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Air Crash Investigation - Season 26 - Episode 07: Divided In Crisis Air AlgéRie 6289
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00:01B-1, rotate.
00:03As Air Algerie Flight 6289 lifts off from Tamanrassit, Algeria...
00:09Gear up.
00:10Air traffic controllers hear an explosion.
00:21The plane crashes into the desert.
00:24102 people are killed.
00:28Investigators examine engine debris found on the runway.
00:32Looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guideway.
00:35They know an engine failed, but not why the pilots couldn't recover.
00:40Pilots are expected to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing where they've lost an engine.
00:46The investigation reveals a crew that was struggling, not with the plane...
00:51Let go. Take your hand away.
00:52I let go. I let go.
00:54...but with each other.
00:55Which one of them is actually flying the plane?
00:59B-Day, B-Day.
01:04Oh, stop.
01:06T-R-1-0-3-A-V-Y-O-R-N-G-O-R-P-A-V-Y-O-R
01:09-K-A-V-Y-O.
01:10I want to hear something.
01:20It's early afternoon in the middle of the Sahara Desert in Algeria.
01:25The crew of Flight 6289 readies for its upcoming journey at the remote Tamanrassid Aguenar Airport.
01:36Seatbelts. Seatbelts.
01:39There are 97 passengers on board. Among them, members of the local football team headed to a tournament and military
01:48personnel.
01:49Seatbelts. Seatbelts.
01:51Though there are some European nationals, almost everyone on board is Algerian.
02:06Now the instrument transfer switches.
02:10Normal.
02:12In the cockpit, pre-flight checks are underway.
02:17Your damper.
02:20On.
02:22Today's flight is operated by Air Algerie, a state-owned national carrier.
02:28Air Algerie is a publicly owned company that is owned by the country of Algeria.
02:33The country takes a lot of pride in this particular airline because it is the face and name of the
02:42country as it goes all around the world.
02:50Yes, the wind is calm. Temperature 23, Q&H 1020, QFE 965.
02:58Copy. We'll call you back for engine start.
03:0244-year-old Fatima Yusfi is the first officer of this flight.
03:07She is Algeria's first female commercial pilot.
03:12The female first officer was one of the first women to be hired in an airline in Algeria, which would
03:20be a big deal in such a male-dominated field, especially in that country.
03:25As the first woman to pilot a Boeing 747 trans-oceanic flight, Lynn Ripplemeyer knows what it's like to blaze
03:33a trail.
03:37Aviation was then and still is, in some cases, a boys' club.
03:44Back in the beginning of when women were initially beginning in aviation here in the States, maybe it's like it
03:52was for her, that it was unusual.
03:59Taman Rasset, 6289. We request clearance for Khardaya.
04:04Received. We will call you back.
04:10Hey, Bualam.
04:12Hey.
04:12We've got some Taman Rasset football players back there.
04:15Oh. Tell them we're rooting for them this weekend.
04:1948-year-old captain Bualam Benawicha has over 10,000 flying hours.
04:251,000 of those hours are on the Boeing 737.
04:28The captain was highly experienced, had been flying for over 20 years,
04:32and then flown all kinds of aircraft from small aircraft to large jetliners.
04:386289 Taman Rasset.
04:40Go on.
04:41Start approved. Call back for taxi.
04:43Roger.
04:46At 3 p.m., the pilots get clearance to start up the engines.
04:53Okay, before I start checklist. Fuel quantity.
04:569,800 kg.
04:59Pumps.
05:02On.
05:05Flight 6289 is a Boeing 737-200, an early generation of the popular twin-engine jetliner.
05:15The Boeing 737-200 is one of the most common types of commercial airliners in the world,
05:21and there are different variations of it.
05:24The Boeing 737-200 is an original version of the 737, so it's an older model,
05:32and it's not as highly sophisticated in technology as the current 737s.
05:42Flight 6289 will be departing from Taman Rasset,
05:46with a scheduled stop in Gardaia, and then on to the capital, Algiers.
05:52The total flying time is approximately three hours.
06:01That is taxi, Air Al-Jahri, 6289.
06:076289, Taman Rasset. Taxi onto runway 02 and backtrack.
06:11Wind 030 at 10 knots.
06:14Roger.
