- há 22 horas
Trilogy of William Karrel about the history of the CIA.
This three-part documentary series takes an in-depth look at the anatomy and functioning of the CIA, its failures (the Bay of Pigs, the Watergate Scandal) and its chronic shortsightedness (inability to foresee the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, the fall of the USSR, or the 9/11 attacks).
The film identifies and dissects the CIA's true power base and gives us a rare inside glimpse at the inner workings of the US intelligence agency and American government.
This three-part documentary series takes an in-depth look at the anatomy and functioning of the CIA, its failures (the Bay of Pigs, the Watergate Scandal) and its chronic shortsightedness (inability to foresee the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, the fall of the USSR, or the 9/11 attacks).
The film identifies and dissects the CIA's true power base and gives us a rare inside glimpse at the inner workings of the US intelligence agency and American government.
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00:00A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:30A CIDADE NO BRASIL
01:00A CIDADE NO BRASIL
01:18A CIDADE NO BRASIL
01:25everlastin' regret
01:41cia headquarters are located in Langley Virginia 15 miles outside
01:45washington DC 16,000 people work inside this fortress the CIA is not required to
01:52revela-se budget, organização chart,
01:54figuras, número de emploiadores
01:56e salários, ou até mesmo o nome e
01:58job descripções.
02:00O overall budget é rumor
02:01para chegar wilde figuras.
02:03Nós sabemos que a CIA staff
02:05tem crescido de 35%
02:06na ação de 100,000
02:09no presente.
02:10O budget tem crescido de
02:11várias milhares a 28 bilhões.
02:14O CIA é o cargo
02:16de esporca de esporca
02:17fora do país, mas não pode
02:19operar na América do Sul.
02:21A domínio ainda reservado
02:22para a FBI.
02:24Truman fez a CIA
02:25diretamente responsável
02:26para o Presidente dos Estados Unidos.
02:29Mas a agência
02:30se deslizou do seu grasp,
02:31se tornando o único serviço
02:32autorizado para carregar
02:34a acção especial e operações
02:35e subversivas de fora.
02:37Quando a CIA foi criada,
02:39foi dado uma tarefa clara,集ando,
02:42correlando, coordenando
02:43e analisando inteligência,
02:45e intervenindo apenas quando o
02:46esforço diplomáticos falaram e
02:48a ação militar não foi recomendada.
02:52A CIA foi a
02:54criada de a guerra.
02:57A CIA foi a criada de
02:58uma função
02:59e uma função
03:00apenas.
03:01A única função
03:01de ter uma função
03:02e que foi
03:03a determinação
03:04quando,
03:06como,
03:06e onde a
03:07ação
03:07O que é que a União Soviética vai atacar os Estados Unidos, ou se.
03:11É tudo isso foi set up para.
03:12Foi set up para o Pearl Harbor,
03:15depois da falta de atacção,
03:18e a nossa missão,
03:19durante o 50 e 60 e 70 e 80,
03:22foi decidir, ou decidir,
03:24o que os planos e intenções foram da Política em Moscou.
03:27Nós também fizemos um erro em que
03:30nós escolhemos, early em que nós escolhemos nos espais
03:33no que nós chamamos de hardos.
03:35E então, todo o nosso inteligencia
03:37foi focada na União Soviética.
03:39A CIA, a U.S. inteligencia comunidade,
03:43as a whole,
03:44foi gastando
03:45entre 55 e 60%
03:48de nossos recursos
03:48na União Soviética.
03:50O nosso trabalho foi
03:51checkar os Estados Unidos
03:51em o terceiro mundo,
03:52em Angola,
03:54na Hora da África,
03:55na Congo,
03:56na Afeganistão,
03:58na Irã.
03:59Isso é um constante
04:01de uma guerra, se você quiser,
04:03que foi um tempo.
04:03para um tempo.
04:04É o nome do jogo.
04:06Eu acho que o nosso trabalho
04:06é saber o que as pessoas
04:08foram up para.
04:09E a melhor maneira de saber
04:11é para penetrar
04:12alguma organização.
04:14Put alguém em um lugar
04:15ou defecto alguém.
04:17E é o nome do jogo.
04:18É o nome do jogo.
04:18É o que nós fizemos.
04:19Nós começamos
04:20o nosso erroneos ways
04:21por importar
04:22as muitos nazis
04:23as nós pudimos
04:24para os Estados Unidos.
04:27In 1943,
04:28future CIA head
04:29Alan Dallas
04:30flew to Switzerland
04:31to open secret negotiations
04:32with several nazi leaders.
04:34Contact had already been made
04:36with General Reinhard Galen,
04:37head of Hitler's secret service,
04:39Otto von Boschwing,
04:40Eichmann's right-hand man,
04:41and Klaus Barbie.
04:43All these war criminals
04:44would be employed
04:44by the CIA
04:45at the close of the war.
04:47As a renowned
04:48Wall Street lawyer,
04:49Alan Dallas' biggest clients
04:50was the Standard Oil Group,
04:51one of only a handful
04:53of companies
04:53that kept on doing business
04:54with the Nazis
04:55during the war.
04:57And therefore,
04:58America literally
04:59infected itself
05:01with Nazis
05:02immediately after World War II
05:05because that was the price
05:06it was willing to pay
05:07for their brains.
05:08That was the first mistake.
05:11The second mistake
05:12over time
05:14has been to believe
05:15that we could interfere
05:17in the affairs of others
05:18and literally topple governments
05:21by putting our money
05:23and our influence
05:23behind selected groups.
05:26In 1953,
05:27at the height of the Cold War,
05:29Alan Dallas is named
05:29Director of Central Intelligence.
05:31The number of special
05:32and secret operations
05:33grows steadily
05:34after Dallas
05:35takes over the CIA.
05:36If you go back to 1947
05:38and take it all the way
05:40through Guatemala,
05:43Hungary,
05:45Berlin,
05:46Vietnam,
05:48Chile,
05:48all the operations
05:50over the years,
05:52the same kind of behavior
05:53is repeated again
05:54and again and again.
05:55The CIA has mounted
05:56a number of covert operations.
05:59One of the reasons
06:00the CIA went into covert operations
06:02was because
06:02it was something
06:03no one else was doing
06:05and so there was
06:06no bureaucratic competition
06:07over it.
06:08They also went into
06:09these operations
06:10because the presidents
06:12found that they could
06:13use this tool
06:14secretly
06:15without having to explain
06:17to the American people
06:18what they were doing.
06:19It's probably changed
06:20a fair amount
06:21over the years.
06:22If you were to go back
06:24to the Eisenhower period
06:26or even the early
06:28Kennedy period,
06:29there really was
06:30much more discipline
06:31and much more secrecy.
06:33And this, of course,
06:34these were the days
06:35when the CIA
06:35was really doing things
06:36like Iran,
06:38like Guatemala,
06:39and so forth.
06:40You didn't actually hear
06:41much in this country
06:42about those operations
06:43in those days
06:44because people
06:45didn't talk about them.
06:46In May 1953,
06:48Alan Dallas draws up
06:49Operation Ajax,
06:50the first in a long
06:51string of coups
06:52organized entirely
06:53by the CIA.
06:54In Tehran,
06:56Iranian Prime Minister
06:57Mossadegh
06:57has decided to privatize
06:59the Anglo-Iranian
07:00Oil Company.
07:01British authorities
07:02launch an international
07:03embargo against Iran,
07:04plunging the country
07:05into chaos.
07:06But British and American
07:08oil companies
07:08deem the measure
07:09insufficient
07:10and flee Iran.
07:12They push the British
07:13Prime Minister
07:13to ask President
07:14Eisenhower
07:15to help him
07:15get rid of Mossadegh.
07:17Alan Dallas
07:18puts together
07:18an operation
07:19to ooze Mossadegh
07:20and restore
07:21the young Shah
07:21to power.
07:23Shah Rizad Pahlavi
07:24will rule the country
07:25until he in turn
07:26is outstead
07:2725 years later.
07:34It was not a big
07:36super planned coup.
07:37It was a big
07:38crazy thing
07:39that happened.
07:40You know who was
07:40behind that?
07:41It was British Petroleum.
07:44British Petroleum.
07:46The Prime Minister
07:47of Britain
07:47came to Eisenhower
07:48and said
07:48there's a threat
07:50here of taking
07:51over the Iranian
07:52oil fields.
07:53We need it
07:53just as you need
07:54Saudi Arabia.
07:55So the Americans
07:56went along.
07:57McMillan was
07:58the Prime Minister
07:59at the time
08:00and he brought
08:01a lot of pressure
08:02to bear
08:03on Eisenhower
08:04and Americans
08:06and so forth
08:07to do something
08:09about the situation
08:10there.
