- 18 hours ago
Category
📚
LearningTranscript
00:08To be continued...
00:35THE END
00:44THE END
01:18OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER
01:20SENT AMERICAN WARPLANES
01:21AGAINST HEAVILY DEFENDED
01:23TARGETS. IT WAS A
01:25DESTRUCTIVE AND COSTLY
01:27BATTLE AS BOTH SIDES USED
01:29EVER MORE SOPHISTICATED
01:30WEAPONS AND TACTICS.
01:38IN ROLLING THUNDER,
01:40AMERICAN AIRCRAFT
01:41DROPPED OVER 650,000
01:43TONS OF BOMBS
01:44ON NORTH VIETNAM.
01:46THERE WERE ALSO
01:47MASSIVE OPERATIONS
01:48IN SOUTH VIETNAM,
01:49SUPPORTING AMERICAN
01:50GROUND TROOPS
01:51AND AGAINST COMMUNIST
01:52SUPPLY LINES AND BASES
01:54IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA.
02:03THE AIR WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
02:05WAS MORE THAN A CONTEST
02:07BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
02:08AND NORTH VIETNAM.
02:12FROM THE START,
02:13AMERICA'S COLD WAR ENEMIES,
02:15CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION,
02:16WERE BACKING THE NORTH
02:17WITH WEAPONS,
02:18ADVISORS,
02:19AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL.
02:27FOR U.S. LEADERS,
02:28THAT RAISED THE MOST
02:29DIFFICULT QUESTION
02:30THEY HAD EVER FACED.
02:32COULD THE AIR WAR BE WON
02:34WITHOUT SPARKING OFF
02:35A WIDER AND INFINITELY
02:37MORE DANGEROUS CONFLICT?
03:05THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
03:07THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
03:08A WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
03:09MORE THAN THREE YEARS
03:11BEFORE AMERICAN COMBAT TROOPS
03:12SET FOOT IN VIETNAM.
03:18IN LATE 1961,
03:20PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
03:22ORDERED MORE HELP
03:23FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
03:24GOVERNMENT IN ITS WAR
03:25AGAINST THE VIET CONG GORILLAS.
03:35U.S. BACKING INCLUDED NEW EQUIPMENT
03:38AND MORE THAN 3,000 MILITARY
03:40ADVISORS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL.
03:46SOON, U.S. ARMY AND MARINE HELICOPTERS
03:49WERE FLYING SOUTH VIETNAMESE
03:51GOVERNMENT SOLDIERS AND THEIR
03:52AMERICAN ADVISORS INTO COMBAT
03:54AGAINST THE VIET CONG.
03:56U.S. AIR FORCE TRANSPORT PLANES
03:58HELPED WITH TROOP DEPLOYMENTS
04:00AND SUPPLIES.
04:08MEANWHILE, RECONNAISANCE AIRCRAFT
04:10SEARCHED FOR GORILLA UNITS
04:12AND INTERCEPTORS DEFENDED
04:13SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIRSPACE
04:15AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE
04:16OR EVEN POSSIBLY SOVIET
04:18OR CHINESE INTRUDERS.
04:21AMONGST THE FIRST U.S. AIR FORCE
04:24UNITS SENT TO VIETNAM
04:25WAS A SMALL DETACHMENT
04:26OF HELICOPTERS DISGUISED
04:28IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE MARKINGS.
04:32UNDER SPECIAL RULES OF
04:34ENGAGEMENT, CODENAMED
04:35FARMGATE, THE AIRCRAFT WERE
04:37FLOWN BY U.S. PERSONNEL BUT
04:39HAD TO HAVE A SOUTH VIETNAMESE
04:40AIR FORCE OFFICER ON BOARD.
04:43UNOFICIALLY, THEY WERE
04:44FLYING COMBAT MISSIONS
04:45AGAINST THE NLF.
04:56IN SPITE OF AMERICAN
04:57EFFORTS, THE NLF
04:59INFLICTED A SERIES OF DEFEATS
05:01ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
05:02ARMY IN 1963.
05:05GERILLA NUMBERS WERE RISING,
05:07AND THEY WERE BETTER ARMED
05:08AND LED THAN EVER.
05:13WITH EACH MONTH THAT PASSED,
05:15THE NLF WAS GETTING MORE
05:16WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND
05:18TRAINED MEN FROM NORTH VIETNAM.
05:43THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE FROM
05:45NORTH VIETNAM, THE HO CHI MIN
05:47TRAIL, RAN INSIDE LAOS AND
05:49CAMBBODIA, TO THE NLF'S BASE
05:51AREAS IN THE SOUTH.
06:00THE TRAIL WAS MANNED BY NORTH
06:02VIETNAMESE ARMY TROOPS WITH THE
06:04HELP OF LAOTIAN GORILLAS WHO WERE
06:06WAGING THEIR OWN WAR AGAINST
06:07THE LAO GOVERNMENT.
06:22THE NLF GORILLAS WERE
06:23CONCENTRATED IN THE MEKONG
06:25DELTA, AROUND SAIGON, AND IN THE
06:28CENTRAL AND NORTHERN PARTS OF
06:29VIETNAM.
06:36IT WAS NEAR THESE AREAS THAT
06:38THE AMERICANS STATIONED
06:39HELICOPTER COMPANIES TO CARRY
06:41SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS INTO
06:43BATTLE.
06:46THE DETACHMENT, OPERATING
06:48UNDER FARM GATE, WAS BASED AT
06:50BEN HOA NEAR SAIGON, AND THERE
06:52WAS ANOTHER IMPORTANT BASE AT
06:53TAN SINUT.
06:57THREE SMALLER AIRFIELDS ALSO
06:59SUPPORTED FIXED-WING
07:00OPERATIONS.
07:11BY THE END OF 1963, FARMGATE
07:14PILOTS, SOON KNOWN AS AIR
07:16COMMANDOS, WERE FLYING MORE
07:18THAN 80 MISSIONS A WEEK.
