman casually referred to it as barbecues.
00:44:16And she overheard this from them.
00:44:18And so, she went on the radio.
00:44:21The only thing they have done, they have barbecued one of their moms, whom they have...
00:44:29And then, of course, the New York Times used that setup to go back to the United States and say,
00:44:35look how horrible she is, when in fact she was using their terminology, which they had pushed her way in
00:44:41the first place.
00:44:42So, it was a complete setup for a woman who really didn't understand English at all.
00:44:52The definitive word on the Buddhist crisis of 1963 will come in a little-known UN fact-finding mission
00:44:58that will be delivered too late to turn back the tide of communist propaganda.
00:45:04The UN General Assembly issues a lengthy report, well over 100 pages,
00:45:08and it basically said the communists had infiltrated the Buddhist movement.
00:45:13They found monks who said, we were told that the Ziem people have destroyed pagodas
00:45:21and raped nuns and murdered monks and, you know, you have to stand up.
00:45:25We will give you painkillers and you need to self-immolate yourself in Saigon
00:45:31to draw public attention to this horrible crime.
00:45:35They did not find evidence of a policy of discrimination against the Buddhists.
00:45:44In August 1963, Nolting is replaced as ambassador by Henry Cabot Lodge.
00:45:50He is a Brahmin in the mold of Harriman, and he seems to have his mind already made up about
00:45:55Nodin Ziem.
00:45:57Nolting was just totally incurious about, you know, the local situation.
00:46:04And I later sort of defined that he had a very simplistic idea of how to fix things,
00:46:12which was get rid of this guy, get that guy in.
00:46:18On August 20th, Ziem declares martial law and moves military units against the pagodas,
00:46:25where the government fears communist weapons are being stockpiled.
00:46:28The bold move outrages Washington.
00:46:31This leads to a famous cable that goes out from Roger Hilsman, Averill Harriman, and Michael Forrestal,
00:46:40saying that we have to start thinking about alternatives to the Ziem government.
00:46:44And this is cleared through a dubious process where they go around saying to various senior officials
00:46:51that this has already been approved by others, when in fact it hadn't.
00:46:56When you get to the Monday after these events,
00:47:01President Kenney gathers people together and realizes that this was pushed through
00:47:06without proper clearances in a dishonest manner.
00:47:10And so there's a very tense meeting where he berates his subordinates.
00:47:16Unfortunately, it's believed by this point that now that we've gone this step,
00:47:20we can't step back from this, and so that cable is not retracted.
00:47:25And then this leads to subsequent events.
00:47:31You have, you know, parts of the CIA, parts of obviously the State Department,
00:47:37making these contacts and leads with these generals to ferment a coup against their very own president.
00:47:46President Ziem describes these generals as very amateurish, immature folks.
00:47:51They have no idea of how a government runs.
00:47:55They knew how to overthrow government through coups,
00:47:58but they did not know what was the consequences if I were to overthrow them.
00:48:12Mr. President, the only hot war we've got running at the moment is, of course, the one in Vietnam.
00:48:19And we've got our difficulties there, quite obviously.
00:48:22Do you think that this government still has time to regain the support of the people?
00:48:28With changes in policy and perhaps in personnel, I think it can.
00:48:35If it doesn't make those changes, I would think that the chances of winning it would not be very good.
00:48:43In Saigon, Kennedy's words are seen as a signal for a change in leadership.
00:48:48The U.S. pressures Ziem to remove his brother Nhu from power,
00:48:51and funding for Vietnam's special forces is discontinued.
00:48:55Meanwhile, Ambassador Lodge remains aloof from Ziem and continues to encourage a coup.
00:49:01He leaks to the press the name of Bill Richardson, the CIA station chief in Saigon and ardent Ziem supporter.
00:49:08Once exposed, Richardson is forced to depart, removing a final obstacle to the coup.
00:49:16A few days before the coup, Lodge and Ziem meet,
00:49:21and Ziem appears to be taking a conciliatory tone towards the United States,
00:49:26offering to see if we can't patch up our differences.
00:49:30But Lodge avoids communicating this potential breakthrough.
00:49:35He continues to take the position that we're past the point of no return,
00:49:39and nothing at this point is going to help.
00:49:44Right before the coup, the president asked me to come down and talk to him.
00:49:50And we sort of sat there, you know, for a minute of silence.
00:49:55And then he asked me about, well, do you think there's going to be a coup?
00:50:00And I said, yes, I think there could be a coup.
00:50:05And they kind of looked at each other, you know, and there was a certain sadness in his eyes,
00:50:12a certain, I don't know, maybe some fatalism.
00:50:17I can't tell you how I felt.
00:50:23The coup takes place on November 1, 1963.
00:50:27Rebel forces seal off military bases in the capital and assault the presidential palace.
00:50:34Under bombardment, Ziem contacts Lodge to clarify the position of the United States.
00:50:43Lodge had a chance to give Ziem safe passage, and he refused to do it.
00:50:49He took this hands-off attitude that he knew nothing, that he had nothing to do with it, and so
00:50:56forth.
