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00:00V-1, rotate.
00:03As Air Algerie Flight 6289 lifts off from Tamanrassit, Algeria.
00:09Gear up.
00:10Air traffic controllers hear an explosion.
00:21The plane crashes into the desert.
00:25102 people are killed.
00:28Investigators examine engine debris found on the runway.
00:32Looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guideway.
00:35They know an engine failed, but not why the pilots couldn't recover.
00:40Pilots are expected to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing where they've lost an engine.
00:46The investigation reveals a crew that was struggling, not with the plane.
00:51Let go. Take your hand away.
00:52I let go. I let go.
00:54But with each other.
00:55Which one of them is actually flying the plane?
01:20It's early afternoon in the middle of the Sahara Desert in Algeria.
01:25The crew of Flight 6289 readies for its upcoming journey at the remote Tamanrassid-Aguenar airport.
01:39There are 97 passengers on board.
01:43Among them, members of the local football team headed to a tournament and military personnel.
01:51Though there are some European nationals, almost everyone on board is Algerian.
02:06Now the instrument transfer switches, normal.
02:13In the cockpit, pre-flight checks are underway.
02:17Your damper, on.
02:22Today's flight is operated by Air Algerie, a state-owned national carrier.
02:28Air Algerie is a publicly owned company that is owned by the country of Algeria.
02:34The country takes a lot of pride in this particular airline because it is the face name of the country
02:43as it goes all around the world.
02:50Yes, the wind is calm, temperature 23, QNH 1020, QFE 965.
02:58Copy, we'll call you back for engine start.
03:0244-year-old Fatima Yousfi is the first officer of this flight.
03:06She is Algeria's first female commercial pilot.
03:12The female first officer was one of the first women to be hired in an airline in Algeria, which would
03:20be a big deal in such a male-dominated field, especially in that country.
03:25As the first woman to pilot a Boeing 747 trans-oceanic flight, Lynn Ripplemeyer knows what it's like to blaze
03:33a trail.
03:37Aviation was then, and still is in some cases, a boys club.
03:44Back in the beginning of when women were initially beginning in aviation here in the States, maybe it's like it
03:52was for her, that it was unusual.
03:59Taman Rasset, 6289. We request clearance for Khardaya.
04:04Received. We will call you back.
04:10Hey, Bualam.
04:11Hey.
04:12We've got some Taman Rasset football players back there.
04:15Oh. Tell them we're rooting for them this weekend.
04:1948-year-old captain Bualem Benawicha has over 10,000 flying hours.
04:25A thousand of those hours are on the Boeing 737.
04:28The captain was highly experienced, had been flying for over 20 years, and then flown all kinds of aircraft from
04:34small aircraft to large jetliners.
04:386289, Taman Rasset.
04:40Go on.
04:41Start approved. Call back for taxi.
04:43Roger.
04:46At 3 p.m., the pilots get clearance to start up the engines.
04:52Okay, B4, start checklist. Fuel quantity.
04:569,800 kg.
04:59Pumps?
05:02On.
05:05Flight 6289 is a Boeing 737-200, an early generation of the popular twin-engine jetliner.
05:15The Boeing 737 is one of the most common types of commercial airliners in the world, and there are different
05:22variations of it.
05:24The Boeing 737-200 is an original version of the 737, so it's an older model, and it's not as
05:33highly sophisticated in technology as the current 737s.
05:42Flight 6289 will be departing from Taman Rasset, with a scheduled stop in Gardaia, and then on to the capital,
05:51Algiers.
05:51The total flying time is approximately three hours.
06:01That is taxi, Air Algiersi, 6289.
06:066289, Taman Rasset. Taxi onto runway 02 and backtrack. Wind 030 at 10 knots.
06:13Roger.
06:15Taxing for runway 02, then backtracking 6289.
06:21As they taxi to the runway, passengers settle in for the journey.
06:39We are ready, 6289.
06:446289, Taman Rasset. Clear for takeoff runway 02, wind 330 at 12 knots.
06:50Clear for takeoff on runway 02 at Ejiri 6289.
07:03You have 90 knots. 100 knots.
