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00:03As Air Al-Jarif flight 6289 lifts off from Tamanrassit, Algeria,
00:10Air traffic controllers hear an explosion.
00:21The plane crashes into the desert.
00:25102 people are killed.
00:28Investigators examine engine debris found on the runway.
00:32Looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guideway.
00:35They know an engine failed, but not why the pilots couldn't recover.
00:40Pilots are expected to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing where they've lost an engine.
00:46The investigation reveals a crew that was struggling, not with the plane.
00:51Let go, take your hand away.
00:52I let go, I let go.
00:54But with each other.
00:55Which one of them is actually flying the plane?
00:59D-Day, D-Day.
01:03Oh, stop.
01:09A CIDADE NO BRASIL
01:37Seatbelts? Seatbelts?
01:40There are 97 passengers on board.
01:43Among them, members of the local football team headed to a tournament and military personnel.
01:49Seatbelts? Seatbelts?
01:51Though there are some European nationals, almost everyone on board is Algerian.
02:06Now the instrument transfer switches, normal.
02:12In the cockpit, pre-flight checks are underway.
02:17Yard damper, on.
02:22Today's flight is operated by Air Algerie, a state-owned national carrier.
02:28Air Algerie is a publicly-owned company that is owned by the country of Algeria.
02:33The country takes a lot of pride in this particular airline because it is the face name of the country
02:43as it goes all around the world.
02:4762.89, Castellanos weather.
02:50Yes, the wind is calm, temperature 23, Q&H 1020, QFE 965.
02:58Copied, we'll call you back for engine start.
03:0244-year-old Fatima Yousfi is the first officer of this flight.
03:07She is Algeria's first female commercial pilot.
03:12The female first officer was one of the first women to be hired in an airline in Algeria,
03:19which would be a big deal in such a male-dominated field, especially in that country.
03:25As the first woman to pilot a Boeing 747 trans-oceanic flight, Lynn Rippelmeyer knows what it's like to blaze
03:33a trail.
03:37Aviation was then and still is in some cases a boys' club.
03:44Back in the beginning of when women were initially beginning in aviation here in the States,
03:51maybe it's like it was for her.
03:53that it was unusual.
04:00Tamaracet, 62.89, we request clearance for Khardaya.
04:04Received, we will call you back.
04:10Hey, Bualam.
04:12Hey.
04:12We've got some Tamaracet football players back there.
04:15Oh, tell them we're rooting for them this weekend.
04:1848-year-old captain Bualam Benawica has over 10,000 flying hours.
04:24A thousand of those hours are on the Boeing 737.
04:29The captain was highly experienced, had been flying for over 20 years and then flown all kinds of aircraft from
04:34small aircraft to large jetliners.
04:46At 3 p.m., the pilots get clearance to start up the engines.
04:52Okay, B4, start checklist.
04:54Fuel quantity?
04:569,800 kg.
04:59Pumps?
05:02On.
05:05Flight 6289 is a Boeing 737-200, an early generation of the popular twin-engine jetliner.
05:15The Boeing 737-200 is one of the most common types of commercial airliners in the world, and there are
05:22different variations of it.
05:24The Boeing 737-200 is an original version of the 737, so it's an older model, and it's not as
05:33highly sophisticated in technology as the current 737s.
05:42Flight 6289 will be departing from Tamanrasset, with a scheduled stop in Gardaia, and then on to the capital, Algiers.
05:52The total flying time is approximately three hours.
06:01That is taxi Air Algierie 6289.
06:076289, Tamanrasset, taxi on to runway 02 and backtrack, wind 030 at 10 knots.
06:14Roger.
06:15Taxing for runway 02, then backtracking 6289.
06:22As they taxi to the runway, passengers settle in for the journey.
06:336289, Tamanrasset, taxi on to runway 02 and backtrack.
06:39We are ready, 6289.
06:446289, Tamanrasset, cleared for takeoff runway 02, wind 330 at 12 knots.
06:50Clear for takeoff on runway 02 at Ejiri 6289.
07:03You have 90 knots.
07:05100 knots.
07:07100 knots.
07:22Be one.
07:24Rotate.
07:29But seconds after takeoff...
07:32Gear up.
07:34...a loud explosion rocks the airplane.
07:43Bismillah.
07:44What's going on?
07:45The pilots assess the situation.
07:48Let go, let go.
07:49I let go, I let go.
