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The FBI and Defense Intelligence Agency team up to capture DIA Senior Analyst Ana Montes for allegedly passing sensitive intelligence to Cuba.
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00:01As a former FBI agent and chairman of the House Intelligence Committee,
00:05I had oversight of all 16 of our nation's intelligence agencies.
00:09My name is Mike Rogers.
00:12I had access to classified information gathered by our operatives.
00:17People who risked everything for the United States and our families.
00:21You don't know their faces or their names.
00:24You don't know the real stories from the people who lived the fear and the pressure.
00:28Until now.
00:30There was a Cuban agent with access to classified information,
00:36placing our entire nation's future at risk.
00:38The spy was almost certainly in our building.
00:41I think it's the betrayal that gets me.
00:43Like, how dare you?
00:45It's a sensitive time because we were launching a war.
00:48Our boys and girls in uniform are going to die because she stabbed him in the back.
00:52dazuもina dessa。
00:59And now we can have it.
01:01We'll see you next time.
01:02You guys are with us.
02:05Nations spying on the U.S.
02:08If you were to believe there are probably in excess of 100,000 foreign agents working in this country, that's not paranoia.
02:17That's a good guess.
02:18My name is Chris Simmons.
02:23I was a career intelligence officer with the Defense Intelligence Agency, where I headed counterintelligence analysis for the Americas team.
02:31The Defense Intelligence Agency is the Pentagon's intelligence apparatus.
02:35DIA is focused on the national security structure of every nation in the world.
02:39The way we became engaged with this case, a woman who led part of the FBI investigation took the initiative to set up the meeting.
02:51The FBI explained that we've heard you and your team are the best there are on Cuban intelligence, and we are part of an FBI spy case that involved Cuba, which had been dragging on for three years.
03:03And we're frustrated.
03:05Can you help us?
03:05I was so concerned about the damage that this mole could have already inflicted and would continue to inflict that I immediately called Scott Carmichael.
03:16Scott Carmichael was head of our investigation side.
03:19I love being a spy hunter.
03:24I love the chase.
03:26Nothing would make me happier than for somebody to say, well, Scott, we know espionage is occurring.
03:31We've got these few tidbits of information.
03:33Can you help us out?
03:34You bet.
03:35I especially love what are termed unsub investigations, unknown subject investigations.
03:41And those are investigations where you have good reason to believe that espionage is occurring.
03:46You have absolutely no idea who might be doing it.
03:49FBI was trying to identify a Cuban spy who was possibly in the D.C. area, and they knew a few tidbits of information about the spy, but they had no idea who this person was, where this person worked.
04:03Well, that's a problem, because what they were talking about is the possibility that there was a Cuban agent with access to classified information.
04:15Cuba does not pose a credible military threat to the United States.
04:19The real danger of Cuban intelligence operations is that the intelligence take is shared by Cuba with other countries.
04:27He shares information with Iran, China, Russia, even Venezuela, North Korea.
04:34What makes Cuba important is that it's the world's biggest intelligence trafficker.
04:38And I say that in the context of the sale or barter of U.S. secrets is now one of the central engines of the Cuban economy.
04:49Whether it's political secrets, economic secrets, military secrets, every country has interest in the United States.
04:57And Cuba, their ability to steal secrets, they outperform almost every nation in the world.
05:03The Cubans are so good for several reasons.
05:10At the start of the Cold War, the Russians and all the Warsaw Pact allies saw the Cubans as useful partners that would not draw attention like they would.
05:20The Russians, the Poles, every service in the world trained the Cubans.
05:26Cuba exploited the perception that they're not a threat because it lowers their cost of espionage.
05:33And it gets them more clients because situations that would be hard for the Chinese or Russians to do, Cuban agents can do easily.
05:40Building an unsub case is like putting a puzzle together.
05:50The challenge is you don't know what the puzzle looks like and you don't know how many pieces there are.
05:57The FBI's case, they had three very distinct pieces of the puzzle.
06:02As they shared their puzzle pieces, it turns out I had the fourth puzzle piece.
06:10That one piece of information fit perfectly into what they had just shared.
