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00:08In the summer of 1949, three trains left a secret Soviet city called Arzamas-16.
00:19One carried scientists, one carried soldiers, and one carried an atomic bomb.
00:30It hardly needs to be said that the whole operation took place in the greatest secrecy.
00:35Along the whole route, not a single signal was against the special trains.
00:44All the points were switched in their favour.
00:49They were on their way to Kazakhstan, where they would test the first red bomb.
01:00Everything was done according to a strict plan, in case anyone tried to ambush the train on its journey.
01:13At a Politburo meeting a few days before, someone had asked,
01:17what will we do if the bomb doesn't work?
01:20Stalin replied, we can shoot the scientists.
01:26The end of the track lay a moment of truth for the post-war world.
03:00We settled in a few minutes later, four or five rows in back of Yakovlev.
03:05And both of us got very much interested in the film that was being shown.
03:16And the next thing I looked up, and Yakovlev was gone.
03:19And I thought, oh, God.
03:27We hurriedly looked around the theater, and here he was, way down front, way off to one side, in a
03:33very poor seat.
03:34The senior of the two FBI men was Bob Lanfier.
03:38He continued to watch his suspect.
03:40Though he saw nothing specific, he left the cinema feeling he'd witnessed something important.
03:45That in all likelihood, we had seen the servicing of a dead drop.
03:49In other words, somebody had come in and put something under that seat.
03:53Yakovlev had spotted where they were, number three, seat over, rove.
03:59Eight.
03:59And they had gone down and reached under, darkened theater, and retrieved the message.
04:09Soviet espionage in America was then in full swing.
04:12And Yakovlev was the man who, that autumn, engineered the greatest coup of the atomic spy war between East and
04:19West.
04:19East and West.
04:49Before that incident in the cinema, he'd been given an important new job.
04:56I was instructed to set up a special department at the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs to develop the atomic
05:05project.
05:06That department was known as Department S.
05:19The Commissariat, or secret police, was housed in the Lubyanka, then the most feared building in Russia.
05:30Sudoplatov knew the corridors and staff of the commissariat well.
05:35Trained as an assassin, he'd been in charge of guerrilla action during the war.
05:39But his new job was potentially even more lethal.
05:44Department S.
05:45was to be the secret information center of the Soviet bomb-building program.
05:51In the Lubyanka vaults were some 10,000 documents relating to the building of America's bomb,
05:57the product of years of wartime espionage under the direction of Lavrenti Beria.
06:04Beria was Stalin's right-hand man.
06:07By reputation, the most ruthless schemer in the Kremlin.
06:10By habit, someone obsessed with secrecy.
06:15When the documents first started coming in, he allowed only one scientist to know they even existed.
06:22Igor Kurchatov, the brilliant physicist who ran the Soviet bomb program.
06:28Kurchatov did his best to keep up with the flood of incoming information.
06:32But Beria's taste for secrecy gave him an impossible task.
06:38Just how impossible became painfully clear when the Americans dropped their bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
06:47When Stalin realized how far the Soviet Union had fallen behind, he was furious.
06:52He was convinced that Russia would soon come under attack from the United States.
06:57And it was made clear to Pavel Sudoplatov that he had to sort the problem out fast.
07:04Sudoplatov's first requirement was people who knew enough science to understand what was in the vaults,
07:09but had enough discretion not to tell anyone it was there.
07:13Since the job was to be located in the Lubyanka, the secret police did the recruiting.
07:21The first person to get a visit was Jakov Terecki.
07:27I was suddenly summoned to the NKVD headquarters on Ljubljanka Street.
07:32A summons to the Ljubljanka was always regarded as something very unpleasant.
07:40Next to get a visit from Sudoplatov's recruiting team was Arkady Rilov.
07:50One of the older men said,
07:52You have to go to Ljubljanka Street.
07:55That was too much for me.
07:56And I said,
07:57What have I done?
07:58They burst out laughing.
08:00I thought they were taking me to the Ljubljanka for a different purpose.
08:04That was just a practical joke they pulled on me.
08:07They said,
08:08We are not sending you to jail.
08:10You are to be offered a job.
08:15I informed Beria of my choice.
08:18He asked me to check those two men out,
08:20to find if they drank,
08:22talk too much and so on.
08:24I told him I didn't know them that well as yet.
08:29Beria replied,
08:30This is what you should do.