07:53Passengers sense something has gone wrong.
07:58We have a small problem, 6289.
08:016289, Tamanrasset.
08:06The 737 is approaching a stall.
08:166289, Tamanrasset, are you in emergency?
08:176289, are you in emergency?
08:286289, are you in emergency?
08:34task force, 7289, planes, or you in emergency?
08:58a desert just outside tamaracid airport emergency response is immediately
09:05activated and firefighters rush to the scene
09:16the impact and fire that ensued afterwards made survival very unlikely for the passengers in
09:23the aircraft but then against all odds rescuers discover a survivor not within the wreckage but
09:32lying in the distant sand clinging to life a gentleman seated all the way in the back
09:38that didn't have a seat belt on so when the airplane crashed and broke apart he was thrown free
09:45he shows only faint signs of life as an ambulance rushes him to hospital in critical condition
09:53defying all expectations the man's condition soon stabilizes and he begins to recover
10:00this passenger's luck cannot be overstated in what was algeria's worst aviation accident at the time
10:09he is the sole survivor out of 103 passengers and crew while the country mourns the tragic loss of a
10:17football squad algerian and french families grieve their loved ones and soon demand answers
10:30the investigation into the crash of flight 6289 is conducted by a commission of inquiry established by
10:38the algerian ministry of transport they receive support from several international agencies
10:45including the ntsb america's national transportation safety board i was the u.s accredited representative
10:53for this accident to assist the algerians initially i wasn't going to travel to the scene however the
10:59u.s ambassador to algeria requested our assistance
11:05while algerian investigators await the arrival of their american colleagues they interview the taman rasset air traffic controller
11:16did the pilots indicate that there was an issue the first officer called only seconds after takeoff
11:26we have a small problem 60 to 89 pilots typically are hesitant to call mayday mayday or uh announce some
11:36type of emergency particularly if they really don't know what the situation and the critical nature of the
11:44situation is and what was the problem they didn't say but i heard something that
11:51it sounded like an explosion seconds later the plane was falling out of the sky you said an explosion
12:02that's what it sounded like
12:14so in 2003 algeria was not the safest place there was bombings and terrorist activities because they
12:21were coming out of 11 years of civil war
12:26when the plane fell was it in one piece yes it was investigators found the airplane intact
12:34there are no claims of responsibility by terrorists so it pretty much ruled out that there was some type
12:41of nefarious means to bring the aircraft down can you describe how the plane fell it was
12:49the plane was nose up and crashed near the threshold of runway 20.
12:57the controller and other witnesses saw that the airplane was struggling to climb
13:02had a nose high pitch attitude and then impact the ground eyewitnesses recall that the plane
13:11struggled to gain enough lift to remain airborne an indication it was in a stall
13:18one week after the incident algerian investigators are joined by a member of the ntsb
13:27air traffic controller and witnesses described seeing a storm and one witness remarked that the landing
13:34there was down if the landing gear is still down while the aircraft is trying to climb it creates a
13:42lot
13:42of drag on that airplane it takes a lot of thrust and a lot of power to maintain the climb
13:48to overcome
13:49all that drag from the landing gear that would affect a plane's ability to climb but that alone
13:56wouldn't cause a stall that has to have been something else did the load sheets yes right here
14:04one of the big questions is about the aircraft weight because if you're too heavy you won't climb as
14:10well as if you're within the weight envelope investigators review the plane's load sheet to see if the plane was
14:18overweight before takeoff looks like the first officer made some corrections here
14:24while reviewing the load sheet the first officer notices the fuel weight is wrong
14:29and changes it from 8 800 kilograms to the correct amount of 9 800 kilograms
14:42so with those corrections the way to take off would have been
14:4648 708 kilograms and the maximum weight allowed at takeoff would be 49 500 kilograms
14:54the first officer noticed that there was a thousand kilo difference and uh passenger count was a
15:01little bit off which didn't make a whole lot of difference in the overall weight and balance
15:05but did show that she was very attentive in her duties
15:09the aircraft weight was right up against the maximum takeoff weight even though it was heavy the
15:15aircraft weight shouldn't have affected the performance too much
15:18what mechanical failure i did the maintenance reports
15:25investigators make sure that the maintenance is clean and the aircraft has a clean bill of health prior to
15:31the flight it was up to date in its maintenance cycle no work deferred no technical exemptions
15:42the maintenance reports provide no leads maybe there was an environmental factor at play
