- há 26 minutos
Decision-makers from Israel, the Arab states, Russia and the US tell the inside story of the Arab-Israel conflict. Charts the evolution of tensions, violence and peace efforts from 1948 to 1998.
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00:02Trouble and death in the Middle East.
00:06A fighting erupted quickly when Syrians allegedly fired on Israeli farmers operating tractors.
00:11Israel used tanks, mortars and aircraft to counterattack.
00:15Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol said,
00:17Friendly foreign powers will understand the situation.
00:39In May 1967, the leaders of the Soviet Union took a step that would change the map of the Middle
00:46East.
00:47The losers would be their own allies.
00:55It all began with a false report from Soviet intelligence.
01:03Anwar Sadat, Speaker of the Egyptian Parliament,
01:06was in Moscow for talks with Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin.
01:11This was a routine contact between a client state and its superpower ally.
01:19Sadat was seen to his plane by the Deputy Foreign Minister.
01:40Egypt's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was the hero of the Arab world.
01:45If Israel was massing troops on Syria's border, Nasser would be expected to act.
01:52He sent for his chief of staff and instructed him to find out what the Israelis were up to.
02:27I went to Syria's border between Syria and Israel.
02:28Eu não encontrei nada.
02:32A pesquisa da pesquisa não conseguiu o que o soviético não conseguiu.
02:40Mas, também, o que o soviético dizia que o soviético,
02:49é que o soviético não permanece em que o soviético não se torneia
02:53para que o soviético não tenha sido fechado.
02:58Sovjet diplomats spread the alarm throughout the region, even in Israel,
03:04as the Prime Minister and his wife soon found out.
03:35Shubachin visited the school in the morning, and Shubachin told him that he was ready to meet with the Soviet
03:45government to discuss the situation in the region.
03:48Shubachin was all the time, he was full of chaos, he was full of chaos, he was full of chaos,
03:55and he said that he was full of chaos.
03:56Shubachin said, you want me to come to you like I am now, and I am ready for a moment
04:00to take care of you to Golan and see that we are not going to be able to do anything,
04:08and the Russian government is going to die.
04:14At that time, Soviet leaders believed they had America on the run in Vietnam.
04:21Some in the Kremlin sought to weaken America's influence in the world's second big trouble spot.
04:25Even at the risk of another war.
04:28We thought that in the political point, even if the war ends in the fight, the war will be a
04:36certain victory, a geopolitical victory for our side.
04:41Because the Egyptians showed their ability to fight with our weapons, with our military and political support, we could hope
04:56and consider that the relationship of the political forces in the Middle East, after the war, will be a certain
05:05change.
05:07In Cairo, Nasser had mobilized his armed forces the moment he received the Soviet report.
05:13If Moscow's plan was to provoke a war, it seemed to be working.
05:20Ignorant the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, if Israel was to go to Syria.
05:42Abdel Nassar não conseguiu contra Israël.
05:49Abdel Nassar conseguiu citar suas imagens,
05:58que não conseguiu contra a força da guerra.
06:06Os Estados Unidos e os Estados Unidos foram colocados em uma guerra entre os Estados Unidos.
06:33Nasser ordered them out.
06:37The eyes of the world focused on a small harbor
06:41at the edge of the Sinai Desert,
06:43Sharm el-Sheikh.
07:07A blockade at the Straits of Tehran
07:09would amount to a declaration of war
07:11because the Straits, at the foot of the Gulf of Aqaba,
07:15controlled Israel's only trade route
07:17to the eastern half of the world.
07:21We are ready for the war.
07:23Our armed forces, Khaliq al-Aqaba,
07:26are responsible for the political waters
07:28of the Arab Emirates.
07:29It is not possible to allow the Israeli world
07:33to die.
07:56In Israel, the people prepared to defend themselves.
08:00In Israel, the people prepared to defend themselves.
08:03Their Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol,
08:06summoned his cabinet and military commanders.
08:10He said, by the Allies,
08:12by the Allies,
08:13that there is no difference
08:14not only to defend themselves,
08:16but that there is a very short time
08:18to go to the war,
08:1972 hours,
08:21or maybe more than that.
08:22But we don't have a lot of time
08:24because this period of time
08:26allows the military army
08:27to provide more divisions.
08:30The General saw Israel becoming increasingly vulnerable.
08:34The Chief of Staff, General Rabin,
08:37was very worried.
08:38He smoked a great number of cigarettes
08:39and he ate nearly all the nuts and raisins
08:42in the little basket there.
08:44The Foreign Minister cautioned them
08:46against rushing into war.
08:48I said there should still be some attempt to avoid it
08:52by exercising warnings and pressures upon the Egyptians.
08:58And then Mr. Eshkol sent me a note saying,
09:03what are you doing here?
