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00:00A private charter jet is flying 15 passengers to Aspen, Colorado, for a party.
00:07This flight really captured the public attention because of the people on board.
00:13Poor weather makes the landing a challenge for the experienced pilots.
00:17Can you see out there at all yet?
00:20No.
00:21Aspen is considered one of the most dangerous airports in the country.
00:25As the plane nears the runway, the controller watches as disaster unfolds.
00:33What are they doing?
00:38Investigators examine the Gulf Stream's wreckage for answers.
00:42I don't see any issues here.
00:45When they learn about the passengers' behavior...
00:49We're running out of fuel here for the birthday boy!
00:52The moving parts of this mystery fall into place.
00:56That clearly had to put some pressure on the pilots to say,
00:58all right, this is not looking good.
01:02D-Day, D-Day!
01:06Oh, fuck!
01:24The sun has just set over the Colorado mountains.
01:28Avjet November 303 Gulf Alpha is nearing the end of its journey to Aspen.
01:33Well, there's the edge of the night there.
01:38Yep.
01:40Captain Robert Frisbee has almost 10,000 flying hours to his credit.
01:46What time is official sunset?
01:49He and First Officer Peter Kowalczyk have been flying together for close to five months.
01:56628.
01:59Both pilots have been with Avjet for less than a year.
02:04The small charter airline is based out of Burbank, California.
02:11Avjet catered to high rollers, business people, people who could afford to charter a jet.
02:16People who had to get there in a hurry, but do it in style.
02:21We're running out of fuel here for the birthday boy!
02:26A Miami financier chartered this flight for 14 of his friends to attend a birthday party at an exclusive venue
02:34in Aspen.
02:35This was a group of friends who seemed to have had tremendous early achievements and accomplishments and they were really
02:43going to go places.
02:47So 4,800 pounds, 126.
02:50It was 50.
02:51You know what? I adjusted it because the fuel was way off.
02:56The pilots are flying a Gulfstream 3.
03:01The Gulfstream is a luxurious plane that, you know, people see in the movies and people think high rollers and
03:09movie stars flying.
03:10But it's a workhorse plane. It actually has a good reputation.
03:15It's a 90-minute flight from Los Angeles to Aspen.
03:23Gulfstream 303 Gulf Alpha, Aspen reduced speed to 210 or slower.
03:29The controller slows down the Gulfstream to maintain a safe distance from the other planes heading into Aspen.
03:38210 or slower, 3 Gulf Alpha.
03:4517 minutes from landing, the pilots begin their descent.
03:51Aspen-Pitkin County Airport, also known as Sardi Field, is about 3 miles northwest of Aspen.
03:58Landing on its single runway is a challenge.
04:03Aspen is considered one of the most dangerous airports in the country.
04:08The runway is not long and it is in close proximity to high terrain on all sides.
04:19Hey, do you remember that crazy guy in the Lear when we were in Aspen last time?
04:24It was, I can see the airport, but he couldn't see it.
04:30Set you up on the approach.
04:31Okay.
04:33The landing is made even more difficult, with the final stage needing to be carried out visually.
04:39As the plane nears Aspen, a beacon guides it to the airport.
04:44But it doesn't lead it directly to the runway.
04:48Once the airport is in sight, the pilots must line up with the runway visually.
04:53Because of the high terrain and close proximity to the final approach course, the minimum altitude is a couple thousand
05:01feet above the ground.
05:02And we must be visual by that time to safely continue our descent down to a landing.
05:09And tonight, the weather isn't making landing any easier.
05:15And if at any time it's snowing, it's very hard to acquire that visual reference to safely descend further to
05:24a landing.
05:28Residential noise restrictions around the airport leave the pilots only nine minutes until the landing curfew at 6.58.
05:35The crew is cutting it close.
05:40Can you see out there at all yet?
05:44Uh...
05:46No.
05:49Coaststream 3 Gulf Alpha, heading 050.
05:54Heading 050, 3 Gulf Alpha.
05:58As the pilots prepare to line up with the runway, passengers get ready for landing.
06:12Synchronizer's off.
06:14There is just enough fuel for one landing attempt.
06:17After that, the pilots will have to divert to another airport.
06:21Okay, it's off.
06:25Hydraulic pressure's good.
06:28Gulfstream 3 Gulf Alpha, turn heading 140, intercept final approach course maintenance.
06:331-6000.