15:51take a look at this did the location of the airport have something to do with the stall
15:59temperatures 23 degrees celsius so it's hot tamaraset is in a harsh desert climate and the high
16:06temperatures can affect the aircraft performance and climb and the airport sits at 4518 feet above sea
16:15level at this altitude the air is already thin if you factor in the heat it's high density altitude that
16:24affects the performance of the airplane so it's generating much less lift over the wings so it takes
16:30longer to get the airplane airborne so just a few pounds below max takeoff weight high elevation
16:36airport high temperature landing gear extended that could definitely cause a plane to stall
16:44but that doesn't explain the explosion right what are we missing
16:56investigators study the crash site of flight 6289 for evidence that could explain the explosion heard
17:06so the first point of impact is here
17:145396 feet from the takeoff point skidded through the airport perimeter fence across the road and came to rest
17:21here less than 300 feet outside of the airport
17:34plane's destroyed by the fire the main wreckage is practically in one piece except for the rear section
17:41and look at this debris this was on the runway right about here
17:49engine debris
17:52on the runway we found a large quantity of engine debris which is indicative of an engine shelling
17:57when a large quantity of engine blades are thrown out the back end of an engine
18:04it's an old adage in accident investigation what fails first falls first
18:12so if they find debris prior to finding the wreckage then they know that happened prior to the accident
18:18so one of the engines blew out that must have been the explosion the controller hurt
18:24what caused the engine failure we needed to get our eyes on those engines to determine which failed and why
18:33it failed
18:34investigators begin a visual inspection of the plane's engines starting with the right one
18:41take a look at the fan blades
18:44heavy deformation it was definitely rotating at the time of impact on the right engine we showed that
18:53it was turning at impact we don't know what exactly what level of thrust it was rotating at
19:00if the right engine was operating on impact then did the left engine fail
19:10these turbine blades have far fewer deformations than the right engine looks like it was barely moving
19:17the hot section is completely torn apart
19:21in an engine's hot section fuel is ignited in a combustion chamber generating a powerful stream of hot air that
19:29spins the turbine blades
19:33the damage is evidence that the left engine failed we knew that the failure was in the hot section
19:40so we had to follow every lead that we could to determine where the failure occurred
19:51there's a bunch of blades missing from the hot section
19:55the missing pieces are most likely the debris that we found on the runway
19:59we found that the hot section was basically corn cobbed as we say there was not many blades left in
20:07the hot section and there was metal all over the place what caused the blades to break let's get some
20:13of these parts out on the table and we wanted to further tear down the engine we wanted to look
20:20at the
20:20failures under the microscope we're going to look at the metallurgical aspects of the failure we wanted to
20:25look to see if there was a bird strike investigators begin by examining components from the hot section
20:32in search of pre-existing defects
20:36managed to remove the sediment from the nozzle vein
20:45nozzle guide vanes direct the hot air flow in the combustion chamber
20:49to the blades of the high-pressure turbine causing them to spin
20:59interesting
21:14looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guide vein
21:19investigators find evidence of fatigue cracks in two of the left engine's nozzle guide vanes
21:26this type of cracking occurs over time and as the engine ages these cracks get slightly larger and
21:32and eventually they will fail and it will destroy the entire engine
21:39if this was a progressive failure why wasn't it caught earlier
21:45this type of cracking is typical of an older engine and it's a progressive failure so that gets us into
21:50the question of what was the maintenance history what was the inspection criteria that was used
21:54by the operator investigators look into the engine's repair history
22:02it looks like the left engine was completely overhauled four years ago
22:07when would have been the last time they looked at the nozzle guide veins during the hot section
22:12maintenance inspection which was last year any mention of cracking any work done on any of them
22:21inspections of the hot section are meant to catch fatigue cracks so why weren't these found
22:28since this was an algerian registered aircraft it falls under the authority of the algerian civil
22:33aviation authority for oversight of the inspection not the fa which typically has more stringent requirements
22:42the crack formed at some point it was missed during the inspection last year it grew and grew
22:48until point of failure and then blew out at takeoff that explains why the engine failed not why the plane
22:55stalled
22:57pilots are expected to demonstrate their ability to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing
23:05where they've lost an engine investigators examine the crew's training records to determine if they knew how
