- 2 days ago
Indonesia joins over 25 countries in the Board of Peace, part of President Trump's peace plan for Gaza, sparking controversy at home. Nailah Huda speaks with Pieter Pandie, researcher at CSIS Indonesia, on the Indonesian government's narrative and public sentiment towards the Board.
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00:00This is Awani Global with me, Naila Huda.
00:09And this week on Awani Global, we take a close look at the Board of Peace,
00:13part of the US President Donald Trump's peace plan for Gaza.
00:18The group of countries participating in this Board of Peace
00:21met for the first time on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos.
00:26The Board currently comprises 19 countries, including Indonesia,
00:31whereas some major powers in the West have held off from showing support for the Board,
00:37including the UK, France and Norway.
00:40In this episode, we want to look specifically at Indonesia's participation in the Board,
00:46which has since sparked controversy and criticism at home.
00:50So joining us now to tell us a little bit more about that,
00:52we have joining us from Jakarta, Peter Pandi, researcher at the Department of International Relations
00:58at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia.
01:02Thank you so much, Peter, for joining us.
01:05Likewise, thank you.
01:06So maybe we can start off with some of your overall thoughts on what's been proposed by Trump,
01:12this Board of Peace for Gaza.
01:14How do you think this mechanism might actually deliver peace,
01:20especially given that it actually excludes Palestinians from being a part of this,
01:25whereas Israel is participating as an equal member?
01:29How do you see this as maybe a peace mechanism,
01:31or is it more of a conflict resolution of sorts?
01:36What I can say outside of what you've already outlined in regards to the lack of Palestinian involvement
01:43as a member of the Board of Peace itself, on the executive board,
01:47or on the Gaza executive board itself,
01:50I think what it is, especially in comparison to the United Nations Security Council,
01:55is a very personalized sort of version of an international institution.
01:59If we take a peek at the drafts of the charter that have been circulated online,
02:05the powers that are held by the chairman, in this case it's Donald Trump,
02:10is very, very strong.
02:13The chairman has final say in the implementation, application of the charter itself.
02:19The chairman can also only be replaced by voluntary resignation
02:23or by unanimous vote by the executive board of the Board of Peace,
02:27who are coincidentally also mostly Americans coming from the Trump administration.
02:32So the way that the institution is designed is fundamentally different
02:36to how, let's say, the United Nations Security Council is designed,
02:40where veto powers are spread out across just five countries,
02:44which is also a point of criticism for many countries,
02:47five veto-wielding states who kind of serve as check-and-balances
02:52in a way that many would consider inefficient as well.
02:56But in the case of the Board of Peace, it's much more centralized,
02:59in this case, not even a country, but on a single individual,
03:03which is Donald Trump itself.
03:05Before we look specifically at Indonesia,
03:07what do you make of some of the countries that have either supported
03:11or maybe rejected or refrained from showing support for the board?
03:17We're seeing countries in the Gulf like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan,
03:22participating in the board while, like I mentioned,
03:25some of the other major powers, not just the UK,
03:28but China, France being absent from the signing ceremony.
03:32What does it say about the kind of support that it's getting?
03:37So I think many of the sort of bigger powers
03:40or even the US traditional allies, such as the UK, France,
03:44even Australia and Japan have taken a more cautious approach
03:47to the Board of Peace.
03:48Some have rejected outright, such as France and the UK.
03:52Some have accepted, like Canada, but then had their invitation rescinded.
03:56And some who have been invited have not given a response as of yet.
04:00And those include countries such as China,
04:03even US allies such as Australia, Japan.
04:05What that tells me is that US allies who have rejected
04:08show that they are fully on the same page
04:11as what the US is trying to do right now
04:13as far as global institutions and peacemaking.
04:18And others who have not responded
04:20are taking a more cautious approach,
04:21more like a wait-and-see approach.
04:23Also being a little bit wary, I think,
04:25of where US foreign policy is being taken
04:27under this current administration.