08:32Organize a dinner party in your flat
08:34and invite Terletsky and Rilov.
08:37Make sure you have as many bottles of brandy, vodka and wine as possible.
08:41on the table during dinner
08:42and prepare several kinds of hors d'oeuvres.
08:45I asked him where I would find all that.
08:47He replied,
08:48Don't worry about a thing.
08:50We'll deliver it all straight to your flat.
08:56It was a posh party,
08:58a staggering party for the time.
09:09There were wines and all kinds of appetizers.
09:19I noticed that Sudoplatov drank very little.
09:22He just sipped.
09:29I noticed the others were also drinking little,
09:32so I followed their example.
09:36Toasts were raised,
09:37Stalin's health was drunk,
09:39then Beria's and all kinds of toasts.
09:42And then we parted company.
09:50The two scientists had passed the test
09:52and joined Department S in the Lubyanka.
09:58They soon realized how far they had to go.
10:03It's quite clear that this very valuable,
10:07super valuable information
10:08was put on ice for four years.
10:12It's a fact.
10:13This is why Department S
10:15wasn't set up until after
10:17the two bombs exploded in Japan.
10:19Then everyone remembered, so to speak.
10:24Oi, didn't we get information about this
10:27as much as four years ago?
10:32Department S had inherited the wartime spoils
10:35of a Soviet spy ring codenamed Operation Enormous.
10:45Operation Enormous was based in New York,
10:48and it was now being run by the man the FBI
10:50had been watching in that cinema,
10:53Anatoly Yatskov, otherwise known as Yakovlev.
10:57The single most important focus of his work
11:00was America's bomb.
11:02The prototype, codenamed Trinity,
11:05had been built by some of the best
11:06scientific brains in the world,
11:08many of them emigres from Hitler's Germany.
11:12At least one of them was a spy working for Yakovlev,
11:16the German-born scientist Klaus Fuchs.
11:21Sometime in September 1945,
11:23Fuchs smuggled a package out
11:25for delivery via a courier
11:26to Yakovlev in New York
11:28and from there to Moscow.
11:34We have obtained the translation
11:36that Department S made from those documents
11:38as soon as they arrived in Moscow.
11:42Top secret to this day,
11:44only selected parts can safely be shown,
11:47because what they give
11:49are the critical dimensions and details
11:51of materials required to build a plutonium atom bomb.
11:55From the core to the shell casing,
11:57every single component is laid bare.
12:01Particularly sensitive, even today,
12:03is the special device
12:05which sets off the chain reaction.
12:07On advice from senior nuclear scientists,
12:09we have removed parts of the diagram
12:11from the document in our possession.
12:15What we can show clearly
12:17is the word at the top of the page.
12:20Trinity.
12:21The Russians had stolen a blueprint
12:23of America's first bomb.
12:29It was a triumph for Department S
12:31and a triumph for the Soviet spy ring in America.
12:40But Moscow in those days
12:42was no place in which to celebrate.
12:48The Soviet Union was still suffering
12:50from the ravages and deprivations of war.
12:57But with coups like that behind it,
13:00Department S prospered.
13:02New recruits found themselves
13:04in a world of unknown luxury.
13:12Department S enjoyed a special status
13:14and the personnel had perks.
13:20We had food coupons
13:23and other coupons
13:24for consumer goods shops.
13:29Also, we had breakfast
13:31brought to us every day
13:33by the charlady,
13:34or whatever you'd call her.
13:40There was a room
13:41where they sliced good bread loaves,
13:44filet of sturgeon,
13:45or sausages.
13:47In any case,
13:48that kind of food
13:49was very scarce at the time
13:50and unavailable
13:52to ordinary people.
13:56We didn't eat up the food right away.
13:58We would hoard it in our desks
14:00and try to take it home.
14:02Of course,
14:03there were lots of cockroaches
14:04and mice running about.
14:13We started work at 10 in the morning
14:15and worked until 5 o'clock
14:17in the afternoon.
14:18There was a break
14:19from 5 o'clock to 8 o'clock
14:21and then we worked
14:22until midnight at the earliest,
14:24but sometimes until 2 in the morning.
14:40There were two large steel safes
14:43which contained the materials.
14:48There were around 10,000 various items.
14:52There were photocopies of documents,
14:55U.S. documents,
14:57super-secret U.S. documents.