06:19And when we put it all together, I told them that the FBI is looking in the wrong place.
06:26Because the unsub doing the three things you just shared, coupled with the fourth piece of the puzzle,
06:32there are probably 40 or 50 people that could do what your unsub can do.
06:37And in all likelihood, it's working within the confines of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
06:42Even more narrowly, the spy was almost certainly in our building.
06:45What was the information that the FBI had? What did they show you?
06:56The information that our colleagues shared with us remains classified to this day
07:02because it would reveal some of our methods that the Cubans aren't yet aware of.
07:08Some of the methods and systems that the DIA employs to collect information about other countries' activities
07:19are so sophisticated.
07:22And that's why espionage is so dangerous.
07:24Because if you tell other countries,
07:27hey, the United States is able to do this,
07:31they will then guard against that.
07:34And of course, that degrades our ability to collect the information
07:37that our warfighters need in the event that they go to war with some country.
07:41That's the problem.
07:43For most of the years that I worked for DIA,
07:45I was the senior counterintelligence investigator.
07:48So if anybody was engaged in an espionage in the agency on my watch,
07:53that was an affront to me.
07:55I hate that.
07:57I think it's the betrayal that gets me.
07:59Like, how dare you?
08:02One investigative lead that the FBI had
08:05was that the spy in question had traveled to the naval station at Guantanamo, Cuba
08:11during a specific time frame.
08:14That was the best investigative lead.
08:15I knew that people who travel to Gitmo require permission to do so.
08:20And they submit their request for permission by message.
08:24And it's searchable by keyword.
08:26It only took me moments to submit my query.
08:30And the system produced a hit file, a list of messages,
08:35about 100 of them that matched the parameters of my search.
08:39And so I started hitting my function key very quickly
08:42just to see if I would recognize names.
08:44And the 20th one...
08:48It was...
08:54I don't want this, hon.
08:57It was very, very emotional.
08:58The moment I saw her name, I knew.
09:08The second I saw her name, Ana Montes, I said, oh, shit.
09:26Because I knew that Ana, at that time, was the queen of Cuba.
09:31She was the senior Cuba analyst in the entire U.S. intelligence community.
09:36Ana Montes had probably more time invested
09:39in the study of political and military affairs regarding Cuba than anybody else.
09:44Ana's security clearance was top secret with access to special intelligence.
09:49This stuff is so extraordinarily sensitive that only a handful of people would be given access to it.
09:54Someone in an honest position could cause exceptionally grave damage to our collective security.
10:01And she could do that in a moment.
10:04Which means a greater possibility that our war fighters, who are our boys and girls, will die.
10:13That's why this is not a game.
10:16I actually went into shock.
10:20And at that moment, I realized, I'm the only guy outside of Havana who knew that Ana Montes was a major spa.
10:30Now, this was not the first time that I had seen Ana Montes' name.
10:40I had other interactions with Ana.
10:42And during the course of those interactions with her, I developed a gut feeling that there was something wrong and suspicious about this woman.
10:51And so, when I saw her name again, I knew that she was the spy that they were looking for.
10:58Four years earlier, in April 1996, one of our employees, Reg Brown, came to me expressing concerns about Ana.
11:07He said her actions during a specific incident caused me great concern.
11:12Give me a three, two, one.
11:14Okay.
11:15Ladies and gentlemen, I have just been briefed by the National Security Advisor on the shooting down today
11:23two American civilian airplanes by a Cuban military aircraft.
11:28On the 24th of February 1996, the Cuban military shot down two aircraft operated by a Cuban emigrant group.
11:37It's called Brothers to the Rescue.
11:39Two civilian aircraft piloted by a total of three American citizens were shot down in international airspace by Cuban maids.
11:47Do you have relatives?
11:48My son was in one of the airplanes.
11:53That was the murder of three American citizens.
11:56Now, in response to the shoot down, the United States government scrambled to figure out what had happened and how we might respond.
12:04One of the first people that the Pentagon called in as an expert to advise them was Onomatis.
12:11In that circumstance, when the Pentagon calls you in, you must stay in place until you are dismissed.