07:11You have 90 knots. 100 knots.
07:23V1, rotate.
07:29But seconds after takeoff...
07:32Gear up.
07:34A loud explosion rocks the airplane.
07:43Bismillah, what's going on?
07:45The pilots assess the situation.
07:48Let go, let go.
07:49I let go, I let go.
07:53Passengers sense something has gone wrong.
07:58We have a small problem, 6289.
08:016289, Taman Rasset.
08:06The 737 is approaching a stall.
08:166289, are you in emergency?
08:246289, are you in emergency?
08:26Don't think. Don't think. Don't think. Don't think.
08:30The pilots make desperate attempts to recover the aircraft.
08:36But their efforts are in vain.
08:39The plane goes into a freefall.
08:42The passengers brace themselves.
08:54The plane bursts into flames and skids across the desert just outside Taman Rasset Airport.
09:03Emergency response is immediately activated and firefighters rush to the scene.
09:15The impact and fire that ensued afterwards made survival very unlikely for the passengers in the aircraft.
09:24But then, against all odds, rescuers discover a survivor.
09:30Not within the wreckage, but lying in the distant sand, clinging to life.
09:35A gentleman seated all the way in the back that didn't have his seatbelt on, so when the airplane crashed
09:41and broke apart, he was thrown free.
09:45He shows only faint signs of life as an ambulance rushes him to hospital in critical condition.
09:53Defying all expectations, the man's condition soon stabilizes and he begins to recover.
09:59This passenger's luck cannot be overstated in what was Algeria's worst aviation accident at the time.
10:08He is the sole survivor out of 103 passengers and crew.
10:14While the country mourns the tragic loss of a football squad,
10:19Algerian and French families grieve their loved ones and soon demand answers.
10:29The investigation into the crash of Flight 6289 is conducted by a commission of inquiry established by the Algerian Ministry
10:39of Transport.
10:41They receive support from several international agencies, including the NTSB, America's National Transportation Safety Board.
10:51I was the U.S. accredited representative for this accident to assist the Algerians.
10:56Initially, I wasn't going to travel to the scene.
10:58However, the U.S. ambassador to Algeria requested our assistance.
11:05While Algerian investigators await the arrival of their American colleagues,
11:10they interview the Taman Rasset air traffic controller.
11:16Did the pilots indicate that there was an issue?
11:21The first officer called only seconds after takeoff.
11:26We have a small problem, 6289.
11:30Pilots typically are hesitant to call mayday, mayday, or announce some type of emergency,
11:37particularly if they really don't know what the situation and the critical nature of the situation is.
11:45And what was the problem?
11:48They didn't say.
11:49But I heard something that sounded like an explosion.
11:54Seconds later, the plane was falling out of the sky.
11:59You said an explosion?
12:01That's what it sounded like.
12:05Like a bomb?
12:10Couldn't say.
12:15So in 2003, Algeria was not the safest place.
12:18There was bombings and terrorist activities because they were coming out of 11 years of civil war.
12:26When the plane fell, was it in one piece?
12:29Yes, it was.
12:32Investigators found the airplane intact.
12:34There are no claims of responsibility by terrorists.
12:38So it pretty much ruled out that there was some type of nefarious means to bring the aircraft down.
12:45Can you describe how the plane fell?
12:48It was nose up and crashed near the threshold of runway 20.
12:57The controller and other witnesses saw that the airplane was struggling to climb, had a nose-high pitch attitude, and
13:06then impact the ground.
13:09Eyewitnesses recall that the plane struggled to gain enough lift to remain airborne, an indication it was in a stall.
13:18One week after the incident, Algerian investigators are joined by a member of the NTSB.
13:27Air traffic controller and witnesses described seeing a storm, and one witness remarked that the landing gear was down.
13:36If the landing gear is still down while the aircraft is trying to climb, it creates a lot of drag
13:43on that airplane.
13:44It takes a lot of thrust and a lot of power to maintain the climb to overcome all that drag
13:50from the landing gear.
13:52That would affect a plane's ability to climb, but that alone wouldn't cause a stall.
13:58That has to mean something else.
14:00To the load sheets?
