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01:00In January 1968, NLF guerrillas, backed by North Vietnamese troops, launched a full-scale offensive against the cities and towns
01:10of the South.
01:13For two years, they had been cautious, avoiding big battles.
01:17But at Thet, the Vietnamese New Year, they staked everything on one all-out bid for victory.
01:44The Thet offensive was one of the most stunning surprise attacks ever launched by an army.
01:50More than 80,000 guerrillas and North Vietnamese troops were thrown against the forces of the South Vietnamese government and
01:58their American allies.
02:03The battles were on a scale which no one had imagined the Viet Cong could achieve.
02:09The fighting even spilled into the American embassy in Saigon.
02:24The Thet offensive turned into a military catastrophe for the Viet Cong.
02:31In clashes of shocking violence, the guerrillas lost most of their best fighters.
02:40But in one of the greatest ironies in the history of war, the Viet Cong's military defeat turned into a
02:48political victory.
02:52It was a victory that would change the whole course of the war in Vietnam.
03:15American forces in South Vietnam had spent 1966 massively building up their numbers.
03:23Men and supplies poured in.
03:28Bases, airfields, and port facilities were expanded at a frantic pace.
03:39By the start of 1967, the Americans had 389,000 troops and were ready to go on the offensive.
03:56The American aim was to defeat the NVA and NLF force by now numbering nearly 128,000.
04:07For seven years, the NLF had been fighting to overthrow the government of South Vietnam and reunite the South with
04:14the North.
04:16The North was backing them with supplies and men and had sent units of the North Vietnamese Army to fight
04:23inside the South.
04:33American commanders wanted to take on the enemy's big units, the battalions and regiments.
04:40If U.S. forces could destroy them faster than they could be replaced, the war would soon be over.
04:56In fact, the American strategy had quickly run into trouble.
05:01After early battles in which enemy regiments had suffered heavy casualties, they had avoided head-on clashes.
05:08Instead, the Viet Cong meant to stick to hit-and-run and ambush.
05:26The Viet Cong's tactics caused American casualties to rise sharply.
05:35Instead of big battles, there were snipers, booby traps and surprise attacks.
05:42The Americans grew increasingly frustrated as they mounted countless search-and-destroy operations, took casualties and still failed to find
05:51important guerrilla units.
05:59The commander of American forces in Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland, was determined to make the Viet Cong fight big
06:07battles.
06:08Only then could superior American firepower be used to the full.
06:24One answer, Westmoreland believed, might be to attack in force into the Viet Cong's traditional base areas.
06:34These he was sure the Viet Cong would fight to defend.
06:53By 1967, there were strong American marine forces based in the heavily populated coastal areas of northern South Vietnam.
07:06In the Central Highlands, there were army units, including the Air Cavalry Division.
07:14However, the greatest concentration of U.S. Army strength was in the Saigon area, and it was there, between the
07:22capital and the Cambodian border, that the Americans launched their biggest operations.
07:36The Viet Cong base areas targeted by the Americans were the Iron Triangle, only 20 miles from the capital, Saigon,
07:44and War Zone C, near the Cambodian border.
07:52Along with War Zone D, these areas held strong NLF regional forces and the elite 9th Division.
08:05Supplied down the Ho Chi Minh Trail from North Vietnam, the bases were springboards for attacks in and around Saigon.
08:15In January 1967, the Americans launched Operation Cedar Falls into the Iron Triangle.
08:27Between February and May, Operation Junction City swept War Zone C.
08:42In Cedar Falls and Junction City, up to 25,000 Americans and South Vietnamese Army troops swept through the NLF's
08:52base areas.
08:54There were hundreds of firefights and several major NLF attacks with assaults by thousands of guerrillas.
09:06But the Americans never did succeed in trapping any of the big units.
09:13The Viet Cong regiments melted away into forests and swamps, or over the border into Cambodia, where the Americans were
09:21forbidden to follow.