04:29As far as countries in the Gulf,
04:31it is quite interesting to see that most of the countries
04:35in the Middle East and the Gulf
04:37have accepted and joined the Board of Peace.
04:40And one can speculate as to why there seems to be
04:44almost a unanimous decision for those countries
04:46to join the Board of Peace.
04:47As far as statements go,
04:49although most of them have paid lip service
04:52to wanting peace and stability within the region,
04:55which I do think to some extent is the case,
04:57but I wonder what other things have pushed them
05:02or driven them to join the Board of Peace.
05:04May that be economic incentives, trade incentives,
05:07or investment incentives that have been offered
05:09by the United States outside of the Board itself.
05:11But these are things that will come out
05:13in coming days, I believe,
05:15and are a bit difficult to speculate at this point.
05:19As you said earlier, you described this
05:21as being sort of different from what we've seen
05:25as traditional forms of conflict resolution
05:28or peacemaking.
05:30Would you say this is still a multilateral framework
05:33or is this a unilateral decision taken by the US
05:37but that's being supported either by choice
05:41or as we're seeing some of the threats
05:44that's being put out by the US with tariffs and whatnot,
05:48do you think that this is multilateral or otherwise?
05:53Yeah, as I said before,
05:55I think the basic nature and design of this board,
05:59institution, is fundamentally different
06:01from institutions that most countries
06:03like Indonesia or others have been accustomed to
06:06throughout the history
06:07of the liberal international order.
06:09Institutions like the United Nations
06:11and the bodies that are associated
06:13with the United Nations
06:14have usually come out of consensus design,
06:17consensus decision-making,
06:19even though some countries may have
06:22more political leverage than others,
06:24such as, let's say,
06:25the veto-wielding powers
06:26and the United Nations Security Council.
06:28What's very different with the Board of Peace
06:30is that the charter was by and large
06:32designed by, I can assume,
06:34the Trump administration itself.
06:36Invitations were given out
06:37by the Trump administration.
06:42Powers of the chairman are overwhelming
06:44compared to institutions
06:46that were accustomed to
06:47in the liberal international order.
06:49So I think it's very, very different
06:51to institutions that we've seen in the past.
06:53How it will play out in practice,
06:56how it will operationalize later
06:58once the board starts working,
07:00I think will be interesting to see.
07:02Whether some countries will just kowtow
07:04and go with whatever the chairman
07:06of the United States proposes
07:07in board meetings,
07:09or will there be more political deliberation?
07:11I think that remains to be seen.
07:13But as far as institutional design
07:15based on the charter,
07:16I think it's very much centralized
07:17towards Donald Trump and the United States.
07:20Now, looking at the signing ceremony in Davos,
07:24that came as a surprise to some,
07:25especially for Indonesia.
07:28What do you think you can describe
07:30the sort of narrative
07:31that the Indonesian government
07:33has been trying to put out
07:34talking about their participation
07:36in the Board of Peace
07:37and the kind of reaction
07:39that we're seeing at home?
07:40There's been a lot of criticism as well.
07:43Right.
07:44So what's come out of
07:45the Indonesian government
07:45is that they're justifying Indonesia
07:48participating in this Board of Peace
07:51as sort of a continuation
07:52of our foreign policy,
07:53wanting a two-state solution
07:54to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
07:58continuing our fight
07:59for Palestinian independence,
08:00and so on and so forth.
08:01And also being that
08:02the Board of Peace
08:03is somehow the work
08:08of the United Nations Security Council 2803.
08:12But there are certain things
08:13that are pretty inconsistent,
08:15I would say,
08:15and I would argue,
08:16to Indonesia's traditional
08:18foreign policy stances.
08:19Number one would be
08:20Indonesia has always been
08:22pretty critical
08:23of how the United Nations Security Council
08:25has been designed.
08:26We've been critical
08:27that it's not representative
08:29of developing countries.
08:31Power is overwhelmingly centralized
08:33towards the five permanent members
08:36of, in this case,
08:37Russia, China,
08:39United Kingdom,
08:40France, and the United States.
