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01:04The helicopters sent to Vietnam by President Kennedy flew their first combat missions against the NLF.
01:11In Operation Chopper, the aircraft flown by U.S. Army pilots ferried 1,000 South Vietnamese soldiers to sweep an
01:19NLF stronghold near Saigon.
01:26It was the beginning of a whole new phase of the conflict.
01:42From the start, the American helicopters had a dramatic effect on the fighting.
01:49Government troops could take the guerrillas by surprise or cut off their line of retreat after a battle.
01:59Often, they panicked and were killed as they tried to escape.
02:03In the first months of 1962, the South Vietnamese Army won a string of victories, badly shaking the NLF's morale.
02:22Using helicopters for offensive operations called for a whole new set of tactics.
02:27It was a complex business in which helicopter forces and ground units had to be strictly coordinated.
02:35But the aim was simple.
02:37The enemy had to be found, fixed in position, and then defeated.
02:42Government troops called it spear and net.
02:46Later, it would become known as search and destroy.
03:21A search and destroy operation usually began with intelligence locating an NLF unit.
03:30The task then was to place forces to cut off the enemy's retreat.
03:38If there was a river nearby, South Vietnamese gunboats were deployed in blocking positions.
03:45Infantry on foot and in armored personnel carriers were moved in over land.
03:53Meanwhile, American helicopters loaded up with government troops rendezvoused with their escort of ground attack aircraft.
04:04After bombing or artillery strikes, the airborne infantry landed and advanced towards the enemy, acting as the offensive spear.
04:17Trapped by the net of blocking forces, the Viet Cong would be forced to do battle and be destroyed by
04:23vastly superior firepower.
04:25Or so the theory went.
04:36The instant success of helicopter operations seemed to prove that the approach favored by the Americans was the right one.
04:44What U.S. advisors wanted now was more and bigger offensive operations.
04:58The greatest need was for more helicopters, and the Americans quickly provided them.
05:06A series of government victories followed, and soon it looked as if the South Vietnamese Army might, in the not
05:13-too-distant future, actually defeat the guerrillas.
05:22In July 1962, General Paul D. Harkins, head of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Saigon, reported to Washington
05:32that tremendous progress was being made in South Vietnam.
05:38It was just what President Kennedy wanted to hear, and in the White House, there was a deep sense of
05:44relief.
05:47They hoped they could bring home all U.S. military personnel by the end of 1965.
06:12They hoped they were to be a little bit more than the second half of the day, but they were
06:23to be a little bit better.
06:24To Ho Chi Minh and the leaders of North Vietnam,
06:27the big increase in American military support for the South
06:31was deeply troubling.
06:34Did the U.S. mean to put in combat troops
06:37or perhaps even invade the North itself?
06:48They appealed to the Chinese leader Mao Zedong for help.
06:59Mao was anxious to be seen as the champion
07:02of liberation movements around the world.
07:04He was also determined to counter the American strategy in Vietnam.
07:12In the summer of 1962, the Chinese leader promised Ho Chi Minh
07:17substantial support for the guerrilla war
07:19against the Southern government.
07:22Right away, North Vietnam would get 90,000 extra rifles for the Viet Cong.
07:38As yet, the Americans knew nothing of the Chinese decision to back the war.
07:43They were still highly optimistic.
07:50Although the NLF were not being beaten on the battlefield
07:53and had managed to hit over 2,500 hamlets in 1962 alone,
07:59pacification programs designed to increase government control
08:03over the countryside promised real progress in the villages.
08:18In a program coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency,
08:23U.S. Special Forces were working with Montagnard tribal groups
08:26in the central highlands of South Vietnam.
08:28They fortified villages and trained local volunteers
08:33to fight the Viet Cong in their own areas.
08:36The tactics involved setting ambushes,
08:39heavy night patrolling,
08:41and above all, responding fast to guerrilla incidents.
08:56The civilian irregular defense forces created by the American teams
09:00were highly effective.
09:02The NLF found it increasingly difficult
09:05to organize openly amongst the population.
09:14At its peak, the program would encompass
09:17thousands of villages and hundreds of thousands of people.
09:29While the effort in the highlands
09:31was entirely an American initiative,
09:34further south, the Saigon government
09:36had embarked on its own pacification program.
09:45Backed by the CIA,
09:47called the Strategic Hamlets Program,
09:49the idea was to create 11,000 settlements
09:52which could defend themselves from the Viet Cong
09:54and bring government authority into the countryside.
09:57The campaign was a disaster from the start.
10:08Instead of winning the voluntary cooperation of villagers,
10:11the government embarked on a crash program
10:14of forced resettlement.
10:17Families were moved, sometimes at gunpoint,
10:20from their traditional lands
10:21and the burial grounds of their ancestors.
10:26Funds promised for development
10:28were embezzled by corrupt officials.