23:11to handle a single engine failure on takeoff the first officer's last exercise in engine failure during
23:20takeoff was four months ago the captain's training was even more recent only two months before the crash
23:26they both should have known what to do in this situation
23:31they've got the airplane veering to the left there's no way they didn't know that engine failed
23:39so what did they actually do
23:46investigators prepare to listen to the cockpit voice recorder from air algeri flight 6289
23:54it was very important for us to listen to the cvr to determine how the pilots dealt with this
23:58this engine failure got it queued up to right before i take off
24:06c1 rotate
24:15gear up
24:19they hear the sound of the engine failing five seconds after takeoff
24:25bismillah what's going on let go let go i let go i let go
24:36they transferred control in the middle of an emergency that didn't even sound like a proper
24:40transfer he just took the controls for another pilot to take control from the pilot who is flying the
24:49the pilot needs to say i've got it taking control of the airplane without saying he was taking control
24:55made things worse for him and for the first officer the captain is the pilot monitoring he shouldn't be
25:01taking over he should be diagnosing the problem so do either of them identify a left engine failure
25:10after handing over control to the captain the first officer realizes they aren't properly
25:15configured to climb with only one engine
25:20get up or are we okay but there's no response from the captain
25:27we have a small problem 62 89
25:34just seconds after the engine failure the situation deteriorates as the plane begins to stall
25:45there are no attempts by the pilots to work together to identify or troubleshoot the problem
25:52let go take your hand away i let go i let go let go take your hand away let go
25:59seconds later the ground proximity warning activates indicating the plane is getting dangerously close to
26:05the ground please take your hand away both pilots really didn't know what the other was doing didn't
26:15know what the other expected of them and may well have been working at cross purposes and as a result
26:21of
26:21that the team performance broke down don't think don't think i don't hear a single mention of engine failure
26:35and why was he telling her to let go so many times was she trying to take back control of
26:39the plane
26:40which one of them is actually flying the plane when all is said and done the pilots did not work
26:46together
26:46without more information from the flight data recorder we really don't know exactly what they
26:51did to control the airplane investigators turned to the flight data recorder or fdr from flight 6289
27:00to determine how the pilots tried to recover from the loss of the left engine flight data recorders are
27:06important to investigators because it gives them information on how the pilots were operating the
27:13airplane and how they were managing the critical situation they were in not much sure older plane
27:22older fdr it doesn't actually tell us how the pilots were handling the engine failure
27:30because we only had five parameters on the fdr we had to go to boeing and ask for a detailed
27:36aircraft performance analysis to determine what happened on this accident flight
27:43using the fdr's limited data boeing's performance study includes a reconstruction of engine operations
27:51and flight controls in the final moments of the flight
27:56so there is the left engine losing its thrust after it blows out that's odd the data from the fully
28:05functioning right engine shows something unexpected look at the thrust from the right engine
28:12yes it seems to be going up and down but we know it was working fine that can only mean
28:18one thing
28:23bismillah what's going on the team finds evidence of thrust being added to the right engine
28:31let's go let go and then pulled back
28:34i let go i let go when one engine fails what you need is maximum power on the other engine
28:43not reduce it
28:44so thrust is pulled down then back up then down then back up again we have a small problem 62
28:5589
29:02let's go
29:06this is as if they were having some sort of a tug of war
29:10it shouldn't have been first officer did the right thing by increasing the power of the right engine
29:17what likely happened is that the captain wasn't fully aware of which engine had failed however the first
29:22officer knew that the the left engine had failed and was trying to push up the throttle on the right
29:28engine to keep them from stalling
29:34let go take your hand away i let go i let go let go take your hand away let's go
29:39i let go
29:44the captain's basically telling the first officer
29:46to get out of his way to leave him alone to let him be in charge of the airplane by
29:53himself which he
29:54was knowing that the left engine had failed the first officer might have been trying to help things
30:00out by increasing the power on the right engine please take your hand away
30:11the moment the captain reduced the thrust on the right engine and never returned it to takeoff thrust
30:16with the gear down it doomed the flight
30:22pilots should have been able to work together to recover the plane
