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01:01In 1967, American forces in South Vietnam launched a series of powerful attacks on the Vietnamese Communist guerrillas.
01:10The aim was to take the war to the NLF's biggest units by attacking their bases in overwhelming strength.
01:25The Americans hoped that the guerrillas would stand and fight.
01:29They could then annihilate them with vastly superior firepower.
01:50The offensives were designed to use the tactics of search and destroy on the grandest scale yet.
01:57Some of the biggest helicopter operations of the war were mounted to try and trap entire Viet Cong regiments.
02:08More guns and aircraft were called in to support the attacks than had ever been unleashed on a Vietnam battlefield.
02:22The Americans meant to damage the Viet Cong so badly, they would be unable to carry on the war.
02:29In fact, the Americans would fail to wipe out the Viet Cong's biggest units.
02:35Despite heavy losses in men and equipment, the guerrillas would return even stronger, ready to launch their own offensive campaign.
03:06By mid-1965, the mission of American troops in South Vietnam was changing fast.
03:14They had come to secure air bases, but now they were actively looking for combat with the Viet Cong.
03:22On May 18th, 1965, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the first U.S. Army infantry unit to arrive in Vietnam, began
03:33operations.
03:41Its first task was to sweep a wide area around its base near Saigon.
03:56The 173rd, the 173rd, met no real resistance.
04:00There were thousands of Viet Cong troops in the Saigon area, but they remained elusive.
04:16more american troops arrived as the weeks went on questions were asked about the whole policy
04:24was it wise to send a conventional army with its slow-moving heavily armed infantry its planes its
04:32tanks against guerrilla units that might be impossible to pin down the u.s commander in
04:48vietnam general william c westmoreland insisted that the army could find and beat the enemy there
04:55were soon encouraging signs in august 1965 in operation starlight u.s marines surrounded a
05:06vietcong regiment of 2 000 men and defeated them in a full-scale battle
05:18the next major challenge was posed by the nlf's allies the professional troops of the north
05:24vietnamese army
05:41by september 1965 two north vietnamese army regiments the 32nd and the 33rd had moved down the ho chi minh
05:51trail
05:51and infiltrated from cambodia into south vietnam
05:57the 66th regiment was following close behind
06:04the plan was to take the provincial capital ply khu and advance along highway 19
06:10to the coast at key none splitting the south in two
06:19the americans were determined to block the nva's attempt to reach kina
06:27the idea was to place in the anke valley the most mobile force they possessed the first air cavalry division
06:44the air cavalry was the first formation anywhere in the world designed around the helicopter
06:50the division was 15 000 strong and had 480 machines five times the number of a normal infantry division
07:00the whole idea had until recently been an experiment with an eye to any future war in europe
07:08no one really knew how it would work in a place like vietnam
07:24combat units of the first cavalry began to arrive at anke in mid-september 1965
07:31by october the division was fully operational
07:39its base camp radcliffe had grown into a massive complex of helicopter pads supply dumps accommodation
07:48and maintenance facilities
07:53for the officers and men of the air cavalry there was a great deal to prove and they were determined
07:59to take
08:00the battle to the enemy
08:09for their part north vietnamese army commanders were just as keen for a fight as the americans
08:15their 6 000 troops already in the border area meant to keep up the pressure on south vietnamese government forces
08:22at the same time they aimed to find out how well u.s troops would fight
08:27and how their own soldiers would cope with american weapons and tactics
08:54after infiltrating into the south the 32nd and the 33rd north vietnamese regiments
09:01had established a base area on the high ground of the chu pong massif
09:08on october 20th 1965 the 33rd regiment laid siege to an american special forces camp at ply my
09:19after a siege that lasted six days the south vietnamese army
09:23backed by the u.s air cavalry secured that camp and both nva regiments withdrew to the chu pong
09:31there they meant to join with the newly arrived 66th regiment before renewing their campaign
09:42the american plan was to fly in the whole of the first battalion of the 7th cavalry