12:23It doesn't matter how long.
12:24If you're in there for two months, you stay there until our senior military leaders no longer have a need for your expertise.
12:33Reg Brown called the Pentagon shortly after 8 p.m. that night just to ask Anna a question.
12:39But she left.
12:41And he thought, well, that's odd.
12:44Reg thought that her actions in leaving the Pentagon early was suspicious.
12:50So the first thing I did is I took a look at our own records.
12:59Everybody at DIA has a personnel file.
13:02Everybody has a security file.
13:04I reviewed our files on Anna Montis, and what I found was an absolutely model employee.
13:11Anna, she had been working at DIA since 1985, and she'd never committed a security violation.
13:18She rose through the ranks very quickly, lived very modestly.
13:22She was the kind of employee that supervisors hold up for others to emulate.
13:27So the assessment that Anna might be a spy just didn't make a lot of sense.
13:33Nevertheless, I decided to interview her, and Anna gave me great answers to most of my questions.
13:44But then when I started questioning her about just going home and did anybody see you, her entire demeanor changed.
13:52One minute, we're joking and laughing and having a good time.
13:59And the next minute, she is scared to death that I know something that she did.
14:04And I had no idea what it was.
14:07I didn't know what was going on.
14:09But I walked away from that situation with a gut feeling that she was hiding something from me that was very important to her.
14:16And that gut feeling played a major role four years later, in September of 2000, when her name popped up on that screen.
14:24And so I contacted the FBI.
14:29I met with them.
14:30I told them, look, I've got an employee who I think is your suspect.
14:33The FBI had yet additional data that they were employing to measure suspects.
14:39New information, which I had not previously possessed, and I refer to it as a template.
14:45Onomatis did not match up against that template at all.
14:50The FBI told me that, well, on the basis of this information alone, I can eliminate your employee as a suspect in this case.
14:56And they obviously had a lot of confidence in the validity of this new information.
15:01They used it as a trump card on me.
15:08From the time I left the meeting until the time I took the elevator ride downstairs,
15:13and I found myself literally out on the curb,
15:16I knew that Anna was at work three miles south in our headquarters building.
15:23I could just picture her in my mind's eye.
15:25Because that woman was in my building, pulling this crap on my watch,
15:30placing our entire nation's future at risk.
15:33She was going to get the hell out of there.
15:35Now, I needed the FBI to be able to make that happen.
15:39So what I did, I said, we are going to persuade the FBI that Anna Montes was the spy that they were looking for.
15:46And I realized that I had to attack the trump card.
15:49The next morning, on a Saturday, the 14th of October of 2000, I got up.
16:04I couldn't sleep very well.
16:06I was so upset about the trump card.
16:09Because what I knew about Anna did not match up against that new information at all.
16:15But I knew that she was the agent they were looking for.
16:19It was her.
16:20I never doubted my intuition.
16:27The next day, I spent most of the day examining the trump card.
16:32And I discovered something.
16:35I discovered a pattern that I recognized from something that I learned in an eighth grade statistics math class.
16:46And my math instructor told us, if you ever see this pattern, you need to understand that the fix is in.
16:54Somebody is manipulating the data in order to get the outcome that you're looking at.
16:58And I saw a pattern which I knew could never occur in a random world.
17:04Can't happen.
17:05It had to be the Cubans.
17:07The FBI was using the trump card that was being manipulated.
17:12They didn't know it.
17:16And so at that moment, I realized that I had cracked the trump card.
17:22I wrote up an eight-page memo.
17:25And the next morning, I faxed that eight-page memo to the FBI.
17:30About an hour later, the FBI case agent, Steve McCoy, called me.
17:34And the first thing he said was, Scott, I think we've gotten off on the wrong foot.
17:40I think we're going to be working together for a while.
17:43And I was relieved.
17:45The only way we were going to be successful is to work together.
17:48And it was at that moment, I knew that we were going to be okay.
17:57One of the things that the FBI did was to assign a co-case agent by the name of Pete Lapp.
18:06So the first time I heard the name Adam Montez was at our squad Christmas party in 2000.