14:01Yes, right here.
14:04One of the big questions is about the aircraft weight, because if you're too heavy, you won't climb as well
14:10as if you're within the weight envelope.
14:14Investigators review the plane's load sheet to see if the plane was overweight before takeoff.
14:19Looks like the first officer made some corrections here.
14:24While reviewing the load sheet, the first officer notices the fuel weight is wrong, and changes it from 8,800
14:32kilograms to the correct amount of 9,800 kilograms.
14:42So, with those corrections, the weight at takeoff would have been 48,708 kilograms.
14:48And the maximum weight allowed at takeoff would be 49,500 kilograms.
14:54The first officer noticed that there was a 1,000 kilo difference, and passenger count was a little bit off,
15:01which didn't make a whole lot of difference in the overall weight and balance, but did show that she was
15:06very attentive in her duties.
15:09The aircraft weight was right up against the maximum takeoff weight. Even though it was heavy, the aircraft weight shouldn't
15:16have affected the performance too much.
15:18What about mechanical failure?
15:21I'll get the maintenance reports.
15:26Investigators make sure that the maintenance is clean, and the aircraft has a clean bill of health prior to the
15:31flight.
15:35It was up to date in its maintenance cycle.
15:38No work deferred, no technical exemptions.
15:42The maintenance reports provide no leads.
15:46Maybe there was an environmental factor at play.
15:51Take a look at this.
15:53Did the location of the airport have something to do with the stall?
15:59Temperature is 23 degrees Celsius, so it's hot.
16:03Tamarosset is in a harsh desert climate, and the high temperatures can affect the aircraft's performance and climb.
16:11And the airport sits at 4,518 feet above sea level.
16:16At this altitude, the air is already thin.
16:19If you factor in the heat, it's high-density altitude that affects the performance of the airplane,
16:26so it's generating much less lift over the wings, so it takes longer to get the airplane airborne.
16:32So just a few pounds below max takeoff weight.
16:35High elevation airport.
16:37High temperature.
16:39Landing gear extended.
16:41That could definitely cause a plane to stall.
16:44But that doesn't explain the explosion.
16:47Right.
16:48What are we missing?
16:56Investigators study the crash site of Flight 6289 for evidence that could explain the explosion heard seconds after takeoff.
17:06So, the first point of impact is here.
17:135,396 feet from the takeoff point.
17:17Skidded through the airport perimeter fence, across the road, and came to rest here,
17:22less than 300 feet outside of the airport.
17:34The plane is destroyed by the fire.
17:36The main wreckage is practically in one piece, except for the rear section.
17:41And look at this debris.
17:43This was on the runway, right about here.
17:48Engine debris.
17:52On the runway, we found a large quantity of engine debris, which is indicative of an engine shelling.
17:57And a large quantity of engine blades are thrown out the back end of an engine.
18:04It's an old adage in accident investigation, what fails first, falls first.
18:12So, if they find debris prior to finding the wreckage, then they know that happened prior to the accident.
18:18So, one of the engines blew out.
18:20That must have been the explosion the controller heard.
18:24What caused the engine failure?
18:29We needed to get our eyes on those engines to determine which failed and why it failed.
18:35Investigators begin a visual inspection of the plane's engines, starting with the right one.
18:41Take a look at the fan blades.
18:44Heavy deformation.
18:47It was definitely rotating at the time of impact.
18:51On the right engine, we showed that it was turning at impact.
18:54We don't know exactly what level of thrust it was rotating at.
19:00If the right engine was operating on impact, then did the left engine fail?
19:11These turbine blades have far fewer deformations than the right engine.
19:14Looks like it was barely moving.
19:16The hot section is completely torn apart.
19:20In an engine's hot section, fuel is ignited in a combustion chamber, generating a powerful stream of hot air that
19:29spins the turbine blades.
19:33The damage is evidence that the left engine failed.
19:37We knew that the failure was in the hot section, so we had to follow every lead that we could
19:42to determine where the failure occurred.
19:51There's a bunch of blades missing from the hot section.
19:55The missing pieces are most likely the debris that we found on the runway.
19:59We found that the hot section was basically corncobbed, as we say.