06:15Taxing for runway 02, then backtracking 6289.
06:22As they taxi to the runway, passengers settle in for the journey.
06:39We are ready, 6289.
06:446289, Taman Rasset.
06:45Clear for takeoff on runway 02, wind 330 at 12 knots.
06:50Clear for takeoff on runway 02 at Angeli 6289.
07:03You have 90 knots.
07:06100 knots.
07:22B1, rotate.
07:29But seconds after takeoff...
07:32Gear up.
07:35A loud explosion rocks the airplane.
07:43Bismillah.
07:44What's going on?
07:45The pilots assess the situation.
07:48Let go, let go.
07:49I let go, I let go.
07:53Passengers sense something has gone wrong.
07:58We have a small problem, 6289.
08:016289, Taman Rasset.
08:06The 737 is approaching a stall.
08:166289, are you in an emergency?
08:31The pilots make desperate attempts to recover the aircraft, but their efforts are in vain.
08:39The plane goes into a freefall.
08:42The passengers brace themselves.
08:54The plane bursts into flames and skids across the desert just outside Taman Rasset Airport.
09:03Emergency response is immediately activated, and firefighters rush to the scene.
09:15The impact and fire that ensued afterwards made survival very unlikely for the passengers in the aircraft.
09:24But then, against all odds, rescuers discover a survivor, not within the wreckage, but lying in the distant sand, clinging
09:34to life.
09:35A gentleman seated all the way in the back that didn't have his seatbelt on, so when the airplane crashed
09:41and broke apart, he was thrown free.
09:45He shows only faint signs of life, as an ambulance rushes him to hospital in critical condition.
09:53Defying all expectations, the man's condition soon stabilizes, and he begins to recover.
10:00This passenger's luck cannot be overstated in what was Algeria's worst aviation accident at the time.
10:08He is the sole survivor, out of 103 passengers and crew.
10:14While the country mourns the tragic loss of a football squad, Algerian and French families grieve their loved ones, and
10:23soon demand answers.
10:29The investigation into the crash of Flight 6289 is conducted by a commission of inquiry established by the Algerian Ministry
10:39of Transport.
10:41They receive support from several international agencies, including the NTSB, America's National Transportation Safety Board.
10:51I was the U.S. accredited representative for this accident to assist the Algerians.
10:56Initially, I wasn't going to travel to the scene.
10:58However, the U.S. ambassador to Algeria requested our assistance.
11:05While Algerian investigators await the arrival of their American colleagues, they interview the Taman Rasset air traffic controller.
11:16Did the pilots indicate that there was an issue?
11:21The first officer called only seconds after takeoff.
11:26We have a small problem, 6289.
11:30Pilots typically are hesitant to call mayday, mayday, or announce some type of emergency, particularly if they really don't know
11:40what the situation and the critical nature of the situation is.
11:45And what was the problem?
11:48They didn't say, but I heard something that sounded like an explosion.
11:54Seconds later, the plane was falling out of the sky.
11:59You said an explosion?
12:01That's what it sounded like.
12:05Like a bomb?
12:10Couldn't say.
12:15So in 2003, Algeria was not the safest place.
12:18There was bombings and terrorist activities because they were coming out of 11 years of civil war.
12:26When the plane fell, was it in one piece?
12:29Yes, it was.
12:32Investigators found the airplane intact.
12:34There are no claims of responsibility by terrorists.
12:37So it pretty much ruled out that there was some type of nefarious means to bring the aircraft down.
12:45Can you describe how the plane fell?
12:47It was nose up and crashed near the threshold of runway 20.
12:57The controller and other witnesses saw that the airplane was struggling to climb, had a nose-high pitch attitude, and
13:06then impact the ground.
13:09Eyewitnesses recall that the plane struggled to gain enough lift to remain airborne, an indication it was in a stall.
13:18One week after the incident, Algerian investigators are joined by a member of the NTSB.
13:27Air traffic controller and witnesses described seeing a stall, and one witness remarked that the landing gear was down.
13:36If the landing gear is still down while the aircraft is trying to climb, it creates a lot of drag
13:43on that airplane.
13:44It takes a lot of thrust and a lot of power to maintain the climb to overcome all that drag
13:50from the landing gear.
13:52That would affect a plane's ability to climb, but that alone wouldn't cause a stall.