10:38Soon, the Strategic Hamlets came to be seen
10:41by their inhabitants
10:42as little better than prisons.
10:44The result was a massive upsurge
10:47in support for the NLF
10:48who vowed to destroy the Strategic Hamlets
10:51by every means possible.
11:09From the first introduction
11:11of American helicopters
11:12into South Vietnam,
11:14NLF tacticians
11:16had worked feverishly
11:17to develop ways
11:18of dealing with the threat.
11:20They had learned to mount ambushes
11:22with heavy machine guns
11:24near the obvious landing zones.
11:35They also practiced
11:36breaking up their larger units
11:38at high speed
11:39and melting into the forests or swamps
11:41at the first sign of an enemy sweep.
11:49One of the biggest lessons learned
11:51by the guerrillas in 1962
11:53was to keep their attacks short.
11:56Raids or ambushes
11:57were planned to last
11:58no more than 15 minutes.
12:00The idea was that
12:02even with helicopters,
12:04government forces
12:05would have too little time to react.
12:14slowly,
12:15by using their new tactics,
12:17the Viet Cong
12:17had recovered their confidence.
12:19So much so
12:20that by the start of 1963,
12:23they were able to inflict
12:24a shattering defeat
12:25on a South Vietnamese
12:27Army air mobile operation.
12:48The hamlet of Aptan Toi
12:51in the Mekong Delta
12:52was believed
12:53by the South Vietnamese Army
12:55to be the location
12:56of a Viet Cong headquarters,
12:58a radio transmitter,
13:00and a small guerrilla force.
13:06The Army's 7th Division,
13:08with American advice,
13:10decided to attack.
13:11What they didn't know
13:12is that they were
13:13walking into a trap.
13:15The South Vietnamese Army
13:17were lured in
13:18so the NLF
13:19could for the first time
13:20test their effectiveness
13:22against militia
13:23and airborne units.
13:24The operation was launched
13:26on January 2nd, 1963.
13:42The neighboring hamlets
13:44of Aptan Toi and Apt Bac
13:46were strung out
13:47along a raised dike
13:48and an irrigation canal.
13:53In the tree line
13:54was deployed
13:55the whole Viet Cong 514th Battalion,
13:58reinforced by local guerrillas,
14:00altogether nearly 350 men.
14:08The 11th Regiment
14:09of the South Vietnamese Army
14:11landed north of Aptan Toi
14:13and exchanged fire
14:15with the Viet Cong.
14:20Meanwhile,
14:21a civil guard task force
14:23pushing from the south
14:24ran straight into the Viet Cong
14:26at Apt Bac
14:27and was stopped in its tracks.
14:34Air and artillery strikes
14:35were directed
14:36at both hamlets,
14:38but the Viet Cong
14:38were well dug in.
14:46A reserve company
14:47of army troops
14:48was landed
14:49in transport helicopters
14:50to attack Aptan Toi.
14:55Fire from Apt Bac
14:56destroyed five aircraft.
15:01Next, a company
15:03of armored personnel carriers
15:04made a disorganized assault
15:06on Apt Bac
15:07but was driven off
15:08with heavy losses.
15:15Airborne reinforcements
15:16were dropped
15:17in the wrong place
15:18by the army commander.
15:22This allowed the Viet Cong
15:24to escape
15:25and avoided
15:25further government casualties.
15:39For the Viet Cong,
15:40the Battle of Apt Bac
15:42was a stunning victory.
15:44For the first time,
15:45they had stood their ground
15:46against helicopters
15:47and armored vehicles.
15:49Almost 400
15:50South Vietnamese troops
15:52were killed
15:53or wounded.
15:54Three American advisors
15:55were also killed
15:57and they had lost
15:59only nine men themselves.
16:05As the news swept
16:06through the hamlets
16:07and villages of Vietnam,
16:09Viet Cong morale
16:10and recruitment soared.
16:17after Apt Bac
16:18the guerrillas
16:19sharply accelerated
16:20the tempo
16:21of their operations.
16:23Attacks on strategic hamlets
16:25were launched
16:25almost every day
16:27and hundreds
16:28were overrun.
16:32The guerrillas
16:33hit isolated
16:34government forts
16:35tempting sources
16:36of arms and radios.
16:38Usually,
16:39they set ambushes
16:40for any army troops
16:41that might be sent
16:42to the rescue.
16:52The South Vietnamese
16:53army's attempts
16:54to find the Viet Cong's
16:56big units
16:56and make them fight
16:58seemed increasingly futile.
17:00One major sweep
17:01after another
17:02failed to find
17:03the guerrillas
17:04in any numbers.
17:13By now,
17:14many American advisors
17:16in South Vietnam,
17:17colonels and captains
17:19at the sharp end
17:20of the battle
17:20had begun to ask questions
17:22about U.S. military doctrine.
