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01:00In early 1968, United States Marines fought the North Vietnamese Army in one of the most bitterly contested battles of
01:09the Vietnam War.
01:14For 77 days, 20,000 NVA troops laid siege to the Marine Combat Base at Khe Sanh.
01:25At stake was the control of the gateway to South Vietnam.
01:43The siege of Khe Sanh was the longest single battle of the Vietnam War.
01:50It was also one of the most violent.
01:58There were savage artillery duels, mass infantry assaults, and fierce hand-to-hand combat.
02:11Khe Sanh also saw the most concentrated tactical bombing campaign in history, as the Americans used massed airpower to try
02:20and break the siege.
02:32The North Vietnamese meant their attack on Khe Sanh to deliver an historic victory that would destroy the will of
02:39the United States to carry on the war.
02:45In fact, in spite of immense sacrifice, the North Vietnamese Army would fail.
02:56After Khe Sanh, the NVA would never again take on the Americans in a set-piece battle.
03:26In March 1965, three and a half thousand U.S. Marines
03:30had been the first American combat troops sent to South Vietnam.
03:35Their orders were to defend an air base at Da Nang, but their mission didn't stay defensive for long.
03:51In spite of years of U.S. backing, South Vietnam was close to losing its war against communist Viet Cong
03:58guerrillas.
04:02By July 1965, Washington had decided to commit 200,000 U.S. troops to the fight, and the Marines had
04:10gone on the offensive.
04:21American commanders saw their role as taking on the Viet Cong's big units, the battalions and regiments.
04:33The units were well-trained and had been armed with modern weapons by North Vietnam.
04:41Increasingly, the NLF's war was controlled from the North,
04:45and North Vietnam had already begun to send its own troops to fight alongside the guerrillas.
04:57The first big battle between the Americans and the Viet Cong was in August 1965.
05:06In Operation Starlight, the Marines smashed a Viet Cong regiment.
05:14In November, in the Yed Rang Valley, the 1st Air Cavalry Division battled nearly 6,000 North Vietnamese Army troops.
05:22According to General Westmoreland, the Americans killed more than 1,200 in a storm of heavy fire.
05:35American commanders were buoyed up by their apparent success on the battlefield.
05:41More such victories would quickly force the Viet Cong to give up their campaign.
05:47The optimism did not last long.
05:55By the close of 1965, the Americans were finding it impossible to make the Viet Cong fight pitched battles.
06:06Meantime, U.S. casualties were rising fast from ambushes, booby traps, and surprise attacks.
06:29By the start of 1966, Military Assistance Command, known as MACV, the main American headquarters in South Vietnam,
06:38deployed 184,000 U.S. troops.
06:46Army units were concentrated in the Saigon area, in a strip along the Central Coast and in the Central Highlands.
06:59The Marines of the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force were further north, in the area known as I-Corps.
07:10I-Corps bordered the demilitarized zone, separating North and South Vietnam.
07:24The Marines now had three main bases in I-Corps, at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai.
07:34While the South Vietnamese Army had headquarters at Hue and Quang Nhai.
07:43The threat came from NLF battalions in the countryside and the border areas,
07:48the North Vietnamese Army on the demilitarized zone,
07:51and from tens of thousands of local NLF inside the heavily populated coastal belt.
08:07To the NLF, the coastal villages were a priceless asset.
08:14They produced vast quantities of rice which could feed the big guerrilla units in the remote interior.
08:25They also produced large numbers of recruits.
08:33Over the years, the NLF had gained control of thousands of villages.
08:40They had created their own local administration and village guerrilla forces.
08:50The villages also played host to the big units as they passed through on operations.
09:01All the areas in which the American Marines had built their bases were surrounded by NLF-controlled villages.
09:10Marine sweeps through the settlements rarely managed to find them.
09:19Viet Cong tactics were to pull out the main guerrilla forces and officials,
09:24leaving only snipers and booby traps behind.
09:33After the Marines had moved on, the fighters would quickly return.
09:51The Marines were forced to think again about how they could fight this new and unsettling kind of war.
10:03The answer the Marines came up with was a pacification program.
10:09The idea was to fight the NLF for control of the villages and to do it around the clock.
10:21Squad and company-sized units patrolled vigorously and mounted constant ambushes.
10:35The rice harvest was protected to keep it out of Viet Cong hands.
10:42In areas that stayed hostile, whole villages were moved by force to districts already pacified.