09:35Even though U.S. commanders had failed to provoke the big battles they wanted, they were more optimistic than before.
09:45They had done massive damage to the Viet Cong's installations and had captured huge amounts of supplies.
09:56Cedar Falls and Junction City alone had killed nearly 3,000 guerrillas.
10:11U.S. forces had also blunted an enemy initiative further north, where the war was between the Americans and the
10:18North Vietnamese Army.
10:34North and South Vietnam were separated by a demilitarized zone, inside which troops were not supposed to operate.
10:46South of the zone, the American defense against the North Vietnamese Army was a string of fire bases.
10:54Khe Sanh, the Rock Pile, Camp Carroll, Cam Lo and Dung Ha along Route 9, and the newly built Kan
11:03Tien and Giao Lin.
11:09All were controlled by Special Forces units and later the 3rd Marine Division, which constantly swept the surrounding area.
11:18Between January and May 1967, two North Vietnamese divisions, operating out of the DMZ, launched heavy bombardments of these bases.
11:27Ground assaults at Kan Tien and Khe Sanh were only driven off after massive aerial bombardments.
11:33Afterwards, the Marines continued to patrol aggressively.
11:49The increased North Vietnamese activity on the DMZ triggered an American plan to reinforce the whole area.
12:01More Marines were moved up, and Army units were redeployed from other parts of South Vietnam.
12:14Meanwhile, in the Central Highlands, the Americans intercepted North Vietnamese Army units moving in from Cambodia.
12:25In late May 1967, there were nine days of continuous battles which left hundreds of North Vietnamese soldiers dead.
12:39While American ground operations were piling on the pressure in the first half of 1967, the U.S. air campaign
12:47against North Vietnam had also been stepped up.
12:54The aim of the bombing was to force the North to stop supporting the war.
13:00In fact, the bombing and the massive ground assaults were having exactly the opposite effect.
13:15Far from giving up, North Vietnam was preparing to unleash the biggest offensive of the war so far.
13:40Time and again, Ho Chi Minh, the aging North Vietnamese president, had proclaimed that the Vietnamese people were prepared to
13:48fight for 20 years.
13:49He insisted they would pay any price to reunite Vietnam and drive out the Americans.
14:05Privately, however, Ho and most of the Hanoi leadership had come to believe that the war could not go on
14:11in the same way for much longer.
14:20The problem was not just the casualty rate in the South, estimated by the Americans to be at least 5
14:26,000 troops dead every month.
14:28Such losses could be sustained for a long time yet.
14:32The biggest fear was that the safe base areas in Laos and Cambodia, or perhaps even in the North itself,
14:39might soon be invaded by the Americans.
14:51There were also worries about how well the morale of the population would stand up to a bombing campaign that
14:58might go on for years.
15:05The North's leaders foresaw that they might have to negotiate with the Americans sooner or later.
15:13But before that happened, they were determined to make one more attempt to win the war on the battlefield.
15:22In July 1967, the Politburo, led by Party First Secretary Li Duan, proposed an all-out offensive in South Vietnam,
15:31timed for early 1968.
15:47Up to recently, command of the war effort in the South had been divided between General Giap, who controlled the
15:54North Vietnamese Army's campaigns, and General Tan, who ran the war further south.
16:02And there had been disagreement between them about the planned offensive.
16:06But just as preparations got underway, General Tan died of heart disease in a Hanoi hospital.
16:13For years afterward, it was thought in the West that he died as the result of an American bombing raid
16:18on his southern headquarters.
16:22As well as the loss of a charismatic leader and the shock to the Viet Cong's command, it was an
16:28ironic turn.
16:28Now, Japp was solely responsible for planning the entire campaign.
16:56Since he had first dispatched combat troops to South Vietnam, the U.S. President, Lyndon Baines Johnson,
17:03had been determined to limit the war's impact on the American people.
17:07He had refused to call up the reserves and had never pushed for any formal declaration of war by Congress.
17:16Despite mounting casualties, the U.S. never officially declared war on Vietnam.
