- há 23 minutos
Decision-makers from Israel, the Arab states, Russia and the US tell the inside story of the Arab-Israel conflict. Charts the evolution of tensions, violence and peace efforts from 1948 to 1998.
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00:01A guerra na guerra não trouxe a solução para todos os problemas de esta parte do Middle East.
00:07Egypt, por exemplo, declara que ela não vai abrir o Suez Canal
00:11até que Israel entrega o território que ela conquistou,
00:14que os israelis não estão preparados para fazer.
00:19Israel's novo Prime Minister, Mrs. Golda Meier,
00:22visita troops no Sinaí deserto,
00:23não tão longe do Suez Canal, onde as caixas continuam a fly.
00:27Ele queria uma chance de conversar e falar com os homens
00:29que estavam vivendo face-to-face com a realidade da situação do Middle East.
01:03The death of President Gamal Abdel Nasser,
01:06after 18 years in power,
01:09devastated Egypt
01:10and the entire Arab world.
01:17His successor,
01:19Vice President Anwar Sadat,
01:21was considered little more than a caretaker.
01:40The funeral was a grand family occasion
01:43for the leaders of the Arab states
01:45and Nasser's Soviet allies.
01:47Nasser had severed relations with America,
01:50so the representative from Washington
01:52expected to be ignored.
01:54Then a soldier came into the room,
01:58weaving his way through the crowd.
02:01Apparently, it turned out heading for me.
02:05The soldier led the American away,
02:07out of sight of the world's press
02:09and the watchful eye of the KGB.
02:23We went down the stairs.
02:26The lower floor
02:27was darkened
02:30and propped up in the hospital bed
02:32was the man who had just inherited
02:37the presidency of Egypt.
02:40President Sadat was resting behind the scenes
02:43after apparently suffering from heat stroke.
02:46He held out his hand to me.
02:48It was cold and rather clammy.
02:51He said that he wanted to take advantage
02:54of the opportunity to turn a new page
02:57in the relationship between our countries.
03:02The next day,
03:03Sadat was sufficiently recovered
03:05to organise a photo opportunity
03:07for the American media.
03:09The United States provide Israel
03:12from the loaf of bread
03:13to the phantom
03:14to the even deficit in the budget itself.
03:18So, it is the vein of life.
03:21The vein of life for Israel
03:23goes from the United States.
03:26Sadat wanted the Americans
03:28to help him get back the Sinai Desert,
03:30the Egyptian land
03:32Israel had seized in the Six-Day War.
03:36In the three years since the war,
03:38Israel had established
03:39a formidable defence line
03:41along the Suez Canal,
03:42close to the heart of Egypt.
03:59The canal had been closed
04:00since the Six-Day War.
04:04Sadat now proposed that
04:06if Israel moved back
04:07a few miles from the canal,
04:09he would reopen it,
04:11even to ships trading with Israel.
04:16Sadat's proposal
04:17was designed to appeal
04:19to the minority
04:19in the Israeli cabinet,
04:21including war hero Moshe Dayan,
04:23who believed the Sinai
04:25should eventually
04:26be returned to Egypt.
04:29What we say
04:30is that we sit there
04:32just because the war is going on.
04:34But once you agree
04:35to make peace agreement,
04:36we don't think
04:37that we should sit
04:37on your Suez Canal.
04:40But his Prime Minister
04:41was not an advocate
04:43of trading land for peace.
04:45You want the Golan Heights?
04:48Do you want East Jerusalem?
04:51Do you want Gaza Strip?
04:53And do you want Sinai?
04:59In Washington,
05:01President Nixon
05:01looked for the right person
05:03to urge Sadat's proposal
05:04on Golda Meir.
05:05He chose Joe Sisko.
05:08I can recall the words
05:10to this day.
05:11He said,
05:11Joe,
05:12press Golda,
05:14press her hard,
05:16but don't cause
05:18a major Donnybrook
05:20between Israel
05:22and the United States.
05:28But by the time
05:29Joe Sisko arrived in Israel,
05:31the Prime Minister
05:32had cracked the whip
05:33over her cabinet rebels.