08:12When the British
08:12approached
08:14the Eisenhower
08:15administration
08:16the argument
08:17that convinced
08:19Eisenhower
08:19to say yes
08:20was not that
08:21we'll give you
08:22some of the Iranian
08:23oil when it's over
08:24it's that Mossadegh
08:25are communists
08:26and the Soviet Union
08:28is going to
08:28win Iran
08:30the way the communists
08:32won China
08:33and you
08:34President Eisenhower
08:36don't want to be
08:36the president
08:37who has to answer
08:38the question
08:38who lost Iran.
08:40There was a very
08:40formal procedure
08:42on the Mossadegh
08:42affair.
08:43This was an
08:44organized plan.
08:46Mossadegh
08:47is a bad leader.
08:48He's weak.
08:49The communists
08:50are strong.
08:51He's also irrational.
08:52The Shah's
08:53also weak.
08:54He's not going
08:55to do anything
08:55about it.
08:55We have to intervene
08:57to save the country
08:58from being taken
08:59over by the Soviets.
09:00Just that blunt.
09:02Mossadegh
09:02was a communist.
09:03I have no doubt
09:04he was.
09:05I thought it was
09:06a good idea.
09:07If we had not
09:09got rid of Mossadegh
09:12you might have had
09:13a very different
09:14kind of government.
09:16Socialists,
09:17communists,
09:18God knows what.
09:19We can't now
09:20let Iran fall
09:22but at the same time
09:23we're not going
09:24to fight a war
09:25like Korea in Iran.
09:26We're not prepared
09:27to do that.
09:28So the cheap way
09:29to do it
09:29is covert operations.
09:31CIA will be
09:32more active
09:32and so Alan Dulles
09:34became the director
09:35of CIA
09:36with the mandate
09:37to be active.
09:38And he said
09:39the inexpensive way
09:40to be a great power
09:41is to topple governments
09:42with the CIA.
09:43So this was
09:43a huge success.
09:45That's why they thought
09:45well, Guatemala
09:46and other places
09:48do it this way.
09:50You know,
09:50it's easier.
09:51And the question
09:51of whether it's
09:52moral or immoral.
09:55In June 1954,
09:57Guatemala's new
09:58president,
09:58Jacobo Arbenz Guzman,
10:00decides to give
10:01the country's
10:01poorest farmers
10:02a few acres of land
10:03held by the United Fruit Company,
10:05an American multinational.
10:07He also creates
10:08a tax on exports.
10:10Guatemala is
10:10the Caribbean's
10:11leading producer
10:12of bananas
10:12and tropical fruits,
10:14the country's
10:14unique resource.
10:15But virtually
10:16all the nation's lands,
10:18its entire economy,
10:19is in the hands
10:19of United Fruit.
10:23When Guatemala
10:24very reasonably
10:24wanted to tax
10:25the bananas,
10:28the United Fruit Company
10:29asked the U.S. government
10:31to go in
10:31and basically
10:33bankrupt Guatemala.
10:34They were very close
10:36to people
10:36in the White House
10:37and the Pentagon
10:38and all over
10:39the government.
10:40They had
10:40an enormous influence
10:42over the U.S. government
10:43and they were able
10:44to call
10:47for the overthrow
10:48of Arbenz.
10:49They were
10:50leaning leftward
10:51toward communism
10:52and that was
10:52something that
10:53we wanted to resist.
10:54There were two things
10:55involved,
10:55United Fruit
10:56and communism.
10:57And Jacoba Arbenz
10:58came down
10:59on the wrong side of it.
11:01A full-scale coup
11:02is drawn up
11:03during the meeting
11:03between President Eisenhower,
11:05Alan Dallas,
11:06and Dallas' brother
11:06John Foster,
11:08head of the U.S. State Department.
11:09The Dallas brothers,
11:10who once ran
11:11Wall Street's
11:12leading law practice,
11:13now hold
11:13the two most important posts
11:15in the Eisenhower administration,
11:17foreign affairs
11:17and CIA operations.
11:19Alan Dallas,
11:20head of the CIA,
11:22also sits on the board
11:22of United Fruit.
11:26Two brothers,
11:28one run CIA,
11:29one run the State Department,
11:31and their family law firm
11:33is involved
11:34with United Fruit
11:35in Central America.
11:36Alan Dallas
11:37was running
11:37his own private CIA
11:38out of Wall Street,
11:39out of his offices
11:40at number 44
11:41Wall Street.
11:43You've got to
11:44understand something.
11:45It's spy business.
11:47It's about helping
11:49American business overseas.
11:51Presidents found
11:52they could earn money
11:53from corporations
11:54by using the CIA
11:56as enforcers.
11:58The CIA risks power
12:00from Arbans,
12:00replacing him
12:01with a military janta
12:02led by General Castillo Armas.
12:04The General's first move
12:06is to quash
12:06the land reform program,
12:08which threatens
12:08the financial interests
12:09of United Fruit
12:10and the United States.
12:13It was probably
12:14one of the worst things
12:16the CIA
12:17or the U.S. government
12:17has ever done.
12:19The United States government
12:20and the CIA
12:20are responsible
12:21for genocide
12:22in Guatemala
12:23because they put
12:25in power people
12:25so as to avoid
12:28a small tax
12:29on bananas.
12:30They put in place
12:31a military dictatorship
12:33which for the next
12:3440 years or so
12:37killed hundreds
12:39of thousands
12:39of people
12:40in Guatemala.
12:41Everybody likes
12:42to think
12:42that that was CIA
12:43that did a very
12:45delicate operation
12:46against Arbans.
12:48Okay.
12:49Or that they did
12:50a very well-planned
12:51operation
12:52against Mosadek.
12:53Those were two
12:55lucky things
12:56that happened.
12:57The U.S.
12:58treats the world
12:59as if it was
13:00the godfather.
13:02They're very arrogant
13:04in their foreign policy.
13:06In 1960
13:06Congo claims
13:07independence
13:08from Belgium.
13:09Leftist leader
13:09Petrus Lumumba
13:10becomes prime minister.
13:11The United States
13:13has its eye
13:13on the country's
13:14vast mineral resources.
13:15Lumumba will stay
13:16in office
13:16just two short months.
13:18This was a terrible
13:19example to set
13:20for the rest of Africa.
13:22It was shocking.
13:23And he sealed
13:25his fate
13:25at that moment.
13:27He had to be overthrown.
13:29There was a meeting
13:29about the 18th of August
13:30of 1960
13:33and Eisenhower
13:34gave an indication
13:36that it would be nice
13:38to have Lumumba
13:38out of the way.
13:39I was arguing
13:40inside the embassy
13:42that we could
13:43oust Lumumba
13:44as prime minister.
13:46But Alan Dulles
13:47interpreted
13:47the Security Council
13:48meeting
13:50to undertake
13:51a plot
13:52against Lumumba
13:52which they did.
13:53There were instructions
13:54to try and do
13:56away with Lumumba
13:57and the poison toothpaste
14:00was sent
14:01to Larry Devlin
14:02the station chief
14:03and he refused
14:04to deliver it.
14:04Our officers
14:05were not about
14:06to get involved
14:07in an assassination.
14:09So I was arguing
14:09for a political
14:12solution.
14:13But there were those
14:14I guess in Washington
14:15who felt
14:16that other measures
14:18were more appropriate.
14:20Alan Dulles
14:21ordered Lumumba's
14:22assassination.
14:23In 1975
14:25Congress in an inquiry
14:26it concluded
14:27that President Eisenhower
14:28had approved
14:28the operation.
14:30General Mobutu
14:31who had seized power
14:32had Lumumba
14:33shot in the head
14:34and dumped
14:34in the vat of acid.
14:37Frank Kaluchi
14:38future CIA
14:39deputy director
14:40then U.S.
14:41defense secretary
14:41was posted
14:42in Congo
14:43during the coup.
14:46They accused me
14:48of being responsible
14:50for the assassination
14:51of Lumumba.
14:52It's all absurd
14:53of course
14:54the idea
14:54that a very junior
14:56foreign service officer
14:58would sanction
14:59the assassination
15:00of a prime minister
15:01is silly
15:02on the face of it.
15:03He escaped
15:04from prison
15:05and he was in hiding
15:06and the CIA
15:07helped to find him
15:08and then he was
15:09turned over
15:10to one of his main
15:14enemies
15:15in the Congo
15:16and he was killed.
15:17CIA was certainly
15:18a component in that.
15:19What you have to talk
15:21about
15:21is the way
15:23America
15:23was run
15:24in those days.
15:25The CIA
15:26was asked
15:26to choose
15:27dictators
15:27and help them
15:30rule over
15:31the people.