17:25Up to now, Johnson's approach had seemed to pay off.
17:29There was some anti-war feeling, but nothing so serious as to threaten the president's policy.
17:39However, the toll of American combat casualties, now running at more than 6,000 killed, wounded and missing every month,
17:47was hardening opposition.
17:50The draft call had been increased, yet so far no real attempt had been made to get the American public
17:56support for the war or its aims.
18:15Divisions were beginning to open up between the president's military and civilian advisers.
18:23The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted more damaging targets for the bombing campaign against the North,
18:31a widening of the ground campaign into Laos, Cambodia, and possibly North Vietnam, and a big increase in troop levels.
18:45On the other hand, the Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, strongly opposed escalating the war.
18:57McNamara believed that widening the conflict would run a real risk of drawing in Communist China or the Soviet Union.
19:08He also believed that the war might be a long one, and that if the American people were to support
19:13it, the cost would have to be kept down.
19:16That meant no wider war and a big effort to prepare the South Vietnamese Army to take over more of
19:23the fighting.
19:33In the face of contradictory advice from his military and civilian advisers, President Johnson's reaction was to compromise.
19:45The bombing war would be intensified to include a whole range of targets which would hit the North Vietnamese war
19:52effort hard.
19:57On the other hand, there would be no expansion of the ground war.
20:01The army would get fewer than 50,000 extra men, and the reserves would not be called up.
20:14On September 29th, 1967, President Johnson took a step closer to those advisers who were arguing against escalating the war.
20:24At San Antonio, Texas, Johnson declared that the U.S. would stop bombing North Vietnam if Hanoi promised not to
20:31take advantage of the ceasefire.
20:39There was no response from Northern leaders.
21:02The great offensive meant to change the course of the war was to begin with full-scale Viet Cong attacks
21:09on cities, headquarters,
21:11and radio stations, and radio stations all over South Vietnam.
21:16The shock of the offensive would cause the South Vietnamese Army to collapse.
21:25Government troops would be encouraged to mutiny, and some might even be persuaded to turn their guns on the Americans.
21:36At the same time as the military offensive, the signal would go out for a nationwide uprising by the people
21:43of South Vietnam.
21:45It would be led by the secret youth leagues and workers groups already in place in the cities.
21:56The government would be overthrown, and a new NLF-led regime would call for the Americans to leave.
22:09NLF planners believed that with the world looking on, the Americans would have little alternative but to go.
22:20The success of the general offensive depended on the Viet Cong avoiding the overwhelming firepower of American forces.
22:29Fortunately, the cities and towns were garrisoned by the much less formidable South Vietnamese Army.
22:40Still, General Japp meant to take no chances.
22:44Large numbers of American troops would be drawn away from the populated areas by carefully planned diversions.
23:09In the last months of 1967, the North Vietnamese Army meant to attack government troops at Song Bay...
23:19...and the American base at Dock Toh.
23:25The U.S. Marine outpost at Con Tien would also be hit.
23:31And forces would be massed around Kha Sanh.
23:36An elite NLF regiment would also hit the South Vietnamese Army garrison at Loch Ninh.
23:44The attacks near South Vietnam's borders would draw American forces away from their main base areas and deep into the
23:52interior.
23:56The general offensive and uprising would then begin.
24:01The Viet Cong would attack the national capital, Saigon, most of the country's 44 provincial capitals, and over 100 other
24:11towns.
24:15The last phase would happen at Kha Sanh.
24:19There, the NVA would win a major victory over the United States in a huge set-piece battle that would
24:26destroy the American will to carry on the war.
24:38General Jap was sure that surprise would be the key to a successful offensive.
24:43His plan was to choose the one time when no attacks would be expected, the New Year Festival of Tet.
24:59In previous years, an informal ceasefire over the holiday had seen vast numbers of South Vietnamese Army troops on leave,
25:08celebrating with their families.