06:35Eight minutes from the airport, the controller gives the crew clearance to commence the approach.
06:411-4-0, 1-6000, intercept final approach course 3 Gulf Alpha.
06:501-6000.
06:56As the pilots get their final intercept to the airport...
07:02Challenger 7, Juliet Alpha, you have the airport in sight.
07:06Another aircraft, also on approach to Aspen, updates the controller.
07:11Uh, that's a negative. Going around.
07:15Those pilots aboard their landing, because they can't see the runway.
07:22Attention all aircraft, last aircraft went missed.
07:26What?
07:27Went missed.
07:29Went missed?
07:31Damn.
07:32That's not good.
07:35If you can't successfully land the aircraft, then a missed approach is a procedure that pilots will execute to return
07:42to a safe altitude.
07:45As the Gulf Stream gets closer to the airport, the weather deteriorates.
07:59Coldstream 3 Gulf Alpha, five miles from Red Table, cross Red Table, at or above 1-4000, clear VOR DME
08:07-Charlie approach.
08:09The controller clears the pilots to begin the final approach, 11 miles from the airport.
08:18You have to be configured properly, at the right altitude, at the right speed. Otherwise, you are expected to execute
08:25a missed approach.
08:27Red Table at 1-4000, cleared for VOR approach. Gulf Stream 303 Gulf Alpha.
08:34Here we go.
08:38As the pilots get closer to the airport, they're counting on the weather to improve for their landing.
08:45Ascending to 1-4000.
08:48Problems can escalate very quickly when flying into Aspen.
08:53There's really no room to recover without breaking off that approach or trying it again.
09:00Landing flaps.
09:02Landing flaps.
09:04Just over two minutes from landing, instruments have successfully guided the pilots to the airport.
09:10Now it's up to them to identify the runway.
09:14You see the runway?
09:21Gulf Stream 3 Gulf Alpha, you have the runway in sight?
09:27Affirmative.
09:28Yeah, now we do.
09:29Runway in sight, 3 Gulf Alpha.
09:32Gulf Stream 3 Gulf Alpha, visual. Roger.
09:351,000.
09:371,000.
09:381,000 to go.
09:39The pilots are now less than a minute from landing.
09:52200.
09:53At the last moment, they realize something is wrong.
09:58Go! Go! Go! Go! Go! Go! Go!
10:16Avjet 303 Gulf Alpha crashes just short of the runway at Aspen.
10:23Aircraft identification, Gulf Stream 303 Gulf Alpha.
10:27Aircraft location, it was north of the runway, approximately the Shale Bluffs area.
10:34Emergency vehicles rush to the scene in the hope that there are survivors of the crash of Avjet 303 Gulf
10:42Alpha.
10:51But all 18 people on board are dead. All 15 passengers, the two pilots and the flight attendant.
11:06This flight really captured the media and the public attention because of the people on board.
11:14There were a lot of very young, talented people.
11:23Put everything from the tail section over there.
11:27By the following day, investigators are on site.
11:33Thousands of passengers fly charter airplanes every year, encompassing 2.5 million flight hours annually.
11:42So trying to understand why this accident occurred was significant.
11:52Let me see that.
11:54Within hours, the plane's cockpit voice recorder, or CVR, is retrieved from the wreckage.
12:00Let's get the data pulled from that ASAP.
12:03What about a flight data recorder?
12:11Looks like there wasn't one.
12:14Okay.
12:16Because the airplane was manufactured in 1980 and registered in 1981, it was not required to have an FDR.
12:25While the CVR is sent for analysis, investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board wonder why the pilots weren't able
12:34to land safely.
12:35The plane crashed 2,400 feet from the runway.
12:40When an aircraft crashes short of runway, especially a sophisticated airplane like a Gulfstream jet, a number of questions arise
12:47here.
12:47How did they get there?
12:48What possible factors could the crew have?
12:51Was there some sort of a failure in the aircraft?
12:56Take a look at this.
12:58What do you think caused that?
13:00There's a deep ground scar at the crash site.
13:06That would do it.
13:09Investigators conclude that it was formed when the left wing hit the ground.
13:14When an airplane comes through trees or vegetation as it approaches the ground, it cuts off branches.
13:22And we can look at those branches and the angles that are made to understand the airplane's attitude as it
13:29came into the ground and its descent profile.
13:34Left wing struck the trees at about 49 degrees.