15:03A stamp on each document
15:04said it was secret
15:05and its disclosure
15:07was punishable as espionage.
15:12When these files
15:13with translations were prepared,
15:15we were told,
15:16get this or that file ready
15:18for a session
15:19of the Scientific and Technical Council.
15:30And we consulted
15:31the procedures manual
15:32to keep to the rules
15:34for transferring classified materials.
15:37The scientists,
15:38Relov and Tirletsky,
15:40took them from us
15:41and went to a report
15:43at Kirov Street.
15:50Kirov Street was only 300 yards away
15:53from the Lubyanka.
15:56But Relov and Tirletsky
15:57would make the short trip
15:59by car under military guard.
16:01A lieutenant accompanied me.
16:09He kept a Walter handgun
16:11in his pocket.
16:14It was so secret.
16:20The car headed for number 20,
16:22where the so-called
16:23Scientific and Technical Council,
16:26brain center of the bomb project,
16:28met under the chairmanship
16:29of the armaments minister,
16:31Vanikov.
16:34We came and were invited
16:36into the reception room
16:37and were asked
16:38to make our reports.
16:48After Tirletsky or I
16:50gave our report,
16:52Vanikov would say,
16:53comrades,
16:54those who need this information
16:56raise your hands.
16:57They did.
17:02The scientists
17:03in Kirov Street
17:04were hungry for information.
17:06Meetings would go on
17:07night and day
17:08with few breaks.
17:09For example,
17:11three persons
17:12would want one work
17:13or ten would want another
17:15or as many as 15
17:16would want a third one.
17:20No one talked about
17:22Department S.
17:23If the scientists asked,
17:24they were led to believe
17:25the papers came
17:26from a rival team.
17:31Vanikov said these were materials
17:33produced by Bureau No. 2.
17:35This raised suspicions.
17:37What was Bureau No. 2?
17:38No one knew what it was.
17:40But Vanikov tactfully
17:42parried all questions.
17:43He said,
17:45oh, Bureau No. 2,
17:46you'll know what it is
17:47in due course.
17:51No one could complain
17:52about the quantity
17:53of information.
17:54But NKVD boss
17:56Lavrentiy Beria
17:57knew only too well
17:58the dangers
17:59of deliberate disinformation.
18:01An important breakthrough
18:03came in the autumn
18:04of 1945.
18:05Beria came into
18:06Kurchatov's office
18:07with an astonishing
18:08piece of news.
18:10Niels Bohr,
18:11one of the guiding lights
18:12behind America's bomb,
18:14was willing to meet
18:15discreetly
18:15with Russian scientists
18:17to discuss the problems
18:18they were having
18:19building their own bomb.
18:21Niels Bohr was
18:23somebody who had done
18:24as much,
18:25probably more
18:26than anyone else,
18:27to create this
18:28international community
18:29of physicists
18:30who had a great belief
18:31in what this
18:32internationalism of science
18:34could do
18:35for the human race.
18:37He thought
18:38if people could realize
18:39the common danger
18:40that faced the human race,
18:42then people would be led
18:44to cooperate
18:44and to avoid
18:46an arms race.
18:50Bohr had agreed
18:51to this crucial meeting
18:52after an approach
18:53from the Danish communists.
18:57What we can reveal
18:58for the first time
18:59is how the Russians
19:01then turned the opportunity
19:02into a major operation
19:04for Sudoplatov's
19:05Department S.
19:06We needed a meeting
19:10with Bohr.
19:11I don't need
19:12to explain to you
19:13who Bohr is.
19:15You probably know
19:16he was a great man.
19:18At that point,
19:19we had come to a deadlock
19:20in the development
19:21of the atom bomb
19:22in certain aspects
19:24and we didn't know
19:25what to do.
19:28It was decided
19:29to send Terlecki to Bohr.
19:31I decided to send
19:32Terlecki to Bohr.
19:39Sudoplatov summoned me
19:40and said,
19:41Beria wants to talk to you.
19:44We waited in the
19:45anteroom for some time
19:46and finally Beria
19:48received us.
19:50He made a very
19:51depressing impression
19:52on me.
19:53He was a man
19:53of medium height,
19:55so to speak,
19:56not even a suggestion
19:57of smile.
19:59A very forbidding face.
20:03A very forbidding look.
20:10No hint of goodwill.
20:15He said,
20:16hello,
20:17and then began
20:18asking questions.
