Lt Gen Rajan Bakshi (retd.), former GOC-in-C Central Command, Indian Army speaks with Col Anil Bhat (retd.) on the continuing border standoff with China

1 year ago

Lt Gen Rajan Bakshi (retd.), former GOC-in-C Central Command, Indian Army speaks with Col Anil Bhat (retd.) on the continuing border standoff with China | SAM Conversation

Transcript

00:00Welcome to SAM Conversation, an online program of South Asia Monitor, to discuss the latest

00:19situation about the occupation in our side of the line of actual control by Chinese People's

00:30Liberation Army. We have the pleasure of welcoming Lieutenant General Rajan Bakshi, a former

00:42Central Army Commander and GOC of the 14th Corps, which covers, apart from a portion of the

00:57line of control, the line of actual control. It also has a major coverage of the line of actual

01:03control. He is the only armored corps officer to have commanded a mountain formation like this,

01:16and it is during his presence that there were induction of tanks also. However, now let's take

01:24a look at, in the light of external affairs, Minister Jai Shankar recently announcing that

01:39there are about 75% of disengagement problems which have been sorted out

01:46and the differences have been narrowed down. This is the terminology used. They mutually agreed

02:03on five friction points which include the Galwan, Tangong Tso and Gogra Hot Springs.

02:14Now, the intrusion so far have been, in 2011, there were 180.

02:25In July 2012, China painted China on the rocks, PLA painted China on the rocks in Demshock. In

02:342013, Chumar, Chhagla Gram in Arunachal and Depsang were intruded upon.

02:49And the latest on 6th and 7th of September is in Anjore district of Arunachal Pradesh,

03:0060 kilometers inside across the line of actual control. And also the latest is a heliport,

03:11not just a helipad, but a helicopter port just about very close to the line of actual control.

03:22Apart from this, the heliport is in the Arunachal border, Ningchi, which is Tibet.

03:35China occupied Tibet, 20 kilometers from the line of actual control. And also, let's remember

03:48that there are 800 Jiao Kang villages. Jiao Kang means well-organized

03:57villages which have come up over the last five years.

04:04I request you, Genbakshi, to throw some light on whatever has been announced and what can we

04:15expect from now on? All right, sir. To start with, to get your viewers on grid as far as the

04:27outline, the major issues of terrain are concerned, I would like to cover that very briefly.

04:35Since it's been a long haul for the Chinese to have been there and people know what is happening,

04:43but the terrain configuration may not be very clear. The terrain can be divided into major

04:49issues. First, the Depsang Bulge. It's at an altitude of 16,000 feet at an average height.

04:58It is interspersed with rocky outcrop, rivers, and it is conducive for the employment of mechanized

05:09forces in this area, this high-altitude plateau. It's also known as Depsang Plains.

05:16We have two important areas in this sector. One is Dolat Bek Oldi, DBO.

05:25The threatening of DBO is vital for our defensive battle, the execution of our defensive battle.

05:37It also provides us a very suitable helipad connection launch pad in case we are interested

05:44as and when to launch offensive operations. That part, the enemy can progress operations from DBO

05:56deeper into our territory and also a possibility of moving from across the Karakoram range

06:06into the Nubra Valley, which is, you know, the area where we have the Siachen Glacier.

06:14It can also progress operations toward Darbuk, where we now have a lovely road running from

06:22Darbuk to DBO. The second area is the area south of DBO and north of the Pangyang Tsunli.

06:33This area has nalas and rivers, rivers of the kind of Galwan, Rakhi Nala, etc. However,

06:41these are confined spaces and employment of large forces is not possible.

06:49Now we come to the Pangyang Tsunli area, the lake.

06:55On the north bank of Pangyang Tsunli, we have those fingers, finger one to finger eight.

07:03Five to eight is with them. They are holding them and one to four is with us.

07:08The road commences from finger five and goes towards Sirijab. Sirijab is a major hub.

07:19It is a nodal point for administration and for operational employment.

07:25Therefore,

07:33these fingers are vital to them. Sirijab can get threatened if they move or withdraw,

07:42which I don't think they should ever do. That apart, they have made two bridges on the Pangyang

07:50Lake, which connect the north and the south bank of the lake. Towards the south bank lies

07:59Moldo, their major garrison, as also in the area of Spangboor and Spangboor Gap. This is the area

08:07we're talking about, the Chishul area, which is vital because operations can be progressed from

08:16Chishul on towards Tangsey and Dharbuk and Chagla and get into the label. That's an

08:22access available in that area. That's a vital area. Thank you. Rajan, could you please specify

08:30when these two bridges were made over the Pangyang Tsunli? Sir, please say again.

08:38Can you please tell us when these two bridges over the Pangyang Tsunli were constructed?

08:45Sir, these two bridges were constructed last year. Last year. Last year. It's been a long time.

08:53So, we're talking about recent. It is in the area where the lake is the narrowest.

09:02Therefore, you can connect the Spangboor area with the area in the vicinity of Sirijab.

09:11And I take it that these roads are, can take, they've got the road classification of

09:22carrying armour also, light tanks at least. That is true. That is true. It is to reinforce the area

09:32which includes heavy equipment, including tanks and BMPs and heavy loads of vehicles.

