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00:01História não é uma ciência exacta.
00:05Não é nunca colocado em stone.
00:16As tempo passando, a conhecimento do passado é refazido e evolui.
00:29Mas, por definição, recebidas ideias têm corretas e são difíceis de mudançar.
00:42Eu tenho um sonho, que todos os homens são criados.
00:49Eu tenho um sonho, que todos os homens são criados.
01:16Isso deixe o mundo na frente de um núcleo abysse.
01:20Posteria tem que o pior foi havido por causa da força do poder dos Estados Unidos e dos carismáticos.
01:27Presidente John Fitzgerald Kennedy.
01:32E ainda...
01:43In the autumn of 1961, at its airbase near Izmir, Turkey,
01:47the United States deployed a squadron
01:49equipped with 15 medium-range Jupiter missiles.
02:02Jupiters could be armed with nuclear warheads almost a hundred times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
02:11They were able to reach Moscow in barely 10 minutes
02:14and could plunge the Soviet Union into an endless nuclear winter.
02:23For the USSR and its leader Nikita Khrushchev,
02:27this threat so close to its border gave the Americans an unfair advantage.
02:32The Soviets had to respond and fast.
02:47In 1961, the Cold War was dangerously close to boiling point.
02:55In early June, the summit meeting in Vienna
02:58between the experienced Nikita Khrushchev and John Fitzgerald Kennedy,
03:02the recently elected US president,
03:04revived the tensions that existed between the two blocs.
03:18Khrushchev demanded that the Allies pull out of West Berlin.
03:22This enclave of freedom surrounded by the communist world
03:25presented an exit route for millions of Germans
03:27fleeing from the German Democratic Republic.
03:32Kennedy refused.
03:40While Berlin was a thorn in the side of the communist bloc,
03:44the island of Cuba had become the same thing for the Americans.
03:52Fidel Castro had come to power two years earlier
03:55and had since strengthened ties with the USSR.
04:01Kennedy's biggest fear was seeing this government last
04:04and become an example for its neighbors.
04:08For him, anything was permitted to bring about the downfall of the regime.
04:13We do not intend to be lectured on intervention
04:17by those whose character was stamped for all time
04:21on the bloody streets of Budapest.
04:23Cuba must not be abandoned to the communists
04:26and we do not intend to abandon it either.
04:30In April 1961, an invasion in the Bay of Pigs
04:34led by the U.S. and anti-Castro Cuban exiles
04:37turned into a fiasco.
04:42In just a few days,
04:441,400 of the men involved in the CIA-directed operation
04:47were killed, wounded, or captured by Fidel Castro's forces.
04:54Khrushchev reacted to the attack,
04:56solemnly warning the Americans,
05:00the USSR will provide the Cuban people
05:03and their government
05:04the necessary aid to repel any armed attack
05:08against their island.
05:14Kennedy didn't give up.
05:16He asked CIA experts to formulate a top-secret plan
05:21to destabilize Cuba's entire society.
05:26Operation Mongoose was launched in late 1961.
05:36From their headquarters in Miami,
05:39400 agents ran a program that cost $50 million.
05:46and there was no holding them back.
05:49Mongoose financed economic sabotage
05:51and propaganda programs
05:55and worked on plans to assassinate Cuban leaders.
06:04Military men were also brought into Operation Mongoose
06:07to formulate a number of scenarios
06:09which could serve as pretexts for invading the island.
06:13The staging of phony terrorist attacks
06:15in the United States, for example.
06:17Or the torpedoing of a ship filled with refugees
06:20on its way to Florida,
06:22for which the Cubans would be blamed.
06:27The CIA even considered
06:29trying to inject Fidel Castro's cigars
06:31with a drug that would cause behavioral problems.
06:36Everything was justifiable
06:37if it brought down the Cuban government.
06:42Todo este instrumental
06:43había entrado en Cuba
06:45en valija diplomática de la Embajada Yankee.
06:49Los espías habían hecho perforaciones en el piso
06:52para instalar los micrófonos
06:53y captar todo cuanto ocurriese
06:55en el apartamento del piso inferior,
06:57sede de la agencia cablegráfica Sinhua.
07:00Así utilizan los yankees su embajada,
07:03como centro de conspiración,
07:05interferencia en los asuntos que solo competen
07:07al pueblo cubano,
07:09espionaje y violación de la soberanía de Cuba.
07:15While Kennedy sought all kinds of ways
07:17to overthrow Castro's regime,
07:20Khrushchev gave orders
07:21to the East German government
07:22to close off access to West Berlin.
07:27In August 1961,
07:29temporary barbed wire fences
07:30and barriers went up
07:32along the borders
07:32of the occupied zones.
07:40Before eventually being replaced
07:42by an imposing wall.
07:52This was the moment
07:53that Kennedy chose
07:54to strengthen NATO's position
07:56by deploying the Jupiter missiles
07:58in Turkey.
08:02An action defended
08:03by the United States
08:04Secretary of Defense,
08:06Robert McNamara.
08:08Actions were taken
08:09to increase both the nuclear
08:10and non-nuclear strength
08:12of the armed forces.
08:14These actions
08:15were inescapable
08:16in the face
08:16of the aggressive atmosphere
08:17in the Far East.
08:20Khrushchev was all the more
08:22put out by the fact
08:23that the U.S.
08:23was far ahead
08:24of the U.S.S.R.
