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00:00.
00:04Down below is one of the most radioactive places on Earth.
00:10A site so secret that it has never appeared on any map.
00:20Even now it is a tightly restricted area under the direct control of a Red Army general.
00:27For 40 years this empty land was codenamed Semipalatinsk 21.
00:33It was the main test site in the Soviet nuclear program.
00:38The lake down there marks the spot of their first atom bomb.
00:42It is the bleak epicenter of an extraordinary story.
00:45Of how the Soviet bomb was built with secrets stolen from the West.
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01:33This tattered manuscript tells many of the secrets of Russia's bomb.
01:37It is an unpublished account of a hidden world, written by a scientist at its very heart.
01:44In it are revealed for the first time the names and faces of people the public never saw.
01:50The scientists and military men who built the Russian bomb.
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02:01in the most closely guarded operation of the Cold War.
02:06Men like Yuli Hariton, a reclusive figure who for 50 years
02:10was in charge of constructing the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal.
02:16Today he's an old man of 90, still living incognito and behind barbed wire
02:21in the remote and secret city which he himself founded 50 years ago.
02:28Or Yakov Toretsky, the KGB mathematician who was sent secretly
02:32to meet a top Western scientist who wanted the Soviet Union
02:35to know what the West already knew.
02:38Or Anatoly Yatskov, who ran the Soviet spy network in New York
02:43which smuggled a blueprint of America's first bomb
02:46back to the KGB's headquarters in Moscow.
02:50And this is the end product of the story they have to tell.
02:56Both sides armed to this day with weapons
02:58which in a few minutes could kill more people
03:00than all the wars in history put together.
03:17It all started in a quite different key.
03:24The medieval university city of Cambridge, England
03:28was where man first split the atom.
03:36In 1919, a scientist called Ernest Rutherford
03:39started the process that led inexorably to the age of the bomb.
03:43The 1920s were a fantastically exciting time in physics
03:49throughout Europe
03:50because you had the development of a new physics
03:54dealing with subatomic matter.
03:56It's very much an international community,
03:59quite a small community.
04:01What drove them was the sheer intellectual excitement
04:04of the discoveries that were being made.
04:09Some of those involved, like Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein,
04:13were already big names in contemporary science.
04:16But beneath them, a whole new generation
04:18of brilliant young physicists was emerging.
04:23There was a sort of feeling of community among scientists.
04:27It was like one family from all over the world.
04:31All the science is open in those days,
04:33so everybody knew what other people are doing.
04:36So in this sense, scientists formed at that stage
04:40this family, they're almost citizens of the world, if you like.
04:44No boundaries.
04:47Two people who visited Cambridge in the 20s
04:50were to play crucial roles on opposite sides
04:53in the race to build a bomb.
04:57One of them was a brilliant, 26-year-old American physicist
05:00called Robert Oppenheimer,
05:02who arrived in the summer of 1926
05:04and who would later become famous
05:06as the man who led the American atomic bomb project.
05:11The man who became his bomb-building opponent
05:14is still virtually unknown.
05:17Yuli Hariton.
05:19But he's an explosives designer so important to the Soviet Union
05:22that he still commands his own private carriage
05:25when he travels on Russian railways.
05:27It was a gift from Joseph Stalin.
05:30He is a hero of socialist labor three times over,
05:34the unsung scientist who built the red bomb.
05:42Communism was fashionable among students at Cambridge
05:45in those days,
05:46and Hariton spent two carefree years there,
05:48openly sponsored by the Bolshevik government in Moscow.
05:53For Hariton, and the rest of them,
05:55physics was a matter of detached inquiry,
05:58not of engineering that could destroy mankind.
06:02They used to meet at conferences,
06:06and their main concern was about science itself.
06:09And the idea that science,
06:10how it affects society, the overall community,
06:13entered very little.
06:15One might put it briefly,
06:17many of them lived in an ivory tower,
06:19and they felt that because they're only investigating nature,
06:23and nature has no connections with human feelings,
06:28therefore scientists should not be concerned
06:30with the way how science affects society as a whole.
06:35Rutherford's lecture hall was a central room
06:38in their ivory tower.
06:40Few seemed to realise the dangerous potential
06:42of the work they were doing.
06:45Rutherford himself did not believe
06:48that we should be able to use,
06:50to utilise the energy contained in the nucleus.
06:53He thought it would be impossible.
06:56In fact, at one of the meetings in Cambridge,
06:58he said anybody who speaks about
07:01the utilisation of nuclear energy
07:03is talking moonshine.
07:06Hariton was a romantic and friendly young man,
07:09but his carefree days were almost over.
07:19When the time came to go home,
07:21Hariton decided to break his journey in Germany.
07:27There he found a different atmosphere,
07:29particularly for Jews like himself.
07:37I bought newspapers at the kiosks and read them.
07:43And I discovered all sorts of fascist leaflets,
07:46which I found thoroughly unpleasant.
07:51For the time being, fascism was still weak,
07:54but if it started to flourish,
07:56then that could cause serious unpleasantness
07:59for the Soviet Union.
08:05Soon, his worst fears were realised.
08:11Hitler came to power in Germany,
08:13pledged to drive out communists and Jews.
08:20Some of those who fled the Nazis
08:21were among Europe's brightest scientists.
08:24Some, like Einstein and Teller, went to America.
08:27Others, like Rudolf Piles, fled to England.
08:31So I found myself in Cambridge
08:33when Hitler came into power and stayed there.