05:34Golda Meir took it
05:36upon herself
05:37to do all of the talking.
05:39It was interesting
05:40to see everyone here,
05:43all the ministers,
05:44nobody opening their mouth.
05:45What they did
05:46to release their attention
05:48was sending little notes
05:49to each other.
05:50I sent Daryanichet saying,
05:52listen, Moshe,
05:53I think we can get you
05:54some support.
05:55He said back
05:56a very abrupt reply,
05:59saying,
06:00sarcastically,
06:01thank you very much.
06:02But if Golda is not for this,
06:04then I'm not for it either.
06:06Sisko saw that something
06:07was happening,
06:08that nobody was supposed
06:09to speak there,
06:11and so he was
06:12a very smart negotiator.
06:15He asked the Prime Minister
06:17whether he's permitted
06:18to ask the Minister of Defense
06:19one question,
06:21a professional question.
06:22So what could she say?
06:24I said to him,
06:26Mr. Minister,
06:27if we don't do anything,
06:29what do you think
06:30is going to happen?
06:31Daryanichet said,
06:32well,
06:34I cannot imagine
06:35that any government
06:37will tolerate
06:40indefinitely
06:40a situation
06:41where a strong army
06:43is poised
06:43at the gates
06:44of its capital.
06:45He was exaggerating.
06:46after all our forces
06:48where it's a distance
06:50of more than
06:51100 kilometres
06:52from Cairo,
06:52and this will lead
06:54to war.
06:56The Prime Minister
06:57was unmoved,
06:59but Joe Sisko
07:01kept trying.
07:02The next day,
07:04I walked up
07:05with these flowers,
07:07rather gingerly,
07:09and she said to me,
07:11oh, Joe,
07:12now you're saying
07:14it with flowers.
07:15It won't do you any good.
07:22In Cairo,
07:23Israel's rebuff
07:24almost brought about
07:25the downfall
07:26of the man
07:27who had proposed
07:27the initiative,
07:28Anwar Sadat.
07:30So he tried a tactic
07:31more likely
07:32to win Arab support.
07:55I thought of Sadat
07:56as a character
07:57out of Aida.
07:59I didn't take him
08:00seriously.
08:00He kept making
08:03grandiloquent pronouncements.
08:04He never acted on them.
08:05So I frankly
08:07thought he was bluffing.
08:11In fact,
08:12Kissinger was too
08:13preoccupied with the war
08:14in Vietnam
08:15to give the Middle East
08:16his attention,
08:17even when,
08:18in another Egyptian zigzag,
08:21the first substantial
08:22Arab peace offer
08:23arrived from Sadat.
08:26He wanted Israel
08:28to return
08:28to the 67 borders
08:30in return
08:31for which
08:31Egypt would be
08:33willing to make peace,
08:34which was a big step
08:35because no Arab state
08:37had as yet ever
08:38flatly said
08:39that they would
08:41make peace.
08:43We were in no position
08:45to handle that.
09:08Sadat drew the obvious
09:09conclusion.
09:10If it required a crisis
09:11to make Washington intervene,
09:13he would have to create one.
09:16to make a peace
09:17of the Middle East
09:18and the other
09:19forces
09:19to make peace.
09:20In the
09:20the President of the
09:21President,
09:22there was a
09:22Al-Giza.
09:23He said that we
09:24don't think
09:25there will be a
09:26peace.
09:27And the peace
09:28of the peace
09:29of the peace
09:29is
09:29meaning
09:29that it is
09:30the peace.
09:31And I'm not
09:31willing to make
09:33peace.
09:35The peace
09:35of the peace
09:36is the peace.
09:38Se eles derrotaram 10 centímetros de canaães e derrotaram com eles, eu posso fazer todos os que podem ser filmados.
09:49President Sadat then proposed a secret alliance with President Assad of Syria.
09:55They agreed to organize a joint attack on Israel.
10:04Os primeiros primeiros saíram para alexandria, para encontrar seus companheiros de Egipto.
10:09Eu viajamos para a Rússia, com a humanidade.