20:20How are you going
20:21to travel there?
20:22What kind of questions
20:23will you ask?
20:24What about
20:25the language barrier?
20:30The truth was
20:31that scientifically
20:32Terlecki was not
20:33the best qualified
20:34for the job.
20:35He was chosen
20:36simply because
20:37Beria didn't trust
20:38any of the leading
20:39physicists.
20:40So Kachatov
20:41and his colleagues
20:42hurriedly had to
20:43tutor him
20:44in the basics
20:44of nuclear science.
20:48I could understand
20:49the general principle,
20:50but how was
20:51the explosive prepared
20:53and what exactly
20:54is plutonium?
20:56They'd begun
20:57to explain things
20:58to me.
20:58It was a veritable
21:00lecture.
21:02Kachatov was
21:03the chief lecturer.
21:05I could write,
21:06record everything,
21:08and he told me
21:09everything from
21:09the very beginning.
21:10and he told me
21:11everything from the beginning.
21:31Terlecki set up
21:32by train,
21:33accompanied by
21:34a translator
21:34and one of Beria's
21:36security chiefs
21:37called Colonel
21:37Vasilevskii.
21:48They crossed the border
21:49into Finland
21:50and then went by sea
21:51to Copenhagen,
21:53where Bor lived.
21:59The meeting
22:00was so important
22:01to them,
22:02everyone was living
22:03on their nerves.
22:06I sensed already
22:07that we were being
22:08watched en route
22:09and Vasilevskii said,
22:11look,
22:11this man here
22:12is a U.S.
22:13intelligence man
22:14and that one,
22:16the Finnish intelligence agent,
22:17they were watching
22:18us all the time.
22:21Finally,
22:22we reached the embassy.
22:23At first,
22:23I wasn't even allowed
22:24to leave the embassy.
22:26I was under lock and key.
22:30After an agonizing
22:31wait of two weeks,
22:32they got the signal
22:34to make the 200-yard drive
22:35to the Niels Bohr Institute.
22:37They were told
22:38to leave their notebooks
22:39behind.
22:41We weren't allowed
22:41to carry any papers
22:43because the idea was
22:44that by carrying a paper,
22:46we might leave
22:46behind a document.
22:48We had to memorize
22:49everything,
22:50both the questions
22:51and the answers,
22:52and keep everything
22:53in our heads.
22:57Niels Bohr
22:58gave us
22:59a fairly reserved welcome.
23:01When he shook hands
23:02with me,
23:03I noticed
23:03his hands were shaking.
23:08The meeting
23:09was only
23:10a partial success.
23:12Bohr was unhappy
23:13to find
23:13Tilecki had not
23:14come on his own
23:15and he didn't come up
23:16with the practical detail
23:17the Russians wanted.
23:22Bohr's answers
23:23weren't enthusiastic
23:24because many of the questions
23:26were such
23:27that there were things
23:28he didn't know.
23:31He asked about
23:32the design
23:33of the atomic bomb
23:34or separation facilities
23:36which Bohr didn't know.
23:42He was a theoretician.
23:50The scientists
23:52back in Moscow
23:52had given Tilecki
23:54one particular dilemma
23:55to resolve.
23:57Should they concentrate
23:58on building
23:59a uranium bomb
24:00like the one
24:01dropped on Hiroshima
24:02or a plutonium one
24:04like Nagasaki?
24:08Tilecki knew
24:09he had not got enough
24:10to satisfy them
24:11on this point.
24:14But two days later
24:16he had another meeting
24:17and this one
24:19turned out
24:19to be more productive.
24:24At the second meeting
24:25Bohr handed over
24:26a mimeographed copy
24:27of a book
24:28about the building
24:29of America's bombs
24:30written by a consultant
24:32to the Manhattan Project
24:33called Henry Smythe.
24:35All the things
24:36done in the United States
24:38were outlined
24:39in that book
24:39by Smith.
24:43The extraordinary thing
24:44about the book
24:45is that it had been
24:46published against
24:46the advice
24:47of Robert Oppenheimer
24:48the scientist
24:49who ran the project
24:50to build the bomb
24:51but with an approving
24:52forward
24:53by General Leslie Groves
24:54the man responsible
24:56for security
24:56at Los Alamos.
24:58Groves had badly
24:59miscalculated
25:00how far the Soviets
25:00had got
25:01and how useful
25:02it would be to them.