09:47to find the nva regiments it was the first time u.s troops would face nva regulars
09:54the first step was to create an artillery fire support base near the chu pong at landing zone falcon
10:01next the lead elements of the first battalion landed at lz x-ray
10:06right in front of them were nearly all the 66th and 33rd nva regiments
10:28when company b pushed towards the spur of the chu pong it was attacked immediately and a platoon was encircled
10:36company a was also pinned down by fierce fire before the rest of the first battalion was landed
10:51a and b companies then launched attacks to relieve the encircled platoon but were driven back
11:03the following morning the americans reinforced by another company were hit by waves of nva troops
11:10heavy fire support wrecked havoc on the attackers and by now another american battalion was on its way overland
11:25in the east
11:26conceding defeat the shattered north vietnamese regiments began to pull back towards the e trang valley
11:31in the safety of cambodia
11:43after the fight at lz x-ray the chu pong was bombed by almost a hundred b-52s each unloading
11:5017 tons of high explosives
12:04for the next 10 days the nva regiments were pursued relentlessly by the americans
12:13but although the north vietnamese were in retreat they were still capable of hitting back
12:18in one textbook ambush mounted by a rearguard battalion of the 66th regiment
12:25155 americans were killed
12:31for u.s forces it was the most costly day of the war so far
12:42in the battle of the e drang valley in the ply coup operation the first cavalry division lost 300 dead
12:49but the nva had suffered much worse
12:52thirteen hundred north vietnamese soldiers had been killed and many more wounded
12:57it was a clear-cut victory for the americans
13:01two enemy regiments were all but smashed and there was now little danger of south vietnam being caught in two
13:24the e drang battle was a major boost for u.s commanders
13:27it seemed to prove their strategy was the right one
13:32the enemy's big units could be made to stand and fight and take heavy casualties in the process
13:44if the communists could be forced into more battles like e drang they would quickly suffer such losses
13:51they would have to abandon their whole campaign
14:15the final push to use american combat forces in south vietnam had come from president lyndon johnson himself
14:22yet he had never wanted to fight a war in asia
14:28johnson's priority was social reform
14:30his great society program
14:33and he feared the war in vietnam might fatally damage his plans
14:42the problem for johnson was that if the war grew unpopular
14:46it could cost him the political support his program needed
14:49on the other hand if vietnam was lost to communism it would be just as damaging
15:04the only solution that johnson could see and the one agreed with his defense secretary robert mcnamara
15:10was an uneasy compromise
15:13the u.s. would carry on fighting the war
15:15but everything possible would be done to limit its impact on the american people
15:21dramatic measures like calling up the reserves or the national guard had to be avoided
15:46above all johnson was determined to keep china and the soviet union out of the conflict in vietnam
15:53by now both communist powers had nuclear weapons and china had almost unlimited manpower
16:05fighting the chinese in asia would demand millions of american troops and cost untold casualties
16:22johnson's solution was to fight a limited war
16:25he restricted the bombing campaign against north vietnam to personally approve targets
16:31he also ruled out invading the north no matter how much it backed the nlf
16:58in fact general westmoreland the u.s commander in south vietnam had no desire yet to go into what he
17:05felt
17:05were communist sanctuaries in neighboring countries
17:08but what he did want was a much more effective bombing campaign to cut the flow of supplies and men
17:14to the guerrillas
17:22if that happened westmoreland was confident he could win
17:26he would need more troops but once he had built up his forces he was sure he could seize the
17:31initiative
17:52the leaders of the national liberation front were rarely able to meet
17:59the leaders of the national liberation front were rarely able to meet
18:02privacy in a remote forest area near the cambodian border
18:11the fear was that a single american bombing raid could wipe out the leadership at a stroke
18:17security was intense and avoiding enemy units meant that some members had to travel for weeks to reach the conference
18:37The Central Committee had 52 members, and was led by the chairman, Nguyen Hu Tho.