09:43They have a major garrison on Maldow and Maldow is a very threatened place which we did

09:49when we occupied Kailash range with our tanks. Yes. Yes. That is why we had. Yes.

09:56And they were very, very, they were very, you know, rattled. They were very rattled

10:02when we occupied Kailash range and they were after us. They were after us that we withdraw

10:09from there and we agreed. We agreed. And there is a very strong view amongst serving officers

10:18who cannot, you know, speak out, but a lot of us veterans who, you know, who've been studying this

10:28that we should never have withdrawn from Kailash range because that would maintain for us

10:37forever, you know, a position to bargain with them as against always we being bargained against.

10:47So you have said it. That is absolutely correct. We, you see, that could have been a very major

10:55bargaining factor for Depsang and Demchok because Galwan and Hot Springs, we knew they were not as

11:06strong in not withdrawing. So anything in Depsang and Demchok, this was a very, very good and a

11:14strong point for negotiation. Yes. Yes. Sir, I will run out of food because you may run short

11:23of time. Well, the area south of Chuchul leads you from Dungti onwards to Demchok into the Indus

11:32Valley. Indus River enters India at Demchok. This area is also conducive for employment of mechanized

11:39forces. I will later on introduce you to whatever I know on how the motorized division and the

11:51mechanized division which they had brought into Depsang and how they have reorganized them

11:57into combat armed division and regiments. I'll explain it as we go along.

12:09Sir, I think we may run short of time. You can go over those briefly because

12:17we finally have to come to the major question. Will the PLA withdraw from whatever has been stated?

12:29That is these five friction points. That's all they have stated. Five friction points which

12:36we've already named, which include Galwan, Pangong Tso and Gograj hot springs and narrow

12:45down the differences. After you briefly go through this, we must dwell on these aspects.

12:53Sir, one thing is very clear. No nation would like to have its military withdrawn

13:02from areas that they have already occupied and the line that they hold.

13:07The Chinese are well aware of the fact that they were extremely lucky and fortunate

13:13to attain the 1959 claim line, which is their claim line. It is extremely sad that they could

13:22come there and we were not able to pick up movement which was over hundreds of kilometers.

13:38However, that is a lesson learned which we must carry forward from what happened in Kargil.

13:45The formations in this case for the Chinese to come to the eastern Ladakh,

13:50the formations come from around 1500 kilometers.

13:57If they come in the garb of training in the close vicinity or even a reasonable distance away from

14:07the LAC, the Indian side is that much more cautious. Warning bells are ringing all over

14:16and we are something like formations on stand two and we have to have our surveillance,

14:25our strategic surveillance, operational level surveillance that should have given us

14:30as to what is happening even if they have come in the garb of training.

14:35So, that is that bit, sir. The no nation, that's one thing very clear.

14:40Now, Galwan, we finished with eyeball to eyeball contact and that is why they went back with the

14:50basic premise during our peace talks that they can withdraw to an area where there is no skirmish.

14:57When the militaries of two nations are in an environment of such hostility,

15:04anything can happen between the troops at any time. So, they've gone back from there.

15:10Hot Springs is again not an area which is as vital. In fact, even Demchok is in the CNN area

15:18not as vital as the large chunk of Depsang Plains and the Depsang Bulge which comprises

15:28the major portion of what is the Akshaya Chin. Therefore,

15:36Depsang is never discussed in any meeting. Depsang is one which we have to be more interested in.

15:46Pangang Tso is an area where I don't feel that even if we have our best

15:57foot forward for negotiations that they would like to withdraw.

16:02In fact, it is a good effort on our part to have got one to four, fingers one to four.

16:10Because we must also know that G, I'll just give you the number,

16:19it is the new highway which has come up in this area G695. Like we have G219 in further depth

16:34in the Akshaya Chin area, it is the closest at Redop which is close to Demchok that G219 is

16:43in eastern Ladakh. Now, G695 is one, it is between G219 and closer to the line of the LSE.

16:58So, that is the effort which this highway has already come. It's in being. So, therefore,

17:06you can imagine the sidestepping of forces in eastern Ladakh which is 826 kilometers

17:15of effective frontage of 14 poles. Therefore, induction, de-induction, resupply, logistics

17:27of all sorts, it has all been catered for. And combined with that, the forces which they have

17:34deployed, they have mixed the combat, the mechanized division and the motorized division

17:47into a combined armed divisions and further into regiments which have a mix of heavy,

17:55medium, and light equipment. Based on where the employability is more suitable,

18:04the mix of heavy, medium, and light is.

18:09Just a moment, please. Could you please specify the heavy, medium, and light in the case of guns?

18:15Guns only. In the case of tanks, it's only light tanks. Am I right?

18:21Yes. So, they have heavy tanks and medium tanks in the form of T99A and T96.

18:31And T96, they also have in a medium category something called PLT. It's a wheeled vehicle

18:40with 100 millimeter gun. The light tank is the ZTQ-15. It is 33 tons, 105 millimeter gun.