15:32There are certainly
15:33incidences
15:34whether they're
15:35in Guatemala
15:35in the 50s
15:37or the Shah
15:37or you know
15:38early on
15:39where
15:41people could argue
15:42that CIA involvement
15:43was wrong.
15:45Well whether
15:45it was right
15:46or wrong
15:47that's a different
15:47matter
15:48but that's what
15:49the CIA is for
15:50to conduct
15:51clandestine operations.
15:53There was an
15:54American belief
15:55or illusion
15:56back there
15:57in the 1950s
15:58at the time
15:59of the agency's
16:02and involvement
16:03in Iran
16:05and subsequently
16:06in Central America
16:09that the CIA
16:14could accomplish
16:15anything
16:16on the
16:16international scene.
16:17This mythology
16:19was encouraged
16:20by people
16:21in the agency.
16:23And this gave
16:24the CIA
16:25an aura
16:25of power.
16:28That was a
16:28problem
16:29that after a while
16:32they began
16:33to believe
16:33the own myth.
16:35They kept
16:35their position.
16:37They kept
16:37their money.
16:38They kept
16:39their power
16:39by being able
16:40to tell the
16:40president of the
16:41United States
16:41one thing.
16:43In the end
16:44if you're really
16:45in trouble
16:46we can come in
16:47and overthrow
16:48the government.
16:49We can come in
16:50and replace
16:50the government.
16:51We can give
16:51you that power.
16:52The biggest
16:53problem with that
16:54is a lot
16:55of people
16:56at CIA
16:56believed it.
16:58They believed
16:59they were that
16:59good.
17:00So this thing
17:01this guy
17:02Castro
17:02I mean
17:03this ought
17:04to be easy
17:04enough.
17:05We thought
17:05we could
17:06just treat
17:06Cuba
17:06like a
17:07banana republic
17:08and Cuba
17:09turned out
17:10to be a
17:10little bit
17:10stronger
17:11and a
17:11little bit
17:11smarter
17:12than the
17:13American
17:13bureaucrats
17:13expected.
17:26In Cuba
17:27after running
17:27dictator
17:28Batista
17:28out of the
17:29country
17:29Fidel Castro
17:30nationalizes
17:31sugar plantations
17:32owned by
17:32American
17:33companies.
17:34Tensions
17:34immediately
17:35mount.
17:36The U.S.
17:36halts all
17:37loans to Cuba
17:38and breaks
17:38off diplomatic
17:39ties.
17:40Cuba strikes
17:41a trade
17:41agreement
17:41with the
17:42USSR.
17:43Castro
17:43defies
17:44Washington
17:44openly
17:45courting
17:45Soviet
17:45leader
17:46Nikita
17:46Khrushchev.
17:48He was
17:49setting a
17:49very bad
17:49example
17:50for Latin
17:51America.
17:52I mean
17:53the idea
17:53of this
17:54small island
17:56standing up
17:57to Washington
17:58and saying
17:59there will
18:00no longer
18:00be a
18:01client
18:01state
18:02this was
18:03shocking.
18:05The day
18:05Eisenhower
18:06handed over
18:06power to
18:07John Kennedy
18:07he also
18:08gave him
18:09a file
18:09called
18:09the
18:09Bay of
18:10Pigs.
18:11The plot
18:11was hatched
18:12by Alan
18:12Dallas
18:13and Richard
18:13Nixon
18:14Eisenhower's
18:15vice
18:15president
18:15and Kennedy's
18:16opponent
18:16in the
18:171960
18:17presidential
18:18race.
18:19Kennedy
18:19inherited
18:20a plan
18:20drawn up
18:21by the
18:21CIA
18:21to
18:22invade
18:22Cuba
18:22and
18:23used
18:23Castro
18:23by
18:23landing
18:24at
18:24the
18:24Bay
18:24of
18:24Pigs.
18:27He
18:27was
18:27looking for
18:28ideas
18:29and one
18:30of the
18:30ideas he
18:31approved
18:31was the
18:32Bay of
18:32Pigs
18:32but it
18:32turned out
18:33to be
18:33the
18:33Bay of
18:33Pigs.
18:34Kennedy
18:35comes
18:35just barely
18:36takes
18:37office
18:38and goes
18:39through
18:39his
18:39inauguration
18:40he's
18:41briefed
18:41on
18:41the
18:41Bay
18:41of
18:42Pigs
18:42he
18:43doesn't
18:43like
18:43it
18:44but he
18:44goes
18:44with
18:44it
18:45and it
18:45turns out
18:46to be
18:46a
18:46disaster.
18:49The
18:50CIA
18:50sent
18:511500
18:51inexperienced
18:52Cuban
18:52exiles
18:53on a
18:53suicide
18:54mission
18:54hoping
18:55Kennedy
18:55would
18:56cave
18:56in
18:56and
18:57send
18:57American
18:57air
18:57power
18:58to
18:58back
18:58them
18:58up
19:00but
19:00Kennedy
19:00refused
19:01and the
19:02operation
19:02failed
19:03the CIA
19:03laid the
19:04entire
19:04blame
19:04for
19:05the
19:05Bay
19:05of
19:05Pigs
19:05debacle
19:06on
19:06his
19:06shoulders
19:14and
19:14the
19:14was
19:15a
19:15failure
19:16because
19:16it
19:17was
19:17badly
19:17run
19:18period.
19:19I
19:19think
19:19he
19:20went
19:20along
19:20with it
19:20because
19:21he
19:21didn't
19:21have
19:21any
19:21better
19:22ideas
19:22and
19:23his
19:23staff
19:23didn't
19:24have
19:24any
19:24better
19:24ideas
19:25so
19:26he
19:26kept
19:27on
19:27what
19:27he
19:27had.
19:28It
19:28was
19:28a
19:28poorly
19:29planned
19:30military
19:31operation
19:32and
19:32the
19:33intelligence
19:33supporting
19:34it
19:34was
19:35not
19:35good.
19:35The
19:36idea
19:36that
19:36a
19:36small
19:36group
19:37of
19:37people
19:37could
19:37come
19:38in
19:38and
19:38somehow
19:38they
19:39could
19:39overthrow
19:39what
19:40a
19:41regime
19:43underestimated
19:44the popularity
19:44of Castro
19:45in a
19:46significant
19:46way.
19:47They
19:47expected
19:47the
19:48Cubans
19:48to
19:50rally
19:50to
19:50our
19:51side
19:51and
19:51they
19:52did
19:52not
19:53and
19:54they
19:54just
19:54didn't
19:55have
19:55the
19:55right
19:56military
19:57plan
19:57and
19:58forces
19:58to
19:59do
19:59the
19:59job.
19:59The
20:00CIA
20:00had
20:01said
20:01it
20:02could
20:02be
20:02done
20:02if
20:03the
20:03United
20:04States
20:04was
20:04willing
20:04to
20:05support
20:05the
20:06insurgents
20:06militarily
20:07and at
20:08the last
20:08moment
20:09the
20:09administration
20:10decided
20:10not to
20:11provide
20:12military
20:13support
20:13for the
20:14Bay of
20:14Pigs
20:14insurgents
20:15and it
20:17failed.
20:17We were
20:18angry about
20:18the Bay of
20:19Pigs
20:19because it
20:20failed and
20:21because we
20:21were really
20:22to a
20:22considerable
20:23degree
20:24responsible
20:24for the
20:25operation
20:26and there
20:27certainly
20:27would have
20:27been
20:28people
20:28who were
20:29irritated
20:29and angry
20:30at the
20:30president.
20:30They
20:31hated
20:31Kennedy
20:32because he
20:32did not
20:33support the
20:34Bay of
20:34Pigs
20:34enough
20:35in their
20:35opinion
20:36especially
20:37with air
20:38power.
20:39You can't
20:39say CIA
20:40liked or
20:41disliked
20:42something.
20:42It's got
20:43to be
20:43certain
20:44people
20:44or certain
20:44groups
20:45that might
20:46not have
20:46and I'm
20:47sure there
20:47were people
20:48case
20:48officers
20:48and division
20:49chiefs
20:49and other
20:50senior
20:50officers
20:51who probably
20:52didn't like
20:53the president
20:53and why
20:55not?
20:55He was
20:56doing things
20:56that they
20:56didn't like
20:57so they
20:57didn't like
20:58him.
20:58Just month
20:59after taking
20:59over the
21:00White House
21:00John Kennedy
21:01and younger
21:01brother Robert
21:02U.S.
21:03Attorney General
21:03give the CIA
21:04full power
21:05to get rid
21:05of Fidel
21:06Castro.
21:07Sam Halpern
21:08is put in
21:08charge
21:08Operation
21:09Mongoose.
21:10Between
21:10the failed
21:11landing
21:11at the
21:11Bay of
21:12Pigs
21:12in 1961
21:13and John
21:14Kennedy's
21:14assassination
21:15two years
21:15later
21:16Castro
21:16escapes
21:17eight
21:17assassination
21:17attempts
21:18all organized
21:19by the
21:19CIA.