10:56The Marines' aggressive military tactics were combined with persuasion.
11:01In civic action projects, widely known as the Hearts and Minds Program,
11:06villagers were given medical aid and help with economic development.
11:10The Marines claimed the policy was highly successful and helped bring more than a million people under government control.
11:17However, in reality, it was just an illusion.
11:20And the NLF still managed to infiltrate these areas, which continued to abound with sympathizers.
11:35The change came in mid-1966.
11:39General Westmoreland, the commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, had never agreed with the Marines' methods.
11:46He believed that controlling villages was a waste of highly trained and heavily armed troops.
11:54Westmoreland argued that the Marines should instead be used to pursue the enemy's big units in the remote interior.
12:12In fact, events would soon force the Marines to reduce their whole pacification effort.
12:18Civil unrest erupted between South Vietnamese factions right across the country.
12:28The North saw its opportunity and assembled thousands of troops poised to cross into the South.
12:37It was a threat the Marines could not ignore.
13:00The North Vietnamese Army's 324B Division crossed the demilitarized zone in late May 1966 and encountered a Marine battalion.
13:10The NVA held their ground, and the largest battle of the war to date broke out near Dong Ha.
13:18General Walt moved most of the 3rd Marine Division north, 5,000 men in five battalions.
13:30In Operation Hastings, the Marines, backed by South Vietnamese Army troops, the heavy guns of U.S. warships,
13:37and the Marines' own artillery and air power, drove the NVA back over the demilitarized zone in just over three
13:46weeks.
13:51Because the Marines were forbidden to cross the demilitarized zone into North Vietnam,
13:56the 324B Division, along with elements of two more divisions,
14:03were able to regroup and return to the South almost at once.
14:11The Marines were forced to mount Operation Prairie, which tied up 11 battalions,
14:16nearly 10,000 troops, for a full 10 months.
14:25To support the operations, they and Special Forces units built a string of combat bases
14:31stretching from Jialin in the east to Khe Sanh in the west.
14:45Casualties on both sides were heavy in Operations Hastings and Prairie.
14:51Although over 300 Americans were dead and nearly 1,500 wounded,
14:55it was a victory for the Americans.
15:06However, the NVA divisions had not been beaten.
15:10They simply slipped back across the demilitarized zone
15:13from where they could return at any time.
15:25The Marines now had little choice but to keep strong forces in the area,
15:29as the Americans had expected,
15:31in the first months of 1967,
15:34North Vietnamese Army units once more began infiltrating into the South.
15:47The Marine reaction was to mount big operations to find them and cut them off.
16:04Both sides were determined to control the hilltops dominating the valley trails.
16:10The bloodiest battles of all were those fought for the hills surrounding the Marine combat base at Khe Sanh.
16:15These were 881 North and South and Hill 861, thus named for their height and feet.
16:34American bases below the demilitarized zone were strung out along Route 1 and Route 9.
16:44The command center was Dong Ha,
16:47while Camp Carroll and the Rock Pile were artillery bases with long-range heavy guns.
16:55On the western end of Route 9,
16:58Long Vy, a special forces camp,
17:00and the Marine base at Khe Sanh were particularly important.
17:08They dominated North Vietnamese infiltration routes into the South
17:12from the demilitarized zone and from Laos.
17:26Khe Sanh combat base sat astride the valley of the Rao Kwan River.
17:30With Dong Tree Mountain to the north
17:33and a series of smaller, numbered hills to the northwest.
17:44In April 1967,
17:46elements of the NVA 325C Division
17:49moved onto hills 881 North
17:52and south and hill 861
17:56and stormed a signal relay station atop hill 950.
18:02They built fortifications and placed artillery to support the main effort,
18:06an infantry assault by all three of the division's regiments,
18:10more than 5,000 men.
18:16The base at Khe Sanh had been defended by only a single company of Marines.
18:23But now, American strength was raised to two battalions with more artillery.
18:30By May 5th, after violent battles,
18:33the Marines had seized all three key hills.
18:40The battered North Vietnamese Division
18:42pulled back over the demilitarized zone
18:45and across the Laotian border.
18:55After the hill fights at Khe Sanh,
18:57the war on the demilitarized zone
18:59shifted to the eastern sector.
19:04North Vietnamese artillery,
19:06hidden inside the zone,
19:08hammered Marine bases,
19:10causing heavy casualties.