25:13Although an attack during Tet would be deeply offensive to much of the population, it would be certain to catch
25:20the enemy totally unprepared.
25:43Now that Washington had refused to widen the ground war, General Westmoreland was forced to carry on trying to win
25:51in the same way as before.
25:53His forces would continue to mount relentless offensives meant to cause the guerrillas such losses they would have to give
26:00up.
26:19Meanwhile, there was another war to be fought too.
26:24The NLF still controlled a quarter of the villages in Vietnam.
26:34Attempts by the South Vietnamese government to get back control of the rural areas had been going on for years.
26:42Various pacification programs had tried to win the people's support and root out the NLF political organization.
26:49The campaign had failed dismally, in part because it was poorly coordinated with the American war in the field.
26:56And because successive Saigon regimes and the CIA had alienated the people with thousands of assassinations of suspected NLF sympathizers.
27:08It was also in this year that the Phoenix program of assassinations began.
27:14Washington was now insisting that the two efforts, pacification and the bigger war, had to be pulled together to make
27:21one grand strategy.
27:33American military planners had always seen the main force Viet Cong in the interior of South Vietnam as the biggest
27:41danger.
27:46They threatened the populated areas with attack and, the Americans believed, they supplied men, food and weapons to the local
27:54guerrilla units.
28:01In the new plan, the American role would still be to keep main force Viet Cong away from the populated
28:08areas.
28:10However, there would now be more emphasis on what happened behind the American shield.
28:18The village guerrillas would be driven out by the South Vietnamese army and militia.
28:24Local security would be strengthened and pacified areas would spread out until they encompassed most of the populated regions of
28:32South Vietnam.
28:46American strategists were convinced that if the US military effort and the government's pacification program could be made to work
28:52together, they could win the war against the Viet Cong.
29:02To succeed, they would have to get the cooperation of sometimes skeptical military commanders.
29:13They would also have to do something about the huge number of different American agencies supporting pacification projects.
29:26All American support for pacification and its multimillion dollar budget was now placed under one man.
29:34Robert Comer was given the rank of ambassador equal to a four-star general and made Westmoreland's deputy.
29:51Everyone knew that Comer faced an enormous task, but in Saigon and Washington, there was real optimism.
29:59It looked like the United States at last had a strategy that could deliver a solid victory in Vietnam.
30:28For the Tet Offensive, North Vietnamese leaders had decided to rely on Viet Cong guerrillas for most of the fighting.
30:35rather than the regular army.
30:40They believed that the people of the South
30:43would be more likely to join the revolt
30:45if the offensive was led by Southerners.
30:52It would also reassure the NLF leadership inside the South
30:56who had a real fear that their role in the war
30:59would be taken over by Hanoi.
31:07By late 1967, the NLF and the North Vietnamese Army
31:12together fielded 128,000 main force troops in South Vietnam,
31:18most of them in 152 infantry battalions.
31:26There were also hundreds of thousands of regional and local guerrillas,
31:31male and female, who would play a major part in the Tet Offensive.
31:42Although the Americans believed that local Viet Cong guerrillas in the villages
31:47were supplied and supported by the main force units,
31:50the opposite was usually the case.
31:52It was the village guerrillas who supported the main force battalions.
32:05They collected rice taxes from the local farmers,
32:09built up supplies,
32:10and provided scouts and screening forces for the big units.
32:27All communist military forces in the southern part of South Vietnam
32:32were controlled through the Viet Cong's mobile headquarters,
32:36the central office for South Vietnam.
32:44operations further north were commanded from a North Vietnamese Army headquarters
32:49inside the demilitarized zone.
32:53For the Tet Offensive,
32:55the NVA would deploy elements of the 341st Division,
33:01supported by Viet Cong sapper battalions just below the demilitarized zone.
33:10Three more divisions and a regiment
33:13would be deployed around the U.S. Marine Base at Khe San.
33:19Further south,
33:21two divisions,
33:22supported by Viet Cong sappers and artillery units,
33:25were spread out along the coast
33:28and another was deployed in the central highlands.