13:58That has to have been something else.
14:00Do you have to load sheets?
14:01Yes, right here.
14:04One of the big questions is about the aircraft weight, because if you're too heavy, you won't climb as well
14:10as if you're within the weight envelope.
14:14Investigators review the plane's load sheet, to see if the plane was overweight before takeoff.
14:20Looks like the first officer made some corrections here.
14:24While reviewing the load sheet, the first officer notices the fuel weight is wrong,
14:30and changes it from 8,800 kilograms to the correct amount of 9,800 kilograms.
14:42So, with those corrections, the weight at takeoff would have been 48,708 kilograms.
14:49And the maximum weight allowed at takeoff would be 49,500 kilograms.
14:54The first officer noticed that there was a 1,000 kilo difference, and passenger count was a little bit off,
15:01which didn't make a whole lot of difference in the overall weight and balance,
15:05but did show that she was very attentive in her duties.
15:09The aircraft weight was right up against the maximum takeoff weight.
15:13Even though it was heavy, the aircraft weight shouldn't have affected the performance too much.
15:19What about mechanical failure?
15:21I'll get the maintenance reports.
15:26Investigators make sure that the maintenance is clean,
15:28and the aircraft has a clean bill of health prior to the flight.
15:36It was up-to-date in its maintenance cycle.
15:38No work deferred, no technical exemptions.
15:42The maintenance reports provide no leads.
15:46Maybe there was an environmental factor at play.
15:50Take a look at this.
15:53Did the location of the airport have something to do with the stall?
15:59Temperature's 23 degrees Celsius,
16:01so it's hot.
16:04Tamarissat is in a harsh desert climate,
16:06and the high temperatures can affect the aircraft's performance and climb.
16:11And the airport sits at 4,518 feet above sea level.
16:16At this altitude, the air is already thin.
16:19If you factor in the heat,
16:21it's high-density altitude that affects the performance of the airplane,
16:26so it's generating much less lift over the wings,
16:29so it takes longer to get the airplane airborne.
16:32So just a few pounds below max takeoff weight,
16:36high elevation airport,
16:37high temperature,
16:39landing gear extended.
16:41That could definitely cause a plane to stall.
16:44But that doesn't explain the explosion.
16:47Right.
16:48What are we missing?
16:56Investigators study the crash site of Flight 6289
17:00for evidence that could explain the explosion
17:03heard seconds after takeoff.
17:06So, the first point of impact is here.
17:135,396 feet from the takeoff point.
17:17Skidded through the airport perimeter fence,
17:20across the road,
17:21and came to rest here,
17:22less than 300 feet outside of the airport.
17:34The plane is destroyed by the fire,
17:36but the main wreckage is practically in one piece,
17:38except for the rear section.
17:40And look at this debris.
17:43This was on the runway,
17:45right about here.
17:49Engine debris.
17:52On the runway,
17:53we found a large quantity of engine debris,
17:55which is indicative of an engine shelling,
17:57when a large quantity of engine blades
18:00are thrown out the back end of an engine.
18:04It's an old adage in accident investigation.
18:08What fails first, falls first.
18:12So, if they find debris prior to finding the wreckage,
18:16then they know that happened prior to the accident.
18:18So, one of the engines blew out.
18:20That must have been the explosion the controller heard.
18:25What caused the engine failure?
18:29We needed to get our eyes on those engines
18:31to determine which failed and why it failed.
18:35Investigators begin a visual inspection
18:37of the plane's engines,
18:38starting with the right one.
18:41Take a look at the fan blades.
18:44Heavy deformation.
18:47It was definitely rotating at the time of impact.
18:51On the right engine,
18:52we showed that it was turning at impact.
18:54We don't know exactly what level of thrust
18:57it was rotating at.
19:01If the right engine was operating on impact,
19:04then did the left engine fail?
19:11These turbine blades have far fewer deformations
19:13than the right engine.
19:14It looks like it was barely moving.
19:17The hot section is completely torn apart.
19:21In an engine's hot section,
19:23fuel is ignited in a combustion chamber,
19:26generating a powerful stream of hot air
19:29that spins the turbine blades.
19:33The damage is evidence that the left engine failed.