08:41And we've always argued
08:42that it's not equitable
08:43and there are reforms
08:44that are needed to be made
08:45as far as making the Council
08:46more representative
08:47and more efficient
08:48and more effective
08:49in pursuing justice
08:51and peace
08:52in the international system.
08:54By joining this Board,
08:55I think that betrays
08:56a lot of the normative stances
08:58that Indonesia has taken
08:59in regards to both
09:01the Palestinian issue
09:02as well as in regards
09:03to the reform
09:04of those two-lateral institutions.
09:06So I think there is
09:07a bit of a mismatch
09:08as far as what this Board
09:10and this new institution
09:11represents by its design
09:13and its nature
09:14and what sort of normative stances
09:16Indonesia has argued for
09:17in the past
09:18through its foreign policy.
09:21What do you think this is
09:22about the kind of legacy
09:24that the Indonesian administration
09:26under President Prabowo
09:28is trying to leave
09:29on Indonesian foreign policy?
09:33Well, I think what
09:34this current administration
09:35is trying to do
09:36is, from their own words,
09:38trying to elevate
09:39Indonesia's profile
09:40and presence
09:41in the sort of
09:43international stage.
09:44We've seen that
09:45over a year
09:45of this current
09:46Prabowo administration,
09:47Indonesia has been
09:48very present.
09:49The president himself
09:50has visited numerous countries,
09:52dozens of countries,
09:53throughout just over a year
09:55of his administration.
09:56We've joined
09:57not just the Board of Peace,
09:58but also organizations
09:59such as BRICS.
10:00We've bought arms,
10:02signed multiple trade deals
10:04and arms deals
10:04with multiple countries.
10:05So I think
10:06what this administration
10:08is trying to portray
10:09is an Indonesia
10:10that is active
10:12and what I would argue
10:15is status-seeking
10:16or prestige-seeking,
10:18trying to be present
10:18at every table,
10:19trying to be the bride
10:20at every wedding
10:21in that sense.
10:23So I think
10:23activism is where
10:25the instincts lie
10:28at this administration.
10:29But what I worry
10:30is that activism
10:31comes at the cost
10:32of norms and principles
10:34that Indonesia
10:35has held on to
10:36very strongly
10:36in its foreign policy
10:37over the years
10:38and whether
10:39our involvement
10:40in many of these
10:41sort of institutions
10:42and forums
10:43are strategic or not
10:45and whether they are
10:46aligned to our national
10:47interests and values
10:48or not.
10:49So I think
10:50activism is okay,
10:53but there needs
10:53to be considerations
10:54outside of that,
10:55whether that be
10:56normative,
10:57strategic or other.
10:59Maybe you can tell us
11:00a little bit also
11:01about the response,
11:03the public sentiment
11:04towards this move.
11:06As I said,
11:07it I think came off
11:08as quite a surprise
11:09that it came so soon,
11:10the signing ceremony
11:11in Davos,
11:12and that it happened
11:13without any prior
11:14public consultation.
11:16Has there been
11:17any sort of announcement,
11:18any hints
11:19that were given
11:20by the administration
11:22before this?
11:24No, I think
11:25the decision came
11:25quite quickly.
11:27Even news
11:28that Indonesia
11:28was invited
11:29came from,
11:31I believe,
11:32mostly foreign sources.
11:33And then the decision
11:34that Indonesia
11:34would join
11:35was made
11:36incredibly quickly,
11:38I think,
11:39while Prabowo
11:40was making his trip
11:40to Davos
11:41or while he was
11:42already at Davos.
11:43So I think
11:43the public knowledge
11:45of it
11:46was very short-term.
11:49People didn't know
11:50of it long beforehand.
11:52The public reaction,
11:53I would say,
11:53at least on social media,
11:54from what I've seen,
11:55has been pretty negative.
11:56Most people
11:57have rejected
11:58or very much
12:00criticized
12:00Indonesia's participation.
12:02And also,
12:02a few foreign policy
12:05observers
12:06have also written
12:07articles such as myself
12:08on various media platforms
12:10to criticize
12:11or question
12:12the government's decision
12:13for Indonesia
12:13to join the Board of Peace.
