- 4 weeks ago
Two weeks into the US-Israel war on Iran, the war is already sending shockwaves across global politics and energy markets. Nailah Huda speaks with Dr Julia Roknifard from Taylor’s University and William J Jones from Mahidol University to examine whether diplomacy can still prevail and what the conflict could mean for Southeast Asia and the wider global economy.
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00:06This is Awani Global with me, Nailah Houda.
00:09Marking two weeks since the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran,
00:14the number of casualties continues to rise with at least 1,300 civilians killed in Iran
00:20and over 600 in Lebanon.
00:23While President Trump likes to claim that the war is going very well,
00:26Iran on the other hand demands recognition, reparations and guarantees against future aggression
00:33as terms for ending the war.
00:36With oil prices climbing over $100 a barrel,
00:41to what extent can the global economy, particularly in this part of the world,
00:45withstand the pressure should the war go on?
00:48Joining us to unpack some of these concerns we have,
00:51joining us today in the studio we have Dr. Julia Rognifat,
00:55Senior Lecturer at the School of Law and Governance at Taylor's University.
00:58And joining us online we have William J. Jones,
01:01Assistant Professor of International Relations at Maidal University International College.
01:06Thank you so much, Julia and William, for joining us today.
01:09Perhaps if I may start with you, Julia,
01:11coming into two weeks now since the US and Israel launched this war on Iran,
01:17do you think the end is near, as Trump would like to claim?
01:21It is the same as with the goals of this campaign, of this operation,
01:26that is hard to tell with Donald Trump,
01:29because at first it was in and out,
01:33but then as expected it didn't work out,
01:36then it was extended to two weeks and then a little bit more.
01:40Now it's 100 days already,
01:41so it's really hard to tell and some of the observers keep waiting for this point
01:46when Trump finally decides to declare victory over something and pull out,
01:51because the dissatisfaction within the United States is growing
01:54and over these unnecessary wars,
01:57since Trump has campaigned on the platform of not engaging the United States
02:01in any foreign conflict
02:03and solely taking care of the problems of his constituents.
02:09And in fact, one of the latest posts shows that in the United States,
02:13people mostly disapprove of this war.
02:16It's a narrow margin, but it's over 50% that people are quite unhappy about it.
02:24So I would say in the absence of indicators from Trump's administration,
02:29we should pay attention to some other factors.
02:33For example, the very pragmatic and mostly clearly pointed indicator
02:40of the amount of munitions that the United States have.
02:45And since the start of the war, military experts expressed that
02:48it's about four weeks that the United States can continue its engagement in the war
02:54and later on will have to pull out
02:56and probably Israel will have to retrieve as well,
02:58because it relies on the United States largely.
03:01There is also an issue of servicing the aircraft, for example,
03:08that, again, military experts assess that at most five weeks
03:14these naval carriers will have to, after five weeks,
03:16they will have to retrieve and go through quite a lengthy service.
03:19So they'll have to be replaced by something.
03:25And some of the other plans of President Trump, for example,
03:29he was planning to go and visit President Xi in about four weeks
03:33since the start of this war.
03:34So was he planning to do it so quickly
03:38and then come and be presented to Xi as a victor in this war
03:42and then negotiate further on the other issues that the two have between them.
03:46So there are indirect factors that point at the possible length of this campaign.
03:54What we know also for sure that Iran is not going to stop
03:57and it has got enough ammunition to tackle this threat.
04:01And in fact, it doesn't have to respond with a barrage of missiles.
04:05It can attack Israel and the neighboring countries with the U.S. bases sporadically.
04:11So it will require the U.S. presence.
04:16It will require the constant defense on their part.
04:19So let's see how it develops.
04:22I mean, this also ultimately goes back to the question of whether the U.S. or Israel
04:26is accomplishing whatever objective they had in mind in this war.
04:30Are they getting close or have they achieved it as, again, Trump likes to claim?
04:34Just now, President Trump declared that the United States has been succeeding
04:39and Iran's navy, the air fleet are being destroyed.