19:37We knew that the failure was in the hot section,
19:40so we had to follow every lead that we could
19:42to determine where the failure occurred.
19:51There's a bunch of blades missing from the hot section.
19:55The missing pieces are most likely
19:57the debris that we found on the runway.
20:00We found that the hot section
20:01was basically corncobbed, as we say.
20:04There was not many blades left in the hot section,
20:07and there was metal all over the place.
20:10What caused the blades to break?
20:13Let's get some of these parts out on the table.
20:16We wanted to further tear down the engine.
20:19We wanted to look at the failures under the microscope.
20:21We wanted to look at the metallurgical aspects
20:23of the failure.
20:24We wanted to look to see if there was a bird strike.
20:28Investigators begin by examining components
20:30from the hot section
20:32in search of pre-existing defects.
20:36Managed to remove the sediment from the nozzle vein.
20:45Nozzle guide veins direct the hot air flow
20:48in the combustion chamber
20:49to the blades of the high-pressure turbine,
20:52causing them to spin.
21:13It looks like there's a fatigue crack
21:15in the nozzle guide vein.
21:19Investigators find evidence of fatigue cracks
21:22in two of the left engine's nozzle guide veins.
21:26This type of cracking occurs over time,
21:28and as the engine ages,
21:30these cracks get slightly larger,
21:32and eventually they will fail,
21:34and it will destroy the entire engine.
21:39If this was a progressive failure,
21:41why wasn't it caught earlier?
21:45This type of cracking is typical of an older engine,
21:48and it's a progressive failure.
21:49So that gets us into the question of
21:51what was the maintenance history,
21:52what was the inspection criteria
21:53that was used by the operator?
21:57Investigators look into the engine's repair history.
22:02It looks like the left engine
22:04was completely overhauled four years ago.
22:07When would have been the last time
22:09they looked at the nozzle guide veins?
22:11During the hot section maintenance inspection,
22:13which was last year.
22:16Any mention of cracking?
22:17Any work done on any of them?
22:21Inspections of the hot section
22:23are meant to catch fatigue cracks.
22:25So why weren't these found?
22:28Since this was an Algerian-registered aircraft,
22:31it falls under the authority
22:32of the Algerian Civil Aviation Authority
22:35for oversight of the inspection,
22:37not the FAA,
22:39which typically has more stringent requirements.
22:42The crack formed at some point.
22:44It was missed during the inspection last year.
22:47It grew and grew until a point of failure,
22:49and then blew out at takeoff.
22:51That explains why the engine failed.
22:54Not why the plane stalled.
22:57Pilots are expected to demonstrate their ability
23:00to fly out of a situation
23:03either on takeoff or landing
23:05where they've lost an engine.
23:07Investigators examine the crew's training records
23:10to determine if they knew how to handle
23:12a single engine failure on takeoff.
23:17The first officer's last exercise
23:19in engine failure during takeoff
23:21was four months ago.
23:22The captain's training was even more recent,
23:24only two months before the crash.
23:26They both should have known
23:27what to do in this situation.
23:31They've got the airplane veering to the left.
23:35There's no way they didn't know
23:36that engine failed.
23:39So what did they actually do?
23:46Investigators prepare to listen
23:48to the cockpit voice recorder
23:49from Air Algerie Flight 6289.
23:54It was very important for us
23:55to listen to the CVR
23:56to determine how the pilots
23:58dealt with this engine failure.
24:00Got it queued up
24:01to right before takeoff.
24:05V-1, rotate.
24:19They hear the sound of the engine failing
24:22five seconds after takeoff.
24:25Bismillah.
24:26What's going on?
24:29Let go, let go.
24:30I let go, I let go.
24:35They transferred control
24:37in the middle of an emergency.
24:39That didn't even sound
24:40like a proper transfer.
24:41He just took the controls.
24:43For another pilot
24:45to take control
24:46from the pilot who is flying,
24:49the pilot needs to say,
24:50I've got it.
24:51Taking control of the airplane
24:53without saying he was taking control
24:55made things worse for him
24:56and for the first officer.
24:58The captain is the pilot monitoring.
25:00He shouldn't be taking over.
25:01He should be diagnosing the problem.
25:04So, do either of them
25:06identify a left engine failure?
25:10After handing over control
25:11to the captain,
25:12the first officer realizes
25:14they aren't properly configured
25:16to climb with only one engine.