33:36The Viet Cong fielded three formations of divisional strength,
33:41all within 75 miles of Saigon.
33:46Countrywide,
33:47they also had 30 independent main force battalions
33:50and more than 60 regional and local battalions,
33:56altogether the equivalent of 10 divisions.
34:09During 1967,
34:11American fighter bombers would fly 53,000 attack sorties
34:15against the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
34:19Their aim was to cut off the flow of forces and weapons
34:23from the north to the southern guerrillas.
34:30In spite of the massive scale of the bombing campaign,
34:34it was having little real impact
34:36on the Viet Cong's buildup for the Tet Offensive.
34:42The area the bombers had to cover was vast
34:45and the Viet Cong were experts at camouflage.
34:52In the month of July 1967,
34:57480 trucks made the long and arduous journey
35:00from North Vietnam to the south.
35:03By the end of the year,
35:05traffic would soar to 3,000 trucks a month.
35:09In fact,
35:10on the eve of the offensive,
35:12many Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army units
35:15would have a surplus of modern weapons and equipment.
35:39The North Vietnamese army and most Viet Cong guerrillas
35:42were well-equipped with light infantry weapons,
35:45including the superb AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifle.
35:55They also had a range of medium and heavy machine guns.
36:07Because American aircraft were always on the prowl,
36:10almost everything had to be carried by porters often at night.
36:15That meant the most valuable weapons
36:17were those that had the hitting power
36:19but could still be transported easily.
36:30The Soviet-made rocket-propelled grenade launcher,
36:34the RPG-2,
36:35and its replacement,
36:36the RPG-7,
36:38were lightweight and highly effective
36:40against armor and bunkers.
36:45Designed to be fired by one man,
36:48the rocket had a range of more than 500 meters.
36:56For much longer ranges,
36:58the Chinese 75-millimeter recoilless rifle,
37:01the Type 52,
37:03was an accurate and powerful weapon.
37:05It was able to fire high-explosive shells
37:07over 6,600 meters.
37:10And with a high-explosive armor-piercing shell,
37:13it was effective against armor at up to 800 meters.
37:19Its big disadvantage
37:21was that if its crew needed to move fast,
37:23it was a cumbersome weapon to manhandle.
37:31In the rugged terrain of South Vietnam,
37:34mortars were by far the most useful
37:36of all heavy weapons.
37:41The NLF and the North Vietnamese Army
37:44had thousands,
37:45and they were the perfect combination
37:47of hitting power,
37:48range,
37:49and portability.
38:12Although Viet Cong forces in the South
38:14were estimated by the Americans
38:15to have lost more than 60,000 men in 1967,
38:18they had still managed
38:20to keep up their overall numbers.
38:23Thousands of North Vietnamese Army troops
38:26had been sent down the Ho Chi Minh Trail
38:28to join the guerrillas,
38:30and they now accounted
38:31for more than one in five Viet Cong.
38:42The guerrillas also operated a draft
38:45in the villages.
38:46Because men younger than 20
38:48were not called up
38:49by the South Vietnamese Army,
38:51most teenagers were still at home
38:52and made up a huge pool
38:54of potential recruits.
39:07local NLF guerrillas were given
39:09only a basic minimum
39:11of infantry training.
39:12Later on, though,
39:14if they were recruited
39:15to a main force unit,
39:16they could get up to a month
39:18of advanced instruction.
39:24There were also dozens
39:26of training centers
39:27spread all over South Vietnam,
39:30running long courses
39:31for squad and platoon leaders,
39:33operators of crew-served weapons,
39:35and radio men.
39:45To make sure the guerrillas
39:47understood what they were fighting for,
39:49all training courses
39:50included political instruction.
39:58Most Viet Cong attacks
40:00planned for the Tet Offensive
40:01were to be led
40:02by elite sapper commandos.