10:14Eu viajamos para a cruzada, com a cruzada, com a cruzada, com o nome de Jamal Hassan.
10:28Once they arrived, they kept up the subterfuge.
10:53Between dips in the hotel pool,
10:55the generals discussed the plans for their joint attack
10:58and came up with a clever idea for the date.
11:14The Syrians' aim was to recapture the Golan Heights,
11:17taken from them in the Six-Day War.
11:20To keep Israel's troops tied down,
11:23they needed Egypt's forces to advance right across the Sinai.
11:27But the Egyptians had their own plan
11:30to limit their advance to territory they could protect
11:33with their anti-aircraft missiles.
11:47Egypt's chief of staff urged his president to stick to their own plan.
11:53After that, they said,
11:54let's do a plan.
11:56In order for the Syrians,
11:58we did a plan for the development of the Syrians
12:02only to be recognized for the Syrians.
12:24The Syrians fell for it.
12:27But it would be harder to fool the enemy.
12:30Somehow the Egyptians would have to cross the Suez Canal
12:33right under the gaze of Israeli troops.
12:37Among the few units were 172 meters.
12:37In the distance between my sisters was 180 meters.
12:42I saw their own plan,
12:43and I saw them.
12:48How are they?
12:52How are they at least?
12:54I have to be careful.
12:58In the spirit of Israel,
13:16Os Estados Unidos e Assyria foram preocupados por um inimigo que os Estados Unidos e os Estados Unidos
13:35...como through northern Jordan.
13:39In the final analysis, I assured them that as far as we were concerned,
13:45no one is going to use our country to attack anyone.
13:50King Hussein smelt a rout.
13:52The last time Egypt and Syria had manoeuvred him into a war with Israel,
13:56he had ended up losing a large slice of his kingdom.
14:03So he flew off alone.
14:05Telling no one he was going to meet the enemy, Prime Minister Golda Meir.
14:12I was very concerned and worried that a state of no peace and no war
14:16was going to end us up in serious difficulty.
14:20The main issue that was held in the meeting by Hussein Mellech Yerden
14:25was the possibility of a fight against Syria in the attack of Israel.
14:31The Prime Minister received the king alone.
14:34But the head of Israeli intelligence, listening to the tape,
14:38heard her dismiss the king's warning as the latest in a series of false alarms.
14:57She was pretty, uh, formidable, pretty, uh, adamant in terms of her position.
15:06The Prime Minister refused to cancel any engagements.
15:13Israel took no action.
15:20The war was the day of the 6th of October.
15:22And on the day of the day of the day, I went to the visit that I gave it,
15:24and I took it to the north side of the channel,
15:27and I found out that there was nothing to say that the enemy
15:32felt the war with the war.
15:34I was very happy.
15:35Muito bem.
15:36Depois que eu saí, eu disse ao Presidente,
15:38até que eles não saíram, eles não saíram.
15:41Não foi até o dia próximo dia,
15:47que muitos jovens estavam preparando para ir para a synagogue para Yom Kipur,
15:51que a inteligência de Israel finalmente se convidou
15:54que a Israel e a Syria iriam atacar,
15:57dentro de horas.
16:02Os israelis ouviram a call to arms no radio
16:05e dos rabbis em suas synagogues.
16:11À 2 p.m., as civilians estavam reporting for duty,
16:16Egypt opened fire.
16:35A thingyeles pediu o que foram atitudes para a ellos.
16:39Os guerras foram atitudes,
16:41eles foram atitudes de todo o time,
16:45e eles foram atitudes do que menor que o time na Virgem.
16:46E eles foram atitudes do que,
16:47que foi apesar disso,
16:47que eles foram atitudes de que o quão o time,
16:51e que assim,
16:51que eles foram atitudes do mundo.
16:53E isso é isso,
16:57o volume do mundo,
16:58At 6 o'clock, I told my people, my forces, felicitations.
17:04The Israelis have lost their balance.
17:12Sadat's armies drove the Israelis from the Suez Canal.
17:17Israel's air force tried to retaliate,
17:21but failed to break through Egypt's missile cover.