12:15But I have also
12:16personally seen
12:17or heard
12:18dissenting opinions
12:19arguing that
12:20this may be
12:20some sort of new solution
12:21to the long-standing
12:23Israeli-Palestinian issue
12:24and that we should
12:25give it a chance
12:26of some sort.
12:27But what I would say
12:28is that most
12:28Indonesians at this point
12:30have been critical
12:31and questioning
12:31the government's decision
12:33to do so.
12:35As you said before,
12:36this is pretty inconsistent
12:38with Indonesia's
12:39long-standing
12:40foreign policy.
12:41What do you think
12:42it signals
12:43or it says
12:44when Indonesia
12:45is opting
12:46for this sort of mechanism
12:48that is outside
12:49multilateral
12:50or legally binding
12:53frameworks?
12:53As you said,
12:54they've been quite critical
12:55of frameworks
12:56or bodies
12:57like the UN Security Council
12:58for being
12:59not so representative
13:01of developing countries.
13:02But what do you say,
13:04what do you think
13:05this says about
13:06not just Indonesia
13:07but perhaps
13:07developing countries
13:09and the sort of faith
13:10or trust
13:11that they have
13:12in multilateral frameworks?
13:13There's been a lot
13:13of discussion,
13:14of course,
13:15about this erosion
13:16of trust
13:17and confidence
13:17in multilateralism.
13:19Do you think
13:19this is one
13:20of those signals?
13:21Yeah,
13:23I think
13:23in regards
13:24to your question,
13:25I think
13:25we're at a very
13:26sort of
13:27a period
13:28with a heightened
13:29level of uncertainty
13:30if not
13:31at a transitionary point.
13:33Everyone has been
13:34talking about
13:35the Mark Carney
13:35speech
13:36at Davos,
13:38head of state
13:39of Canada,
13:40saying that
13:41there's been
13:41a rupture
13:41in the international
13:42system
13:43and we're
13:43in a transitionary
13:44period
13:44towards something new.
13:46And I think
13:46we're at this
13:49sort of point
13:49where multilateral
13:51institutions,
13:52the liberal
13:52international order,
13:54rules,
13:55norms,
13:55and institutions
13:56are being viewed
13:56differently,
13:57even by the countries
13:59who contributed
13:59most greatly
14:00to designing it,
14:02the United States.
14:03We can see them
14:03withdrawing from
14:04these norms
14:05and values
14:05and institutions
14:06which they helped
14:07built
14:07and which they've
14:08benefited greatly from.
14:10So I think
14:10it's a very
14:11uncertain period
14:12where we're
14:13seeing great
14:15power such as
14:16the United States
14:16and others
14:17acting in a way
14:17that we wouldn't
14:18have guessed
14:18they would
14:19in 20 or 30,
14:2140 years ago
14:22at the height,
14:23let's say,
14:24of the international
14:24liberal order.
14:26So I think
14:26most developing
14:28countries are also
14:29changing their views
14:29or trying to figure
14:30out what sort of
14:31changes are going
14:32to come
14:33in the next few years.
14:36What's also
14:37being reported
14:37is that countries
14:38participating
14:39in the board
14:40or at least
14:41trying to gain
14:42permanent membership
14:43on this board
14:43of peace,
14:44they have to pay
14:46a sort of
14:47membership fee
14:48of about
14:481 billion US dollars
14:50and you were
14:51talking a little bit
14:52about how
14:53or what
14:54the Indonesian
14:55administration
14:55under Prabowo
14:56what they're trying
14:57to achieve
14:58is this sort of
14:58elevated status
15:00on the global stage.
15:01Do you think
15:02that this is
15:03the sort of
15:03tangible influence
15:04that Indonesia
15:06can gain from this?
15:07do you think
15:08it's, you know,
15:09compensate
15:11for the
15:12high fee
15:13that they have
15:14to fork out
15:15for this
15:15membership?