08:38We didn't exactly predict what was coming,
08:41but we knew it was not good.
08:44In 1938, Hitler's army swarmed into Czechoslovakia.
08:48The period of international cooperation in science had ended.
08:53But not all Hitler scientists had fled,
08:56and those that remained were about to make a breakthrough
08:58that would change the world.
09:02What they discovered was that if you split the uranium atom,
09:05you released enormous explosive power.
09:09The news spread like wildfire through the scientific world.
09:15In Russia, Yuli Hariton read with fascination
09:19what the Germans had done.
09:23It was obvious to people like us,
09:26who'd been working with explosives for years,
09:29that something terrible like an atomic explosion
09:32could not be discounted.
09:37But Hariton found that no one in authority
09:40was interested in nuclear theory.
09:42He was told to stick to work on conventional armaments.
09:51But in Cambridge, refugees like Rudolf Piles
09:54immediately saw the military implications.
09:57When we decided that an atom bomb was possible
10:01and not excessive in size,
10:04we immediately thought that the Germans
10:07might have realized the same thing
10:10and might be ahead of us.
10:12And an atom bomb in the hands of Hitler
10:15would have been frightening.
10:17In America, too, the scientists were worried.
10:20But no one else seemed to take it seriously.
10:24In April 1939, the New York Times ran this report
10:28on a meeting of distinguished physicists.
10:31Tempers and temperatures increase visibly today
10:33among members of the American Physical Society
10:36as they close their spring meeting
10:37with arguments over the probability of some scientists
10:40blowing up a sizable portion of the Earth
10:42with a tiny amount of uranium.
10:46It was left to a scientist still working in Germany
10:49to spell out the threat.
10:51He smuggled a message to old friends
10:53who had fled to America.
10:55We got a message
10:59through a refugee physicist
11:03which said essentially
11:09we know how to make nuclear explosions.
11:14Hurry up!
11:20But time was already running out.
11:29In September 1939, the Second World War began.
11:34This posed to the scientists
11:35a great dilemma, I suppose,
11:37the greatest dilemma
11:38that they ever had to face.
11:43The job of a scientist
11:44is to try to do something
11:45which will help humanity.
11:46And therefore,
11:47to try to make an atom bomb
11:49and weapon mass destruction
11:50was completely abhorrent.
11:51But people began to realize
11:53that if Hitler goes ahead
11:57if he acquires the bomb
11:59this will help him to win the war
12:00in which case
12:02all the humanitarian principles
12:04of which we stand
12:05would have been abolished.
12:08So it was a race to build a bomb
12:11and a race in which the winner
12:13would take all.
12:27The early days of the war
12:29saw a deceptive peace
12:30in the Soviet Union.
12:33But it was a highly dangerous
12:35volatile time
12:36in which this man
12:37was to play a crucial role.
12:44Lavrenti Beria
12:45was the ruthless head
12:47of the NKVD,
12:48the secret organization
12:49which later became the KGB.
12:51He was the man in charge
12:53of Stalin's purges
12:54when millions had been killed
12:55or sent to the gulag.
12:59Now, after Stalin,
13:01he was the most feared man
13:03in the Soviet Union.
13:07Beria had huge authority.
13:09His word was law
13:11and people lived in fear.
13:12They used to say,
13:14who's going to be next
13:15against the wall?
13:16They lived in fear
13:17whatever they did.
13:22Vladimir Barkovsky
13:23was then one of Beria's
13:24young agents.
13:25He was sent by sea
13:27from a Russia at peace
13:28to an England at war.
13:30His first night
13:31was a shock.
13:37That evening,
13:38we came down to supper
13:39and an air raid
13:41began on Liverpool.
13:42That's where we had dogged.
13:44I can't say
13:45it was a pleasant feeling.
13:47To be honest,
13:48I got a bit panicky.
13:51After so many years
13:52of peaceful life,
13:53it was pretty frightening.
13:57His first job
13:58was to report
13:59to a man named Gorsky
14:01who ran the intelligence
14:02operation
14:02in the Soviet embassy
14:03in London.
14:05Gorsky had just received
14:06some secret
14:07British government papers
14:08about atomic research.
14:12When I was going
14:13through that material
14:14for my report to Moscow,
14:16I didn't know
14:17who it had come from
14:18because the boss,
14:19Gorsky,
14:20didn't tell me.
14:21He just said,
14:22here, take this
14:23and prepare a report
14:24for Moscow's center.
14:28What Barkovsky
14:29didn't realize
14:30was that a few miles away
14:31the British war cabinet
14:32was discussing
14:33that very same material.
14:36The Soviets
14:37had acquired a copy
14:38of the Maud report,
14:39a top-secret summary
14:40of Britain's plans
14:41to build an atom bomb
14:42and of parallel steps
14:44just starting in America.
14:45It was an espionage coup,
14:48but Moscow ignored it.
14:53Berrier was very suspicious
14:55of the material.
14:58It's the Germans
14:59trying to divert
15:01our attention
15:01and our resources
15:02from proper military purposes,
15:04he said.
15:06So no one acted
15:07on the information.
15:09It just lay around
15:11unused.
15:17In fact,
15:18the papers had come
15:18from one of Berrier's
15:19top spies in Britain.
15:21But in those days,
15:22none of his agents
15:23knew enough
15:23about atomic physics
15:25to assess them.
15:26What they needed
15:27was a specialist,
15:28and that was what
15:29they were about to get.