19:1430,000 NVA troops
19:17tried to infiltrate past the American outposts.
19:26In July 1967,
19:29there was heavy fighting
19:30near Kan Tien,
19:31killing 1,300 NVA troops.
19:50During the last months of 1967,
19:53the Marines launched one operation after another
19:57to try and intercept infiltrating NVA forces.
20:01It was no easy task.
20:05The terrain was rough.
20:08There were never enough helicopters,
20:10and poor weather often shut down air operations.
20:18Meanwhile,
20:19powerful NVA units were once again
20:22massing in the hills and forests
20:24around the Khe Sanh combat base.
20:44Since the start of the conflict,
20:46North Vietnamese leaders
20:47had been arguing bitterly
20:49about how best to win the war in the south.
20:53The president,
20:55Ho Chi Minh,
20:56was by now aging and in poor health,
20:58but he still had enormous influence.
21:07Ho was revered by millions of Vietnamese,
21:11North and South,
21:11and any big decisions
21:13had to be approved by him.
21:21For the last two years,
21:23Ho had supported a cautious approach
21:25to fighting the war.
21:26But in mid-1967,
21:29he backed a new strategy
21:30pushed by powerful figures
21:32within the Politburo,
21:34including Li Tuan,
21:35the general secretary of the Communist Party.
21:44The plan was to mount
21:46an all-out offensive
21:47against the cities and towns of the south.
21:57The NLF guerrillas inside South Vietnam
22:00would launch most of the attacks.
22:03But General Japp,
22:05North Vietnam's defense minister,
22:07planned to add a distinctive touch of his own.
22:10He meant to pit
22:12North Vietnamese army troops
22:13directly against the Americans at Khe Sanh
22:16in a major set-piece battle.
22:25He would even direct
22:27the attacking forces himself.
22:45Throughout 1967,
22:47the U.S. president, Lyndon Johnson,
22:49had been under pressure
22:50from his military advisers
22:51to intensify the war in Vietnam.
22:58The Joint Chiefs of Staff
23:00The Joint Chiefs of Staff
23:01wanted the president
23:01to ease the many restrictions
23:03on the bombing campaign
23:04against the north.
23:06They also wanted ground attacks
23:09against enemy sanctuaries
23:10in Laos and Cambodia,
23:13perhaps even
23:14into North Vietnam itself.
23:22Without such measures,
23:24they could see no prospect
23:25of victory soon.
23:32President Johnson's fear
23:34was that expanding the ground campaign
23:36might draw China
23:37or the Soviet Union
23:38into the war.
23:42He also faced problems
23:44at home.
23:47The anti-war movement
23:48was already growing
23:50and a wider conflict
23:51might turn the American people
23:53completely against
23:54the whole effort.
24:01The last thing
24:02the president wanted to hear
24:04was that the communists
24:05were preparing
24:06for a major offensive.
24:09But General Westmoreland,
24:11the commander of U.S. forces
24:12in Vietnam,
24:13was warning that
24:14a large-scale attack
24:15might be on the way.
24:18Westmoreland believed
24:19that the North Vietnamese army
24:20was preparing
24:21a big push into the south
24:23and that its first target
24:25might be the marine combat base
24:27at Khe Sanh.
24:40Although the president
24:41and his advisers
24:42were deeply worried
24:44by the news,
24:45Westmoreland himself
24:46was optimistic.
24:48He believed he had the forces
24:50to deal with any threat
24:52and a massive enemy offensive
24:54might be the opportunity
24:56he'd been waiting for.
25:02If the North Vietnamese army
25:04came out into the open
25:06to fight pitched battles,
25:07there was a real chance
25:08of a decisive
25:09American victory.
25:27For the North Vietnamese army
25:29and its commander,
25:30General Jap,
25:31attacking the Americans
25:32at Khe Sanh
25:33promised a whole series
25:34of benefits.
25:40The build-up
25:41would draw
25:41American attention
25:42away from the southern cities,
25:44the main targets
25:45of the Tet Offensive.
25:50A successful attack
25:51would also open
25:53a clear route
25:53into south Vietnam.
26:02A victory at Khe Sanh
26:04might also bring
26:05another,
26:05even more valuable prize.
26:10The U.S. Marines
26:12defending the base
26:13were an elite force
26:14and crushing them
26:15might damage
26:16American morale
26:17beyond repair.