25:20Get up or are we okay?
25:22But there's no response
25:24from the captain.
25:27We have a small problem,
25:2860 to 89.
25:2960 to 89,
25:30come at us.
25:34Just seconds
25:35after the engine failure,
25:36the situation deteriorates
25:38as the plane begins to stall.
25:45There are no attempts
25:47by the pilots
25:47to work together
25:48to identify
25:49or troubleshoot the problem.
25:52Let go.
25:52Take your hand away.
25:53I let go.
25:54I let go.
25:54Let go.
25:55Take your hand away.
25:56I let go.
25:57Don't think.
25:59Seconds later,
26:00the ground proximity warning activates,
26:02indicating the plane
26:03is getting dangerously close
26:05to the ground.
26:08Please!
26:09Take your hand away.
26:11Both pilots really didn't know
26:13what the other was doing,
26:14didn't know what the other
26:15expected of them,
26:16and may well have been working
26:18at cross purposes.
26:19and as a result of that,
26:21the team performance broke down.
26:25Don't think.
26:27Don't think.
26:32I don't hear a single mention
26:33of engine failure.
26:35And why was he telling her
26:36to let go so many times?
26:38Was she trying to take back
26:39control of the plane?
26:40Which one of them
26:41is actually flying the plane?
26:43When all is said and done,
26:45the pilots did not work together.
26:47Without more information
26:48from the flight data recorder,
26:49we really don't know exactly
26:51what they did
26:52to control the airplane.
26:54Investigators turned
26:55to the flight data recorder,
26:57or FDR,
26:58from flight 6289,
27:00to determine how the pilots
27:02tried to recover
27:02from the loss
27:03of the left engine.
27:05Flight data recorders
27:06are important to investigators
27:08because it gives them
27:09information on how
27:11the pilots were operating
27:13the airplane
27:13and how they were managing
27:15the critical situation
27:17they were in.
27:19Not much here.
27:21Older plane,
27:22older FDR.
27:25It doesn't actually tell us
27:26how the pilots were handling
27:27the engine failure.
27:30Because we only had
27:31five parameters on the FDR,
27:33we had to go to Boeing
27:34and ask for a detailed
27:36aircraft performance analysis.
27:38to determine
27:38what happened
27:40on this accident flight.
27:43Using the FDR's
27:45limited data,
27:46Boeing's performance study
27:48includes a reconstruction
27:49of engine operations
27:51and flight controls
27:52in the final moments
27:53of the flight.
27:56So, there is the left engine
27:59losing its thrust
28:00after it blows out.
28:02That's odd.
28:03The data from
28:05the fully functioning
28:06right engine
28:07shows something
28:08unexpected.
28:10Look at the thrust
28:11from the right engine.
28:12Yes, it seems to be
28:13going up and down.
28:15But we know
28:15it was working fine.
28:17That can only mean
28:18one thing.
28:23Bismillah.
28:24What's going on?
28:26The team finds evidence
28:27of thrust being added
28:29to the right engine
28:31Let's go, let's go.
28:32And then pulled back.
28:34I let go, I let go.
28:37When one engine fails,
28:39what you need
28:40is maximum power
28:41on the other engine,
28:43not reduce it.
28:45So, thrust is pulled down,
28:47then back up,
28:49then down,
28:50then back up again.
28:53We have a small
28:54problem, 6289.
28:566289,
28:57Tom and Hudson.
29:02Let go.
29:06It's as if they were
29:07having some sort of
29:09tug of war.
29:10They shouldn't have been.
29:12First officer did
29:13the right thing
29:14by increasing the power
29:15of the right engine.
29:17What likely happened
29:19is that the captain
29:19wasn't fully aware
29:20of which engine had failed.
29:22However, the first officer
29:24knew that the left engine
29:25had failed
29:26and was trying to push up
29:27the throttle
29:28on the right engine
29:29to keep them from stalling.
29:34Let go.
29:34Take your hand away.
29:35I let go.
29:36I let go.
29:36Let go.
29:37Take your hand away.
29:38Let go.
29:39I let go.
29:40Don't think.
29:41Don't think.