15:31Klaus Fuchs
15:32was a German scientist
15:33who'd fled from Germany
15:35because he was a communist
15:36rather than a Jew.
15:37But because of his brilliance
15:39and his opposition
15:40to the Nazis,
15:40he was soon co-opted
15:42into Britain's
15:42atomic bomb program.
15:44There he came into contact
15:45with fellow refugee
15:46Rudolf Piles.
15:48Fuchs was,
15:49well,
15:49I had not known him
15:51in Germany.
15:52I met him
15:53in this country
15:53and I knew
15:56that he was
15:56a good physicist.
15:59It tended
16:00to be rather silent,
16:01but when you talked
16:02to him
16:03and asked questions,
16:04they were
16:05disgusting.
16:08Many years later,
16:09Fuchs broke his silence
16:11to give a rare interview.
16:13In it,
16:14he described
16:14his early work
16:15on the bomb.
16:19To begin with,
16:20I was in Birmingham
16:21with Piles.
16:23We were working
16:25on initial assessments
16:26of how big
16:27the bomb would be.
16:28But we soon focused
16:30on the problem
16:30of separating isotopes.
16:33You see,
16:34the uranium-235
16:35had to be separated
16:37from the uranium-238.
16:40That was
16:41one of the roads
16:42to the atom bomb.
16:50At the same time,
16:52Fuchs made contact
16:53with a communist agent
16:54living in Oxford.
16:56Nicknamed Red Sonja,
16:58her real name
16:59was Ruth Werner,
17:00and she would bicycle
17:01to meet Fuchs
17:02in the countryside.
17:04I picked out
17:06the crossroads
17:07where we would meet,
17:08and I loved to bike
17:10and thought
17:10of the least suspicious.
17:12We had a culture
17:13to talk
17:14and a political talk
17:16as comrades have,
17:17and we both
17:19enjoyed it greatly.
17:20He was
17:20very sensitive,
17:23intelligent.
17:24He looked
17:25very kind.
17:28He carried
17:29a big,
17:30blue book,
17:31and I opened
17:33the book
17:33at home,
17:35and it was
17:37to me
17:37like Egyptian
17:38writing.
17:39I mean,
17:39there were so many
17:40chemical,
17:41physical forms,
17:43but I could see
17:44that it was
17:46a military thing,
17:47let's say,
17:47of importance.
17:48And I thought
17:50if he hands over
17:50300 pages,
17:52it must be
17:52very important.
17:57all the inefficiency
17:58of the MI5
18:03stinks to heaven.
18:05I mean,
18:05that they didn't
18:06find us out.
18:10The information
18:11Fuchs passed her
18:12went straight back
18:13to Moscow,
18:14but again
18:15it was put
18:15on one side.
18:16The Soviet government
18:18had more immediate
18:19problems on its mind.
18:43on Soviet-Russian soil,
18:46in spite of the
18:46careful preparations
18:47of the defenders,
18:49the German Wehrmacht
18:49has captured
18:50vast stretches
18:51of territory.
18:54Under such
18:55severe bombardment,
18:57complex papers
18:57about a theoretical
18:58weapon didn't
18:59come high
19:00on the list
19:00of priorities.
19:03Take these
19:04unknown souls
19:04to your heart,
19:05native soil.
19:06They fought
19:07till death
19:07for your sake.
19:11So priceless
19:12information from
19:12Fuchs
19:13and other spies
19:14was left
19:14on one side.
19:19It would take
19:20a chance
19:20encounter
19:21of battle
19:21to make
19:22the leadership
19:22understand
19:23that atomic
19:24research
19:24actually mattered.
19:31The catalyst
19:32was this man,
19:33Ilya Starynov,
19:34known in those
19:35days as King
19:36of the Saboteurs.
19:40Early in 1942,
19:42he took part
19:42in a daring raid
19:43on a German
19:44garrison,
19:45in which a great
19:46number of documents
19:47were captured.
19:48One in particular
19:50caught his attention.
19:52A large number
19:54of documents
19:54were seized.
19:55Among these
19:56documents,
19:57there was a notebook
19:57and I forwarded
19:58it to headquarters.
19:59They returned
20:00it to me.
20:01They said the notebook
20:02wasn't important
20:03to them.
20:04It contained
20:04some formulas,
20:06so to speak,
20:06but no troop
20:07deployments.
20:08Try to figure it
20:09out for yourself,
20:10they said.
20:10You are the
20:11engineering troops.
20:12It must be
20:13of some interest
20:14to you.
20:14I took the
20:15notebook,
20:16sent it off
20:17for translation
20:18in Rostov.
20:19It turned out
20:20that in the
20:21notebook,
20:22the author
20:22was suggesting
20:23the use
20:24of an atomic
20:24system
20:25to produce
20:26explosions.
20:30Despite
20:30the army's
20:31indifference,
20:31Starynov thought
20:32it was worth
20:33sending on
20:33to Moscow.
20:34Eventually,
20:35the captured
20:35document landed
20:36on the desk
20:36of Lavrenti
20:37Beria,
20:38who this time
20:38did not dismiss
20:39it as German
20:40disinformation.
20:43But decisive
20:44action still
20:45depended on Stalin
20:46and his overwhelming
20:47priority was
20:48rallying his
20:49stricken army.
20:51Comrades,
20:52soldiers of
20:52the Red Army,
20:54sailors,
20:55commanders of
20:56the political
20:56sections,
20:57men and women
20:58partisans,
21:00the whole world
21:01is watching to see
21:02if you are capable
21:03of destroying
21:03the invading
21:04marauders.