17:29They were training
17:30the South Vietnamese
17:31to depend
17:32on big operations
17:34and very heavy firepower.
17:36As a result,
17:38large numbers
17:39of civilians
17:39were being killed
17:40which could only
17:41increase support
17:42for the NLF.
17:44And in spite
17:45of everything,
17:45the guerrillas
17:46were usually
17:47escaping the net.
17:58what the advisors
18:00wanted
18:00were tactics
18:01more like those
18:02the special forces
18:03had adopted
18:04in the central highlands.
18:06Small unit patrolling,
18:07ambushes,
18:08and night operations
18:10all the time
18:11working closely
18:12with local people.
18:18In Washington,
18:20the suggestion
18:20met with some hostility.
18:22As far as the generals
18:24were concerned,
18:25the job was to find
18:26the enemy
18:26and destroy him
18:28with as much firepower
18:29as could be mustered.
18:49For years,
18:51President Diem
18:52had filled the ranks
18:53of South Vietnam's
18:54government officials
18:55with fellow Catholics,
18:57enraging the majority
18:58Buddhist population.
19:02from the beginning
19:03of May 1963,
19:06there were
19:06widespread protests.
19:08Diem reacted violently.
19:11The army raided temples.
19:13Monks, nuns,
19:14and priests
19:15were arrested
19:16and demonstrators
19:17were shot
19:17in the streets
19:18by police.
19:25In July,
19:27students began
19:28their own mass actions
19:29in support
19:30of the Buddhist cause.
19:32By the fall of 1963,
19:35South Vietnam
19:35was sliding
19:37into political chaos.
19:41As sheer mismanagement
19:43looked set
19:44to destroy the country,
19:46army generals
19:47directed by the CIA
19:48hatched a plan
19:49to overthrow the president.
19:51American officials,
19:53exasperated
19:54at Diem's failures,
19:55signaled that Washington
19:56would not oppose a coup.
20:01The plotters
20:02made their move
20:03on November 1, 1963,
20:06attacking the presidential palace
20:07with armor and aircraft.
20:13The generals
20:14had promised
20:15that President Diem
20:16would be allowed
20:17a safe flight
20:18into exile.
20:22the day after the coup,
20:24Diem was brutally murdered
20:25along with his brother
20:26Nhu
20:27by unidentified assassins.
20:32Three weeks later,
20:34on November 22, 1963,
20:37in the United States,
20:38President Kennedy
20:39was himself assassinated.
20:51Kennedy's place
20:52was taken by
20:53his vice president,
20:55Lyndon Baines Johnson.
20:59Johnson had always been wary
21:01of America's involvement
21:02with Vietnam.
21:03Now,
21:04he had inherited
21:05a strong U.S. commitment
21:06to the South.
21:11Whatever his private doubts,
21:13it was a commitment
21:14he was determined
21:15to honor.
21:24The chaos
21:26that had engulfed
21:26South Vietnam
21:27in the closing months
21:28of 1963
21:29was seen
21:30in North Vietnam
21:31as a golden opportunity.
21:39Ho Chi Minh
21:40and most of his
21:40fellow leaders
21:41saw the chance
21:42of a quick victory
21:43if the war
21:44was stepped up fast.
21:51Amongst the North's
21:53communist backers,
21:54the Soviet Union
21:55was opposed
21:56to any escalation.
21:59But the Chinese leader,
22:01Mao Zedong,
22:01had promised his support.
22:03If the Americans
22:05reacted by invading
22:06North Vietnam,
22:07China would even
22:08deploy combat troops
22:09to help the defense.
22:21In December 1963
22:24in Hanoi,
22:25the Central Committee
22:26of the Communist Party
22:27approved measures
22:28to intensify the war
22:30in South Vietnam.
22:36General Japp,
22:38the defense minister,
22:39had argued for caution,
22:40but most of the leadership
22:41was against him.
22:45The order was given
22:46to speed up
22:47the flow of men
22:48and weapons
22:49to the NLF
22:50in the South.
23:08In 1959,
23:10a specialized
23:10North Vietnamese
23:11Army unit,
23:12Group 559,
23:14had been formed
23:15to create a supply route
23:16from the North
23:17to the Viet Cong
23:18in South Vietnam.
23:26Jungle trails
23:28inside the South
23:29had proved
23:29too vulnerable
23:30to government army sweeps,
23:32and so,
23:33helped by their allies,
23:34the Pathet Lao guerrillas
23:35in Laos,
23:36and with the tacit approval
23:37of Prince Sihanouk
23:38of Cambodia,
23:40Group 559
23:41had taken over
23:42the border areas
23:43just outside
23:44outside South Vietnam.
23:49A primitive route
23:51was developed,
23:52soon known
23:53as the Ho Chi Minh Trail,
23:54with offshoots
23:55into Vietnam
23:56along its entire length.