15:17Again, I think
15:18it is quite
15:19questionable
15:20whether or not
15:21we can gain
15:21sort of
15:22tangible strategic
15:22outcomes
15:23out of this
15:24board of peace.
15:25As I said before,
15:25I think the
15:26institutional design
15:27is not one
15:28where regular
15:30members such as
15:31Indonesia
15:31will likely
15:32become,
15:33will have
15:34significant
15:34political or
15:35institutional
15:36leverage
15:36to be able
15:37to push
15:37for certain
15:38initiatives
15:39or solutions
15:40when veto powers
15:42or implementation
15:43of the charter
15:44powers are
15:45overwhelmingly
15:45centralized
15:46on the chairman
15:47himself.
15:48So I think
15:48by virtue
15:49of that
15:50on its own
15:51it's difficult
15:52to see
15:52how the board
15:53will actually
15:54work in practice
15:54when the charter
15:55itself is already
15:56limiting
15:56the influence
15:58that member
15:59states can have
16:00outside of
16:01the United
16:01States itself.
16:03As far as
16:03the budget
16:04I think
16:04it is
16:05it's a very
16:05big amount
16:07of money
16:07to sort
16:08of pay
16:08up front
16:09for membership
16:10into this
16:10board
16:11and one
16:12that I think
16:13is also
16:13a mismatch
16:14as far
16:14as how
16:15this
16:16administration
16:17under
16:18PABOA
16:18has approached
16:19the national
16:20budget.
16:22We know
16:22that the
16:23Ministry of
16:23Foreign Affairs
16:24has faced
16:24significant
16:25budget cuts
16:25that has
16:28affected
16:28its
16:29operational
16:29costs
16:30and whatnot
16:31and then
16:31we have
16:32this sort
16:32of very
16:33huge fee
16:33for joining
16:34the Board
16:34of Peace
16:34which I
16:35believe
16:35is also
16:36much bigger
16:37than the
16:38current budget
16:38of the
16:38Ministry of
16:39Foreign Affairs.
16:40When you
16:41think about
16:41it,
16:42foreign policy
16:42making and
16:43actually doing
16:44foreign policy,
16:45we need a
16:46well-budgeted,
16:47well-oiled
16:48machine in the
16:48foreign ministry
16:49so they can
16:50actually do
16:50their tasks
16:50of diplomacy
16:51in the
16:52multiple
16:52international
16:52forums that
16:53Indonesia
16:53is a part
16:54of.
16:54But what
16:55we see
16:55in the
16:55past year
16:56is budget
16:56cuts for
16:57the foreign
16:57ministry,
16:58but a very,
16:59very high-cost
17:00one-time payment
17:01for joining
17:02a Board
17:02that Indonesia
17:03might have
17:04lesser political
17:06or strategic
17:06leverage.
17:07So I think
17:07there is that
17:07sort of
17:08mismatch
17:08that I
17:09question as
17:09well and
17:10also many
17:10others have
17:11questioned in
17:11regards to the
17:12choices that
17:12this administration
17:13has made in
17:14regards to
17:14foreign policy.
17:15If we try to
17:18see the
17:18positive in
17:19all this,
17:20if we can
17:20even try,
17:21do you think
17:21there is
17:22any effective
17:23way for
17:25not just
17:26Indonesia but
17:27for other
17:28Palestinian allies
17:29that have
17:30signed up in
17:31the Board
17:31could potentially
17:33try to influence
17:34from within
17:34this sort of
17:35mechanism or
17:36do you think
17:36it's entirely
17:37impossible when
17:38Palestinians are
17:40themselves
17:41excluded from
17:42this?
17:42I'm not
17:45sure.
17:45Again, it'll
17:46really have to
17:47depend how
17:47the Board
17:49works in
17:49practice.
17:50So far, we
17:51haven't seen
17:51meetings being
17:54convened of
17:54the Board.
17:55We've seen
17:55the signing
17:56ceremony but
17:57nothing after
17:58that as of
17:58yet.
