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Air Crash Investigation - Season 26 Episode 2 - Moments From Touchdown Yeti Airlines Flight 691
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Short filmTranscript
00:00just moments after taking off from a remote island in Norway
00:07something's wrong the pilots of Videro flight 839 lose control of their plane
00:15oh god it plunges into the Norwegian sea killing everyone on board
00:22in the wreckage investigators find damage to a critical part
00:28the upper end is broken it didn't make a great deal of sense and when they learn
00:37another Videro flight nearly met the same fate at the same airport looks like they
00:43lost control of the plane for two minutes
00:51they discover a controversial decision that put lives at risk I wish
00:58that we had put our foot down and said no more
01:01D.D. D.D.
01:04D.D.
01:13D.D.
01:15D.D.
01:16D.D.
01:31D.D.
01:33D.D.
01:34Videro flight 836 is heading to a remote outpost on the Lofoten archipelago in the Norwegian sea
01:43Lofoten is one of the most beautiful places in Norway.
01:48It's a place where a Norwegian would want to go on holiday to experience untouched nature, and especially the beautiful mountains.
02:01Tonight's flight is carrying 11 passengers.
02:05Most are Norwegians traveling to the islands from the mainland.
02:08Videro 836. Runway 25 free. Winds variable 1021 at 260 degrees. Visibility 2,500 meters.
02:22Copy that. Videro 836.
02:29Videro is Norway's largest regional airline. It serves remote communities across the country.
02:36Videro 836.
02:38Since the 1960s and 70s, it was a push in Norway to build regional airports in rural areas.
02:45It's made people feel less isolated, and it made traveling a lot easier.
02:54The plane is heading first to the small island of Vare, and then southwest to Rust, before returning to the mainland city of Bode.
03:03Approach checklist.
03:0912 miles from the airport, the crew prepares for landing.
03:14The crew was experienced, but this was the first time the captain had flown into Vare.
03:20Optimeters.
03:24Set.
03:24They're flying a de Havilland Twin Otter.
03:31It's a twin turboprop utility aircraft.
03:34A workhorse for getting in and out of small remote airports.
03:38The best airplane in the world.
03:44It's an incredibly sturdy aircraft.
03:47Very pilot-friendly.
03:50We have a long mountainous coast, and for that, the Twin Otter was perfect.
04:00Landing lights.
04:02On.
04:03Viderot flight 836 is now minutes from landing at Vare.
04:08And seatbelt.
04:11Party on.
04:13But the airport is notorious for unpredictable winds.
04:19Vare translated means the weather island.
04:22The airport was located to the north of the island, between the mountain and the sea.
04:28It's a very demanding flying environment, because the weather changes all the time, so the pilots have to adapt to that.
04:40Set flaps.
04:43Lapse set.
04:45With the runway in sight, the pilots begin to line up for landing.
04:50But just as the plane turns, it's rocked by turbulence.
04:58I have control.
05:03You have control.
05:08When flying at Vare, you will experience turbulence, and you will be tossed around.
05:18This isn't getting better.
05:20Go around.
05:21He obviously decided that the situation was not good to land, so he went around, and it was a great call on his part.
05:33Lapse up.
05:35As the captain powers out of the landing, the plane is hit with a powerful downdraft and extreme turbulence.
05:43You get sort of a tunnel vision when you're in a situation like that, and you pull out all your resources, and you try to counteract the situation that you're in.
05:58For two minutes, the captain struggles to level the plane.
06:07He was in extreme turbulence.
06:10You're momentarily out of control.
06:12You may or may not regain control.
06:14The force of the wind becomes so great that the plane rolls over, speeding towards the mountains.
06:36Altitude!
06:39I can't see anything.
06:41Only 250 feet from the ground, the captain levels the plane and pulls out of the dive.
07:11I just can't believe that he recovered at such a low altitude.
07:23Put in headings for Rust.
07:30Vitero, 836 has aborted landing.
07:34Redirecting to Rust.
07:36Copy that, Vitero, 836.
07:38Stay safe.
07:39Everyone okay back there?
07:48Vitero, flight 836, escapes disaster.
07:52No one on board is injured.
07:58I'm still shaking my head at that one.
08:01That was an ace pilot.
08:02In the city of Boda, officials from Vitero Airlines cancel all flights into Vare while they try and piece together what happened with flight 836.