18:10I knew the FBI had gotten a name of suspect, someone who may have matched one of these unsub cases, as we call them.
18:18So I talked to Steve McCoy, the senior case agent.
18:21And I said, hey, I hear you're working this neat case and you have a name.
18:24You know, I'd love to work with you on this.
18:27So he said, yeah, sure, I'd really appreciate your help.
18:30And from there, we worked the entire case together with Scott.
18:34It's important to keep in mind that the FBI has to prove these cases.
18:40You know, we're the lead counterintelligence agency for the United States.
18:44The Bureau is going to be the organization that brings charges against someone for espionage.
18:49So there's a lot of pressure on us to get it right.
18:52Knowing someone is guilty of espionage is fundamentally different than proving that someone's guilty of espionage.
19:00So let's validate Scott's claim that she's an agent of a foreign power and, in fact, who we're looking for.
19:09And then let's try or catch her in the act of committing espionage.
19:13National security letters are hugely important tools for the FBI.
19:20So a national security letter is a letter that's issued by the FBI that compels financial institutions, credit institutions, telephone companies to relinquish critical information.
19:31And once Montez is identified as a suspect, we opened a full investigation on her that allowed us the opportunity to use national security letters.
19:41We had very sensitive intelligence that told us that the unknown subject had purchased a specific brand, make and model computer at a specific period of time in 1996 from a store in Alexandria.
19:55No further information.
19:57Through national security letters, I identified Ana's line of credit.
20:02And from that, we knew that Ana had made a purchase to CompUSA back in October of 1996.
20:09So in April 2001, we served a national security letter at CompUSA and asked them, could we identify a specific purchase made here in October of 1996?
20:21And they said, we keep records that far back behind the store and we only keep them for about five years.
20:28This was April 2001. The records were almost destroyed.
20:34So we pulled out boxes and about 20 minutes after we started, the assistant manager for CompUSA said, is this what you're looking for?
20:42And in fact, it was the purchase that Ana made in true name for the computer that we could prove that the Cubans tasked her to purchase back in October of 1996.
20:57This sales receipt for this computer purchase proved that she was in fact the spy.
21:03Ana Montez officially became a spy.
21:04So from April 2001, I had no doubts that she was a Cuban spy.
21:08The question was, was she currently spying?
21:11And could we catch her in the act of committing espionage?
21:24This sales receipt for this computer purchase proved that she was in fact the spy.
21:30Ana Montez officially became the prime suspect of the unknown subject investigation.
21:37Now it's just a matter of proving her, catching her in the act of committing espionage.
21:44We need to get her on film meeting someone.
21:47Uploading intelligence secrets, passing an encrypted thumb drive, that's the ultimate threshold.
21:52Court worthy evidence that will convict a spy.
21:54So one of the first things we did was request physical surveillance resources on her.
22:02We had a lot to do.
22:04You know, the FBI put cameras in her cubicle and microphones and tapper phones and all that sort of thing.
22:10We started doing significant physical surveillance on Montez, identifying her patterns of behavior, what was her routine.
22:19So watching Ana Montez, we saw that, for example, she would leave her home on Sundays at a precise time, go to the local metro, get on, go several stops, get off, walk, stop at locations, wait 60 seconds, go somewhere else, wait 90 seconds.
22:38Very methodical, things that a normal person doesn't.
22:43So from a tradecraft standpoint, you knew something was afoot.
22:47Her shoe seemingly came untied and she stopped and tied it.
22:50Was she really tying her shoe?
22:52Or was she doing counter surveillance or signaling someone?
22:55Over the next several months, the surveillance team told us, we've got a pattern now, she's leaving work at particular times.
23:02She's following a route, here's the route, she's going into drugstores, but she doesn't come out with a bag.
23:10So what's she doing in the stores?
23:13Turns out, she was using the pay phones.
23:17Not too long ago, we had pay phones everywhere and using pay phones was not in and of itself suspicious.
23:24But when you have a cell phone, you have a home phone, and when you have phones at your office, the fact that you go a couple blocks off your normal route to and from home to use a pay phone, that is suspicious.