24:00By early 1964,
24:02the trail
24:03was being transformed
24:04into a secret jungle highway
24:06with depots,
24:07air defense,
24:08and garrisons
24:10of permanent logistics troops.
24:16Meanwhile,
24:17another unit,
24:18Group 579,
24:20controlled the infiltration
24:21of men and weapons
24:22into South Vietnam
24:23by sea.
24:36In the first months
24:37of 1964,
24:38the NLF
24:39stepped up
24:40their campaign
24:41in a concerted effort
24:42to push South Vietnam
24:43to the edge.
24:45With better equipment,
24:47leadership,
24:47and training,
24:48the NLF
24:49were now attacking
24:50in big units,
24:51up to 1,000 men
24:52at a time.
25:03As the guerrillas
25:04sensed victory
25:05and piled on
25:06the pressure,
25:07on January 30th,
25:08there was yet
25:09another military coup
25:10in Saigon.
25:14The U.S. Defense Secretary,
25:16Robert McNamara,
25:18was dispatched
25:18to Vietnam
25:19to boost the authority
25:20of the new leader,
25:21General Nian Khan.
25:22Yet few American officials
25:25imagined Khan
25:26could soon win
25:27popular support
25:28or rally
25:29the demoralized
25:30South Vietnamese army.
25:42As the crisis
25:43in Vietnam deepened,
25:45the pressure
25:46on President Johnson
25:47to take strong action
25:48grew almost intolerable.
25:52Many of Johnson's
25:53political opponents,
25:54including the Republican
25:56Senator Barry Goldwater,
25:57were calling
25:58for North Vietnam
25:59to be bombed
26:00and for U.S. troops
26:01to be sent to fight
26:02in the South.
26:08The Joint Chiefs
26:09of Staff
26:10were also insisting
26:11that decisive military action
26:13would have to be taken
26:14to pressure Hanoi.
26:20From the start,
26:22Johnson doubted
26:22that the United States
26:23could win a war
26:24in Southeast Asia.
26:26He also believed
26:27that neither Congress
26:29nor the American people
26:30would approve
26:31of open military intervention.
26:36However,
26:37he did agree
26:37to covert actions
26:38against North Vietnam,
26:40including secret bombing
26:41of economic targets
26:42and villages
26:43along the Laotian border.
26:49With support
26:50from American warships,
26:52the South Vietnamese Navy
26:53began a series
26:54of commando raids
26:55on North Vietnamese
26:56coastal installations.
27:03It was one such operation
27:05in August 1964
27:07that would set the stage
27:09for a dramatic clash
27:10between U.S.
27:11and North Vietnamese
27:12naval forces.
27:17In the Gulf of Tonkin,
27:19the simmering conflict
27:21between the United States
27:22and Hanoi
27:23was since spiraling
27:24towards outright war.
27:40On the night
27:41of 30th July, 1964,
27:44South Vietnamese commandos
27:46attacked two small
27:47North Vietnamese islands
27:48in the Gulf of Tonkin.
27:53The U.S. destroyer Maddox,
27:56an electronic spy ship,
27:57was 123 miles south
27:59with orders
28:00to electronically simulate
28:01an air attack
28:02to draw North Vietnamese boats
28:04away from the commandos.
28:14On August 2nd,
28:16three North Vietnamese torpedo boats
28:18approached the Maddox
28:19at high speed,
28:21mistaking it
28:22for a South Vietnamese
28:23escort vessel.
28:30In the engagement
28:31that followed,
28:32the Maddox sank
28:33one of the craft
28:34and air support planes
28:35damaged the others.
28:45Maddox continued operations,
28:47reinforced by a second destroyer,
28:50the U.S.S. Turner Joy.
28:52Two nights later,
28:53still gathering intelligence
28:54and in bad weather conditions,
28:56the captain of the Maddox
28:57reported that he thought
28:58they had been fired on
28:59and were about to be attacked.
29:01As he later reported,
29:02no attack took place.
29:16The possibility
29:17that the second attack
29:18had been imagined
29:19by tense sailors
29:20in the poor weather conditions
29:22was considered
29:23and rejected
29:24in the White House.
29:34Six hours after
29:36the supposed attack,
29:37a retaliation
29:38against North Vietnam
29:39was ordered
29:40by President Johnson.
29:44American jets
29:45bombed two naval bases.
29:47A major oil facility
29:49was also destroyed.
29:51Two U.S. aircraft
29:53were lost in the raids.
30:17Within hours
30:18of the American airstrikes,
30:19the Chinese Premier
30:21Chao En Lai
30:22was calling on the Vietnamese
30:23to prepare to fight back.
30:25Chinese air units
30:27on the Vietnam border
30:28were heavily reinforced.
30:35Frantic efforts
30:36were made to improve
30:37North Vietnam's
30:38anti-aircraft defenses.