26:22In 1954,
26:2313 years previously,
26:25General Jap
26:26had inflicted
26:27just such a defeat
26:28on French colonial forces
26:29at Dien Bien Phu.
26:39In selecting Khe Sanh
26:41as the site
26:41for a set-piece battle
26:42with the Americans,
26:44General Jap
26:45had chosen carefully.
26:46The jungle-covered hills
26:48and low cloud
26:50combined with heavy fog
26:51would work
26:52against American air power.
27:01And while his own troops
27:03were close to supplies
27:04and reinforcements,
27:06the Americans
27:06could be cut off
27:08from any outside help.
27:14The weakened garrison
27:16would then be overrun.
27:32From March 1967,
27:35the Americans
27:36had succeeded
27:37in sending
27:37heavily armed convoys
27:39down Route 9
27:40to Khe Sanh.
27:44However,
27:45in July,
27:46an attempt
27:47to get long-range artillery
27:48to the combat base
27:49was blocked
27:50by North Vietnamese ambushes.
27:58Soon,
27:59the NVA
28:00had closed the road
28:01completely
28:01and the first phase
28:03of the campaign
28:03against Khe Sanh
28:05was completed.
28:15The next stage
28:16in the North Vietnamese plan
28:17was to deploy
28:19infantry north
28:20and west
28:20of Khe Sanh.
28:25The units
28:26to the north
28:27would capture
28:28the hills
28:28overlooking the base
28:29and place artillery
28:31to bombard the Americans
28:32and destroy
28:33their airfield.
28:38They would also
28:39mount ground attacks
28:40to create a diversion.
28:44The western units
28:45would capture
28:46Lang Vey Special Forces Camp
28:48and Khe Sanh Village
28:50and then mount
28:51a massive assault
28:52to take the Marine
28:53Combat Base
28:54from the south.
29:06A vital ingredient
29:08of General Japp's plan
29:09was to soften up
29:11Khe Sanh
29:11and its surrounding
29:12hill outposts
29:13with massive
29:14artillery bombardments.
29:16It was vital
29:17to prevent
29:17American aircraft
29:18from finding
29:19and destroying
29:20the guns,
29:21mortars,
29:22and rocket batteries
29:23before the attack.
29:33The troops
29:34made enormous efforts
29:35to protect
29:36the artillery
29:36by hiding it
29:38in caves
29:38or specially dug pits.
29:44They cited
29:45huge numbers
29:47of anti-aircraft guns
29:48to drive away
29:49inquisitive reconnaissance planes
29:51while everything
29:52was hidden
29:53by elaborate camouflage.
30:10From the start
30:11of the war
30:12in Vietnam,
30:13U.S. military commanders
30:15had believed
30:15that the best form
30:16of defense
30:17was to attack
30:18attack in strength.
30:23When reconnaissance
30:24detected a large
30:25enemy force,
30:26U.S. troops
30:27would be helicoptered
30:28in to surround
30:29and destroy it.
30:30Although they often
30:31flew straight
30:32into an ambush,
30:33in the main,
30:34the strategy worked.
30:43The problem
30:44with the American tactics
30:45was that they needed
30:46ever-increasing numbers
30:47of troops
30:48and helicopters.
30:56In Washington,
30:58Robert McNamara,
30:59the Secretary of Defense,
31:00worried that the
31:01constant demand
31:02for more men
31:03would eventually destroy
31:04public support
31:05for the war.
31:08Throughout 1967,
31:10McNamara had pushed
31:11for a strategy
31:11that would reduce
31:12the need for manpower.
31:18One proposal in particular
31:20McNamara adopted
31:21enthusiastically.
31:24The idea
31:25was to clear a line
31:26along the demilitarized zone
31:28and build an electronic
31:29barrier to stop enemy
31:31infiltration from north
31:32north to south.
31:33The plan,
31:35called the Strongpoint
31:36Obstacle System,
31:37was expected to cost
31:39a billion dollars.
31:42To U.S. troops
31:43on the ground,
31:44it made no sense.
31:46They christened it
31:47McNamara's Line.
32:00Because the eastern part
32:02of the demilitarized zone
32:03was flat ground,
32:05the area was given
32:06the first priority
32:07for defense.
32:12The plan was for nine
32:13strong points,
32:15including Kantian
32:16and Geolin,
32:18linked by fencing,
32:20minefields,
32:21and electronic detectors.