07:19THEY ATTACKED VIET CONG BASE
07:21AREAS AND RIVER TRAFFIC, AND
07:24WERE CREDITED WITH KILLING
07:25HUNDREDS, MAYBE THOUSANDS,
07:26OF GORILLAS.
07:37OPERATION RANCH HAND FLIGHTS
07:39SPRAYING A DEADLY HERBICIDE TO
07:41DESTROY JUNGLE COVER WERE ALSO
07:43FLOWN UNDER FARMGATE RULES.
07:49THE SPRAYING, WHICH BEGAN IN
07:52EARLY 1962, CLEARED THE
07:54VEGETATION ALONGSIDE HIGHWAYS.
07:56VIET CONG AMBUSHES WOULD THEN
07:58BE FAR EASIER TO SPOT.
08:08RANCH HAND'S MISSION WAS SOON
08:10EXTENDED BEYOND PREVENTING
08:11AMBUSHES.
08:13VAST TRACKS OF FOREST WERE
08:15SPRAYED WITH AGENT ORANGE, A
08:17HERBICIDE CONTAINING THE DEADLY
08:19CHEMICAL DIOXIN.
08:21GORILLA TRAILS AND BASE AREAS
08:23WERE EXPOSED, AND COPS THAT
08:25MIGHT FEED VIET CONG UNITS WERE
08:26DESTROYED.
08:31BY THE SUMMER OF 1971, OPERATION
08:34RANCH HAND HAD SPRAYED 11 MILLION
08:36GALLONS OF AGENT ORANGE CONTAINING
08:38240 POUNDS OF DIOXIN AND DESTROYED
08:416 MILLION ACRES OF SOUTH VIETNAM.
08:45ONE-SEVENTH OF THE COUNTRY'S TOTAL
08:47AREA WAS LAID WASTE.
08:50HERBICIDES CONTAINING DIOXIN WERE
08:53BANNED FOR USE IN THE U.S. BY THE
08:55DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE IN 1968.
08:57IN VIETNAM, THE SPRAYING CONTINUED
09:00UNTIL 1971.
09:13BETWEEN APRIL AND JUNE 1964, AMERICAN AIR POWER IN
09:18SOUTHEAST ASIA WAS MASSIVELY REINFORCED.
09:22TWO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS ARRIVED OFF THE
09:25VIETNAMESE COAST.
09:26THE MOVE WAS PROMPTED BY AN NVA OFFENSIVE
09:29IN LAOS.
09:36TO HELP LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES, U.S.
09:40AIRCRAFT MOUNTED A BIG RECONNAISANCE
09:41EFFORT, CODENAMED OPERATION YANKEE TEAM.
09:51SOON AFTER YANKEE TEAM BEGAN, TWO NAVY PLANES
09:55WERE LOST TO ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE OVER LAOS.
09:58THE AIR FORCE RETALIATED BY HITTING THE ENEMY
10:01GUN POSITIONS IN THE FIRST JET BOMBING RAIDS
10:03IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
10:12AS WELL AS PHOTOGRAPHING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
10:15LAOTIAN GORILLAS, AMERICAN AIRCRAFT OVER LAOS
10:18WERE MONITORING THE HO CHI MIN TRAIL.
10:21IT WAS CLEAR THAT NORTH VIETNAM WAS SENDING MORE
10:25MEN AND SUPPLIES TO THE SOUTHERN GORILLAS THAN EVER
10:27BEFORE.
10:36IN WASHINGTON, THE NEW U.S. PRESIDENT, LYNDON
10:39JOHNSON, WAS BEING PRESSED HARD BY HIS MILITARY
10:42COMMANDERS TO PUNISH THE NORTH.
10:46SO FAR, JOHNSON HAD REFUSED TO SANCTION OFFICIAL
10:50DIRECT ATTACKS ON NORTH VIETNAM.
10:52HOWEVER, COVERT ATTACKS WERE BEING CONDUCTED OVER
10:55VIETNAM NEAR THE LAOTIAN BORDER.
10:59IT WAS AN INCIDENT IN THE TONKIN GULF THAT FINALLY
11:02LIT THE FUSE.
11:03IN BAD WEATHER CONDITIONS, THE CAPTAIN OF AN AMERICAN
11:07DESTROYER THOUGHT HE WAS FIRED UPON BY NORTH VIETNAMESE
11:10PATROL BOATS, AN ATTACK THAT ACTUALLY NEVER HAPPENED.
11:13BUT ON AUGUST 5, 1964, THE PRESIDENT ORDERED RETALIATION.
11:32OPERATION PIERCE ARROW WAS LAUNCHED BY THE CARRIERS
11:35TICONDOROGA AND CONSTELLATION.
11:42AIRCRAFT FROM CONSTELLATION BOMBED NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL
11:46FACILITIES AT HONG GAI AND LOC CHO WITH THE LOSS OF TWO
11:51AMERICAN AIRCRAFT.
11:57FUEL STORAGE TANKS AND A PATROL BOAT BASE AT VIN AND ANOTHER
12:01BASE AT QUONG CAI WERE ATTACKED BY AIRCRAFT FROM TICONDOROGA.
12:10LATER, A FOLLOW-UP STRIKE COMPLETED THE DEVASTATION AT VIN.
12:32IN NORTH VIETNAM, THE AMERICAN BOMBING RAIDS IMMEDIATELY
12:35TRIGGERED A SECRET PLAN.
12:37FOR YEARS, THE NORTH HAD BEEN CREATING AN AIR FORCE
12:40WITH SOVIET-BUILT JET FIGHTERS.
12:42THE FORCE HAD BEEN BASED IN CHINA.
12:45THE DAY AFTER THE AMERICAN BOMBINGS, THE FIGHTERS WERE CALLED HOME.
12:57EVEN AS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FIGHTERS BEGAN TO PATROL
13:00OUT OF THEIR NEW BASE, THE AMERICANS RUSHED THEIR OWN
13:03REINFORCEMENTS TO THE REGION.