29:44The captain's basically
29:45telling the first officer
29:46to get out of his way,
29:48to leave him alone,
29:49to let him be in charge
29:53of the airplane by himself,
29:54which he was.
29:56Knowing that the left engine
29:57had failed,
29:58the first officer
29:58might have been trying
29:59to help things out
30:00by increasing the power
30:01on the right engine.
30:04Please.
30:04Take your hand away.
30:11The moment the captain
30:12reduced the thrust
30:13on the right engine
30:14and never returned it
30:15to takeoff thrust,
30:17with the gear down,
30:18it doomed the flight.
30:22Pilots should have been
30:22able to work together
30:23to recover the plane.
30:26These planes are designed
30:27to fly with a team.
30:29Pilot flying,
30:30pilot not flying,
30:31both have very specific roles
30:33that they are trained
30:34to do,
30:37but especially
30:38in emergencies.
30:39They stay in their roles,
30:40they help each other,
30:42they work as a team,
30:42and this crash
30:44could have been avoided
30:45if they would have done that.
30:48Why didn't the crew
30:49of Air Algerie
30:51Flight 6289
30:52work together
30:53to prevent the loss
30:55of 102 lives?
30:59Okay,
31:00I'll cue it up
31:01to the pre-flight
31:02preparations.
31:05Investigators
31:06returned to the cockpit
31:07voice recording
31:08of Flight 6289
31:10to understand
31:11why there was
31:12a lack of coordination
31:13between the two pilots.
31:26They listen
31:27as the first officer
31:28works through
31:29the pre-flight checklist.
31:31They're surprised
31:32by what they don't hear.
31:35Where's the captain?
31:37Is she doing
31:38the flight preparation
31:39by herself?
31:48We found that
31:49the first officer
31:50was actually
31:51in the cockpit
31:52by herself
31:53conducting most
31:53of the pre-flight
31:54work without
31:56the captain.
32:00It's unusual
32:01for the captain
32:02not to be present
32:03during the pre-flight
32:04because there are
32:04responsibilities
32:05that the captain
32:06has to get
32:07his side of the
32:08airplane ready.
32:10It's just
32:10inappropriate
32:11for the captain
32:12not to be
32:13in the cockpit
32:14during the pre-flight
32:15and it's actually
32:16kind of rude.
32:18It's only after
32:19the first officer
32:20completes the pre-flight
32:22preparations
32:23that the captain
32:24enters the cockpit.
32:25The last Q&H,
32:271019.
32:281019, Roger.
32:30Good afternoon,
32:31Captain.
32:32How are we looking?
32:33Good.
32:34I completed
32:35the pre-flight
32:35checklist.
32:36I tested your oxygen
32:37and everything
32:39is set to go.
32:40Good, good.
32:43Captain Benwisha
32:44is late,
32:45leaving his responsibilities
32:47to the first officer.
32:48When the captain
32:49showed up,
32:50he was not
32:51in the mindset
32:51of getting brought
32:53up to speed
32:54or being part
32:55of the team
32:55of setting
32:55the cockpit
32:56up for the flight.
33:01Heading.
33:02Zero, two, zero.
33:05Altitude?
33:07Investigators
33:07then hear
33:08the pilots
33:08performing
33:09their before-start
33:10checklist.
33:11Two, eight, zero.
33:13You know,
33:13I could have been
33:14on the team
33:15with those boys
33:16back there.
33:16Give me a break.
33:18Who's the third voice?
33:20Flight attendant?
33:23The only male
33:24flight attendant
33:25is the chief
33:25flight attendant.
33:31As part of the
33:32checklist,
33:33the first officer
33:33reviews the
33:34takeoff speeds.
33:38V1, 144 knots.
33:42VR, 146 knots.
33:43You're saying
33:43you were good enough
33:45to turn pro?
33:46Yeah.
33:47I was a good footy
33:48blayer.
33:49You wanted a scout
33:50to come watch me
33:50blayer.
33:51Yeah, they were
33:51scouting you
33:52to mow the pitch.
33:56V2, 150 knots.
33:57Okay, that's enough.
33:58I understand.
33:59Can we go?
34:01I got it.
34:02I got it.
34:02Let's go.
34:08So the captain
34:09is just carrying
34:09on a conversation
34:10with his friend
34:11while they're doing
34:11their before-start
34:12checklist.