09:07Prime Minister Eshkol dispatched his Foreign Minister
09:10to seek the help of Israel's key allies.
09:14As soon as he arrived in Washington
09:16with Ambassador Gideon Raphael,
09:19the Foreign Minister was handed a telegram.
09:22There were instructions signed by Prime Minister Eshkol
09:25that he should put as a main point
09:28in his discussion with the Secretary of State
09:30and the President
09:33the fact that we have information
09:35that within the next 24 hours
09:37Egypt is going to attack Israel.
09:40I said to Gideon, this sounds crazy to me.
09:43It simply doesn't fit in
09:45with anything that I've been hearing.
09:49The Prime Minister's telegram
09:51had been beefed up by the Chief of Staff, Yitzhak Rabin,
09:54to exaggerate the Egyptian threat.
09:57According to Israel's own intelligence reports,
10:00Egypt's forces were not about to attack.
10:04The telegram went on
10:05to order the Foreign Minister
10:07to seek an immediate pledge of military support
10:09from the Americans.
10:11The weakening effect on my mission was...
10:14cannot be exaggerated.
10:16First, we were showing panic.
10:18Second, we were asking for something
10:20which you should never do in diplomacy.
10:23Never ask your interlocutor
10:25for something which he is objectively unable to do.
10:29I said, disregard it
10:30and continue on the line with which you have gone.
10:33He said, how can I?
10:35I'm a foreign minister.
10:36My Prime Minister sends me instructions
10:38because at the end of the telegram was said,
10:41don't ask back.
10:43Don't argue.
10:44I've been asked by my government to explore what these governments intend to do
10:53in order to reopen this international waterway to a situation of law.
10:57What do you want the United States to do, sir?
11:00Well, I've come here really to find out what the United States intends to do.
11:06President Lyndon Johnson was informed of the Foreign Minister's telegram.
11:10The President had said to Dean Rusk and me, and I'm going to speak rather crudely,
11:15get Eban in here, into the family quarters of the White House,
11:18so we can work him over.
11:21Because we had heard that the Israelis were about to preempt.
11:28They were about to attack the Egyptians.
11:30We want our land! We want our land! We want our land! We want our land!
11:35I was shown into one of the back doors at the White House to avoid the press.
11:41Eban talked at great length and eloquently.
11:46He always spoke eloquently and he always spoke at great length.
11:50But what he had to say was very simple.
11:52This was a mortal crisis for Israel,
11:55and he wanted to know what the United States was prepared to do.
11:58The President, he simply expressed skepticism about the idea that Israel was in danger.
12:06He said, you are not in danger.
12:08You are in a very difficult situation.
12:11But you are not in peril.
12:13He said to Eban, we do not believe that Egypt is about to attack Israel.
12:24Moreover, if it does, you'll lick them.
12:29To make the point, President Johnson asked for the Defense Department's assessment of the likely outcome of a Middle East
12:36war.
12:37We had concluded that if Israel preempted, they could win, clearly, in a period of about seven days, as I
12:47remember.
12:48We had also estimated that if they did not preempt, and Egypt attacked first, that it would take somewhat longer,
12:57perhaps 10 to 14 days.
13:00Then the President took out a piece of paper and started reading from it, as though this was some kind
13:06of a sacred text.
13:08And what this document said was, Israel will not be alone unless it decides to be alone.
13:15If you go alone, you'll stand alone.
13:19That was a very cold-blooded statement.
13:22We will not come to your offense if you preempt.
13:25We cannot come to your offense if you preempt.
13:30As Israel received its warning in the White House, an Egyptian delegation was heading towards the Kremlin.
13:49The Soviets, like the Americans, warned their client not to be seen as the aggressor.
13:54The premier Kossigin has told us that you will have been commissioned.
13:59If you will perform the first attack, it will lead to theúa.
14:03This will lead to improving the war and bringing this conflict into a great country.
14:09Americans and others will not remain alone.
14:12The Soviets made it clear that they meant what they said.
14:20The Soviets made it clear that they meant what they said.
14:24Eu me perguntava sobre as exigências que eram presentes, para ser capazes de fazer isso.
14:33Especialmente, os equipamentos de ferramentas.
14:35Como eu disse antes, era possível que nós nos prendemos na mão.
14:39Os egyptianos sempre pediam, em qualquer caso, em qualquer conversa.
14:47Em qualquer nível, em qualquer nível.
14:49E também em BADRA.
14:52Eles não expõem para nós.
14:54Eles dizem que isso não é necessário.
14:56Eles dizem que isso não é necessário.
14:57Eu realmente acreditava.
14:59Eu disse que não é possível.
15:01A soviético, como a gente faz com a guerra com a guerra, com a guerra.
