00:07Greetings, everyone. Welcome to SAM Conversations. I am Jiya Srivastar.
00:12Our topic for today is the most important geopolitical issue, the recently concluded
00:18U.S.-Iran agreement. To understand this better, today we welcome Commodore Udaybhastar, who
00:25is a well-known strategic affairs expert and a leading voice in geopolitics and foreign
00:30policy. Thank you so much, sir, for joining us today.
00:34Thank you, Jiya, for inviting me to be a part of this conversation.
00:39Thank you, sir. Sir, my first question to you is that the U.S. and Iran have already had
00:45one ceasefire collapse earlier this year. With violations from both sides and even a fresh
00:51U.S. strike on Tehran in May, now we have this new memorandum of understanding, extending
00:58the ceasefire by 60 days. Do you think this time the truce is built to last or we're just
01:04looking at another temporary pause before tensions rise again?
01:09The current agreement, the MOU, as you have rightly described, it's more a ceasefire.
01:18This is not a peace agreement. So I think we have to keep that in mind. But it is a
01:23significant
01:24development. And in terms of the geopolitics of 2026, I would even go to the extent of saying
01:31that this was a very major development, primarily because it allows for a cessation of hostilities
01:49to resolve many of the complex issues. Now, that having been said, there is a lot of wishful thinking,
01:57which is currently hoping that there will not be a breakdown. As we had in the past, as you rightly
02:06pointed out, both Iran and the United States had a very brief window of a ceasefire, but hostilities
02:12resumed again. This time it appears, and I think I want to underline the word appears, that there are
02:19domestic compulsions for U.S. President Donald Trump to agree to such a ceasefire. And the very fact that at
02:27the G7, he was claiming this as a major victory, is a sign of what you might call as one
02:35of these
02:35triggers for Donald Trump. Because there is a midterm election coming up for him in the United States,
02:41the price of gasoline has been going up. And these are all important considerations for any U.S. President,
02:46Iran, especially when a midterm election is coming. On the Iranian side also, I would say that there is
02:52a certain amount of domestic pressure, because as you again noted in the beginning, Iran has taken a
02:58lot of punishment. Thousands of its citizens have died, infrastructure has been totally damaged and
03:05devastated. So they also need a pause. And clearly, they have proved to be very tenacious negotiators.
03:12Because if you look at the fine print of the 14 points in the MOU, Iran has come away with
03:22far more
03:23in terms of tangible benefits, including a commitment of $300 billion for the rebuilding of Iran at the
03:33appropriate time after the extended window is over. And the final agreement is hopefully signed in a
03:40positive way. But the big question mark here is Israel. Because when we are talking about who are
03:47the likely spoilers of this agreement, ceasefire agreement, one is Israel. First of all, it is not a
03:55signatory to this particular MOU. It's only between United States and Iran. And of course, we must also
04:02remember that Pakistan played the role of a mediator. That is why it is called the Islamabad MOU,
04:10this particular agreement. But for Israel, which started this war, if you remember on February 28th,
04:18in many ways, it is Israel that encouraged President Donald Trump to embark on this,
04:24what everyone has agreed was an unprovoked war, as far as the US was concerned. So there is a strong
04:31possibility that Prime Minister Netanyahu, for his own domestic compulsions, may decide, for instance,
04:37to increase the attacks on Lebanon. In which case, Iran may have to respond to assuage the hardliners in
04:46Iran, because there are hardliners in Iran, who don't want the street. There are hardliners in the United
04:52States who feel, even in the Republican Party, that President Donald Trump has conceded too much.
04:58So at this point, I think it's a very, very, I would say, tentative, nascent agreement. And we have
05:05to take it literally a day at a time to ensure that nobody acts in a manner that would scuttle
05:13the deal
05:13while the complex negotiations go on, because the 60-day window has to address some very complex issues,
05:20including the nuclear capability of Iran, which is what, if you remember, had started this entire
05:28war against Iran.
05:32Thank you so much, sir. That's a great perspective. On to the next question.
05:37Sir, the agreement states clearly that Iran can never develop a nuclear weapon. But the actual
05:43technical details of how that will be verified are left for negotiation over the next 60 days,
05:48as you mentioned. So given the past nuclear talks with Iran, including the JCPOA have collapsed at
05:54exactly this stage, what do you expect to come out of this window? Is this likely to end in a
06:00real
06:00lasting agreement or not? As of now, I would say that the fine print about how Iran's nuclear program
06:08would be addressed remains very vague. Preliminary reading would suggest that the JCPOA, which was
06:16arrived at when President Obama was in the White House, was a multilateral agreement, because it had
06:24all the major powers, that is the UN Security Council members, as also Germany. So it was the P5 plus
06:321,
06:32if you remember. And at that time, there was years of technical work that preceded the JCPOA. And if I
06:42remember right, the document was almost 160 pages of technical compliance that was expected from
06:50Tehran. As of now, the current agreement with Iran, the MOU, is very vague. It only says that Iran has
06:58made a commitment that it would renounce nuclear weapons. Now, if you remember, Iran renouncing nuclear
07:05weapons goes back to 1970, when Iran joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. This was when the
07:13Shah was in power in Tehran. Since then, Iran has remained what is called as a signatory to the NPT,
07:20the Nuclear Non-Predicization Treaty, as an NNWS. Now, in 2015, Iran said the same thing that
07:30it will not acquire nuclear weapons, but it would retain the right to enrich uranium.