32:26West to Khaissan,
32:28U.S. bases would act
32:29as anchors for short
32:31strips of line,
32:32blocking all the likely
32:33approaches.
32:36Artillery would cover
32:37the whole area.
32:48By the end of 1967,
32:50the eastern part
32:52of the Strongpoint
32:53Obstacle System
32:54was almost complete.
33:01American planners
33:02hoped the new defense
33:03would at least channel
33:04the North Vietnamese
33:05into the more difficult
33:07hilly terrain
33:07guarded by the rock pile
33:09and Khaissan.
33:13In the future,
33:15when those bases too
33:16were part of the system,
33:18military commanders
33:19saw them playing
33:19a particularly important role.
33:22If full-scale ground
33:24operations were ever
33:25launched into Laos,
33:26the barrier would protect
33:28the Americans
33:28from flank attacks.
33:40The Strongpoint Obstacle System
33:42was deeply unwelcome
33:44to U.S. commanders
33:45in the area.
33:48Building just the eastern part
33:50imposed a heavy burden
33:52on the Marines.
33:57The line was soaking up
33:59vast amounts
34:00of material
34:00and manpower,
34:02restricting
34:03offensive operations.
34:07Worst of all,
34:09the construction work
34:10and the transport
34:11supplying it
34:11were sitting targets
34:13for North Vietnamese gunners.
34:33All together,
34:35the North Vietnamese army
34:36numbered just under
34:37470,000 troops
34:39in 12 divisions
34:41and 100 independent regiments.
34:48There was also
34:49a small navy
34:50for coastal patrol
34:51and an air force
34:52to defend against
34:53American bombing raids
34:54together with
34:55an air defense missile force.
35:06China had also committed
35:0850,000 advisors
35:10officers and engineers
35:11to repair damage
35:12done by American bombing
35:13and so free
35:14North Vietnamese troops
35:15for combat operations.
35:24By now,
35:26the NVA
35:26had taken over
35:28all military activity
35:29in the northernmost parts
35:30of South Vietnam
35:31and 102,000 NVA troops
35:34were available
35:35to fight in the south.
35:41All the same,
35:42the planned Tet Offensive
35:43was not meant
35:44to depend heavily
35:45on the northern army.
35:47The southern guerrillas,
35:48the Viet Cong,
35:49would do most
35:50of the fighting
35:51and just over a quarter
35:52of NVA units
35:53in the south
35:54were to be committed
35:55to Tet.
35:55The rest would either
35:57be held back
35:58as a reserve
35:59or thrown into the battle
36:00against the Americans
36:01at Khe Sanh.
36:26by the start
36:27of 1968,
36:28the North Vietnamese army
36:30had more than 40,000 men
36:32positioned near the border
36:34with South Vietnam.
36:37One division
36:38was to launch attacks
36:39down the east coast
36:41to take Da Nang
36:42and other important centers.
36:47Four divisions
36:48and two regiments
36:50were massed
36:51for the assault
36:52on Khe Sanh
36:53and for follow-up operations
36:55to seize
36:55the northern provinces.
37:10North of Khe Sanh
37:11was the 325C division
37:14with three regiments
37:15and a battalion.
37:18The elite 304th division
37:20was south of the base.
37:26The besieging forces
37:28were supported
37:28by three artillery formations
37:30and anti-aircraft units
37:32while a regiment
37:33handled resupply
37:35from the north.
37:40Further east,
37:41another division
37:42was placed
37:43to threaten
37:43the American artillery base
37:45at the rock pile
37:46to keep Route 9 cut
37:48and to act
37:49as reinforcements.
37:55A small number
37:56of tanks
37:57were also positioned
37:58west of Lan Vey.
38:09If the battle
38:10for Khe Sanh
38:10was to end
38:11in victory,
38:12General Jap
38:13and his planners
38:14knew that
38:14an uninterrupted flow
38:15of supplies
38:16would be the key.
38:18The experience
38:19in 1954
38:20of fighting the French
38:21at Dien Bien Phu
38:22had taught him
38:23the value
38:24of ensuring
38:25continuous supply
38:26long before
38:27the final storming
38:28of the enemy base.
38:30He was determined
38:31to repeat his achievement
38:33at Khe Sanh.
38:42To get ammunition,
38:44food,
38:44and materials
38:45to the forces
38:46attacking Khe Sanh,
38:48Jap ordered the building
38:49of two new roads.
