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00:00I
00:42The End
00:58The defense of the American combat base at Khe Sanh was given the codename Operation Scotland.
01:09Khe Sanh was one of the most remote outposts in Vietnam, but by January 1968, even the American
01:17president, Lyndon Johnson, had taken a personal interest.
01:22With the Marines facing a full-scale siege by the North Vietnamese Army, the question
01:28was being asked, should the base be held, or should it be quietly abandoned?
01:39Many in Washington worried that defending Khe Sanh could invite a costly and humiliating
01:45defeat.
01:47General Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, dismissed all such fears.
01:53Already, Khe Sanh was tying up nearly 20,000 North Vietnamese troops, and there might be
01:59a chance of winning a major American victory.
02:09General Rath von Tompkins, the new commander of the 3rd Marine Division, was also convinced
02:14that the base could and should be held.
02:16To boost the defenses, he had sent a 3rd Battalion of the 26th Marines as reinforcements.
02:27They were directed to Hill 558, from where they could provide fire support.
02:32There were now 5,000 American troops at Khe Sanh.
02:45The combat base at Khe Sanh was built around a 3,900-foot airstrip.
02:52Beside the strip was the Marine Air Traffic Control Unit.
02:58Nearby was the 26th Marine Command Post in the Fire Support Coordination Center.
03:08At the eastern end of the base was the main ammunition dump, with a secondary dump to
03:13the west.
03:21The base perimeter was manned by the 1st Battalion and a company of the 3rd.
03:283rd.
03:31There was also a forward operating base run by special forces.
03:39The infantry were backed by tank and anti-tank units and an artillery battalion of the 13th
03:44Marines.
03:58Outside the Khe Sanh base, the Marines held Hill 881 South, Hill 861, and a radio relay station
04:07on Hill 950.
04:13The whole 2nd Battalion occupied Hill 558 to block the Rao Kwan River Valley.
04:23Beyond 881 South, the North Vietnamese 325C Division had secretly fortified a chain of hills.
04:34On January 20th, 1968, the Americans thwarted an attempt to take 881 South, and just after
04:42midnight the next day, 861 was partially overrun, but the attackers were also driven off.
04:52At 5.30 a.m., Khe Sanh base itself was hammered by a massive North Vietnamese artillery bombardment.
05:11The shattering barrage of shells, mortars, and rockets, which slammed into the Marine combat base
05:18at 0530 on January 21st, signaled the start of the battle for Khe Sanh.
05:32The North Vietnamese gunners had targeted their bombardment with unerring accuracy.
05:36As Marines had dived for cover, one of the first rounds had scored a direct hit on the main
05:42ammunition store.
05:50The number one dump stored 1,500 tons of artillery and mortar rounds, 90% of the base's entire stock,
05:58or 10,000 rounds.
06:02All of it was lost.
06:0418 men were killed instantly and 40 were wounded as the ammunition exploded and shells and mortar rounds
06:11flew in every direction.
06:14The explosions would go on for another 48 hours.
06:28Even at the height of the chaos, the Marines were still able to fire their mortars and guns against
06:34the enemy batteries.
06:40They also called in air support, and very quickly, fighter bombers were blasting the suspected locations
06:46of the North Vietnamese artillery, which in return scored 300 direct heavy artillery hits on the fire base.
07:00As the bombardment of the base reached a crescendo, the 26th Marines commander, Colonel David Lowndes,
07:07expected a massive North Vietnamese ground attack at any moment.
07:13But the attack didn't come.
07:15The North Vietnamese infantry had a different objective.
07:21The target was Khe San village, three miles from the Marine combat base.
07:43At dawn on January 21st, NVA troops attacked Khe San village, where 200 Marines and South Vietnamese
07:50troops were stationed.
07:51The North Vietnamese attackers were a 400-man battalion of the 66th regiment.
08:00The battalion attacked twice, but in the face of powerful American artillery and airstrikes,
08:06failed to take the village.
08:12An attempt at reinforcement by a South Vietnamese unit went disastrously wrong, and the whole force was destroyed.
08:22Later in the day, the village was evacuated and abandoned to the NVA.
08:36Later that evening, Khe San base itself was probed by a North Vietnamese assault unit.
08:44L company of the 3rd Battalion drove off the attack.
08:51The following day, the base's western flank was reinforced by the newly arrived 1st Battalion of the 9th Marines,
08:58deployed at a quarry a mile from the perimeter.