17:29The Egyptians advanced 12 kilometers into the Sinai
17:33and stopped inside their missile cover, as planned.
17:38In the north, Syria's attack also caught Israel off balance.
17:44600 Syrian tanks rolled over Israel's defenses
17:47and across the Golan Heights.
17:58We weren't ready today.
18:00We came from the home, in the middle of Yom Kippur.
18:06So who was here?
18:07That was regular soldiers?
18:08Yes, only in the middle.
18:11So they must have had a hard time?
18:13Oh yeah, very hard.
18:15Did you have many casualties?
18:16Well, with such things, we don't know.
18:19It's not allowed to talk about them.
18:54Israel's defeat appeared imminent.
18:57But on the fourth day, the Syrians ran into large Israeli forces.
19:03Israel had been able to divert these troops to the Syrian front
19:06because the Egyptian army had halted.
19:12Syria's president demanded to know
19:14why the Egyptians were not advancing through the Sinai, as agreed.
19:30Syria appealed over Sadat's head
19:33to the superpower that was still Egypt's patron.
19:36The Soviet prime minister came to Cairo to sort things out.
20:05President Sadat yielded to Soviet pressure
20:08and gave the order to advance,
20:10much to the dismay of his chief of staff.
20:14They were responsible for the failure before they were able to do it.
20:19It was not only for the fire and the fire and the fire,
20:26but also for the failure.
20:29Now, the battle began to swing Israel's way.
20:38In three hours, they destroyed 250 Egyptian tanks.
20:44But Egypt still had two armies in the Sinai.
20:49The Israelis planned a daring coup.
20:51They set out to cut through the gap in the Egyptian lines,
20:55create a bridgehead over the canal
20:57and sweep around to isolate the Egyptian third army.
21:04The architect of the plan was General Ariel Sharon.
21:36The U.S. Army
21:38Uma vez mais tarde,
21:41eu me envia os membros da câncer
21:44para a câncer.
21:46O próximo dia,
21:48os forças rascam ao canal
21:50para segurar o câncer.
21:52Eu fiquei realmente sobre a terra.
21:54Nós vimos a câncer,
21:56a câncer,
21:57a câncer,
21:59a câncer,
22:00e a câncer.
22:03Eu me senti muito bem.
22:10Israel's troops
22:11were now only ours
22:13from Cairo.
22:15President Sadat
22:16begged the Soviets
22:17to arrange a ceasefire.
22:20The Israelis crossed
22:22the canal
22:23and about 24 hours later
22:25we got a message from
22:28Brezhnev
22:29inviting me
22:30to come to Moscow.
22:32both sides
22:33believed
22:34that the Kissinger's
22:36in Moscow
22:37could help
22:38to remove
22:39the pressure
22:39that existed
22:41in this conflict.
22:43We thought it would
22:45give the Israelis
22:46more time
22:47if I went to Moscow
22:49because nothing could happen
22:50until I got there.
22:52while I was in the air
22:54Nixon sent a message
22:56directly to Brezhnev
22:57saying that I was
22:59fully authorized
22:59to conclude
23:00but I frankly
23:01wanted to stall.
23:03The Soviets
23:04were in such a hurry
23:05to end the fighting
23:06that General Secretary
23:08Brezhnev
23:08led the talks
23:09with Kissinger
23:10himself.
23:12and he said
23:13that he had to stop
23:13the war
23:15and he said
23:17that he had to stop
23:19the war
23:19and he said
23:20and that he had to stop
23:21the war
23:21and that he had to stop
23:24the war
23:24I told Brezhnev
23:27I would
23:28carefully
23:29communicate
23:29everything he said
23:30to Washington
23:31but that there had to be
23:32some time interval
23:34so that I could get
23:35the President's
23:36views
23:37and he said
23:39no here's
23:40a message
23:41and he gave me
23:43power of attorney
23:44that in effect
23:46power of attorney
23:46that the President
23:47had given me
23:49which did not
23:50thrill me.
23:52The Secretary of State
23:53realized
23:54he could stall
23:54no longer.