08:15As part of an internal investigation.
08:17As part of an internal investigation, the pilot is interviewed.
08:20We were lining up for approach.
08:24Turbulence was getting worse and worse.
08:26I have control.
08:29It was obvious we couldn't land.
08:35I applied power to the engines and we climbed to about 1,800 feet, where we got hit with a massive downdraft.
08:44We're going over.
08:45I battled that plane.
08:58Trying to keep it away from the mountains.
09:01Eventually, I was able to level out, climb to a safe altitude, and turn for a roost.
09:17It would be terrifying for them, I'm sure.
09:23I've heard stories about that airport.
09:30And they're true.
09:34The pilots were not very happy.
09:38We realized this had been a serious incident, and we had to tighten the operational requirement at the island to make that a safer.
09:48The first action taken by Videro officials is to reduce the maximum wind speeds for take-off and landing at Vare Airport from 20 to 15 knots.
10:04Videro asks the Civil Aviation Authority to install anemometers, devices that monitor and transmit wind speeds.
10:12Two are installed at each end of the airstrip, and one is installed on the mountain.
10:16The mountain is its own weather-maker.
10:19It can cause winds to change in direction, change in speed, which are conducive to making some serious turbulence.
10:29It's called terrain-induced turbulence.
10:32When winds hit the mountains on Vare, they tend to accelerate over the top and drop down towards the airstrip.
10:40This creates powerful downdrafts and crosswinds.
10:42The sudden changes in wind speeds and direction can create wind shear and cause a pilot to lose control.
10:52This was a difficult place to operate, when the wind was flying over the mountains and down onto the airport.
10:58And we had to tighten those restrictions quite severely and quickly.
11:07But will the restrictions at Vare be enough to ensure the safety of future flights?
11:13It's been 15 months since Videro Flight 836 had their close call at Vare Airport.
11:26Videro Flight 839 has just landed at Vare and is refueling before heading back to the mainland for Easter weekend.
11:36Anti-collision light.
11:37On.
11:40Aft and forward boost.
11:42On.
11:44Captain Idar Nils Pearsson is the pilot in command.
11:49Idar was a very level-headed fellow.
11:53He was a top-rated pilot.
11:56And he'd been with us for years.
11:59Start switch.
12:00Left engine.
12:01The first officer is Ant Vidar Grunerflotter.
12:07On.
12:08Right engine.
12:09Right engine.
12:12On.
12:14The first officer was fairly new.
12:18I think he'd been with us for only about a year.
12:23Look at that windsock.
12:25It's flapping like mad.
12:28Welcome to Vare.
12:29Hey.
12:31Buckle up, folks.
12:32It's going to be a bit bumpy getting out of here.
12:35There are three passengers on board, including a young couple.
12:40All right.
12:41Videro 839 ready to taxi.
12:43Videro 839, roger.
12:45No known traffic.
12:46Runway free.
12:47Wind variable middle direction 250 at 21, max 57.
12:53QNH, Niner 88.
12:56Copy, Niner 88.
12:57The captain, he was a local pilot.
13:02He knew the weather.
13:04He knew the limitations of the aircraft.
13:06Knew the limitations of the airport.
13:10As they line up at the end of the runway, the crew performs the before takeoff checklist.
13:18Clap set 10.
13:20Set 10.
13:22Heading set to 280.
13:23Let's make it 320.
13:28Just get clearance.
13:29It's calm now.
13:30We should get going.
13:31Copy that.
13:33Tower.
13:34Videro 839 requesting clearance.
13:36Videro 839.
13:38ODOT control clears.
13:39Videro 839 direct ODOT at 5,000 feet and squawk 0135.
13:45Copy.
13:46Videro 839.
13:47Here we go.
13:49Wind has varied.
13:57210 to 290 degrees.
14:01The gusts of 34.
14:03Yep.
14:04Roger.
14:04We are rolling.
14:0670 knots.
14:0980 knots.
14:1080 knots.
14:15Rotate.
14:16At 2.43, Videro flight 839 takes off from Vare and heads for the mainland.
14:26The return flight to Boda will take less than 30 minutes.
14:34Flaps up.
14:3510 seconds after takeoff.
14:41A strange noise catches the pilot's attention.
