Col Rajinder Singh Kushwaha (retd.), formerly of Bihar Regiment that lost 20 soldiers at Galwan in 2020, speaks with Col Anil Bhat (retd.)  on why China cannot be trusted | SAM Conversation - video Dailymotion

South Asia Monitor

Col Rajinder Singh Kushwaha (retd.), formerly of Bihar Regiment that lost 20 soldiers at Galwan in 2020, speaks with Col Anil Bhat (retd.)  on why China cannot be trusted | SAM Conversation

Transcript

00:00Welcome to Siam Conversation, a program of South Asia Monitor. It's time, 62 years after

00:16the Chinese regression of 1962 October, that we look back in the light of a number of comments

00:27and issues that have come up. We like to welcome Colonel Rajendra Singh Pushwaha, who has written

00:38and commented a lot on whatever is going on, particularly since the Galwan incident, that

00:46is the second aggression in 2020 June. He commanded the 3rd battalion, the Bihar Regiment

00:57and he was one of the first to come up with the facts about what happened in Galwan on the

01:09fateful night of 15-16 June 2020. First thing I think we need to recall is the events of pre-1962,

01:24the run-up to the 1962 India-China war. Colonel Pushwaha, what would you mention as the sparking

01:36point? Anil, thank you very much. You have invited me to give my opinion on as to what

01:45happened before the 1962 war took place. Before I start off, there are certain things we must

01:51understand. There are two things. First, from 1950 to 1955-56, India's pro-China policy,

02:00thereafter from 1955-62 till the 1962 war happened, there was an anti-China policy. So,

02:10the duplicity we have to understand to understand as to why the war took place in 1962 and what

02:16were the reasons. Briefly, if you could please. Yeah. So, I'll come to you. Firstly, we must

02:22the two Asian giants, India and China, they are not complementary countries because one side,

02:33they said totalitarian government since 1949 when China became independent and Indian side,

02:40it was a democracy since 1947. And Chinese geography is about, the area is 9.7 million

02:50kilometers whereas India is one third of it, somewhere about 3.27 million kilometers. So,

02:58there was a mismatch between India and China in 1947-49 onwards. However, in 49 when China

03:07became independent or the communists came to power in China, that time the Indian economy

03:13was better, Indian military was better than the Chinese. Over a period of time, since 1950

03:22onwards, China got involved in certain wars like Korean War or taking over certain territories.

03:35At that particular time, Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru who was the Prime Minister of India,

03:41he had a special liking for China. And you'll see that he was of the opinion that if India

03:55has to progress and develop, then it has to be a friendly relation with China. And that is why

04:02some of these actions, as I spoke to you, when China occupied Tibet in 1950, Jawaharlal Nehru

04:11went ahead and supported China. Though, at that time Deputy Prime Minister before his death,

04:18Sardar Patel on 17 December 1950, he had opposed this. He had advised Nehru not to do it. He said

04:27that China will ultimately be our enemy. But Nehru overruled because he was a very tall figure and

04:36Sardar Patel who could question him, he had died by 1950, 1951 beginning. So, therefore,

04:44there was nobody to check Nehru as to whatever he wanted to do. He was such a towering figure

04:50at that particular time. Now, certain things that China occupied Tibet because of the reason

04:58that it thought that it was a Chinese territory ruled by the Qing dynasty since 17th century,

05:071644 to 1912. Surprisingly, just a bit of information for you, for all others who will

05:17be listening to me that Xinjiang province, first by known as East Turkmenistan was once

05:26an Indian tributary state during Mahabharata period. It was called as Uttarakuru. But China

05:35occupied in 1951 and this was accepted by Nehru. When India got independence, Britishers left.

05:43That time the Indian boundary with Tibet was undefined. Britishers had from time to time

05:51earmarked certain lines which they occupied because of Russian invasion from the expansion

05:59from that side in that order. So, there were boundaries between India and Tibet were not

06:06defined. From time to time, they kept on drawing lines as per their interest. But on the eastern

06:18side, they had an agreement with Tibet government where they had defined the McMahon line along the

06:28watershed which ultimately became in 1962 the major cause of the fight between India and China.