20:04There was not many blades left in the hot section, and there was metal all over the place.
20:10What caused the blades to break?
20:13Let's get some of these parts out on the table.
20:16We wanted to further tear down the engine.
20:19We wanted to look at the failures under the microscope.
20:21We wanted to look at the metallurgical aspects of the failure.
20:24We wanted to look to see if there was a bird strike.
20:28Investigators begin by examining components from the hot section, in search of pre-existing defects.
20:36We managed to remove the sediment from the nozzle vein.
20:45Nozzle guide vanes direct the hot air flow in the combustion chamber to the blades of the high-pressure turbine,
20:52causing them to spin.
20:59Interesting.
21:14Looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guide vanes.
21:19Investigators find evidence of fatigue cracks in two of the left engine's nozzle guide vanes.
21:26This type of cracking occurs over time, and as the engine ages, these cracks get slightly larger, and eventually they
21:33will fail, and it will destroy the entire engine.
21:38If this was a progressive failure, why wasn't it caught earlier?
21:45This type of cracking is typical of an older engine, and it's a progressive failure.
21:49So that gets us into the question of what was the maintenance history, what was the inspection criteria that was
21:54used by the operator.
21:57Investigators look into the engine's repair history.
22:02It looks like the left engine was completely overhauled four years ago.
22:07When would have been the last time they looked at the nozzle guide vanes?
22:11During the hot section maintenance inspection, which was last year.
22:15Any mention of cracking?
22:17Any work done on any of them?
22:21Inspections of the hot section are meant to catch fatigue cracks.
22:25So why weren't these found?
22:28Since this was an Algerian registered aircraft, it falls under the authority of the Algerian Civil Aviation Authority for oversight
22:36of the inspection, not the FAA, which typically has more stringent requirements.
22:42The crack formed at some point. It was missed during the inspection last year. It grew and grew until point
22:48of failure and then blew out at takeoff.
22:51That explains why the engine failed.
22:54Not why the plane stalled.
22:57Pilots are expected to demonstrate their ability to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing where they've
23:05lost an engine.
23:07Investigators examined the crew's training records to determine if they knew how to handle a single engine failure on takeoff.
23:17The first officer's last exercise in engine failure during takeoff was four months ago.
23:22The captain's training was even more recent, only two months before the crash.
23:26They both should have known what to do in this situation.
23:31They've got the airplane veering to the left. There's no way they didn't know that engine failed.
23:39So what did they actually do?
23:46Investigators prepare to listen to the cockpit voice recorder from Air Algerie flight 6289.
23:54It was very important for us to listen to the CVR to determine how the pilots dealt with this engine
23:59failure.
24:00Got it queued up to right before I take off.
24:07V1, rotate.
24:15Gear up.
24:19They hear the sound of the engine failing five seconds after takeoff.
24:25Bismillah, what's going on?
24:29Let go, let go.
24:30I let go, I let go.
24:36They transferred control in the middle of an emergency.
24:39That didn't even sound like a proper transfer. He just took the controls.
24:43For another pilot to take control from the pilot who is flying, the pilot needs to say, I've got it.
24:51Taking control of the airplane without saying he was taking control made things worse for him and for the first
24:58officer.
24:58The captain is the pilot monitoring. He shouldn't be taking over. He should be diagnosing the problem.
25:04So, do either of them identify a left engine failure?
25:10After handing over control to the captain, the first officer realizes they aren't properly configured to climb with only one
25:17engine.
25:20Get up or are we okay?
25:22But there's no response from the captain.
25:27We have a small problem, 6289.
25:306289, come at last.
25:34Just seconds after the engine failure, the situation deteriorates as the plane begins to stall.
25:45There are no attempts by the pilots to work together to identify or troubleshoot the problem.
25:52Let go, take your hand away.
25:53I let go, I let go.
25:54Let go, take your hand away.
25:56I let go.
25:59Seconds later, the ground proximity warning activates, indicating the plane is getting dangerously close to the ground.
26:08Please, take your hand away.
26:11Both pilots really didn't know what the other was doing, didn't know what the other expected of them, and may
26:17well have been working at cross purposes.