14:46You don't want anything unusual to happen in that face of the flight since you are very close to the ground.
14:55They struggle to keep the plane level.
15:00Steady.
15:00Something's wrong.
15:17And then, the nose of the plane drops and the captain can't do anything to raise it.
15:23No.
15:24No, no, no.
15:25No.
15:25No.
15:25No.
15:25Just 63 seconds after lifting off, Videro flight 839 slams into the sea.
15:46Videro 839, this is Vare Tower.
15:55Do you copy?
15:57Videro 839, Vare information on 119.4.
16:01Within hours, search and rescue teams spot debris on the ocean's surface, 6.5 kilometers northwest of the airport.
16:18The wreckage was found three days after the accident.
16:25Harsh tea conditions made it a challenge.
16:31The bodies of the three passengers and the first officer are recovered.
16:37Captain Pearson's remains are never found.
16:39The accident caused a lot of grief.
16:45Vare is a small island where everyone know each other, so everyone felt they had lost someone close to them.
16:53Investigators from the Norwegian Accident Commission for Civil Aviation, or HSL, soon arrive on the island.
17:00The purpose of the Videro investigation was to find out what happened during that incident.
17:13I was manager air safety for Boeing Canada to have on a division, and I traveled to Valeroy to assist with the investigation.
17:21The airfield was spectacular, but I was somewhat surprised in the closeness of the mountain range, which paralleled the entire runway.
17:37Investigators start by interviewing the controller, who briefs pilots on the local weather.
17:42Sorry about that.
17:43That's fine.
17:44Can you walk me through what happened the day of the accident?
17:46Normal day, by our standards.
17:48They landed at 14.30, refueled, changed passengers, and asked to taxi out.
17:55The whole turnaround was less than 15 minutes.
17:58What were the winds when they took off?
18:00It was gusting when they were parked, but eased off to 34 on the west end.
18:05The winds were coming from every direction.
18:07It's pretty common.
18:09Did the pilots have any hesitation about taking off?
18:12No, not at all.
18:14And what about the takeoff?
18:15The controller explains that after the plane passed the tower, it turned and then disappeared into the clouds.
18:26What was the cloud ceiling at the time?
18:291,000 feet.
18:31I received a distress signal, and a few seconds later, I heard a bang.
18:35Could there have been a structural failure or loss of power which caused Flight 839 to crash so quickly into the sea?
19:052,000 feet.
19:09Investigators survey the wreckage of Videro Flight 839 for any signs that would explain a crash so soon after takeoff.
19:17Nose and cockpit completely crushed.
19:19Both wings, engines, undercarriage, and tail section severed from the fuselage on impact and carried forward.
19:35High energy impact.
19:36With the nose buckled the way it was, and the left wingtip buckled, we had a pretty good idea of how the aircraft impacted the sea.
19:49The wreckage tells investigators the plane entered the water nose first at high speed.
20:03The team considers whether engine failure caused the high speed impact.
20:09The manufacturer provides their report.
20:11No fire damage.
20:14Both engines appeared to be running at high RPM and torque at the time of impact.
20:20The engine manufacturer determined that the engines were running, and they were ruled out very, very quickly.
20:26With engine failure ruled out, they wonder whether any parts that control the plane's pitch or steering failed, causing it to plunge into the sea.
20:41The right elevator sheared in half, maybe due to impact.
20:45The elevator is a control surface on the twin otter's tail that adjusts pitch.
20:57Investigators discover something unusual in the elevator connecting rod.
21:06The elevator connecting rod moves the elevators up and down on the tail.
21:11It's activated when the pilot pushes or pulls on the control column.
21:18The upper end is broken.
21:20What would cause such a vital part to break?
21:24You shouldn't have any preconceived notions as to why the part failed.
21:31Let's get this elevator rod to metallurgy.
21:34I want to know how it failed.
21:35Did the part fail because there was a manufacturing defect?
21:43Did it fail because there was a tool mark on it?
21:48You should let the part tell you the story.
21:52While investigators wait for the metallurgical results, they research the plane's history,
21:58looking for any clues into what might have caused the elevator connecting rod to fail.
22:03So the twin otter DHC-6300 was purchased by Vidro in 1977.
22:10The last daily inspection was carried out the day of the accident.
22:14Maintenance all in accordance with the current regulations.