00:50:57And I think that was typical of his very cold-blooded attitude towards Ziem, towards the Vietnamese in general.
00:51:07During the night, Ziem and Nu flee the palace.
00:51:11Early on the morning of November 2, All Souls Day, the feast day founded by his patron saint, Saint Odillo,
00:51:18Ziem and Nu attend mass and pray at Saint Francis Saviour's church.
00:51:23They then turn themselves in to the coup's leader, General Min.
00:51:28So they come out, and they pick the brothers up and say they're going to take them to the headquarters.
00:51:32And then along the way, the bodies are riddled with bullets.
00:51:34He had their gallbladders cut out while they were still alive.
00:51:41In East Asian medicine, the gallbladder was seen as the seat of the soul.
00:51:46So if you consume or take the gallbladder, you've really conquered that guy.
00:51:52Kennedy reportedly blanched and turned white and had to walk into another room.
00:51:57He was so upset.
00:51:59I was shocked by the death that the human knew.
00:52:03He was an extraordinary character.
00:52:09The way he was killed made it particularly foreign.
00:52:15Well, I began to come out.
00:52:17Now, I am sad.
00:52:22I was very sad to stay here.
00:52:27I am sad because I have so passionate about the people.
00:52:31The Prime Minister of the Tổng thống has given us a lot of good life and good life.
00:52:37Not to be a person, but many people are angry at all who have been killed by the President of
00:52:48the Tổng thống.
00:52:50for us.
00:52:55And the second thing I remember is
00:53:00on the 11th of the year,
00:53:05in 1963,
00:53:09when I was studying
00:53:11at the University of the U.S.
00:53:16in Dallas.
00:53:18When I heard about the current war,
00:53:26all the U.S. связей
00:53:28gave me a fear about the situation.
00:53:34And when I heard about the U.S. councilman
00:53:39as a secretary of the U.S. administration,他们
00:53:39were killed. And
00:53:42with my husband, the
00:53:44U.S. come on too,
00:53:46So all of us, students and students of the University of Guadalupe
00:53:58are grateful for their support.
00:54:11I can say that after the war, we have seen a clear thing, and the people of Vietnam have seen
00:54:17a clear thing.
00:54:18There is no one who can stand against the government.
00:54:21There is no one who can stand against the government by the government.
00:54:28After the war, they are divided into the government.
00:54:31They are divided into the rights of their rights.
00:54:38I think probably the person who influenced me the most, Anoden Ziem, was a defector named Buikong Tong.
00:54:48And he said, when we heard on the radio that Ziem had been killed, we thought it must be some
00:54:53sort of trick.
00:54:56We senior party leaders could not believe the Americans would let anything happen to them.
00:55:02Bill Colby, he said to me, Jeff, he said, I think after Ziem, there was no hope.
00:55:16By engineering that crew encouraging that the Americans not only shot themselves in the foot, but you could say shot
00:55:21themselves in both knees too.
00:55:23I think if Ngo Dien Ziem had remained in power, it wouldn't have been necessary to come in and intervene
00:55:32with hundreds of thousands of troops.
00:55:38First, let me say a lot of the vitriol in the press against Ziem is the result of the failed
00:55:45coup.
00:55:46And you had people like Neil Sheehan, David Halversand, Stanley Carnot, who had been very supportive of overthrowing Ziem at
00:55:54the time, believed that this was going to make things much easier.
00:55:58They see ultimately this coup turns out to be a huge disaster.
00:56:03And so to justify it, they have to smear Ziem in the worst possible ways, depict him as being corrupt
00:56:11and ineffective, his military as being inept.
00:56:15Most of that's not true, but they twist facts, I think, to support that.
00:56:21I think if you look in reality, Ziem has many virtues.
00:56:37Ziem has many virtues.
00:56:50Alexander Solznitskin once wrote,
00:56:53In keeping silent about evil.
00:56:56In burying it so deep within us that no sign of it appears on the surface.
00:57:02We are implanting it.
00:57:04And it will rise up a thousand fold in the future.
00:57:12When we neither punish nor reproach evildoers,
00:57:17we are not simply protecting their trivial old age.
00:57:23We are thereby ripping the foundations of justice from beneath new generations.
00:57:28...
00:57:31...
00:58:05We have not seen any country in any country, but a president has died for 60 years and there are
00:58:27so many people in the country, even now in the country, and in the world, people still have a new
00:58:38year.
00:58:39I believe that the integrity of the patriotism is important.
00:58:53I have to learn and learn to teach them.
00:59:00If you look around the world today, wherever there are Vietnamese Catholics, there are always
00:59:06shrines going up to Xi'an every November 2nd.
00:59:13He is hailed as a great man. The communists knew this.
00:59:17I asked him, General Khan, what is it about Xi'an that the Vietnamese, they all get this strange
00:59:24spirit all comes over them, whether they liked him or not. He said it was because he was pure.
00:59:30So, yes, in a temporal, earthly, political sense, yeah, he lost. He lost everything.
00:59:37But in the greater sense of the real life that is to come, I think he gained everything.
01:00:10He is so important.
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