39:01They were soon
39:02detected by the Americans,
39:03who named them
39:04the Santa Fe Trail.
39:07U.S. fighter bombers
39:09made furious attacks,
39:10but the roads
39:12were impossible
39:12to destroy
39:13or even damage seriously.
39:21The Santa Fe Trail
39:22was heavily camouflaged
39:24and fully equipped
39:25with bunkers,
39:26storage depots,
39:27and weigh stations.
39:31The roads
39:32were protected
39:33by heavy
39:34anti-aircraft cover.
39:37Already,
39:38supplies have been
39:39built up near Khe Sanh
39:40for between 60
39:41and 90 days
39:42of sustained combat.
40:00for more than a decade,
40:02the North Vietnamese army
40:03had been getting
40:04military equipment
40:05from China
40:06and the Soviet Union.
40:13The best NVA divisions
40:15were extremely well-armed.
40:20The rugged and effective
40:22AK-47 assault rifle
40:24was perfect for the harsh
40:26battlefield conditions
40:27of Vietnam.
40:34infantry units
40:36had large numbers
40:37of machine guns
40:38and RPG-7
40:39anti-tank grenade launchers.
40:47The main defense
40:48against American air power
40:50for the troops
40:51around Khe Sanh
40:51was the Soviet K-38
40:53heavy machine gun.
40:54near special installations,
40:57the NVA
40:57anti-aircraft units
40:58were armed
40:59with 37-millimeter
41:00anti-aircraft cannons,
41:02a menace
41:02even to the fastest
41:03American jets.
41:18The heavy artillery
41:19which NVA gunners
41:21would use
41:21to try and overwhelm
41:22the defenses
41:23of the Khe Sanh base
41:24was also Soviet
41:25and Chinese.
41:28The 130-millimeter
41:30field gun
41:31had a range
41:32of 19 miles,
41:33further than any
41:34comparable American gun.
41:36U.S. troops rated it
41:37the best all-round
41:38artillery piece
41:39on the Vietnam
41:40battlefield.
41:54The guns would be
41:55reinforced by huge
41:56numbers of rockets
41:57and heavy mortars.
42:14The troops of the
42:15North Vietnamese Army
42:16were recognized
42:17even by their
42:18American enemies
42:19as first-class soldiers.
42:21They were extremely
42:22well-trained
42:23and disciplined.
42:30They were skilled
42:31in tactics
42:32and their morale
42:33and determination
42:33often seemed to the
42:35Americans
42:35to border on the
42:36fanatical.
42:45In fact, during 1967,
42:48as losses soared,
42:49North Vietnamese Army
42:50morale had slumped badly.
42:55Desertion threatened
42:56to become a real problem.
43:01The grueling trek
43:03from home bases
43:04to distant Khe Sanh
43:05had also taken its toll.
43:13American bombing
43:14was a constant danger
43:15and diseases,
43:16particularly malaria,
43:18were rife.
43:19Most of the NVA soldiers
43:21who were massing
43:22to attack Khe Sanh
43:23were from the coastal
43:24lowlands of North Vietnam
43:25and found life a misery
43:27in the sodden,
43:28insect-infested jungles,
43:30as did their enemy.
43:43In preparation
43:44for the Khe Sanh battle,
43:46NVA commanders
43:47went to enormous lengths
43:48to restore their troops' morale.
43:51Cultural groups
43:52were sent
43:53on the long
43:54and arduous journey
43:55to the front
43:55to entertain the troops.
44:02The message was simple
44:04and was reinforced
44:05at every opportunity
44:06by political officers.
44:09The coming campaign
44:10would deliver the victory
44:12they had hoped for
44:13for so many years.
44:20The propaganda effort
44:22worked well.
44:23In the final weeks
44:25before the offensive,
44:26desertions from
44:27the North Vietnamese army
44:28fell dramatically.
44:47In late 1967,
44:5073,000 of the almost
44:52half a million American troops
44:54in South Vietnam
44:55were United States Marines.
44:59They were under the command
45:01of the U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet
45:03headquarters in Honolulu.
45:05But operational control
45:06was with General Westmoreland's
45:08Military Assistance Command
45:09in Saigon.
45:16From the start,
45:17the independent status
45:19of the Marines
45:19had led to friction.
45:21Often they were accused
45:22by the Army
45:23and the Air Force
45:24of fighting their own private war.