22:16So not a maintenance issue.
22:17The investigators went through all the maintenance documentation.
22:28All the inspections was completed and no deviations was found.
22:34With maintenance ruled out as a cause for the failure of the elevator connecting rod,
22:40investigators review the results of a metallurgical examination performed on the rod.
22:45Banding is created because you have a repeated load that is applied on and off to your part.
23:00And every time the load is applied, you have a crack that grows a little bit more,
23:05and it creates a rainbow on the fracture surface.
23:09The report also reveals the banding occurred because of sideways bending on the rod.
23:16This was highly unusual.
23:21There's never any side loads on that rod.
23:24It just moves up and down.
23:26So it didn't make a great deal of sense.
23:31Investigators examine schematics of the tail section of the twin otter
23:35to determine what would bend the elevator connecting rods sideways, causing it to break.
23:41So what if this elevator broke in flight?
23:46It would swing freely and uncontrollably.
23:51It would definitely cause the rod to bend.
23:59If the right elevator separated from its mounts in flight,
24:03it would swing in every direction,
24:06putting sideways pressure on the rod and ultimately causing it to break.
24:11First the elevator,
24:14then the rod.
24:18It's the only thing that makes sense.
24:21It's kind of like the cart before the horse.
24:24The control rod would not have seen any loads
24:27had the elevator not broken.
24:31What would cause the elevator to break in flight?
24:34Maybe the cockpit voice recorder can shed some light on that.
24:45Okay, let's start with the take-off roll.
24:49Norwegian investigators listened to the cockpit voice recorder
24:53for clues as to how the right elevator
24:56on Videro flight 839 might have come loose,
25:00bending the connecting rod.
25:0170 knots.
25:0480 knots.
25:06Rotate.
25:07It was amazing that the cockpit voice recorder
25:11was in the aircraft in the first place
25:13because it was not mandatory at the time.
25:19Flaps up.
25:28Did you hear that clattering noise?
25:32Strange.
25:33Steady.
25:46Something's wrong.
25:49Stop.
25:52Here it is again.
25:54Is that the elevator?
25:57Play it back again.
25:58When I listened to the CVR,
26:03there was nothing that I could pinpoint
26:06as being the source of the clattering sound.
26:15Could it have been the elevator breaking?
26:18It was possible, but we really just don't know.
26:22Did you hear the propellers?
26:2355 seconds into the flight,
26:25investigators hear the sound of propellers
26:28rotating out of sync.
26:32This occurs when there's a change in the aircraft's pitch.
26:35Turbulence?
26:38Has to be.
26:40A sudden gust of wind or change in wind direction
26:44would cause the propellers to adjust
26:47to compensate for the changing attitude of the aircraft.
26:51investigators discover that Videro 839
26:56was struck by severe turbulence shortly after takeoff.
27:01The crash happens just 10 seconds later.
27:09No.
27:10No, no, no.
27:11Oh, God!
27:12So, where were they exactly
27:26when they were struck by severe turbulence?
27:28A standard operating procedure
27:30calls for a rate of ascend
27:31of 1,000 to 1,200 feet per minute.
27:34So, they would have hit turbulence
27:37right after they entered clouds
27:39at about 1,000 feet.
27:41And that mountain ridge there
27:44is just over 1,000 feet.
27:47That looks like terrain-induced turbulence.
27:54The quicker you could get away
27:57from the mountains,
27:58the better it was.
28:01How bad could those winds have been?
28:07Investigators learn of the near crash
28:09of the other Videro plane,
28:11Flight 836,
28:12on approach to Vare 15 months earlier.
28:16Looks like they lost control
28:18of the plane for two minutes,
28:20even when inverted.
28:27At what altitude did they lose control?
28:30About 1,800 feet.
28:32Just after he had boarded the landing
28:35on runway 25 due to winds.
28:40Both flights encountered dangerous winds
28:43at or above the mountain ridges.
28:47Were any measures put into place
28:48to prevent this from happening again?
28:51After Flight 836's missed approach,
28:54Flight Order 17 was put into place.
28:56So they made this change.
28:59Landings and departures must not be planned
29:01or executed with variable winds
29:03above 15 knots.
29:05So they reduced the maximum allowable wind speeds
29:08for takeoff and landing.