04:44There was suddenly emerging concern once again,
04:48although we thought we closed it at the June War of 2025,
04:52where Trump declared that the nuclear stockpile, Iran's nuclear program has been destroyed.
04:59At least it's what concerns this military part.
05:03But then again, within the negotiations, it became clear that, okay, Iran still kept that stockpile.
05:09It has it somewhere, enough for probably 10 bombs, 10 nuclear bombs.
05:14So there is a victory declared over destruction of some sites,
05:18although not over this particular stockpile.
05:22The leadership, we've destroyed Iran's leadership.
05:25That's what President Trump also declared.
05:27Although we are seeing there's a new supreme leader,
05:29son of the late leader Ali Khamenei, Mujtaba Khamenei,
05:33and also the replacements for the highly positioned officials,
05:37which were assassinated in the course of that.
05:40And we can see that Iran is capable, due to the dispersion of power within the military itself,
05:46even before the June War of 2025,
05:49it is capable of continuing carrying on with this military campaign.
05:54So the goal, one of the goals that we've heard from American officials,
06:01from President Trump himself, is about regime change.
06:04But by the acknowledgment of Trump himself,
06:07and what's most important, Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel,
06:12who said that, well, that's not enough for the regime change, the current campaign.
06:19We all know it would require ground forces.
06:22But what Netanyahu said, it's now not up to us, it's up to the people of Iran.
06:26I'm not sure what's this silly expectation for the people of Iran to go and attempt at a regime change
06:32right now.
06:33The current conditions, well, they are being continuously bombed.
06:37Over 3 million people were relocated within Iran,
06:41but we know little also due to the Internet blockade.
06:45So there's little information that we have from friends and colleagues on the ground.
06:50So by their own acknowledgment, if the goal was a regime change, it failed.
06:56Iran, on the other hand, has demanded, among others, recognition of its legitimate authority,
07:04reparations and guarantees against future aggression,
07:08which I guess we could say is a bit idealistic on their part.
07:11But do you think that this could potentially signal de-escalation from Iran?
07:14I think Iran is just reiterating its previous demands from the United States.
07:21And if it drags on and the dissatisfaction within the United States continues to rise,
07:28probably there are some points of it that will have to be considered.
07:32For example, pulling out American bases from the region.
07:34Iran has been raising its concern with that for quite a long time.
07:41And indeed, it saw it as a direct threat as targeting Tehran in the first place.
07:46So that would be a valid requirement.
07:48But there's also an understanding within Tehran, I'm sure,
07:52that the United States are not going to accept these terms right now.
07:56Because, again, within the nine months, we've seen the second attack on Iran,
08:02on the part of Israel and the United States,
08:04while the parties were trying to negotiate something.
08:07Although this also remains unclear right now,
08:10because if the problem was the Iran's nuclear program and the doubts over it,
08:16then the negotiations as per acknowledgement of Oman, which was the mediator,
08:21were going very well.
08:22And the parties were supposed to continue next week when the attack occurred in Vienna.
08:28And that never happened.
08:30So we can conclude here that there was never an aspiration to succeed in these negotiations.
08:36In fact, probably the attack happened because negotiations were going too well.
08:41Because to conclude an agreement with basically the regime you're trying to change,
08:47it's nonsense.
08:49So they had to go for some more radical action.
08:53Now, how do you think the other major powers have reacted to this war,
08:59particularly looking at Russia and China?
09:01I mean, we've repeatedly heard this rhetoric of an anti-Western bloc or this sort of movement.
09:07Where is it now?
09:09Both have condemned what's happening in Iran, the attack against Iran.
09:13Although now everybody is drawing attention to the fact that the two abstained in the voting
09:18on the UN resolution condemning Iran's attacks on the neighboring countries.
09:24And that probably can be tied to the fact that they suggested their mediatory services,
09:33but Iran refused until the point that the attacks stopped, which quite makes sense.
09:40And furthermore, what's interesting, the Gulf country leadership from a few Gulf countries,
09:46they started calling in order to request for the mediation to President Vladimir Putin,
09:52not apparently to Donald Trump, but probably after the attempts to talk Donald Trump into seizing the bombing of Iran
10:01failed.
