- há 2 horas
Trilogy of William Karrel about the history of the CIA.
This three-part documentary series takes an in-depth look at the anatomy and functioning of the CIA, its failures (the Bay of Pigs, the Watergate Scandal) and its chronic shortsightedness (inability to foresee the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, the fall of the USSR, or the 9/11 attacks).
The film identifies and dissects the CIA's true power base and gives us a rare inside glimpse at the inner workings of the US intelligence agency and American government.
This three-part documentary series takes an in-depth look at the anatomy and functioning of the CIA, its failures (the Bay of Pigs, the Watergate Scandal) and its chronic shortsightedness (inability to foresee the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, the fall of the USSR, or the 9/11 attacks).
The film identifies and dissects the CIA's true power base and gives us a rare inside glimpse at the inner workings of the US intelligence agency and American government.
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AprendizadoTranscrição
00:15A C.I.A. sempre pensava que era melhor do que qualquer outra agência de governança.
00:19Você quer saber a verdade? É pior.
00:21Eu era o melhor que eles tinham.
00:24Um dos melhores que eles tinham.
00:25Então imagina o que o resto de eles parecem assim.
00:27Esse é o melhor e o brilhante da C.I.A.
00:30É uma legenda construída de uma espécie.
00:34Em late 1976, a C.I.A. estava lutando para reforber a sua imagem.
00:38A testemunha dos primeiros diretores,
00:40along com discosso sobre o Watergate e o Chilunco,
00:43tinha tarnado a sua imagem e fez a obsessão com secreção e a objeto de reaculha.
00:47A C.I.A. começou a recrutar no agência de especialistas.
00:52790 WQX-IAM com a J.J. e a Cowboy Show.
00:55Nós temos um comercial que você acha que você vai gostar.
00:57Nós estamos a central intelligence agency
00:59looking for very special people
01:01to train for a career with us.
01:02Você pode ser um deles.
01:04Se você é certinho que você qualifica,
01:06call for a confidential interview.
01:08Secret agent man
01:10And taking away your name
01:15Jimmy Carter takes office,
01:17firmly determined to erase the C.I.A.'s dark years
01:19and then its covered operations
01:21and low-handed tactics.
01:23You have to be even more pure
01:26and more clean
01:28and more decent
01:28and more honest
01:30than almost any person
01:32to serve in government.
01:34President Carter
01:35names Admiral Stansfield Turner,
01:37a fellow student
01:38at the U.S. Naval Academy
01:39to head up the agency.
01:41Turner is reviled
01:42by the C.I.A.'s rank and file.
01:44One year earlier,
01:45he testified before Congress
01:46to address about the agency's
01:47misdeeds in the 1960s.
01:51Again, I want to express
01:53my complete appreciation
01:55and confidence
01:55in Admiral Stansfield Turner,
01:58whose responsibilities
01:59under this executive order
02:00would be greatly magnifying.
02:02There was considerable skepticism
02:05about an outsider coming in
02:07as opposed to
02:08a professional C.I.A. person.
02:10When Turner came in,
02:11there was a lot of pressure
02:12for the C.I.A. to reveal
02:14some of its secrets
02:16about what it had done
02:17in Congo
02:18and various other places.
02:20And he was the one
02:21who had to go
02:23before the congressional committees.
02:25And I think a lot
02:25of the people in the C.I.A.
02:27are part of a culture
02:28that says,
02:29you never talk
02:29about these things.
02:30Just always say,
02:32just lie.
02:33Don't admit it.
02:34And Turner went out
02:36and admitted these things.
02:38He came in,
02:40I think,
02:41with a view
02:42that he was going
02:43to kind of clean up
02:44the C.I.A. a little bit
02:46or change its culture
02:47a little bit.
02:48But the whole culture
02:49of the C.I.A.
02:50is against transparency.
02:51You don't want people
02:52to know what you're doing.
02:53He tried to change
02:54the organization,
02:55I think,
02:56and pressure the organization
02:58in ways that it didn't like.
03:02Bureaucracies don't like
03:03people to come in
03:04and try to change them.
03:05His style of meeting
03:07with all the lower-level people
03:08and bypassing senior people
03:11tended to antagonize
03:14some of the senior staff.
03:16And that created some problems.
03:18I don't think the C.I.A.
03:20liked the style
03:21of kind of opening up
03:23the agency
03:23to greater public scrutiny.
03:25I think Turner's view
03:27was that you can't
03:28keep this agency
03:30completely secret
03:31after Watergate.
03:33Dan came into the agency
03:36feeling that the agency
03:37had been too autonomous,
03:41it had been too fragmented,
03:43that the DDO in particular
03:46was out of control.
03:48I think he was always
03:49a little uncomfortable
03:50with clandestine operations.
03:53Stansfield Turner
03:54was a good person
03:55with good intentions
03:57who suffered the same disease
03:59that most Navy admirals suffer.
04:01He had an overwhelming
04:03faith in technology
04:04and he had no faith in people.
04:06They felt that
04:07somebody from the outside
04:09wasn't able to make decisions
04:12about spying techniques
04:14and such forth.
04:15This guy is so strange,
04:18very strange guy,
04:19Turner.
04:21He has a real history.
04:26Stansfield Turner
04:27will be remembered
04:28for nearly launching
04:29a nuclear strike
04:30against the Soviet Union
04:31due to a misinterpretation
04:32that made U.S. experts
04:33believe a missile
04:34had been fired
04:35at the United States.
04:39It was a mistake.
04:41There was a problem
04:43that gave some indicators
04:44that there might be
04:45an attack coming.
04:47You can artificially
04:48put into this relationship
04:50radar a signal that says
04:53here come missiles
04:54so that the people
04:57watching that radar
05:00every day
05:00and day in and day out
05:03know what it is going
05:05to look like,
05:05what they're going
05:06to look for.
05:08Somebody can push
05:09the wrong button
05:10and you get this
05:11artificial picture
05:13coming in.
05:13You see what I mean?
05:14And so then you look
05:16at these others
05:16and you say
05:17nothing's going on.
05:18and what's wrong here?
05:20And somebody said,
05:21oh, we pushed
05:22the wrong button.
05:23He's crazy, that guy.
05:24Personally,
05:24he's a little nutty, Turner.
05:26There were people
05:27who think he was
05:27the worst director
05:28we've had
05:29and there are people
05:29who don't disagree
05:31with that
05:31and think that he was okay.
05:32He certainly,
05:33in my view,
05:34was not our best director.
05:35I'm not sure
05:36that Stansfield
05:37Turner's period
05:38as director
05:39will be regarded
05:43as a good time
05:45for either
05:45the American people
05:46or the CIA.
05:48He did more damage
05:49to the CIA
05:50than the Church
05:51and Pike commissions.
05:52He and Schlesinger
05:53and a few others
05:54managed to kill
05:55the clandestine service.
05:57Shortly after taking office,
05:59Jimmy Carter
06:00pardons conscientious objectors
06:02to the Vietnam War.
06:03He makes the Middle East
06:04his top priority.
06:06After 13 days of talks
06:07with Menachem Begin
06:08and Anwar Sadat
06:09at Camp David,
06:10Israel and Egypt
06:11sign a separate
06:12peace agreement.
06:16But Iran will hand
06:18Carter his first failure
06:19and a scathing one.
06:22But in mid-August 1978,
06:24the CIA gave President Carter
06:26erroneous intelligence
06:26about Iran,
06:27saying the country
06:28was not on the brink
06:29of a revolution
06:30or even moving towards it.
06:42The Iranian Revolution,
06:44that's a major turning point.
06:46I think it is probably true
06:48that before 1979,
06:51we in the United States
06:53and I would say
06:54probably most other countries
06:56as well,
06:57had not yet taken
06:58Islamic militancy
07:00very seriously.