40:04Their job would be
40:06to launch the initial assaults,
40:08blasting their way
40:09into enemy headquarters
40:10and bases.
40:15Most sappers were part
40:17of well-trained
40:18main force battalions,
40:20but for Tet,
40:21the Viet Cong would also
40:22heavily rely on local sapper units,
40:25men and women
40:26recruited inside the cities.
40:29Many drove pedicabs,
40:31cyclos, and taxis,
40:32or were chauffeurs
40:34and delivery men
40:35and knew their way
40:36around the streets
40:37like no one else could.
40:46During the year,
40:48as casualties had mounted
40:49under the intense pressure
40:51of the American onslaught,
40:52the morale of the Viet Cong
40:54had suffered badly.
40:58But news of the planned
41:00general offensive
41:01quickly revived
41:02the confidence
41:03of the guerrillas.
41:04Political officers
41:05worked hard
41:06to persuade the troops
41:07that the campaign
41:08would bring the victory
41:10they had fought
41:11so long to win.
41:16In the run-up to Tet,
41:18the rate of desertion
41:20from Viet Cong units
41:21fell away
41:22almost to nothing.
41:40By late 1967,
41:43there were almost
41:44half a million
41:44American military personnel
41:46in South Vietnam.
41:55of these,
41:56only one in seven
41:58were combat troops.
41:59The rest
42:00were the support personnel
42:01needed to run
42:02a military machine
42:03that relied
42:04on high-tech weaponry
42:06and consumed
42:07vast amounts of supplies.
42:12By now,
42:14American forces
42:14in Vietnam
42:15were expending
42:1645,000 tons
42:18of ammunition
42:19and burning
42:2060 million gallons
42:22of fuel
42:22every month.
42:26Almost everything
42:27came from the United States,
42:29and when it arrived
42:30in Vietnam,
42:31there was a massive problem
42:33of storage
42:33and distribution.
42:35Huge numbers of men
42:36were tied up
42:37just handling
42:38the supply traffic.
42:50Protecting the dozens
42:51of big American installations
42:53scattered all over the country
42:55and securing major road links
42:57was another enormous drain
42:58on manpower.
43:04During 1967,
43:06the new American emphasis
43:08on pacification
43:09had led to more attention
43:10than ever being paid
43:12to improving
43:12the South Vietnamese
43:13armed forces.
43:21The armed forces
43:23now numbered
43:24more than 340,000 soldiers,
43:27and there were also
43:28nearly 300,000 regional troops
43:30and other militia.
43:36The South Vietnamese
43:37also had a small navy
43:39for coastal and river patrols
43:41and an increasingly
43:42effective air force.
43:49Its pilots
43:50were now flying
43:51a quarter
43:51of all combat sorties
43:53inside South Vietnam.
44:08The South Vietnamese army
44:10had divided the country
44:12into four tactical zones,
44:14one for each army corps.
44:19The most northerly zones
44:21each deployed
44:22two divisions,
44:23while the zones
44:25further south
44:26each had three.
44:28The South Vietnamese air force
44:31had five fighter squadrons
44:32and the Navy
44:33a force of coastal patrol boats.
44:38The joint general staff's reserve
44:41was an airborne division
44:42and two marine brigades.
44:48For easy coordination,
44:50the American military assistance
44:52command Vietnam
44:53had created
44:54a marine amphibious force
44:56and two field forces
44:57to match three
44:59of the South Vietnamese
45:00army's tactical zones.
45:06All together,
45:07the forces deployed
45:09two marine
45:09and seven army divisions,
45:12two brigades,
45:13an armored cavalry regiment,
45:15and a special forces group.
45:21As well as the Americans,
45:23there were two Korean army divisions
45:25and a marine brigade,
45:27three Australian battalions,
45:29and contingents from New Zealand,
45:31the Philippines,
45:32and Thailand.
45:44During 1967,
45:46the Americans
45:47had launched
45:47their first combat operations
45:49in the extreme south
45:50of Vietnam.