25:04Groves used to say
25:05it would take them
25:0520 years
25:06but almost everyone
25:07else said
25:073 to 4 years.
25:10I think there's
25:10another totally
25:11different lesson
25:12to be learned
25:12out of this
25:13and that is
25:13there really are
25:14no secrets.
25:16That is
25:17if one person
25:17can figure something out
25:18then it's likely
25:19another person
25:20is going to be
25:20figuring it out
25:21at about the same time
25:22and it doesn't
25:22take much information
25:24to get them
25:25on the right track.
25:25There really are
25:26no secrets.
25:28Publication proved
25:29one of the major
25:30security blunders
25:31of the Cold War.
25:34Within days
25:35of the meeting
25:36Department S
25:37would be hard
25:37at work
25:38on Smyth's book.
25:42A copy
25:43was brought over
25:44it was translated
25:46processed
25:46and edited
25:48very fast
25:48and a small
25:49number of copies
25:50were printed.
25:51I even had
25:52a copy myself
25:53but I lost it
25:55somewhere.
25:56At first
25:57the book
25:58carried either
25:58the stamp
25:59secret
25:59or a copy number
26:01or a copy
26:03or a copy
26:04or a copy
26:04or a copy
26:04or a copy
26:05So probably
26:06without realising it
26:07Bor had given
26:08Terlecki
26:09the crucial bit
26:10of information
26:10that he'd come for.
26:11Put alongside
26:13the top secret
26:13diagram sent back
26:14by Fuchs
26:15it gave the Soviet
26:16scientists
26:17the breakthrough
26:17they needed.
26:19Plutonium
26:19was the fastest
26:20route to take.
26:24Terlecki
26:25being a theoretician
26:27was able
26:28to talk to Bor
26:29about possible
26:29solutions
26:30to our deadlock
26:31without disclosing
26:33our difficulties
26:34with the building
26:35of the atom bomb.
26:37But we got
26:38what we wanted.
26:40The point is
26:41Bor was very friendly
26:44towards the Soviet Union.
26:50Bor's own explanation
26:52according to Terlecki
26:53was somewhat different.
27:00Every country
27:01should know
27:02about the design
27:03of the atomic bomb
27:04and possess
27:05the atomic bomb itself.
27:11And of these
27:11other countries
27:12the first
27:13to obtain
27:14the atomic bomb
27:15should be Russia.
27:21Niels Bohr
27:22was not a spy
27:22but the meetings
27:24were useful
27:24to Kerchatov.
27:26In the Soviet archives
27:27we found a cryptic memo
27:29Kerchatov wrote
27:30after debriefing Terlecki.
27:34Niels Bohr
27:36made an important remark
27:37concerning the efficient use
27:38of uranium
27:38in the atomic bomb.
27:40This remark
27:41should be subjected
27:41to theoretical analysis.
27:45More by luck
27:47than ingenuity
27:47they had acquired
27:49the vital information
27:50their scientists
27:50needed
27:51to accelerate progress
27:52towards the first
27:53red bomb.
28:05A few months
28:06after the meeting
28:07with Niels Bohr
28:08one of the top men
28:09in the Soviet Union's
28:10atomic team
28:11was sent on a journey
28:12across the country.
28:15Yuli Hariton
28:16now 90
28:17was then an expert
28:19in explosives.
28:21In his youth
28:22he'd studied
28:22at Cambridge, England
28:24where a number
28:25of the scientists
28:25who'd later been involved
28:26in building
28:27America's bomb
28:28had also studied.
28:31What he was looking
28:32for now
28:33was somewhere remote
28:34in which to build
28:35a Russian one.
28:39What was needed
28:40was an open space
28:41with a populated area
28:43nearby
28:44where work
28:45with explosions
28:46could be carried out.
28:50These days
28:51he travels
28:51in some style
28:52with his own
28:53personal housekeeper
28:54Hlodaya Yegorová.
28:57After 40 years
28:58she's acquired
28:59the habit of secrecy
29:01about her boss's work.
29:02This is Yuli Baryshev
29:04and his personal
29:05and of course
29:07they gave him
29:08for the achievements
29:11to have been
29:17Well,
29:18what was he signed?
29:18What did he
29:19was he
29:19that was
29:20that he
29:20he was
29:21the main
29:22constructors
29:23who made it?
29:38Back in 1946, Hariton visited a series of possible sites before settling on one just
29:45400 miles outside Moscow.