18:00Technically,
18:01countries with
18:02like-minded
18:02interests towards
18:03the Middle
18:03East and the
18:04Palestinian
18:04cause may
18:06form coalitions
18:07within the
18:08Board to
18:09fight back
18:10against any
18:10sort of
18:11solution that
18:11may be
18:12hindrance to
18:14Palestinian
18:14independence
18:15and so on.
18:16But I do
18:17believe we'll
18:18have to
18:18really see
18:18what it'll
18:19be like
18:19political
18:20deliberations
18:21and negotiations
18:21within the
18:22Board.
18:22It's really
18:23tough to
18:23say at
18:23this point.
18:24I mean,
18:25in the
18:25past one
18:26month of
18:272026,
18:28we've seen
18:28a lot of
18:29very unpredictable
18:30situations occur.
18:32In two or
18:33three weeks,
18:33we might see
18:34Trump getting
18:34board of the
18:35Board and
18:35then just
18:36disbanding it
18:38entirely.
18:38So I think
18:39since power
18:40is very,
18:40very centralized
18:41on Trump
18:41itself,
18:42it also
18:42depends on
18:43his own
18:43limbs as
18:45much as
18:45the members
18:46itself.
18:47So it's
18:47really a
18:48toss-up,
18:48I would
18:48say.
18:49Yeah,
18:49that's a
18:50very likely
18:50outcome.
18:52Another
18:52point of view
18:54to consider
18:54is if we
18:55were to
18:55look at
18:56this within
18:56the ASEAN
18:57framework as
18:58well.
18:59Looking at
19:00the list of
19:01countries that
19:01have signed
19:01up,
19:02Indonesia is
19:03the sole
19:04Southeast Asian
19:05country to
19:06have shown
19:07support for
19:07the Board
19:08of Peace.
19:09Do you
19:09think that
19:09this could
19:09potentially
19:10become a
19:11thorn in
19:12the flesh
19:12for ASEAN
19:14member states?
19:15As we've
19:15seen in the
19:15past year,
19:16there's been
19:16divisive issues
19:18with the
19:19Israel-Palestine
19:20crisis.
19:22Some being
19:23somewhat neutral
19:25on the
19:26matter with
19:26some like
19:27Malaysia being
19:28more outspoken
19:30on the issue
19:30and with
19:31Philippines as
19:32Chair of ASEAN
19:32this year,
19:33do you think
19:34that this
19:34could become
19:35a potential
19:35issue for
19:36ASEAN
19:36member states?
19:39Yeah, I
19:39think as you
19:39rightly said,
19:40there's been
19:41different sort
19:41of approaches
19:42to the
19:42Board of
19:43Peace even
19:43amongst the
19:44ASEAN
19:44member states.
19:45I believe
19:45Singapore was
19:46invited but
19:46has not
19:47responded
19:47officially.
19:48Malaysia has
19:49been critical.
19:49Indonesia has
19:50joined.
19:51I think Vietnam
19:51has expressed
19:52interest in
19:53joining the
19:53Board of
19:53Peace.
19:53So there
19:54has been
19:54a sort of
19:54mixed response
19:55as far as
19:56individual states
19:58within ASEAN
19:59and joining
19:59the Board of
20:00Peace.
20:00But I think
20:01whether or not
20:02this becomes
20:02an issue
20:03for ASEAN,
20:04ASEAN has
20:04far bigger
20:05issues at
20:06hand, I
20:06believe,
20:07that stretches
20:08beyond just
20:09the Board
20:09of Peace.
20:09Whether that's
20:10issues within
20:12our own
20:13region, let's
20:13say South
20:14China Sea,
20:15Myanmar, and
20:16so on and
20:16so forth, I
20:17think there's
20:19a lot of
20:19homework that
20:20needs to be
20:20done in
20:21our own
20:21neighborhood as
20:22far as how
20:22ASEAN
20:23works.
20:24How this
20:25board will
20:26affect ASEAN,
20:27I believe, is
20:28whether the
20:28board will
20:29work on
20:31conflict areas
20:32beyond just
20:33Gaza.