13:42That's a hell of a bank.
13:49There is no operationally relevant reason for an airplane to be banked at 49 degrees that close to the airport
13:56or that close to the ground.
13:59Maybe they lost control of the plane.
14:03When we see an aircraft in an abnormal attitude, we've got to look at, did something happen where the pilots
14:10couldn't keep it level?
14:11The plane's position gives investigators a promising lead.
14:16Engine failure?
14:19The loss of thrust resulting from an engine failure on one side can yaw the airplane, and if not appropriately
14:27managed by the pilots in a timely fashion, can lead to a loss of control.
14:34Aside from the impact damage, there's no sign of fire to the exterior.
14:39The team studies the engine's compressor blades to determine if the engines were functioning when the plane hit the ground.
14:48When the Gulfstream 3's engines are working, the compressor blades spin in a clockwise direction.
14:55If the engines were still functioning when the plane crashed, these blades would be bent counterclockwise or in the opposite
15:02direction.
15:07You know, these are all bent counterclockwise, so it wasn't an engine failure.
15:13Our examination of the engines showed that there was no pre-existing damage, no evidence of an in-flight fire,
15:21and also showed that they were operating normally and at high power at the time of the impact.
15:27Let's take a look at the rudder.
15:30An airplane operating at a low airspeed while the rudder moves to an extreme limit could introduce a rolling moment
15:40or also stall one of the wings, which would further exacerbate the rolling moment.
15:48Investigators examine the actuator that controls the rudder's movement.
15:52The piston is completely intact.
15:56No sign of any damage.
16:01There was no pre-existing conditions or failures that would have explained the accident. The airplane was functioning normally.
16:09If mechanical failure didn't cause the roll, what went wrong on approach?
16:16Determining the airplane's flight path helps us understand how that airplane got to the accident site. What was it doing?
16:24Where was it flying? How fast was it going?
16:28Have a look at this radar data.
16:32With no flight data recorder, investigators turn to Aspen's radar information to reconstruct the Gulf Stream's descent profile.
16:44Using the radar position and time, so the altitude and position of the aircraft, the performance engineers can extract the
16:51speed of the aircraft. How fast is it descending? Is that appropriate for the approach that they're trying to do?
17:00Here's what we've got.
17:03This is the approach they should have flown.
17:07Investigators examine the path the pilots were required to follow into Aspen.
17:13Due to the rising terrain away from the airport, Aspen at this time had a step-down approach, which from
17:21a profile looks like stairs. The pilots will step down to an altitude based on the terrain availability.
17:30Pilots cannot descend below that altitude until they reach another fix or another distance.
17:40And here's the descent the pilots actually flew.
17:44The radar data shows the Avjet flight deviated from the published descent profile.
17:51Four miles out, they dropped 300 feet below the minimum. And a mile later, they dropped 900 feet below the
17:59minimum altitude.
17:59And they stayed that way. They flew in very low.
18:06If you go below a minimum altitude before you are allowed to, then you no longer can guarantee the safety
18:14of that aircraft.
18:22Why would they do that?
18:25Because the pilots did not fly this approach to standards, we wanted to look into their backgrounds and training to
18:32better understand why the accident may have occurred.
18:40Why did the pilots of Avjet 303 Gulf Alpha not follow the prescribed approach procedure into Aspen?
18:50The captain passed his last proficiency check.
18:53So did the first officer just a couple months ago.
18:58Investigators learn that all Avjet pilots are trained to land in mountainous terrain like Aspen.
19:05And they both flew into Aspen together twice before, without incident.
19:11No accidents. No reprimands.
19:16Even the captain's driving record is spotless.
19:21So looking into the background of this flight crew, we really didn't see anything that stood out.
19:25They were both well-qualified, well-trained, and experienced to fly this airplane and make this trip.
19:31And they both got plenty of sleep before the flight, so fatigue isn't an issue.
19:36In fact, I don't see any issues here.
19:41This doesn't make any sense.
19:46Why would two well-trained pilots fly so recklessly below the limits?
19:53No matter whether you're a charter pilot or an airline pilot or even just a personal general aviation pilot,
19:59you know, our number one job is safety.
20:01Regulations are there for a reason.
20:03What is it that could lead a good flight crew to go beyond those safety limits?
20:10That's...
20:12Okay, so...
20:13We know the pilots landed at Aspen twice before with that incident.