34:13What is even worse
34:14is he cuts her off
34:14before they could
34:15even finish it.
34:18One of the most
34:19important parts
34:20of the information
34:21that she was trying
34:22to give were
34:23the takeoff speeds
34:24and then there
34:26should have been
34:26a briefing
34:28of an engine
34:29failure departure
34:31at this airport
34:33that was a special
34:34departure that needed
34:35to be briefed.
34:35It was ignored.
34:39Did the captain
34:40become more focused
34:42once they began
34:43to taxi?
34:44Roger.
34:45Taxi for runway
34:46at zero two.
34:48What investigators
34:49find most shocking
34:51is what they hear
34:52next.
34:57where are we eating
34:58tonight?
34:59That place
34:59across from the hotel.
35:01Oh, you always
35:03go back to the same
35:03place.
35:04I like what I like.
35:06We are now
35:07cheers.
35:08Plenty of good
35:08spots to eat.
35:10They are completely
35:11distracted.
35:13They're violating
35:13every sterile
35:14cockpit rule.
35:16During critical
35:17phases of flight,
35:18extraneous conversations
35:20and non-essential
35:20conversations between
35:22the crew members
35:22are prohibited.
35:23Not only is the
35:24captain dismissing
35:25the first officer,
35:26he has this casual
35:28attitude about basic
35:29safety practices.
35:31It's possible he was
35:32more interested in
35:33talking to the flight
35:34attendant than reviewing
35:36the briefing with the
35:37first officer.
35:38It's possible that he
35:39had been through so
35:40many pre-flight takeoff
35:42briefings that at that
35:43time, he felt it was
35:44unnecessary.
35:56As a result of his
35:58dismissive attitude,
36:00the captain is
36:01unprepared to properly
36:02respond when the
36:03crisis occurs shortly
36:05after takeoff.
36:10Had the pilots
36:11completed their
36:12pre-flight safety
36:13briefing, their
36:14response to the
36:15engine failure might
36:16have been very
36:16different.
36:24Gear up.
36:28Engine failure,
36:29left engine.
36:30Fly V2 plus 25.
36:33Lowering the nose to
36:3412 degrees.
36:35V2.
36:37Gear up.
36:39Once the plane was
36:41stabilized, the pilots
36:42could have returned
36:43safely to the airport.
36:45Engine failure is
36:46actually a relatively
36:47common occurrence.
36:49Every pilot needs to be
36:50prepared and trained.
36:52So instead of letting
36:53the first officer fly the
36:55plane while he diagnoses
36:56the issue, he tries to do
36:57everything himself.
36:58And transferring control
36:59during an emergency
37:01situation.
37:03There was never a
37:04positive transfer of
37:05control.
37:06The captain just took the
37:07control yoke away from the
37:10first officer, so he
37:12injected himself in the
37:14emergency.
37:19Let go, let go.
37:20I let go, I let go.
37:22The captain took control
37:24at the worst possible time
37:26when he was out of the loop
37:27and by not assigning
37:29responsibility to her, he
37:30gave himself the
37:31responsibility of doing two
37:32things at once, diagnosing
37:34the nature of the engine
37:35problem, and then flying
37:37the airplane.
37:40Please!
37:41By trying to fly the
37:42plane and diagnose the
37:44problem on his own, the
37:46captain took on too much.
37:49It put the first officer in a
37:51very difficult position.
37:53She's now in the
37:55supportive role, the
37:56non-flying role, waiting to
37:58be told what to do.
37:59And he's not giving any
38:01helpful orders other than
38:03let go.
38:07Why would an experienced
38:09captain so brazenly dismiss
38:11his first officer's help,
38:13risking the lives of
38:15everyone on board?
38:21Investigators look into the
38:22pilot's backgrounds in an
38:24attempt to understand why the
38:26captain took over from his
38:27first officer in the midst of
38:29an emergency.
38:31So the captain actually had
38:33twice as many flying hours as
38:34the first officer.
38:36The captain was both
38:38qualified as a captain on a
38:39737, but also as a first
38:41officer on a 767.
38:44Perhaps his attitude was that
38:46flying the 737 was not that
38:48big of a deal because I fly a
38:50767, which is much more
38:52sophisticated and highly
38:53technical.
38:55But she had more hours on the
38:57737.