21:20Kennedy
21:21asked for
21:21options
21:22on Cuba
21:23and
21:25the
21:26Joint Chiefs
21:27of Staff
21:27actually proposed
21:28to kill
21:29Americans
21:30in a covert
21:31operation
21:32that would
21:32be made
21:33to appear
21:33to be
21:34a Cuban
21:34attack
21:34on U.S.
21:35soil
21:35as an
21:36excuse
21:37for going
21:37to war
21:37against
21:38Cuba
21:39and this
21:40was
21:40properly
21:41refused.
21:42The CIA
21:43at that
21:44time
21:44was trying
21:44to find
21:45ways
21:45to deal
21:46with
21:46Castro
21:47and
21:47whether
21:47it was
21:48eight
21:48or
21:4880
21:49attempts
21:49to
21:50assassinate
21:52Castro
21:52or
21:53blow up
21:53his cigar
21:54or something
21:55like that.
21:55I mean
21:56ridiculous
21:56things
21:56when
21:57planting
22:01itching
22:01powder
22:02in his
22:02beard
22:02you know
22:03these
22:04were
22:05very
22:05feckless
22:05kinds
22:06of
22:06things
22:06they
22:07were
22:07thinking
22:07about
22:08in order
22:09to try
22:09to weaken
22:10his position.
22:11I think
22:11there were
22:1220 or 30
22:12attempts
22:14against
22:15Castro
22:15I think
22:15eight
22:16sounds a little
22:16better
22:16I mean
22:1625
22:17nobody's
22:18that lucky
22:18I mean
22:19somebody's
22:20sooner or
22:21later
22:21but
22:22Kennedy
22:23was
22:24obsessed
22:24with Castro
22:25Robert Kennedy
22:26I'm not
22:27sure
22:27which
22:27one
22:27was
22:28the
22:29pusher
22:29more
22:29than
22:29anybody
22:30else
22:30we
22:31dealt
22:31mostly
22:32with
22:32Bobby
22:33rather
22:33than
22:34with
22:35Jack
22:35John F.
22:36Kennedy
22:36knew
22:37about
22:37everything
22:38Robert Kennedy
22:39knew
22:39about
22:40everything
22:40I could
22:41never
22:41figure
22:41out
22:42what
22:42made
22:42them
22:43so
22:43anti-Cuba
22:44the only
22:45thing
22:46I could
22:46think
22:46of
22:46was
22:47their
22:47own
22:48feelings
22:49their
22:49own
22:50egotism
22:53he
22:53was
22:53a
22:54problem
22:54they
22:54couldn't
22:54solve
22:55and
22:56they
22:56never
22:56ran
22:56up
22:57against
22:57a
22:57problem
22:58they
22:58couldn't
22:58solve
22:59they
22:59were
22:59always
23:00on top
23:00of
23:00everything
23:01and
23:01this
23:02one
23:02they
23:02were
23:02not
23:03and
23:03there
23:03was
23:03no
23:04way
23:04they
23:04were
23:04going
23:04to
23:04be
23:05on
23:05top
23:05of
23:05it
23:06so
23:06everybody
23:06along
23:07the
23:07way
23:07including
23:08the
23:08entire
23:08US
23:08government
23:10had
23:10to
23:10help
23:10them
23:11get
23:11over
23:11this
23:11problem
23:12John
23:12Kennedy
23:13is
23:13having
23:13a
23:13hard
23:13time
23:14keeping
23:14Alan
23:14Dallas
23:14and
23:21becomes
23:21increasingly
23:22intractable
23:23he
23:23launches
23:24a
23:24propaganda
23:24campaign
23:25against
23:25Kennedy
23:25blaming
23:26him
23:26for
23:26all
23:27the
23:27CIA's
23:27failures
23:28since
23:28the
23:28bungled
23:29Bay of
23:29Pigs
23:29operation
23:30and
23:30he's
23:31absolutely
23:32beside
23:32himself
23:32he
23:33wishes
23:33he
23:33could
23:33tear
23:34the
23:34CIA
23:34down
23:35he
23:35was
23:35so
23:35angry
23:36a
23:36month
23:36before
23:37he
23:37died
23:37he
23:38said
23:38I
23:38wanted
23:39to
23:39take
23:39the
23:39CIA
23:40and
23:40take
23:40it
23:40apart
23:40board
23:41by
23:41board
23:42and
23:42scatter
23:43it
23:43to
23:43the
23:43winds
23:44did
23:44you
23:44ever
23:45see
23:45any
23:45pieces
23:45of
23:45CIA
23:47I
23:47have
23:48never
23:48seen
23:48any
23:48pieces
23:48of
23:49CIA
23:49anywhere
23:51CIA
23:51has
23:52never
23:52been
23:52smashed
23:53to
23:53pieces
23:53by
23:53anybody
23:54but
23:54the
23:54agency
23:55attempted
23:56to
23:56stay
23:56out
23:57of
23:57the
23:57limelight
23:58to
23:58a
23:58considerable
23:59extent
23:59it
24:00began
24:00under
24:00Kennedy
24:01Bob
24:02McNamara
24:03was
24:03his
24:04agent
24:04for
24:04doing
24:05it
24:05he
24:05decided
24:06to
24:06remove
24:06them
24:07and
24:07replace
24:07them
24:07with
24:08men
24:08of
24:08the
24:08left
24:08that's
24:09what
24:09Kennedy
24:10did
24:10to
24:10the
24:11CIA
24:11I
24:12watched
24:12it
24:12I
24:12was
24:13there
24:15John
24:15Kennedy
24:16decides
24:16to
24:16curtail
24:17the
24:17CIA's
24:17power
24:17and
24:18get
24:18rid
24:18of
24:18its
24:18powerful
24:19chief
24:19Alan
24:19Dallas
24:20who
24:20is
24:20forced
24:21to
24:21resign
24:22Kennedy
24:22flanked
24:23by
24:23Dallas
24:23names
24:24a
24:24discreet
24:24but
24:25effective
24:25little
24:25man
24:25named
24:26John
24:26McCone
24:26as
24:27new
24:27CIA
24:27director
24:28Alan
24:29Dallas
24:29is
24:29furious
24:30about
24:30what
24:30he
24:30calls
24:31his
24:31firing
24:31he
24:32embodied
24:32the
24:33CIA
24:33for
24:3310
24:33years
24:34the
24:34agency
24:34was
24:35his
24:35creation
24:48the
24:48day
24:48after
24:49John
24:49Kennedy
24:49was
24:49killed
24:50his
24:50brother
24:50Bobby
24:51rushes
24:51to
24:51see
24:51new
24:52CIA
24:52director
24:52John
24:53McCone
24:53with a
24:54single
24:54question
24:54did
24:55the
24:55CIA
24:55kill
24:55my
24:56brother
24:57the
24:57question
24:58came
24:59up
25:00after
25:01the
25:01assassination
25:02in
25:02November
25:0363
25:03of
25:04the
25:04president
25:08and
25:08I
25:08yes
25:09Bobby
25:10Kennedy
25:10asked
25:11John
25:11McCone
25:11is there
25:13anything
25:13there
25:14his
25:15brother
25:15has
25:15got
25:15a
25:15right
25:15to
25:15ask
25:15those
25:16questions
25:17it's
25:18nothing
25:18unusual
25:19why
25:20shouldn't
25:20he
25:20he
25:21should
25:21ask
25:21questions
25:22he
25:23didn't
25:23know
25:23he
25:24wanted
25:24to
25:24be
25:24sure
25:25and
25:25that's
25:25a
25:25human
25:26question
25:27for
25:27one
25:28man
25:28to
25:28ask
25:28did
25:29you
25:29kill
25:29my
25:29brother
25:31why
25:31not
25:32McCone
25:33would
25:33never
25:34admit
25:34to
25:35that
25:35no
25:35head
25:36of
25:36the
25:36CIA
25:37is
25:37going
25:37to
25:37admit
25:38that
25:38there
25:39was
25:39an
25:39involvement
25:39with
25:40the
25:40assassination
25:40of
25:41a
25:41president
25:42why
25:42would
25:42a CIA
25:43chief
25:43want to
25:45kill
25:45a
25:45president
25:46if
25:47president
25:47fires
25:47him
25:48then
25:48the guy
25:50doesn't
25:51have
25:51any
25:51tools
25:51anyway
25:51to
25:52kill
25:52a
25:52president
25:53what
25:54would
25:54be
25:54the
25:54purpose
25:56to
25:56show