23:41Once we did the legal paperwork to get the records from the pay phone, we saw that she was calling pagers in New York City.
23:47And those particular numbers, we knew were associated with Cuban espionage.
23:57And our suspicions were that she was punching in codes, three or four digits.
24:02So we knew she was communicating with a pager.
24:05She was sending signals that told us she was still active.
24:08So we saw her making all these pay phone calls, the timing of which corresponded with encrypted high-frequency messages being transmitted to the DC area from Cuba.
24:24Even before Montes was identified as a suspect, we knew that the Cubans were communicating to their agents via high-frequency messages that would have been picked up using a shortwave radio.
24:35The Cubans would send a message on a Tuesday, repeat it again twice on Thursday, twice on Saturday.
24:46We knew that communicating to the Cubans via the high-frequency messages required encryption and decryption disks.
24:54So it's not like they were sending the messages out in the open air.
24:59They were encrypted messages that no one else could read unless you had the matching decryption software that the Cubans gave to their agents.
25:12In order to catch her in the act, we knew we needed to get into her home because we knew we were trying to find these disks.
25:19She lived in a 30-tenant ownership building, so a huge challenge for us to try and get into her apartment without getting detected.
25:28Our surveillance of her taught us that she had a boyfriend, and her boyfriend lived out of town in Florida.
25:38And her traveling to visit her boyfriend Memorial Day weekend in 2001 gave us a long opportunity to get into her apartment covertly to do a physical search.
25:48So when we went into her apartment, I was absolutely nervous.
25:59It was hot, there was no air conditioning, and although it was a small two-bedroom apartment, there was a lot to look through.
26:07The risk of getting caught doing this is tremendous, and that's the last thing you want to do is compromise the investigation by someone coming home too early,
26:14or someone, you know, watering the plants when you didn't plan on them doing that.
26:21We started searching her apartment, and the first thing we found was the Sony shortwave radio in its box, out in the open, underneath an open window.
26:32And then we found the Toshiba laptop computer that the Cubans had tasked her to purchase.
26:38So our computer experts made a copy of the computer, a hard drive, so that we could forensically analyze it and see what was on it.
26:53So Ana Montes, you know, as she had received and sent reports out to the Cubans, had tried to delete what was on her computer.
27:02But in the deleted space of her computer, we found almost 11 pages of single-spaced text in English and Spanish.
27:14And in that text, we found national defense information that Montes gave to the Cubans that was classified.
27:21That was a hugely successful covert search.
27:24But we had not found the disks.
27:27If we could find the disks that the Cubans had given her, we'd be able to read her encrypted messages while she was getting them,
27:33and hopefully then know what the messages were between her and the Cubans.
27:37We had made a copy and found the communication between her and the Cubans on the computer.
27:53We found the shortwave radio.
27:55We saw her making all these pay phone calls.
27:58And we knew we had a strong case, but we felt that we had to find these disks.
28:02We really needed that concrete proof that took away any shadow of doubt from anybody that Montes is guilty of espionage.
28:15The FBI speculated that perhaps she was keeping this data on her person.
28:21And the reason they couldn't find it was because she was carrying it around with her all the time, perhaps in her purse.
28:25The objective was to get to her purse, search it, and get that purse back without either Anna or any of her coworkers having even a suspicion that something unusual had occurred.
28:39So we came up with a plan to separate her from the purse.
28:42We had insider access to Anna Montes's daily life.
28:48So what occurred to us is we could create a fake meeting that she would have to attend.
28:55We gave her a major speaking assignment, which meant that she would be visible to everybody.
29:01And psychologically, it just wouldn't look good for her to have a purse sitting on top of her material.
29:05So we scheduled that briefing for 9 o'clock in the morning because we wanted to make sure that Anna had had time to settle in at work by 8 o'clock to put her purse into a drawer so she would just secure it.
29:19And she did.
29:20All the attendees were at the meeting, prepared to do a good hour, hour and a half discussion of this very important issue.