08:25The Americans had a total
08:27of 25,000 nuclear warheads
08:30compared to fewer
08:31than 3,000 for the Soviets.
08:37How could Khrushchev
08:39make up for such a disadvantage?
08:41He suddenly had
08:42a flash of genius.
08:44He confided
08:45in his Minister of Defense,
08:47and what if we also
08:48put one of our hedgehogs
08:50down the Americans' pants?
08:55The hedgehog in this case
08:57was nuclear missiles.
09:02And the American pants
09:04was Cuba.
09:08The Soviet leader
09:10hoped to kill two birds
09:11with one stone.
09:15To secure
09:16the communist island
09:17while making Kennedy
09:18comprehend
09:19that he could not
09:20install nuclear missiles,
09:21a stone's throw
09:23from the U.S.S.R.,
09:24with impunity.
09:29Fidel Castro
09:30decided to go along
09:31with Khrushchev's plan,
09:33but he still wanted
09:34to sign an official
09:35alliance treaty.
09:36He was scared
09:37that international
09:38public opinion
09:39would turn against him
09:40if nuclear warheads
09:41were supplied
09:42to Cuba secretly.
09:43In his eyes,
09:45Cuba was a sovereign state,
09:46with the legitimate right
09:48to possess nuclear weapons
09:49without having to hide them,
09:51especially as he
09:52continuously denounced
09:53the violent aggression
09:54by the U.S.
09:55towards his country.
10:16Khrushchev did not
10:17share this view.
10:19He wanted to supply
10:20military aid,
10:21but with the utmost secrecy
10:23to keep the Americans
10:24guessing.
10:30In June 1962,
10:32Khrushchev managed
10:33to convince members
10:34of the Soviet presidium
10:36of his plan.
10:38The Americans are planning
10:39to invade Cuba
10:40with their armed forces.
10:43They need to understand
10:44that by attacking Cuba,
10:46not only will they face
10:47they will face a tenacious country.
10:49They will also face
10:50the nuclear power
10:51of the Soviet Union.
10:57Operation Anadya
10:58was launched.
11:01Its objective,
11:02to transport to Cuba
11:04more than 50,000 men,
11:0660 short, medium,
11:07and long-range
11:08nuclear missiles,
11:10bombers,
11:11some of which could be
11:12equipped with nuclear warheads,
11:14and a number
11:15of military vehicles,
11:16all without being discovered.
11:21To do this,
11:22merchant navy vessels
11:23were used.
11:24The material was wrapped
11:26and loaded onto cargo ships,
11:28and the men
11:29traveled on passenger liners.
11:33To maintain secrecy,
11:35the generals filtered information.
11:38The soldiers had no idea
11:40of their destination,
11:41nor did the captains
11:43of the 85 cargo ships
11:44chartered for the operation.
11:49Some of the ships
11:50sailed from Baltic seaports,
11:53others from the Black Sea.
12:00It was only once
12:01they were at sea
12:02that each captain
12:03opened an envelope
12:04containing instructions
12:05for the rest of the voyage.
12:14and finally,
12:16Foxtrot-class submarines
12:17discreetly escorted
12:18the convoys.
12:33But in spite of all
12:34the trickery,
12:35the Americans soon noticed
12:36this suspicious transport,
12:38notably thanks to one man.
12:41We have no direct evidence...
12:43New CIA director
12:44John McCone.
12:47Appointed by Kennedy
12:49in July 1962
12:50after the Bay of Pigs disaster,
12:52he was the first
12:53to have suspicions
12:54about the unusual arrival
12:56of 21 Soviet cargo ships
12:58in Cuba.
13:00In a report dated August 10th,
13:02he raised the first alarm.
13:06It could be deliveries
13:07of military equipment
13:08and possibly nuclear weapons,
13:12especially as 17 more ships
13:14are expected
13:14during the rest of this month.
13:16His warning went unheeded
13:18by both the CIA
13:19and the White House.
13:21Although Kennedy recognized
13:23the possibility
13:24of anti-aircraft rockets
13:25on Cuba,
13:26he believed they were
13:27purely defensive
13:27and not powerful enough
13:29to be of concern.
13:32Spy planes were nonetheless
13:33rapidly sent out
13:34to reconnoitre
13:35the Soviet ships,
13:36but they were unable
13:37to identify their cargo.
13:44As the nuclear warheads
13:45were arriving in Cuba
13:46by the dozen,
13:48in early August,
13:49the just-married head
13:50of the CIA
13:51left the United States
13:52for his honeymoon
13:53on the French Riviera.
13:58In France,
13:59Macon kept up to date
14:00with the situation
14:01in Cuba.
14:04Although there was
14:05no definite proof
14:06of the freighter's cargos,
14:07he was convinced
14:08they were carrying
14:09nuclear missiles.
14:12In early September,
14:14he cabled
14:15his deputy director.
14:17It seems entirely plausible
14:19that they are hiding
14:20the existence
14:20of offensive capacity
14:22nuclear weapons.
14:28A few days later,
14:30Macon sent a second cable.
14:32We must closely study
14:34the possibility
14:34of the secret deployment
14:36of a number
14:36of Soviet nuclear missiles.
14:44His agents
14:45didn't seem
14:46to share his concern.
14:49This is proved
14:50by the fact
14:51that his warnings
14:52were classified
14:52under the name
14:53honeymoon cables.