29:12Videro established
29:13some very significant wind restrictions
29:16using some very experienced crew
29:20to develop them.
29:21But there was still unpredictability.
29:26Anemometers were also installed
29:28at both ends of the runway
29:30and on the mountain ridge.
29:37It's good to have an anemometer
29:38on top of a mountain.
29:40Just gives the pilot more information
29:42for the landing.
29:44So what were the mountain winds
29:46at the time of Flight 839?
29:47There is no anemometer data
29:56for the mountain.
30:01If it doesn't provide data,
30:03it's absolutely no use.
30:07Investigators contact
30:08the Civil Aviation Authority
30:10to determine why there weren't
30:12any mountain anemometer wind readings
30:14at the time of the crash
30:15of Videro Flight 839.
30:22The anemometer was taken down.
30:27They learned that the anemometer
30:29on the mountain wasn't reliable
30:31because of the icy conditions.
30:33A year after being installed,
30:35it was removed from the mountain
30:37for repair.
30:39It gets worse.
30:41It was never reinstalled.
30:43It was officially taken out of service
30:46three days before the accident.
30:53The removal of the anemometer
30:55is a degradation safety.
30:58It's information that a pilot
31:00would certainly require
31:01for an airport like that.
31:02Okay.
31:03Okay.
31:04So,
31:06what wind information
31:07were the pilots
31:08actually getting
31:09and when?
31:10investigators listened to the CVR recording
31:16of Videro Flight 839
31:18before it landed at Vare.
31:20I'm going to bank west of the island
31:22to avoid more turbulence.
31:24I'm getting updrafts already.
31:26Copy that.
31:26Videro 839
31:29runway free
31:30wind east side
31:32270 degrees
31:34at max 23.
31:36Understood.
31:37Videro 839.
31:4123 knots.
31:43That's 8 knots above the limit.
31:45They shouldn't even have landed
31:46the inbound flight in the first place.
31:49What about when they're on the ground?
31:51Look at that windsock.
32:03It's flapping like mad.
32:06Welcome to Vare.
32:10The pilot was talking a lot
32:12about the wind
32:13and they were discussing
32:14that the wind was coming
32:16from all directions.
32:19Videro 839, Roger.
32:21No known traffic
32:22runway free
32:23wind variable
32:24middle direction
32:25250
32:26at 21
32:28max 57.
32:30Did you say again
32:31max 57?
32:32Yep.
32:33Max 57.
32:38Copy.
32:4357 knots.
32:4757 knots
32:48is more than 65
32:50miles per hour.
32:53Yeah.
32:53The manual says
32:54that the twin otter
32:55must not be operated
32:56on the ground
32:57in winds
32:58above 50 knots.
33:01Well, he is
33:02sticking his neck
33:04out on the line
33:04and I'm not quite sure
33:06why he did that.
33:08Were the winds
33:09that strong
33:09when they took off?
33:10They go through
33:14their pre-takeoff
33:15checklist
33:16and then...
33:18Just get clearance.
33:21It's calm now.
33:21We should get going.
33:23Copy that.
33:24The captain says
33:25it's calm.
33:26What's he basing that on?
33:28Windsocks?
33:29The rains had stopped.
33:31Maybe it looked like
33:31the weather was clearing.
33:32If a shower
33:36was approaching
33:37you could expect
33:38variable winds
33:39but when
33:40the shower
33:41passed
33:42you could expect
33:43a lull
33:43in the wind.
33:49According to
33:49the transcript
33:50they get their
33:52next wind report
33:53as they're about
33:53to take off.
33:56Wind has varied
33:57210 to 290 degrees
34:01with gusts of 34.
34:03Yeah, Roger.
34:04We are rolling.
34:08They took off
34:08in a 34-knot wind.
34:11That's more than
34:12double the limit.
34:14If the winds
34:14were gusting
34:15at 57 knots
34:16on the ground
34:17then who knows
34:18how strong the winds
34:19were coming off
34:19the mountain.
34:22Strong enough
34:23to break the elevator.
34:27When he hit
34:30the lip of the mountain
34:31I bet he encountered
34:3360, 70, 80-knot winds.
34:38It obviously caused
34:39severe to extreme turbulence.
34:43Steady.
34:44The team concludes
34:46the winds were strong enough
34:47to break the right elevator
34:48from its mounts
34:49causing the connecting rod
34:52to break
34:52making both elevators
34:54unusable.