09:04A platoon was detached from the battalion to occupy the nearby hill 64.
09:20For the Marines inside the Khe San base, the days were now filled with feverish activity.
09:28There were sudden heavy bombardments from NVA guns and rockets.
09:38The massive damage done by the first barrage still had to be repaired.
09:46The biggest worry was ammunition.
09:49The first aircraft to land all carried shells.
09:52More than 130 tons were delivered in just two days.
10:05Reinforcements arrived too.
10:07The Marines were joined by 300 South Vietnamese Army Rangers,
10:11and Colonel Lounds now had more than 6,000 men inside the compound,
10:15and in seven defended positions on the surrounding hills.
10:24While the Marines at Khe San braced themselves for the attack that was surely coming,
10:29General Westmoreland warned Washington that the battle could be the turning point of the whole war.
10:40In the United States, President Johnson was getting more and more worried about what might happen.
10:46The last thing he wanted was an American version of Dien Bien Phu,
10:50but he was determined to support his commander.
10:54Westmoreland would be allowed to fight the battle he wanted.
10:57There would be no U.S. withdrawal from Khe San,
11:01despite the fact that the NVA were still raining between 150 and 300 shells a day on Khe San.
11:18It was the awesome potential of American air power that convinced U.S. military leaders that Khe San could be
11:24defended.
11:31Before the battle had started, on 5th January, Westmoreland and U.S. tacticians devised a plan for defending Khe San
11:38by bombing.
11:39It was already being unleashed on the North Vietnamese divisions with devastating effect.
11:50The Americans called it Operation Niagara.
11:59The first part of Niagara was to pinpoint North Vietnamese troop concentrations.
12:05Information from air reconnaissance, special forces teams, radio interception,
12:10and every other possible source was fed into the intelligence system.
12:26Niagara also deployed the most advanced and secret surveillance technology in the world.
12:35aircraft and helicopters scattered hundreds of electronic sensors across the enemy's main lines of approach.
12:45They could detect the movement of troops and send signals to alert the Americans.
12:54As the intelligence picture built up, Operation Niagara quickly gathered momentum.
13:03In spite of rivalry between the Air Force and the Marines over who should control operations,
13:08every available warplane in the area was standing by.
13:15At the peak of the siege, American planes dropped triple the tonnage of bombs delivered on a peak day during
13:22World War II.
13:30Added to this, fighter bombers would deliver 54,500 tons of napalm alone.
13:51Although fighter bombers were flying the vast majority of Niagara missions,
13:55most of the sheer weight of bombs was being delivered by B-52s,
14:00as part of an ongoing operation codenamed Arclight.
14:04The strikes were flown around the clock.
14:08A cell of three B-52s arrived over the Khe Sanh area every 90 minutes.
14:20The giant heavy bomber was able to carry a massive 27 tons of bombs.
14:26The aircraft dropped their loads from 30,000 feet,
14:30high enough so that the planes couldn't be seen or heard from the ground.
14:34The only warning most North Vietnamese troops got of a raid was the shattering detonation of the first bombs.
14:41Over the 77 days of the siege, B-52s flew over 2,500 sorties, dropping more than 53,000 tons
14:50of bombs.
14:53The biggest Arclight raid of the Vietnam War so far was launched as part of Operation Niagara on January 30th.
15:02American radio direction finding seemed to have discovered North Vietnamese Army headquarters for the Khe Sanh offensive.
15:09Whether it was or not, no one is sure, but the site was annihilated by two B-52 raids in
15:15a single day.
15:38Early in the morning of January 30th and 31st, 1968,
15:43the general offensive the Viet Cong had been planning for more than six months
15:47broke with shattering force all over South Vietnam.
15:55As tens of thousands of Viet Cong attacked towns, cities, and military installations,
16:01American commanders were stunned by the sheer scale of the assault.
16:13While most of South Vietnam erupted in violence, Khe Sanh was uncannily quiet.
16:19A North Vietnamese Army defector had confirmed that there was to be a major attack, but nothing had happened yet.
16:34Some US commanders believed that the Arclight raids had shattered the North Vietnamese command system.
16:41There was no way of telling.
16:51As the tide of the Viet Cong's Tet Offensive swept over South Vietnam,
16:55most of the advance was being countered by the South Vietnamese Army.
17:05The Americans had been heavily committed in only a few places, mainly around Saigon and Nguyen.
17:13The Americans had said they got injured I had one of them руки or other travelers but they could put
17:14one of them out.