20:17What was different this time?
20:21Maybe they were trying to get eyes on the runway?
20:25Pull up the weather.
20:36It was important to understand exactly what was going on with the weather in terms of the layers of clouds,
20:43whether they were solid or broken, to understand what capability these pilots may have had to see objects on the
20:52ground.
20:53The crash was at 7.02 PM. Back it up to about 6.30 PM.
21:00They would have been flying in and out of some pretty heavy cloud here.
21:04So...
21:05Maybe they didn't have a clear line on the runway.
21:08Okay, but these are seasoned pilots. They should know if you don't see the runway...
21:12You don't try to land on it.
21:13And yet they did try to land on it.
21:14And they missed by almost half a mile, so...
21:17Did they see the runway or not?
21:21We should talk to the controller.
21:26An air traffic controller can tell you what the visibility is, what the weather conditions were,
21:33what other airplanes were doing in terms of coming into the airport,
21:37and provide eyewitness testimony about the time of the accident.
21:41But they also can help us understand communications that they had with the airplane.
21:49So, did they give you any indication at all that they were having trouble seeing the runway?
21:54No. Quite the opposite.
21:56I asked them if they could see the runway, and they confirmed that they did.
22:00Gulfstream 3 Gulf Alpha, you have the runway in sight?
22:04Yeah, runway in sight, 3 Gulf Alpha.
22:07Gulfstream 3 Gulf Alpha, visual. Roger.
22:13I made extra sure to confirm, because I couldn't see them. The weather was so bad.
22:20Did you have any reason to doubt the pilots?
22:24Not at the time.
22:26But...
22:28Here's what's so odd.
22:30They confirmed they had visual, but then when they came out of the clouds, they were headed to the right
22:34of the airport.
22:45What are they doing?
22:55I don't think they realized they weren't headed for the runway until the last second.
23:02When we put those pieces together, you know, that the pilots did report on the radio, they had the runway
23:06in sight,
23:06we had to ask ourselves, did they really? Did they really see the runway?
23:10Um, might they have engaged in a little wishful thinking?
23:16This leaves investigators with a troubling question.
23:23They couldn't see the runway. Why did they go ahead with the landing?
23:27Maybe they were under some kind of pressure.
23:31We needed to know the purpose of this flight, its schedule, and the pilots' activities before they departed for Aspen.
23:39Looking into what happened before the flight took off from L.A.
23:44can help us gain insight into what might have been going on during the flight.
23:54So sorry to keep you waiting.
23:56No problem at all.
23:58To understand why the pilots were so intent upon landing in Aspen,
24:03NTSB investigators speak to the Avjet coordinator who managed Flight 303 Gulf Alpha.
24:10The charter coordinators communicated with the pilots moments before the flight departed Los Angeles.
24:18They would have insights into what was concerning the pilots,
24:22what they were trying to accomplish, and some of the decisions being made.
24:29Did you talk to the captain on the day of the flight?
24:32Oh, yes. And there were some problems right from the start.
24:35Really? How so?
24:36Well, the flight was supposed to leave at 4.30.
24:39At 4.15, he called to say the passengers still hadn't shown up.
24:45Well, if the passengers don't show up soon with the long taxi out to the runway,
24:50we won't make it to Aspen in time.
24:52So what are you suggesting?
24:54Well, we may need to divert.
24:58The captain was worried that because of the 7 p.m. noise curfew at Aspen,
25:02he might have to go to Rifle instead, which is about 60 miles away.
25:06So he knew about the noise curfew, and he had a plan to divert if he needed?
25:10Absolutely.
25:14They knew that Rifle Colorado Airport was nearby.
25:17They had planned for alternatives even before they left,
25:19which is exactly what a crew should be doing.
25:23When did the passengers board?
25:25They didn't start boarding till around 4.30.
25:29Then what happened?
25:31About 10 minutes later, I got a phone call from the client's personal assistant,
25:35and he told me the client was very upset.
25:41What's this about diverting to Rifle?
25:44What do you mean?
25:46Once the passengers boarded, there was a call by the charter customer's assistant
25:55expressing concern that the crew had told the passengers
26:00that they might have to go to another airport.
26:03Welcome. Welcome.
26:04Given the delay in boarding, looks like we may have to divert the rifle.
26:12So the client had his assistant call me.
26:17So my boss wants you to tell the pilot to, well, keep his mouth shut around the passengers.