34:56Something's wrong.
34:58They ignored
34:59Vitro's wind limits
35:00on the ground
35:01and they had no wind limits
35:04in the dangerous area
35:05around the mountain.
35:08Why were they
35:09so eager to leave?
35:12This was Easter weekend
35:14and there is an incentive
35:16to get home.
35:21There was clearly
35:22some concern
35:23but they went.
35:27to understand
35:35why the captain
35:36of flight 839
35:37took off
35:38in winds
35:39that exceeded
35:39company limits
35:40investigators interview
35:42other Vitro pilots
35:43about wind restrictions
35:45at Vare.
35:46What has been
35:47your experience
35:48at Vare?
35:50I don't like it.
35:52None of the pilots do.
35:53The wind reports
35:54aren't reliable.
35:58You could actually
35:59sit on the tarmac
36:00get one wind indication
36:02move towards the runway
36:05and get another.
36:07Even though
36:08the maximum wind speeds
36:09were reduced
36:09from 20 knots
36:10to 15?
36:11Well they were
36:12but they brought it
36:13back up to 20.
36:17Nine months
36:18after the incident
36:19with the first
36:20Vitro flight
36:21the wind restrictions
36:23were reversed.
36:26How would they do that?
36:29My guess?
36:30Too many cancellations.
36:36After Vitro
36:37lowered the wind limits
36:38cancellations increased.
36:41That led to negative press
36:43and anger
36:43from local residents.
36:45The decision
36:47to cancel flights
36:48became
36:50very unpopular.
36:52It was so
36:54unpredictable
36:54at Vare.
36:58Did pilots
37:00feel pressure
37:00to complete
37:02the flights?
37:03Yeah
37:04but not
37:05from the airline.
37:07I had a situation
37:09where the weather
37:09turned into a hurricane
37:10and it could not
37:12take off
37:13and I got a real
37:14work over
37:14from some
37:15of the passengers.
37:18Investigators
37:19researched
37:19the impact
37:20those wind-related
37:21cancellations
37:22had on Vitro's
37:23operations.
37:27The pressure
37:28was piling on
37:28from the public.
37:30Cancellations
37:31tripled
37:31in the last 12 months.
37:35Compared
37:36to other airports
37:37in Europe
37:37Vare had a lot
37:38of cancellations
37:39and the flights
37:40were often cancelled
37:42quite early
37:43when the wind
37:43was strong
37:44but when the flights
37:46were supposed
37:46to arrive
37:47it could be
37:48no wind at all
37:49which made people
37:51question all the
37:52cancellations.
37:54Almost all the
37:55cancellations
37:55were being caused
37:56by winds.
37:57Because of that
37:58bad press
37:59which gets the
38:00attention
38:01of the government.
38:01the government
38:06paid the company
38:07to fly there.
38:10The company
38:10wrote the government
38:11and said
38:12it was extremely
38:13difficult to operate
38:14there.
38:15And the reply
38:16from the government
38:16was if you don't
38:17fly there
38:18we will have to
38:19take the money
38:20away.
38:22Out of curiosity
38:23how many cancellations
38:25were there on
38:25departure from Vare?
38:26none.
38:37Basically
38:37it's
38:37get home
38:38itis.
38:39If they're at
38:40the airport
38:40pilots are going to
38:41tell themselves
38:42they're capable
38:43of taking off
38:43as well.
38:46You know
38:46there's still
38:46one thing
38:47I don't get.
38:47the conditions
38:51were so
38:52treacherous.
38:54Why was this
38:55airport even
38:55built there
38:56in the first
38:56place?
39:04So why
39:05was this
39:06location
39:06chosen for
39:07the airport?
39:10Investigators
39:10consult officials
39:11about the
39:12viability of
39:13Vare Airport
39:14to determine
39:15if passengers
39:16and crew
39:17were placed
39:17at risk
39:18unnecessarily.
39:22Vidre had
39:22two possible
39:23locations
39:24for the
39:25airport
39:25at the
39:26island.
39:27This one
39:27was chosen
39:28despite
39:29the difficulties
39:31with wind
39:32conditions
39:33near
39:33a mountain
39:34ridge.
39:38Okay
39:38and what
39:38testing
39:39went into
39:39the decision?