13:11THE AIR FORCE DEPLOYED MORE THAN 70 PLANES TO VIETNAM AND THAILAND.
13:18THE NAVY SENT TWO MORE CARRIERS STEAMING TOWARDS THE GULF OF TONG KIN.
13:30AS TENSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ROSE SHARPLY, U.S. INTELLIGENCE LEARNED OF AN OMINOUS DEVELOPMENT.
13:36IN OCTOBER 1964, CHINA, VIETNAM'S NEIGHBOR AND ALLY, SUCCESSFULLY TESTED AN ATOMIC BOMB.
13:57IN THE CLOSING WEEKS OF 1964, AMERICAN AIRCRAFT LAUNCHED A NEW CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
14:04THE AIM WAS TO FIND AND DESTROY NORTH VIETNAMESE TRANSPORT AND INSTALLATIONS
14:09ON THE HO CHIMIN TRAIL IN LAOS.
14:12FOR THE AMERICANS, OPERATION BARREL ROLL WAS THE START OF AN ATTEMPT TO CUT OFF SUPPLIES
14:18TO THE NLF THAT WOULD LAST FOR A FULL EIGHT YEARS.
14:32BY FEBRUARY 8, 1965, NLF GORILLAS IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAD LAUNCHED A SERIES OF ATTACKS
14:39ON U.S. INSTALLATIONS AND PERSONNEL.
14:42THE UNITED STATES WAS DETERMINED TO HOLD NORTH VIETNAM RESPONSIBLE.
14:57CARRIER AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN KEPT READY TO RETALIATE IF THE PRESIDENT GAVE THE ORDER.
15:01ON FEBRUARY 7, 1965, THEY WERE UNLEASHED AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE TARGETS.
15:26OPERATION FLAMING DART
15:28OPERATION FLAMING DART WAS LAUNCHED FROM THE CARRIERS RANGER, HANCOCK AND CORAL C
15:32AND FROM AIRFIELDS IN SOUTH VIETNAM BY BOTH U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE PLANES.
15:41THE TARGETS WERE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY BARRICS AND THE 325TH INFANTRY DIVISION'S TRAINING BASE AT DONG HOI.
15:52BECAUSE OF BAD WEATHER, ONLY ONE TARGET WAS HIT IN STRENGTH AT THE COST OF AN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN.
16:03IN THE NEXT FIVE DAYS, MORE RETALIATION RAIDS AGAIN HIT ARMY BARRICS.
16:10THREE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WERE LOST.
16:29UP TO NOW, THE AMERICAN AIR STRIKES ON THE NORTH HAD BEEN IN RETALIATION FOR PARTICULAR INCIDENTS.
16:36HOWEVER, MANY IN WASHINGTON BELIEVED THAT BOMBING SHOULD HAVE A MUCH BIGGER ROLE TO PLAY.
16:43THEY ARGUED A SUSTAINED CAMPAIGN OF ATTACKS COULD MAKE NORTH VIETNAM STOP SUPPORTING THE WAR IN THE SOUTH.
16:57MILITARY PLANNERS HAD LONG AGO BEEN GIVEN PERMISSION TO PREPARE A MAJOR BOMBING OFFENSIVE.
17:02IT WAS CODENAMED OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER.
17:06ON FEBRUARY 13, 1965, THE WHITE HOUSE GAVE THE GO-AHEAD.
17:16TWO WEEKS LATER, ON MARCH 2, AFTER A SERIES OF DELAYS, THE AMERICANS LAUNCHED THE FIRST RAID OF THE NEW
17:23CAMPAIGN.
17:24THE INITIAL PLAN WAS TO LAUNCH TWO OR THREE STRIKES EVERY WEEK.
17:29BUT BY MARCH 19, WITH ROLLING THUNDER 7, THE AIR STRIKES BECAME A SUSTAINED AND REGULAR EFFORT.
17:42ROLLING THUNDER GOT OFF TO AN UNCERTAIN START.
17:46THE FIRST MISSION, FLOWN BY MORE THAN A HUNDRED AIRCRAFT, HIT AN AMMUNITION DUMP IN THE QUANG KE NAVAL BASE.
17:57FIVE U.S. AIRCRAFT WERE LOST.
18:03IN THE FOLLOWING WEEKS, NORTH VIETNAMESE RADAR, RAILWAY BRIDGES AND MILITARY BASES WERE ATTACKED.
18:09BUT MORE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN.
18:13ALREADY, IT LOOKED LIKE AN AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM MIGHT PROVE FAR MORE COSTLY THAN ANYONE HAD EXPECTED.
18:32THE FOLLOWING WEEKS, NORTH VIETNAM MIGHT PROVE FAR MORE COSTLY THAN ANYONE HAD.
18:50THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT, LYNDON JOHNSON, DOUBTED THAT BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BE ENOUGH TO SAVE THE SOUTH.
19:00BY NOW, HE WAS RESIGNED TO USING AMERICAN TROOPS TO FIGHT THE GORILLAS.
19:09THE FIRST COMBAT UNITS HAD ALREADY LANDED.
19:16JOHNSON'S BIGGEST WORRY, SHARED BY HIS DEFENSE SECRETARY, ROBERT MCNAMARA, WAS THAT BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM MIGHT SPARK OFF A MUCH
19:24BIGGER WAR.
19:33THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA HAD BEEN SUPPORTING THE NORTH WITH FINANCIAL AND MILITARY AID FOR YEARS.
19:39IF THE AMERICAN BOMBING WAS TOO FIERCE, THEY MIGHT BE FORCED TO COME TO ITS DEFENSE.
19:45AFTER THAT, ANYTHING COULD HAPPEN.
19:56JOHNSON'S FEARS THAT THE WAR IN VIETNAM COULD SPIRAL OUT OF CONTROL WERE NOT SHARED BY HIS MILITARY LEADERS.
20:08THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CHINESE OR THE SOVIETS WOULD INTERVENE NO MATTER HOW HARD
20:15THE U.S. HIT THE NORTH.