18:43Tho was a French-educated lawyer, and to many in South Vietnam, the acceptable moderate
18:48face of the Viet Cong.
19:02But behind Tho were lifelong Communists like the General Secretary, Huentan Phat, an architect
19:09and the NLF's foremost thinker.
19:16Another hardliner was the French-educated lawyer, Tron Bou Kim, one of the NLF's founders.
19:29By now, Northerners were in almost full control of the military command, and through them,
19:35North Vietnam was making sure its policies were followed.
19:42The NLF guerrilla army was even more closely controlled by the North.
19:50Its top commander was a North Vietnamese army general, Nguyen Chi Thanh.
19:55Thanh was noted as a political firebrand, and wanted to stay on the offensive, whatever the
20:00cost or the dangers.
20:16Thanh was equal in rank to the North Vietnamese defense minister, General Japp, who favored
20:21a more cautious approach in the South, now that American firepower had entered the equation.
20:31By the end of 1965, Japp was winning the argument.
20:36The result would soon be felt on the battlefields of South Vietnam.
21:04When American combat troops had first arrived in Vietnam, few U.S. officials had
21:10believed that the South could survive.
21:18By the end of 1965, the picture had changed dramatically.
21:25The new government, led by Air Marshal Key, was growing in confidence.
21:29The arrival of American troops had given morale a huge boost, and there was no longer a danger
21:35that the Communists could win quickly.
21:44For General Westmoreland, the next stage was to go on the offensive against the Viet Cong.
21:49His aim was to take on the enemy's big formations on the battlefield, and eliminate them, one by one.
22:04The tactics would be those of search and destroy, finding and trapping the enemy, then smashing his
22:11forces with massive firepower.
22:23General Westmoreland's strategy would be to wear the Viet Cong down by relentless attrition.
22:30In battle after battle, Westmoreland meant to force the Viet Cong to sacrifice troops and materials faster than they could
22:37ever be replaced.
22:46The measure of success would be the amount of supplies destroyed, the number of bases knocked out, and above all,
22:54the body count, the number of enemy soldiers actually killed in battle.
23:13For defense, four national priority areas were agreed by the Americans and the South Vietnamese.
23:23The coastal provinces around Da Nang and Quien Nang, and the central part of the Mekong Delta, and above all,
23:31Saigon, the capital.
23:34These were to be first consolidated, and then made the springboards for large-scale search-and-destroy operations against enemy
23:41units in base areas.
23:54The greatest Viet Cong concentrations in the whole of South Vietnam were known to lie between the capital and the
24:01Cambodian border.
24:04Through this area ran several strategic roads and the river routes into the capital.
24:15There were believed to be enemy bases in the Iron Triangle, War Zone C, and War Zone D.
24:26These base areas were the destination for most of the supplies and men that came down the Ho Chi Minh
24:32Trail,
24:32and it was these bases the Americans would have to attack if the Viet Cong were to be finally defeated.
24:50A key part of the American strategy was to stop the Viet Cong replacing the men and supplies they lost
24:57in battle.
24:58The commando hunt bombing campaign was hitting the North Vietnamese transport system
25:03and the staging areas for troops infiltrating down to the South.
25:13During 1965, U.S. aircraft had flown 55,000 individual sorties over the North.
25:32In the South itself, the Americans meant to take over most of the fighting.
25:36The U.S. forces were better armed and trained than South Vietnamese government troops.
25:47They were much more mobile and had the backing of enormous firepower.
25:57Meanwhile, to the intense frustration of many South Vietnamese Army commanders,
26:02government forces would deal mainly with local security.
26:05only elite units would take part in offensive operations.
26:32In December 1965, Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese leadership
26:38ordered a change in the way the war in the South was to be fought.
26:42From now on, the Viet Cong would avoid pitched battles with the Americans
26:46unless the odds were clearly in their favor.