07:36This time around, the American interpretation is that it's a foolproof guarantee from Iran,
07:44which I would interpret then as a case of saying that has Iran agreed now that it will never leave
07:51the NPT? Because the NPT has a window which says that a member state can withdraw from the NPT if
07:59they
07:59feel that their core security is threatened. And this is the window that North Korea used.
08:05So, we have to see whether Iran is now agreeing to this particular binding clause that it will never
08:12leave the NPT. That would be an additionality. But I think these are the kinds of details that have to
08:18be spent out in the course of the next 60 days. And my current reading is that the JCPOA was
08:26a far more
08:27comprehensive document than what we are seeing just now. And it will be very good if the Americans can
08:33go back to the JCPOA as a template. But that's very unlikely because at each stage, President Donald
08:39Trump is trying to prove that the Obama deal was a bad deal for America and he is going to
08:45give the
08:46U.S. and the world a better deal. So, let us see what kind of a deal will be much.
08:51Yes, sir. That really helps. So, on to my next question. Also, one important detail here is that
08:59Israel has not signed this agreement. So, even though Israel was directly involved in the war alongside
09:05the U.S., so how should we read that? Like, does Israel absence from the deal make the overall peace
09:12less secure? Or is this something that we can hold without Israel's formal involvement?
09:18Israel is a very important player, you know, as far as this war is concerned.
09:23Because as we noted earlier, it was Israel that started this war. It was Israel that attacked Iran
09:29even in 2025. And much of Iran and Israel, if you look at the way in which these two countries
09:36have
09:37engaged with each other, it's a very long and complex kind of history ever since the 1979 revolution,
09:46when the Ayatollah and the clerical regime took power in Iran. From 1979 onward, it has been a very
09:54bitter kind of relationship between Israel and Iran. And Prime Minister Netanyahu has taken it upon
10:02himself to deal with the so-called Iran threat to Israel. And you can see that from last year to
10:09now,
10:10the starting of this war, the political objective of Prime Minister Netanyahu is also linked to his own
10:16personal
10:18fortune, as it were, in the context of Israeli politics and the fact that there are a number of
10:24criminal and corruption charges against him. So he has to continue to remain in power to be able to,
10:31in many ways, stay away from the hand of the law. There are a number of critics within Israel's
10:37domestic politics who feel that he has not handled this ever since we had the Hamas attack in the
10:43appropriate manner. And that the war that he has embarked upon is disproportionate. It has genocidal
10:49characteristics. And this has in many ways led to the isolation of Israel. So my reading is that
10:55Israel can still play the role of a spoiler, particularly by increasing the attacks on Lebanon.
11:02And we have to wait and see whether or not the United States and President Donald Trump
11:07will constrain Israel from attacking either Iran or Lebanon again. It's a question mark, I'm afraid.
11:18Interesting point, sir. Okay, let's move on to my next question. Sir, in the past country, in the past
11:24countries like Oman and Italy mediated talks between the US and Iran. This time it is Pakistan
11:31that has taken on that role, posting the talks and helping bring both sides to the table. So what does
11:38this change tell us about Pakistan's growing influence in the region? And why might Washington
11:43and Tehran would have chosen this role? Well, two questions here, you know, in terms of number one,
11:51Pakistan has played an important role and it must be acknowledged that they have been chosen or, you
11:57know, both Iran and the United States had agreed that Pakistan could play the role of the facilitator,
12:04the mediator, whichever way you want to describe it. But what we can now see is that the final agreement,
12:10the Islamabad MOU, memorandum of understanding, in the last stages, clearly other countries like Qatar
12:20and perhaps Saudi Arabia have also played an important role. And President Trump had acknowledged
12:26the role of Qatar in public. So to that extent, I think, while we acknowledge the role played by Pakistan,
12:33India, there have been other countries. And in many ways, I think the way this MOU has been made
12:40possible is a bit like a chain that many countries have been part of this chain. Some are not as
12:46visible.
12:47But I think it is important that we had this kind of an intervention, because clearly the United Nations
12:54Security Council was not able to play any kind of a meaningful role. Therefore, we needed other power.
13:01And that particular role has been played by Pakistan, by Qatar, by Saudi. And what is important is now
13:09to see what kind of a role, positive role these countries can play, because there are a lot of,
13:16you know, important details that have to be negotiated between Iran and the United States. And the devil is
13:24going to be in the detail, as they say. And therefore, you need a very credible mediator,
13:29a very credible facilitator. And this is something that Qatar has done in the past. Pakistan would be
13:35playing this role for the first time. And we have to see, given the very complex kind of political
13:41dynamic within Pakistan, where the field marshal, the army chief is really in many ways, the most powerful
13:48entity, while the civilian prime minister, Mr. Shabazz, would have to see what kind of a role he would play.