26:19And as a result of that, the team performance broke down.
26:25Don't sink. Don't sink.
26:32I don't hear a single mention of engine failure.
26:35And why was he telling her to let go so many times?
26:37Was she trying to take back control of the plane?
26:40Which one of them is actually flying the plane?
26:43When all is said and done, the pilots did not work together.
26:47Without more information from the flight data recorder, we really don't know exactly what they did to control the airplane.
26:54Investigators turned to the flight data recorder, or FDR, from flight 6289 to determine how the pilots tried to recover
27:02from the loss of the left engine.
27:05Flight data recorders are important to investigators because it gives them information on how the pilots were operating the airplane
27:13and how they were managing the critical situation they were in.
27:19Not much here.
27:21Older plane, older FDR.
27:25And it doesn't actually tell us how the pilots were handling the engine failure.
27:30Because we only had five parameters on the FDR, we had to go to Boeing and ask for a detailed
27:36aircraft performance analysis to determine what happened on this accident flight.
27:43Using the FDR's limited data, Boeing's performance study includes a reconstruction of engine operations and flight controls in the final
27:53moments of the flight.
27:57So, there is the left engine losing its thrust after it blows out.
28:02That's odd.
28:04The data from the fully functioning right engine shows something unexpected.
28:09Look at the thrust from the right engine.
28:12Yes, it seems to be going up and down.
28:14But we know it was working fine.
28:17That can only mean one thing.
28:23Bismillah, what's going on?
28:26The team finds evidence of thrust being added to the right engine.
28:31Let go, let go.
28:32And then pulled back.
28:34I let go, I let go.
28:37When one engine fails, what you need is maximum power on the other engine, not reduce it.
28:44So, thrust is pulled down, then back up, then down, then back up again.
28:53We have a small problem, 6289.
28:566289, Talmadatsen.
29:02Let go.
29:06It's as if they were having some sort of a tug of war.
29:10It shouldn't have been.
29:12First officer did the right thing by increasing the power of the right engine.
29:17What likely happened is that the captain wasn't fully aware of which engine had failed.
29:22However, the first officer knew that the left engine had failed and was trying to push up the throttle on
29:28the right engine to keep them from stalling.
29:34Let go, take your hand away.
29:35I let go, I let go.
29:36Let go, take your hand away.
29:38I let go, I let go.
29:40Don't think.
29:41Don't think.
29:43The captain's basically telling the first officer to get out of his way, to leave him alone, to let him
29:50be in charge of the airplane by himself, which he was.
29:56Knowing that the left engine had failed, the first officer might have been trying to help things out by increasing
30:01the power on the right engine.
30:03Please.
30:04Take your hand away.
30:11The moment the captain reduced the thrust on the right engine and never returned it to takeoff thrust, with the
30:17gear down, it doomed the flight.
30:22Pilots should have been able to work together to recover the plane.
30:26These planes are designed to fly with a team.
30:29Pilot flying, pilot not flying, both have very specific roles that they are trained to do, but especially in emergencies.
30:39They stay in their roles, they help each other, they work as a team, and this crash could have been
30:44avoided if they would have done that.
30:48Why didn't the crew of Air Algerie Flight 6289 work together to prevent the loss of 102 lives?
30:59Okay, I'll queue it up to the pre-flight preparations.
31:05Investigators returned to the cockpit voice recording of Flight 6289 to understand why there was a lack of coordination between
31:13the two pilots.
31:17Modern instruments transfer switches, normal.
31:21Yard damper, on.
31:26They listen as the first officer works through the pre-flight checklist.
31:30They're surprised by what they don't hear.
31:35Where's the captain?
31:37Where's the captain?
31:38Is she doing the flight preparation by herself?
31:42Materialization mode selector.
31:44Auto.
31:46Okay, flight instruments.
31:48We found that the first officer was actually in the cockpit by herself conducting most of the pre-flight work
31:55without the captain.
31:59It's unusual for the captain not to be present during the pre-flight because there are responsibilities that the captain
32:06has to get his side of the airplane ready.