07:01We were surprised
07:03in Iran.
07:05Neither the Department of State
07:07nor the Central Intelligence Agency
07:10understood
07:10that a revolution was coming.
07:12When all the unrest
07:16began in Iran,
07:18the Deputy National Security Advisor
07:20in the Carter Administration
07:21with whom I was working
07:23asked CIA
07:24for any information
07:26they had
07:27on Islamic fundamentalism.
07:28and the answer
07:30that came back
07:31was they'd never heard of it.
07:42The Ayatollah Khomeini,
07:43exiled in Naufel-le-Chateau,
07:45France,
07:45has been preparing
07:46an Islamic revolution
07:47for months.
07:48He openly displays
07:49his plans
07:50to use the Shah
07:51of Iran's feudal regime
07:52put into power
07:53by the CIA
07:5325 years earlier.
07:55I,
07:57the CIA,
07:59made the assumption
07:59that even though
08:00the Shah was
08:01in trouble
08:02at home
08:03domestically,
08:05he had very powerful
08:07military
08:07and intelligence
08:09police
08:11forces
08:12and that if there were
08:13riots in the streets
08:14he would bring out
08:16the police
08:16and he would kill people
08:18if necessary
08:19but he would remain
08:20in power.
08:21I know that Admiral Turner
08:23has publicly stated
08:24several times
08:25that they had
08:26no indication
08:27that a religious cleric
08:29living in France
08:31would be able
08:32to mount
08:32such an enormous
08:35revolutionary effort.
08:36We missed badly.
08:38The CIA
08:38and the rest
08:39of American intelligence
08:41did not understand
08:43that Khomeini
08:45was going to
08:46be able to do
08:47what he did
08:48in the time
08:50in a way
08:50that he did it.
08:51From the whole time
08:52he was in exile
08:53almost no one
08:55on the American side
08:56paid any attention
08:57to him.
08:58And the Mullahs
08:59became the source
09:00of fundamentalism
09:01with Khomeini
09:02operating in your own
09:03capital in Paris
09:05or in France
09:07and we didn't take
09:09a strong line
09:10about the poison
09:11that he was
09:13disseminating
09:14throughout the Arab world.
09:15We thought
09:16that there
09:16were just
09:17another sect
09:18amongst
09:20religious sects
09:21around the world.
09:22And I remember
09:22talking to
09:23the man
09:25who was considered
09:25to be
09:26the most
09:28observant,
09:29the most reliable
09:31American intelligence
09:32analyst
09:34of the Middle East
09:35and of Iran
09:36who told me
09:38well Khomeini
09:40only wants
09:41to be Pope.
09:42He does not
09:43want to be King.
09:44We do not need
09:45to worry
09:46about the Islamic
09:47revolution in Iran.
09:49The Shah himself
09:50who in the case
09:52of Iran
09:54basically shared
09:55that view.
09:55He thought
09:56that the religious
09:56forces were
09:57reactionary,
09:58backwards,
09:59easy to manipulate,
10:01easy to buy off
10:02and he didn't
10:03have to worry
10:04about them.
10:14He said
10:14don't worry
10:15about the turbans.
10:17I can take care
10:18of them.
10:19I know how
10:19to deal with them.
10:20They're easy.
10:21He was wrong
10:23and it was
10:24a mistake
10:24that the United
10:25States government
10:26in different ways
10:30committed as well.
10:31Iran,
10:32because of
10:33the great leadership
10:34of the Shah
10:37is an island
10:39of stability
10:41in one of the
10:42more troubled
10:43areas of the world.
10:44We were spending
10:45too much time
10:46listening to the Shah
10:47and to the people
10:48around the Shah
10:49and not enough time
10:50listening to the
10:51opponents
10:51in the regime
10:52and outside the regime.
10:54There wasn't
10:54a single person
10:55in that embassy
10:56including the spies
10:57who spoke Farsi.
10:59We were all
11:00about first-class
11:02travel
11:02and fancy embassy
11:04dinner parties
11:05with the top people
11:06who were telling us
11:07what they wanted us
11:08to know.
11:09The CIA had
11:10very little contact
11:11with the Islamist
11:13movement in Iran.
11:16I think the ambassador
11:18at the time
11:18had forbidden
11:19any contact
11:20by the CIA
11:21with opposition elements.
11:23That's always
11:24unfortunate
11:25when the ambassador
11:26does that
11:26because it removes
11:27one very valuable
11:29source of information
11:31and if
11:32those elements
11:34should come to power
11:35nobody has any
11:36contact with them.
11:37That happens
11:38and we do that.
11:39We make mistakes
11:39like that.
11:40When the government
11:41not only supports
11:42a dictatorship
11:42that represses
11:43its people
11:44but then tells
11:46the Central Intelligence Agency
11:47it's not allowed
11:48to talk to the opposition
11:50I have to ask myself
11:52why have a spy service
11:53if you can't talk
11:55to the opposition
11:55secretly
11:56so that that government
11:58doesn't know.
12:00Richard Helms
12:01the former CIA director
12:02fired by Richard Nixon
12:03for refusing to lie
12:04about Watergate
12:05is the American ambassador
12:06to Tehran.
12:07He's been a close friend
12:09of the Shah
12:09since lending a hand
12:10in the 1953 coup
12:11that toppled Mossadegh.
12:13He even trained
12:13and supervised
12:14the Shah's secret police.
12:18He was sent
12:19as ambassador
12:20to Iran
12:20right after
12:21the Watergate.
12:22He was ambassador
12:23in the last days
12:24of the Shah.
12:25Richard Helms
12:26told the Shah
12:27that the United States
12:28would back him
12:29would give him
12:29any weapons system
12:30that he wanted
12:32so there was
12:33close cooperation.
12:34Stansfield Turner
12:36and Mrs. Carter
12:38were constantly
12:39sending back
12:40channel messages
12:41to the Empress
12:45to stay
12:46and hang in there
12:47and all that
12:48kind of thing.
12:49It would have been
12:50better to decide
12:51one way
12:51or the other.
12:52and we did not.
12:54Jimmy Carter
12:54would listen
12:55to one one day
12:56and to the other
12:58the next day
12:58and as a result
13:00our policy was amiss.
13:02That's why
13:03it's not so much
13:04that we allowed him
13:06that we consciously
13:07that Jimmy Carter
13:07sat down and said
13:08I don't need
13:09the Shah anymore.
13:10Maybe I can make friends
13:11with the Islamicists.
13:13It was that he didn't know
13:15how sick the Shah was
13:16and he didn't know
13:17what to do.
13:17The CIA was very late
13:19in learning
13:20that the Shah
13:21was fatally ill.
13:22The French knew
13:23about it
13:24but the CIA
13:25didn't get to know
13:26about it.
13:26That failure
13:27was helped along
13:28by the French
13:29who did not share
13:31with us the information
13:32that the Shah
13:33was mortally ill.
13:34We knew there was
13:35a problem.
13:36We misjudged it
13:37and therefore
13:38did not predict
13:39his demise.
13:41We did not anticipate
13:42the return of Khomeini.
13:43We did not anticipate
13:44the reception
13:45he would get.
13:49The Ayatollah Khomeini
13:50is back in Iran.
13:51The United States
13:52turns its back
13:53on the exiled Shah
13:54who is dying of cancer
13:55in the New York hospital.
13:57Richard Helms
13:58visits the Shah
13:58just days before his death.
14:02I saw him
14:03in the hospital
14:05in New York
14:06when he was there
14:08for treatment
14:09for his cancer.
14:12And the first question
14:14they asked me
14:15was why did you do it?
14:17The Shah's position
14:19was hopeless
14:20and at some point
14:22the United States
14:24has to deal
14:24with the reality.
14:26You can't cling
14:26to a failing cause
14:29indefinitely.