20:16WHAT THEY WANTED WAS A QUICK AND DEVASTATING CAMPAIGN.
20:31WHATEVER THE DOUBTS OF HIS MILITARY LEADERS, JOHNSON WAS SURE THAT MASSIVE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM WOULD DROY IN THE
20:39CHINESE.
20:39THE ONLY COURSE THE PRESIDENT COULD SEE WAS TO KEEP STRICT CONTROL OF THE OFFENSIVE HIMSELF.
20:49EACH WEEK THE LIST OF TARGETS TO BE STRUCK WOULD HAVE TO BE APPROVED BY HIM AT THE WHITE HOUSE.
21:16THE FIRST AMERICAN BOMBING RAIDS HAD COME AS A SEVERE SHOCK TO THE LEADERS OF NORTH VIETNAM.
21:22NEITHER THE PRESIDENT HO CHI MIN NOR HIS GOVERNMENT HAD EXPECTED THE AMERICANS TO GO SO FAR.
21:28BUT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF GIVING IN.
21:36ON APRIL 8, 1965, PREMIER FAM VANDONG REPLIED TO A PEACE OVERTURE FROM THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT WITH HIS OWN LIST
21:44OF UNCOMPROMISING DEMANDS.
21:50FOR TEN YEARS HO CHI MIN'S AIM HAD BEEN TO REUNITE THE TWO HALVES OF VIETNAM UNDER COMMUNIST RULE.
21:58NOW THE NLF GORILLAS IN THE SOUTH WERE SO CLOSE TO VICTORY HE SAW NO REASON WHY HE SHOULD NEGOTIATE.
22:11THE PROBLEM WAS, IF THE NORTH WERE BOMBED INTO OBLIVION OR INVADED BY AMERICAN AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES, ALL WOULD
22:19BE LOST.
22:31ONLY WITH MASSIVE HELP FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA COULD NORTH VIETNAM HOPE TO SURVIVE.
22:38THE TWO SUPERPOWERS HAD ALREADY GIVEN NEARLY A BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF AID OVER TEN YEARS, BUT HO WAS APPEALING
22:46URGENTLY FOR MORE.
22:48HO MEANT TO PLAY ON THE BITTER RIVALRY BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS TO GET ALL THE HELP HE COULD.
23:07AT FIRST, THE SOVIET UNION UNDER PREMIER ALEXI KOSIGIN HAD URGED NORTHERN LEADERS TO LOOK FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.
23:19BUT KOSIGIN WAS ACTUALLY IN HANOI IN FEBRUARY 1965 WHEN ROLLING THUNDER BEGAN.
23:25THE RUSSIAN POSITION HARDENED.
23:29THE SOVIETS NOW PROMISED SOPHISTICATED RADAR, AIR DEFENSE MISSILES, AND MORE JET FIGHTERS.
23:46CHINA, UNDER ITS LEADER MAO ZETUNG, WENT MUCH FURTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION.
23:51MAO PROMISED TO SEND COMBAT INFANTRY IF THE COUNTRY WERE INVADED.
24:01MEANTIME, TO HELP THE NORTH DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST THE BOMBING, HE PROMISED ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS.
24:11MAO MEANT TO GUARANTEE THE SURVIVAL OF HIS NEIGHBOR, WHATEVER THE RISKS.
24:36FROM THE START, THE AMERICAN BOMBING OFFENSIVE AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM WAS MEANT TO MEET A WHOLE RANGE OF DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES.
24:47THE MILITARY CHIEFS, INCLUDING ADMIRAL SHARP, THE COMMANDER OF U.S. PACIFIC FORCES, WANTED TO WRECK THE NORTH'S CAPACITY TO
24:54MAKE WAR.
25:07THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN SAIGON, MAXWELL TAYLOR, SAW THE RAIDS AS A MORALE BOOSTER FOR SOUTH VIETNAM.
25:13THE DEFENSE SECRETARY, ROBERT MCNAMARA, MEANT THEM TO PUT ON PRESSURE, WHICH COULD BE STEPPED UP GRADUALLY UNTIL THE NORTH
25:20AGREED TO U.S. DEMANDS.
25:29THE FIRST TARGETS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER CAMPAIGN HAD BEEN CHOSEN MAINLY FOR THEIR POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT.
25:36HOWEVER, TO JUSTIFY THE MOUNTING TOLL OF LOST PILOTS AND AIRCRAFT, MCNAMARA NOW WANTED MORE CONCRETE RESULTS.
25:46HE ARGUED THAT THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM SHOULD BE MUCH MORE CLOSELY LINKED TO THE WAR IN THE SOUTH.
26:14THE NEW AMERICAN PLAN FOR OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER FOCUSED ON THE PART OF NORTH VIETNAM BETWEEN THE DEMILITARIZED
26:22ZONE, SEPARATING NORTH AND SOUTH, AND THE TWENTYTH PARALLEL.
26:31INSIDE THIS AREA, RAILWAY LINES, BRIDGES, AND A VITAL RAIL YARD AT VIN WERE ALL USED TO SEND SUPPLIES
26:39AND REINFORCEMENTS TO GORILLA UNITS IN THE SOUTH.
26:46THESE LINES OF COMMUNICATION WERE TO BE CUT IN A THREE-WEEK CAMPAIGN, WHICH WOULD STEADLY MOVE NORTH
26:55ARMED RECONNAISANCE WOULD THEN DESTROY THE TRANSPORT TRAPPED BY THE BROKEN BRIDGES AND RAIL LINES.
27:20TO U.S. MILITARY LEADERS, THE DECISION TO ATTACK NORTH VIETNAMESE TRANSPORT WAS A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.
27:26BUT IT WAS NOWHERE NEAR AS DESTRUCTIVE AS THE CAMPAIGN THEY WANTED.
27:37THE JOINT CHIEFS STILL ARGUED FOR AN ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE TO DESTROY NORTH VIETNAM'S MILITARY CENTERS, AIR DEFENSES, POWER STATIONS,
27:45AND PORTS.