17:14A 6-9-160.
17:15The responsibility was to resist the large attack or the vehicle to be six to four or three edges.
17:40A double-ین-0,
17:41anotherып路 is not between two Jeremy Tatx,
17:44General Westmoreland was holding back his forces,
17:47still convinced that the main attack would come at Khe Sanh.
17:55By this time, the weather in the Khe Sanh area had deteriorated badly.
18:02Heavy cloud cover had limited American airstrikes.
18:06The battle for the combat base had settled into a straight fight
18:10between American and North Vietnamese gunners.
18:34The busiest time for the American guns was after dark,
18:37when the NVA were most active.
18:41Every night, the Marines laid down concentrated patterns of fire
18:45on the likely areas.
18:50Sometimes in bombardments known as mini-arc lights,
18:53an intense artillery barrage was combined with radar-guided airstrikes
18:58to saturate a target completely.
19:07As for the North Vietnamese artillery, most of the guns, rockets, and mortars
19:12were by now in place.
19:16Getting them into position had been a massive job.
19:23Northern troops had also sighted hundreds of ammunition dumps
19:26around Khe Sanh and across the border in Laos.
19:42The North Vietnamese had placed large numbers of their shorter-range guns and mortars
19:47within two miles of the Khe Sanh base.
19:55Most of the big rockets were fired from Hill 881 North.
20:01The heavy guns were much further away, on Hill 305,
20:06and in caves on the slopes of the Koh Rock Mountain across the border in Laos.
20:15While they could hit the Americans,
20:17the Marine guns didn't have the range to hit back.
20:22Even the Army's big guns on the rock pile in Camp Carroll
20:26couldn't reach the NVA's heavy batteries.
20:38By now, more than two weeks into the battle,
20:41over 150 North Vietnamese artillery rounds
20:44were hitting the Khe Sanh base and its outposts every day,
20:48rising to a peak on February 23rd of 1,300.
20:54For the Marines, building the best possible protection
20:57was a matter of life and death.
21:00Orders were that every man had to have access to a bunker
21:03able to stop an 82-millimeter mortar round.
21:09Command posts were to withstand a 120-millimeter hit.
21:16As for the heavy shells of the NVA's biggest guns,
21:19nothing could stop those.
21:29The North Vietnamese artillery hitting Khe Sanh
21:32and the Marine outposts was all indirect fire.
21:37Spotters on the hills corrected the gunners' aim by radio,
21:41but the gunners themselves could never see the targets.
21:46What NVA commanders wanted most of all
21:49was to place guns on the hills overlooking the base.
21:53From there, they could pour devastating fire
21:55straight down onto the Americans.
22:05On February 5th, 1968,
22:08the American chain of electronic sensors
22:11detected a large-scale NVA movement.
22:17The activity seemed to point to an imminent attack
22:20on Hill 881 South.
22:26The U.S. reaction was a massive Niagara raid.
22:30Whole North Vietnamese units were caught in the open
22:33as the entire area around the hill
22:35was devastated in a massive storm of bombs.
22:56Although a North Vietnamese attack
22:58on Hill 881 South had been blocked,
23:01the Americans had failed to detect a battalion
23:04closing on an outpost called 861A.
23:13There, a single Marine company drove off
23:16two determined assaults
23:17as artillery fire destroyed the follow-on waves
23:20of NVA troops.
23:32On the night of February 6th,
23:35the North Vietnamese 304th Division
23:37began to clear ground approaches
23:39to Khe Sanh from the west.
23:43The first objective
23:45was the American Special Forces Camp at Llang Vây,
23:48manned by a handful of U.S. troops
23:50and a battalion of South Vietnamese local militia.
24:01The attack was launched by the 66th Regiment,
24:051,500 men backed for the first time by tanks.
24:09In less than three hours,
24:11the Llang Vây camp was overrun
24:13and only 74 of the 400 U.S. and South Vietnamese defenders survived.
24:22The next target for the NVA was Hill 64,
24:26occupied by a single American platoon.
24:31A two-pronged infantry attack was launched against the hill,
24:35but a relief platoon supported by fierce air and artillery fire
24:39drove the North Vietnamese to the west.
24:46There they were again hammered by a massive American bombardment.
24:57Even though the NVA had again failed
25:00to take any more American Hill outposts
25:02and had lost hundreds of men in the attempt,
25:05they had at least captured Llang Vây.