20:33Let's say
20:33that it
20:34extends to
20:35our region,
20:36Southeast Asia,
20:37and it
20:37starts being
20:38involved in
20:39issues such
20:40as Myanmar,
20:41South China Sea,
20:42or other, I
20:42think that's
20:43when we can
20:43start to see
20:44differences in
20:45positions start
20:46to play out.
20:47But until then,
20:49I think ASEAN has
20:50a lot of issues
20:50on its own
20:51hand that we
20:51probably need to
20:52talk about more
20:53and get to
20:54con positions and
20:56solving sometime
20:57soon.
20:57domestically, do
20:59you think that
21:00this could
21:00potentially make
21:01a dent in
21:03the Prabowo
21:04administration?
21:05I know
21:05national elections
21:07are still a
21:07long way to
21:08go, but do
21:09you think this
21:09is one of the
21:10issues that
21:10the Indonesian
21:12government should
21:12pay more
21:13attention to
21:14given the
21:14sort of
21:14negative
21:15criticism and
21:17response it's
21:18been getting
21:18from the
21:18public?
21:20I think so.
21:21I think we've
21:22seen very,
21:24very significant
21:24negative public
21:26responses, at
21:26least on social
21:27media, but as
21:28of yet, it
21:29hasn't really
21:30materialized into
21:31mass protests
21:32or anything of
21:33that matter, or
21:34mass assembly
21:35that we've seen
21:36throughout the
21:36past year, let's
21:37say in August
21:38in Jakarta or
21:39the various other
21:39protests throughout
21:40the country.
21:41So I think
21:42until then, until
21:43protests occur or
21:44something of that
21:45nature, the
21:46government is quite
21:47happy just to
21:48limit it to
21:48negative social
21:50media responses.
21:51Whether it will
21:52lead to that or
21:52not, I think
21:53we'll have to
21:54see, but I
21:55think so far
21:56the government
21:56has already
21:57faced a high
21:59number of
22:00dissatisfaction on
22:01certain social
22:01media platforms
22:02more than
22:03others, and
22:05that really
22:05hasn't changed
22:06how they've
22:06done their
22:07own policy.
22:08So I think
22:08social media
22:09has shown a
22:12high level of
22:12dissatisfaction for
22:13certain segments
22:16or sections of
22:17the public, but
22:18others maybe not
22:19as much.
22:20So I think it
22:21really depends on
22:21how it will play
22:22moving forward.
22:22Thank you so
22:25much.
22:25That is Peter
22:26Pandi.
22:26Thank you so
22:27much for sharing
22:28with us some
22:28of your thoughts
22:29on the
22:30Indonesian
22:30government's
22:31narrative on
22:32participating in
22:33the Board of
22:33Peace and what
22:34the sentiment
22:35has been like
22:36back home.
22:37Thank you,
22:37Peter.
22:40That is all
22:41on Awani Global.
22:42That was Peter
22:42Pandi, researcher
22:43at the Department
22:44of International
22:44Relations at the
22:45Center for
22:46Strategic and
22:46International
22:47Studies Indonesia,
22:49sharing his
22:49thoughts on what
22:50the response has
22:51been like towards
22:52the Board of
22:53Peace proposed
22:54by the US
22:56President Donald
22:56Trump as part
22:57of his overall
22:58peace plan for
22:59Gaza, of course
23:01sparking controversy
23:02and criticism as
23:03to whether it can
23:04deliver peace for
23:06Palestinians or
23:07whether it's part
23:08of his PR plan,
23:10probably in his
23:12bid to get the
23:13Nobel Peace Prize
23:14once again.
23:16But that is all
23:16on Awani Global
23:17this week.
23:18We'll catch you
23:18next time as we
23:19explore more
23:20geopolitical and
23:22current global
23:23issues and world
23:24news weekly.
23:26That is all
23:26with me on
23:27Nailah Huda.
23:27With me,
23:28Nailah Huda.
23:29We'll catch you
23:29next time.
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