45:52Up to then,
45:53the maze of rivers
45:54and canals
45:55in the Mekong Delta
45:56had been left
45:57to the South Vietnamese army.
46:07Now,
46:07the Mobile Riverine Force,
46:09a brigade of the U.S. 9th Division,
46:11had moved in
46:12to help fight the NLF
46:13for control
46:14of the richest rice-producing area
46:16in Vietnam.
46:33The Mobile Riverine Force
46:34was unique
46:35in the U.S. Army.
46:37Not since
46:38the American Civil War
46:39had the army deployed
46:40a completely amphibious force.
46:47It had its own base,
46:49a man-made island.
46:56Navy boats
46:57carried the troops
46:58into action
46:59and provided escorts.
47:03Heavy firepower
47:05was carried
47:06by armored vessels
47:07named monitors
47:08after their
47:08Civil War forebears.
47:15during the Tet Offensive,
47:16the Mobile Riverine Force
47:18would see heavy fighting.
47:29In the Mekong Delta
47:31and the other heavily populated parts
47:33of South Vietnam,
47:34the government army
47:36would bear the brunt
47:37of the Viet Cong's
47:38planned defensive.
47:41Some South Vietnamese formations,
47:44ranger, marine,
47:45and airborne units,
47:46and a handful
47:46of infantry divisions
47:48were professional,
47:49dedicated,
47:49and well-led.
47:51They knew their battleground
47:52and their enemy.
48:02But six of the army's
48:0411 divisions
48:05were in poor shape,
48:07suffering from corrupt
48:08and incompetent officers,
48:10desertion,
48:11and obsolete equipment.
48:30At the center
48:31of American military doctrine
48:33was the idea
48:34that troops
48:35should be maneuvered
48:36to fix the enemy
48:37in position
48:37so that firepower
48:39could be unleashed
48:39to destroy him.
48:52In defense, too,
48:54heavy firepower
48:55played a critical part.
48:56Every American infantry division
48:58in Vietnam
48:59could call on
49:00massive support
49:01from aircraft
49:02and sometimes
49:03from long-range artillery.
49:09Divisions had
49:10their own artillery as well,
49:11mostly 105-millimeter weapons,
49:13and the divisions
49:14always set up fire bases
49:16before every operation.
49:25Each company
49:26also had its own mortars.
49:35Tanks were used
49:36by almost every American division
49:38in Vietnam.
49:39The most important tank unit
49:41was the 11th Armored Cavalry Brigade.
49:48All of them used the M48,
49:51a 44-ton vehicle
49:53with a 90-millimeter gun.
49:57In spite of early doubts
49:59about how tanks might fare
50:00in Vietnam,
50:01their firepower and armor
50:03were invaluable
50:04for securing roads
50:05and escorting convoys.
50:13The Marines also deployed
50:15the Antos,
50:16a weapon originally designed
50:18as a tank destroyer.
50:19The Antos mounted
50:21six recoilless rifles
50:22and during the Tet battles
50:24would prove invaluable
50:25for clearing buildings
50:26and destroying fortifications.
50:41of all the armored vehicles
50:43deployed in Vietnam,
50:45the most useful by far
50:46was the M113 Armored Fighting Vehicle,
50:49known to American troops
50:51as the track.
50:57It was so vulnerable to mines
51:00that its crew usually sat on top,
51:02but it was extremely heavily armed.
51:07Tracks mounted several weapons,
51:09including at least
51:10one .50 caliber machine gun,
51:12a weapon too heavy
51:13to carry on foot.
51:20The .50 was incredibly destructive,
51:23able to cut a tree in half
51:25hundreds of yards away.
51:34The weight of firepower
51:36that a track could deliver
51:37and the vast amounts
51:38of ammunition it could carry
51:40saved American units
51:41from being overrun
51:42time and time again.
51:49One weapon highly valued
51:51by the crews
51:51of armored vehicles
51:52and by foot soldiers
51:54was the M79 grenade launcher
51:56called the Duper
51:57from its sound.