45:34Since Lieutenant General
45:36Robert Cushman
45:37had taken over
45:37as Marine commander
45:38in June 1967,
45:41he and Westmoreland
45:42had argued continuously
45:44over how the Marines
45:45should best be used.
45:48The latest issue
45:49was the McNamara line.
45:56The idea was strongly opposed
45:59by the Marines,
46:00but Westmoreland
46:01had become
46:01a strong supporter.
46:08There was also
46:09a major disagreement brewing
46:11over who should control
46:12Marine air power.
46:14On the eve of a major battle,
46:16inter-service rivalry
46:17was threatening to grow
46:19into a serious problem.
46:35All American units
46:37in I Corps
46:38were commanded
46:38by the 3rd Marine
46:40Amphibious Force
46:41with its headquarters
46:42at Da Nang.
46:45The force controlled
46:47the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions
46:49and elements of the 5th,
46:52along with the 23rd Army Division,
46:55two Army brigades,
46:57and a squadron
46:58of armored cavalry.
47:03The South Vietnamese Army
47:05deployed two divisions
47:07and an infantry regiment
47:09in I Corps,
47:11and there was also
47:12a brigade of Korean Marines.
47:19Air support for operations
47:21in I Corps
47:22was provided by
47:23a U.S. Air Force
47:24tactical fighter wing,
47:26the 1st Marine Air Wing,
47:28and a South Vietnamese
47:30Air Force squadron.
47:35U.S. Navy aircraft
47:37were stationed
47:37on the carriers
47:38of Task Force 77,
47:41while three wings
47:42of B-52 bombers
47:44were also on call
47:45from Thailand
47:46and Guam
47:47in the Pacific Ocean.
47:52Air supply
47:53was carried out
47:54by Marine
47:54and Air Force
47:55transport
47:56and helicopter squadrons.
48:09As more than
48:10100,000 men,
48:12half of all U.S.
48:13combat units
48:14in South Vietnam
48:15had been concentrated
48:16in I Corps,
48:17the supply system
48:19had been strained
48:19to the limit.
48:22On the DMZ alone,
48:24ammunition consumption
48:25was running
48:26at 25,000
48:28artillery shells
48:28a month.
48:33The Marine supply lines
48:35stretched from the United States
48:36to Okinawa
48:37in the Pacific
48:38and on into Vietnam.
48:44The U.S. forces
48:45required 21,000 tons
48:48of food,
48:49ammunition,
48:50fuel,
48:50and general supplies
48:51daily.
48:52As a result,
48:53there was a constant stream
48:55of ships
48:55and air freight
48:56into Da Nang.
49:04Getting the supplies
49:05to where they were needed
49:06was a massive job.
49:08Vietnam
49:09was the first war
49:10to see computers
49:11used to control supplies.
49:16The requisitioning system
49:18handled over 80,000
49:20different items
49:21from boots
49:22for the men
49:22to spares
49:23for helicopters.
49:40Just like
49:41their North Vietnamese enemies,
49:43the Marine infantry
49:44would depend
49:45in the coming battles
49:46on supporting firepower.
49:51They had large numbers
49:52of medium
49:53and heavy mortars.
49:59The Marines
50:00would also make good use
50:01of 106mm
50:03recoilless rifles.
50:05The M40
50:07had been designed
50:07as an anti-tank weapon,
50:09but it was also
50:10highly effective
50:11against bunkers
50:12and trenches.
50:20Marine bases
50:21always had their own
50:23standard 105mm
50:24artillery pieces.
50:26The guns had a range
50:27of seven miles.
50:33Some bases,
50:34including Khe San,
50:35also had powerful
50:36155mm howitzers.
50:38They could lob
50:40a heavy shell
50:40over nine miles
50:42at a rate
50:42of four rounds
50:43a minute.
50:48The base
50:49could also call in
50:50supporting fire
50:51from the Army's
50:52huge 175mm
50:53self-propelled guns.
50:55These weapons
50:56could fire
50:57a 170-pound shell
50:5923 miles,
51:00just enough
51:01to reach the Khe San area
51:03from the rock pile
51:04or Camp Carroll.
51:13Support from aircraft
51:14was much less reliable
51:16than artillery.
51:17Air operations
51:18could be shut down
51:19completely by bad weather.
51:25But in the right
51:26conditions,
51:27fighter bombers
51:27could bring
51:28devastating firepower
51:29to the battlefield.