10:03They fell on the only party that they thought is going to be viable,
10:08and this is a mediator, and that's Vladimir Putin.
10:11Because also, as you know, there are energy concerns involved,
10:15and Russia is going to play quite some role in trying to address this energy,
10:22in particular oil shortages in the world.
10:27For China, we've heard there was a long speech by Wang Yi,
10:31who also condemned the attacks in very strong terms.
10:37China is trying to indeed mediate,
10:40and that's why they are unwilling to aggravate a situation,
10:45to put out aggressive statements against the United States,
10:48because they are trying to cool it down.
10:51A lot of business interests are involved.
10:53China also concluded an agreement with Iran on the safe passage
10:59for the ships that are, in particular, carrying oil and other goods to China.
11:03So Iran has been, with the state of Hormuz block,
11:06Iran has been letting China to go through with it.
11:09And there must be a lot that we are not really seeing,
11:13but there are some indicators of this help rendered by Russia or China that we can observe.
11:20For example, how precisely Iran was able to target the U.S. assets in the region.
11:25In particular, and that's a very good example,
11:28there are at least two radars,
11:32this AN-TPY-2,
11:35the U.S. radars with the total cost of about,
11:38I mean, the cost per unit of about 500 million,
11:40that's a half a billion being destroyed in Jordan.
11:44And there are only 13 of such radars in the world, 13 units.
11:48So you can imagine also it will take years to rebuild it.
11:51And Iran precisely stroke those two.
11:53Iran has been striking at other objects.
11:55And the hunch is that Russia and China would supply Iran with intel,
12:01at the very least.
12:02But also with, there's been a debate on weapon supplies.
12:06I would say it's also possible,
12:10like for example, Iran supplied to Russia initially the Shahed drones,
12:14which were modified in Russia in the course of war with Ukraine.
12:18And now it wouldn't be far from the truth to imagine
12:21that Russia would be supplying the same Shaheds,
12:25which were named as Geran, back to Iran.
12:28And it's relatively cheap.
12:30And it can be used in order to overwhelm the missile defenses
12:36in the Gulf countries and Israel as well.
12:38And actually Iran has shown that it is possible.
12:41So Iran is not running short of weapons, of ammunition.
12:45It can continue for quite some time.
12:47It's just, if we can put it in the contrast
12:50between how it was done in the case of Russia, Ukraine,
12:55and now happening in Iran.
12:56In that case, the European countries,
13:01in particular the United States,
13:02they touted widely the supplies of weapons.
13:06Russia and China are choosing another path.
13:08They're just not talking about it.
13:10But it doesn't mean that they're not going to,
13:12not even as much as to help Iran,
13:15but not to try to secure their own interests.
13:18Right.
13:18I'll let you catch your breath there
13:20because we also want to make sense of some of the effects of the war
13:22much closer to home.
13:25William, what can we make of the sort of different
13:27or perhaps similar responses that we've seen
13:29from this region in Southeast Asia?
13:33We're seeing Indonesia potentially trying to step up
13:36as a potential mediator.
13:38Thailand, on the other hand,
13:39is summoning Iran's ambassador.
13:42What do you think?
13:44So, broadly speaking, with countries here in ASEAN,
13:47I don't think there's any countries with sort of the,
13:52how should we say, sort of power or footprint
13:55to insert themselves.
13:57That's kind of point number one.
13:59Maybe number two is,
14:00I don't see any ASEAN country as having
14:06core interest per se
14:08to get involved in the nature of this
14:11extremely, extremely dangerous conflict.
14:15I just don't see that sort of happening
14:17in terms of stepping up to provide
14:19sort of a leadership or mediation role,
14:23especially with regards to America,
14:26its allies, sort of Europe or sort of Israel.
14:30This is definitely a great power issue.
14:34It will be settled by the great power sort of UDA.
14:39We do know the foreign ministers of ASEAN
14:42will be convening a special meeting
14:44to discuss the bloc's response.
14:46They've also released a rather short statement recently.
14:50I guess with what you said,
14:52should we just expect their usual cautious diplomacy
14:55or do you think that this could be a potential
14:59or an opportunity for the bloc to push
15:01for a stronger stance?