14:58Even worse,
14:59his service
15:00simultaneously published
15:01a report
15:02that contradicted him.
15:03It is very unlikely
15:05that nuclear missiles
15:06have been transported
15:07to the island.
15:10Back in the US,
15:11the CIA director
15:12continued to express
15:13his concern.
15:14His warnings
15:15had not been taken seriously,
15:17and reconnaissance flights
15:18over Cuba
15:19had been suspended.
15:21on October the 9th,
15:23Macon managed
15:23to convince
15:24President Kennedy
15:25to urgently
15:26resume spying missions.
15:34It wasn't
15:35until October the 14th
15:36that a Lockheed U-2
15:38finally took off
15:39from Tyndall Air Force Base
15:40in Florida.
15:50Equipped with cameras,
15:51the plane was ordered
15:52to fly over Cuba
15:53and gather
15:54a maximum of information.
16:03Back at the base,
16:04the rolls of film
16:05were unloaded
16:06and sent to the CIA's
16:07photographic laboratory.
16:17928 photos
16:18of Cuban terrain
16:19were taken
16:20on that October the 14th,
16:21and their analysis
16:22continued throughout
16:23the following day.
16:27The result
16:28was irrevocable.
16:31Offensive missile
16:32launch bases
16:33capable of striking
16:34the United States
16:35were indeed
16:35installed on Cuba.
16:39even worse,
16:41the missiles
16:42could be equipped
16:43with nuclear warheads.
16:47U.S. National Security Advisor
16:50MacGeorge Bundy
16:51waited until
16:52the morning of October the 16th
16:54before informing
16:54the President.
16:59Kennedy was shocked.
17:00He didn't believe
17:02Khrushchev was capable
17:03of such a trick.
17:05Meeting up with his brother
17:06and advisor Robert Kennedy,
17:08the President flew into a rage
17:09against the Soviet leader,
17:12branding him an immoral gangster
17:14and a fucking liar.
17:17The CIA and American intel
17:20had failed.
17:21Only John McCone
17:22had warned the White House,
17:23but in vain.
17:27Soviet military equipment
17:28was in place
17:29and it was too late.
17:37This shift
17:38didn't change
17:39the nuclear balance
17:40of power.
17:41For the past few years,
17:43the USSR
17:43had already possessed missiles
17:45capable of reaching the U.S.
17:46in a short space of time.
17:51The Americans
17:52were nervous.
17:53These weapons
17:54could permit Fidel Castro
17:56to attack them.
17:57The operation
17:59could also be a sign
18:00of imminent Soviet action
18:01in Berlin.
18:04The protection
18:05of West Berliners
18:06was only maintained
18:07by the American nuclear threat.
18:10If Kennedy
18:11didn't act firmly,
18:12it might give Khrushchev
18:13free reign
18:14to invade
18:15the former German capital.
18:20The United States
18:21had to react
18:22as rapidly as possible.
18:27On October the 16th,
18:29Kennedy called
18:29an emergency meeting
18:30of the Executive Committee
18:32of the National Security Council,
18:34EXCOMM.
18:36He needed to find solutions
18:38fast to end the crisis.
18:42Among the members
18:43were Vice President
18:44Lyndon B. Johnson,
18:47Secretary of Defense
18:48Robert McNamara,
18:50and Secretary of State
18:52Dean Rusk
18:52next to Robert Kennedy.
18:57President Kennedy
18:58had installed
18:59a secret tape recorder
19:00in the room,
19:01which he activated himself.
19:05Dean Rusk
19:06spoke first.
19:08But, uh,
19:09we can expect, uh,
19:11you would have to
19:12have a back of your own mind
19:14in whatever decision
19:15we take.
19:16The, uh,
19:18it's not the likelihood
19:19of a Soviet reaction
19:21somewhere else,
19:22running all the way
19:24from Berlin
19:24right around to Korea,
19:26uh,
19:27and the possibility
19:28of a reaction
19:29against the United States
19:30as well.
19:31That, uh,
19:32no one can surely
19:34foresee the outcome.
19:37Kennedy replied,
19:38had we done nothing,
19:39communism cast it
19:40and spread through
19:41the hemisphere
19:42as the government
19:42is fighting by
19:43its deliverance
19:45of power
19:45at the top of us.
19:48On the first day,
19:49opinions were
19:50almost unanimous.
19:51The Soviet installations
19:53in Cuba
19:53had to be destroyed.
19:56To do so,
19:58several plans of action
19:58were proposed.
20:00The president was in favor
20:01of a surgical strike.
20:04His secretary of defense
20:05suggested a wider-scale attack,
20:08also targeting air bases.
20:13Robert Kennedy
20:14saw it as a chance
20:15to undertake
20:15what the United States
20:16had been dreaming of
20:17for several years,
20:19to invade Cuba
20:20and depose Castro.
20:25And yet,
20:26the discussions ended
20:27with no clear decision
20:28being taken.
20:34For Kennedy,
20:35the Cuban missile crisis
20:37came at the worst moment,
20:38right in the middle
20:39of the campaign
20:40for the mid-term elections.
20:42The next day,
20:43a series of meetings
20:44was scheduled
20:45in Connecticut.
20:48He couldn't pull out.
20:50Any last-minute changes
20:51would raise media suspicion.
20:55While the Cuban problem
20:56was now his priority,
20:57he couldn't let it be known.