29:32Once the door was closed, the FBI technical team, under the guise of being a maintenance crew, went into her cubicle in the surrounding area to do routine maintenance on the facilities and had access to her purse.
29:45So while she was at the meeting, we had a very short period of time to go through her purse, you know, looking for the discs.
30:00It was a typical woman's purse, had cosmetics and wallets and just had a lot of purse type stuff in there.
30:08So we looked and searched in and couldn't find the discs there.
30:12So we couldn't find exactly what we were looking for, but we did find something.
30:19Inside Anna's purse, the FBI found a sheet with a matrix, which was a crypto material which Anna employed when she communicated with the Cubans via pagers.
30:32And that was exactly what we were looking for, to determine what the message was between her and Cuban intelligence.
30:44Once we had her brevity codes, it was simply a matter of going to a phone, punching in the exact same codes and then we'd just match it against the messages that had been sent and would be sent in the future and know exactly what she was telling New York.
30:57It told us at the time that she did not perceive herself in danger and it was setting up the future meetings to meet with her case officer or spy handler, which was every second week.
31:10If we could get her meeting with a spy handler, we know we would get her convicted and put her in prison.
31:18She had the potential to be one of America's most dangerous spies.
31:21I was sitting in my boss's office, I think, in a commercial office building in Northern Virginia, about a mile up from the Pentagon, when 9-11 occurred.
31:42And we riveted to the television screen.
31:52We understood that this was a terrorist attack and that it was significant.
31:57I sat in there for another 20 minutes or so and I saw a puff of smoke to my right.
32:05And the puff of smoke persisted and it turned gray and began to billow.
32:09And then news coverage came out about the aircraft hitting the Pentagon.
32:13I didn't see the impact, but I knew what was happening.
32:16We had just crossed a threshold and that the United States of America was going to formulate some sort of a response that would require the assistance and support of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
32:31In the aftermath of 9-11, DIA assembled a task force to support the Pentagon's forthcoming operations in Afghanistan.
32:39And Amantes was among those to be chosen for the task force.
32:46On Saturday, the 22nd of September, Ana was going to be briefed on the war plan for Operation Enduring Freedom, the effort to remove the Taliban from Afghanistan.
32:56If Ana Montes gained access to information about our war plans, she could give it to the Cubans, who, in turn, would be happy to trade that information
33:07or to simply share that information with our adversaries, possibly including the Taliban.
33:14In that event, all of our plans that we executed during Operation Enduring Freedom would have been known to the enemy.
33:22I knew that our investigation with Ana was coming to an end.
33:27We really wanted to catch her in the act of committing espionage with her handler, who was handling and receiving the classified information.
33:35But we knew that it was just too much risk and potential damage to keep her at DIA at such a sensitive time when we were launching a war.
33:45It was time to arrest Montes for a conspiracy to commit espionage.
33:50When 9-11 happened, we knew we had days left in the investigation.
34:05We really wanted to catch her in the act of committing espionage, but it was just too much risk to keep her at DIA at such a sensitive time when we were launching a war.
34:18It was time to arrest Montes for a conspiracy to commit espionage.
34:23The FBI decided they'd like to effect the arrest over in our building.
34:31We decided to bring her down into the offices of the Inspector General.
34:36So, we were going to arrest her at work, but we still wanted to try and get her to make some incriminating statements.
34:43If we could get her to say things about her espionage in an interview before she's arrested, that'd be a good thing for the prosecution.
34:51We started our interview, talked to her about the scenario that wasn't true, that there was a defector that came out from the Cuban intelligence service, and he talked about a penetration of the U.S. government.
35:08And quickly into this pretext, Ana had this interesting physiological reaction.
35:15And it was this rash that immediately broke out, and they were on the side of her neck that was facing me.
35:26I could only see them, you know.
35:28I had to kind of control myself and not go, look at that.
35:31She has this rash breaking out.
35:36So, she got him under control, and she was very focused and very firm.
35:40Getting through this story, Montes kind of wised up to it and asked if she was under investigation.
35:47And at that point in time, we told her she was under arrest for conspiracy to commit espionage, handcuffed her, and her life changed from that moment on.