32:10It's just inappropriate for the captain not to be in the cockpit during the pre-flight.
32:16And it's actually kind of rude.
32:18It's only after the first officer completes the pre-flight preparations that the captain enters the cockpit.
32:25The last Q&H, 1019.
32:281019, Roger.
32:30Good afternoon, Captain.
32:31How are we looking?
32:33Good.
32:34I completed the pre-flight checklist.
32:36I tested your oxygen and everything is set to go.
32:39Good, good.
32:43Captain Benwisha is late, leaving his responsibilities to the first officer.
32:48When the captain showed up, he was not in the mindset of getting brought up to speed or being part
32:54of the team of setting the cockpit up for the flight.
33:01Heading.
33:02020.
33:05Altitude.
33:06Investigators then hear the pilots performing their before-start checklist.
33:112-8-0.
33:12You know, I could have been on the team with those boys back there.
33:16Give me a break.
33:18Who's the third voice?
33:20Flight attendant.
33:23The only male flight attendant is the chief flight attendant.
33:28Okay, takeoff speeds.
33:31As part of the checklist, the first officer reviews the takeoff speeds.
33:38V1, 144 knots.
33:42VR, 146 knots.
33:43You're saying you were good enough to turn pro?
33:46Yeah.
33:47I was a good footy blair.
33:49You wanted a scout come watch me blair.
33:50Yeah, they were scouting you to mow the pitch.
33:55V2, 150 knots.
33:57Okay, that's enough.
33:58I understand.
33:59Can we go?
34:01I got it, I got it.
34:02Let's go.
34:08So the captain is just carrying on a conversation with his friend while they're doing their before-start checklist.
34:13What is even worse is he cuts her off before they could even finish it.
34:18One of the most important parts of the information that she was trying to give were the takeoff speeds and
34:25then there should have been a briefing of an engine failure departure at this airport that was a special departure
34:34that needed to be briefed.
34:35It was ignored.
34:39Did the captain become more focused once they began to taxi?
34:44Roger, taxiing for runway is zero two.
34:47What investigators find most shocking is what they hear next.
34:57Where are we eating tonight?
34:59That place across from the hotel.
35:01Oh, you always go back to the same place.
35:04I like what I like.
35:06We are in Algiers.
35:08Plenty of good spots to eat.
35:10They are completely distracted.
35:12They're violating every sterile cockpit rule.
35:16During critical phases of flight, extraneous conversations and non-essential conversations between the crew members are prohibited.
35:23Not only is the captain dismissing the first officer, he has this casual attitude about basic safety practices.
35:31It's possible he was more interested in talking to the flight attendant than reviewing the briefing with the first officer.
35:37It's possible that he had been through so many pre-flight takeoff briefings that at that time he felt it
35:44was unnecessary.
35:49Bismillah, what's going on?
35:54Let go, let go, let go.
35:56As a result of his dismissive attitude, the captain is unprepared to properly respond when the crisis occurs shortly after
36:05takeoff.
36:09Had the pilots completed their pre-flight safety briefing, their response to the engine failure might have been very different.
36:24Gear up.
36:28Engine failure, left engine. Fly V2 plus 25.
36:33Lowering the nose to 12 degrees.
36:35V2.
36:37Get up.
36:39Once the plane was stabilized, the pilots could have returned safely to the airport.
36:45Engine failure is actually a relatively common occurrence.
36:49Every pilot needs to be prepared and trained.
36:52So instead of letting the first officer fly the plane while he diagnoses the issue, he tries to do everything
36:58himself.
36:58And transferring control during an emergency situation.
37:02There was never a positive transfer of control. The captain just took the control yoke away from the first officer,
37:11so he injected himself in the emergency.
37:22The captain took control at the worst possible time when he was out of the loop, and by not assigning
37:29responsibility to her, he gave himself the responsibility of doing two things at once.
37:33Diagnosing the nature of the engine problem.
37:36Diagnosing the nature of the engine problem. And then flying the airplane.
37:43And then flying the airplane.
37:52The captain was in the first officer's position. She's now in the supportive role, the non-flying role, waiting to
37:58be told what to do. And he's not giving any helpful orders other than let go.