13:55And again, we have to wake and watch and hope that the facilitators, the mediators would be able to
14:02take the 14 point memorandum of understanding into a more robust peace agreement, whereby all the
14:12complex kind of areas, whether it is a nuclear issue, whether it's the unfreezing of Iranian assets,
14:18or it is the status of Lebanon and Hezbollah, many elements are there. And each of them would have
14:26to have a consensual agreement between US and Iran. And we have to hope again that Israel will not play
14:34the role of the role of a determined spoiler. Jiya?
14:39That's very insightful. So, now for my last question.
14:43So, India has long balanced its relationship with Iran, including oil trade and Chabahar Code project,
14:51while also growing closer to the US and Israel. So, with the state of hormones reopening and tensions easing,
14:58does India need to rethink its approach to West Asia? Or does the situation not really change much for
15:05India in the near future?
15:07No, actually, I would say Jiya, that this particular war, which began on February 28th,
15:14and the current window of ceasefire that we've had, is going to have a very significant impact
15:20impact for India in terms of both regional geopolitics and the relationship with the United States,
15:29which is the bilateral relationship. First of regional geopolitics, I think it's very clear
15:35that the relationship with Iran will be reviewed by both sides, because there is no denying the fact
15:41that before this war started, to remember on February 28th. Just prior to the beginning of this war,
15:49our Prime Minister, Mr. Modi, had visited Israel. And subsequently, there was a clear sense
15:56that India was leaning more towards the United States and Israel than Iran. And this was reflected in,
16:05I would say, many events that took place, including the sinking of the Iranian ship, IRIS Dina,
16:12when it was going back from Vishakhapatnam to Iran, and the fact that India was not able to condone
16:19at that time what had happened. And subsequently, I think some degree of disappointment within Iran,
16:27that India has not raised its voice, there was a suggestion that India should
16:34lead the BRICS countries in making a statement, but India chose not to. And that works. For different
16:41reasons, India wanted to ensure that its bilateral relationship with the United States remains stable.
16:48But towards the last phase, if you remember, India's relationship with the United States has also
16:54been very, very troubled. And in last week, when we had the United States
17:00using its missiles to attack merchant ships, and three Indian seafarers lost their lives,
17:07you can see the kind of anguish and dismay in India. And subsequently, the response of the United
17:13States was very, very, I would say, almost dismissive. Both the Secretary of State, Mr. Rubio,
17:20and the President Donald Trump, when this matter was raised, they brushed it off. So I think this has
17:27left a very deep kind of, I would say, impact as far as the bilateral relationship is concerned.
17:33So once India and Iran are able to resume normal relations, we have to see whether Iran will return
17:41to being a major supplier of oil hydrocarbons for India. Will India go back to Shabahar and make that a
17:50major investment? And will the nature or the texture of the Tehran-Delhi relationship be restored to
17:59what it was in previous years? That's a question mark again. And with the United States, I expect that
18:06as long as Mr. Trump is the President, there will be a lot of uncertainty. Now, we in India are
18:13making a
18:13lot of visuals that are emerging about Prime Minister Modi and President Donald Trump and the way in which
18:20he greeted him, welcomed him. But I would take that with a pinch of salt, because at the end of
18:26the day,
18:27the United States is becoming more and more transactional. The US has indicated that the Quad
18:34is no longer going to be as important as it was when President Biden was there.
18:40Just a few days ago, the United States changed the name of the command in Honolulu from the Indo-Pacific
18:47command to the Pacific command. So all these, I would say, are signals that New Delhi would have
18:53to study and review. And I think finally, one thought, you need to remember when the war started
18:59on February 28th, the United States used this force also in a very disproportionate way.
19:04And the first attack was on a girl's school, which needs to be recalled, that it was
19:14absolutely, I would say, unpardonable, mainly because the United States is the most powerful
19:23country in the world. It had intelligence. It was using AI. And from the early accounts that I saw,
19:31they did what is called as a double tap, meaning that they attacked it twice. So the death of those
19:38schoolgirls, I think, is something that becomes a visual image of the war. And now, at the very end,
19:45we can see that Iran has paid a very heavy price in terms of lives lost in terms of infrastructure
19:53and
19:53the devastation. The United States has paid a very heavy price in terms of the amount of military inventory
19:59and the cost it has incurred. The allies in the region have been attacked, whether it is UAE,
20:06Saudi and so on. And the question that will be asked is, to what end? What has been achieved?
20:13And this is going to impact, I think, India and its own relationship, both with the region
20:20and with the United States. And my sense is that we would have to look inwards and chart a course,
20:31whereby India would regain the kind of strategic autonomy that it had enjoyed in the past, which
20:38used to be called non-alignment. I think we have lost that particular profile and we need to reflect on
20:46it internally. Jiya? Yes, sir. Great. Thank you so much, sir, for your time and for breaking all of
20:54this down for us so clearly. Thank you for inviting me. Okay. Thank you so much, sir. With this, we
21:01come
21:02to an end with this conversation. Thank you to the audience for joining us today. We will see you in
21:07the
21:07next episode. Till then. Goodbye.
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