51:33A-4 Skyhawks,
51:35operating from carriers
51:36in the Tonkin Gulf
51:37or from marine airfields,
51:39could be over
51:40the Khe San area
51:41in less than 30 minutes
51:42with a ton
51:43and a half of bombs.
51:52Navy,
51:53Marine,
51:54and Air Force Phantoms
51:55were also on call.
51:57Although designed
51:58as an interceptor,
51:59the F-4 was a powerful bomber.
52:01It could carry
52:0218 750-pound bombs
52:05or 11 canisters
52:06of the devastating
52:07flammable gel,
52:08napalm.
52:31as an elite formation
52:33which could attract recruits
52:35of the highest quality,
52:36the United States Marines
52:37had for years
52:38been an all-volunteer force.
52:41Vietnam
52:41had forced a change.
52:48Restricting tours of duty
52:50to 13 months
52:51and the steady accumulation
52:52of casualties
52:53meant the Marine Corps
52:55had to take in draftees.
52:58Around 20,000 men
53:00had been drafted in
53:01by the end of 1967.
53:09basic training
53:10had been cut to
53:11down from 12 to 8 weeks.
53:15There was also
53:16a severe shortage
53:17of skilled personnel,
53:19particularly helicopter pilots.
53:24in spite of the sometimes
53:26appalling conditions
53:27of cold,
53:28wet,
53:28and dirt
53:29in which the Marines
53:30in Vietnam
53:31had to live and fight,
53:32their morale
53:33had stood up well.
53:35Marine discipline
53:36and the sense
53:36of being part
53:37of an elite
53:37helped.
53:41So did the knowledge
53:42that support
53:42from artillery,
53:44helicopter gunships,
53:45or strike aircraft
53:46was not far away.
53:58But nothing
53:59helped the morale
54:00of the men
54:01as much as
54:02the superb
54:02medical evacuation
54:03and treatment system.
54:09After emergency
54:10treatment by a medic
54:11on the spot,
54:11a wounded man
54:13could expect
54:13to be picked up
54:14by medevac helicopter
54:15in less than half an hour.
54:27The crews
54:28of evacuation helicopters
54:29were among
54:30the most admired troops
54:31serving in Vietnam.
54:37The pilots
54:38would go
54:39to extraordinary lengths
54:40to get wounded men away,
54:42even under heavy fire.
54:50in I-Corps,
54:52evacuation was
54:53to one of three
54:54field hospitals
54:55or to the main hospital
54:56at Da Nang.
55:00There were also
55:01two fully equipped
55:02Navy hospital ships,
55:04each with more
55:05than 500 beds.
55:09So effective
55:10was the Marine
55:11medevac system
55:12that 99%
55:13of evacuated marines
55:15survived their wounds.
55:35As evidence had mounted
55:37that the North Vietnamese
55:38were going to attack
55:39Khe Sanh,
55:40the Americans
55:41took a quick decision
55:42to reinforce the base.
55:44By the close
55:45of 1967,
55:47the 3rd Battalion
55:48of the 26th Marines
55:49had arrived
55:50to boost the garrison.
56:02New bunkers,
56:03quarters,
56:04and perimeter defenses
56:05had to be built fast.
56:07Building materials
56:08that were meant
56:09for the McNamara line
56:10were quickly diverted
56:11to Khe Sanh.
56:16Only days
56:17after the new Marine unit
56:19had arrived at Khe Sanh,
56:20it launched a major
56:21search-and-destroy operation
56:23towards the border
56:24with Laos.
56:27The Marines
56:28discovered
56:28North Vietnamese
56:29weapons caches
56:30and fresh trails,
56:32but not a single
56:33enemy soldier
56:34opened fire.
56:39Unknown to the Americans,
56:41the 30,000 NVA troops
56:43all around
56:44were under strict orders
56:46to avoid all contact.
56:54Christmas 1967
56:55came and went
56:57on the demilitarized zone,
56:58but the North Vietnamese
57:00stayed uncannily quiet.
57:06However,
57:07there were signs
57:08of intense NVA reconnaissance
57:10around Khe Sanh.
57:12Most Marines
57:13now believe
57:14the question
57:15was not whether
57:15the North Vietnamese
57:16meant to storm Khe Sanh,
57:18but when?
57:20Yeah.
57:36Oh.
57:38Stop!
57:44Oh.
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