36:06Pete came out of the conference room with Ana.
36:08She was in handcuffs, and I saw them walking down the corridor, if you will, towards me.
36:13She was almost standing in front of me, and she never looked at me.
36:19I doubt that she had any real idea as to what role I might have played in her capture.
36:28We're pleased to announce this morning that 45-year-old Ana Belen Montes pled guilty of a one-count indictment, charging her with conspiracy to commit espionage.
36:39Today's guilty plea is a result of a plea agreement between Ms. Montes and the United States that will require Ms. Montes to fully cooperate with law enforcement by providing information relating to all criminal and or intelligence activities of which she has knowledge.
36:54As part of the plea agreement, she got 25 years for espionage.
36:57And in exchange for that, she agreed to be fully debriefed by the FBI and the rest of the intelligence community.
37:09She was debriefed for about seven months, exhaustively probably three times a week, five or six hours a day.
37:16During Ana's debriefing, they took her from the earliest days in 1985, when she started, all the way up to the day of arrest.
37:26What did you learn?
37:28We learned she betrayed us in El Salvador, compromised all of our military operations in Central America throughout five years of the secret war during the 1980s.
37:37And think here was a woman that would literally sit across the table from special forces teams going down range and pretend to be their friend.
37:50And then as soon as the meeting is over, contact her Cuban handlers and say, you have another special forces team going on to El Salvador.
37:57They'll be at this location on these dates. Good luck. Happy hunting.
38:02I'm convinced she willfully and intentionally took every action she could to get Americans killed in combat.
38:09It should make us all enraged.
38:14People from the intelligence community, every individual that she met from the U.S. government, if they were going to Cuba covertly,
38:22she identified who they were and what their true mission was versus what their stated mission was.
38:29A lot of the information she shared will remain classified to the American public.
38:34And isn't that ironic that information that you cannot read was read in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, Cuba.
38:43There's no way, even in six months of daily, all-day interrogations, you're not going to get everything that a career spy did in 16 years.
38:53We will never fully know the damage that she did to the United States.
39:01During the time we were debriefing her, we learned a lot about her motivation for being a Cuban spy.
39:08So, in 1984, 1985, Montez was working on her master's degree in international relations at Johns Hopkins University.
39:19And her mutual friend saw her in class, knew her opinions, knew that she was diametrically opposed to U.S. foreign policy
39:28and what we were doing in that time period, which was 1984, 1985.
39:33Ana felt that the United States didn't have a right to kind of impose their will on other countries,
39:39especially in Central and South America, and really disagreed with U.S. foreign policy at the time.
39:45So, her friend sensed that she had this passion that the Cubans would be interested in.
39:51She's introduced to the Cubans via a diplomat who was their undercover.
39:58He recognized that she had this visceral empathy for the Cuban plight, for the Cuban cause,
40:05and that's folks who they really reach out to and ultimately trust to be their agents.
40:10Honest Cubicle was actually devoid of anything personal. It was all devoted to business.
40:21But on Honest Cubicle's wall, posted right next to her computer monitor, was a piece of paper.
40:27It was lined and written in script.
40:29The king hath note of all that they intend, by interceptions which they dream not of.
40:35Fidel Castro was aware of all of their plans, by some secret means they can't even imagine.
40:42This was an inspirational quote that she had posted to her wall,
40:45so that every time that she was down at her computer, she could see it and motivate herself as a spy.
40:54You know, people who commit espionage are placing our collective security at risk.
40:59Our boys and girls in uniform, who are fighting battles for us, are going to die because somebody stabbed them in the back.
41:07That's what espionage is. Death.
41:11And that's why guys like me work so hard to find these people.
41:16I've told people that hunting for spies is like trying to find a ghost in the fog.
41:24And you've got to believe, first of all, that they're there.
41:29And then you have to have enough drive to keep looking.
41:31I've told the chief staff.
41:33I have to keep looking.
41:35No!
41:37No!
41:41No!
41:42Second.
41:44Second.
41:49Then we should restart here and have an adjacent 요 dare Şimdi
41:54and have to keep looking.
41:56You
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