27:57PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND ROBERT MCNAMARA WERE ADAMANT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ALL-OUT CAMPAIGN.
28:03THIS WAS TO BE A LIMITED WAR TO ACHIEVE LIMITED OBJECTIVES.
28:07IN ANY CASE, MCNAMARA AND OTHER OFFICIALS ARGUED, THE MOST VALUABLE TARGETS SHOULD BE KEPT AS HOSTAGES.
28:14TO SAVE THOSE, NORTH VIETNAM WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATE.
28:18TO SAVE THOSE, NORTH VIETNAM WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TOGETHER.
28:46WHEN THE ROLLING THUNDER CAMPAIGN HAD BEGUN, NORTH VIETNAM'S LEADERS HAD FEARED THAT IN A VERY SHORT TIME, THEIR COUNTRY
28:53COULD BE BOMBED INTO RUBBLE.
29:02THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM WAS STILL PRIMITIVE.
29:05IF THE AMERICANS MEANT TO LAUNCH AN ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE, THERE WAS LITTLE THE FLEDGLING NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE COULD
29:11DO TO STOP THEM.
29:14NORTH VIETNAM HOPED THAT OPEN SUPPORT FROM ITS ALLIES, PARTICULARLY THE CHINESE, COULD SAVE IT FROM FULL-SCALE ATTACK.
29:21THERE WAS EVERY SIGN THE CHINESE MEANT WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT COMING TO THE NORTH'S AID IF NECESSARY.
29:26IN FACT, CHINA WAS TAKING THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM SO SERIOUSLY, IT HAD CHANGED ITS WHOLE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY.
29:47MAO TSE TONG HAD LONG RECOGNIZED THAT BY HELPING NORTH VIETNAM, HE WAS RISKING A DIRECT CLASH WITH THE UNITED
29:54STATES.
29:58HE WAS DETERMINED TO PREPARE.
30:00MAO ORDERED A MASSIVE DEFENSE PROGRAM TO ENSURE CHINA COULD WITHSTAND EVEN A NUCLEAR ATTACK BY THE UNITED STATES.
30:06HE CALLED IT THE THIRD FRONT AND BY MARCH 1965 IT WAS ALREADY WELL UNDERWAY.
30:37THE THIRD FRONT
30:40OF THE PROGRAM HAD BEEN TO TAKE CHINA'S INDUSTRIES, MOSTLY CONCENTRATED AROUND THE BIG CITIES, AND SPLIT THEM IN TWO.
30:55THE DUPLICATES WERE THEN MOVED DEEP INTO THE INTERIOR.
31:02ALREADY, FORTIFICATIONS WERE BEING BUILT FOR DEFENSE IN DEPTH, AND EVERY PROVINCE WAS CREATING ITS OWN LIGHT ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY.
31:13MEANWHILE, NORTH VIETNAM'S DEFENSES AGAINST AMERICAN BOMBING WERE ALSO BEING REINFORCED.
31:30CHINA HAD ALREADY MOVED FOUR FULL AIR DIVISIONS AND AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT DIVISION TO ITS BORDER WITH VIETNAM.
31:40IT BUILT AIRFIELDS CLOSE TO THE FRONTIER AS SANCTUARY AND REPAIR FACILITIES FOR NORTH VIETNAM'S JET FIGHTERS.
31:50INSIDE VIETNAM, NEW AIRFIELDS WOULD BE BUILT AND OLD ONES REPAIRED.
32:00CHINESE LOGISTIC TEAMS WERE ALREADY CONSTRUCTING OR UPGRADING 12 ROADS NORTH OF HANOI.
32:28IN NORTH VIETNAM, FULL-SCALE MOBILIZATION WAS BEING CARRIED OUT AT A FRANTIC PACE.
32:33MANY BELIEVED THAT AN INVASION MIGHT FOLLOW THE AIR ASSAULT.
32:40A MILLION PEOPLE WERE ORGANIZED INTO REPAIR AND CONSTRUCTION TEAMS.
32:47IN A MASSIVE PROGRAM, THEY DUG THOUSANDS OF MILES OF TRENCHES AND MILLIONS OF SINGLE-PERSON AIR RAID SHELTERS.
32:53SOON, IN HANOI, THERE WOULD BE A SHELTER ON AVERAGE EVERY 20 FEET.
33:12TO THE LEADERS OF THE NORTH, BUILDING DEFENSES AND ACQUIRING ADVANCED WEAPONRY WAS ONLY ONE PART OF THE STRATEGY.
33:19THERE WAS ALSO THE POLITICAL BATTLE.
33:27THERE WOULD BE A MAJOR PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE TO PRESSURE THE AMERICANS INTO RESTRICTING OR EVEN STOPPING THEIR ATTACKS.
33:58FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS, AMERICAN MILITARY PLANNING HAD GIVEN THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO STRATEGY.
34:14THE U.S. HAD BUILT A HUGE FORCE OF LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT ABLE TO ATTACK TARGETS DEEP INSIDE THE SOVIET
34:20UNION WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
34:24AS THE CONFLICT WITH NORTH VIETNAM HAD INTENSIFIED, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND HAD MODIFIED ITS GIANT B-52s TO CARRY CONVENTIONAL
34:32BOMBS.
34:40ALTHOUGH THE B-52s HAD BEEN STATIONED READY TO ATTACK NORTH VIETNAM, IN THE END THEY HAD BEEN KEPT OUT
34:46OF ROLLING THUNDER.
34:54THE WHITE HOUSE BELIEVED THAT THE MASSIVE HIGH-ALTITUDE BOMBERS WERE JUST TOO DESTRUCTIVE.
35:00THEY COULD BE SEEN AS A MASSIVE ESCALATION OF THE WAR.
35:16INSTEAD, THE SMALLER AND MORE ACCURATE TACTICAL BOMBERS WOULD FIGHT THE STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE NORTH.