26:50There would be more hit-and-run attacks and ambushes.
27:02To counter the American build-up, Viet Cong recruitment would be stepped up
27:07and more North Vietnamese Army troops would be infiltrated into South Vietnam.
27:20The Vietnamese communists, following the example of Chinese guerrillas before them,
27:26had always given the highest priority to creating safe base areas.
27:30They were training grounds, logistics centers, and headquarters.
27:41They also offered secure sanctuaries for times when the war might go badly.
27:55Hiding the base areas had always been a high priority for the Viet Cong.
27:59Now, with American spotter planes everywhere, it was more vital than ever to protect them.
28:05In remote swamps or forests, there were few problems, but nearer the capital, it was much more difficult.
28:21The answer was to build enormous warrens of underground tunnels.
28:26The biggest were in the Iron Triangle and in the Ku Chi district, only 20 miles from Saigon.
28:46In the Ku Chi base area, any facility used by the guerrillas, like a conference room or training area,
28:53had almost instant access to the safety of underground.
29:02Hidden trapdoors led below, past guarded chambers, to long passages.
29:09At regular intervals, branches led back to the surface and other secret entrances.
29:18Some openings were even concealed beneath the waters of streams or canals.
29:28At the deeper levels, there were chambers carved out for arms factories and a well for the base's water supply.
29:37There were store rooms for weapons and rice, and there was sometimes a hospital or forward aid station.
29:48Long communication tunnels connected the base with other distant complexes.
29:57Base kitchens were always near the surface, with long carved-out chimneys designed to diffuse cooking smoke
30:04and release it some distance away.
30:11Near the kitchens were the guerrillas' sleeping chambers, where they could survive for weeks at a time if need be.
30:22Everywhere on the top level, there were tunnels leading back upwards to hundreds of hidden firing posts for defense of
30:29the base.
30:40The base area at Koo-Chi was a vast network with 200 miles of tunnels.
30:47There were other complexes too, big and small, scattered all over the country.
30:53Each villager in an NLF area had to dig a meter of tunnel a day.
31:01There was even a standard handbook specifying exactly how tunnels were to be built.
31:17The orders coming from NLF headquarters were absolutely clear.
31:22Tunnels were not to be treated as mere shelters.
31:25They were to be fighting bases, able to provide continuous support for troops.
31:36Even if the village was in enemy hands, the NLF beneath should still be fully capable of offensive operations.
32:08When Washington had decided to send American troops to fight the Viet Cong, the biggest question had been, how many
32:15would be needed to win?
32:22Military planners accepted that to win a war against guerrillas, an army needed to outnumber them 10 or even 15
32:29to 1.
32:31But American generals were now arguing that the Viet Cong was no longer a guerrilla force, but a conventional army
32:38of big units.
32:50Because U.S. commanders were confident they were not fighting a guerrilla war, they saw no need for a 10
32:56to 1 superiority in forces.
32:59Against a regular army, 3 to 1 was usually considered enough.
33:11400,000 U.S. troops, plus the South Vietnamese army, would be just sufficient to reach that target.
33:21The plan was to have most of the men in Vietnam by the end of 1966.
33:42The South Vietnamese army had divided the country into four tactical zones, with an army corps in each.
33:53As American forces arrived, military assistance command headquarters in Saigon assigned them to a corps tactical zone.
34:06By the end of 1965, the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force commanded four regiments in I Corps.
34:15The 1st Air Cavalry Division was in II Corps along with a brigade of the 101st Airborne.
34:24The 1st Infantry Division and the 173rd Airborne were in III Corps.
34:36During 1966, the plan was to build up U.S. strength by two marine regiments, three army divisions, an armored
34:45cavalry regiment, and two light infantry brigades.
34:54The combat strength of allied nations would also increase to two Korean divisions and a marine brigade, an Australian task
35:02force, plus New Zealand and Philippine units.