30:03And this is the place he chose.
30:07The town of Sarov, where a 19th century hermit called Saint Seraphim once preached and where
30:13the Tsars once came to pray.
30:19Over the next few years, Seraph sprouted a mighty suburb, cloaked in secrecy and devoted
30:25entirely to the production of an atomic weapon.
30:28It was called Azamas 16.
30:32Thousands of prisoners from the gulag camps were herded together to carry out the construction
30:37work.
30:39I was struck by the fact that the construction work was being done by prisoners, who at the
30:46time all lived in secure zones.
30:49So morning and night, columns of these prisoners went by under guard.
30:56No one was immune from Stalin's oppression.
30:59Hariton took a realistic view of his new workforce.
31:06It was very unpleasant, but what were we to do?
31:13I realized that we couldn't get by in any other way.
31:20There was nowhere else to get the number of people needed to push construction work here
31:26ahead at the speed required.
31:43Then, as now, no one entered Azamas 16 without permission.
31:51To this day, it is a closed city where everyone lives under guard, part of an archipelago of
31:58secret communities in which, for years, everything was geared to the production of nuclear weapons.
32:05In those days, under Stalin and Beria, people lived in fear as well as in isolation.
32:18Even the scientists were under suspicion.
32:24Of course, I was kept under what is called observation.
32:30Of that, there is absolutely no doubt.
32:34There was basically a duty officer from the security service constantly at my side at all
32:41times.
32:44What it amounted to was that they simply lived at our apartment.
32:49They were around the whole time.
32:58The secret police had informers everywhere.
33:01This was a security operation which meant business.
33:08To give you some idea of how harsh security was, I'll give you an instance.
33:14The head of the capital works department here at the installation was the first person to
33:20get himself an official business trip back to Moscow.
33:27He told a bunch of his relatives that soon we were going to screw the Americans and that he was
33:33getting
33:33through a budget of so many millions that we could expect our great project to be a success.
33:43That was enough for the KGB to press for him to receive an eight-year sentence in a high-security
33:49prison.
33:54In that climate of fear, others didn't even wait for official punishment.
34:06One of the workers at the first section transferred some documents from one folder to another, forgot
34:14about it and couldn't find them.
34:16And foreseeing all these problems, because there was no way he could prove that he hadn't sold
34:22it to someone, to some spy, he shot himself.
34:33The big problem facing the Soviets in those early days was the supply of uranium.
34:43The only place it was then mined was in the Fagana Valley in the Republic of Tajikistan.
34:55It was one of those mountainous regions with steep hills and no proper roads.
35:05The uranium ore which they obtained there in the mountains had to be carted down on mules.
35:17The terrain was so tough that even a horse couldn't manage it easily.
35:29But beggars couldn't choose, and any seam they discovered had to be worked whatever the difficulty.
35:38A critical breakthrough, which probably saved them a year's work, came from occupied East
35:44Germany.
35:45Troops taking charge of factories there heard rumours of large supplies of uranium somewhere
35:50near the American zone.
35:54They themselves didn't know exactly where it was.
36:03So we set off around the factory, and we went into separate workshops.
36:09And in one of them, we saw there was a large number of small tubs.
36:17On one of them, we saw a piece of cardboard lying, on which was written in capital letters,
36:24uranium-308.
36:32This is the building where the first experimental reactor was built.
36:37In those days, it was an open field, and working conditions were appalling.
36:41But it was a vital step.
36:43Unless they could make a reactor work, they wouldn't have a bomb.
36:51The reactor is still there, two floors underground.
36:58It was an unwieldy structure, assembled out of graphite bricks, with slugs of the precious
37:03uranium slotted into them.
37:10Alexey Kondratyev was then a young lab assistant.
37:13He remembers the day it went into commission.
37:16Everyone was nervous.
37:19I rode down to the storeroom, and they dressed me up in smart clothes.
37:23I didn't have the slightest idea what it was all about.
37:26I arrived back, and I'd come without a tie.
37:28Pavel Vasilevich shouted at the driver, where's his tie?
37:31We managed to pick up a tie at a military base somewhere.
37:36The reason for this nervousness was that Labrenti Beria was coming to witness the occasion.
37:41It was a crucial moment.
37:43If the reactor didn't work, they would probably lose their jobs, if not worse.