26:23And if he has anything to say, save it until he gets there, and then they can talk it over.
26:29Understood. There's nothing to worry about. I'll take care of it.
26:33Thank you very much for letting me know.
26:38So, of course, safety comes first. But we wanted to keep the client happy.
26:44Did this make it back to the captain?
26:46Yes, I called him right away.
26:49The client's very upset. He doesn't want you speaking to any of the passengers anymore.
26:53Only to him.
26:54Understood. Okay. Don't mention diverting.
26:58Thank you so much.
26:59Yeah.
27:04He was worried that he was going to disappoint our boss, maybe even get into trouble for upsetting the client,
27:11but he wouldn't get into trouble.
27:14In a charter operation, the needs of your passengers are front and center. You're fully aware of them. And in
27:20a situation where a group of people are going to add dinner, and that's the only reason they're taking this
27:27trip. If they can't satisfy that timeline, then there was no point of being on that aircraft.
27:34The captain was told not to upset the passengers. Did that instruction affect his decision about diverting his plane to
27:42rifle?
27:43And so this was all before they took off?
27:45Yes.
27:46And was that the last time you spoke to the captain?
27:48No. He called me again en route to Aspen.
27:52And what time was that?
27:546.30.
27:58We'll be landing in Aspen in about 20, 25 minutes, but we'll have to spend the night there.
28:03No problem. I can book your rooms.
28:05Hey, how are the passengers? Are they still upset?
28:10I don't think so.
28:11What about the client?
28:13I had a talk with the client. It's just really important to him that we make it to Aspen.
28:18Apparently, he's dropping a substantial amount of money on dinner.
28:23The client didn't want to go to Rifle. Rifle was more than 60 miles away. It would have taken them
28:28too long to get there.
28:29I see.
28:32Okay. Well, thank you very much for your time.
28:37Happy to help.
28:39I see.
28:40Although the pilots would be aware of the needs of their passengers, at no point can that supersede the professionalism
28:48of that crew.
28:49Your primary and only real job is the safety of that aircraft.
28:55You know, it seems they were under a lot of pressure to land, not only before the flight began, but
29:01even during the flight.
29:04Crash happened more than half an hour after that last call from the plane.
29:09Did commercial pressure influence the pilots to make a risky decision that cost the lives of 18 people?
29:17You know, this comes up all the time. Charter pilots often voice on chat rooms and complaint lines that they
29:26are pressured to keep people happy and do really difficult things just to satisfy a demanding customer.
29:32And it's dangerous.
29:36They still had time to correct the situation. So what happened in these final 30 minutes?
29:48It's here.
29:50NTSB investigators turned to the cockpit voice recorder of Avjet 303 Golf Alpha to understand why the pilots chose to
29:59land instead of diverting.
30:02We could learn about the crew's decision making and what they were doing from their conversations with each other,
30:07you know, how they were planning and using the information that was coming in as they approached Aspen.
30:15You know what, let's pick it up before they begin their final descent.
30:28Hey, do you remember that crazy guy in the Lear when you were in Aspen last time?
30:33It was, I could see the airport.
30:35But he couldn't see it.
30:38How's that?
30:43So, 14 minutes before the crash, they're ridiculing another pilot who tried to land without the runway in sight.
30:51Why did they do the same thing?
30:53At that point, they were still in the mode of, we're going to do this right, and even sort of
31:00made a joke about this one guy that didn't do it right.
31:07Okay.
31:11Okay.
31:11Okay, we'll shoot it from here.
31:13I mean, we're here, but we only get to do it once.
31:16Right, once.
31:18And then we get a rifle, right?
31:19Yeah, it's too late in the evening to come around.
31:26So, right there, they're talking about doing a missed approach.
31:31That was at 6.50, so two minutes later.
31:35Twelve minutes from the airport, the pilots confirmed their plan to divert if they needed to.
31:42As the crew was approaching Aspen, they were getting the idea that the weather was getting more difficult to get
31:48in, and they were having a conversation about this.
31:50They mentioned again, well, we might only have one shot at this, and we have to go to rifle.
31:55They were really saying the right things.
32:01Attention all aircraft, last aircraft went missed.
32:06What?
32:06You went missed.
32:08You went missed?
32:10Damn.
32:12That's not good.
32:16Nine minutes from crashing.
32:19They know the plane in front of them couldn't land.