18:52All these tanks have the ERA. And the ICV that they have is CSK-181. It's a wheeled vehicle.

19:03So, they have a mixture of wheels and tracks. But this is the kind of equipment which is available

19:09in this area. And therefore, we have medium tanks. Don't want to get into the realms of

19:16what we should have there. But certainly, the requirement of light tanks exists.

19:21Fair enough. Now, if you could please wind this up, please.

19:35Okay. You want me to finish this off?

19:38Yeah, the deployment part that you're talking about.

19:41So, this deployment in CADs and CAR, which is the regimental level, they do rotation.

19:51So, what is CAD and CAR, please?

19:55Combat Arms Division and Combat Arm Regiment. Regiment in their case is like a brigade.

20:05So, this configuration of brigades is what is heavy medium light.

20:13Accordingly, the tasking and their locations, the deployments are done.

20:22Similarly, the mechanized forces, along with a mix of all arms and services,

20:32which form part of the Combat Arm Regiment, there is a separate one for the Debsang,

20:38a separate one for the area of Pangang Tso, separate for areas south of Pangang Tso,

20:45south of Pangang Tso, which is the Rizangla area till Dungti. And from Dungti to Demchok

20:51is a separate Combat Arms Regiment. So, that is the configuration all along till Chumar.

21:04Beyond Demchok is Chumar.

21:06Chumar, yes, Chumar. Thank you very much, General Bakshib. No, we would love to, you know,

21:13take on more, but we're a little strapped for time. You have elaborated on a very,

21:21very large amount of deployment of, you know, a large area. We haven't yet talked about,

21:29you know, the Arunachal Pradesh. That's yet another, you know, large area where there's

21:40been a very heavy deployment. Now, what I want to, you know, ask and get your views on is

21:48that in light of what the External Affairs Minister has said, do you think that the PLA

21:55is going to withdraw from the set points, that is the three mentioned Galwan, Pangang Tso,

22:02and Gogra Hot Springs? And will they actually do it? And also, you know, relax on the patrol points?

22:13So, after having reached here in middle of 2020, starting April 2020,

22:22there has been a massive effort in creation of infrastructure all along. I want to tell you,

22:29I want to tell you that prior to 2020, we had defenses on our side at Demchok, Phuket,

22:39Tungti, etc. We had pillboxes, we had communication friendships. The Chinese didn't have anything.

22:46They only had the border guards, which were in camps. They used to go for patrolling and get

22:52back to their camps. Obviously, when they have come here, and they're not going to go back,

22:59never would they want to go back. That is why defenses are being constructed.

23:07Roads have been constructed, which are connecting G695 closer to the LAC, the verticals

23:14connecting 695, 219. There are forward locations, there are defenses, there are habitats come up,

23:23helidromes, the airfields in the supporting vicinities have been upgraded,

23:28and fighter aircrafts brought in there, logistic nodes have come up.

23:32The strategic reserves of Western theater are also along 219, separate for Depsang,

23:43for Pangang Tso area, and areas south of it in this valley.

23:50So there are these reserves which are there at Redok, further up north for Depsang,

23:58and further southwards for areas of Chumar and the like. So therefore,

24:07there is a lot of, you know, they have actually entrenched themselves. So this had to be done. We

24:13had to accept it. They're not going to go back. Had they wanted to, that would have been a very

24:19different scene. And I don't see them patrolling at all, sir. We had, I think, 21 co-commander

24:28meetings on which not an inch was agreed upon. Not an inch of Bidwan was agreed upon.

24:41I wonder. Well, if there was anything, it would have come in the media.

24:45I have no direct access to any serving officer. I don't do it.

24:49No, no, that's fine. Anyway, thank you very much, Jal Bakshi, for, you know, this

25:00very, a dose which is not yet big enough. There's much more happening. But whatever that you

25:09share, thank you very much. Sir, your overall aim of, you know, having the emphasis

25:16and focus on Eastern Ladakh, that is why we didn't want to get into the realms of

25:21South China Sea, Taiwan. And I must conclude by saying, the way we used to have our dual

25:29task formations for North, the West and the East, they have something like that. If Taiwan is quiet,

25:37they have reserves here at Shikane, in the areas of that time, Shikane, where it is Taiwan-based.

25:46If Taiwan's hot, then they move. So something on those lines is what he's already planned

25:52and executed on ground. I'm also to say, sir, very sorry, lots has been done since the time I was

26:00there. Lots, fantastic work done by our country. And I only pray and hope that we don't repeat

26:09Kargil and we don't repeat April 2020 in terms of our strategic surveillance

26:15and intelligence. God bless our nation, proud of our nation.

26:20Thank you. Thank you, Jal Bakshi. And I think that you ended that very well, that we cannot,

26:26we cannot afford another Kargil or another Galwan. Thank you very much.

26:30Thank you, sir.

26:31As far as this plan of withdrawal, I think let's believe it when it happens,

26:38if it does happen. Thank you. All the best.

26:41Thank you, sir.

Lt Gen Rajan Bakshi (retd.), former GOC-in-C Central Command, Indian Army speaks with Col Anil Bhat (retd.) on the continuing border standoff with China | SAM Conversation

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