14:29It's not the policy
14:30of our government
14:31to go into
14:31the internal affairs
14:33of another people
14:35or country
14:35and try to determine
14:37who should be
14:37their leaders.
14:38This is contrary
14:39to the philosophy
14:40of our people.
14:41I think we've tried it
14:41once in the past
14:42in Vietnam
14:43and failed abominably
14:44and I think
14:45no one in this country
14:46of any responsibility
14:48wants to do that
14:49to a country
14:50including Iran.
14:51Carter was a very
14:52interesting blend
14:53of toughness
14:56and naivete
14:59and in many ways
15:00he was almost
15:02schizophrenic
15:02because
15:04for example
15:05in the Soviet Union
15:07until after the invasion
15:08of Afghanistan
15:09he really never could
15:10make up his mind
15:11how to deal
15:11with the Soviet Union.
15:13Despite Red Army
15:14movements
15:14on the Afghan border
15:15and repeated warnings
15:16from the CIA
15:17the U.S. make concession
15:19after concession
15:19pushing the detente
15:20process forward.
15:22Carter meets
15:23with Leonard Brezhnev
15:23in Moscow.
15:24My appreciation
15:25of what happened
15:26in the Politburo
15:27of the USSR
15:29during most of 1979
15:33everybody was sick
15:35or drunk
15:35and they had
15:37some very wrong ideas.
15:39The whole Politburo
15:41was in a position
15:42to make a fatal error.
15:45On the 12th of December
15:47they signed
15:49the document
15:51authorizing
15:52the military intervention
15:53in Afghanistan.
15:54We pointed
15:55to the preparations
15:56for the invasion
15:58of Afghanistan
15:58said the troops
15:59are in place
16:00we don't think
16:01they're going to go in
16:02they made a mistake
16:02that time
16:03but the administration
16:05knew
16:05that the Soviet Union
16:07had the capability
16:08and had deployed
16:09its troops
16:09in such a way
16:10that it could act
16:11virtually anytime.
16:12We just did not
16:13believe the Soviets
16:15at that point
16:16in time
16:16would commit
16:17the kinds of forces
16:18that we thought
16:20they would need
16:21to be effective
16:22in Afghanistan.
16:24So we knew
16:25they were ready
16:25to invade Afghanistan
16:26there was no problem
16:28there.
16:29There was no surprise
16:31except
16:32that we did not know
16:34they were actually
16:36going to do it.
16:37President Carter
16:38draws the lessons
16:39of the CIA's
16:40shortcomings
16:40during the Iranian
16:41revolution
16:42questioning the agency's
16:43strategy
16:44and shortcomings
16:45in gathering intelligence.
16:47Stansfield-Turner
16:48fires 700 CIA department
16:49heads and field officers
16:51and begins
16:51dismantling the agency.
16:55Stansfield-Turner
16:56was taking
16:56the CIA apart
16:58cutting it back
16:59cutting it back
17:00cutting it back
17:00He fired
17:01hundreds of people
17:03made them retire
17:04fired them
17:05I mean there were
17:06there were a lot of
17:07he got rid of a lot
17:08of CIA assets
17:09in the field
17:11you know
17:12key people
17:13that had been around
17:13for years
17:14that could do things
17:15Particularly
17:15in the directorate
17:16of operations
17:17large number
17:18of people
17:18moved out
17:19He eliminated
17:20some 600 jobs
17:21that was probably
17:23too many
17:23So the whole
17:24infrastructure
17:24was thrown out
17:25that had been
17:27taking years
17:27to build up
17:28for the 50s
17:29I don't think
17:29they had much
17:31use for CIA
17:32and I don't think
17:33Stansfield-Turner
17:34did any good
17:35at CIA
17:35I think
17:36as a matter of fact
17:37their assessment
17:38of the world
17:40was probably
17:42flawed
17:43I may not have
17:44made the right
17:45decision
17:45I may have been
17:47wrong
17:47That's the problem
17:49Men like
17:49Stansfield-Turner
17:50and Richard Helms
17:52and others
17:53who have led
17:53the CIA
17:54never looked
17:54past their own
17:55noses
17:55Look
17:57he was only
17:58doing what
17:58he was told
17:59to do
18:01and that was
18:02to remove
18:06the human
18:07asset
18:08and build up
18:09the technical
18:10asset
18:13That's what
18:13he was told
18:14to do
18:14Stansfield-Turner
18:17It wasn't
18:18the fault
18:19the president
18:20was appalled
18:21So when
18:22December of
18:231979
18:24when the Soviet
18:25Union invaded
18:25Afghanistan
18:26Jimmy Carter
18:27turned to
18:27Stansfield-Turner
18:28and said
18:28I want the CIA
18:29to do something
18:29about this
18:30and the CIA
18:30said
18:31what?
18:32We don't have
18:33any resources
18:33thank you very much
18:38Jimmy Carter's last
18:39illusions about
18:40Brezhnev
18:40are crushed
18:41in 1979
18:42when the Soviet
18:42army invades
18:43Afghanistan
18:44After underestimating
18:45Soviet aims
18:46Carter watches
18:47his house of cards
18:48collapse
18:48discovering the world
18:49as it really is
18:50neither harmonious
18:51nor just
18:58but soon after
18:59he asks
19:00Stansfield-Turner
19:01and the CIA
19:02to start
19:03arming
19:03Afghan rebels
19:04to fight
19:05the Soviet
19:05occupation
19:08Jimmy Carter
19:10was the one
19:10that was most
19:11surprised
19:11in December
19:13Christmas
19:14in 1979
19:15when the Soviets
19:15invaded Afghanistan
19:16and he was
19:17he flew into
19:18a rage
19:18he was very
19:20unhappy
19:20he didn't have
19:21a lot of
19:22experience
19:22with the
19:23communists
19:23and he was
19:24even though
19:25we warned him
19:26the agency
19:27warned him
19:27about the
19:29invasion
19:29of Afghanistan
19:31he was surprised
19:32that the
19:33Soviet Union
19:34would do that
19:35the world
19:36simply cannot
19:37stand by
19:38and permit
19:39the Soviet Union
19:39to commit
19:41this act
19:41with impunity
19:43President Carter
19:44changed his view
19:45on the Soviets
19:46as a result
19:47of that
19:48blatant invasion
19:49of Afghanistan
19:50he certainly
19:52lost a lot
19:53of his illusions
19:54about the
19:54Soviet Union
19:55particularly
19:56after Afghanistan
19:57Afghanistan
19:58hit him hard
19:59Jimmy Carter
19:59was so upset
20:01because he
20:03thought Brezhnev
20:03was someone
20:04that he could
20:05work with
20:05and Brezhnev
20:07thought that
20:07Carter wasn't
20:08paying attention
20:08decided to
20:09invade Afghanistan
20:10and boom
20:11Carter said
20:12no
20:13the Soviets
20:14saw a side
20:15ironically
20:15of Carter
20:16that most
20:16Americans
20:17never did
20:18see
20:18and that
20:18was the
20:19tough side
20:19that was
20:20the hard
20:21side
20:22what is
20:23the option
20:23that we
20:24had
20:26not to
20:27resist
20:29and let
20:30the Soviets
20:32overwhelm
20:32the country
20:33completely
20:33he apparently
20:34had a
20:36very severe
20:37change of
20:38mind
20:38and immediately
20:40agreed to
20:41help the
20:44Afghan
20:44Mujahideen
20:45with lethal
20:46weapons
20:47and I think
20:47the invasion
20:48took place