32:22And they know it's a bad sign for them.
32:26That clearly had to put some pressure on them, say, all right, this is, uh, this is not looking good.
32:32It should have those pilots starting to get into the mindset of executing the missed approach rather than landing the
32:39aircraft.
32:40So, they know they shouldn't attempt the landing either.
32:43Up until now, they've been doing everything right by the book.
32:46Yeah.
32:47I wonder what changed.
32:51Investigators discover something unusual in the CVR transcripts.
32:56Huh.
32:59Looks like the flight attendant brought someone into the cockpit.
33:05About eight minutes before the accident, somebody came into the cockpit, one of the passengers.
33:11Thank you very much.
33:21You think it's the client?
33:25It's possible.
33:28Having somebody else up on the flight deck as you're conducting an approach into mountainous area at night in poor
33:37weather is not a good idea.
33:43Did the presence of a passenger in the cockpit play a role in the crash?
33:56Weather's going down.
33:59They're not making it in.
34:01As the crew got closer to Aspen, the weather worsened, making it more dangerous for planes to try to land.
34:09Oh, really?
34:11Oh, really?
34:15The only conversation that should be going on is between the crew about aspects of the flight.
34:20Here, having someone up there questioning their decision-making, questioning, you know, the weather and the operation is just such
34:27a distraction and a pressure to them.
34:30As the pilots approached the airport, the situation intensified.
34:36Challenge your 9-8 Romeo, your number one.
34:399-8 Romeo, negative visual, on the mist.
34:43They learned that the plane ahead of Avjet 303 Golf Alpha also missed their approach because they couldn't see the
34:51runway.
34:52It's too dangerous to land on that runway under these conditions.
34:57So what happened?
35:04Are we clear to land?
35:06Not yet.
35:07We just missed. The guy in front of us didn't make it either.
35:11Oh, really?
35:16Okay, so it sounds like this guy is sending the pilots a message.
35:20Exactly.
35:23O'Reilly may not sound like much, but after all those other things that had occurred, I think O'Reilly
35:30was a warning shot.
35:31Get this thing in Aspen.
35:34But the pilots still had one more chance to implement their backup plan to divert to another airport.
35:44Where's it at?
35:48So obviously they still can't see the runway.
35:53To the right.
35:55To the right.
36:02So instead of executing a missed approach, they're still looking for the runway, which is actually to their left.
36:08There was a river valley and some roads nearby. Might they have seen something they thought was the runway? You
36:14know, some lights of the village or whatnot. They believed they saw the runway, but that wasn't correct.
36:19They just keep flying lower and lower looking for the airport.
36:25They were just under way too much pressure to make good decisions.
36:31They had the night curfew. They had the time pressure, pressure from the client as well. And then with the
36:38weather coming in and out, as they stepped down, they'd catch glimpses now and then of the ground.
36:45500.
36:47Rev plus 5. Think rate. Think rate.
36:5222 seconds after crossing the missed approach point, Avjet 303 Golf Alpha hits the ground.
37:00About 9.
37:0922 seconds after crossing the ground.
37:12No, no, no, no.
37:16Oh, no!
37:17No!
37:18No!
37:18No!
37:26No!
37:27Em Los Angeles, eles estavam prontos para divertir.
37:32Depois, eles ficam fechados por falar sobre divertir,
37:35e o cliente dizem o quão importante o diner é.
37:38Topando tudo isso, o passageiro enters o cockpit.
37:41Então, quando eles chegam para Aspen...
37:43Eles foram boundas e determinadas para ir.
37:49Sabe, eles viram para os pilotos que estavam ridiculando.
37:53Todos os indicadores da nossa investigação
37:58mostram que esses dois pilotos eram bons pilotos.
38:02Uma vez que os pilotos descançados,
38:04sem o caminho de frente,
38:07o accidente foi inevitável.
38:12Eles continuaram pressionando,
38:13e, step-by-step,
38:15ficou pior e pior, até que eles descançaram muito baixo.
38:19Despite os pressões que os pilotos estavam dando para ir,
38:23havia mais uma segurança que poderia ter prevented essa tragédia.
38:27Você não vai acreditar isso.
38:39Investigadores de Avjet 303 Golf Alpha
38:42examinam uma nota de segurança para Aspen Airport
38:45que poderia ter impedido o crash.
38:48A NOTAM.
38:51Notam é uma nota oficial para os airmen.