21:02On October 17th,
21:04it was less the president
21:05and more the Democratic leader
21:07who landed
21:08at Stratford, Connecticut.
21:09The fact of the matter is
21:11that the great fight
21:12in 1962
21:14is the same fight
21:15that we waged in 1960
21:17and must be waged
21:19in this decade.
21:20And that is to provide
21:22employment for our people,
21:23education for our children,
21:25and security
21:26for our older citizens.
21:27And that job,
21:29in my opinion,
21:29can only be done
21:30by the Democratic Party.
21:39And meanwhile,
21:40as Kennedy flitted
21:41from rally to rally,
21:43over in Russia,
21:44Nikita Khrushchev
21:45was preparing
21:45another trick for him
21:47with the unwitting help
21:48of his Minister
21:49of Foreign Affairs,
21:50Andrei Gromyko.
21:54Bromyko arrived in Washington
21:56on October 18th
21:57for an official visit
21:58already planned
21:59well in advance.
22:02The timing was perfect
22:04for Kennedy
22:05to enter into talks
22:06with the USSR
22:07without alerting
22:08the American public.
22:14Kennedy brought up
22:15the numerous Soviet cargo ships
22:17which had berthed in Cuba
22:18in recent months.
22:19But he didn't let on
22:21that the U.S.
22:21had discovered
22:22what the ships
22:23were transporting.
22:25And even Khrushchev
22:26hadn't informed Gromyko
22:28about the delivery
22:28of the nuclear missiles.
22:30The Soviet Foreign Minister
22:32swore blind.
22:34Soviet aid
22:35was purely defensive.
22:36Equipping Cuba
22:37with warheads
22:38capable of hitting the U.S.
22:40had never been part
22:41of the plan.
22:45Kennedy forced himself
22:47to remain calm
22:48in face
22:48of this blatant lie.
22:54Khrushchev was delighted.
22:56His plan was working
22:57better than he had ever hoped.
22:59The delivery
23:00of nuclear weapons
23:01to Cuba
23:01continued smoothly
23:02while Soviet submarines
23:04took up position
23:04close to the island.
23:12The next day,
23:14October the 19th,
23:15the President summoned
23:16his Joint Chiefs of Staff.
23:17He wanted the opinion
23:19of his senior military men.
23:25The U.S. Army generals
23:26didn't think
23:27that a surgical strike
23:28would guarantee
23:29the total destruction
23:30of the missiles.
23:33The only option
23:35was a full-scale attack
23:36and invasion.
23:41Ongoing manoeuvres
23:42on the beaches
23:43of Florida
23:43proved the crushing
23:44superiority
23:45of the U.S. forces,
23:46which,
23:47if the order was given,
23:48would solve the problem
23:49within a matter of days.
23:52For Kennedy,
23:53this plan was unacceptable.
23:56How could he,
23:57the figurehead
23:58of the free world,
23:59justify aggression
24:00towards a small island nation
24:02when the world
24:03ignored its real threat?
24:05To say nothing
24:06of probable
24:07Soviet reprisals.
24:10General LeMay
24:11made one last remark
24:12to the President.
24:14We're going to have
24:15a pretty bad fix,
24:16the President.
24:16Yes, sir?
24:17Yes, sir.
24:17We're going to have
24:18a pretty bad fix.
24:19We're going with us.
24:20We're going with us.
24:23After the meeting,
24:24Kennedy confided
24:25to one of his advisors.
24:27If we listen to them
24:29and do what they want us to do,
24:30none of us will be alive later
24:32to tell them
24:33that they were wrong.
24:43Two further EXCOMM meetings
24:45were held
24:45on October the 20th
24:46and 21st.
24:49Kennedy informed
24:51its members
24:51of his decision.
24:53To prevent Soviet freighters
24:55from reaching Cuba,
24:56he would order
24:57a naval blockade
24:58of the island.
25:21A week had gone by
25:23since reconnaissance photos
25:24had established
25:25the presence
25:25of nuclear missiles
25:26on Cuba.
25:27and life was going by
25:29without anybody realizing
25:30the mortal danger
25:31hanging over the world.
25:39But the secret
25:40wouldn't be kept
25:41for much longer.
25:43Kennedy was preparing
25:44to share the truth
25:45in a televised speech
25:46on October the 22nd.
25:51On the 21st,
25:52he dispatched
25:53Dean Acheson
25:54to Europe
25:54to inform
25:55his NATO allies
25:56in person.
25:58of the United States.
25:59Faced with
25:59a fait accompli,
26:00European leaders
26:01were obliged
26:02to give President Kennedy
26:03the green light.
26:07The international press
26:09was called on
26:09to announce
26:10the importance
26:10of the President's speech.
26:15Out of respect
26:16for the Soviets,
26:17at 6 p.m.,
26:18Secretary of State
26:19Dean Rusk
26:20received the Soviet
26:21Ambassador,
26:22Anatoly Dobrynin,
26:23and gave him
26:24a copy of the speech
26:25that Kennedy
26:26would be making
26:26one hour later.
26:31Dobrynin was stupefied.
26:33He hadn't been informed
26:34of the deployment
26:35of the offensive nuclear missiles.
26:45The President
26:46of the United States.
26:48Good evening,
26:49my fellow citizens.
26:50Within the past week,
26:53unmistakable evidence
26:54has established
26:55the fact
26:55that a series
26:57of offensive
26:58missile sites
26:59is now in preparation
27:01on the island of Cuba.