25:07A thorn in their side had been eliminated
25:10and they had cleared Route 9 for their own use.
25:22Artillery reinforcements,
25:23including 130-millimeter guns,
25:26could now be brought much closer to the Kaysan base.
25:35The Americans were sure the NVA had finished
25:38building up their forces at Kaysan
25:40and were ready for the main attack.
25:45But to their surprise,
25:48the expected assault still didn't come.
25:56Instead, the siege settled down
25:59to a deadly daily duel
26:00fought by artillery and aircraft.
26:06At the same time,
26:08the North Vietnamese began to launch
26:10frequent, small-scale probes
26:12against the base perimeter.
26:31In Washington,
26:32anxiety about the fate of the Marines
26:34at Kaysan was mounting.
26:36A relief operation was being planned,
26:39but it would demand powerful forces
26:41and couldn't be mounted for weeks.
26:49The weather was still too poor.
26:55Meantime,
26:55if the base's air bridge was cut,
26:57it would be all over for Kaysan.
27:03The troops manning the base
27:05needed ammunition, food, and medicines.
27:18Casualties had to be evacuated.
27:20Men finishing their tours of duty
27:23had to be flown out
27:24and replacements brought in.
27:29The main base alone
27:30needed 160 tons of supplies a day
27:34just to keep on fighting.
27:44The supply effort depended above all
27:47on the huge load-carrying ability
27:49of the C-130 Hercules transport.
27:53The aircraft was able to carry
27:55up to 20 tons of cargo,
27:57but for that very reason,
27:58it needed most of the strip to land
28:00and took time to turn around.
28:11Every plane met a storm
28:13of anti-aircraft fire, mortars, and artillery.
28:26On February 11th, 1968,
28:29the North Vietnamese anti-aircraft gunners
28:31scored their first major success
28:33against a Marine KC-130 Hercules
28:36landing at Kaysan.
28:39The plane was carrying a cargo
28:41of helicopter fuel
28:42and burst into flames.
28:44Six of her crew were burned to death.
28:49The loss of the C-130
28:51marked the end of attempts
28:53to land very large aircraft
28:54at Kaysan.
29:00Smaller, more nimble planes
29:02like the C-123 provider
29:04as well as Marine helicopters
29:06would still come in.
29:08But without the big loads
29:10of the Hercules,
29:11the base would never survive.
29:15Other methods would have to be tried.
29:20The most successful new method
29:22was called LAPES,
29:24the low-altitude parachute extraction system.
29:29The Hercules flew only five feet
29:32above the runway
29:33while a parachute snatched
29:34the cargo pallets
29:35out of the hold.
29:41Another technique used a hook
29:43and a restor cable
29:44to drag the load
29:45from the aircraft.
29:55In February 1968,
29:58appalling weather
29:59with ground fog and low cloud
30:01stopped all low-altitude deliveries.
30:05The only option was to parachute supplies
30:08into a drop zone
30:09just outside the perimeter.
30:12Several thousand tons
30:14would arrive this way,
30:15but still for the Marines,
30:17bad weather invariably
30:18meant tight rations.
30:25Although the battle
30:26to supply the main base
30:27was being won,
30:29the hill outposts
30:30were a much bigger problem.
30:32A fifth of Khe San's manpower
30:34was stationed on the hills.
30:36The men were suffering
30:37almost 50% casualties,
30:39and the posts depended completely
30:41on helicopters for supply.
30:53For the crews of helicopters
30:55supplying the hill outposts,
30:57every mission was a gamble
30:58with death.
31:00North Vietnamese gunners
31:01were quick to target
31:02the approaches
31:03and the landing zones.
31:11Anti-aircraft fire
31:13followed the helicopters in,
31:14and as soon as they landed,
31:16mortar crews
31:16and machine gunners
31:17opened up.
31:27As the slopes of the hills
31:29became a graveyard
31:30for American helicopters,
31:32the Marines realized
31:33that the survival
31:34of the hill outposts
31:35was under serious threat.
31:37And if they fell,
31:39the main base
31:40couldn't last for long.
31:48Air commanders
31:49worked frantically
31:50to devise new tactics
31:52for getting helicopters
31:53in and out
31:54of the hilltop bases safely.
32:12The tactics the Americans devised
32:14depended on swamping
32:16the enemy anti-aircraft guns
32:17and mortars
32:18around a landing zone
32:19with a high-speed assault.