23:55There and then
23:57in Moscow
23:57he agreed terms
23:59for a ceasefire.
24:02He need not have
24:03worried.
24:04It was another
24:05five days
24:06before the Israelis
24:07halted their advance.
24:14a day
24:14later
24:15the opposing
24:15generals met
24:16in the desert
24:17to work out
24:17how to disentangle
24:18their forces.
24:21It was the first
24:22formal meeting
24:23of Egyptian
24:23and Israeli officers
24:25for 25 years.
24:29Then
24:29we brought
24:31a coffee
24:32and I told him
24:32I'm not worried.
24:34We brought
24:34anything else
24:35and I'm not worried.
24:37Then
24:37the world
24:38is cold
24:38and you don't have
24:39anything.
24:40You don't have
24:40anything.
24:40You don't have
24:44It was a week
24:51before the Egyptian
24:52general
24:52began to relax.
24:54We came out
24:55and we went
24:57out
24:57and we were
24:57standing
24:58on the ground
24:59and we went
25:01on the ground
25:02on the ground
25:02and we went
25:03on the ground.
25:06Then
25:07when I was
25:08on the ground
25:09on the ground
25:10of the people
25:11I told him
25:12I was
25:14first
25:14to prevent
25:15the
25:16rise
25:17and
25:17the way
25:19is
25:20that you
25:21will
25:22A gente descaria da cidade,
25:25para uma cidade de São Paulo,
25:27a cidade de São Paulo
25:28é a cidade de São Paulo
25:28e a gente vai voltar
25:30a cair do que os cairos.
25:33A gente atuou a partir de uma cidade
25:36e disse que foi assim
25:37e foi tudo bem
25:38e foi uma viva de resultado
25:40pela nossa nossa relação.
25:44...
25:44...
25:44...
25:44...
25:44...
25:46...
25:47O que é isso?
25:51O que é isso?
25:52O que é isso?
25:55O que é isso?
25:58Mas Siddat quer mais do que desigualdade.
26:05Ele queria o Sinai.
26:07Então, então, ele voltou para os Estados Unidos.
26:12Ele veio em uniformidade e disse,
26:15eu preciso fazer um planejamento.
26:16Eu concordi fazer um shuttle e fazer isso rápido.
26:20E ele disse que ele ia fazer concessões para fazer isso possível.
26:24O secretário de Estado decidiu que a forma de ir para todos os partidos
26:29para uma conferência de uma conferência em Geneva.
26:31Eu nunca pensava que você ia kissar uma mulher.
26:35O que os Estados Unidos e os Estados Unidos decidiu fazer a conferência.
26:39Eu lembro que ela estava com ela.
26:43O que é isso?
26:45O que é isso?
26:49O que é isso?
26:49Eu vi acreditava que era impossível.
26:51Mas ele me recebeu com muita polícia e desigualdade.
26:55E eu disse, você sabe, é incrível.
26:57Eles são todos os que me dizem de ser tão difícil.
27:00Então, todos os que eu fiz, ele disse que eu soube, eu soube, e ele disse que eu soube, ele
27:06disse que eu soube.
27:07Ele disse que ele soube, ele disse que ele soube.
27:10Eu me disse que ele era muito mais confiante.
27:12E eu disse, se você tem algo que eu deveria perguntar, mas eu não.
27:16Ele disse, sim, você não perguntou se eu vou para a conferência.
27:19Eu disse, você? Ele disse, não.
27:24Kissinger did have some success.
27:26He talked the rival armies back to their pre-war positions.
27:36But Sadat had still not got back Egypt's lost land.
27:41So he pursued with new vigour the Arab demand for a comprehensive peace.
27:47Israel must move on all the front.
27:51The Egyptian front, the Syrian front, the Jordanian front, the Palestinian front.
28:00Sadat embraced the cause that lay at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
28:06The Palestinians demand for their own state.
28:10You see, we are cooperating together.
28:12And as we have mentioned,
28:16there are three partners.
28:22Egyptians, Syrians and the Palestinians.