52:04The Duper's range
52:05was up to 250 meters
52:07and its explosive shell
52:09would kill within 15 feet
52:11of the blast.
52:12A good grenadier
52:14could hit a target
52:15the size of an open window
52:16at 100 meters
52:17and fire a shell
52:18every three or four seconds.
52:39For the South Vietnamese conscript soldier,
52:421967 had begun to show some signs
52:45that army life might become bearable.
52:48food and accommodation
52:50improved slightly.
52:54Amongst the professionals
52:55and the better units at least,
52:57confidence was high.
53:02Many officers and NCOs
53:04had been at war for years
53:05and were both tough
53:06and tactically skilled.
53:11but in spite of this,
53:13the desertion rate
53:14continued to rise.
53:20While the South Vietnamese conscript
53:23served four years,
53:24the United States Army
53:25had stuck to its policy
53:27of bringing soldiers home
53:28after one 13-month tour of duty.
53:31It was effective in preventing combat fatigue,
53:36but the decision was having
53:38a real impact on the battlefield.
53:43Units were constantly losing
53:45experienced men
53:46who were replaced by newcomers,
53:49unable to spot booby traps
53:51and ambushes
53:52and not yet used
53:54to Vietnam's punishing climate.
54:00Officers served only six months
54:02in combat
54:03and new arrivals
54:04had a very high chance
54:06of being killed or wounded.
54:08Drop back about five meters.
54:11Five meters.
54:15American combat units
54:17in the field
54:17were almost always
54:19seriously under strength.
54:21With operations running
54:22all the time
54:23and the men perpetually
54:25short of sleep,
54:26exhaustion was beginning
54:27to till on morale.
54:33So too was boredom
54:35and sometimes disillusion.
54:37Returning again and again
54:39to the same places
54:40on exhausting search-and-destroy sweeps
54:43often seemed utterly pointless.
55:11In the early autumn of 1967,
55:14as communist forces
55:15were building up
55:16for the Tet Offensive,
55:17the internal divisions
55:19that had plagued both sides
55:20throughout the war
55:21began to come to a head.
55:28In Hanoi,
55:30200 senior officers
55:31were arrested
55:32in a crackdown
55:33on opponents
55:34of the Tet strategy.
55:38In Washington,
55:40Robert McNamara,
55:41the increasingly disillusioned
55:42defense secretary,
55:44had lost the confidence
55:45of the president
55:45and would soon resign.
55:52As for Johnson himself,
55:54he faced a presidential election
55:56late in 1968,
55:58and there was already
55:59opposition from within
56:00his own Democratic Party.
56:06Meanwhile,
56:07on the streets,
56:08opposition to American
56:09involvement in Vietnam
56:10was growing more
56:12more and more vocal.
56:17As Johnson's popularity
56:19slipped to an all-time low,
56:21he clung to his belief
56:22that the public
56:23could be persuaded
56:24to back his conduct
56:25of the war.
56:31He embarked on a huge
56:33public relations campaign
56:35in which Washington
56:36and Saigon pumped out
56:37masses of information,
56:38all supporting the line
56:40that the war
56:41was being won.
56:47President Johnson
56:48toured military bases
56:50around the country
56:51and even recalled
56:52General Westmoreland
56:53from Vietnam
56:54to add his weight
56:55to the argument.
57:01Speaking to one
57:02influential gathering
57:03after another,
57:04Westmoreland assured
57:05his listeners
57:06that the end
57:07was almost in sight.
57:12What the general
57:13did not know
57:14was that halfway
57:15around the world,
57:16in the forests
57:17and mountains
57:18of South Vietnam,
57:19the first phase
57:20of the communist offensive
57:21had already begun.
57:43amongst the beast
57:43is how far
57:44has wandered
57:44had already begun.
57:44In a state
58:00existed in chéri
58:05in the wars
58:05the greatest
58:05of the people
58:05that had other
58:06From the
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