35:23THEY WOULD ALSO CARRY OUT THEIR NORMAL ROLE BY SUPPORTING GROUND OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
35:37WHILE THE AIR FORCE AND MARINE AIRCRAFT WOULD FLY MOST MISSIONS INSIDE SOUTH VIETNAM,
35:43A LARGE PART OF THE STRIKES AGAINST THE NORTH WOULD BE MOUNTED BY THE NAVY.
35:55THE U.S. NAVY HAD 16 STRIKE CARRIERS AND DEPLOYED MORE AIRCRAFT THAN ALL THE WORLD'S OTHER NAVYS COMBINED.
36:08BY THE END OF 1965, TEN DIFFERENT CARRIERS WOULD HAVE TAKEN PART IN ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONS OVER NORTH VIETNAM.
36:33U.S. NAVAL AIR POWER OFF VIETNAM WAS UNDER THE COMMAND OF TASK FORCE 77.
36:45ITS CARRIERS WOULD OPERATE FROM TWO AREAS, CODENAMED YANKEY AND DIXIE STATIONS.
36:55AIRCRAFT FROM YANKEY STATION WOULD ATTACK TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS,
37:00WHILE PLANES FROM DIXIE WOULD FLY OVER SOUTH VIETNAM.
37:13AMERICAN AIR FORCE UNITS WERE CONTROLLED BY THE 2ND AIR DIVISION.
37:20IN 1965, THE DIVISION OPERATED FROM TWO MAIN AIRFIELDS IN VIETNAM AND FIVE IN THAILAND.
37:32THE FIRST MARINE AIR WING WOULD DEPLOY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT AT ANOTHER TWO AIRFIELDS IN NORTHERN SOUTH VIETNAM.
37:38WHILE B-52 WINGS OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND OPERATED FROM GUAM IN THE PACIFIC AND LATER FROM THIILAND,
37:48WITH REFUELING TANKERS FROM OKINAWA.
38:05U.S. AIR COMMANDERS HAD A LIMITED SAY IN HOW THE BATTLE OVER NORTH VIETNAM WAS FOUGHT.
38:14THE WHITE HOUSE WAS NOT ONLY CHOOSING THE TARGETS, BUT DECIDING ON ALMOST EVERY OTHER DETAIL
38:19OF EACH ATTACK.
38:21WASHINGTON SPECIFIED THE DAY AND OFTEN THE TIME OF EACH MISSION, AND SOMETIMES EVEN THE
38:26TYPE OF BOMBS TO BE USED.
38:38FROM THE APPROVED LIST, AMERICAN PILOTS WERE GIVEN A TARGET AND ONE OR TWO ALTERNATIVES.
38:44ONLY THOSE TARGETS COULD BE ATTACKED.
38:51THE MONSOON WEATHER WAS STILL ENVELOPING NORTH VIETNAM, MAKING SOME TARGETS IMPOSSIBLE TO HIT,
38:56AT THE TIME SPECIFIED IN WASHINGTON.
38:59AIR COMMANDERS HAD NO AUTHORITY TO IMPROVISE.
39:30THE MAIN BURDEN OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE'S WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM WOULD FALL ON A SINGLE AIRCRAFT
39:36TYPE.
39:37THE F-105 THUNDER CHIEF WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AS A SUPERSONIC LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR BOMBER.
39:45THE SINGLE SEATER COULD CARRY UP TO FIVE TONS OF BOMBS, MORE THAN A WORLD WAR II B-17 FLYING
39:52FORTRESS.
39:57AS A FIGHTER ESCORT AND FOR LIGHT ATTACK, THE AIR FORCE HAD THE F-100 SUPER SABER.
40:03THE F-100 COULD CARRY ALMOST FOUR TONS OF BOMBS.
40:06IT WAS ALSO ARMED WITH AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES AND FOUR 20-MILLIMETER CANNON.
40:22FOR BOMBING MISSIONS, THE U.S. NAVY STILL RELIED HEAVILY ON THE PROPEELLER-DRIVEN SKYRAIDER.
40:32ALTHOUGH THE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN IN SERVICE MORE THAN 20 YEARS AND WAS VERY SLOW, IT COULD CARRY A HEAVY
40:38LOAD OF BOMBS AND ROCKETS.
40:40IT ALSO HAD ASTONISHING ENDURANCE AND WAS ABLE TO STAY OVER A TARGET AREA FOR HOURS AT A TIME.
41:00AS ROLLING THUNDER DEVELOPED, THE SKYRAIDER WOULD BE GRADUALLY REPLACED IN THE NAVY'S ATTACK SQUADRONS BY THE A-4 SKYHAWK.
41:09THE SKYHAWK COULD CARRY FOUR TONS OF BOMBS, BUT IT WAS A SLOW AIRCRAFT ABLE TO REACH ONLY 670 MILES
41:16PER HOUR.
41:18SKYHAWK RAIDS WERE USUALLY ESCORTED BY CRUSADER FIGHTERS ARMED WITH BOTH CANNON AND AIR TO AIR MISSILES.
41:39BY APRIL 1965, THE AMERICANS' MOST VERSATILE AIRCRAFT WAS ALREADY DEPLOYED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA BY AIR FORCE, NAVY AND MARINE
41:48UNITS.
41:52THE F-4 FANTOM WAS A BIG AIRCRAFT AND WAS ABLE TO FLY AT MORE THAN TWICE THE SPEED OF
41:57SOUND, 1400 MILES PER HOUR.
42:00IT COULD ALSO CARRY A BOMB LOAD OF UP TO 8 TONS.
42:18AS PHANTOM UNITS TOOK ON A BIGGER ROLE IN THE WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM, ONE UNFORSEEN SHORTCOMING WOULD SOON EMERGE.
42:25THE F-4 HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO DEPEND FOR SELF-DEFENSE ON ITS MISSILES.
42:29IT HAD NEVER BEEN FITTED WITH CANNON FOR CLOSE-RANGE AIR COMBAT.