21:06But Beria now
21:08had enough
21:08on his desk
21:09about atomic
21:09weapons to
21:10convince him
21:10that there was
21:11an even greater
21:12danger in doing
21:12nothing.
21:13He went to
21:14seize Stalin.
21:17One of the few
21:18men to have
21:18seen the full
21:19story of what
21:20happened next
21:20is a KGB
21:21colonel called
21:22Vladimir Chikov.
21:24He was recently
21:25given unique
21:25access to
21:26Russia's
21:27nuclear archive,
21:28still listed
21:28top secret
21:29despite the
21:30end of the
21:30Cold War.
21:34The archive
21:35is kept
21:35in the
21:36Lubyanka,
21:36then headquarters
21:37of Beria's
21:38NKVD.
21:43Inside the
21:44Lubyanka,
21:45Chikov unearthed
21:46a succession
21:47of documents
21:47showing how
21:48critical spies
21:49were in
21:50persuading Stalin
21:51that the Russians
21:52must do
21:52something immediately
21:53to match
21:54research going
21:55on in other
21:56countries.
21:59And so,
22:00when enough
22:00material had
22:01piled up on
22:02Beria's desk,
22:03the data on
22:04heavy water
22:05from the
22:05German officer,
22:07the first
22:07two intelligence
22:08reports from
22:09London,
22:09and then a
22:10third report,
22:12Beria went
22:12to see Stalin
22:13once again.
22:15And this
22:16time,
22:17Stalin paid
22:17more careful
22:19attention.
22:21Stalin
22:22authorized a
22:22cable to be
22:23sent to
22:23Beria's
22:24station chiefs
22:25in London
22:25and New
22:26York.
22:26Please take
22:27whatever steps
22:28you think
22:29fit to obtain
22:29information on
22:31the theoretical
22:31and practical
22:32aspects of
22:33the atomic
22:33bomb projects,
22:34on the design
22:35of the atom
22:36bomb,
22:36nuclear fuel
22:37components,
22:38and a trigger
22:39mechanism,
22:39stop.
22:40Which government
22:41departments have
22:42been made
22:42responsible,
22:43stop.
22:44Where this work
22:45is being done
22:46and under whose
22:47leadership,
22:47message ends.
22:49The cable
22:50back from their
22:51man in New
22:52York was
22:52forthright and,
22:53to the Russians,
22:54shocking.
22:56All the research
22:57laboratories studying
22:58uranium fission
22:59sited in New
23:00York,
23:01Berkeley,
23:01Princeton,
23:02and Chicago
23:02have begun to
23:03work to a
23:04coordinated plan,
23:05which has been
23:05given the
23:06codename
23:06Manhattan Project.
23:08We have
23:08unsubstantiated
23:09information that
23:10an offer has been
23:11made to Robert
23:12Oppenheimer to
23:13head the most
23:13powerful super
23:14laboratory in
23:15America.
23:18The first pieces
23:21of information
23:22started coming
23:23from New
23:23York,
23:23which said that
23:24a laboratory
23:25had been set
23:26up at Los
23:26Alamos and
23:27that it was
23:28involved in the
23:29development of
23:29atomic weapons,
23:32that the Los
23:33Alamos laboratory
23:34was in the
23:35remote state of
23:35New Mexico,
23:38in a desert
23:39locality that
23:40was nearly
23:40inaccessible.
23:43I mean,
23:44not only to our
23:45intelligence
23:45agents,
23:47but for all
23:48outsiders in
23:48general.
23:56Stalin realized
23:57he could wait
23:57no longer.
23:58He appointed a
23:59brilliant scientist
24:00called Igor
24:01Kuchatov to be
24:02head of a project
24:03to build a
24:03Russian bomb.
24:06Later,
24:07Kuchatov would
24:08become so famous
24:09they'd make
24:09records of his
24:10voice.
24:24The first thing
24:26Kuchatov did
24:27was to put a
24:27call through
24:28to one of the
24:29few Russian
24:29scientists still
24:30working on
24:31atomic theory,
24:33Yuli Hariton,
24:35the man who'd
24:35studied under
24:36Rutherford at
24:37Cambridge all
24:38those years
24:38before.
24:44I heard Kuchatov's
24:47voice saying,
24:48you stay at
24:49home.
24:50I'm on my
24:51way around.
24:54I've got something
24:55very important
24:56to tell you.
25:00You are to get
25:02started immediately
25:03on the design
25:04of an atom
25:05bomb.
25:09From that
25:10point onwards
25:10Kuchatov became
25:12the public face
25:13of the Soviet
25:13bomb, while
25:16Hariton
25:17disappeared into
25:18a hidden world
25:19from which few
25:20names emerged.
25:25Out here,
25:26on the Kazakh
25:26steppes, is the
25:28secret city named
25:28after Kuchatov,
25:30which grew up
25:31around the atomic
25:31project in the
25:32years which
25:33followed.
25:34In due course,
25:35thousands of
25:36scientists and
25:37soldiers would
25:37flood into the
25:38city and turn it
25:39into the testing
25:40ground of the
25:40most destructive
25:41arsenal in the
25:42history of mankind.
25:44But at that
25:45moment, the
25:46great push forward
25:47was on the
25:48other side of
25:48the world.
25:53In the high
25:54mesas of New
25:55Mexico is the
25:56place where
25:56America's bomb
25:57was being built.