30:26these planes are designed to fly with a team
30:28pilot flying pilot not flying both have very specific roles that they are trained to do but
30:37especially in emergencies they stay in their roles they help each other they work as a team
30:42and this crash could have been avoided if they would have done that
30:48why didn't the crew of air algeri flight 6289 work together to prevent the loss of 102 lives
30:59okay i'll cue it up to the pre-flight preparations
31:05investigators returned to the cockpit voice recording of flight 6289 to understand why
31:11there was a lack of coordination between the two pilots
31:26they listen as the first officer works through the pre-flight checklist
31:31they're surprised by what they don't hear
31:35where's the captain is she doing the flight preparation by herself
31:42sterilization mode selector auto okay flight instruments
31:48we found that the first officer was actually in the cockpit
31:52by herself conducting most of the pre-flight work without the captain
32:00it's unusual for the captain not to be present during the pre-flight because there are responsibilities
32:05that the captain has to get his side of the airplane ready it's just inappropriate for the captain not to
32:12be in the cockpit during the pre-flight and it's actually kind of rude it's only after the first
32:20officer completes the pre-flight preparations that the captain enters the cockpit
32:281019 roger good afternoon captain how are we looking um good i completed the pre-flight checklist
32:36i tested your oxygen and everything is set to go good good
32:43captain ben weisha is late leaving his responsibilities to the first officer
32:49when the captain showed up he was not in the mindset of getting brought up to speed or
32:54being part of the team of setting the cockpit up for the flight
33:02heading 020 altitude investigators then hear the pilots performing their before start
33:10checklist 280 you know i could have been on the team with those boys back there give me a break
33:18who's the third voice flight attendant
33:23the only male flight attendant is the chief flight attendant
33:28okay takeoff speeds as part of the checklist the first officer reviews the takeoff speeds
33:38V1 144 knots we are 146 knots
33:43you're saying you were good enough to turn pro
33:45yeah
33:47i was a good footy blayer
33:49you and the scout come watch me blayer
33:50yeah they were scouting you to mow the pitch
33:54hmm um v2 150 knot
33:57Ok, está enough. I understand.
33:59Can we go?
34:01I got it, I got it. Let's go.
34:08So the captain is just carrying on a conversation with his friend
34:10while they're doing their before-start checklist.
34:13What is even worse is he cuts her off before they could even finish it.
34:18One of the most important parts of the information
34:21that she was trying to give were the takeoff speeds
34:24and then there should have been a briefing
34:28of an engine failure departure at this airport
34:32that was a special departure that needed to be briefed.
34:35It was ignored.
34:39Did the captain become more focused once they began to taxi?
34:44Roger. Taxi for runway at 02.
34:48What investigators find most shocking is what they hear next.
34:57Where are we eating tonight?
34:59That place across from the hotel.
35:01Oh, you always go back to that same place.
35:04I like what I like.
35:06We are now cheers. Plenty of good spots to eat.
35:10They are completely distracted.
35:12They're violating every sterile cockpit rule.
35:16During critical phases of flight, extraneous conversations
35:20and non-essential conversations between the crew members are prohibited.
35:23Not only is the captain dismissing the first officer,
35:26he has this casual attitude about basic safety practices.
35:31It's possible he was more interested in talking to the flight attendant
35:35than reviewing the briefing with the first officer.
35:37It's possible that he had been through so many pre-flight take-off briefings
35:42that at that time he felt it was unnecessary.
35:49Bismillah. What's going on?
35:56As a result of his dismissive attitude, the captain is unprepared to properly respond
36:03when the crisis occurs shortly after take-off.
36:09Had the pilots completed their pre-flight safety briefing,
36:13their response to the engine failure might have been very different.
36:24Gear up.
36:28Engine failure, left engine.
36:30Fly V2 plus 25.
36:33Lowering the nose to 12 degrees.
36:36V2.
36:37Gear up.
36:39Once the plane was stabilized, the pilots could have returned
36:43safely to the airport.
36:45Engine failure is actually a relatively common occurrence.
36:49Every pilot needs to be prepared and trained.
36:52So instead of letting the first officer fly the plane while he diagnoses the issue,
36:57he tries to do everything himself.
36:58And transferring control during an emergency situation.
37:03There was never a positive transfer of control.
37:05The captain just took the control yoke away from the first officer.
37:11So he injected himself in the emergency.
37:19Let go, let go.
37:20I let go, I let go.
37:22The captain took control at the worst possible time when he was out of the loop.
37:27And by not assigning responsibility to her, he gave himself the responsibility of doing two things at once.
37:33Diagnosing the nature of the engine problem.
37:36And then flying the airplane.
37:40Please.