27:03The purpose
27:04of these bases
27:05can be none other
27:07than to provide
27:08a nuclear strike capability
27:10against the Western Hemisphere.
27:13The truth was out.
27:14The nuclear threat
27:15hanging over
27:16the United States
27:17was now known to all.
27:19Kennedy demanded
27:20that the Soviets
27:21immediately cease
27:22all ongoing operations,
27:24or the USSR
27:25would be hit
27:26with terrible reprisals.
27:28Finally,
27:29he announced
27:29a quarantine
27:30around Cuba.
27:31all ships,
27:32whichever nation's flag
27:33they flew,
27:34would be intercepted
27:35and forced to turn back
27:36if they were carrying
27:37offensive weapons.
27:38The cost of freedom
27:40is always high,
27:41but Americans
27:42have always paid it.
27:44Our goal
27:45is not the victory
27:46of might,
27:47but the vindication
27:48of right.
27:50Not peace
27:51at the expense
27:51of freedom,
27:52but both peace
27:53and freedom
27:54here in this hemisphere,
27:57and we hope
27:58around the world,
27:59God willing,
28:01that goal
28:01will be achieved.
28:03Thank you
28:04and good night.
28:06His speech
28:07plunged the world
28:08into apocalyptic anguish.
28:26stores were stormed
28:28by panicked shoppers.
28:39nuclear fallout shelters
28:41sprang up.
28:47From the Vatican,
28:49where worshippers
28:50were gathered
28:50to pray for peace,
28:51Pope John XXIII
28:53launched an urgent appeal.
28:54on the morning
29:22of October 23rd,
29:24Khrushchev replied
29:25to Kennedy's speech
29:26in a brief letter.
29:28He denounced
29:30the aggressive action
29:31of the so-called quarantine,
29:32which violated
29:33the United Nations Charter
29:34and the freedom
29:35of navigation.
29:37He maintained
29:38that the weapons
29:39delivered to Cuba
29:40were exclusively defensive,
29:42and hoped
29:43that the Americans
29:43would renounce
29:44any action
29:45that could have
29:45disastrous consequences
29:47for peace.
29:52At the same time,
29:53he placed
29:54Eastern Bloc forces
29:55on red alert.
29:59While in the U.S.,
30:01the machinery of war
30:02had started turning.
30:04I have taken
30:05the necessary steps
30:05to deploy our forces
30:07to be positioned
30:08to make effective
30:09the quarantine
30:10at 2 p.m.
30:12tomorrow,
30:13Greenwich time.
30:15That will be
30:16the equivalent
30:16of 10 a.m.
30:17Eastern Daylight time.
30:19The forces
30:19are ordered
30:20to interdict
30:21delivery of offensive weapons
30:23and associated material
30:24to Cuba.
30:25Those are the instructions
30:27we've been given.
30:27Those are the instructions
30:28we will carry out.
30:33Four aircraft carriers
30:35and 40 destroyers
30:36steam towards
30:36the Caribbean Sea.
30:44At Guantanamo Bay
30:46Naval Base,
30:47an American enclave
30:48in the south of Cuba,
30:49families were urgently
30:50evacuated back
30:51to the United States.
31:02While war
31:03was on everybody's minds,
31:05in Moscow,
31:06a performance
31:07at the Bolshoi Theater
31:08was drawing to a close.
31:10Khrushchev
31:11was peacefully watching.
31:13What better way
31:14to reassure the public
31:15than attending a ballet
31:17in the middle
31:17of a geopolitical crisis?
31:34At 10 o'clock
31:35on the morning of October 24th,
31:37the quarantine of Cuba
31:38officially began.
31:40Within hours,
31:41the first Soviet freighters
31:43would reach the blockade
31:44set in place
31:45by the American warships
31:46ordered to intercept them.
31:53At the same time,
31:55U.S. Army Strategic Air Command
31:56went to DEFCON 2,
31:58the highest alert state
31:59right before total war.
32:04All American nuclear weapons
32:06across the globe
32:06were activated.
32:08A large-scale conflict
32:10between the two nations
32:11seemed imminent.
32:15It was a grave hour.
32:18A tense Kennedy wondered.
32:21What if the Soviet ships
32:22actually broke the blockade?
32:24Would he really have
32:26to declare war?
32:51Among the approaching
32:52Soviet ships,
32:53four of them
32:54were transporting
32:54nuclear warheads.
32:56But what Kennedy
32:58didn't know
32:58was that Khrushchev
33:00had already ordered
33:00them to turn back.
33:02The Soviet leader
33:03didn't want to take
33:04the risk of them
33:05falling into American hands.
33:07Plus,
33:07he estimated
33:08that there were already
33:09enough warheads
33:10in Cuba.
33:16Khrushchev's order
33:17didn't concern
33:17every ship.
33:18Other Soviet freighters
33:20continued on their way,
33:21ready to break
33:22to break the blockade.
33:27Like the Bucharest.
33:30Spotted,
33:31it was chased
33:31by the U.S. Navy.
33:36An American destroyer
33:38approached it
33:38to call it into order.
33:40Tension was at its peak.
33:43When questioned via radio,
33:45the Soviet captain
33:45claimed he was
33:46only transporting fuel.
33:50after much consideration,
33:52the Americans decided
33:53to let the ship through,
33:56believing that it was
33:57not carrying
33:57military equipment.