30:41At the same time,
30:43jets of the fledgling
30:44North Vietnamese Air Force
30:46returned to Vietnam
30:47from their training base
30:48in China.
31:02The same day
31:04that North Vietnamese
31:05fighters began operations
31:07from their new home airfield,
31:08an historic step
31:10was taken in Washington.
31:14On August 7th, 1964,
31:17the U.S. Congress
31:18passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
31:21It gave President Johnson
31:23the freedom
31:24to take whatever actions
31:25he thought necessary
31:26to defend Southeast Asia.
31:31Johnson now had the power
31:33to use military force
31:35in Vietnam
31:36in almost any way
31:37he chose.
31:58In North Vietnam,
32:00there was a growing fear
32:02that the United States
32:03meant to deploy troops
32:04troops in the south
32:05and perhaps even invade
32:07the north itself.
32:14The U.S. might also decide
32:17to bomb North Vietnam
32:18into the ground.
32:20Communist leaders
32:21could only hope
32:22that fear of China
32:23would make the enemy
32:24hesitate before taking
32:26any drastic steps.
32:33meanwhile,
32:34a bold stroke
32:35might win the war
32:36in the south
32:36before the Americans
32:38could intervene.
32:46The plan was
32:47that the North Vietnamese army
32:48should be sent
32:49to fight in the south.
32:52Supplying them
32:53would be no easy task,
32:55but their well-trained
32:56and heavily-armed regiments
32:58just might tip the balance.
33:00The aim was to topple
33:02the weakened
33:02South Vietnamese state
33:04within little more
33:05than a year.
33:24The first North Vietnamese army units
33:27to be raised
33:28and trained
33:28for combat in the south
33:30were the 32nd
33:31and the 33rd regiments
33:33of the 325th Division
33:34based at Dong Hoi.
33:39The 66th regiment
33:41of the 304th
33:42would follow next.
33:47The plan was
33:49that starting in October,
33:50the troops would march
33:51for six weeks
33:52down the Ho Chi Minh Trail
33:53and enter South Vietnam's
33:55central highlands
33:56in early 1965.
34:08The first step
34:09would be to seize territory
34:10in the border area.
34:12At the same time,
34:14the Viet Cong
34:14would take over
34:15the coastal provinces
34:16of Quang Nghai
34:17and Binh Din.
34:19The NVA would then advance
34:21along the line
34:22of Highway 19
34:23between Plei Cu
34:24and Quang Nghong,
34:25splitting South Vietnam
34:27in two.
34:31Meanwhile,
34:32the Viet Cong
34:33would mount big attacks
34:34in the Mekong Delta
34:35and around Saigon.
34:39Victories there
34:40would open the way
34:41for a general offensive
34:42and trigger the popular
34:44uprising
34:44which would sweep away
34:46the Saigon government.
34:55While the North Vietnamese
34:57army prepared
34:58its divisions
34:58for infiltration
35:00into the South,
35:01the NLF
35:02stepped up
35:02their campaign.
35:08One of their main aims
35:09now was to deter
35:11the United States
35:11from getting more deeply
35:13involved in the war.
35:16With the U.S. presidential election
35:18coming up,
35:19reminding Americans
35:20that intervention
35:21had a price
35:22just might pay dividends.
35:35On November 1, 1964,
35:38only two days
35:39before the election,
35:41Ben Hua Air Base
35:42near Saigon
35:42was blasted
35:43by Viet Cong mortars.
35:44Four Americans
35:46were killed
35:47and 76 wounded.
35:49Five B-57 bombers
35:51were destroyed
35:52and 15 damaged.
35:57Although the attack
35:59seemed a blatant provocation,
36:01President Johnson
36:02was determined
36:02not to react
36:03in a way
36:04that might endanger
36:05his election chances.
36:10his restraint
36:11seemed to have
36:12paid off handsomely
36:13when,
36:14on November 3, 1964,
36:17he resoundingly
36:17defeated his rival,
36:19Barry Goldwater.
36:26By now,
36:27Johnson's advisors
36:28feared that
36:29South Vietnam
36:29could be on the brink
36:31of collapse.
36:35from January 1, 1965,
36:38through to February 7, 1965,
36:41the Viet Cong
36:42mounted a series
36:43of coordinated attacks
36:44across the country.
36:46They took
36:47and held
36:47the village
36:48of Binh Gia
36:48only 40 miles
36:50from Saigon,
36:51severely mauling
36:52government army units
36:53sent to the rescue.
37:00Altogether,
37:02200 government troops
37:03were killed
37:04near Binh Gia
37:05along with
37:05five American advisors.
37:07The battle culminated
37:09in a devastating ambush
37:10that almost wiped out
37:12a relief column
37:12of elite
37:13South Vietnamese
37:14army rangers.