06:36Here I would like to point out that Arunachal Pradesh which is currently the bone of contention

06:44between India and China, it is called in the Chinese parlance as South Tibet. But however,

06:54in 1950, China had no attention towards it and India in 1951 February occupied Tawang which is

07:04also called South Tibet. Point of interest here is that Nehru was so enamoured with China. When

07:13China entered Tibet in 1950, China requested Nehru to give food and rations. Nehru sent

07:2410,000 months or 400 tons of rice for the PLA troops there. So, these are the things when he

07:35was basically trying to be thinking. Actually, Nehru and Gandhi, they were stuck in the

07:47heuristic bug they had. They said peace is the only way they can carry out progress. They were

07:54not very clear on the pragmatic way the world goes around today or even at that particular time. So,

08:03it was Jairam Dalatram, the governor of Assam that time in 1951. He sent Brigadier Major Bob

08:13Cutting. Bob Cutting made 200 men. 200 men he sent to capture. They went and occupied Tawang.

08:20And the Chinese at that particular time didn't object to it. The objection came,

08:30when I come to it, I'll talk about it. Only after 1960. The Chinese did not object. But

08:36Nehru was very unhappy. He expressed his... Nehru was very unhappy. He was scared that

08:44Chinese will do it. But Chinese didn't object. Chinese objection came only after 1960 when

08:50Chao Enlai had come and gone back dejected as the Prime Minister of China had come,

08:561960. He had gone back dejected. Now, Indian border with Tibet was undefined. So,

09:05there was basically these lines were drawn by the Britishers only to keep keeping Russian

09:13expansion in mind. Otherwise, they were not ratified. Even the MacMahon line was not ratified.

09:19The major line which was John Johnson and Ardagh line which was 1865 when he had surveyed and

09:29marked it which included a side chain. This will come out later in our discussion. MacMahon line

09:36was in 1940 with the Shimla Agreement. They had decided with Tibet but it was not ratified either

09:43by Tibet or the Britishers. John Ardagh line was it was established in a earmark by surveyed by

09:52Johnson who was a surveyor of the British Army, British India. So, which included of course,

09:59a side chain. As I said, Nehru's pro-China approach in 1945 because of he had a moralistic

10:06and ethical concern about peace and harmony and not to occupy, not to go out of our borders.

10:14You would know that his famous rebuke to General Roy Butcher when he said,

10:21what we don't need army, we have no enemy. So, that is the kind of attitude he had about himself.

10:27And I already said 400 tons of rice he sent to PLA troops and when the uproar took place in

10:35the parliament in 1951-52, he appointed, a committee was appointed by Minister of State

10:43for Defence Himmat Singh to check as to what can be done to occupy these, I mean to check China.

10:54But that report came out in 1953 and no action was taken. Then again, Lieutenant Kulwant Singh

11:01who was really promoted as level core commander, he was asked to review the borderline between

11:09China and Tibet, Tibet and India. So, therefore, he recommended and in fact, he said that we must

11:21booster up our defences along with Tibet or against China. But nobody listened to him,

11:27that report also went to the deep freezer. But he had, Lieutenant Kulwant had made a statement

11:35that within 5-7 years, India will have a war with China. That was in which year?

11:43He did it in 55. 55, okay. 55, Lieutenant Kulwant Singh, he said India will have a war,

11:50in next 5-7 years, India will have a war with China. But nobody paid any attention and the

11:56Indian army was still left as it is. Now, if you could please come to the stage now where

12:07Nehru is now taking steps which are contrary to, they don't show him as being friendly to China.

12:19Okay, okay, I am coming to that. So, in 1954, he went to Vandu, the Vandu conference took place,

12:31that Panjshir agreement, 5 principles or 5 things were signed with China. When he came back after

12:39Vandu conference and having signed the Panjshir agreement, that is the time he was informed that

12:47China is building or constructing a road from Xinjiang province to Tibet, which is called as

12:53Tibet highway or G219. So, Nehru was unaware of all the geographical features and other things.

12:59So, he said, where is our border? Actually, this information had come to him through IB,

13:08whose chief was Bholanath Malik, who had been IB chief from 1950 up to 1964, as long as Nehru was

13:18the prime minister. 14 years he was the prime minister. 14 years he was the IB chief with Nehru.

13:29So, this information came to him and Nehru was shocked that I am trying to be friendly.

13:34Then he said, please explain to me where are our borders. Then these various lines of the British

13:41line which were drawn, they were explained to him by IB, Intelligence Bureau, IB Malik, BN Malik

13:55and also the army brief name. So, it was suggested to him that Johnson Ardagh line,

14:02which is the first line drawn by Mr. Johnson in 1865, that should be our boundary with Tibet

14:11because that included Aksai Chin. So, therefore, he said, okay, if that is the thing,

14:19this is our boundary, then publish our maps showing this is our boundary. So, 1954-55,

14:27he gave the orders for publication of new maps which showed our boundary with Tibet,

14:36a Johnson Ardagh line. So, then he gave two orders. On the advice of BN Malik, he gave two

14:42orders. First is a republication of the map where he showed the boundary along the Johnson Ardagh

14:49line. Second map, second order he gave of establishing post all along.