39:42Vidre had
39:43done test
39:44flights
39:44at Vare
39:45prior to
39:45the decision
39:46of building
39:47the airport
39:47there
39:48and they
39:49had experienced
39:50very windy
39:51conditions
39:52and did not
39:53recommend
39:53building the
39:54airport there.
39:59So if
40:00Vidre was
40:00against it
40:01then why
40:01did it go
40:02ahead?
40:03We knew
40:04that the
40:05wind conditions
40:06at Vare
40:07would be so
40:07difficult
40:08it would
40:09affect
40:10regularity
40:11but that
40:12advice
40:13was ignored
40:14by the
40:15meteorology
40:16specialists
40:17that the
40:18authorities
40:19had consulted
40:20when it
40:21came to
40:21put the
40:22airport
40:22on the
40:23island.
40:24Maybe
40:25some of the
40:26decisions
40:27that were
40:27made
40:28were more
40:29politically
40:30motivated
40:30than were
40:32practical.
40:32Investigators
40:36now know
40:37the factors
40:38that led
40:38to the
40:39deaths
40:39of three
40:40passengers
40:40and two
40:41pilots
40:41on board
40:42Vidreau
40:42flight 839.
40:45First up
40:46you have
40:46an airport
40:47next to a
40:48mountain
40:48resulting in
40:49dangerous winds.
40:51Lower wind
40:52limits are
40:52imposed
40:53but the
40:54result is
40:55an increase
40:55in cancellations.
40:57Which forces
40:57the limits
40:58to change
40:58again?
40:58Limits go
41:00back up
41:01and then
41:02finally
41:02the unreliable
41:03wind data
41:04which results
41:05in wind reports
41:06being ignored
41:07by pilots.
41:15Rules
41:15are established
41:16for a reason.
41:18If you don't
41:19follow the rules
41:20you're taking
41:21a big risk.
41:23Wind
41:24has varied
41:25210
41:26to 290
41:28degrees
41:28the gusts
41:29of 34.
41:31Yep.
41:31Roger.
41:32We are
41:32rolling.
41:38Vidreau
41:39flight 839
41:40enters turbulent
41:41airspace
41:42when the winds
41:43coming off
41:43the mountain
41:44were extreme.
41:46The force
41:47of the winds
41:48causes the
41:49right elevator
41:49to break free.
41:54Something's
41:55wrong.
41:55bending the
41:58connecting rod
41:59until it
42:00fails.
42:04No.
42:06No, no, no.
42:10It was
42:12subject to
42:13aerodynamic
42:13loads that
42:15exceeded the
42:16structure strength
42:17of the tail.
42:18It must have been
42:23absolutely terrifying
42:24because you would
42:26pull the
42:27control column
42:28without any
42:29reaction at all.
42:30Oh, God!
42:32the
42:44Norwegian
42:44accident
42:45commission
42:45for civil
42:46aviation
42:46recommends new
42:48regulations
42:48for the
42:49distribution
42:49of wind
42:50information
42:51to crews
42:52and urges
42:53Vidreau to
42:54ensure their
42:55pilots follow
42:56established
42:56restrictions.
42:58The captain
42:59wanted to get
42:59the job done
43:00and he probably
43:02got away with it
43:03other times
43:04but this time
43:06it didn't work
43:07out.
43:11Other
43:12recommendations
43:13are made for
43:14Vare Airport
43:14but ultimately
43:16it is deemed
43:17too dangerous
43:18and the airport
43:19never reopens
43:20to commercial
43:21traffic.
43:24Vare Airport
43:25was open
43:26only four years
43:27which makes it
43:28one of the
43:29shortest lived
43:29airports
43:30in the world.
43:35I wish
43:37that we had
43:38put our foot
43:38down and said
43:39no more.
43:43I wish
43:44the company
43:44had done
43:45the same.
43:49I wish
43:50the government
43:51and the experts
43:52had listened
43:53to our warnings
43:54earlier
43:55than we might
43:58have had
43:59our colleagues
44:00still alive.
44:01We'll see you
44:17next time.
44:18Bye.
44:18Bye.
44:19Bye.
44:19Bye.
44:20Bye.
44:20Bye.
44:20Bye.
44:22Bye.
44:23Bye.
44:29Bye.
44:31You
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