37:41By trying to fly the plane and diagnose the problem on his own, the captain took on too much.
37:49It put the first officer in a very difficult position.
37:53She's now in the supportive role, the non-flying role, waiting to be told what to do.
38:00And he's not giving any helpful orders other than let go.
38:07Why would an experienced captain so brazenly dismiss his first officer's help, risking the lives of everyone on board?
38:21Investigators look into the pilot's backgrounds in an attempt to understand why the captain took over from his first officer
38:28in the midst of an emergency.
38:31So the captain actually had twice as many flying hours as the first officer.
38:36The captain was both qualified as a captain on a 737, but also as a first officer on a 767.
38:43Perhaps his attitude was that flying the 737 was not that big of a deal because I fly a 767,
38:51which is much more sophisticated and highly technical.
38:55But she had more hours on the 737.
38:58Not only did she have more experience flying the 737, that's the only plane that she was flying.
39:05I think there's a good chance that had she been left alone, she would have flown the airplane out of
39:10the scenario that we saw in this accident.
39:13The question is, would he have reacted the same way if the first officer was a man?
39:20In 2003, at the time of this crash, here in the States, female airline pilots only constituted less than 6
39:28% of the pilot population.
39:30And it really hasn't changed that much in the 20 years since then.
39:34The first officer was Algeria's first female commercial airline pilot.
39:41My friend, male pilots in this part of the world aren't used to sharing a cockpit with women.
39:51I think Algeria is becoming fairly westernized, but in some cultures there is the feeling that a man has to
39:57be up in the cockpit in case anything goes wrong.
40:00Why did this captain take control from the first officer when she was doing an okay job at that point?
40:06And I think you can't rule out the possibility that there may have been some gender stereotyping on his part
40:13that played a role in it.
40:16Sadly, this accident was totally preventable.
40:24Investigators now have a clear picture of what led to the crash of flight 6289.
40:32V1, 144 knots. VR, 146 knots.
40:38You're saying you were good enough to turn pro?
40:39After arriving late and allowing the flight attendant into the cockpit, the captain interrupted a crucial pre-flight safety briefing.
40:49V2, 150 knots. OK, that's enough. I understand. Can we go?
40:55I got it. I got it. Let's go.
40:57The captain demonstrated a lax attitude towards cockpit protocols.
41:04Fatigue cracks in a nozzle guide vane in the plane's left engine were reaching their braking point.
41:10And when the guide vane failed, it set off a chain reaction.
41:15High-speed metal fragments ripped the engine apart.
41:20Let go. Let go. I let go. I let go.
41:23When crisis struck, the captain decided he needed to be the one to handle the controls
41:29and took over flying from his first officer before even identifying the problem.
41:35The engine failure alone was not the cause of this accident.
41:39Engines fail and pilots are trained to handle those emergencies.
41:46Failing to retract the landing gear after the engine failure made recovery more difficult.
41:52Let go. Take your hand away.
41:54I let go. I let go.
41:55Let go. Take your hand away.
41:56I let go.
42:05It was the captain's assumption of patrol of the aircraft without properly identifying the nature of the emergency.
42:11His failure to raise the landing gear and his lack of adherence to standard operating procedures that eventually doomed the
42:21flight.
42:23As a result of this accident, Algeria's Commission of Inquiry makes several recommendations.
42:31They recommend that Air Algeria, along with other operators, ensure that their crew resource management training programs emphasize the importance
42:40of handover procedures and task sharing in the cockpit.
42:45But in the 1980s, they had captains who were trying to fly a team airplane solo.
42:53So a lot of training went into it to teach that your best resource is your team.
42:58You support each other and work together as a team for the safety of the airplane.
43:05The fact that the captain insisted on taking over control of the airplane at that critical moment cost everybody on
43:13that airplane their lives.
43:17I felt particularly affected when I saw that the accident was preventable.
43:23And I think the investigators did the best job they could trying to discover why the crew made the errors
43:28that they did.
43:29The next time that happens, people won't die as a result of that.
43:34For Lynn Rippelmeyer, it's one more example of why the industry needs to continue evolving.
43:41The airlines now are much more open to hiring women, to not having gender bias, realizing that women do have
43:51a lot to contribute to the industry.
43:55And I think it's up to women now to step up to the plate and take the opportunities that the
44:00career offers.
44:01They're amazing.
44:02Thank you.
44:03Thank you.
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