35:16By late December 1965, almost 150,000 U.S. troops had arrived in Vietnam.
35:25The Air Force had over 500 aircraft at eight bases.
35:30The huge scale of the buildup had placed an incredible strain on facilities and installations.
35:42There was a frenzy of building as Army and Navy engineers, along with American civilian contractors, improved airfields, bases, and
35:50roads.
36:02The most ambitious construction project of all was a gigantic port and logistics base at Cam Ran Bay.
36:12The whole effort was to cost a hundred million dollars, but the new facility would quickly ease the pressure on
36:19Saigon's overloaded docks.
36:21By now, American supplies arriving in Vietnam by sea were topping 300,000 tons a month and rising fast.
36:53As the Cold War had produced one world crisis after another,
36:56the U.S. armed forces had been on a war footing almost continuously for five years.
37:03Budgets were generous, and all the services were superbly well-equipped and trained.
37:18Many American officers and NCOs already had combat experience in Vietnam as military advisors.
37:26Most of the more senior personnel had fought in World War II in Korea.
37:39But for the enlisted men, many of whom were draftees, their training programs rarely prepared them for what was to
37:45come.
37:56Even to the best-trained soldiers, the reality of arriving in Vietnam could come as a shock.
38:03The climate was exhausting, with extremes of heat and humidity.
38:11The Vietnamese people and their culture were totally unfamiliar.
38:18Many American soldiers were from U.S. cities, and the lives of Southeast Asian peasants were beyond anything they knew.
38:35But in spite of the strangeness of the world in which they had come to fight,
38:39at this stage, morale was high amongst American troops in Vietnam.
38:44There was confidence in the Army's leadership, and most units had a strong sense of camaraderie.
38:49There was also the knowledge that a soldier's basic tour of duty was a finite 13 months and 14 days.
39:09While thousands of Americans were getting their first look at Vietnam,
39:13the South Vietnamese Army was in its sixth year of war.
39:18Most of the Army's 300,000 soldiers were reluctant conscripts.
39:23Many were underfed, and desertions were outstripping recruitment by 2,000 a month.
39:38As for the officers, corruption was rife, and many sold their units' food and supplies.
39:45The most senior commanders had nearly all been appointed for their political and family connections.
40:06For years, the basic infantry weapon of the American soldier had been the M-14 rifle.
40:12It was a dependable weapon, but was unstable when fired on full automatic.
40:22The M-14 would stay in service with some units for a long time yet.
40:29But a new weapon was starting to reach the troops in Vietnam.
40:39The M-16 was a light, compact assault rifle made of metal alloy and plastic.
40:45It was effective up to 400 yards and had a very high rate of fire.
41:00Although, on paper, the M-16 seemed to offer the infantryman everything he could wish for in a rifle,
41:06the reality was very different on the battlefield.
41:12The M-16 was prone to jamming, a nightmare for the soldier in a firefight.
41:19The problem was reduced by scrupulous cleaning,
41:22and later modifications would cure the problem completely.
41:27But in the meantime, many men viewed the M-16 with deep mistrust.
41:44In an American infantry platoon, the most valued weapon of all was the M-60 machine gun.
41:53The M-60 could fire more than a hundred rounds a minute and had a range of a thousand yards.
42:00The gun was usually operated by a two-man crew, but it could also be fired from the hip.
42:08The M-60 was extremely robust and well suited to the harsh conditions of battle in Vietnam.
42:26As well as the weapons they took with them into the field,
42:29American infantry could call on heavy fire support at any time.
42:34Ground attack aircraft could saturate the area with high explosives or napalm,
42:38while few operations were ever mounted out of range of friendly artillery.
42:52Unlike aircraft, guns were not affected by weather or visibility,
42:56and they were extremely accurate.
43:01The biggest American artillery pieces, the 175-millimeter howitzers,
43:07could destroy a target at a range of 20 miles.