14:58Are you referring to the forward posture?

15:01Forward posture all along the boundary.

15:04How many posts?

15:0660 posts were established by 1962.

15:0960 posts, okay. Did the Indian army have the strength to do so?

15:15No, Indian army had actually, while IB was suggesting a forward posture, forward policy,

15:25Indian army led by General Samaya was proposing defense in depth. They did not want to have

15:32posts on the borderline.

15:35Please also clarify, did we have the numerical strength to do so?

15:38No, we didn't have that numerical strength.

15:41We did not, yes.

15:43See, after 1952 report by General Kulwant Singh, then two ITBP was raised and two frontal posts

15:54were created by ITBP or under the Indian border police under BN Malik. And that time Nehru also

16:08ordered that these posts should carry out a forward patrolling. However, in 1959, a

16:17Kanka post incident took place where these ITBP people were massacred. So therefore,

16:24order was given that these posts, ITBP posts should be occupied by the army and army was

16:32to occupy the 60 posts which were created by right up to 1962. Before that in 1950,

16:38Lt. Gen. H.P. Thorat, who was a Western army, Eastern army commander, he suggested certain

16:44things to be done because army is not competent enough to hold all these posts and fight in the

16:52front. So, but BN Malik made a clarification that China will be reluctant to confront India,

17:04will not do anything even if he's in a position to do so. So, it was his messages which were

17:13his ears and Nehru was giving his ears to him, accepting his viewpoints. But army's viewpoint

17:19Nehru was not accepting. So, the defense in depth versus the forward policy. But after Kanka

17:26incident, the forward patrolling by ITBP was stopped and the army moved ahead and occupied

17:34these forward posts. In 1961, 2nd November 1961, I think, in a cabinet meeting once again BN Malik

17:43impressed upon the Prime Minister that we should carry out a forward posting and China will not do

17:49anything. So, it was that the restriction which was laid on forward posting that was lifted.

17:56Now, here comes in one of the post in Eastern sector which is called the Dhola post

18:05was established even before, even ahead of the McMahon line. By 1962, even ahead of the

18:14McMahon line that is even ahead of the accepted border with China, Tibet. On the Ladakh side,

18:23on the western side, another post was created in the Galwan valley. So, Chinese objected to it.

18:30First thing is the Chinese stated that this is the wrong place you have come in because this is

18:39our claim line. So, in July 1962, China had got out this Gurkha post in Galwan valley.

18:55And this post was then kept to the ground against a company post in the Galwan valley by

19:03Gurkha regiment. So, the Indian army sent a column of five-yard regiment to relieve this.

19:12But this was massacred by the Chinese and this column was sent on 6th of October 1962.

19:20Now, on the other side, on the Eastern sector where the Dhola post was there, Chinese

19:25had grouted on 8th of September. Dhola post, 8th of September they grouted and it was

19:33so the army headquarters was sitting in Delhi. And by that time,

19:40General BM Kaul had become the CGS and D. K. Palit, Brigadier D. K. Palit was the DMO.

19:49They gave the order to the people deployed on Dhola, people like General John Dalby's brigade,

19:57they were asked to clear a post 1000 yards northeast of Dhola post. The Chinese post

20:05captured it. So, by 20th October, the stage was set for China to take an event. In between

20:171960, the major causes in 1960, Chinese Prime Minister Chow En-lai had come

20:26and he wanted to settle the border issue. At that particular time, China was prepared to

20:33barter Nepal, South Tibet with India for Aksai Chin. Aksai Chin is an area of roughly about

20:4438,000 kilometers. And if you add 5,180 kilometers in 1961, which was ceded by Pakistan,

20:53it works out to be 43,180 square kilometers. Now, 62 years later, whatever happened then,

21:06is it still affecting us? Yes, because see the problem is…

21:11Briefly you can just bring that out. I will do that. But I thought we'll cover it in part two.

21:18That is what comes out in the Brooks HB report. The Anderson Brooks report.