32:26Twelve Skyhawk fighter bombers,
32:29four Huey gunships,
32:31up to 16 supply helicopters,
32:33and an airborne command
32:35and control aircraft
32:36all acted together.
32:43The first stage
32:45was for four Skyhawks
32:46to hit North Vietnamese positions
32:48with bombs and napalm.
32:54Two more laid tear gas.
32:59Next, two Skyhawks dropped smoke bombs
33:02to create a corridor,
33:04and 30 seconds later,
33:05the transport helicopters swooped in,
33:08covered by the Huey gunships.
33:13Meanwhile, four more Skyhawks
33:16with rockets, bombs, and guns
33:18made close-in attacks.
33:23The whole operation
33:24was over in less than five minutes.
33:35The new tactics
33:36quickly earned the title
33:38Super Gaggle
33:39because the helicopters
33:40looked like an oversized
33:42flock of geese.
33:44With the fighters
33:45and gunships in the air too,
33:47the method took incredible timing
33:49to pull off successfully.
33:56But it worked.
33:59Only two more helicopters
34:01would be shot down
34:02supplying the hill outposts.
34:08By now,
34:09the strain of the long siege
34:11was beginning to tell
34:12on the troops at Khaisan.
34:17Being under shellfire
34:19every day
34:19meant a steady drain
34:21of casualties
34:22and constant tension.
34:27Food was often down
34:29to two sea ration meals daily.
34:32Conditions were appalling.
34:34The bunkers were knee-deep
34:35in filth and mud
34:36and overrun by rats.
34:39In addition,
34:40it was impossible to forget
34:42that up to 20,000 enemy soldiers
34:44were waiting for the signal
34:46to storm the base.
35:03To stop the men brooding
35:05about their possible fate,
35:06officers and NCOs
35:08kept the troops
35:09as busy as possible.
35:10Digging trenches,
35:11filling sandbags,
35:12and improving bunkers
35:14was a big part of every day.
35:25There was some patrolling too,
35:27although not more than 500 yards
35:29from friendly lines.
35:31Colonel Lownes
35:32had no intention
35:33of sending his men
35:34into certain ambushes
35:36and in any case,
35:37they had to be kept clear
35:39of the Niagara bombing raids.
35:51On the base perimeter,
35:53the watchword
35:54was constant vigilance.
35:56The North Vietnamese
35:57were probing the defenses
35:58with infantry and sapper teams.
36:04The Americans
36:05were facing assaults
36:06of up to 200 men at a time
36:08as the enemy tested
36:09for weaknesses in the line.
36:11The Marines were also plagued
36:13by hidden machine gun nests,
36:15which could open up
36:16at any moment,
36:17day or night.
36:37By now,
36:38the attention
36:39of the American public
36:40was riveted
36:40by the Battle of Khe San.
36:42The story was being covered
36:44by dozens of journalists
36:45and was featured
36:46on network television
36:48every day.
36:49Stories about Khe San
36:51accounted for 25%
36:53of all film news reports
36:54about the war
36:55on U.S. networks
36:56and up to 50% on CBS.
37:00Arguments raged
37:01over the rights
37:02and wrongs
37:02of trying to hold the base.
37:08In Washington,
37:10President Johnson
37:10was deeply worried
37:11about the fate
37:12of the Marines at Khe San.
37:18He was constantly demanding
37:20the latest information
37:21on the battle.
37:22A model of the base
37:23had even been brought
37:24into the White House
37:25situation room.
37:26For the first time
37:28in the Vietnam War,
37:29the room was on full alert
37:3124 hours a day.
37:40A multitude of doubts
37:42and fears haunted
37:43the president
37:43and his advisors.
37:48Should nuclear weapons
37:49be used to save the base
37:51as some had suggested?
37:56What if the enemy
37:57diverted or poisoned
37:58the base's water supply?
38:00Most worrying of all,
38:02what if enemy jets
38:03mounted a sudden
38:04bombing attack
38:05on Khe San?
38:10It would be a massive
38:11propaganda victory
38:12for the North.
38:19Although North Vietnamese aircraft
38:21did penetrate to within
38:22striking distance of Khe San,
38:24they made no attempt
38:25to attack the Marine base.
38:31American air defenses
38:33over the DMZ
38:34were far too strong.
38:42The biggest threat
38:44to the Marines
38:44at Khe San
38:45did not come
38:46from modern fighter aircraft.
38:50It came from one of the most
38:52primitive weapons
38:52in warfare.