43:25By now, every infantry division depended heavily on helicopters to maneuver its forces on the battlefield
43:31and to carry supplies and heavy equipment.
43:36For the Army, the basic infantry transport helicopter was the UH-1 Huey.
43:44The men called it a slick because its frame was uncluttered by guns or rockets.
43:54The Huey was able to carry 11 soldiers and their equipment.
43:58For protection, each helicopter had a door gunner with an M-60.
44:08As well as Hueys for transporting infantry and general supplies,
44:13there were Huey gunships for escort and assault.
44:17The gunships were armed with a formidable array of rockets, machine guns, and grenade launchers.
44:49By the end of 1965,
44:51the total strength of the NLF and North Vietnamese Army units in the South
44:55had grown to 206,000 men and women.
44:59Of these, 36,000 were main force NVA troops.
45:07The rest were regional and local guerrillas.
45:16The main force Viet Cong units
45:18were used to launch large-scale offensives over a wide area.
45:22They were uniformed, full-time soldiers.
45:30Regional forces were also full-time,
45:33but they operated inside their own districts.
45:39If necessary, their units could come together
45:43to make bigger formations for a large-scale attack.
45:47If enemy pressure became too great,
45:49they could break again down into smaller units and scatter.
45:58As for the local guerrillas based in the villages,
46:02their main job was political.
46:04They were a constant reminder of the armed presence of the Viet Cong
46:07and worked to increase local support.
46:16They were also expected to defend nearby installations
46:20like bunkers and tunnel complexes.
46:40Viet Cong forces were commanded by the central office
46:44for South Vietnam near the Cambodian border.
46:50The NLF deployed two divisions,
46:53the 9th with three regiments and the 5th with two.
46:57Four more regiments were independent main force units.
47:06The NLF also controlled more than 40 local and regional battalions.
47:17Further north, all communist operations
47:20were run by the North Vietnamese Army.
47:25The NVA deployed three divisions and nine independent regiments.
47:32The NLF deployed three divisions and nine independent regiments.
47:40In 1965, American aircraft made tens of thousands of bombing attacks
47:46against the Ho Chi Minh supply trail
47:48and on logistic centers in North Vietnam.
47:57In spite of their efforts,
47:59the Viet Cong were getting more weapons
48:01and reinforcements from the North than ever before.
48:05The average Viet Cong unit was now better armed
48:09than at any time in the movement's history.
48:19Although the guerrillas depended on the Ho Chi Minh trail
48:22for arms, ammunition, and special equipment,
48:2521 tons a day was enough to keep them fighting.
48:29Their other needs were met inside South Vietnam.
48:38To feed the troops,
48:40rice taxes were imposed on farmers
48:42and every possible local resource was used and reused.
48:46Nothing was wasted.
48:48Even the American supplies and containers
48:51left behind on the battlefield
48:52were put to some military purpose.
49:16In the last 12 months,
49:18the Viet Cong had suffered terrible losses.
49:2040,000 had been killed or captured in 1965.
49:28Yet the casualties had little effect
49:31on Viet Cong fighting strength.
49:33Losses in main force units
49:35were easily made up
49:36from the ranks of the local guerrillas.
49:45The biggest problem was the high casualty rate among officers.
49:49To replace these,
49:51the Viet Cong depended on trained men
49:53coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail from the North.
50:03One in ten Viet Cong were now Northern,
50:06and the Viet Cong was increasingly run
50:09by the Northerners right down to the village level.
50:17By this time,
50:19most Viet Cong main force soldiers
50:21had fought for years
50:22and were highly skilled and motivated.
50:25Every attack was planned down to the last detail
50:29using elaborate models and endless rehearsals.
50:33The troops were well trained
50:35in infantry tactics and night operations.
50:55They were also masters of camouflage.
51:01While main force troops
51:03thought of themselves as professional soldiers,
51:05local Viet Cong were far less confident.