34:02The first day
34:03of quarantine
34:04ended without
34:05any major incidents,
34:08to the great relief
34:09of the members
34:10of XCOM.
34:13But Kennedy knew
34:14the crisis
34:15was far from over.
34:17Well, now,
34:18the quarantine itself
34:19won't remove the weapons.
34:20So you're going to get
34:21two ways
34:21of removing the weapons.
34:22One is to be,
34:23with the,
34:24is to negotiate them out,
34:26in other words,
34:26trade them out,
34:27and the other is
34:28to go in
34:28and take them out.
34:29I don't see any other way
34:30to get the weapons out.
34:36At the United Nations,
34:37on Thursday,
34:38the fourth day
34:39of crisis,
34:39the conflict
34:40is carried on
34:41among the diplomats
34:42of the world.
34:43Here,
34:43in this political forum,
34:45representatives
34:45of each of the nations
34:47involved in the global dispute
34:48are given the opportunity
34:50to hear and be heard,
34:51nation against nation,
34:53face to face,
34:54in dramatic confrontation.
34:56The Soviet ambassador
34:58to the UN,
34:59Valerian Zorin,
35:00began hostilities
35:01by accusing
35:02the United States
35:03of piracy.
35:04But the American ambassador,
35:06Adlai Stevenson,
35:07hit back.
35:08Let me ask you
35:09one simple question.
35:11Do you,
35:13Ambassador Zorin,
35:14deny that the USSR
35:15has placed
35:17and is placing
35:18medium and intermediate
35:20range missiles
35:21and sites in Cuba?
35:22Yes or no?
35:24Don't wait for the translation,
35:26yes or no?
35:34I am not in an American courtroom,
35:38sir,
35:39and therefore
35:39I do not wish
35:40to answer a question
35:41that is put to me
35:43in the fashion
35:44in which a prosecutor does.
35:45In due course,
35:46sir,
35:46you will have your reply.
35:47I am prepared
35:48to wait for my answer
35:49until hell freezes over,
35:50if that's your decision.
35:53Stevenson then displayed
35:54two photographs
35:55taken by
35:55American reconnaissance planes.
35:58Constructions
35:59can clearly be seen
36:00and an expert eye
36:01could easily recognize
36:02the infrastructures
36:04required
36:04for launching missiles.
36:07The photos managed
36:08to sway public opinion
36:10into thinking
36:10that it was the USSR
36:12that had started
36:13the hostilities.
36:19Khrushchev would make
36:20the first step
36:21towards a diplomatic solution.
36:22He wanted to bring
36:24to an end
36:25the vicious circle
36:26where a single spark
36:27could result
36:28in an apocalypse.
36:30On October 25th,
36:32he summoned the Presidium
36:34and offered to withdraw
36:35the nuclear missiles
36:36installed on Cuba.
36:38In return,
36:40he demanded
36:40that Kennedy promise
36:41that the US
36:42would never try
36:43to bring down
36:44Fidel Castro
36:45by invading the island.
36:51This was Khrushchev's
36:53prime objective
36:53to sustain
36:54the spread of communism
36:56into the heart
36:56of the West.
37:04A first message,
37:05seemingly written
37:06by Khrushchev,
37:07arrived at the White House
37:08the next evening.
37:10Robert McNamara
37:11recalled the event.
37:12We received the most
37:14extraordinary diplomatic cable
37:15that I have ever seen.
37:19Eight pages long,
37:20the message
37:21was quite surprising.
37:23After agreeing
37:24to withdraw the missiles
37:25in return for a promise
37:26not to invade Cuba,
37:28Khrushchev then embarked
37:30on a confused description
37:31of the drastic effects
37:32of a possible nuclear war.
37:34But it convinced Kennedy
37:36of his counterpart's
37:37willingness to negotiate.
37:41On the evening
37:42of October the 26th,
37:44a second letter
37:45was written in Moscow,
37:46this time
37:47in a more formal style.
37:49In it,
37:50Khrushchev played
37:51another gamble.
37:52Beyond security
37:53for Cuba,
37:54he also demanded
37:55the withdrawal
37:56of all American
37:57Jupiter missiles
37:58from Turkey.
38:05First broadcast
38:07by Radio Moscow,
38:08the contents of the letter
38:09soon reached the ears
38:10of Western journalists.
38:13And on the morning
38:14of October the 27th,
38:16an assistant brought
38:17the U.S. president
38:18the first reports.
38:21Kennedy realized
38:22that another letter
38:24from Khrushchev
38:24was on its way
38:25containing this new demand,
38:27and he wasn't
38:28completely hostile
38:29to the idea.
38:30If the United States
38:31didn't want nuclear missiles
38:33in Cuba
38:33for fear of being attacked,
38:35it was only natural
38:36for the U.S.S.R.
38:38not to want them
38:38in Europe
38:39for the same reason.
38:41The majority
38:42of XCOM members
38:42were against
38:43this new demand.
38:45They believed
38:46that Kennedy
38:46should agree
38:47only to the exchange
38:48requested by Khrushchev
38:50the day before,
38:51the withdrawal
38:52of Soviet missiles
38:53from Cuba
38:53in return
38:54for a promise
38:55not to invade the island.
38:58During the day
38:59on October the 27th,
39:01discussions continued
39:02while the shadow
39:03of the apocalypse
39:04stretched out.