43:00EVERY AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED BY AN AIR FORCE FIGHTER WING OR
43:03U.S. NAVY CARRIER DEPENDED ON MORE THAN 30 MEN TO KEEP IT FLYING.
43:12A CARRIER HAD A CREW OF AROUND 4,000 CRAMMED INTO THE SHIP ALONGSIDE PLANES, BOMBS AND STORES.
43:21BECAUSE THE CARRIER WAS OPERATING 24 HOURS A DAY, THE MEN WORKED IN SHIFTS UP TO 16 HOURS LONG.
43:39IN THAILAND AND SOUTH VIETNAM, CONDITIONS FOR AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WERE EASIER.
43:44ALL THE SAME, HEAT AND HUMIDITY TOOK A HEAVY TOLL ON MEN AND MACHINES.
43:50TO ADD TO THE BURDEN, HIGHER COMMAND OFTEN MEASURED THE SUCCESS OF A UNIT BY THE SHEER NUMBER OF SORTIES
43:56IT COULD FLY.
44:10WHETHER NAVY OR AIR FORCE, MORALE WAS HIGH AMONGST THE AIR CREW WHO WERE GOING INTO COMBAT OVER NORTH VIETNAM.
44:18AIRCRAFT AND PILOTS HAD BEEN LOST AND THE ENEMY'S AIR DEFENSES WERE STILL BEING DEVELOPED.
44:34THE MONSOON WEATHER STILL ENVELOPING THE NORTH WAS OFTEN A BIGGER CONCERN THAN THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS.
44:40SO TOO WERE THE STRICT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT THAT PILOTS HAD TO MEMORIZE.
44:51WASHINGTON HAD ORDERED THAT ONLY CONFIRMED MILITARY TARGETS COULD BE HIT AND THEN NEVER IN CIVILIAN AREAS.
44:58ENEMY AIRCRAFT HAD TO BE IDENTIFIED VISUALLY BEFORE THEY COULD BE ATTACKED IN CASE THEY WERE CHINESE.
45:09AND THERE WAS A HOST OF OTHER RESTRICTIONS.
45:11SUCH RULES HAD NEVER BEEN PART OF THE TRAINING OF U.S. PILOTS.
45:15BUT CREW WERE LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT INFRINGEMENTS WOULD LEAD TO SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY ACTION.
45:47THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES
45:49FIELDED 400,000 MEN IN 13 REGULAR DIVISIONS.
45:54ALL DIVISIONS HAD THEIR OWN ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS.
45:58SO DID THE UNITS OPERATING IN LAOS BUILDING AND RUNNING THE HO CHI MEN TRAIL.
46:13THE NAVY PLAYED A ROLE IN AIR DEFENSE TOO.
46:16ITS FLEET OF EAST GERMAN GUNBOATS WAS STATIONED ON THE SEA AND RIVER APPROACHES TO IMPORTANT TARGETS.
46:29FROM ITS BEGINNINGS, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE WAS PART OF THE ARMY.
46:33AS WELL AS ITS PLANS AND A SMALL NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS, THE AIR FORCE CONTROLLED THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT COMMAND, A
46:40SPECIALIZED ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY FORMATION.
46:45IT ALSO CONTROLLED AN INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED EARLY WARNING RADAR SYSTEM SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA.
47:10NORTH VIETNAM'S ONLY FIGHTER WING, THE 921ST, WAS BASED AT NOI BAI AIRFIELD, 40 KILOMETERS FROM HANOI.
47:21A SECOND WING, THE 923RD, WAS PLANNED FOR THE AIRFIELD BEING BUILT AT KEP.
47:31THERE WAS ALSO A TRAINING WING AND A WING OF ILEUSHIN BOMBERS AT KAT BAI AND FUK YEN.
47:43THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN BATTERIES OF THE AIR DEFENSE FORCE WERE ORGANIZED INTO FOUR BRIGADES, CONCENTRATED AROUND AREAS OF STRATEGIC
47:52IMPORTANCE.
47:56THE MAIN ROAD AND RAIL JUNCTIONS, THE INDUSTRIAL CENTERS AROUND HANOI AND HAIFONG, AND THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTS TO LAUS
48:06AND THE SOUTH WERE MOST HEAVILY DEFENDED.
48:15ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS WERE ALSO DEPLOYED ALONG THE IRRIGATION SYSTEM OF THE RED RIVER VALLEY.
48:35ALTHOUGH NORTH VIETNAM'S AIR DEFENSES WERE STILL WEAK, THEY WOULD SOON BECOME AMONGST THE MOST FORMIDABLE EVER ASSEMBLED ANYWHERE.
48:43THE PLAN WAS TO COORDINATE THE EFFORTS OF RADAR SIGHTS AND OBSERVATION POSTS, ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS AND THE FIGHTER INTERCEPTORS.
48:53THE PLANES WOULD TRY TO AMBUSH THE ENEMY, AND IF THEY COULDN'T SHOOT HIM DOWN, AT LEAST FORCE HIM TO
48:58FLY THROUGH HEAVY GROUND FIRE.
49:08IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE AIR BATTLE, CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN RADAR, GUNS AND FIGHTERS WOULD NOT BE EASY TO
49:15ACHIEVE.
49:16THERE WERE TOO MANY DIFFERENT ANTI-AIRCRAFT COMMANDS.
49:27SOON, AS SOVIET-BUILT ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES BECAME OPERATIONAL, ANOTHER INGREDIENT WOULD BE ADDED TO THE ALREADY COMPLEX SYSTEM.
49:36FOR A LONG TIME TO COME, NORTH VIETNAMESE PILOTS WOULD RUN A VERY HIGH RISK OF BEING SHOT DOWN BY
49:42FRIENDLY FIRE.
50:07THE MAINSTAY OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE WAS THE MIG-17 JET FIGHTER.
50:12IT WAS AN AGING DESIGN, A TOP SPEED OF ONLY 710 MILES AN HOUR, AND WAS LATER REPLACED BY THE
50:18MORE ADVANCED MIG-21.