37:25In Washington,
37:26the pressure
37:27to do something
37:28to save
37:28South Vietnam
37:29was now intense.
37:34Although Johnson
37:36doubted
37:36that bombing
37:37North Vietnam
37:37could dissuade it
37:38from supporting
37:39the Viet Cong guerrillas,
37:40he agreed
37:41to let military planners
37:43prepare a major campaign.
37:46Meanwhile,
37:47a series of strikes
37:48would be launched
37:48as reprisals
37:49if there was
37:50any major attack
37:51by the Viet Cong.
38:03The provocation
38:04came on February 7, 1965.
38:08A U.S. helicopter base
38:09and advisory compound
38:11in the central highlands
38:12of South Vietnam
38:13was attacked
38:14by NLF commandos.
38:19Nine Americans
38:20were killed
38:21and more than 76
38:22were wounded.
38:25Johnson ordered
38:26immediate retaliation
38:27and U.S. Navy
38:29fighter bombers
38:29were launched
38:30to attack military targets
38:32just inside
38:33North Vietnam.
38:43only three days
38:45after the U.S. raids
38:46there was another attack
38:47by the Viet Cong
38:48on Americans.
38:52This time
38:53it was a bomb
38:54in a hotel
38:55at Quy Nong
38:55which killed
38:5623 U.S. servicemen.
39:01More retaliation strikes
39:02were launched
39:03and on February 13, 1965
39:06President Johnson
39:07authorized a bigger campaign
39:09codenamed
39:10Operation Rolling Thunder.
39:18Rolling Thunder
39:19was to be a limited
39:21but long-lasting offensive.
39:23Its aim
39:24was to force North Vietnam
39:25to stop supporting
39:27the guerrillas
39:27in the South.
39:46As Operation Rolling Thunder
39:48got underway,
39:49the chief of the U.S.
39:51Military Assistance Command
39:52in Saigon,
39:53General William C. Westmoreland,
39:55grew increasingly worried
39:56about the security
39:57of bases
39:58involved in the campaign.
40:04Da Nang,
40:06sighted in a largely
40:07hostile area
40:08and guarded
40:08by a small
40:09Vietnamese army unit
40:10was particularly vulnerable
40:12to Viet Cong attack.
40:17Westmoreland
40:17asked for two battalions
40:19of U.S. Marines,
40:20three and a half thousand men,
40:22to be deployed
40:23around the base.
40:31On March 8, 1965,
40:34a battalion
40:34of the 9th Marine
40:35Expeditionary Brigade
40:37went ashore at Da Nang.
40:41The 2nd Battalion
40:42would arrive later
40:43by air.
40:44The Marines' mission
40:46was to be strictly confined
40:47to defending
40:48the Da Nang base.
40:57However,
40:58even as the troops
40:59were landing,
41:00General Harold K. Johnson,
41:01the Army Chief of Staff,
41:03was already in Saigon
41:04to talk about
41:05much bigger deployments.
41:16General Johnson
41:17had been appointed
41:18by the President
41:19his special representative.
41:22His mission
41:23was to prompt
41:24General Westmoreland
41:25and U.S. Ambassador
41:26Maxwell Taylor
41:27to say what troops
41:28they needed
41:29to win the war.
41:37In fact,
41:39General Johnson
41:39and his fellow commanders
41:41on the Joint Chiefs
41:42of Staff
41:42already had a clear idea
41:44of the forces
41:45they wanted
41:46for Vietnam.
41:54The Joint Chiefs' wish
41:56was for three divisions,
41:57around 70,000 men.
41:59That was the number
42:01called for
42:01in their defense plan
42:03for Southeast Asia,
42:04Operation Plan 32.
42:08The plan
42:09had been designed
42:10to meet an invasion
42:11of South Vietnam
42:12from the north
42:13or China,
42:13something that no one
42:15now expected to happen.
42:23However,
42:24as part of the plan,
42:26airfields,
42:27communications,
42:27and other facilities
42:28had already
42:29been put in place.
42:31Now,
42:31large numbers
42:32of troops
42:33could be deployed
42:33as soon as the President
42:34gave the order.
42:58It was American public opinion
43:00that most worried
43:01President Johnson.
43:02he was determined
43:04to move slowly
43:05on sending more men
43:06to Vietnam.
43:07He agreed
43:08to another 3,000 Marines
43:10and 20,000 logistics
43:12and support troops
43:13to prepare
43:14for further deployments.
43:16But for the moment,
43:18that was as far
43:19as he would go.
43:29On April 7, 1965,
43:32at Johns Hopkins University,
43:34President Johnson
43:35offered economic aid
43:37to North Vietnam
43:38in exchange for peace.
43:40His offer
43:41was brusquely rejected
43:42by the North Vietnamese government.
43:51two weeks later,
43:52Johnson agreed
43:53to raise U.S.