38:57The North Vietnamese
38:58besieging Khe San
39:00were digging mile upon mile
39:02of trenches and bunkers
39:03just as they had
39:05at Dien Bien Phu.
39:07They were fast approaching
39:09the perimeter
39:10of the combat base itself.
39:23Already, there was
39:25a major system
39:25of North Vietnamese
39:26fortifications
39:27on Hill 471
39:29less than two miles
39:31to the south
39:31of the Khe San base.
39:39Now, at incredible speed,
39:41the trench lines
39:42were being extended
39:43northwards
39:44until they reached
39:45to within 25 yards
39:46of the American perimeter.
39:52Another line
39:53of trenches and bunkers
39:54was creeping across
39:56from the southeast.
40:01The NVA plan
40:02was for the infantry
40:03to mass under cover
40:04of the trenches
40:05before launching
40:06their final assault.
40:14By the last week
40:15of February 1968,
40:18few Americans
40:18inside Khe San
40:20doubted that the big
40:21North Vietnamese
40:22ground assault
40:23would have to come soon.
40:27The moon was in its
40:29darkest phase
40:29and a night infantry attack
40:31would have a good chance
40:33of overwhelming
40:34the perimeter defenses.
40:36Smashing the enemy
40:37trench lines
40:37was an absolute priority.
40:48The Americans
40:49tried every conceivable
40:51method to destroy
40:52the trenches.
40:53Napalm and bombs
40:54were rained down
40:55in huge quantities.
40:57The Marines fired
40:58countless artillery barrages.
41:16But the Americans
41:17had little success.
41:23The discouraging fact
41:25learned from other wars
41:27was that it could take
41:28a thousand hits
41:29to destroy
41:30a hundred yards
41:31of trenches.
41:48In the end,
41:49the answer lay
41:50with the B-52s.
41:54Up to now,
41:55arc light raids
41:56had been kept
41:57more than two miles
41:58away from the base
41:59perimeter.
42:04On February 27, 1968,
42:07the restriction
42:08was lifted.
42:16For the first time,
42:18the B-52s,
42:19under close radar guidance,
42:21dropped their bombs
42:21to within 1,200 yards
42:23of the Kaysan base.
42:33The effect was shattering.
42:35The effect was shattering.
42:37There was massive damage
42:39to the North Vietnamese
42:40trenches and bunkers.
42:48It was a turning point
42:49in the battle for Kaysan.
42:53From now on,
42:54close-in bombing
42:55by B-52s
42:56would play a major part
42:57in the defense.
43:14The sudden increase
43:15in North Vietnamese activity
43:17around Kaysan
43:18had left no one
43:19in any doubt
43:20that the climax
43:21of the battle
43:21was near.
43:22A few days before,
43:24a Marine patrol
43:25trying to get information
43:27had been almost wiped out.
43:29North Vietnamese traffic
43:31along Route 9
43:32from Laos
43:32had also risen
43:33to a new peak.
43:35Enormous quantities
43:36of supplies
43:37were being rushed
43:38to the Kaysan divisions
43:39for the final assault.
43:59The 66th Regiment
44:01of the North Vietnamese
44:02304th Division
44:03was assembling
44:04near a plantation
44:05to the south
44:06of the Kaysan base.
44:08Units were also massing
44:10near an old French fort.
44:11On the night
44:12of February 29th,
44:14a battalion
44:14of the 304th
44:16NVA Division
44:16assaulted the 37th
44:18Arvin Rangers
44:19at the eastern edge
44:20of the camp,
44:21a diversion
44:22to cover the unexpected
44:23and imminent withdrawal
44:24of all NLF troops
44:26from Kaysan.
44:30The American defense
44:31was to coordinate strikes
44:32by artillery,
44:33fighter bombers
44:34and B-52s
44:35on three main areas
44:37through which
44:37the attacking NVA
44:39had to pass.
44:44Then,
44:45as the final assault waves
44:46approached the base,
44:47Kaysan's own defensive fire plan
44:49was unleashed.
45:00The base perimeter
45:01at the point of attack
45:02was manned
45:03by the 37th
45:04South Vietnamese
45:05Ranger Battalion.
45:10As the lead NVA units
45:12advanced,
45:12the base fired
45:13an artillery pattern
45:14forming the sides
45:15of an open box.
45:18The base
45:18was made
45:19of an open box.
45:21A creeping barrage
45:23was then walked
45:24up and down inside.