26:05this was the
26:06top-secret complex
26:07which housed what
26:09was called the
26:09Manhattan Project.
26:18The team that was
26:19assembled was made
26:20up largely of top
26:22European scientists
26:23who'd fled fascism
26:24just before the war.
26:26After what they'd been
26:27through, many were
26:28uneasy about putting
26:29science to military
26:30use, but recognized
26:32the supreme need
26:33to beat Hitler.
26:35Men like Teller,
26:37Fermi, and
26:38Bethe, and the
26:40man known as the
26:41godfather of the
26:41Manhattan Project,
26:43the distinguished
26:43Dane Niels Bohr.
26:45As the Soviet spies
26:47had predicted, and
26:47maybe wanted, they
26:49were led by Robert
26:49Oppenheimer, who'd
26:50also studied at
26:51Cambridge before the
26:52war.
26:53Oppenheimer was
26:54known by the
26:54American authorities
26:55to have sympathized
26:56with communism, but
26:57seemed to offer the
26:58right combination of
26:59energy and brilliance.
27:01Because people have
27:02respected him, he
27:03managed to keep them
27:04all together.
27:05There are many
27:05prima donnas in
27:07Los Alamos, and
27:08they want to go in
27:08different ways, but
27:10somehow he managed
27:10to do this by the
27:12way, his
27:13organizational skill.
27:15Joseph Rotblatt was
27:17one of those who
27:17came from Europe to
27:18join Oppenheimer in
27:19Los Alamos.
27:22They all came under
27:23the ultimate control
27:24of a soldier, General
27:25Leslie Groves.
27:27He was uneasy with
27:28the way the
27:28scientists approached
27:29the job.
27:30In the first instance,
27:31he wanted to put
27:32all scientists in
27:33uniform, give them
27:34ranks, and so on.
27:35Secondly, he wanted
27:36to keep each
27:37scientist in a
27:38separate compartment,
27:39because they
27:39wouldn't at all
27:40communicate with
27:41each other.
27:41He was very
27:42concerned about
27:43security and
27:44secrecy.
27:45Of course, science
27:45doesn't work.
27:46The only way
27:47scientists work is
27:48by talking to each
27:48other, trying to
27:49get new ideas
27:50coming out from
27:51such conversations.
27:53And so it
27:54didn't work.
27:54In fact, it was
27:55Oppenheimer who
27:55convinced him it
27:56wouldn't work.
28:02Nevertheless,
28:03security was tight.
28:05Everyone knew
28:05that this was a
28:06race which America
28:07and its allies
28:08could not afford
28:09to lose.
28:10And in this
28:11context, Groves
28:12was quite clear.
28:13The term allies
28:14did not include
28:15the Russians.
28:19It was a cue
28:20for Beria's
28:21espionage war
28:22to switch its
28:22focus to America.
28:27At the Soviet
28:28consulate on
28:29Manhattan Island
28:29worked a man for
28:31whom Los Alamos
28:31was a prime target.
28:35His real name
28:36was Anatoly
28:37Yatskov, though
28:38in his FBI file
28:39he appeared for
28:40many years as
28:41Anatoly Yakovlev.
28:44On the surface,
28:45he was a middle-ranked
28:46diplomat.
28:46In fact,
28:48he was the
28:48Soviet master
28:49spy working
28:50for Beria.
28:53Robert Lamphere
28:54was an FBI
28:55agent assigned
28:56to what was
28:56then a tiny
28:57squad watching
28:58out for Soviet
28:59spies.
29:02The new unit
29:03had little
29:04experience at
29:04that stage,
29:05but he soon
29:06picked out
29:06Yakovlev as
29:07someone to
29:08watch.
29:09One of the
29:09reasons for
29:10our interest
29:11in Yakovlev
29:11was that he
29:12could come
29:13and go
29:14almost at
29:15will,
29:15as other
29:17employees had
29:17to stay
29:18to their
29:19consulate duties
29:20and he was
29:21frequently out
29:22of the consulate.
29:24Furthermore,
29:25he was treated
29:26with, we
29:27thought,
29:27a little undue
29:28respect by
29:29the other
29:30members of
29:30the consulate.
29:32Behind his
29:33front as a
29:33family man,
29:35Yatskov had
29:35no qualms about
29:36spying on a
29:37wartime ally.
29:39Years later,
29:40he wrote an
29:41article in
29:41Pravda
29:42justifying his
29:43action.
29:45In those
29:46years,
29:46the fatal
29:47forties,
29:47we were
29:48allies in
29:49the war
29:49against
29:49fascist
29:50Germany
29:50and
29:51subsequently
29:51against
29:52Japan,
29:53allies with
29:54the USA.
29:55As an
29:56ally,
29:56the American
29:57authorities
29:57should have
29:58shared the
29:58information on
29:59the bomb
29:59with us.
30:00We had a
30:01full moral
30:02right to
30:02it, but
30:04they meticulously
30:05concealed even
30:06the very
30:06existence of
30:07some work
30:08from us.
30:09So there,
30:10shouldn't the
30:11actions of our
30:11intelligence network
30:13be regarded not
30:14as spying
30:15activities, but
30:16rather as a
30:17positive attempt
30:18to help the
30:19American authorities
30:20correct their
30:20oversight.
30:34The contrast
30:35between the
30:36resources available
30:37at Los Alamos
30:38and what the
30:39Russians could
30:39afford on atomic
30:40research could not
30:41have been greater.