28:28Two years later, Israel's voters set back Arab hopes.
28:33They elected a leader even more determined than his predecessors
28:37to hold on to land occupied by Israel.
28:41What occupied territories?
28:43If you mean Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip,
28:46they are liberated territories.
28:49They are part, an integral part,
28:52of the land of Israel.
28:58The new prime minister was godfather to the first Israeli boy
29:02born in Hebron, on the West Bank.
29:07He made the building of settlements
29:08the first priority of his government.
29:11Settlements like the new town of Yamit,
29:13where 5,000 Jews lived,
29:16in the Sinai.
29:20This was not a man Sadat would find it easy to do business with.
29:25Sadat is an implacable enemy of Israel.
29:29This is also the truth.
29:30He is no fool, but he is an enemy.
29:41Sadat's response would write his name indelibly
29:44into the history books.
29:47He announced he would make a keynote speech
29:49to the Egyptian parliament.
29:51He invited the leader of the PLO to attend.
29:55Arafat was happy to be in the parliament,
29:58and he was happy that Sadat is paying attention
30:00to the Palestinian problem.
30:02Sadat then abtعد an alwaraq al-maktoub
30:05wabtada yikellim min damaughuh,
30:07kalam akhar.
30:09Fana ulte alwazir al-khargiyya,
30:13Ismaeim Fahmi,
30:14al-zahir huwa hirmi qumbula dilwati,
30:17wa qumbula siasiyya.
30:19Seven years of frustration
30:21boiled up in Sadat.
30:23He had tried everything.
30:25Now he broke the final Arab taboo.
30:40The idea that Sadat intended to go alone
30:43to meet the enemy
30:45was too much
30:46for most of his audience
30:47to take in.
31:05Sadat had put the ball firmly
31:07in Israel's court.
31:10At first,
31:12Prime Minister Begin did not respond.
31:15Sadat told me that if Begin
31:18will take his time and receive it,
31:20he will be able to go to Jerusalem
31:21already in the next week.
31:24The next day,
31:25the Prime Minister
31:26was hosting a lunch
31:27at the Hilton Hotel.
31:29The Prime Minister
31:30of CBS CBS
31:31in the United States
31:31who wanted his reaction
31:32to Begin.
31:33He was in the midst
31:34of the Maraq
31:35on the Prime Minister.
31:37He said to him
31:38what he should say.
31:39He said,
31:40''Okay,
31:40I will convince Sadat
31:42to the next day.''
31:43Ladies and gentlemen, I hereby invite President Sadat on behalf of the government of Israel
31:50to come to Jerusalem and to start negotiations to establish permanent peace between Israel and Egypt.
32:02Before accepting the invitation, Sadat flew to Syria
32:06to persuade President Assad that his trip to Jerusalem would not be a betrayal of the Arab cause.
32:13We asked the President to take the decision to take the decision to take the decision to take the decision
32:18to take the decision to take the decision and not travel to Egypt.
32:21But the President saw Sadat as his guest and preferred to hear him out first.
32:28The President tried to take the decision to take the decision to take the decision.
32:34He told me it will be proof that you are wrong.
32:37I said very well, Assad.
32:39This is a sacred mission for me.
32:43And if this is going to be the last mission as a President, I shall be very happy to fulfill
32:49it.
32:58Assad's ministers urged him to act.
33:00The Presidential Guard was standing by.
33:04The President didn't agree.
33:05He said that this is not the Arab culture and the Arab culture.
33:11President Sadat returned safely to Egypt.
33:14Three days later, he set off for Jerusalem.
33:18As the officer, the government should be responsible for them.
33:23As a Prime Minister role, there is a lot of internal resources around the President's' world."
33:27king of the United States
33:29He had to appear for 40 years.
33:29He had to find them with him.
33:32He had to come to them.
33:33He had to come in the right hand.
33:34So that I should think,
33:35I should think about the all of these things that were not perfect for us.
33:45E aí
34:28Quando chegamos em Tel Aviv,
34:31foi como eu chegava para o espaço.
34:35Isso significa algo completamente novo.