38:07Why would an experienced captain so brazenly dismiss his first officer's help, risking the lives of everyone on board?
38:21Investigators look into the pilot's backgrounds in an attempt to understand why the captain took over from his first officer
38:28in the midst of an emergency.
38:31So the captain actually had twice as many flying hours as the first officer.
38:36The captain was both qualified as a captain on a 737, but also as a first officer on a 767.
38:43Perhaps his attitude was that flying the 737 was not that big of a deal because I fly a 767,
38:51which is much more sophisticated and highly technical.
38:55But she had more hours on the 737.
38:58Not only did she have more experience flying the 737, that's the only plane that she was flying.
39:05I think there's a good chance that had she been left alone, she would have flown the airplane out of
39:10the scenario that we saw in this accident.
39:13The question is, would he have reacted the same way if the first officer was a man?
39:20In 2003, at the time of this crash, here in the States, female airline pilots only constituted less than 6
39:28% of the pilot population.
39:30And it really hasn't changed that much in the 20 years since then.
39:35The first officer was Algeria's first female commercial airline pilot.
39:41My friend, male pilots in this part of the world aren't used to sharing a cockpit with women.
39:51I think Algeria is becoming fairly westernized, but in some cultures there is the feeling that a man has to
39:57be up in the cockpit in case anything goes wrong.
40:00Why did this captain take control from the first officer when she was doing an okay job at that point?
40:06And I think you can't rule out the possibility that there may have been some gender stereotyping on his part
40:13that played a role in it.
40:16Sadly, this accident was totally preventable.
40:24Investigators now have a clear picture of what led to the crash of Flight 6289.
40:32V1, 144 knots.
40:36VR, 146 knots.
40:38After arriving late and allowing the flight attendant into the cockpit,
40:43the captain interrupted a crucial pre-flight safety briefing.
40:49V2, 150 knots.
40:51Okay, that's enough. I understand.
40:53Can we go?
40:55I got it, I got it. Let's go.
40:57The captain demonstrated a lax attitude towards cockpit protocols.
41:04Fatigue cracks in a nozzle guide vane in the plane's left engine were reaching their braking point.
41:10And when the guide vane failed,
41:13it set off a chain reaction.
41:16High-speed metal fragments ripped the engine apart.
41:20Let go, let go.
41:22I let go, I let go.
41:23When crisis struck,
41:25the captain decided he needed to be the one to handle the controls
41:30and took over flying from his first officer before even identifying the problem.
41:35The engine failure alone was not the cause of this accident.
41:39Engines fail and pilots are trained to handle those emergencies.
41:46Failing to retract the landing gear after the engine failure made recovery more difficult.
41:52Let go, take your hand away.
41:54I let go, I let go.
41:55Let go, take your hand away.
41:56I let go.
42:05It was the captain's assumption of control of the aircraft without properly identifying the nature of the emergency,
42:11his failure to raise the landing gear and his lack of adherence to standard operating procedures that eventually doomed the
42:21flight.
42:23As a result of this accident,
42:26Algeria's Commission of Inquiry makes several recommendations.
42:31They recommend that Air Algeria, along with other operators, ensure that their crew resource management training programs emphasize the importance
42:40of handover procedures and task sharing in the cockpit.
42:45But in the 1980s, they had captains who were trying to fly a team airplane solo.
42:53So a lot of training went into it to teach that your best resource is your team.
42:59You support each other and work together as a team for the safety of the airplane.
43:05The fact that the captain insisted on taking over control of the airplane at that critical moment cost everybody on
43:13that airplane their lives.
43:17I felt particularly affected when I saw that the accident was preventable.
43:23And I think the investigators did the best job they could trying to discover why the crew made the errors
43:28that they did.
43:29The next time that happens, people won't die as a result of that.
43:34For Lynn Rippelmeyer, it's one more example of why the industry needs to continue evolving.
43:41The airlines now are much more open to hiring women, to not having gender bias,
43:49realizing that women do have a lot to contribute to the industry.
43:55And I think it's up to women now to step up to the plate and take the opportunities that the
44:00career offers.
44:01They're amazing.
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