30:43This cluttered
30:44little laboratory
30:45in Moscow housed
30:46the entire Soviet
30:47atom bomb program
30:48at that stage
30:49in the war.
30:52Compared with
30:53Oppenheimer,
30:54the Soviet team
30:55leader Igor
30:56Kurchatov lacked
30:57money,
30:58manpower,
30:59and expertise.
31:03Kurchatov managed
31:04to bring together
31:05a small group of
31:06people at
31:06laboratory number
31:07two, which
31:08literally started
31:09up with five
31:10people, just
31:11five people.
31:14The team
31:14considered it
31:15a great step
31:16forward when
31:17they were given
31:17a large tent
31:18on the outskirts
31:19of Moscow
31:19to work in.
31:21This is thought
31:22to be the only
31:23picture in existence
31:24of their
31:25Canvas HQ.
31:29Their main problem,
31:31scientifically,
31:31was how to move
31:32forward without a
31:33supply of uranium
31:34for their
31:35experiments.
31:36In practical terms,
31:38their problem was
31:39mud.
31:41It was an open
31:42field, and part
31:44of the grounds
31:45around the building
31:46were marked off
31:47by a barbed wire
31:48perimeter fence
31:49a little distance
31:50away.
31:53They were guards
31:54standing at the
31:55checkpoint with a
31:56barrier, and so
31:57much mud all
31:58round, it was
31:59almost impossible
32:00to get through.
32:05The official Soviet
32:06legend is that
32:07Igor Kurchatov was
32:08the genius who
32:09matched Oppenheimer
32:10talent for talent.
32:11But the full story
32:13is more complicated.
32:15Kurchatov was
32:16brilliant, but he
32:17was leading a
32:18double life.
32:20By night, he
32:21would study an
32:22ever-increasing flow
32:23of intelligence
32:24reports being
32:24brought in by
32:25barrier spies.
32:27Next day, he
32:27would appear in
32:28the labs and
32:29issue his
32:29instructions.
32:30No one knew
32:31many of them
32:32were based on
32:33ideas stolen
32:33from the West.
32:39Most of the
32:40information was
32:40delivered by
32:41courier.
32:45Because the
32:45information ran
32:46into hundreds of
32:47pages, it was
32:49impossible to code
32:50or transmit it
32:51all over the
32:52radio for fear
32:53of interception.
32:57There were two
32:57possible delivery
32:58options over to
33:00the center, to
33:01Moscow, by courier
33:04and by diplomatic
33:05mail, though it
33:09was in violation
33:10of the rules.
33:13and when there
33:14was a need to
33:14send classified
33:15data fast, the
33:21diplomatic mail was
33:22used.
33:28When Kurchatov
33:29hit a problem, he'd
33:30sometimes send a
33:31specific question out
33:32to the network of
33:33spies.
33:34March 22nd, 1943.
33:37give instructions to
33:39the intelligence
33:40services to find out
33:41what work has been
33:42done on using
33:43Echarenium-239 for
33:45a bomb.
33:47He even suggested a
33:48list of experimental
33:49research sites where
33:50they might find
33:51answers.
33:52Berkeley, Yale,
33:54Ann Arbor, Columbia,
33:58Rochester, Princeton,
34:00and Swarthmore,
34:01Pennsylvania.
34:04But what he got back
34:06was more than one man
34:07could handle.
34:09Thousands of documents
34:10lay untouched in the
34:11Lubyanka vaults.
34:13The secretive barrier
34:14was determined that no
34:15one else should know
34:16just how dependent
34:17Soviet science was on
34:19the West.
34:22Buria banned showing
34:23the materials to
34:24anyone but Kurchatov
34:26at this early stage.
34:30Just imagine, a 600-page
34:32volume comes in.
34:36How could he find the
34:38time to compute
34:39something in his head?
34:44Problems safferced.
34:46New ideas and
34:48thoughts, and Kurchatov
34:51had to process them
34:52in his mind.
34:56The Soviets had good
34:57reason to be suspicious
34:58of their allies.
35:01In 1943, President
35:03Roosevelt met the
35:04arch-anti-communist
35:05Winston Churchill in
35:06Quebec.
35:06At Churchill's
35:07suggestion, the Russians
35:09weren't invited.
35:13After the public
35:14greetings, and behind
35:16closed doors, an
35:17agreement was reached
35:18under which the
35:19signatories would pool
35:20their atomic secrets,
35:21and their atomic
35:22scientists.
35:26But though they had
35:27been excluded, there
35:28was an unexpected bonus
35:29for the Russians.
35:31The deal meant that
35:32Klaus Fuchs, who had
35:34been steadily supplying
35:35material through Red
35:36Sonja in London, got
35:37orders to move to the
35:38United States.
35:48Fuchs' first stop was
35:50New York.
35:54There he made contact
35:55with Yakovlev, through an
35:57intermediary known in the
35:58spy business as a cutout.
36:02One of the early
36:03meetings took place
36:05here in Manhattan, just
36:07at the entrance, back of us
36:09here, of the
36:10Queensborough Bridge.
36:12As I remembered, I think
36:13there were a total of seven
36:15meetings took place between
36:16the two men in the boroughs of
36:19New York City, Queens,
36:21Brooklyn, Manhattan, most of
36:23them in Manhattan.
36:25The key developments taking
36:26place on the Manhattan
36:28Project were known to the KGB
36:31about as fast as they were
36:33known to the American
36:34scientists.