45:30At the same time,
45:32two NVA battalions
45:34cut off behind the box
45:35were hit
45:36by fighter-bomber strikes.
45:41While long-range artillery
45:43from the rock pile
45:44and Camp Carroll
45:45created a moving
45:46outer cordon.
45:52The North Vietnamese troops
45:54who survived
45:55to emerge
45:56from the open end
45:57of the box
45:57then faced
45:58the direct fire
45:59of the South Vietnamese Rangers.
46:05over the next week
46:06despite continued aerial bombardment
46:09and the barrage
46:10of artillery fire
46:11the trenches
46:11came even closer.
46:13Then,
46:14for no apparent reason
46:15they stopped.
46:17On March 6th
46:19with the Marines
46:20still waiting
46:21for the final assault
46:22many of Jap's troops
46:24stumbled away
46:25through what was left
46:26of the jungle
46:26an area of land
46:28that had received
46:29100,000 tons of bombs
46:31the heaviest aerial bombardment
46:34on a single piece of land
46:35in the history of warfare.
46:40The next three weeks
46:42were relatively quiet
46:43around Khe Sanh.
46:45American air activity
46:46increased steadily
46:47as the weather improved
46:49and more NVA units
46:51began to withdraw
46:52into Laos.
46:55But the battle
46:57for Khe Sanh
46:57was not yet over.
47:01On March 22nd, 1968
47:04there was a sudden
47:05explosion of violence.
47:10Without warning
47:11a massive
47:12North Vietnamese bombardment
47:14including huge numbers
47:15of heavy shells
47:16from the Kho Rock Mountain
47:17slammed into Khe Sanh.
47:23More than a thousand rounds
47:25hit the base
47:26at the rate of
47:27a hundred every hour.
47:31At the same time
47:32the electronic sensors
47:34around Khe Sanh
47:35again indicated
47:36NVA movements
47:37and the Americans
47:38replied with heavy bombing.
47:46As the weather
47:47steadily improved
47:48U.S. air attacks
47:49around the Khe Sanh base
47:51grew fiercer
47:52by the day.
47:56Further afield
47:57over the North
47:58Vietnamese rear areas
48:00fighter bombers
48:01roamed with orders
48:02to pounce on any movement.
48:12For the North Vietnamese
48:14the situation
48:15could only get worse.
48:20General Japp
48:21was forced to concede
48:23that Khe Sanh
48:23could not now be taken.
48:25by this time
48:26by this time
48:26the Marines
48:27were mounting small
48:28but aggressive attacks
48:29out of the base.
48:38General Japp
48:39now ordered
48:40the remainder
48:41of his units
48:41to pull back
48:42from Khe Sanh.
48:46One by one
48:47the NVA regiments
48:48around the base
48:49melted away.
48:51only 6,000 troops
48:53were left behind
48:54to continue
48:55the siege
48:55of the Marine
48:56combat base.
49:03Although fighting
49:04would go on
49:05the worst
49:06of Khe Sanh's
49:07ordeal
49:07was over.
49:22On April 1st, 1968
49:24the Americans
49:25formally ended
49:26Operation Scotland
49:27the defense
49:28of Khe Sanh
49:29and seven days later
49:31began Operation Pegasus.
49:37April 9th
49:38was the first time
49:39in 45 days
49:40that no shells
49:41fell on Khe Sanh.
49:50The aim of Pegasus
49:51was to reopen
49:52Route 9
49:53the road linking
49:54Khe Sanh
49:55to the other
49:55American bases
49:56along the
49:57demilitarized zone.
50:02As well as
50:03the Marines
50:03Pegasus
50:04deployed the
50:051st Air Cavalry
50:06Division
50:06the most mobile
50:07American unit
50:08in Vietnam.
50:15The Air Cavalry
50:16had more helicopters
50:17and airborne firepower
50:18than any other
50:19U.S. unit.
50:24It was perfectly
50:25suited to the rugged
50:26and demanding
50:27terrain
50:27near Khe Sanh.
50:34For Pegasus
50:35the division's
50:36commander
50:36Major General
50:37John Tolson
50:38was also given
50:39the 1st Marine
50:40Regiment
50:41a South Vietnamese
50:42Airborne Task Force
50:43and the 26th Marines
50:45in Khe Sanh.
51:12The entire length
51:13of Route 9
51:14was still
51:15dominated by
51:16North Vietnamese
51:17Army units
51:18especially elements
51:19of the 66th
51:20and 29th regiments.