43:55combat strength
43:55in Vietnam
43:56to more than 60,000 troops.
44:00Allied forces
44:01from Korea
44:02and Australia
44:03would be added
44:04as a sign
44:05of international support.
44:15There were restrictions
44:16on how the U.S.
44:18commander in Vietnam,
44:19General Westmoreland,
44:20would be able
44:21to use the troops
44:22he had been given.
44:26They were to operate
44:27only inside
44:28clearly defined enclaves
44:30around their bases.
44:35To Westmoreland's dismay,
44:38all operations
44:39were to be
44:39strictly defensive.
44:47The American policy
44:49of defending enclaves
44:51would soon be severely tested
44:53by the Viet Cong.
44:54The guerrillas
44:56were planning
44:56to unleash
44:57a massive offensive.
44:59The campaign
44:59was designed
45:00to inflict
45:01the final blows
45:02on the tottering
45:03South Vietnamese state.
45:16The storm broke
45:17on May 11
45:18with a full-scale assault
45:20by 2,500
45:21Viet Cong troops
45:22on Song Bay,
45:23a provincial capital.
45:25After fierce battles
45:27in and around the town,
45:28the Viet Cong
45:29withdrew,
45:30but only after holding
45:31Song Bay
45:32for nearly two days.
45:51The Viet Cong assault
45:53on Song Bay
45:53was followed
45:55by a series of attacks
45:56to within a few miles
45:57to within a few miles
45:57of Saigon.
46:01Meanwhile,
46:02in the central highlands,
46:04U.S. intelligence
46:05had detected
46:05all the elements
46:06of the North Vietnamese
46:07Army's 325th Division
46:11and signs
46:12that the 304th
46:13was on its way.
46:20There was intense
46:21Viet Cong activity
46:22in all the central provinces
46:24with a big Viet Cong victory
46:26near Bajia.
46:30On June 10, 1965,
46:33at Dong Shua,
46:34a South Vietnamese
46:35Army district headquarters
46:36and U.S. special forces camp
46:38was overrun
46:39by a full regiment.
46:43It was abandoned
46:45only after frantic
46:46American air attacks.
47:02The sheer scale
47:03of the Viet Cong's
47:04new offensive
47:05had far surpassed
47:06anything that either
47:07the South Vietnamese Army
47:09or the Americans
47:10had anticipated.
47:11The government's
47:12best and most
47:13mobile battalions
47:14had been shattered.
47:20The disaster
47:21was followed
47:22by political upheaval.
47:24A faction of young
47:25military officers
47:26installed Air Vice Marshal
47:28Key as Prime Minister
47:29and General Nian Van Thieu
47:31as President,
47:32openly restoring
47:33military government.
47:40After the Viet Cong's
47:42May offensive,
47:43it was plain
47:44to the Americans
47:45that enemy numbers
47:46were much higher
47:47than they had thought.
47:48That meant far more
47:49U.S. troops
47:50would be needed
47:51to hold the line.
47:58Estimates of just
47:59how many kept rising
48:00until on June 7, 1965,
48:03General Westmoreland
48:05asked Washington
48:06for 200,000 men.
48:15While Westmoreland
48:16was waiting
48:17for the president's
48:18decision,
48:19he was given
48:19new powers
48:20to use the troops
48:21he already had
48:22more aggressively.
48:24He would no longer
48:25have to confine
48:26his men
48:27to defensive enclaves
48:28but could go out
48:29and attack the enemy.
48:37On June 27, 1965,
48:41General Westmoreland
48:42launched the first
48:43purely offensive
48:44operation by American
48:45ground forces
48:46in Vietnam.
48:48It was a sweep
48:49into NLF territory
48:50just northwest
48:51of Saigon.
49:02A month after
49:03the start
49:04of offensive operations,
49:06President Johnson
49:06announced that
49:07more troops
49:08would be sent
49:09to Vietnam.
49:14He was still
49:15playing down
49:16the scale
49:16of the commitment
49:17but had already
49:18decided to deploy
49:20the 200,000 men
49:21he had been asked for.
49:29The following day,
49:31the first troops
49:32of the big build-up
49:33arrived in Vietnam.
49:35The men were a battalion
49:36of the 101st
49:38Airborne Division.
49:42By this time,
49:43there was no longer
49:44any doubt about
49:45just what their mission
49:46would be.
49:47they were to find
49:48the Viet Cong's
49:49main force military units
49:50and destroy them
49:51on the battlefield.
50:15As the build-up
50:16of American forces
50:17in Vietnam went on,
50:19the chances
50:20they would be attacked
50:21grew by the day.
50:26On August 5th,
50:28NLF sappers
50:29penetrated an oil
50:30storage depot
50:31near Da Nang
50:32and blew up
50:33two million gallons
50:34of fuel.