39:05Things could still
39:06go either way.
39:10The same day,
39:11an American U-2
39:12on a mission
39:13to collect air samples
39:14from the Arctic Circle
39:15lost its way.
39:18The pilot flew off course
39:20right into Soviet airspace.
39:29Picked up by Russian radar,
39:31a fighter jet
39:32was sent up
39:33to intercept it.
39:45At the same time,
39:47U.S. Air Command,
39:48realizing that one
39:49of its aircraft
39:49was lost,
39:50sent out fighters
39:52to retrieve it.
39:54Only due to
39:55the DEFCON-2
39:56state of alert,
39:57the U.S. jets
39:58were carrying
39:59nuclear rockets.
40:07The U-2
40:08was about to be
40:09intercepted
40:09by the Soviet MiG
40:11when it finally managed
40:12to leave Russian airspace.
40:20When the event
40:21was reported
40:22to President Kennedy,
40:23he lost his cool.
40:25There's always one
40:26son of a bitch
40:27who doesn't get
40:27the message.
40:29Khrushchev
40:30was equally shocked.
40:31A lost American plane
40:33could make us
40:34take that fateful step.
40:39A few hours
40:40after the incident,
40:41an American U-2
40:42reconnaissance aircraft
40:43on a mission
40:44over Cuba
40:44was shot down
40:46by an anti-aircraft missile.
40:56The order
40:57to fire the missile
40:58came from Soviet commanders
40:59stationed on the island,
41:00despite the opposing orders
41:02given by Moscow.
41:04The pilot,
41:05Major Rudolf Andersen,
41:06was killed
41:07in the crash.
41:11Fidel Castro
41:12was convinced
41:13that the Americans
41:14were about to bomb Cuba.
41:17He urgently cabled Khrushchev
41:19to ask him
41:19to consider
41:20a nuclear strike.
41:28Khrushchev
41:28was aghast.
41:32Kennedy
41:32was against
41:33any reprisals.
41:35At the White House
41:36and the Kremlin,
41:37the two leaders
41:37knew that
41:38that a single spark
41:39could ignite
41:39the whole world.
41:47Another dramatic episode
41:48would be proof of this.
41:54Soviet submarines
41:55were still active
41:56in the blockade zone
41:57and were being
41:58systematically tracked down
41:59by the Americans.
42:08two of them surfaced
42:10and were immediately spotted.
42:27But submarine B-59
42:29was still untraceable.
42:31It had left its base
42:33three weeks earlier
42:34and since reaching
42:35and since reaching
42:35the Sargasso Sea
42:36had been unable
42:36to report back
42:37to Moscow.
42:41All the radio operator
42:43could do
42:43was listen to news
42:44broadcast by Radio Miami.
42:48It spoke of an imminent
42:50American invasion
42:50of Cuba
42:51which plunged the crew
42:53into high anxiety.
42:58especially as on board
43:00the submarine
43:01the air conditioning
43:02had broken down.
43:12The U.S. Navy
43:13finally traced the sub
43:14on October the 27th.
43:17To signal the vessel
43:18to surface
43:19the Americans dropped
43:20blank depth charges
43:22used for training exercises.
43:26The Russian captain
43:28thought he was under attack.
43:33Thinking that war
43:34had been declared
43:35he prepared to launch
43:36the 10 kiloton nuclear missile
43:38his submarine was carrying.
43:44Fortunately
43:45his second in command
43:46Vasily Arkhipov
43:48managed to convince him
43:49at the last instant
43:50to surface
43:51before committing
43:52the act of no return.
43:57The worst was avoided
43:59in extremis.
44:03After what was nicknamed
44:05Black Saturday
44:05by the White House
44:06Kennedy was determined
44:08to reach a diplomatic solution.
44:11XCOM composed a letter
44:13agreeing to abandon
44:14any invasion of Cuba
44:15in return for the withdrawal
44:17of Soviet nuclear missiles.
44:19but Kennedy was convinced
44:21that Khrushchev
44:22would refuse the proposal
44:23since there was no mention
44:24of withdrawing
44:25American Jupiter missiles
44:27from Turkey.
44:29Kennedy was ready
44:31to withdraw the missiles
44:32despite opposition
44:33from his advisers
44:34but the problem
44:35was NATO.
44:39How would his allies
44:40take the withdrawal
44:41of weapons
44:42that protected them
44:43without consulting
44:44with them first?
44:52Kennedy summoned
44:53a small committee
44:54and informed them
44:54of his decision
44:55to accept
44:56Khrushchev's demand.
44:58To avoid upsetting
45:00their NATO partners
45:01it was Secretary of State
45:02Dean Rusk
45:03who came up
45:04with the answer.
45:06To promise the Russians
45:07they would withdraw
45:08the missiles from Turkey
45:10but later
45:11once the current crisis
45:12was solved.
45:15Robert Kennedy
45:16was given the task
45:17of informing
45:17the Soviet ambassador
45:18Anatoly Dobrynin.
45:20In this way
45:21Khrushchev would get
45:22what he wanted
45:23without giving the impression
45:24that the US
45:25had handed him victory.
45:30The President's brother
45:32reassured Dobrynin
45:33it would probably
45:35take us
45:35four or five months
45:36to withdraw
45:37our missiles
45:37from Turkey.
45:39That's the minimum
45:40amount of time
45:41given the procedures
45:43imposed by NATO.