20:48on 26th or 27th
20:50December
20:50and the first
20:51weapons that we
20:52sent through
20:53the Pakistanis
20:53arrived on the
20:5410th of January
20:55which was pretty
20:55quick
20:56and we
20:57in the
20:57Carter
20:57administration
20:58started
20:58that support
21:00through the
21:01CIA
21:02we
21:03the CIA
21:04formed up
21:06a very
21:07quiet
21:08covert
21:08clandestine
21:09alliance
21:09of countries
21:10to work
21:10against them
21:11and we
21:12made it
21:13miserable
21:14for them
21:14over 10
21:15years
21:15the objective
21:16was very
21:16clear in
21:171979
21:17and 80
21:18and through
21:18the 80s
21:19and that
21:19was
21:20our
21:20objective
21:21and the
21:22policy
21:22objective
21:22was to
21:23drive the
21:24Soviets
21:24out of
21:25Afghanistan
21:25how
21:26could we
21:26predict
21:28way back
21:29in 1979
21:32that the
21:33people we
21:34were supplying
21:34arms to
21:35to defeat
21:36the Soviets
21:37in Afghanistan
21:39weren't
21:40necessarily
21:40going to
21:41turn into
21:42something as
21:43horrible
21:43as the
21:44Taliban
21:44we
21:45created
21:46the
21:46Taliban
21:46we
21:47created
21:48this
21:48fundamentalist
21:49army
21:49and we
21:51did not know
21:52what we were
21:52doing
21:52we did not
21:53take into
21:53account
21:54the
21:54cultural
21:54reality
21:55of what
21:56was on
21:56the ground
21:56there
21:56but
21:57Carter
21:57has another
21:58crisis
21:58on his
21:59hands
21:59one that
22:00has stirred
22:00up public
22:00opinion
22:01one month
22:02before the
22:02invasion of
22:03Afghanistan
22:03the staff
22:04of the
22:04American
22:05embassy
22:05in Tehran
22:06was taken
22:06hostage
22:06by Islamic
22:07students
22:08the hostage
22:09crisis
22:09and a
22:10failed
22:10military
22:10rescue
22:11operation
22:11could spell
22:12doom
22:12for Carter's
22:13political
22:13ambitions
22:14he's running
22:15for re-election
22:15against a
22:16hard-hitting
22:16Ronald Reagan
22:17whose campaign
22:18is handled
22:18by William
22:19Casey
22:19I believe
22:20that this
22:20administration's
22:21foreign policy
22:23helped create
22:24the entire
22:24situation that
22:25made their
22:26kidnap possible
22:27and I think
22:28the fact that
22:29they've been
22:29there that
22:29long is a
22:30humiliation
22:30and a
22:31disgrace to
22:31this country
22:32Carter
22:32was completely
22:34consumed by
22:35events in
22:36Tehran
22:37President Carter
22:38calls in
22:38all his
22:39advisors
22:39he then
22:40decides to
22:41open secret
22:41negotiations
22:42with the
22:42new Iranian
22:43government
22:43to win
22:44the release
22:44of the
22:44hostages
22:45before
22:45presidential
22:46election
22:46but someone
22:47working inside
22:48the White
22:48House
22:49relays
22:49every move
22:50to Ronald
22:50Reagan's
22:51team
22:52we know
22:53that Carter
22:54was close
22:54to getting
22:55a deal
22:55with the
22:56Iranians
22:56to release
22:57the hostages
22:57before the
22:58elections
22:58the Republicans
23:00got wind
23:00of this
23:01and realized
23:02that if
23:03Carter got
23:03the hostages
23:04out
23:04he might
23:04win the
23:05election
23:06and tried
23:07to make
23:07sure that
23:08this operation
23:10wouldn't succeed
23:11because for
23:11some reason
23:12suddenly about
23:13two weeks
23:13before the
23:13elections
23:14the Iranians
23:14just stopped
23:15negotiating
23:15they just
23:17stopped
23:17how did
23:18that happen
23:19because that
23:20national security
23:21staff leaked
23:23classified information
23:24to the
23:24Reagan campaign
23:25to assist
23:26Reagan getting
23:27elected president
23:28there was an
23:29entire intelligence
23:30operation to
23:31ruin Jimmy
23:31Carter's
23:32presidency
23:33Frank
23:33Calucci
23:34CIA deputy
23:34director resigns
23:36and joins
23:36Ronald Reagan's
23:37team soon
23:37followed by
23:38Robert Gates
23:38head of the
23:39National Security
23:39Council
23:41Gates worked
23:41for Jimmy Carter
23:42Carlucci
23:43worked for
23:43Jimmy Carter
23:44all these guys
23:45worked for
23:45Jimmy Carter
23:45and suddenly
23:46it's just
23:47coincidental
23:48that every one
23:49of those guys
23:50in that
23:50operation
23:51that Carter
23:51ran
23:52ended up
23:52working
23:53for
23:54Ronald Reagan
23:55I wanted
23:56to get out
23:58of the
23:58Carter White
23:58House
23:59and I wanted
23:59to go back
23:59and take
24:00a senior
24:01analytical
24:01position
24:01at CIA
24:02I had
24:03planned
24:03to leave
24:03government
24:04so I did
24:06not abandon
24:06Jimmy Carter
24:08and I don't
24:08think Bob
24:09Gates did
24:10either
24:11I had
24:12frankly gotten
24:13fed up
24:13with the
24:13Carter White
24:14House
24:14and so
24:15Reagan comes
24:16in and they
24:16all move
24:17over to
24:17Reagan
24:18the American
24:19hostages
24:20are released
24:20on the very
24:21same day
24:22Jimmy Carter
24:22hands over
24:23power to
24:23successor
24:24Ronald Reagan
24:25January
24:2620th
24:261981
24:29It was clear
24:30that the
24:31Republicans
24:31didn't have
24:32anything to
24:32do with it
24:32it was the
24:33decision
24:33on the part
24:34of the
24:34Iranians
24:35to humiliate
24:36Carter
24:37by not
24:37freeing
24:37them
24:38until
24:38January
24:3820th
24:39after he'd
24:39left office
24:40I don't think
24:41there was
24:41anything to
24:42it
24:42I don't
24:42think
24:42there
24:44there
24:45was no
24:46deal
24:47between
24:47the
24:47Republicans
24:48and
24:48the
24:50Khomeini
24:50forces
24:51that's
24:51clear
24:52that's
24:52all one
24:53of those
24:53conspiracy
24:53theories
24:54that's
24:54just
24:55absolutely
24:55not
24:55true
24:56Ten
24:56years
24:56later
24:57on
24:57television
24:57Jimmy
24:58Carter
24:58described
24:58the
24:59behind
24:59the
24:59scene
24:59maneuvering
25:00during
25:00the
25:00October
25:01surprise
25:01operation
25:02President
25:02Bani Sider
25:03who was
25:04the leader
25:04of Iran
25:05then working
25:05under the
25:06Ayatollah
25:06Khomeini
25:07has made
25:07public
25:08statements
25:08on several
25:09occasions
25:09to responsible
25:10news reporters
25:11that there
25:12was a
25:13deal
25:13made
25:13Casey
25:15was the
25:15central
25:16figure
25:16he was
25:17traveling
25:18in Europe
25:18at that
25:19time
25:19Casey's
25:20role
25:20remained
25:21a mystery
25:21for a
25:22very long
25:22time
25:23he was
25:23the
25:24campaign
25:24manager
25:25for
25:25Reagan
25:26and he
25:27went on
25:27to become
25:27the director
25:28of CIA
25:30Ronald Reagan
25:31decided to
25:31make William
25:32Casey
25:32the key
25:32player
25:33in his
25:33administration
25:34long before
25:35moving into
25:35the White
25:36House
25:38you remain
25:39the eyes
25:39and ears
25:40of the free
25:40world
25:41you are the
25:42tripwire
25:43over which
25:44the totalitarian
25:45rule must stumble
25:46in their quest