25:56he
25:56didn't
25:57like
25:57the
25:57president
25:57the
25:58president
25:58knows
25:59that
25:59by
25:59now
26:03new
26:04American
26:04president
26:05Lyndon
26:05Johnson
26:05charges
26:06the
26:06Warren
26:06commission
26:07with
26:07getting
26:07to
26:07the
26:07bottom
26:08of
26:08the
26:08Kennedy
26:08assassination
26:09oddly
26:10enough
26:10the
26:11investigation
26:11is handed
26:12to
26:12Allen
26:12Dallas
26:12even
26:13though
26:13the
26:13two
26:13hated
26:14each
26:14other
26:14and
26:15Kennedy
26:15had
26:15stripped
26:15him
26:15of his
26:16post
26:16Dallas
26:17has
26:17his
26:17visit
26:18to
26:18Dallas
26:18filmed
26:19Charles
26:19Cabell
26:20Dallas
26:21deputy
26:21director
26:21at
26:22the
26:22CIA
26:22and
26:22brother
26:23of
26:23mayor
26:23of
26:23Dallas
26:24assists
26:24in
26:25the
26:25investigation
26:25a
26:26few
26:26months
26:26later
26:27Judge
26:27Warren
26:28releases
26:28his
26:28conclusions
26:29in
26:29the
26:29presence
26:29of
26:30Lyndon
26:30Johnson
26:30there
26:31was
26:31no
26:31assassination
26:32plot
26:32Lee
26:33Harvey
26:33Oswald
26:34acted
26:34alone
26:42Allen
26:42Dulles
26:43did
26:43his
26:43best
26:44to
26:44sabotage
26:45the
26:45Warren
26:45commission
26:46I
26:46think
26:46if
26:47you
26:47don't
26:47want
26:47anything
26:48to
26:48come
26:48out
26:48of
26:48the
26:49commission
26:49then
26:49it's
26:49not
26:50strange
26:50you
26:51know
26:51it's
26:51it's
26:53I
26:53think
26:53it was
26:54done
26:54on
26:54purpose
26:54my
26:55instructions
26:55to
26:56the
26:56CIA
26:56were
26:57to
26:57make
26:57all
26:57the
26:57information
26:58available
26:59the
27:00CIA
27:00virtually
27:01emptied
27:01its
27:01files
27:02on
27:03the
27:03Kennedy
27:03assassination
27:04and
27:05there
27:05was
27:06absolutely
27:06no
27:06evidence
27:07of
27:07any
27:07conspiracy
27:08certainly
27:08no
27:09evidence
27:09that
27:09the
27:09CIA
27:10was
27:10ever
27:11involved
27:11I
27:12couldn't
27:12imagine
27:12the CIA
27:13would
27:13be
27:14involved
27:14in
27:14the
27:14assassination
27:15of
27:15a
27:15U.S.
27:16president
27:16that's
27:16beyond
27:18the
27:18wildest
27:19imagination
27:20you
27:20know
27:20people
27:21have
27:21made
27:21a
27:21cult
27:22out
27:22of
27:22this
27:23what
27:24happened
27:26I
27:26haven't
27:27seen
27:27anything
27:28to the
27:29contrary
27:29that I
27:30found
27:30persuasive
27:31the
27:31house of
27:32representatives
27:33ran
27:33on a
27:34six
27:34million
27:35dollar
27:35investigation
27:37and just
27:38as I
27:38came
27:38to the
27:39FBI
27:39they gave
27:40me a
27:40tape
27:41a
27:42tape
27:42that was
27:43the
27:43committee
27:44gave
27:44me a
27:44tape
27:44to
27:45suggest
27:45that
27:45there
27:46was
27:46a
27:47second
27:47shooter
27:47from
27:48the
27:49hill
27:49there
27:50the
27:50Knoll
27:50grassy
27:51Knoll
27:51it was
27:52interesting
27:52because
27:52when I
27:53first
27:53came into
27:54the CIA
27:54I
27:55found
27:55out
27:55of
27:55a
27:55Frenchman
27:56who
27:57was
27:58claimed
27:58to know
27:59about
27:59the
27:59Kennedy
27:59assassination
28:01and
28:03I
28:03can't
28:03describe
28:04him
28:04any
28:04more
28:04than
28:04that
28:05but
28:05he
28:05provided
28:05a lot
28:06of
28:06detail
28:08and
28:09so
28:10I
28:10wanted
28:10to
28:10read
28:11it
28:11I
28:11was
28:11curious
28:11just
28:12curious
28:12it
28:12was
28:12pure
28:14personal
28:14curiosity
28:16so I
28:16asked
28:17for the
28:17file
28:18and
28:18they
28:18told me
28:19it was
28:19very
28:20very
28:20sensitive
28:20and it
28:21was
28:21called
28:21what's
28:21black
28:22tape
28:22that
28:22they
28:22put
28:22black
28:23tape
28:23around
28:23it
28:23and
28:24all
28:24these
28:24seals
28:25so
28:25no
28:25one
28:25can
28:25get
28:25it
28:27so
28:28what I
28:29did
28:29was
28:29I
28:29waited
28:30for
28:30a
28:30Saturday
28:30when
28:31I
28:31was
28:31on
28:31duty
28:32and
28:32took
28:32a
28:32request
28:33to
28:33get
28:33the
28:33file
28:34and
28:34only
28:34the
28:34director
28:35of
28:35operations
28:35and the
28:36director
28:36could
28:36read
28:36it
28:36and
28:37I
28:37stuck
28:37it
28:38between
28:38a bunch
28:38of
28:38other
28:38requests
28:39and I
28:39knew
28:40he
28:40was
28:40very
28:40busy
28:40so
28:41I
28:41went
28:41to
28:41the
28:41director
28:41of
28:42operations
28:42office
28:43put
28:43it
28:44on
28:44his
28:44desk
28:45and
28:45he
28:45very
28:45quickly
28:45signed
28:45them
28:46all
28:46so
28:46I
28:47got
28:47the
28:47permission
28:47to
28:47get
28:48this
28:48I
28:49changed
28:49the
28:49address
28:49where
28:50it
28:50should
28:50go
28:50and
28:50I
28:50sent
28:51it
28:51down
28:51to
28:51files
28:52it
28:53was
28:53like
28:5312
28:53volumes
28:54it
28:54the
28:55Kennedy
28:55assassination
28:56and
28:57it
28:57came
28:57back
28:57said
28:58sorry
28:58file
28:58lost
29:00disappeared
29:04I
29:05cannot
29:05tell you
29:06how many
29:06conspiracy
29:07theories
29:07I
29:08have
29:08dealt
29:08with
29:08over
29:08the
29:09decades
29:11and
29:12the
29:12one
29:12thing
29:13I
29:13know
29:13is
29:13that
29:15conspiracy
29:15theories
29:16in
29:16Washington
29:17don't
29:17hold
29:18water
29:19because
29:19nobody
29:20can
29:20keep
29:20a
29:20secret
29:22and
29:22particularly
29:23for a
29:23long
29:23time
29:24and
29:24particularly
29:24if there's
29:25a lot
29:25of money
29:25involved
29:26if they
29:27could
29:27sell
29:27it
29:27to
29:28the
29:28newspapers
29:28or
29:29a
29:30journalist
29:30or
29:30something
29:31like
29:31that
29:31nobody
29:32keeps
29:32secrets
29:32that
29:33well
29:33I
29:34mean
29:35there
29:35were
29:36thousands
29:36of
29:36people
29:36that
29:37had
29:37to
29:37keep
29:37the
29:38secret
29:39in
29:39the
29:39FBI
29:40and
29:40the
29:40CIA
29:41and
29:41the
29:41army
29:41and
29:41the
29:41Pentagon
29:42everybody
29:42about
29:43killing
29:43Kennedy
29:44The
29:44reality
29:45is
29:48the
29:49greatest
29:50secret
29:52that
29:52America
29:53has
29:53we
29:53don't
29:53really
29:54know
29:54what
29:55happened
29:55Several
29:56months
29:56after
29:57Kennedy's
29:57assassination
29:58Lyndon
29:59Johnson
29:59begins
29:59reconsidering
30:00the late
30:00president's
30:01plans
30:01to withdraw
30:02American
30:02military
30:03advisors
30:03from
30:03Vietnam
30:04He
30:05tells
30:05an
30:05impatient
30:05general
30:06to get
30:06him