21:30Anderson Brooks report. Now, you must know what happened in 1960. Chow En-lai had come to sort

21:36out the border. But he wanted to barter Aksai Chin with Nehru, giving him Nepal or what you

21:47call it, Natal Pradesh or South Tibet. He said, you take and let's sort out the border. Nehru

21:52rejected this. And then Mao is said to have told people that let's teach a lesson to Nehru. When

22:03Chow En-lai went back, in fact, this is recorded by Kissinger in his book, in his autobiography,

22:12Mao told him that I want to teach a lesson to Nehru. Nehru was once his great friend

22:18till 1954. And China thought that Nehru is now backing out at the behest of USA. So,

22:27they wanted to teach a lesson to India. So, that is how the war took place. As things stand today,

22:36see the things have, though we are not what we were there in 1962, because our boys fought with

22:45100 rounds and they were all running around. Indian Air Force, I forgot the point, the Indian

22:52Air Force, why wasn't it used? It wasn't used because the IB said, IB again, BN Malik's

23:00assessment was that the terrain is not conducive for the use of Air Force and therefore, we should

23:09not use the Air Force there. And also the second point was that PLA Air Force was much stronger

23:18because they had MiG-19 and MiG-21 at that particular time, very offensive. But the point

23:23is that he did not, neither the Indian Air Force nor him understood that Chinese Air Force had

23:31to operate from mainland China, India, but they had no Air Force. I think we are a little strapped

23:38for time, but the fact remains that 62 years later, there are certain decisions taken then

23:49which are still affecting us very adversely and it now remains to be seen. Yes, one aspect is

23:59that whatever is coming out in the Henderson Brooks report, that should be made, that should

24:06be declassified fully and it now remains to be seen how the government will deal with whatever

24:18incursions that have occurred over the years since 1962 and what was added as a second Chinese

24:27aggression in 2020. See, I like to make a comment here before we get to the Henderson Brooks report.

24:39They say it is leaked out and something and Maxwell had made certain observation on this

24:47in his book India-China War. One thing is the Henderson Brooks report is in two parts. Part

24:56one has got four chapters. Part two is hardly anything. It is the lessons learned, tactical

25:01lessons. Basically, the thing which is going against the whole thing, publication of this

25:09Henderson Brooks report is part four, where damning remarks have been made by the report

25:16where it blames not Indian Army, not the government, but the intelligence agency which

25:24probably is manipulated by the foreign intelligence agencies. That is why this report

25:31is not being declassified with the Indian Army by the government of India. That is the main reason

25:37and I probably feel that part four is a must and we require a truth commission. India should ask

25:46for a truth commission as to what exactly had happened because we don't know. We are only

25:51blaming the Indian Army. We are only blaming the government of that time, but we don't understand

25:59the role played by the intelligence agency to provoke this war. Particularly, IB at that

26:05particular time, India had no other intelligence agency other than IB and this IB was only for

26:13internal information, internal intelligence, not for external intelligence. Now, as coming to your

26:19question, one minute I'll take. So, what exactly is the position? We should know in 1967 at the

26:25Nathula Pass, Chinese were plastered very badly and therefore, they had to run for their lives.

26:34Then again in 1987, they suffered the same humiliation. Again, come back to Galwan in

26:4415 June 2020, though they haven't disclosed their casualties, but they are much more. As

26:50for the Russian and the Americans, the casualty of Zainab was 160. They are much more than 43,

26:55they may go up to over 100 even. 100. So, therefore, Indian Army is not what it was in 1962

27:05when our boys fought in the winters of December. They fought in OG clothes and

27:13jungle boots in the area of the snow and 100 rounds each man had on him. Today, it's entirely

27:19a different thing. In defensive position, yes, we are going to give them a very bad time to Chinese

27:27if they try to do anything. In offensive role, probably we may not be that good at the moment.

27:36And that is why we need to, but China has built, you know, thereafter China has created a lot of

27:43facilities which we haven't done all along our border. We kept on the government which

27:50before the present government, they have been saying not to do anything on the border because

27:57Chinese will make use of it. And that is why our mobility and our deployment of forces was a

28:04problem which the work has started now. Thank you very much, K. Gutwaha, for all the inputs

28:12that you brought out. Look forward for another session on Henderson Brooks report, certainly

28:21at some stage if it can be, you know, we must hope for it to be declassified. Thank you very much.

28:34Okay. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Anant. Thank you.

Col Rajinder Singh Kushwaha (retd.), formerly of Bihar Regiment that lost 20 soldiers at Galwan in 2020, speaks with Col Anil Bhat (retd.) on why China cannot be trusted | SAM Conversation

Category

Transcript

Be the first to comment

Recommended