15:06E a guerra deve ser sobre as mãos.
15:09Nasser conseguiu a mensagem.
15:11Os soviets iriam retornar ele apenas se não fosse o agressor.
15:15Os comandos foram instruídos para ficar em defesa,
15:18para avançar um ataque da Israel.
15:21Os comandos foram condutados.
15:26Os comandos foram abandonados.
15:28Os comandos foram abandonados.
15:29E eles dizem que eles estão sendo estressados.
15:35Os comandos foram abandonados.
15:40E eles dizem que eles estão perdidos.
15:41Os comandos serão mortos.
15:47Nasser foi um golpe de Israel ou não foi um golpe de Israel.
15:55Mas o fogo de Nasser foi um golpe de Israel.
16:02O que Nasser não fez nada para descarar,
16:07agora ele apoiou o outro líder do seu lado.
16:16Even King Hussein of Jordana, for years at odds with Nasser,
16:20decided he could no longer stand aloof.
16:24I told my generals that I'm very afraid a war is imminent.
16:30If it does occur, I'm very concerned with the results.
16:35We in Jordan are probably the prime target.
16:40So, in the morning, I got into my aircraft and flew it to Cairo.
16:45And I was met by the president.
16:47I was in military fatigues with my gun on.
16:50And he said, well, I see you're carrying a gun.
16:52I said, I've been like that for the last few days with my troops.
16:56And then he made a strange remark.
17:00What would happen if we suddenly took you prisoner
17:03and denied all knowledge of your arriving in this country?
17:09King Hussein did not reply to this threat.
17:14He signed a mutual defence treaty with President Nasser
17:17and agreed to put his army under Egyptian command.
17:24We were on the verge of a war.
17:28Therefore, any reservations they had in the past
17:31to any troops coming into Jordan
17:34were removed as far as I am concerned.
17:38So, Israel faced the prospect of war on three fronts.
17:42From Jordan in the east,
17:44from Syria in the north,
17:46and from Egypt in the south.
17:55By now, Israel had been mobilised for more than a week.
18:02All males aged 18 to 55 were called to serve.
18:10Most vehicles were requisitioned.
18:12Most factories closed.
18:17Israel could not stay fully mobilised for long.
18:22But still, Prime Minister Eshkol hesitated.
18:27He came to military headquarters
18:29to remind his generals of America's warning.
18:32Israel must not go alone.
18:49Flanked by his chief of staff,
18:51the Prime Minister found himself face to face
18:53with a rebellion.
19:23He said to him,
19:24e se você não se derrubar, você não esquece de deixar isso.
19:28E se derrubar, você vai fazer isso e você vai fazer dois milhares históricas.
19:31Para regainar a confiança dos seus generos,
19:34Prime Minister Eshkol appointed um novo ministro de Defensa,
19:38Moshi Dayan, o herói da 1956 Suiz War.
19:43Of course, o número de seus poderes é maior do que nós,
19:49mas ainda espero que nós possamos fazer isso,
19:52mas muito dependendo, muito dependendo de onde a batalha é.
19:58O general também pediu um segundo envoi para ser enviado a Washington.
20:03O Prime Minister agreed.
20:06Ele disse que eu vejo que ele vai para Washington
20:12e você vai ver o que está acontecendo lá.
20:17Ele disse que ele era um primeiro ataque de defensa de Fiedemano.
20:18O primeiro ataque de Fiedemano era se ver se os Estados Unidos
20:19vai levantar o primeiro ataque da Alegre.
20:28O primeiro ataque da Alegre,
20:31o primeiro ataque da Alegre.
20:43Eu gostaria de dizer para você que nós não queremos nada de um guerreiro americano sobre o dedo de Israel.
20:50Vocês sabem o que vocês estão fazendo o seu conhecimento de vietnã.
20:52Ele estava fazendo a maioria das conversas.
20:54Eu me perguntava um ou dois perguntas.
20:57E então eu disse para ele, veja, eu vou sair de casa, eu vou pedir que nós vamos começar a
21:03trabalhar.
21:04Eu estava amigável durante a minha discussão e amigável quando ele deixou.
21:09Mas ele não me perguntava, mas ele não me perguntava, mas ele não me perguntava.
21:14Eu, obviamente, acabei de fazer o meu objetivo, que eu preciso de fazer.
21:20O head of Mossad raced back to Israel to report to the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet.
21:27Eu me senti a parte da parte da terra, eles moram lá dentro, e nós moramos, e moramos, e moramos,
21:33e moramos.
21:34Eu me perguntava, e moramos, e moramos, e moramos, e moramos, e moramos.
21:44E moramos, e moramos, e moramos, e moramos, e moramos.
21:48Eu pedi que um dos serem do seu trabalho não era nascido.
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