51:12Mostly, the recruits were young teenagers,
51:15and while many were motivated by idealism,
51:18others had been pressured or shamed into joining.
51:23What many had in common
51:25were real doubts about their ability
51:27to fight heavily armed
51:28and well-trained American soldiers.
51:48Most main force Viet Cong troops
51:50were now armed with a superb assault rifle.
51:57The AK-47 was a Russian design
52:00copied by the Chinese.
52:04It was comparable to the American M-16,
52:07but it had fewer moving parts.
52:10The stock was wood, not plastic,
52:12and was far more reliable
52:14in Vietnam's testing conditions.
52:17The AK-47 also had the advantage
52:20of a 30-round magazine
52:22compared to the 20 of the American rifle.
52:28The Viet Cong had a range
52:30of effective Soviet and Chinese
52:32light and medium machine guns.
52:34They also had heavy machine guns,
52:36though never enough.
52:42The bigger weapons were specially valued
52:45for defense against American helicopters.
52:59For destroying armored vehicles or bunkers,
53:02the Viet Cong had highly effective
53:04rocket-propelled grenades
53:05and recoilless rifles.
53:10Mortars were also available
53:11in large numbers
53:12and had the advantage
53:13of being very easy to transport.
53:24Many weapons,
53:25including booby traps and mines,
53:27were homemade in the villages.
53:29The materials ranged
53:31from scavenged tin cans
53:33to discarded wire,
53:34but the most important ingredients
53:36were provided by the enemy.
53:44In a year,
53:46dud American bombs
53:47could leave more than 20,000 tons
53:49of explosives scattered
53:51around the Vietnamese countryside.
53:53After air raids,
53:55volunteers retrieved the duds
53:57and the dangerous business
53:58of creating a new weapon began.
54:03In 1966,
54:06locally made devices
54:07would kill more than
54:081,000 American soldiers.
54:30For General Westmoreland,
54:32the close of 1965
54:34marked the end
54:35of the defensive stage
54:36of the American war
54:37in Vietnam.
54:39In the coming year,
54:41he meant to complete
54:42his build-up.
54:43Then,
54:44he would launch
54:45the full-scale offensives
54:46that would lead
54:47to final victory.
54:53The key to Westmoreland's strategy
54:55was that Communist main force units
54:58would be destroyed
54:59in set-piece battles
55:00by concentrated American firepower.
55:07Westmoreland was confident
55:08the Viet Cong
55:09would stand and fight.
55:12But there were some signs
55:14that the Viet Cong
55:15might be changing
55:16their tactics.
55:32In the last weeks
55:34of 1965,
55:36the Viet Cong
55:36concentrated their attacks
55:38on poorly defended targets
55:40like isolated outposts
55:41and remote towns.
55:44strong South Vietnamese
55:45or American forces
55:46were making contact
55:48with big guerrilla units
55:49less and less often.
55:54At the same time,
55:56there were more sniping incidents
55:57and ambushes.
55:59As a result,
56:00while Viet Cong casualties
56:02went down,
56:03American and South Vietnamese
56:04army losses
56:05increased dramatically.
56:20There was even more disturbing news
56:23in store for American commanders
56:25as 1965 came to a close.
56:29Washington's Defense Intelligence Agency
56:31reported that the Rolling Thunder
56:33bombing campaign
56:34against North Vietnam
56:36was failing.
56:44After 10 months
56:46of increasingly fierce air attacks,
56:48the North showed no signs
56:50it was about to give up
56:51its support for the Viet Cong.
56:55Nor had the bombing
56:57staunched the flow
56:58of men and supplies
56:59to the guerrillas.
57:02That meant only one thing.
57:04The real contest
57:06was still to come
57:07on the battlefields
57:09of South Vietnam.
57:14East Korean
57:14which was still here
57:14in certain Gosh
57:14but only one thing
57:16was still around
57:17all of the trouble
57:17the
57:17the
57:18who
57:18used the
57:38första
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