30:06elected
30:07then
30:07he
30:07can
30:07have
30:08his
30:08damn
30:08war
30:10We
30:11were
30:11very
30:11skeptical
30:13throughout
30:14much
30:14of
30:14the
30:14Vietnam
30:15War
30:15about
30:15the
30:16ability
30:16to
30:18essentially
30:19beat
30:19a
30:19guerrilla
30:21war
30:22against
30:23the
30:23North
30:24as long
30:24as
30:24the
30:25North
30:25was
30:26kept
30:27as
30:27a
30:27primary
30:28sanctuary
30:30In
30:30August
30:311964
30:31the
30:32CIA
30:32fakes
30:33a
30:33North
30:33Vietnamese
30:33attack
30:34against
30:34an
30:34American
30:35warship
30:35in
30:35the
30:35Tonkin
30:36Gulf
30:36This
30:37totally
30:37contrived
30:38attack
30:38gives
30:39Johnson
30:39the
30:39pretext
30:40he
30:40needs
30:40to
30:40increase
30:41the
30:41number
30:41of
30:41American
30:41soldiers
30:42in
30:42Southeast
30:43Asia
30:43tenfold
30:43and
30:44begin
30:44bombing
30:44North
30:45Vietnam
30:47The
30:48United
30:48States
30:49destroyer
30:49matter
30:50was
30:50attacked
30:51on
30:51the
30:51high
30:51seas
30:52in
30:52the
30:53Gulf
30:53of
30:54Tonkin
30:54The
30:55attacks
30:55were
30:56deliberate
30:59The
31:00attacks
31:00were
31:02unprovoked
31:02It was
31:03most likely
31:04a fake
31:04attack
31:04or
31:05probably
31:05never
31:05happened
31:06at all
31:06it could
31:06have been
31:07totally
31:08misunderstood
31:08by the
31:10people on
31:10the ship
31:10thinking
31:11they were
31:12being
31:12attacked
31:12The
31:13captain
31:13of the
31:14ship
31:14sent
31:14in a
31:15message
31:15saying
31:16he
31:16had
31:17not
31:17seen
31:17anything
31:19and
31:19that
31:19he
31:19was
31:20now
31:20questioning
31:21all
31:21of
31:21his
31:21earlier
31:22messages
31:22and
31:23that
31:23he
31:23believed
31:24there
31:24was
31:24a
31:24real
31:25possibility
31:25that
31:27he
31:28had
31:28been
31:28fighting
31:29a
31:29phantasma
31:32The
31:32Pentagon
31:33and
31:33the
31:33presidency
31:34chose
31:34to
31:35ignore
31:35his
31:36last
31:36message
31:36and
31:37they
31:37chose
31:37to
31:37use
31:38the
31:38Tonkin
31:38Gulf
31:38incident
31:39as
31:39an
31:40excuse
31:40for
31:40going
31:40to
31:41war
31:41That
31:41brought
31:42about
31:42a
31:43resolution
31:43which
31:44changed
31:44a lot
31:45of
31:45different
31:45things
31:45for sure
31:46The
31:46determination
31:47of
31:47all
31:48Americans
31:49to
31:50carry
31:50out
31:50our
31:50full
31:51commitment
31:51to
31:51the
31:52people
31:52and
31:52to
31:52the
31:52government
31:53of
31:53South
31:53Vietnam
31:54will
31:55be
31:56redoubled
31:56by
31:57this
31:57outrage
31:58That
31:58was
31:58used as
32:00a
32:00pretext
32:01to
32:01escalate
32:01the
32:02war
32:02That
32:02incident
32:03was
32:03used
32:04as
32:04a
32:04justification
32:05for
32:06other
32:06action
32:07Now
32:07we know
32:07that
32:08it was
32:08a lie
32:10at
32:11the
32:11time
32:11it
32:12happened
32:13people
32:14were
32:14suspicious
32:15but
32:16it
32:16was
32:16only
32:16elated
32:16that
32:17their
32:17suspicions
32:18were
32:18confirmed
32:19and
32:20it
32:20was
32:20shown
32:21very
32:21clearly
32:21that
32:22it
32:22was
32:22all
32:22a
32:22pretext
32:23a
32:23phony
32:24story
32:32Inside
32:33Vietnam
32:34Operation
32:35Phoenix
32:35begins
32:35coming
32:36together
32:36The CIA
32:37is told
32:38to carry
32:38out
32:38a
32:38series
32:39of
32:39assassinations
32:40targeting
32:40civilians
32:41to
32:41paralyze
32:42the
32:42country
32:42CIA
32:43experts
32:44teach
32:44special
32:45teams
32:45how
32:45to
32:45terrorize
32:46the
32:46population
32:46by
32:47killing
32:47teachers
32:47doctors
32:48and
32:48businessmen
32:55each
32:55assassination
32:56is
32:56signed
32:56every
32:57time
32:58a
32:58death
32:58squad
32:58strikes
32:59a
32:59playing
32:59card
33:00the
33:00ace
33:00of
33:00spades
33:01is
33:01left
33:01in
33:01clear
33:02view
33:02on
33:02the
33:02body
33:03most
33:04of
33:04the
33:04victims
33:04are
33:04tortured
33:05before
33:05they're
33:05killed
33:12Willem
33:13Colby
33:13the
33:13CIA
33:14agent
33:14who
33:14headed
33:15up
33:15the
33:15operation
33:16would
33:16become
33:16head
33:17of
33:17the
33:17CIA
33:17a
33:18few
33:18years
33:18later
33:22operation
33:23phoenix
33:23was
33:25an
33:25operation
33:26to
33:26destroy
33:28the
33:28viet
33:29kong
33:29structure
33:30they
33:31wanted
33:31to
33:32eliminate
33:33anybody
33:33who
33:35had
33:35any
33:35connection
33:36whatsoever
33:36to
33:37the
33:38viet
33:38kong
33:38that
33:38was
33:39a
33:39covert
33:39operation
33:40which
33:40we
33:40were
33:40instructed
33:40to
33:41carry
33:41out
33:41in
33:42order
33:42to
33:43distract
33:44and
33:45hinder
33:45the
33:46north
33:46Vietnamese
33:46effort
33:47Bill
33:47Colby
33:47assured
33:48was
33:48associated
33:48with
33:49Phoenix
33:49and
33:50those
33:50ended
33:51up
33:51killing
33:51a lot
33:51of
33:51Vietnamese
33:52people
33:52would
33:53I
33:53want
33:53to
33:53go
33:53and
33:53dig
33:54all
33:54that
33:55up
33:55again
33:55probably
33:56not
33:56it
33:57was
33:57run
33:57mostly
33:58by
33:58Bill
33:59he
34:00organized
34:00it
34:00I know
34:03but
34:04the idea
34:05was
34:05a
34:05protective
34:06device
34:06for
34:08our
34:08operations
34:08to
34:08protect
34:09their
34:09operations
34:09Bill
34:10Colby
34:10assured
34:11me
34:11that
34:11it
34:12was
34:12a
34:12reasonably
34:14crisp
34:15and clean
34:15operation
34:16they
34:17just
34:17murdered
34:18anybody
34:18whom
34:18they
34:18thought
34:19had
34:19any
34:20connection
34:20to
34:20the
34:20Viet
34:21Kong
34:22I'm
34:23speaking
34:23not
34:23of
34:24soldiers
34:24I'm
34:25speaking
34:25of
34:25civilians
34:26and so
34:27it
34:27was
34:27a
34:28pretty
34:28bloody
34:30massacre
34:30strategic
34:31hamlets
34:32rural
34:33pacification
34:34all
34:34of
34:35these
34:35things
34:35generally
34:36fail
34:36in
34:36a
34:37revolutionary
34:37situation
34:38that
34:39was
34:39part
34:39of
34:40a
34:40failed
34:40set
34:41of
34:41policies
34:42and
34:43Lyndon
34:44Johnson
34:44gets
34:44absolutely
34:45buried
34:46in
34:46Vietnam
34:56in
35:02four
35:02years
35:03time
35:03U.S.
35:04ground
35:04troops
35:04in
35:04Vietnam
35:04swell
35:05from
35:0520,000
35:06to
35:06540,000
35:07a
35:08former
35:08Pentagon
35:09employee
35:09gave
35:10the
35:10New York
35:10Times
35:10a
35:11confidential
35:11file
35:12detailing
35:12the
35:12U.S.