25:46for global
25:47domination
25:48Casey
25:49was the one
25:50who orchestrated
25:50Reagan's
25:51resounding
25:51victory
25:52deftly put
25:53Jimmy Carter
25:53out of the
25:54running
25:54he managed
25:55Reagan's
25:55election
25:56campaign
25:56with
25:56finesse
25:57sparing
25:58no effort
25:58and no
25:59funds
26:00to ensure
26:00victory
26:01William
26:02Casey's
26:03business
26:03activities
26:03had made
26:04him a
26:04billionaire
26:05he was
26:06also
26:06chairman
26:06of the
26:07Securities
26:07and Exchange
26:08Commission
26:08which oversees
26:09operations
26:10on the
26:10New York
26:10Stock Exchange
26:11Ronald Reagan
26:13had limited
26:14knowledge
26:14of foreign
26:15affairs
26:15he gave
26:16Casey
26:16a free
26:16hand
26:17to decide
26:18the country's
26:18new directions
26:20during the
26:20transition
26:21period
26:21CIA
26:22director
26:22Stan
26:23Spiel
26:23Turner
26:23kept
26:24the future
26:24president
26:25abreast
26:25of world
26:26affairs
26:27I went
26:28to brief
26:29him
26:29as the
26:30prospective
26:30president
26:31George Bush
26:32was not
26:33there
26:33in my
26:34recollection
26:36and I
26:37briefed him
26:38and he'd do
26:38the briefing
26:39and the Soviets
26:39have this
26:40missile here
26:40and this
26:41missile here
26:41and they're
26:42working on
26:42this silo
26:43shut down
26:43very detailed
26:44long
26:44briefing
26:45and Reagan
26:46would get up
26:46and like
26:47loosen his tie
26:47and say
26:48is it hot
26:48in here
26:49and go
26:49opening
26:49you want
26:50some coffee
26:51yeah
26:52can I get
26:53you something
26:54because he
26:54had no
26:55interest
26:55I thought
26:56some of
26:56his questions
26:57were not
26:58very
27:00deep
27:01after that
27:02there were
27:02no more
27:02briefings
27:04Reagan
27:04never got
27:04the briefings
27:05his aides
27:06got the
27:07briefings
27:07so he had
27:08no idea
27:08what the hell
27:09was going
27:09on
27:09with his
27:10nomination
27:11as CIA
27:12director
27:12William Casey
27:13strengthens
27:13the agency's
27:14role
27:14in green
27:15states
27:15most of
27:15the jobs
27:16eliminated
27:17by
27:17Stan
27:17Spiel
27:17Turner
27:18during his
27:19tenure
27:19the agency
27:20steps up
27:20its covered
27:21operations
27:22Bill Casey
27:23was possibly
27:27the most
27:28powerful
27:28director of
27:29central intelligence
27:30since Alan
27:31Dulles
27:31he had a
27:32rather good
27:33relationship
27:33with the
27:34president
27:34and he
27:37derived a
27:37lot of his
27:38authority
27:38from the
27:39fact that
27:39the president
27:40trusted him
27:40he could
27:41pick up
27:41the phone
27:42and say
27:42Ronnie
27:43and talk
27:44to the
27:44president
27:44William Casey
27:46was unique
27:46in our
27:47recent
27:48history
27:49because he
27:50was a
27:50man who
27:50was
27:51co-equal
27:52in power
27:53with the
27:54secretary
27:54of state
27:54and the
27:55secretary
27:55of defense
27:56and the
27:56president
27:56of the
27:57United
27:57States
27:57Casey
27:58wanted to
27:59be
27:59secretary
27:59of state
28:01Casey
28:01couldn't
28:02be
28:02secretary
28:02of state
28:03they
28:03wouldn't
28:04let him
28:04because
28:05he
28:05couldn't
28:05get
28:05through
28:05the
28:05clearances
28:06so they
28:07picked
28:07Al Haig
28:08William Casey
28:09was a
28:10very dedicated
28:12believer
28:13in
28:14covert
28:15action
28:17and in
28:18that sense
28:19he didn't
28:19have the
28:19experience
28:20with covert
28:21action
28:21that I
28:21have had
28:22and so
28:24I was
28:24very
28:24leery
28:25and
28:27suspicious
28:28he was
28:29completely
28:29unsatisfied
28:30with the
28:31CIA bureaucracy
28:32and therefore
28:33he kept
28:34trying to
28:35do things
28:35on the
28:36perimeter
28:37Casey
28:37was running
28:39the CIA
28:40as if he
28:40was running
28:41the mafia
28:43William Casey
28:44lays out
28:44his first
28:45objective
28:45to reestablish
28:47order in
28:47Nicaragua
28:48where the
28:48Marxist
28:49Leninist
28:49Sandinistas
28:50took power
28:50after Carter
28:51hastened
28:51the fall
28:52of dictator
28:52Somoza
28:55Somoza
28:55was a CIA
28:56flunky
28:57who was a
28:58creep
28:58a crook
28:58terrible
28:59on our
29:00payroll
29:00for years
29:00like
29:01like
29:01a hundred
29:04other
29:05Latin
29:05American
29:05African
29:06dictators
29:08I
29:08mean
29:09we
29:09used
29:10them
29:10we
29:11needed
29:11them
29:12that
29:12was
29:13the
29:13attitude
29:13take
29:13the
29:14you
29:14know
29:14hire
29:15the
29:15bad
29:15guys
29:15pay
29:15them
29:16off
29:16and
29:16they'll
29:16do
29:16what
29:16you
29:16need
29:17it's
29:17for
29:17business
29:18in this
29:19case
29:19bananas
29:19I guess
29:20so
29:21one evening
29:21I don't know
29:22like seven
29:22o'clock
29:23night
29:24I went up
29:24and saw
29:25Casey
29:25as I
29:26frequently
29:26did
29:27we sat
29:28there
29:28and we're
29:29looking
29:29out over
29:29the lights
29:30over the
29:30Potomac
29:31and I
29:32said to
29:32him look
29:32I think
29:33I've got
29:34a solution
29:34and what
29:36the government
29:37and what
29:37CIA should
29:38do
29:38to do
29:39better
29:40the
29:40Sandinista
29:41policy
29:41was hatched
29:43by the
29:43clandestine
29:44services
29:44division
29:44of the CIA
29:45Casey
29:46expanded
29:46on
29:46there was
29:47a coup
29:48against
29:48Allende
29:49but in
29:50Nicaragua
29:51we didn't
29:52really have
29:52any coups
29:53we take
29:54the 500
29:56people up
29:56on the
29:57Honduran
29:57Nicaraguan
29:58border
29:58create
29:59a guerrilla
30:00operation
30:01in
30:01Nicaragua
30:02to
30:03interdict
30:04their
30:05arms
30:06shipments
30:06to
30:08El Salvador
30:08and
30:09elsewhere
30:09one
30:11second
30:12by creating
30:14a
30:14revolutionary
30:15atmosphere
30:25Latin America
30:27always had
30:28stormy
30:28relations
30:28with the
30:29CIA
30:29during the
30:30Reagan
30:30administration
30:31the
30:32KC-led CIA
30:33steps
30:33again
30:33to
30:33center
30:34stage
30:34leading
30:35a
30:35decidedly
30:35bellicose
30:36campaign
30:36in
30:36Central
30:37America
30:38working
30:39through
30:39the
30:40contrast
30:40the CIA
30:41steers
30:41the war
30:41against
30:42the
30:42Sandinistas
30:42in
30:43Nicaragua
30:43while
30:44stepping
30:44up
30:44covered
30:45actions
30:45in
30:45El
30:45Salvador
30:46and
30:46Honduras
30:49I
30:50believe
30:50that
30:52covert
30:53action
30:55is
30:56simply
30:57an
30:57extension
30:57of
30:58foreign
30:58policy
30:58short
31:00of war
31:04people
31:05have
31:05been
31:05employing
31:06covert
31:07action
31:07since
31:08the
31:08beginning
31:09of
31:09time
31:09Bill
31:10Casey
31:10was
31:11the
31:11most
31:11controversial
31:12director
31:12of my
31:13time
31:15in many
31:15ways
31:16Bill
31:16Casey
31:16was the
31:16best
31:17director
31:17and the
31:17worst
31:18director