36:36The KGB was right inside
36:38the project.
36:42Once Fuchs got to Los Alamos,
36:44the life of the spy was
36:46comparatively easy.
36:49Not least because of
36:51Oppenheimer's insistence that
36:52everything between scientists
36:54should be open.
36:55We had complete freedom to
36:59converse with any scientist
37:04who had a white badge.
37:07This was partly due to
37:10Oppenheim.
37:12He insisted on that.
37:19Hans Beter was head of
37:21theoretical physics at Los
37:22Alamos.
37:24A fellow refugee from
37:25Hitler's Germany, he was
37:27Klaus Fuchs' direct boss.
37:31Klaus Fuchs was very
37:35reticent.
37:37He wouldn't give anything
37:42by himself except science.
37:47He wouldn't talk about
37:50personal things.
37:53My friend Jenya Pyers, Mrs. Pyers,
37:58said you have to drop a penny
38:01into the slot to make him talk.
38:08Scientifically, however, he was
38:10very good.
38:11He worked, I think, 12 hours a day,
38:15seven days a week, and he produced
38:19an awful lot of results.
38:24He was a very good scientist and
38:28very silent.
38:35But the more the actual bomb took shape,
38:38the more doubt some of the scientists
38:40had about their work.
38:41The threat from Hitler was fading fast,
38:43so why was the bomb needed?
38:48One night in 1944, at a dinner party
38:51for senior scientists, their boss,
38:54General Groves, let the cat out of the bag.
38:57Groves said to us, you realise, of course,
39:01that the whole purpose of the project
39:04is to subdue the Russians.
39:07Now, I remember these words,
39:09almost as they were spoken yesterday,
39:10because they came to me with such a shock,
39:14I couldn't believe my own ears.
39:16The shock came to me because, first of all,
39:20this was not the purpose of the bomb at all,
39:22this would be used against another nation,
39:24and secondly, because at that time,
39:25the Russians were our allies.
39:27We had a mortal enemy,
39:29and they were carrying the main burden
39:31of the war against Germany,
39:33and here I'm told,
39:34ah, what we are doing now
39:35is to subdue these people.
39:39The godfather of the American bomb project,
39:42the Dane Niels Bohr,
39:43was particularly concerned.
39:46Although Groves' view was not official,
39:49Bohr felt it was essential
39:50to share atomic information with the Russians,
39:52to stop what he thought would inevitably
39:54turn into a nuclear arms race.
39:59Bohr and Fuchs were obviously in agreement on this,
40:02and later Fuchs explained how the protest grew.
40:10The first statement,
40:11and probably the firmest,
40:13came from Niels Bohr
40:14in a memo to Roosevelt.
40:19He had evidently been thinking
40:21much more intensely about this
40:23than anyone else.
40:26And this memo to the president
40:29also expressed very clearly
40:31the need for the United States
40:33and the Soviet Union
40:34to work together in harmony.
40:38And he argues that in order
40:40to establish the confidence required,
40:45America should inform the Soviet Union
40:48before using the atom bomb.
40:52Roosevelt raised the matter with Churchill.
40:55But Churchill was completely opposed
40:57to the idea
40:58and in his first outburst
41:00went so far as to comment
41:02that Niels Bohr
41:03ought to be arrested on suspicion.
41:10Bohr was invited to the White House
41:12to put his case to the president.
41:14He didn't get far.
41:17Roosevelt didn't even let him speak
41:20for the half hour
41:21that had been allotted to him
41:24and told him,
41:26well, Mr. Bohr,
41:29you are a great scientist.
41:31When you want to talk to me
41:33about science,
41:34I am terribly interested.
41:38But these political matters
41:40are our business.
41:45The war, meanwhile,
41:47was reaching a bloody crescendo.
41:51The Russians,
41:52who'd already lost
41:53over 20 million people
41:54in the long years of fighting,
41:56were now pounding their way
41:57into Berlin.
42:00Victory in Europe
42:01was virtually won.
42:03Hitler was beaten.
42:04And the need for the atomic bomb,
42:06as originally defined,
42:07was over.
42:08But everyone knew
42:09it wouldn't end there.
42:23Niels Bohr
42:24returned to Denmark
42:25disillusioned and worried.
42:28He foresaw
42:29that if the Americans
42:31go on with themselves
42:32together with the British,
42:34and then the Russians
42:35will go on their own,
42:36they make their own bomb,
42:38there will be an arms race,
42:40which will have
42:40enormous consequences,
42:42dire consequences
42:43for the whole of our civilization.
42:45And he tried to prevent this.
42:50He and some of his fellow scientists
42:52now believed
42:52that building the bomb
42:53had opened a Pandora's box.
43:00I don't know whether it's apocryphal
43:02or not, I can't remember,
43:03but I'm supposed to have said
43:05at the time,
43:06it's too late now.
43:07The military men
43:08have got their hands
43:09on the bomb.
43:12They had indeed.
43:14The following month,
43:15the first atom bomb,
43:16codenamed Trinity,
43:17was wheeled out for testing.
43:44For the scientists involved,
43:45it was a time
43:46of great tension.
43:47I was very nervous.
43:51Would it work?
43:53We wanted to see
43:54the actual explosion
43:58very accurately
44:00because we wanted to measure
44:03the development
44:05of the fireball.
44:11Eight, seven, six,
44:15five, four,
44:17three, two,
44:19one,
44:20now.