15:03No, we should definitely expect the same.
15:08I don't foresee sort of ASEAN collectively
15:12coming to a position that would be forceful.
15:16Again, you know, there's a number of reasons for this,
15:18whether it's, you know,
15:20sort of their position towards America,
15:22their position towards China
15:25and kind of the singularity, let's say,
15:28of the energy issue.
15:31It's just far too dangerous, you know,
15:34to get involved with something like such.
15:36How do you think this would affect perceptions
15:39and sentiment in the region?
15:41We know ASEAN has tried to maintain
15:43this sort of hedging strategy.
15:45Could this potentially tip the balance for ASEAN?
15:49In terms of ASEAN sort of as a whole,
15:53I don't think so.
15:54I think we would have to kind of break it down by,
15:57or break it down sort of at the country level.
16:01If we speak in broad terms,
16:03I think by this point now,
16:07there would be three kind of guiding understandings
16:12of ASEAN leaders towards America under Trump, too.
16:17And this is concern about the unpredictability
16:25of the Trump administration
16:26from day to day, week to week, month to month.
16:31With regard to the previous presenters
16:34sort of comments,
16:38perhaps a feeling of untrustworthiness.
16:41The conflict here was the second
16:43within the last year,
16:46where you had diplomacy,
16:48active diplomacy taking place
16:49while, you know,
16:52strikes were being planned and then undertaken.
16:55And then with regard to just how violent
16:58this last war,
17:00the ongoing conflict is,
17:02perhaps the dangerousness,
17:07if I could,
17:09about this partnership
17:11and sort of alliance
17:12sort of that many countries have with America.
17:15The unpredictability,
17:17the instability with regard to tariffs,
17:20trade policy, security policy,
17:22and now, of course,
17:24the effects which are going to hit the region
17:25with regards to energy security
17:28and inflation.
17:30Julia, maybe you have your thoughts on this.
17:32Could this moment be significant enough
17:35to shift perceptions in the region?
17:38Of Donald Trump and the US?
17:41Yes, for sure.
17:42I think I totally agree
17:45with what William just said.
17:47And also, we should draw in the tariffs,
17:49in particular,
17:50this uncertainty,
17:54the difficulty in negotiating
17:56something with the United States.
17:57And at the same time,
17:58we should pay attention to that
17:59Trump just took a hit from within,
18:02which ASEAN did not escape
18:04attention of ASEAN countries
18:06that the Supreme Court
18:08within the United States
18:10stroked down
18:11his tariff decisions,
18:12his tariff policies.
18:13So, within ASEAN countries,
18:16I think there is a sense of
18:18emboldened towards that
18:19since they were trying to negotiate so hard,
18:23we did so much
18:24trying to receive Donald Trump over here
18:26and please him.
18:27And now, wow, look,
18:28it seems like we don't have to
18:30even abide by it.
18:31And the perception of the United States
18:34within the region,
18:35especially in Muslim-majority communities,
18:37was already not as great
18:41since, at the very least,
18:43since the start of the...
18:45the 7th of October in 2023,
18:48and whatever ensued,
18:49the attacks on Gaza,
18:51there have been a lot of rallying,
18:54and even today that we're talking,
18:55it's a good stay,
18:56the last Friday of Ramadan,
18:57and people are out there,
19:00in particular,
19:00in Jalan Tundrazaq,
19:01in Kuala Lumpur,
19:02in front of the U.S. Embassy,
19:05expressing their protests.
19:06And it exacerbated throughout time,
19:10especially if we look at
19:12how also the hypocrisy
19:14was compounding over hypocrisy.
19:17So first,
19:18people were comparing,
19:19including here in ASEAN,
19:20were comparing the treatment
19:21by the international political establishment
19:25and the media
19:26and the coverage of the conflicts
19:28between Russia, Ukraine,
19:29and then Gaza,
19:30what happened in Palestine.
19:31And now, once again,
19:33what is happening against Iran,
19:35where Iran is being largely,
19:40on the part of the Western world,
19:42being condemned
19:43for aggression against it.