31:18we had
31:18because
31:19he
31:19got our
31:20relationship
31:20with
31:20Congress
31:21in
31:21just
31:21terrible
31:22trouble
31:221986
31:23marked
31:24the
31:24beginning
31:24of
31:25the
31:25Arungate
31:25scandal
31:26the
31:26US
31:26sold
31:27arms
31:27to
31:27the
31:27Islamic
31:28Republic
31:28of
31:28Iran
31:29the
31:2930
31:30million
31:30dollar
31:30profit
31:30was
31:31used
31:31to
31:31continue
31:32financing
31:32anti
31:33Sandinista
31:33guerrillas
31:34despite
31:35a
31:35congressional
31:35ban
31:35on
31:36all
31:36efforts
31:36to
31:37destabilize
31:37the
31:38government
31:38of
31:38Nicaragua
31:39and give
31:39support
31:40to
31:40the
31:40Contras
31:40all
31:41covered
31:42CIA
31:42operations
31:43are
31:43supposed
31:43to
31:43receive
31:44official
31:44approval
31:44from
31:45the
31:45president
31:45of
31:45the
31:46United
31:46States
31:46did
31:47the
31:47president
31:48know
31:54and
31:54any
31:55cocktail
31:55party
31:56you
31:56went
31:56to
31:56the
31:57fact
31:58that
31:58he
31:58was
31:58doing
31:58this
31:59was
31:59known
31:59to
32:00everybody
32:01and
32:02we
32:02had
32:02gone
32:02through
32:02Iran
32:03Contra
32:03and
32:04CIA
32:04was
32:04being
32:05killed
32:05William
32:06French
32:06Smith
32:06determined
32:07that
32:07under
32:07an
32:07appropriate
32:08finding
32:08you
32:09could
32:09authorize
32:09the
32:09CIA
32:10to
32:11sell
32:11arms
32:11to
32:11countries
32:12outside
32:12of
32:13the
32:13provisions
32:13of
32:13the
32:13law
32:14if
32:14the
32:14CIA
32:15using
32:15an
32:16authorized
32:16agent
32:17as
32:17necessary
32:18purchased
32:18arms
32:19from
32:19the
32:19Department
32:20of
32:20Defense
32:20under
32:20the
32:21Economy
32:21Act
32:21and
32:22then
32:22transferred
32:23them
32:23to
32:23Iran
32:23directly
32:24after
32:24receiving
32:25appropriate
32:25payment
32:25from
32:26Iran
32:27you
32:27recall
32:28that
32:28I
32:28do
32:29was
32:30it
32:30illegal
32:32to
32:33sell
32:35arms
32:36to
32:36Iran
32:36taking
32:37the
32:38profits
32:38and
32:39moving
32:39them
32:39over
32:39to
32:40the
32:40countries
32:40Colonel
32:41North
32:41when
32:41you
32:42talk
32:42to
32:42Director
32:43Casey
32:44about
32:44the
32:44fact
32:45of
32:45using
32:45I
32:46will
32:46tell
32:46you
32:47right
32:47now
32:47counsel
32:48and
32:48all
32:49the
32:49members
32:49here
32:50gathered
32:50that
32:51I
32:51misled
32:52the
32:53Congress
32:54I
32:55missed
32:55that
32:55meeting
32:56face
32:57to
32:57face
32:58face
32:58to
32:58face
32:59you
32:59made
33:00false
33:00statements
33:00to
33:01them
33:01about
33:01your
33:01activities
33:02in support
33:02of the
33:03Contras
33:03I
33:03did
33:04there's
33:05always
33:06been
33:08a number
33:09of attacks
33:10against CIA
33:11particularly
33:11for activities
33:12in Latin
33:12America
33:13particularly
33:14Central
33:15America
33:15I mean
33:16that's
33:16where
33:16Bill
33:17Casey
33:18ran into
33:18his
33:18trouble
33:19in
33:22the
33:22Iran
33:23Contra
33:23business
33:24the whole
33:26business
33:26in Central
33:27America
33:27but
33:28William
33:28Casey
33:29gets a
33:29chance
33:29to apply
33:30his
33:30strategy
33:30for
33:31fighting
33:31communists
33:32and the
33:32USSR
33:32in
33:33Afghanistan
33:33where war
33:34has been
33:34raging
33:35for three
33:35years
33:36CIA
33:37does
33:37its
33:37utmost
33:38to get
33:38the
33:38Soviets
33:39bogged
33:39down
33:39in a
33:39conflict
33:40that
33:40will
33:40last
33:40ten
33:41years
33:41and
33:41finally
33:42drive
33:42them
33:42out
33:42of
33:42the
33:42region
33:45Bill
33:45Casey
33:46changed
33:46the
33:46rules
33:47in
33:47Afghanistan
33:47in
33:481985
33:50Carter's
33:51decision
33:52was
33:53to
33:53harass
33:54the
33:55Soviets
33:55to
33:56torment
33:56them
33:56to
33:57make
33:57life
33:57difficult
33:58in
33:591985
34:01Bill
34:01Casey
34:02got
34:03President
34:03Reagan
34:04to
34:04sign
34:04a
34:05directive
34:05that
34:06says
34:06you're
34:07there
34:07to
34:07win
34:07you're
34:08to
34:08drive
34:08them
34:09out
34:09and
34:10Bill
34:10Casey
34:11came
34:11to
34:11me
34:11and
34:12I
34:12had
34:12known
34:12him
34:12before
34:13from
34:13my
34:14Africa
34:14days
34:15and
34:16he
34:16says
34:16I
34:16want
34:16you
34:16to
34:16go
34:17to
34:17Afghanistan
34:17and
34:18I
34:18want
34:18you
34:18to
34:18win
34:18the
34:19resistance
34:19was
34:20able
34:20in
34:21the
34:21long
34:21run
34:21to
34:22defeat
34:22the
34:23120,000
34:24troops
34:25we
34:26had
34:26not
34:26expected
34:27that
34:27how
34:28did
34:28they
34:29defeat
34:29them
34:29they
34:30were
34:30provided
34:30with
34:31huge
34:31amount
34:32of
34:32military
34:33aid
34:34that
34:34was
34:34very
34:34important
34:35the
34:36stingers
34:36for
34:36instance
34:36they
34:37really
34:37made
34:38Soviet
34:38aircraft
34:39actions
34:40practically
34:41very
34:42vulnerable
34:42we
34:43lost
34:43so
34:43many
34:44helicopters
34:44and
34:45we
34:45were
34:45afraid
34:46to
34:46fly
34:46low
34:47flying
34:47planes
34:47at
34:48the
34:48time
34:48you
34:48know
34:48that
34:48was
34:49the
34:49CIA
34:50ammunition
34:51without
34:51the
34:52stingers
34:53against
34:54the
34:54helicopters
34:55the
34:55Soviets
34:56would
34:56have
34:56won
34:57the
34:58CIA
34:58was
34:59already
34:59supplying
34:59Afghanistan's
35:00Mujahideen
35:01with arms
35:01and money
35:01under
35:02Carter
35:02but under
35:03William Casey
35:03the agency
35:04overarms
35:05dozens of
35:05guerrilla groups
35:06over which it has
35:07no control
35:08even supplying them
35:09with high-tech weapons
35:10so they can attack
35:11the Soviets
35:12anti-aircraft missiles
35:14anti-aircraft missiles
35:14are put in the hands
35:15of Islamist fanatics
35:16in return for
35:17vague promise
35:17they will only be used
35:19against Russian
35:20ten years after the
35:21Soviets left
35:22the weapons are still
35:23in circulation
35:24one billion a year
35:26at the end
35:26a total of maybe
35:28three billion dollars
35:30for the Afghan
35:31effort
35:32you know how much
35:33the
35:35Cold War cost
35:36the American
35:37taxpayer
35:38thirteen trillion
35:41there's not even a
35:44I don't even know
35:45how many zeros
35:46that is
35:46and three billion
35:49to finish it off
35:50was a good buy
35:52it's a bargain
35:53that was a success
35:57the fact that
35:58you created
35:59a group of people
36:00who were armed
36:02led to other problems
36:04in fact
36:04the United States
36:05CIA supplied
36:07the Afghan
36:08Mujahideen
36:09with weapons
36:09with instructions
36:10and as we know
36:12Bin Laden
36:13was one of their
36:14recipients
36:15at the time
36:16the most fundamentalist
36:18groups at that time
36:19are the ones
36:20that we now face
36:22or their
36:25descendants
36:26if you will
36:27are the ones
36:27that we face