37:50Beria arrived, and he was standing wearing his traditional three-piece suit.
37:55He was a small, square-shouldered man, an impressive man, and Kurchatov introduced us.
37:59We began the demonstration.
38:02Our equipment lights came on.
38:04The needles on the gauges flickered.
38:06Sound signals came on.
38:09Everything was in working order.
38:12The guards got scared when the neutron counter started up.
38:16T-ta-ta-ra.
38:18T-ta-ta-ta-ra.
38:18T-ta-ta-ta-ta-ta-ta-ta-ta-ta-t.
38:20Hedda-ta-ta-ta-ta-ta-ta.
38:20As team leader, Igor Kurchatov was anxious to make Beria understand how well his men had
38:25done just to get this far.
38:29T-ta-ta-ta-ta-ra.
38:30IAN NIYGUI-KURCHATOV, local leader of the war, and he says, what are you showing me,
38:38Igor, my lad?
38:39You explode a bomb for me, and then I'll give you a kiss and a hug.
38:46The F-1 had begun to work on Christmas Day, 1946,
38:50at a minute after six in the evening.
38:55The control room clock froze the moment in time for history.
38:59The next stage would be the bomb itself.
39:07Eight of Britain's newest transport planes,
39:09the big Hanley-Page Hastings aircraft,
39:12have now joined in the RAF's Berlin airlift.
39:16Our pictures show them leaving Dishforth in Yorkshire
39:19on their flight to Germany.
39:21In the summer of 1948, the world came close to war over Berlin.
39:29All pretense of the old wartime partnership
39:32between the Soviet Union and the West had disappeared.
39:35An iron curtain, as Churchill put it, had descended across Europe.
39:40Millions of people live or die depending on our adaptability.
39:48The world's mightiest offensive force
39:50has been transformed into the world's mightiest guardian of peace.
39:58The West's decision to draw the line at Berlin
40:01was underpinned by the ultimate sanction.
40:04Only America had the atomic bomb.
40:07But the disturbing truth, it's now clear,
40:10is that the Soviet Union was much closer
40:13to potential nuclear retaliation than most people suspected.
40:21A few hundred feet below the surface
40:23at Prebram in Czechoslovakia
40:25was one reason why.
40:27Fresh supplies of uranium,
40:29captured from the Germans at the end of the war,
40:31and now being fed back to the Soviet Union.
40:34Exactly the opposite
40:35of what the Los Alamos military boss,
40:38General Groves,
40:39was telling his own government.
40:40It was the fact that Groves himself knew how difficult it was
40:45to get uranium out of a low-grade ore
40:46that led him to believe that it would take the Russians 20 years
40:50because he thought they didn't have any good sources of uranium.
40:53And at one point he even told the Senate committee in 1946,
41:00the Soviets have no uranium.
41:02Clearly not true.
41:04I mean, our own espionage with regard to what was going on in Russia
41:09was abysmal.
41:10I mean, terrible.
41:13It meant that by early 1947,
41:16the Russians had both the raw material and the technology
41:19to manufacture plutonium for their bomb.
41:22What they needed now was a full-size industrial reactor.
41:29A jubilant Igor Kurchatov summoned a young engineer
41:33called Vladimir Merkin to see him.
41:38You're going to build a reactor in the Ural.
41:41Pack up your things.
41:43You're leaving tomorrow.
41:48Merkin's destination was the remote site
41:51where a powerful new plutonium reactor would be built.
41:56Suddenly, everyone was in good spirits.
42:01When we arrived there,
42:02we saw that nothing had been built yet.
42:05There was nothing but a few barracks,
42:08ramshackled wooden buildings,
42:09mud and foundation stones lying all over the field.
42:19Under the czars,
42:21the site had once been a place for the rich to feast by the lake.
42:25The travel-weary scientists
42:27now improvised a picnic of their own.
42:31A table had been laid at the lakeside,
42:34and while we were there,
42:35some of the guys began to fish for tench.
42:37They were big tench.
42:39I remember that well.
42:43They set up several baking trays for fried potatoes,
42:47and we were hungry after all the traveling.
42:51We ate and drank with relish.
42:53I remember that to this day.
43:06Merkin's job was to build a giant reactor
43:08that would make the plutonium for the first red bomb.
43:16This is the complex he helped to create at high speed.
43:21Now it is just a shell,
43:23and the reactor has been dismantled.