38:58Not only did she have more
38:59experience flying the 737,
39:02that's the only plane that she
39:03was flying.
39:05I think there's a good chance
39:06that had she been left alone,
39:08she would have flown the
39:09airplane out of the scenario
39:11that we saw in this accident.
39:13The question is, would he have
39:15reacted the same way if the
39:17first officer was a man?
39:20In 2003, at the time of this
39:22crash, here in the States,
39:25female airline pilots only
39:26constituted less than 6% of the
39:29pilot population.
39:30And it really hasn't changed that
39:32much in the 20 years since then.
39:35The first officer was Algeria's
39:38first female commercial airline
39:40pilot.
39:41My friend, male pilots in this
39:44part of the world aren't used to
39:47sharing a cockpit with women.
39:51I think Algeria is becoming fairly
39:53westernized, but in some cultures
39:55there is the feeling that a man has
39:57to be up in the cockpit in case
39:58anything goes wrong.
40:00Why did this captain take control
40:02from the first officer when she was
40:04doing an okay job at that point?
40:06And I think you can't rule out the
40:08possibility that there may have
40:09been some gender stereotyping on his
40:13part that played a role in it.
40:16Sadly, this accident was totally
40:18preventable.
40:24Investigators now have a clear
40:26picture of what led to the crash of
40:29flight 6289.
40:32V1, 144 knots.
40:36VR, 146 knots.
40:37You're saying you were good enough
40:39to turn pro?
40:40After arriving late and allowing
40:42the flight attendant into the
40:43cockpit, the captain interrupted a
40:46crucial pre-flight safety briefing.
40:49V2, 150 knots.
40:51Okay, that's enough.
40:52I understand.
40:54Can we go?
40:55I got it, I got it.
40:56Let's go.
40:57The captain demonstrated a lax
40:59attitude towards cockpit protocols.
41:04Fatigue cracks in a nozzle guide
41:06vane in the plane's left engine were
41:08reaching their braking point.
41:10And when the guide vane failed,
41:14it set off a chain reaction.
41:16High-speed metal fragments ripped the
41:18engine apart.
41:21Let's go, let's go.
41:22I let go, I let go.
41:23When crisis struck, the captain decided he
41:27needed to be the one to handle the
41:29controls and took over flying from his
41:31first officer before even identifying the
41:34problem.
41:36The engine failure alone was not the cause
41:38of this accident.
41:39Engines fail and pilots are trained to
41:42handle those emergencies.
41:46Failing to retract the landing gear after
41:49the engine failure made recovery more
41:51difficult.
41:52Let go, take your hand away.
41:54I let go, I let go.
41:55Let go, take your hand away.
41:57I let go.
42:05It was the captain's assumption of
42:07control of the aircraft without properly
42:09identifying the nature of the emergency,
42:12his failure to raise the landing gear and
42:15his lack of adherence to standard operating
42:18procedures that eventually doomed the flight.
42:23As a result of this accident, Algeria's
42:27Commission of Inquiry makes several
42:29recommendations.
42:31They recommend that Air Algerie, along with
42:34other operators, ensure that their crew
42:36resource management training programs
42:39emphasize the importance of handover
42:41procedures and task sharing in the cockpit.
42:45But in the 1980s, they had captains who were
42:48trying to fly a team airplane solo.
42:53So a lot of training went into it to teach that
42:56your best resource is your team.
42:59You support each other and work together as a team
43:02for the safety of the airplane.
43:05The fact that the captain insisted on taking over
43:07control of the airplane at that critical moment
43:12cost everybody on that airplane their lives.
43:17I felt particularly affected when I saw that
43:21the accident was preventable.
43:23And I think the investigators did the best job they could
43:26trying to discover why the crew made the errors
43:28that they did.
43:29The next time that happens, people won't die
43:31as a result of that.
43:34For Lynn Rippelmeyer, it's one more example of why
43:38the industry needs to continue evolving.
43:41The airlines now are much more open to hiring women,
43:47to not having gender bias, realizing that women do
43:50have a lot to contribute to the industry.
43:55And I think it's up to women now to step up to the plate
43:58and take the opportunities that the career offers.
44:01They're amazing.
44:02I think it's up to you to be able to do that.
44:03It's up to you.
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