44:24Even the experts
44:26were astonished
44:26by the result.
44:29It was just tremendous.
44:31And first,
44:34it was brilliant white.
44:40And then,
44:41as it rose
44:42in the atmosphere,
44:44it became
44:46dominantly purple.
44:49The gamma rays
44:51give you
44:52then this
44:53purple light
44:55that's radiation
44:56from the air.
45:04So it was
45:05a tremendous
45:06spectacle.
45:07And
45:08we all
45:09were aware
45:10what kind
45:12of a weapon
45:12it was.
45:18when they actually
45:18saw the result
45:20at the Trinity test,
45:23they were really
45:24flattened.
45:24I mean,
45:25it's one thing
45:25to do a calculation
45:26on a piece of paper.
45:27It's another thing
45:27to actually see it.
45:28They were really
45:29flattened by it
45:30when it hit them
45:32what they had done.
45:35The very next day,
45:36Harry Truman,
45:37newly made president
45:38after the death
45:39of Roosevelt,
45:39was able to tell
45:40his allies
45:41he had a new
45:42superweapon
45:43ready to beat
45:43the Japanese.
45:46Stalin,
45:47of course,
45:47already knew
45:48about the bomb
45:48from his spies,
45:49and he made no sign
45:51of being impressed.
45:58A few days later,
45:59he was.
46:04Once the dust
46:05had settled,
46:06everyone knew
46:07the rules of war
46:08had changed forever.
46:10Los Alamos
46:11was a very depressed
46:12place after Hiroshima
46:13because it suddenly
46:14sank in fully
46:16what it was
46:16they had been working on.
46:22What motivated them
46:23initially was the fear
46:24that the Germans
46:25were going to get the bomb.
46:26And so they were
46:27building this thing.
46:28They weren't really
46:28building it to use it.
46:29They were building it
46:30so that they could have,
46:31you know,
46:31in case Germany
46:32did get the bomb,
46:33we would have
46:34our own bomb,
46:35and it would be
46:36a stalemate
46:37with regard
46:38to nuclear weapons.
46:41So I don't think
46:42many of them
46:43seriously considered
46:45that it was going
46:46to be used,
46:47and there was
46:47all this euphemistic
46:49language.
46:49I mean,
46:49they weren't
46:50building a bomb.
46:51They were building
46:52a gadget.
46:56Among the first
46:57foreigners to pick
46:58their way through
46:59the ruins of the city
47:00was a man from
47:01Russian military
47:01intelligence
47:02called
47:03Mikhail Ivanov.
47:08We made our way
47:10through the streets,
47:11those devastated streets.
47:13All the maps
47:14were terribly confused.
47:15There was rubble
47:16everywhere,
47:17and the rubble
47:18was covered
47:18in a strange dust.
47:20It was an awful sight.
47:21When we said
47:22we had come
47:23to look at the city,
47:24one man smiled
47:26and said,
47:26what city?
47:27There is no city.
47:28There is a dreadful
47:30sickness here,
47:30he said.
47:31A dreadful sickness.
47:33People who have
47:34survived
47:34are dying
47:35from just being here.
47:51Ivanov's report
47:53was sent straight
47:53back to the Kremlin
47:54where Stalin
47:55summoned his
47:56Politburo
47:56to a crisis meeting.
47:58Despite all the
47:59information from his
48:00spies,
48:01he was shocked
48:01by the news
48:02from Japan.
48:06He was enraged.
48:07He banged his fist
48:08and stamped his feet.
48:10He clearly hadn't
48:11reckoned that they
48:12would really drop
48:13the bomb
48:14or that it would
48:14cause such destruction.
48:19The news
48:20couldn't have been
48:21worse time.
48:24Parade победы
48:25итог
48:26heroического
48:27putty
48:27нашего
48:28naroda
48:28prойденного
48:29podводительством
48:31великого
48:31Stalina.
48:32After a long
48:33and bitter war
48:33the Russians
48:34were celebrating.
48:35And not just
48:36victory,
48:37they were celebrating
48:38the future as well.
48:43It's obvious
48:44why Stalin
48:44was enraged.
48:46We had won
48:46the war.
48:47The stage
48:48was set
48:48for making
48:49Europe socialist,
48:50making it red.
48:51nearly everything
48:53was in place
48:54and all of a sudden
48:55this obstacle
48:56appeared
48:56and everything
48:57was going
48:58to the dogs.
49:03Stalin
49:04was in no mood
49:05to leave anything
49:05to chance.
49:08Instead of leaving
49:09the building
49:09of a bomb
49:10to his scientists,
49:11he put his secret
49:12police in charge.
49:15The boss
49:16of the Lubyanka,
49:17Lavrenti Beria,
49:18was told he must
49:19deliver a working
49:20atomic bomb
49:21within five years.
49:24He knew
49:25that the vaults
49:25of the Lubyanka
49:26were filled
49:27with wartime
49:27intelligence.
49:29But much of it
49:30was still waiting
49:31to be read.
49:32And the volume
49:32alone told Beria
49:33one thing.
49:34The Soviets
49:35had a long way
49:36to go before
49:36they could match
49:37the United States.
49:41But within months
49:42he was to get
49:43a message
49:43from the West
49:44that could
49:45dramatically
49:45cut down
49:46the Americans' lead.
49:49One of the top
49:50men in the Los Alamos
49:51team
49:52was willing
49:53to talk.
50:20to the U.S.
50:22to the U.S.
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