43:26But during its heyday,
43:27it produced plutonium
43:28to build hundreds of nuclear weapons
43:30for the Soviet arsenal.
43:33Merkin remembers the mood at the time.
43:37People worked instinctively,
43:39not counting the hours they put in,
43:42and the knowledge that completing the job quickly
43:45was vital for our country and our nation.
43:56It took us just one year and eight months to build,
43:58from the very first day to the finish,
44:01when the reactor began working
44:02at its full design capacity.
44:05One year and eight months.
44:13700 miles away,
44:14behind the perimeter fence at Asma 16,
44:17Yuli Hariton started using the plutonium
44:20to complete his bomb.
44:24Inside the museum there,
44:25they still keep a replica of what he designed.
44:28Even to the lay eye,
44:30it is virtually identical
44:31to the model on show
44:33in the museum in New Mexico,
44:35Fat Man,
44:36the bomb they dropped on Nagasaki.
44:40Hariton today makes no bones about it.
44:49This bomb,
44:50or to be more accurate,
44:52the nuclear device inside this bomb,
44:54is basically a copy
44:56of the first nuclear device
44:59tested by the Americans
45:00in 1945.
45:08In those days,
45:10that was an admission
45:11for which he'd been shot.
45:15By early summer 1949,
45:18Hariton and Kerchatov were ready.
45:31The bomb set out
45:32on its 2,000-mile journey
45:34to a test site
45:35in remote Kazakhstan.
45:37It was accompanied
45:38by soldiers,
45:39scientists,
45:40and the top men
45:40in the Politburo.
45:43Everybody's fate,
45:44to some extent,
45:45was in the balance.
45:52This is where the bomb
45:53would be tested.
45:54No-one in the West
45:56knew what was happening.
45:57The test firing,
45:59codenamed First Lightning,
46:00was set for 6 a.m.
46:04It was August 29th, 1949.
46:09Beria's last words
46:10to Kerchatov,
46:11just 10 minutes before the test,
46:13were not encouraging.
46:15Nothing will come of it,
46:16Igor, he said.
46:17But there was no going back.
46:21The original control panel
46:23is preserved
46:24in the Azymas Museum.
46:26Everything that day
46:27depended on the throwing
46:28of a single switch.
46:33Throwing this switch
46:35cuts in the battery,
46:37leading to the apparatus,
46:39which,
46:40after a short pause,
46:42should deliver
46:43the correct surge
46:44of current,
46:51that finally detonates
46:53the powerful implosion,
46:56which compresses
46:58the sphere of plutonium
47:01lying at the center
47:03of the bomb.
47:26So Kerchatov leapt up
47:29and headed for the open door.
47:31At that point,
47:32the fireball was just forming
47:35and turning
47:35to a rising mushroom shape,
47:37illuminating the whole area
47:40with a brilliant light.
47:48And the cloud
47:52continued to rise.
47:54And at that point,
47:55Kerchatov,
47:56at full tilt,
47:58grabbed hold of Beria
48:00and hugged him.
48:01We did it.
48:01It worked.
48:03Now, Kerchatov
48:04wasn't a small man
48:06and he crushed him
48:07so hard
48:08that Beria started screeching,
48:10let me go,
48:11let me go,
48:12you throttling me.
48:13But Kerchatov
48:15still wouldn't let him go.
48:16Beria kept shouting
48:18until the full mushroom cloud
48:20started to rise.
48:35And we could already
48:37see the shockwave
48:38coming towards us.
48:39Kerchatov started
48:40to rush for the door
48:41without any thought.
48:42He simply lost
48:43his self-control.
48:44But Florev caught up
48:46with him,
48:47stopped him
48:47and brought him
48:48back into the dugout
48:49so that when the shockwave
48:51hit and we heard
48:52the rumble
48:53of the explosion,
48:54we were all back inside
48:56and the door was closed.
49:16The dark lake
49:17marks the spot
49:18where that explosion
49:19went off.
49:22The news reached the west
49:24before it was even announced
49:25in the Soviet Union.
49:28People were shocked
49:29that the Soviet Union
49:30had produced a bomb
49:31so quickly,
49:32at least two years earlier
49:34than even the pessimists
49:35had forecast.
49:37The arms race was on
49:38and what no one realised
49:40was that on the next leg
49:42the Soviets were going
49:43to overtake the Americans.
50:23for the first time.
50:24To be continued...
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