19:45And it's being called out
19:48for aggression
19:48on the neighboring countries
19:50and on Israel,
19:51while it was the other way around.
19:54So people here looking at it,
19:56including the political elites,
19:58are continuing to
20:00reassure themselves
20:02that the strategy
20:02of hedging their bets
20:03was the right one
20:04between the U.S. and China.
20:06And it could also push them
20:08to lean towards China
20:10since this dilemma is always here.
20:14The image of the United States
20:17under Donald Trump,
20:18in particular,
20:19in the light of this
20:19latest aggression against Iran,
20:22yes, it's going to take a hit.
20:25We also want to look at
20:26some of the economic impact.
20:28Iran's new supreme leader
20:29has asserted that
20:30the Strait of Hormuz
20:32will remain closed
20:33as a tool of pressure.
20:34Iran's warning that
20:35oil prices could also
20:36potentially reach $200 a barrel.
20:39William, how do you think
20:40Southeast Asia's economy
20:43would cope
20:44should this war prolong,
20:45should the Strait of Hormuz
20:47remain closed?
20:48What are some of the countries
20:49that you think
20:50are at most risk?
20:52It depends on the country
20:53of the question.
20:55In particular,
20:56their strategic reserves,
20:57how much they have on hand
20:59and their ability
21:00to tap into,
21:02you know,
21:03sort of different suppliers.
21:05And of course,
21:06this varies.
21:06So you get countries
21:07like Indonesia,
21:09Malaysia,
21:10which have their own
21:11domestic basis of supply,
21:13but they can also reach out
21:16to sort of other producers
21:17and partners.
21:19Thailand, perhaps,
21:20less modest.
21:21We'll be looking at perhaps
21:23sort of 60 to 90 days.
21:25So this is manageable,
21:27perhaps,
21:28sort of in the short term.
21:29And of course,
21:30the government is planning
21:32to find other sources,
21:34alternative sources.
21:35But there are a few countries
21:37in particular
21:37that are acutely at risk
21:42that have very,
21:44very short supplies.
21:45In particular,
21:46these would be
21:48Cambodia,
21:50Laos,
21:52and perhaps
21:52sort of the Philippines
21:53to a lesser extent.
21:56I think for these countries,
21:57it is quite dangerous
22:00in terms of
22:01their energy security,
22:03food,
22:03but then also
22:05inflation,
22:06trying to find a way
22:06out of this.
22:08Of course,
22:09they can always tap
22:09into
22:11sort of other
22:13ASEAN partners
22:14such as Singapore,
22:15which has very,
22:16very wide,
22:16broad
22:17sort of
22:20networks abroad.
22:22But again,
22:24this is
22:24tenuous
22:26and dangerous.
22:28Julia earlier
22:29mentioned
22:30about tariffs
22:31and with
22:32President Trump's plate
22:34looking rather full
22:35with Iran,
22:37do you think
22:37that this could
22:38provide some relief
22:39for Southeast Asian countries
22:41that are prioritizing
22:43more economic issues,
22:44particularly to do
22:45with the tariffs?
22:46Do you think
22:46that this provides
22:47relief for them
22:48that Trump might
22:49not be
22:51prioritizing tariffs
22:52on top of his agenda
22:53right now,
22:54William?
22:55With tariffs,
22:57I don't think anyone
22:58can breathe a sigh
22:59of relief.
23:01I mean,
23:02President Trump
23:02basically on the day
23:04of the Supreme Court
23:05verdict
23:06just brushed it off
23:07and then instituted
23:09various other means.
23:11Recently,
23:12I think,
23:12just as soon
23:14as yesterday,
23:14the day before,
23:16more measures
23:17via,
23:17you know,
23:18Section 301.
23:19So we're looking
23:20at other
23:21measures
23:22which are tariff
23:23and non-tariff
23:24related.
23:25So,
23:27you know,
23:28this just goes back
23:29to unpredictability
23:31leading to
23:32acute instability
23:33and the inability
23:35to,
23:37you know,
23:38plan it
23:38in meaningful respect.