35:13involvement
35:13in
35:13Vietnam
35:14and
35:14revealing
35:14the
35:15lies
35:15of
35:15the
35:15Johnson
35:16administration
35:17We
35:18invaded
35:18Cambodia
35:19we
35:19bombed
35:20Cambodian
35:20targets
35:21and
35:21the
35:21Pentagon
35:21actually
35:22created
35:22false
35:23books
35:23false
35:24records
35:25to show
35:26that we
35:26were bombing
35:27inside of
35:28Vietnam
35:28They mistook
35:29a civil
35:29war
35:30for a
35:31communist
35:32war
35:32and cost
35:33us 55,000
35:35American lives
35:35in the
35:35process
35:36and a million
35:37Vietnamese
35:37lives
35:38The
35:38Americans
35:39violated
35:39the
35:39Geneva
35:40Accord
35:40the
35:40Americans
35:41committed
35:41war
35:42crimes
35:42and
35:43the
35:43American
35:44people
35:44didn't
35:45realize
35:45that war
35:46crimes
35:46were being
35:47committed
35:47in their
35:47name
35:48Very
35:48few
35:49people
35:49knew
35:49about
35:50all
35:50the
35:50terrible
35:51things
35:51that the
35:53CIA
35:53had done
35:56Operation
35:57Chaos
35:57launched
35:58under
35:59Johnson
35:59and
36:00expanded
36:00under
36:00his successor
36:01Richard Nixon
36:02targeted
36:02leftists
36:03and
36:03subversive
36:04elements
36:04said to
36:05be
36:05manipulated
36:06by
36:06foreign
36:07powers
36:08The CIA
36:09had been
36:09spying
36:10on over
36:1010,000
36:11Americans
36:11for years
36:12surveilling
36:13the moves
36:13and tapping
36:14the phones
36:14of teachers
36:15students
36:16journalists
36:16and political
36:17leaders
36:18Special
36:19Intelligence
36:19units
36:20broke
36:20into
36:20buildings
36:21searched
36:22homes
36:22and opened
36:23the mail
36:23of people
36:23whose only
36:24crime
36:24was disagreeing
36:25with government
36:26policy
36:28not just
36:29the CIA
36:29but
36:31all
36:31of
36:32the
36:32U.S.
36:32intelligence
36:32elements
36:33were spying
36:35on our
36:35children
36:35they were
36:36abusing
36:36their power
36:37The FBI
36:38was investigating
36:40groups
36:41simply because
36:42of who
36:43the groups
36:43were
36:44and without
36:44any particular
36:45practical
36:46information
36:47of
36:47suggesting
36:48those groups
36:49were
36:49unlawful
36:50engaged in
36:51unlawful
36:51activities
36:52or planning
36:52unlawful
36:53activities
36:54And that
36:54was part
36:55of Operation
36:55Chaos
36:56it was
36:56to disrupt
36:57any kind
36:58of
37:01protest
37:01any kind
37:02of
37:03argument
37:04against
37:05the government's
37:05policies
37:06And it was
37:07targeting
37:07the anti-war
37:09movement
37:09and those
37:10anti-administration
37:12journalists
37:13a few of them
37:16that were
37:17bugged
37:17A lot of
37:18people became
37:19targets of
37:19this thing
37:20and this
37:21tradition
37:21of setting
37:22up
37:22enemies
37:22lists
37:23was
37:24something
37:24that
37:25is long
37:26in this
37:27country's
37:28history
37:28Mail
37:28openings
37:29was
37:30something
37:30that I
37:30was
37:30directly
37:31involved
37:31in
37:32and that
37:32I
37:32canceled
37:33it
37:33when I
37:33became
37:34director
37:34I don't think
37:35an American
37:35intelligence service
37:36ought to
37:37spend much time
37:38targeting
37:39Americans
37:39There is a
37:40difference
37:41between
37:41counterintelligence
37:42against terrorists
37:43and invading
37:44the privacy
37:45of your citizens
37:46The agency
37:47had done this
37:48at the behest
37:49of the Johnson
37:49administration
37:50and that
37:51those who
37:52were blaming
37:52the agency
37:53should have
37:54blamed
37:54President Johnson
37:55and his
37:56administration
37:57The idea
37:58of keeping
37:58track of your
37:59fellow Americans
38:00which seems to be
38:01the most
38:01fundamentally
38:03non-American
38:04behavior you can
38:04engage in
38:05was something
38:06that was
38:07practiced
38:07and advocated
38:09by Hoover
38:09by Van Diemen
38:10and by Nixon
38:11That's what
38:12they did
38:12and Richard Nixon
38:14firmly believed it
38:16and made it
38:16part of his policy
38:17That's
38:18the great
38:19scandal
38:19Well I mean
38:20we had a period
38:20of lawbreaking
38:21under Nixon
38:24and the CIA
38:25was involved
38:26in the lawbreaking
38:26On June 17th
38:281972
38:28in the middle
38:29of the presidential
38:30campaign
38:30five men
38:31who broke
38:32into the
38:32Watergate building
38:33disguised as
38:33plumbers
38:34are arrested
38:34The former CIA
38:35agents
38:36had been sent
38:36to inspect
38:37Democratic Party
38:38headquarters
38:38for President
38:39Richard Nixon
38:40presidential press
38:41secretary
38:42Ron Ziegler
38:43today called
38:43the incident
38:44a third-rate
38:45burglary
38:46and nothing
38:46the president
38:47would be
38:47concerned with
38:48Four of the
38:49men arrested
38:49were Cuban
38:50nationals
38:50now living
38:51in Miami
38:51and the fifth
38:52James McCord
38:54was a former
38:54FBI and CIA
38:56agent
38:57recently employed
38:58as a security
38:58aide by the
38:59Republican National
39:00Committee
39:00and the committee
39:01to re-elect
39:02the president
39:03Information
39:03began to come
39:05out about
39:06connections
39:07between the
39:07CIA
39:09and the
39:11break-in
39:12at the
39:12Watergate
39:13there were
39:14a few
39:14officers
39:14who had
39:15retired
39:15who had
39:15formerly
39:16worked
39:16for the
39:16CIA
39:17who were
39:18involved
39:18I was
39:19appalled
39:19at this
39:20senseless
39:21illegal action
39:23and I was
39:24shocked to
39:25learn that
39:25employees of
39:26the re-election
39:27committee were
39:27apparently among
39:28those guilty
39:29when his own
39:30case was
39:30involved
39:31he apparently
39:32was rather
39:32because he
39:33made some
39:33terrible mistakes
39:34in defending
39:36himself
39:36Nixon pushes
39:37on with his
39:38re-election
39:38campaign
39:39convinced the
39:40Watergate
39:40scandal has
39:41been hushed
39:41up
39:41all the
39:42polls put
39:43him in
39:43the lead
39:43by a
39:43comfortable
39:44margin
39:44but two
39:45reporters
39:45from the
39:46Washington
39:46Post
39:47have
39:47Nixon
39:47by the
39:48throat
39:48the president
39:49asks CIA
39:50director
39:50Richard Helms
39:51to pressure
39:51the FBI
39:52into dropping
39:53its investigation
39:53into the
39:54Watergate
39:54burglary
39:55and to cover
39:56for him
39:56by saying
39:56the stolen
39:57files were
39:57seized
39:58at the
39:58CIA's
39:58request
39:59but Helms
40:00refuses
40:00it's
40:01Nixon
40:01that was
40:01the criminal
40:02not CIA
40:02the CIA
40:04refused
40:05to cooperate
40:06with a cover
40:07up
40:08that was
40:08ordered
40:09by president
40:09Nixon
40:10the CIA
40:10was being
40:11used
40:12by
40:12president
40:13Nixon
40:14to block
40:15FBI
40:16investigations
40:17and he
40:18wanted
40:18the agency
40:20to come
40:21forward
40:22with a
40:23signed
40:24piece of
40:24paper
40:24which I
40:26refused
40:27Nixon
40:27asked
40:28Helms
40:29to do
40:29it
40:29Helms
40:29said no
40:31we
40:31will
40:32not
40:32say
40:32that
40:33that
40:33was
40:33a
40:33national
40:33security
40:34issue
40:34we
40:34will
40:34not
40:35be
40:35involved
40:35in
40:36that
40:36situation
40:37and
40:37Helms
40:37then
40:38lost
40:38his job
40:39as a
40:39result
40:39the
40:40most
40:40popular
40:41CIA
40:41director
40:42was
40:42the
40:42worst
40:42one
40:43in
40:43terms
40:43of
40:44policy
40:45was
40:45Helms
40:46they
40:46loved
40:46him
40:47Richard
40:48Helms
40:48he
40:49was
40:49known
40:49as
40:49the
40:49Teflon
40:50director
40:50because
40:50nothing
40:51bad
40:51ever
40:51stuck
40:52to
40:52him
40:53except
40:53Chile
40:56in
40:561971
40:57socialist
40:58leader
40:58Salvador
40:59Allende wins the presidential election in Chile
41:01it's too much for Richard Nixon
41:03the horrified US leader gives CIA director Richard Helms a free hand to prevent Allende from taking office
41:09This is newspaper talk
41:12newspaper language
41:14carte blanche
41:16how many times do you really get carte blanche
41:20now as far as
41:24Allende was concerned
41:25Nixon
41:26instructed us
41:29to try and
41:30prevent
41:31Allende's
41:33access
41:34to office
41:36and the CIA was creating all kinds of chaos
41:39in
41:40Chilean society
41:41economic and social chaos
41:43to give the military an excuse
41:45to step in and overthrow the government
41:49nobody talked about
41:50killing Allende
41:53it was to try to get him out of office
41:55but we were associated with people who were willing to kill
41:59Allende
42:00they were using
42:01private corporations
42:02and the CIA
42:04and the military
42:06and the embassy
42:08everything was
42:08thrown in
42:09they had a big team
42:12working
42:14specifically to overthrow Allende
42:16he was not somebody that the United States government was
42:19was very fond of
42:21Henry Kissinger
42:22and Richard Helms
42:24the head of the CIA
42:25they certainly
42:25they were part of the masterminding of this operation in Washington
42:30and if they felt that Allende was a problem
42:32and they wanted us to do something about it
42:34we would do the best we could
42:36and we tried the best we could
42:39Washington decides to help Chilean military leaders
42:42boost Salvador Allende
42:44and put General Pinochet in power
42:46military coup is finally launched on September 11th 1973