38:55É uma nota feita pela FAA
38:57para contar os pilotos sobre alguma abnormidade
39:00no sistema do espaço.
39:02Um...
39:02Um...
39:02Um...
39:03Um...
39:03Um...
39:04Um...
39:06Um...
39:13Um...
39:17Um...
39:20Um...
39:21Um...
39:21Um...
39:35Um...
39:38Um...
39:42Um...
39:49Um...
39:51Um...
39:53Um...
39:53Um...
39:53Por que eles não seguem o NOTAM?
39:59Investigadores examinam o Gulf Stream's briefing records
40:02para ver se se incluem a mais recentemente notícia.
40:07Parece que o primeiro-officer recebe o NOTAM
40:09antes da sua voz.
40:12Então, quem sabe se ele passava isso para o capitão?
40:17NOTAMs são difícil de ler.
40:18Tem muita informação extranjante em eles.
40:21Eles dizem sobre tudo de uma luz de luz em uma torre 15 quilômetros
40:26a que as ruas fechadas e tudo entre as ruas fechadas.
40:30E o que é o controle?
40:36NOTAMs também são distribuídos para as atc.
40:38Eles precisam saber sobre as coisas que afetam o espaço.
40:45Não foi passada para aspen-atc.
41:06A razão a torre não recebe o NOTAM
41:08pode ter permitido o descanso.
41:11No final análise,
41:13investigadores concluem
41:15que a probabilidade do caso do acidente
41:16foi a operação do acidente
41:19abaixo do mínimo de descente altidão
41:22sem um apropriado visual referência
41:24para a ruas fechadas.
41:27Isso aconteceu porque o capitão não conseguiu
41:30conduzir a abordagem,
41:31não conduzir a abordagem.
41:34Há ele feito isso,
41:36eles iriam para a ruas fechadas.
41:38E os passadores podem ter sido frustrados,
41:41podem ter sido frustrados,
41:41podem ter sido um grande conversa,
41:43mas eles iriam estar vivo.
41:49Eles também acreditam que
41:51externa pressão
41:52jogou um papel
41:53em decisão de fazer um papel.
41:56Nós chamamos de ter-e-tis.
41:58Eles foram quase perto do destino,
42:00quase lá,
42:01e pressão de pessoas
42:02para fazer a decisão.
42:04Não foi descanso,
42:05não foi descanso,
42:06além de decisão de ter-e-tis
42:08under pressão de ter-e-tis.
42:13As a result of this accident,
42:16Avjet restricts flying into Aspen
42:18between sunset and sunrise.
42:21The FAA also revises
42:23its specifications
42:24for flying into Aspen
42:25with a minimum visibility
42:27of 5 miles
42:28and a cloud ceiling
42:29of at least 4,400 feet
42:31above ground
42:32now required for landing.
42:36Você vê a runway?
42:39This is to ensure
42:40pilots always have
42:41a clear view
42:42of the runway
42:43before landing.
42:45Thank you very much.
42:46Avjet also takes steps
42:48to prevent
42:49unnecessary distractions
42:50in the cockpit
42:51during the flight.
42:53After the accident,
42:55the company issued
42:56a bulletin
42:56changing their rules
42:57that no passengers
42:58were allowed
43:00in the cockpit.
43:02OK, guys.
43:04Let's finish up tomorrow.
43:07Well, the NTSB
43:08has also made
43:09a number of recommendations
43:10on improving
43:11the NOTAM system,
43:12making things
43:13a little bit more graphical
43:14and easy to use
43:15so that people
43:16can sort them out
43:17rather than just
43:18reading a list.
43:20The lessons serve
43:21as a warning
43:22to all other pilots
43:24who interact
43:24with passengers.
43:26I think the message
43:28of this flight
43:29is there is no dinner,
43:31date engagement,
43:32or birthday party
43:34that is more important
43:35than the lives
43:36of your passengers
43:37on the plane.
43:39And the pilot
43:40has to be tough enough
43:41to stand up to that
43:43because the passengers
43:44just don't know.
43:45They're not pilots
43:46and they do not know
43:47that their behavior
43:48is endangering
43:49their very lives.
43:51But it did help
43:53change the law
43:54and change how the FAA
43:55operates in many aspects.
43:58And for that,
43:58we're thankful.
44:24for their death,
44:25you know?
44:31So,
44:32so you have to
44:41see the
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