23:40I think there were
23:41some ASEAN members
23:42such as
23:43Cambodia,
23:44Indonesia,
23:46which took part
23:47or indicated
23:49they would take part
23:50in Trump's
23:51Board of Peace
23:52hopefully to
23:54hedge against this,
23:55you know,
23:55by moving closer
23:56to the President
23:57or,
23:57you know,
23:58staying within
23:59his good graces
24:01regardless of,
24:02you know,
24:03the legitimacy
24:04of said proposals.
24:07But with,
24:08you know,
24:09what Julia said,
24:10you know,
24:10with what's going on
24:11in Iran,
24:12you know,
24:13the Muslim population,
24:14you know,
24:14just how
24:16egregious this is,
24:18you know,
24:18a violation
24:18of international law
24:20and how Trump
24:20just brushes
24:21these norms off,
24:23you know,
24:23sort of openly
24:24by,
24:24you know,
24:24stating,
24:25you know,
24:26international law
24:26just doesn't concern me
24:29and I'm not worried
24:30about it.
24:31These are all
24:33compounding
24:34sort of issues,
24:35you know,
24:35that go against
24:37ASEAN leaders,
24:38norms,
24:39sensibilities,
24:40and just basic
24:43international governance.
24:45So no,
24:46I don't see
24:47any of this
24:48bringing any
24:49degree or measure
24:50of relief
24:51to ASEAN
24:54leaderships.
24:55We have just
24:56a couple minutes left
24:57but Julia,
24:58I do want to
24:58pick your brain
24:59on Iran's
25:00new supreme leader.
25:01What can we expect?
25:02I mean,
25:03I think there were
25:03a few doubts
25:04about whether
25:04Iran's regime
25:06can withstand,
25:07can survive
25:08this sort of pressure
25:08but it seems that
25:09they are most likely
25:11to come out of this
25:11and potentially gain
25:13even more legitimacy
25:14or stability.
25:15What can we make
25:16of the new leadership?
25:17I think even
25:19in the Western press
25:19we saw the messages
25:21that Iranian regime
25:22is pretty steady
25:24so it didn't fall.
25:25That's why the aims
25:26of the operation
25:27were not achieved
25:28at least on this one.
25:30Mojtabakh Khamenei
25:31was considered
25:32a potential successor
25:34and I think
25:34the most likely successor
25:35for quite some time
25:36although his figure
25:39was covered
25:40with secrecy
25:41so we didn't know
25:42much about him
25:43but what was expected
25:45happened
25:45and he's well known
25:47for having direct ties
25:49with the Revolutionary Guards
25:52with the RGC
25:53and this is why
25:54he's no doubt
25:55is tightly involved
25:57in decision making
25:58over this war
26:00or the response
26:01to the attacks
26:02and also he's known
26:04as a more radical,
26:06more hardline figure
26:07so we could even expect
26:09instead
26:10or as opposed
26:11to the expectations
26:12of the regime change
26:14a more harder regime
26:17in place
26:17instead of the one
26:19that was under
26:20Ali Khamenei.
26:21So I guess
26:23we should expect
26:24and that also goes
26:25in line with
26:26strategic considerations
26:27Iran is going to
26:28continue responding
26:29to the attacks
26:30as long as it's got
26:31ammunition
26:32and it has them
26:35and at least for now
26:37also the general sense
26:38the general logic
26:39tell us that
26:40Iran is not going
26:41to trust the United States
26:42unless first of all
26:44the bombing stops
26:46and then it's probably
26:48going to request
26:49for some more concessions
26:50like pulling out
26:51at least some
26:52of the US bases
26:52in the region.
26:53Yeah, plenty more
26:55of course we'd like
26:55to discuss
26:56but that is all
26:56the time that we have.
26:57Thank you so much
26:58Julia and William
26:59for joining us
26:59on Awani Global
27:01and of course stay tuned
27:02to Astro Awani
27:03as we continue
27:03to bring more developments
27:04on the Iran war.
27:06That's all on Awani Global
27:07this week with me
27:08Nala Odaq
27:08we'll catch you next time.
27:31We'll catch you next time.
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