50:38There had been sniping
50:39and mortar attacks, too.
50:40But the real fear
50:42was of a large-scale
50:44infantry assault
50:45overrunning
50:45an American installation.
50:53What the Americans
50:54needed was accurate
50:55and timely intelligence
50:57about what the enemy
50:58intended to do.
51:04It came when a deserter
51:06from the 1st Viet Cong
51:07regiment,
51:08a force nearly
51:082,000 strong,
51:10told his captors
51:11that his unit
51:12was planning
51:12to hit the Marine base
51:14at Chu Lai.
51:23The Marines
51:24quickly planned
51:25a full-scale operation
51:26to trap
51:27the Viet Cong regiment
51:28in its assembly area.
51:30The operation
51:31was planned
51:32in the strictest secrecy.
51:34Codenamed
51:34Operation Starlight
51:36and deploying
51:374,000 troops,
51:38it would be
51:39the first American
51:40regimental-sized battle
51:41since the war
51:42in Korea.
52:00The Marine base
52:02at Chu Lai
52:03was 15 miles
52:04from the village
52:05complex of Van Tuong.
52:08Between the Trabong River,
52:10the elevation
52:11known as
52:12Hill 43
52:13and the Phuoc Thuan
52:14Peninsula
52:15was a fortified
52:17Viet Cong base area.
52:22There,
52:23the 1st Viet Cong
52:24regiment,
52:25made up of
52:25the 60th
52:26and 80th battalions,
52:28had assembled
52:29for the attack
52:29on Chu Lai.
52:35On August 17,
52:371965,
52:38Company M
52:39of the 3rd Battalion,
52:403rd Marines,
52:41took up a blocking
52:42position
52:42on the Trabong River.
52:47Next morning,
52:49the rest of the battalion
52:50made an amphibious landing,
52:52while three more companies
52:53were inserted
52:54at landing zones
52:55red,
52:56white,
52:57and blue.
52:59The Marines
53:00pushed on
53:01from LZ's red
53:03and white,
53:04but around
53:05Hill 43,
53:06near LZ Blue,
53:08the entire
53:09Viet Cong 60th Battalion
53:11was dug in
53:12and there was a fierce battle
53:14before the hill
53:14was taken.
53:22There was also
53:23heavy Viet Cong resistance
53:25near the hamlet
53:26the Americans
53:26called
53:27Ah Chuang 2.
53:31But after reinforcement,
53:32the Marines succeeded
53:34in squeezing
53:34the Viet Cong
53:35from three sides,
53:36trapping them
53:37with their backs
53:38to the sea.
53:51In Operation Starlight,
53:53it was the early battles
53:55that proved
53:56the heaviest.
53:57The first two companies
53:58in action
53:59took almost
54:00one-third casualties.
54:0229 were dead
54:03and many wounded,
54:05but the Marines
54:06had claimed
54:06nearly 300 Viet Cong kills.
54:14The next five days
54:16involved only
54:17small-scale actions.
54:18As the Marines
54:19advanced,
54:21the Viet Cong,
54:21numbed by the
54:22shattering naval,
54:23artillery,
54:24and air bombardments,
54:25fought delaying actions
54:26as they tried
54:27to disengage.
54:38In support of the attacking infantry,
54:41Marine guns
54:42at the Chulai base alone
54:43fired over 3,000 rounds.
54:51The ships fired another 1,500.
54:57Marine air support
54:58was so effective
54:59that at times
55:00aircraft were dropping
55:01their bombs
55:02within 200 feet
55:03of their own troops.
55:12at the end of the operation,
55:14nearly 700 Viet Cong
55:16were claimed as dead.
55:21The Marines
55:22had lost 45 dead
55:24and more than 200
55:25wounded in the battle.
55:43for the United States Marines,
55:46Operation Starlight
55:47had been a resounding victory.
55:48In the first major
55:50battle of the war,
55:52the guerrillas
55:52had been defeated
55:53on their own territory
55:54and by inexperienced troops.
56:06The classic U.S. military doctrine
56:08had worked exactly
56:09as it was supposed to.
56:11The enemy had been found,
56:13fixed in position,
56:14and then destroyed
56:15with massive firepower.
56:28The Marines moved fast
56:30to take advantage
56:31of their victory
56:32in Operation Starlight.
56:34They launched a series
56:35of attacks
56:36against NLF concentrations
56:37along the coast.
56:44Meanwhile,
56:45General Westmoreland's
56:46attention shifted
56:47to the Central Highlands.
56:48There,
56:50the threat was posed
56:51not by the Viet Cong guerrillas,
56:53but by the newly arrived troops
56:54of the North Vietnamese Army.
57:06It was against
57:07these professional
57:08and highly trained regiments
57:09that the Americans
57:11would fight
57:11their next major battle.
57:33the field of the world
57:43that they had
57:43and the other
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