51:24for Operation Pegasus
51:26the Americans
51:27built a main base
51:29for the Air Cavalry
51:30at Landing Zone
51:31Stud.
51:33The Marines
51:34would operate
51:35out of Kalu.
51:38The plan
51:39was for air assaults
51:40to seize landing zones
51:41and fire bases
51:42north and south
51:43of Route 9
51:44while other forces
51:45pushed down the road.
51:57Although the weather
51:58was poor
51:58for fighter-bombers
51:59the weight
52:00of American firepower
52:01supporting Pegasus
52:02was still enormous.
52:10In a single day
52:11the Americans
52:12fired more than
52:1310,000 artillery rounds.
52:20Before the operation
52:21was over
52:22B-52s launched
52:2445 arc-light strikes.
52:30The American offensive
52:31was unstoppable.
52:37By April 5th, 1968
52:39the Air Cavalry
52:41had forged past Khe Sanh
52:42and established
52:43landing zones
52:44west and south
52:45of the combat base.
52:52While the cavalry
52:53consolidated
52:54their new positions
52:55the Marines
52:56in Khe Sanh
52:57mounted their own
52:58breakout assaults.
53:01There was
53:02strong resistance
53:03from battalions
53:04of the North Vietnamese
53:0566th Regiment
53:06which mounted
53:07fierce counter-attacks
53:08but the Marines
53:09succeeded
53:10in taking
53:10Hill 471.
53:17It was the first
53:18of a string
53:19of NVA hills
53:20recaptured
53:21over the next
53:21few days.
53:29On April 8th, 1968
53:31the Air Cavalry
53:33and the 26th Marines
53:34at the combat base
53:35linked up
53:36formally ending
53:37the siege
53:38siege of Khe Sanh.
53:43In fact,
53:44the Marines
53:45were less than
53:46pleased to be seen
53:47as being rescued
53:48by the army.
53:49In their view,
53:50they had long since
53:51guaranteed
53:51their own survival.
54:12The 77-day siege
54:14of Khe Sanh
54:15had turned
54:16into the biggest
54:16single battle
54:17of the Vietnam War.
54:19The official assessment
54:20of the North Vietnamese
54:21army dead
54:22was just over 1,600
54:24with two divisions
54:25all but shattered.
54:27But thousands more
54:29were probably killed
54:30by bombs
54:30and left no trace
54:31of ever having existed.
54:37By the end
54:38of Operation Pegasus,
54:40American and
54:40South Vietnamese units
54:42had suffered
54:421,000 dead
54:43and 4,500 wounded.
54:47But official figures
54:48state that
54:49under 250
54:50had been killed
54:51at the Khe Sanh
54:51combat base
54:52and its outposts.
54:54In the aftermath
54:56of the battle,
54:57General Westmoreland
54:58had high hopes
54:59that the next phase
54:59would be the thrust
55:00into Laos
55:01he had long advocated.
55:07He now had
55:08the forces he needed.
55:14But Westmoreland's
55:16hopes for a great
55:17campaign to follow
55:18up his victory
55:19at Khe Sanh
55:20were soon dashed.
55:24In the United States,
55:26by the spring of 1968,
55:28American public opinion
55:29had turned sharply
55:31against the war
55:31in Vietnam.
55:44The shock
55:45of the Tet Offensive
55:46had led many
55:47to believe
55:47that the U.S.
55:48would have to withdraw
55:49sooner or later.
55:54Under severe pressure,
55:56President Johnson
55:57had promised
55:57to search
55:58for a negotiated peace.
56:00He ruled out
56:01any big troop increases
56:02and any widening
56:04of the conflict.
56:16In June 1968,
56:18General Westmoreland
56:20approved the destruction
56:21of the Khe Sanh
56:22combat base.
56:23The president's decision
56:25not to widen the war
56:26had meant there could be
56:27no offensive
56:28into Laos.
56:41Nor was the base
56:42needed for defense
56:43as there were now
56:44strong and highly mobile
56:46American forces
56:46forces in the area.
56:56In any case,
56:57as both sides
56:58were slowly beginning
56:59to realize,
57:00even as the battle
57:01had raged at Khe Sanh,
57:03the war had changed
57:05out of all recognition.
57:17The war had changed
57:34and nieahu
57:34Fox News
57:34to theBats
57:34of Costa Rica
57:35to the hedge
57:35The war had changed
57:36into majorè·ª
57:36and from
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