42:50Salvador Allende is assassinated
42:52or according to the CIA commits suicide
42:56thousands of Chileans are tortured and killed
42:58after the CIA turns over lists of suspects
43:01to the junta's death squads
43:09even the most experienced CIA officers
43:13people with 20-30 years experience
43:17do not really understand
43:19just how many things the CIA has done
43:21in the way of assassination
43:22or other covert operations
43:29Congress is still smarting from being lied to
43:32and humiliated by Nixon
43:33before he was forced from office
43:34the CIA's role in the coup in Chile
43:37coupled with revelations about the agency's ties
43:39to the White House and the Watergate operation
43:41push Congress to muzzle the CIA
43:45in 1976
43:46interviews of potential CIA directors
43:49by the church and pipe committees leave Americans stunned
43:51it's a turning point in American political life
43:54things will never be the same again
43:57revelations are staggering
44:00the church report describes the CIA's backing of General Pinochet
44:04in its role in boosting Allende's socialist government
44:06greatly tarnishing Secretary of State
44:08Henry Kissinger's image
44:11the attempt of the United States government was
44:17not to destabilize or to subvert it
44:20but to keep in
44:21but to keep
44:24but to keep in being
44:28those political parties
44:30that had traditionally contested the elections
44:33and our concern was with the election in 1976
44:36and not at all with a coup in 1973
44:40about which we knew nothing
44:41Henry Kissinger was not enthusiastic
44:44about the revelations that the Pike and church committees made
44:49because he came under a lot of criticism
44:51for things that he said and did
44:53Chile was an abuse of American power
44:56it was an abuse by Kissinger
44:58and it was an abuse by the corporations
45:00that wanted Kissinger to act on their behalf
45:02Richard Helms is called to testify
45:04he had never uttered a word in public before
45:06never granted a single interview
45:08the Washington Post would quip that Helms
45:10testifying under oath
45:12came close to perjuring himself on several occasions
45:14responsible for the wiretaps
45:16Helms had time to destroy all the files
45:18before he left the CIA in 1973
45:20Mr. Helms, in that answer you used a vague term
45:24let's try and clarify it
45:25you say you told him about this operation
45:27well I thought so
45:28but maybe I wasn't specific enough about it
45:31I don't know
45:32I thought that this was the general purport of it
45:35and that to get information out of the letters
45:38you would have to open them
45:40this is an agency that need not obey the law
45:44the way we were trying to get on with our job
45:46we were trying to protect our form of government
45:48our way of life
45:49I'm trying to find out why
45:51a program like this went on for 20 years
45:55was against the law of the country
45:57by every indication we have
45:58statutes, the constitution
46:00the decisions of the supreme court
46:03I've been producing some information
46:05on foreign connections with dissidents and terrorists
46:09all I'm trying to find out from you
46:12is whether you believe
46:13that the CIA doesn't have to abide by these laws
46:17because of the problems that the CIA faces
46:21well I think my position
46:23I don't think things are black and white in this life
46:27you were conscious of the serious question of its legality
46:31I was sir
46:32and nevertheless you continued to pursue the program
46:38that statement covert coverage has been discontinued was a lie
46:42the mail continued to be open
46:44how does a president exercise any control over the CIA
46:48or any of these agencies
46:50I just want to ask one question
46:52do you know that Mr. Nixon doesn't
46:54didn't know about that CIA mail intercept operation
46:58and if he did there's no one including you
47:00that have been able to tell us that he did
47:02the president was given a document
47:04that did not tell him the truth
47:08can't you ask President Nixon whether he knew or not
47:10and I will be guilty as charged
47:12if you had been the president of the United States
47:14and had asked for recommendations
47:17coming from a report that was signed
47:19by you the director of the CIA
47:21what would you believe?
47:23well Mr. Chairman I have to concede
47:25that on the record here
47:26and without the discussion that went on at the time
47:29it certainly looks that way
47:30and I'm sorry if I made a mistake at that time
47:32he's the one who used to lie to the presidents
47:34he's the one who lied to Congress
47:36he's the one who tried to keep the thing going
47:38yet he's the big hero at the CIA
47:40Richard Helms will go down in the history of CIA
47:45as the man who kept the secrets
47:47and he went to his desk with lots of secrets
47:50that nobody would ever know about
47:51that's fine
47:52that's what the intelligence system is all about
47:55there are certain things that you're not supposed to see the light of day
47:58and Dick managed to keep a lot of them secret
48:02he was very good
48:04former CIA director William Colby is called
48:07and turned to testify before the Senate
48:08they start with questions about the coup in Chile
48:11the agency make money
48:14they print money
48:16for example
48:17ITT offered the CIA money to destabilize in Chile
48:23we must rest only on appropriated funds
48:25however in the process of our operations
48:29we do develop proprietary organizations
48:31Mr. McCone was involved
48:33and he was involved with the CIA
48:34it kind of indicates that maybe that's not an outrageous request
48:37some of our activity along these lines have been generally known for years
48:41and no objection made against
48:43have you ever been briefed on the full extent of CIA's relationships with the mafia
48:48if so when and with whom
48:50Colby was the man who finally saw that Frank Church was not going to go away
48:57and he took the transparency route
49:03and it changed forever how CIA is run
49:06Colby has to field questions about the CIA's expeditious methods
49:10and its assassination attempts
49:12both successful and failed
49:13most notably those against Fidel Castro
49:15does this pistol fire the dart?
49:19yes it does
49:20what range does it have?
49:22100 meters I believe about
49:24about 100 yards and 100 meters
49:27cornered by the Senators
49:28Colby agrees to talk about Vietnam and Operation Phoenix
49:31in effect this Phoenix program was an assassination program
49:36was the objective of eliminating the infrastructure of the BC
49:39fully discussed at each briefing
49:42how many roughly would you estimate were eliminated?
49:45some 20,000 had been killed by that time
49:48like most congressional and presidential commissions
49:53their long-term impact was next to nothing
49:56all of these commissions have not really had an impact
50:00because they haven't addressed the mindset
50:04the culture
50:05the character
50:07of the people actually doing these operations
50:10we simply cannot afford to delude ourselves
50:13into believing that the Congress in its ultimate wisdom
50:16can sit up on Capitol Hill
50:19and create laws that are going to correct the intelligence agencies
50:23if you go back and read the church committee hearings
50:25you find that everything that the agency did
50:28was instigated at the presidential level
50:32including the efforts to eliminate Lumumba
50:38the Bay of Pigs
50:41the various things the agency has been blamed for
50:45were instigated at the political level
50:48every president that has ever had the CIA do something terrible
50:52during their administration has ordered that action to be carried out
50:59but President Gerald Ford would be the one to give the CIA the final blow
51:03in 1976 he signed an executive order that ended with these words
51:07no employee of the United States government shall engage in
51:11or conspire to engage in political assassination
51:14so we couldn't conduct assassinations or kill anybody
51:18there's a series of executive orders
51:21which we were forced
51:23not forced but we were asked to read and sign
51:26the reason
51:27the jury Ford signed
51:29the executive order
51:30was because it was the time of the church committee
51:33the time of the investigations
51:34and it was a lot of pressure
51:36and he had to say something
51:38our legislature
51:39and the American people began to believe
51:42that you can legislate morality
51:44it was on the heels of Allende
51:48as well as everything else
51:52and Gerald Ford
51:54looked up and he's president
51:56and he signs the executive order
51:5912033 that says
52:01there will be no assassinations
52:04period
52:04baloney
52:07they've always done it
52:08if it was in the interest of the United States
52:11to assassinate somebody
52:12they would do it
52:12every government has used it when necessary
52:15it's nothing special
52:18assassination is a tool of government
52:20that's all
52:20and theaal
52:33they're doing it
52:34they're doing it
52:36they're doing it
52:49no
52:50he's saying
53:12Transcrição e Legendas Pedro Negri
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