36:28we did provide
36:29some arms
36:30to the Afghan
36:32Mujahideen
36:33and some of those
36:35have turned around
36:36and are now
36:37fighting against us
36:38that is
36:39that's true
36:40this is an example
36:41of blowback
36:43of unintended
36:44consequences
36:45the agency
36:47took
36:49actions
36:49to help
36:50bleed
36:51the Soviet Union
36:52and helped
36:53bring down
36:54the Soviet Union
36:55but they did not
36:57understand
36:57that the people
36:58they were helping
36:59were not fighting
37:00just the Soviet Union
37:01we shouldn't have
37:02had so many illusions
37:03about who our
37:04friends were
37:05in that campaign
37:07against the Soviets
37:07in Afghanistan
37:08we didn't choose
37:09our allies very well
37:10we didn't exercise
37:11very much control
37:11over them
37:12and then
37:14after we had
37:15accomplished
37:15the purpose
37:16of bleeding
37:17the Soviet Union
37:19we did not
37:20continue to be
37:21engaged
37:22with those people
37:23we closed down
37:25the shop
37:25the world
37:26then
37:27after 1989
37:29turned its back
37:31on Afghanistan
37:32not CIA
37:33CIA doesn't
37:35build nations
37:35CIA does its thing
37:37we thought CIA
37:38or we thought
37:39the American government
37:40should continue
37:40to provide support
37:41to the Afghans
37:42after 89
37:44and essentially
37:45the United States
37:45walked away
37:46from Afghanistan
37:46and let Afghanistan
37:48become something new
37:49a failed state
37:50and that's a thing
37:52maybe they didn't
37:53need quite so many
37:54arms
37:54Stinger missiles
37:55maybe they didn't
37:58need that much support
37:59and did we create
38:00the Islamist movement
38:01it was a foolhardy
38:03and stupid policy
38:04that almost destroyed
38:06Afghanistan
38:06and the blowback
38:08the effect
38:09of all of that
38:10is being felt now
38:10around the world
38:11with this war on terrorism
38:12I mean we have to look
38:14at our own complicity
38:15in creating the conditions
38:17that allowed a lunatic
38:18like Osama bin Laden
38:19to succeed
38:20in appealing to people
38:22who have no hope
38:28the Soviets are dragged
38:29into the mad race
38:30to overarm the country
38:3110 years of bitter fighting
38:33bleed Russia dry
38:35throughout the Reagan presidency
38:36the CIA's Robert Gates
38:38issues highly exaggerated
38:40assessments of Soviet power
38:41rendering the White House
38:42totally unable to predict
38:44the fall of the Soviet Union
39:04as the casualties increased
39:05and the difficulties
39:07of the war grew
39:08it had the same kind of impact
39:10inside the Soviet Union
39:11that Vietnam had
39:13in the United States
39:14and it contributed
39:15I think significantly
39:17ultimately to the collapse
39:19of the Soviet Union
39:20and it was very clear
39:21that the Soviet Union
39:23could not sustain
39:24the military budget
39:26and the other expenses
39:27associated with its
39:29overseas adventures
39:30that it had been doing
39:31they couldn't afford it
39:33it was a house of cards
39:34it was a financial house of cards
39:35they could not afford
39:36the extension
39:37as we saw
39:37of course the CIA kept
39:40saying that they could
39:41make this go on forever
39:42they could keep spending
39:43the money for weapons
39:43and so forth forever
39:44it wasn't possible
39:45we tried to find out
39:47what part of the Soviet economy
39:49was being invested
39:51in military activities
39:54and I know that our results
39:57there were not
39:59always accurate
40:00I remember telling the Soviets
40:03that their military budget
40:06was 20% of their GNP
40:09it turns out in retrospect
40:11that it was much higher
40:12it was probably somewhere
40:13negative 40%
40:14I think there was an exaggeration
40:16of Soviet economic capabilities
40:19which has to be laid
40:20at the CIA's doorstep
40:21the CIA did not accurately
40:23portray or analyze
40:25the dire straits
40:27in which the Soviet Union
40:28had found itself
40:29you could say to yourself
40:30over the long run
40:32they're not going to be able
40:34to support this
40:36we saw that
40:38we didn't see it as clearly
40:40as we could have
40:42and should have
40:43we sometimes overestimated
40:44the number of missiles
40:45they were going to produce
40:46but you can't look
40:49at 30,000 nuclear warheads
40:51and say
40:52I don't worry about these people
40:55because their economy
40:55is going down
40:56I often my own mind
40:58having talked to Soviet
41:00soviets abroad
41:01during this period
41:02I often questioned
41:04why we thought
41:06they were such a strong power
41:07when in fact
41:08they were not
41:10I think politics
41:12starts to enter into the issue
41:15Pentagon
41:17more weapons systems
41:19sometimes our judgments
41:20about the future
41:21were inaccurate
41:22because we just didn't understand
41:24exactly where the soviets
41:26were going
41:26we were running bomber missions
41:28into northern Russia
41:29just to see how far
41:31we could get
41:32and that's why
41:33the soviet union
41:34ended up spending
41:35so much money
41:36on creating missile defenses
41:38and other defenses
41:39because the united states
41:40was the provocateur
41:42that's bad policy
41:43that was just
41:44dumb cowboy antics
41:46and we should never
41:47have done it
41:49in 1986
41:50when new kremlin head
41:52michael gorachov
41:53meets ronald reagan
41:54the ussr is on the brink
41:55of collapse
41:56the washington post
41:58wrote that robert gates
41:59wasn't the kind of guy
42:00you wanted to invite over
42:01for the weekend
42:03i have no idea
42:05why the post writes
42:06what they do
42:06they had one person
42:09write about me
42:10on soviet affairs
42:12one time
42:12that i was like
42:14eeyore in the
42:15winnie the pooh series
42:16book series
42:17that i could find
42:18the darkest cloud
42:20behind the most
42:21silver lining
42:23because i was so pessimistic
42:24about the soviet union
42:26i was skeptical
42:27of gorbachev
42:28i can remember
42:28telling president reagan
42:31that
42:33rather like gorbachev
42:35remember mr president
42:37this is the last
42:37remaining communist
42:38in the soviet union
42:40because gorbachev
42:41set out
42:41not to dismantle communism
42:44but to fix it
42:44he understood
42:46that it was broken
42:47there was no question
42:48that he was dismantling
42:49the stalinist bureaucracy
42:51but he had nothing
42:52to put in its place
42:53and i think events
42:54proved me right
42:55glasnost and
42:56pelis perestroika
42:57basically got out
42:58of control
42:59and i don't think
43:01he anticipated
43:01the collapse
43:02of the entire system
43:04he wanted to
43:05he wanted to keep
43:06it intact
43:06i thought gorbachev
43:08was telling the truth
43:08my concern was
43:10and actually it began
43:12in 1985-86