50:22YET THE MIG-17 WAS STILL A FORMIDABLE INTERCEPTOR.
50:30IT WAS ONE OF THE MOST MANEUVERABLE JETS EVER BUILT, AND ARMED WITH THREE CANNON, IT WAS DEADLY IN A
50:36DOG FIGHT.
50:45BY NOW, THE AIR DEFENSE FORCE HAD A LARGE NUMBER OF SOVIET AND CHINESE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS.
50:51AT THE START OF THE BATTLE, THEY WERE STILL SIMPLE TYPES WITH OPTICAL SIGHTS.
50:56THE 23 AND THE 37 MILLIMETER TWINS COULD FIRE A HUNDRED ROUNDS A MINUTE FROM EACH BARREL, BUT COULD ONLY
51:02REACH TARGETS UP TO 10,000 FEET.
51:13THE BIGGER 57 MILLIMETER ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS HAD A CEILING OF 18,000 FEET.
51:19AMERICAN PILOTS COULD AVOID THEM BY FLYING HIGHER, BUT IN THE LAST MOMENTS OF AN ATTACK, AIRCRAFT HAD TO COME
51:25IN LOW.
51:25IT WAS THEN THAT THE 57 MILLIMETER WAS AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS WEAPON.
51:43THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REGIONAL MILITIA NOW HAD HALF A MILLION MEMBERS AND WAS EQUIPPED WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF LIGHT MACHINE
51:50GUNS.
51:51AGAINST LOW-FLYING PLANES, THEY COULD BE HIGHLY EFFECTIVE.
52:01MILITIA WERE EVEN TAUGHT TO USE THEIR RIFLES AGAINST ENEMY RAIDERS, AS EVEN A CHANCE HIT BY A SINGLE BULLET
52:07COULD BRING DOWN A MILLION-DOLLAR AIRCRAFT IN FLAMES.
52:31THE ADVANCED WEAPONRY SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA DEPENDED COMPLETELY ON SKILLED PERSONNEL TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN IT.
52:41NORTH VIETNAM WAS AN AGRICULTURAL COUNTRY WITH LITTLE INDUSTRY.
52:46200 NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE TECHNICIANS HAD BEEN TRAINED IN CHINA, BUT IT WAS BARELY ENOUGH.
53:00THERE WAS ALSO A SHORTAGE OF SKILLED RADAR OPERATORS.
53:11FROM THE START OF THE AMERICAN ATTACKS, THE PILOTS OF THE 921ST FIGHTER WING HAD BEEN KEEN TO GET INTO
53:17COMBAT.
53:25THEY HAD BEEN TRAINING AT A FURIOUS PACE. GUNNERY WAS GIVEN THE HIGHEST PRIORITY.
53:31PILOTS PRACTICE OPENING FIRE AT RANGES DOWN TO 150 METERS TO GET A KILL ON THE FIRST PASS.
53:45ALL THE TIME, THE EMPHASIS WAS ON CLOSE-IN ENGAGEMENTS TO MAKE THE MOST OF THE MIG-17'S AGILITY.
53:53AT THE SAME TIME, THE AIR FORCE WAS TRAINING THE NEXT BATCH OF PILOTS AS FAST AS IT POSSIBLY COULD.
54:08MOST OF THE TRAINING OF PILOTS, RADAR OPERATORS AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNNERS WAS BEING CARRIED OUT BY SOVIET AND CHINESE
54:15MILITARY EXPERTS.
54:16MANY HAD ALREADY TAKEN PART IN COMBAT OPERATIONS, ACTUALLY DIRECTING THE DEFENSE.
54:24AT A HIGHER LEVEL BEHIND THE SCENES, THERE WERE SOVIET AND CHINESE STAFF OFFICERS WORKING TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF
54:31EVERY BRANCH OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES.
54:59FOR THE AMERICANS, THE FIRST STAGE IN STEPPING UP THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM,
55:03WAS TO WEAKEN ITS DEFENSES.
55:05IN THE LAST WEEK OF MARCH 1965,
55:09U.S. ATTACK PLANES FROM THE CARRIERS HANCOCK AND CORAL SEA HIT KEY NORTH VIETNAMESE RADAR SITES.
55:27THERE WAS A FIERCE REACTION FROM NORTHER ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS AND SEVERAL U.S. PLANES WERE SHOT DOWN.
55:41AS THE ROLLING THUNDER CAMPAIGN BUILT UP, THE ATTACKS DID BOOST THE CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT.
55:50GOVERNMENT FORCES WERE DOING BETTER ON THE BATTLEFIELD TOO.
55:57EVEN SO, IN WASHINGTON THE MOOD WAS BLEAK.
56:04ON MARCH 29, 1965, NLF GORILLAS LAUNCHED A DARING BOMB ATTACK ON THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN SAIGON.
56:13TWO AMERICANS AND 20 SOUTH VIETNAMESE WERE KILLED.
56:23TO MANY IN WASHINGTON, THE ATTACK SEEMED TO UNDERLINE THE NEED FOR MUCH STRONGER MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN VIETNAM.
56:33BY NOW, PRESIDENT JOHNSON HIMSELF WAS PUSHING FOR VIGOROUS ACTION.
56:37HE GAVE PERMISSION FOR THE MARINES ALREADY IN VIETNAM TO BE USED IN COMBAT OPERATIONS.
56:44FEW DOUBTED THAT MORE TROOP DEPLOYMENTS WOULD FOLLOW.
56:51HE GAVE PERMISSION FOR THE MARINES ALREADY IN VIETNAM.
57:03SOON, U.S. AIRCRAFT WOULD BE FACED WITH TWO MISSIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
57:08THE CONTINUING CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM.
57:11AND SUPPORTING U.S. TROOPS IN A SHARPLY ESCALATING GROUND WAR.
57:16SOON, U.S. TROOPS IN A SHARPLY END BOW.
57:20SOON, U.S. TROOPS IN A SHARPLY END BADGET,
Comments