34:39Eu me encontrei em um carro,
34:41sentindo com Moshi Dayan,
34:43e eu tenho que saber como começar uma conversa.
34:47E eu lio em livro que eu estava interessado em arqueologia.
34:51Então eu mencionei que eu estava interessado em arqueologia.
34:55E nós começamos a falar sobre arqueologia.
34:58O que é isso?
35:14O que é isso?
35:16O que é isso?
35:17O que é isso?
35:21Siddhar offered peace, but he was careful not to abandon the other Arab states or the
35:27Palestinians.
36:12The visitors went from the Knesset to a dinner in their honor.
36:18It was a kind of dinner where there was not much talk.
36:23The atmosphere was cool.
36:26The president and Mr. Begin were not going to be able to do the conversation with Mr. Begin.
36:36And of course, on the trip, I thought that I would be able to visit Ezer Weisman and
36:43he came to the hospital after that.
36:48Mustafa Khalil told me, we have to do something, otherwise the whole trip will be without any
36:55follow up.
36:56What about having a meeting together?
36:59I say, no objection.
37:07I want to enter directly in the process and mentioning what are the problems of Cairo
37:15today and the problems of Egypt.
37:18And this is why we need peace.
37:33I say the solution is this direct talk with the leadership of Israel and through this direct
37:40talk, direct contact, everything will be solved.
37:48It wasn't that simple.
37:52After the trip to Jerusalem, the two sides continued to talk for seven months.
38:03But Begin would not give an inch.
38:07Sadat confided in the new president of the United States.
38:11Sadat felt that the peace process, instead of having been moved forward, had actually been
38:17almost terminated by a fruitless gesture to go to Jerusalem.
38:22So he was quite discouraged.
38:24I asked President Carter, the Senate, the Congress to take their share as full partners in the dispute
38:37that's between us and Israel.
38:40I'm waiting for this moment.
38:42I found myself isolated from all my advisers.
38:45all of them thought that it was a bad idea.
38:49The president decided to undertake Mission Impossible.
38:52He set out to resolve 30 years of conflict in a week of talks at the presidential retreat at Camp
38:59David.
39:01We arrived by helicopters and we find this kind of small bungalows in the forest.
39:08People quite relaxed.
39:10People were using bicycles and it was quite strange for us.
39:16Some of the Americans even brought their children.
39:21The National Security Advisor challenged Israel's Prime Minister to a game of chess and got a foretaste of his negotiating
39:28technique.
39:31I was about to make my first move when he dramatically seized my hand in mid-air and looked me
39:38straight in the eye and said,
39:40and he's always very serious and formal,
39:41Dr. Brzezinski, do you know when I played my last chess game?
39:48And quite frankly, I was a little dismayed because I couldn't care less.
39:52And he says to me, September 1940, when the NKVD broke into my hiding place in Vilna to arrest me.
40:04So I said to myself, oh, my God.
40:06And in the midst of the game, Mrs. Begin appears.
40:09She looks at us and says, oh, the two of you are playing chess.
40:13You know, Mr. Brzezinski, Menachem just loves to play.
40:17He just loves to play.
40:18He plays all the time.
40:20When President Carter brought the two leaders together, Sadat listed the demands his allies and advisors wanted.
40:27Not only the return of all the Sinai to Egypt,
40:30but also a Palestinian state based in the West Bank with its capital in old Jerusalem.
40:39Sadat and I both knew that this was not going to be at all acceptable to me or the Israelis.
40:56They wanted to storm out, to terminate their talks.
41:02And I jumped up from the desk where I was sitting and writing and got in the door in front
41:08of them.
41:09And I wouldn't let them get out of the room until they both agreed to let me try to continue.
41:15And after that, the two men never saw each other for the next 10 days.
41:26The incompatibilities between the two sides were so intense that some sort of an American document bridging the gap
41:34and extracting from each side those relatively few elements on the part of each side that were of a compromise
41:41nature
41:42seemed to us to be the only way to proceed.
41:44So I carried the same text back and forth.
41:49Begin and Sadat agreed to go with the same text, with brackets and modifications and marginal notes.