45:46And if the USSR
45:48wanted the proposal
45:49to come to term
45:50the strategy
45:50must remain
45:51strictly confidential.
45:54Robert Kennedy
45:55gave Dobrynin
45:56a direct number
45:57to the White House
45:58and asked him
45:59to call
45:59the moment he had
46:00Khrushchev's reply.
46:04The end of the crisis
46:06now depended
46:06on Moscow.
46:10Robert Kennedy
46:11joined the President
46:12who was trying
46:13his best
46:14to remain calm
46:15while awaiting
46:15the Soviet reply.
46:25When Khrushchev
46:26received the American proposal
46:27he was pleasantly surprised.
46:30He didn't think
46:31Kennedy would agree
46:32to the removal
46:33of the Jupiters
46:34from Turkey
46:34especially
46:35as he had
46:36just decided
46:37to accept
46:37his previous offer.
46:40The Soviet leader
46:41immediately cabled
46:43Dobrynin
46:43telling him
46:44to accept
46:45the American offer.
46:50Khrushchev
46:50then recorded
46:51a speech
46:52that would be
46:52aired by
46:53Radio Moscow.
46:55In it
46:56he agreed
46:56to withdraw
46:57the missiles
46:58from Cuba
46:58in return
46:59for the security
47:00of Fidel Castro's
47:01government.
47:03And as requested
47:04by his American
47:05counterpart
47:06there was no mention
47:07of the Jupiter
47:08missiles in Turkey.
47:13On the morning
47:14of October the 28th
47:15Kennedy's cavalry
47:16came to an end.
47:19The news reached
47:20Washington at 9am
47:21and the tension
47:22was finally relieved.
47:25The members
47:25of XCOM
47:26congratulated
47:27the President
47:27except for
47:29the Chiefs of Staff
47:30who had still
47:31hoped for an attack
47:32against the Castro
47:33government.
47:35Admiral Anderson
47:36even went so far
47:37as to say
47:38we've been had.
47:42Kennedy was
47:43dismayed
47:43by the reaction
47:44of his top generals.
47:51Throughout the West
47:52Kennedy's victory
47:54was celebrated.
47:55In the eyes
47:56of the world
47:56he had forced
47:57the Soviet Union
47:58to retreat.
48:00The potentially
48:01tragic crisis
48:02which had lasted
48:0313 long days
48:04was finally over.
48:07Its peaceful
48:08resolution
48:09paved the way
48:10for a period
48:11of detente
48:12between the
48:12USSR
48:13and the USA.
48:21The Moscow-Washington
48:22hotline,
48:23the famous
48:23red telephone,
48:24was set up
48:25and several
48:26non-proliferation
48:27of nuclear weapons
48:28treaties
48:29were signed.
48:33And as proof
48:34of the easing
48:35of tensions,
48:36in 1963
48:37Secretary of State
48:38Dean Rusk
48:39and Nikita Khrushchev
48:40met on the shores
48:42of the Black Sea.
48:43Mr. Rusk
48:43said that they
48:44touched on many
48:44things in a
48:45relaxed atmosphere
48:46but reached no
48:47conclusions
48:47on any further
48:48agreements.
48:52Later,
48:53the meeting
48:53adjourned to a
48:53recreation room
48:54where Mr. Khrushchev
48:56took on Mr. Rusk
48:57at badminton.
48:58Decked out
48:58in his Ukrainian
48:59blouse,
48:59the Russian leader
49:00defeated the American.
49:01But that's the life
49:02of a diplomat.
49:13Yet Kennedy's
49:15so-called victory
49:16was relative.
49:17Firstly,
49:18the crisis
49:18would never have
49:19happened without
49:20repeated aggression
49:21by the US
49:21towards Cuba.
49:31Fidel Castro,
49:32at first furious
49:33at Khrushchev's
49:34decision,
49:35repaired their
49:36falling out
49:36in 1963
49:37by making an
49:38official visit
49:39to the USSR.
49:44Khrushchev acted
49:45purely to safeguard
49:47the Red Island
49:48from further
49:48American offensives.
49:50And in this,
49:51he triumphed.
49:51the communist
49:53regime has
49:54lasted in Cuba
49:55until this
49:55very day.
50:02As for the
50:03withdrawal
50:03of the American
50:04missiles from
50:05Turkey,
50:05in February
50:061963,
50:07before a select
50:08committee of the
50:09House of Representatives,
50:10Secretary of Defense
50:12McNamara
50:13and Secretary of State
50:14Dean Rusk
50:15swore that the
50:16withdrawal of
50:17Jupiter's
50:18were never
50:18part of the
50:19bargaining over Cuba.
50:23A lie which
50:25would ensure
50:25the popularity
50:26of a campaigning
50:27president
50:27and feed the
50:29myth of
50:30American
50:30intransigence
50:31in the face
50:32of communism.
50:34But it wouldn't
50:35help Nikita
50:35Khrushchev,
50:36who was removed
50:37from power
50:38in October 1964.
50:40It wasn't until
50:411969 that the
50:43secret agreement
50:44was revealed.
50:46History is made
50:47in such a way
50:47that, in order
50:48to fully grasp
50:49it, no event
50:51can be left out.
50:51music
50:54music
51:12A CIDADE NO BRASIL
51:38A CIDADE NO BRASIL
51:56A CIDADE NO BRASIL