43:14right after he
43:14assumed power
43:16i think we all
43:17underestimated
43:18the magnitude
43:19of the political
43:20changes that he
43:20would make
43:21one year later
43:22in 1987
43:23reagan challenges gorbachev
43:26mr gorbachev
43:28tear down
43:29this wall
43:34i don't think anybody
43:35predicted it
43:36i can remember standing
43:37next to ronald reagan
43:38when he said
43:38mr gorbachev
43:39tear this wall down
43:41and thinking to myself
43:43well that's very nice
43:44rhetoric
43:45but it won't happen
43:46so they were very
43:47reluctant to
43:50put forward their
43:52their views
43:52until
43:54quite a bit later
43:56so that was an
43:57intelligence
43:58failure
43:59and we had a
44:00political revolution
44:01in the soviet union
44:02that we just didn't
44:04expect could happen
44:05if anyone thinks
44:07that ronald reagan
44:09won the cold war
44:10then they don't
44:10understand history
44:13it wasn't ronald reagan
44:14and the build up
44:15of our defenses
44:16that won the cold war
44:17it was the internal
44:20contradictions
44:21in a flawed
44:21political system
44:23marxist leninism
44:24that brought the end
44:26the inevitable end
44:28of the soviet union
44:31new american
44:32president george bush
44:33is at the helm
44:34when the soviet union
44:35finally collapses
44:36deeply marked
44:37by the cold war
44:38and his tenure
44:38at the cia
44:39bush couldn't believe
44:40the ussr was really
44:41on its way out
44:47i did a memorandum
44:48for the president
44:50based on material
44:51when i was deputy
44:52national security
44:53advisor
44:53in june of 1989
44:58telling the president
44:59based on materials
45:01that i'd been reading
45:02from cia
45:04that i thought there was a
45:05very real possibility
45:06that gorbachev would not
45:07be around more than
45:08another year or two
45:09and that we should begin
45:10contingency planning
45:12not only for his demise
45:13but for the collapse of the
45:15soviet union
45:16the fact that it did not predict
45:18the day
45:19i think is
45:22again
45:23the intelligence agencies
45:25are not paid to be fortune tellers
45:27we understood that there was severe trouble in the soviet union
45:31mainly economic trouble
45:33but also some political
45:36but to think that that would lead to a collapse of the soviet political system uh... was more than our
45:46imaginations would accept
45:47everybody missed it uh... you couldn't anybody that suggests you could say the berlin wall would be open on november
45:549th is lying to you
45:55did cia analysis say that the soviet union was going to collapse in the way that it collapsed
46:01kind of imploded i think the answer is no it didn't expect that despite what they want to say today
46:09uh...
46:10it was
46:11to a large extent a surprise
46:13nobody can predict anything like that because the one that was most surprised was not me who was in charge
46:18of the cia side
46:19of uh... in charge of the east germany
46:23but uh... eric honiker
46:24and hans milky who said what is this
46:28and they're running east germany
46:29if we take the service the intelligence service with the greatest insight
46:33into what was going on in the soviet union
46:36and that was the kgb
46:37it did not foresee the collapse of the soviet union
46:41either
46:42and its entire existence depended on
46:44the existence of the soviet union
46:46the cia could not predict the collapse but let me tell you i was a kgb officer
46:51a senior official of the state security intelligence
46:53i could not predict it either
46:54we in the u.s asad could not believe that
46:59uh... we were approaching the end of the system
47:01it was very surreal
47:31to watch the soviet union collapse and be proclaimed dead in 1991
47:35was an extraordinary experience
47:37i mean it was
47:39it was very hard to uh...
47:41to um...
47:43to grasp
47:43that that that empire would end
47:47like a like a candle going out
47:50in november 1989
47:52the fall of the berlin wall opens up the way for german reunification
47:57one by one the once democratic countries chase out their communist regimes
48:01the cold war comes to an end
48:28A CIDADE NO BRASIL
48:34A CIDADE NO BRASIL
48:45Novo inimigo é um morto inimigo.
48:48O grande soviet experimento de 75 anos ou então, é feito.
48:53Tudo tinha stopado e não havia mais problemas na Terra.
48:56Nós vim a guerra, o Weston general vim a guerra.
49:00Nós dissemos, tudo está tudo bem, tudo está tudo bem.
49:06Nós cutamos parte do nosso budget de defense.
49:09Nós desmantelamos o nosso milagre e inteligência estabelecimento.
49:14PEOPLE SAID, WELL, WHO NEEDS IT?
49:15YOU KNOW, THIS IS THE END, WE DON'T NEED CIA AND ALL OF THAT.
49:18IT HAD TO PRODUCE A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN PRIORITIES.
49:22YES, THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN THE PRINCIPAL TARGET
49:25AND BASICALLY THE RATIONALE FOR THE FORMATION OF THE AGENCY.
49:29YOU CAN'T SIMPLY SNAP YOUR FINGERS AND SAY,
49:31WE'RE GOING TO SHIFT ALL OF THIS HUMAN INTELLIGENCE TO OTHER PLACES.
49:34IT JUST DOESN'T WORK THAT WAY.
49:35THESE PEOPLE WERE VERY UNHAPPY WHEN THE SOVIET UNION COLLAPSED
49:39BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T HAVE AN ENEMY, SO THEY HAD TO CREATE ONE.
49:41THE END OF THE COLD WAR CAUSED US TO SHIFT A LOT OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF THINGS
49:46AND TRY TO LOOK DOWN THE ROAD AND UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS GOING TO BE HAPPENING.
49:50THE CIA BECOMES IDLE, USELESS, AND POWERLESS
49:54AFTER LOSING ITS ONE GREAT ENEMY, ITS RAISON DETTE.
49:57AT AGENCY HEADQUARTERS IN LANGLEY,
49:59FORMER AGENTS LONGING FOR THE DAYS WHEN THEY WERE STILL LIKENED TO JAMES BOND
50:03ARE CALLED BACK TO TELL SCHOOLCHILDREN ABOUT THE GLORY DAYS OF THE CIA,
50:07THREE LETTERS THAT HAVE BECOME A MYTH.
50:13THIS IS JUST TO INFORM KIDS.
50:15A WAY TO PUT A HUMAN FACE, IF YOU WILL, ON THE AGENCY.
50:20THE STORY'S OVER.
50:21THAT GAME IS FINISHED.
50:23IT WAS A WORLD WHERE THE SOVIET UNION HERE AND THE UNITED STATES THERE,
50:27AND WE WERE IN A GAME OF CHESS TO TAKE AS MANY PIECES OF THE REST OF THE WORLD
50:33AS WE COULD, AND IN THE END, IN 1991, THE SIDE THAT HAD THE MOST PIECES WON,
50:42AND THEY DIDN'T WIN.
50:45A FEW MONTHS AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION,
50:48FORMER CIA DIRECTOR WILLIAM COBE AND KGB HEAD OLEK KALUGIN
50:52CO-HOST A RECEPTION IN WASHINGTON TO LAUNCH A VIDEO GAME.
50:58WITH NO ONE LEFT TO FIGHT IT, THE COLD WAR WAS INDEED OVER.
51:03GO ON, IT'S WARHURST. WE'VE GOT A SITUATION.
51:10GOOD LUCK.
51:13GOOD LUCK.
51:26EVERY TIME YOU THINK THE AMERICANS CAN'T GET ANY DUMBER,
51:29THEY DO SOMETHING REALLY FUCKED UP.
51:31THEY DO SOMETHING.
51:34Amém.
52:04Amém.
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