41:59Carter's shuttle focused their attention on a clause that would require Israel to give up Gaza and the West Bank
42:05to the Palestinians.
42:08Begin simply dug in his heels and says this is totally unacceptable.
42:11As far as he was concerned, this was greater Israel, or Israel.
42:15And they hadn't acquired territory by force.
42:19It had always been ordained as part of Israel.
42:24Begin remained intransigent.
42:28So Carter persuaded Sadat to give up his demand for a Palestinian state to the outrage of his advisers.
42:36It was a real shock for us.
42:39Our main preoccupation was to avoid a bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt at the expense of the Palestinians.
42:52But that wasn't enough for the Israelis.
42:55They dug in their heels on the Sinai, too.
42:59They say, no, no, no, no, they are refusing to withdraw from the Sinai,
43:03that they want to maintain the three airports, that they want to maintain the settlements.
43:09The Israelis delegated Moshe Dayan to convince Sadat that he would have to compromise on the Sinai, too.
43:17Dayan told him, Mr. President, if anybody has told you that Israel can leave the Sinai settlements, they are deluding
43:26you.
43:26President Sadat was so upset that he asked me for airplanes.
43:31He said, I'm leaving.
43:32If I cannot even get Sinai back, then what is the use of my continuing this peace process?
43:40I asked Sadat if he would go back in his cabin and talk to me.
43:44All of his bags were on the front porch.
43:48I told Sadat he had betrayed our friendship.
43:50He had violated a commitment that he made to me, that he would give me full opportunity to resolve any
43:56differences that arose.
43:58And that I thought that his peremptory action in leaving without giving me another chance
44:04would also seriously and adversely affect the relationships between our two countries.
44:10Sadat unpacked his bags.
44:14Carter would have to get the Israeli Prime Minister to yield.
44:21I was about to play tennis.
44:22I was dressed in whites.
44:24Begin was always dressed as if he was about to go to a funeral.
44:27And we went for a walk in the Camp David woods.
44:31And he says to me very dramatically, I want you to understand that my right eye will fall out.
44:38My right hand will fall off before I ever sign a single scrap of paper permitting the dismantling of a
44:49single Jewish settlement.
44:50Prime Minister Begin had taken a solemn oath before God and the Israeli people that he would not dismantle Israeli
44:58settlements.
44:59So I had to devise an alternative to that so that he would not do it.
45:07Carter urged Begin's advisors to find a way round their Prime Minister's solemn oath.
45:14The only way was to let the Knesset make the decision and not him.
45:19Dayan and Weitzman started speaking up to Begin in Hebrew rather than in English as they did in the past.
45:26And I said to him, look, it would not be possible that we will leave from here if my hands
45:31are broken.
45:32You are right, and we will be able to find any way in my eyes.
45:38Begin's colleagues concluded that the only way to persuade him that dismantling the settlements would not damage him politically
45:44was to get the settlers' champion on the phone.
45:48Prime Minister Begin's
46:17Prime Minister Begin's phone call opened the wall in a
46:20Para a White House ceremony,
46:22a Knesset voted to dismantle
46:24the Sinai settlements.
46:33Egypt became the first Arab state
46:36to recognise Israel's right to exist.
46:42Israel gave back the Sinai.
46:48Sadat and Begin were awarded
46:50the Nobel Peace Prize.
46:57While we had the ceremony
46:59and the different speeches
47:00and the different signatures,
47:02we were listening to the Palestinians
47:05which were outside
47:07and were just shouting
47:09to remind us that
47:10the Palestinian problem
47:13have not been solved.
47:15The peace with Israel
47:17that Sadat concluded
47:18has lasted to this day.
47:23But the Arab peoples
47:24and their leaders
47:25did not forgive Sadat.
47:30Two years later,
47:31at a military display in Cairo,
47:34Islamic extremists
47:35assassinated Anwar Sadat.
47:38a
47:44the
47:45and a
47:46a
47:46a
47:47a
47:47a
48:04A CIDADE NO BRASIL
48:27A CIDADE NO BRASIL
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