- 2 weeks ago
Air Crash Investigation Series S22E08 Pitch Black
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TVTranscript
00:00After losing their electric generators,
00:03Okay, beacons off.
00:05the pilots of Air Illinois Flight 710
00:08shut down one system after another
00:10to conserve their battery power.
00:13It was probably the most sickening feeling for both of them.
00:19But efforts prove futile.
00:23All the passengers and crew are killed.
00:26NTSB investigators examine the plane's electrical components for clues.
00:32There's no short circuit.
00:33What about the batteries?
00:35No signs of arcane.
00:38The cockpit voice recording raises more questions.
00:43Are you using these lights here?
00:45I'll get that one down.
00:47Well, they're doing the right thing.
00:48Turning things off to reduce the load.
00:50So, what happened?
00:52You got a flashlight?
00:54Yep.
00:56E-D-D-D-D.
01:00Oh, fuck.
01:03Air Illinois Flight 710
01:06Departs from Capitol Airport
01:24in Springfield, Illinois.
01:30Gear up.
01:3232-year-old Captain Lester Smith
01:35has been with Air Illinois
01:36almost five years.
01:39He's one of its most experienced pilots.
01:42Gear is up.
01:44First Officer Frank Tudor
01:46has been with the airline for three years.
01:48He's considered one of its top first officers.
01:551,000 feet.
01:58The pilots are flying a Hawker Sidley 748.
02:02The rugged turboprop is designed to land on shorter runways.
02:06The Hawker Sidley 748
02:08was one of a number of aircraft built
02:11to replace the DC-3
02:13as a commuter
02:15slash cargo
02:16slash military type aircraft
02:18but primarily used
02:20as a commuter aircraft.
02:22It's the ideal plane
02:24for a regional airline
02:25that connects big cities
02:26to small towns in Illinois.
02:28Illinois 710, radar identified.
02:32Continue to 3,000 feet.
02:34Clear to Carbondale.
02:35Illinois 710.
02:373,000 feet.
02:37Clear for Carbondale.
02:38Thank you and good night.
02:41Heading 175.
02:52Less than two minutes after takeoff...
02:54It's the generator again.
02:56A generator warning light comes on.
03:00The aircraft is equipped
03:02with two 9-kilowatt generators
03:04that supply power
03:05to the battery banks
03:06and electrical systems.
03:08One of the generators has failed.
03:12Isolating it now.
03:15The first officer disconnects
03:17the right generator
03:18to protect the rest
03:19of the aircraft's electrical system.
03:23When something like this happens
03:24and you have a generator
03:26failure,
03:26one of the most important steps
03:28is to disconnect that generator
03:30from the system
03:32as quickly as possible.
03:35Janine Urban
03:36is a former Air Illinois pilot
03:38who landed the plane
03:40in Springfield
03:40three hours earlier.
03:43The generators
03:44are each rated
03:45to be able to carry
03:46the entire load.
03:49so if one generator goes down
03:52you can continue
03:53to your destination.
03:55It is not an emergency.
03:58Tonight's 40-minute flight
04:00is taking seven passengers
04:02146 miles
04:04from Springfield
04:05to Carbondale, Illinois.
04:06Springfield, Illinois 710.
04:11We've experienced
04:12a slight electrical problem.
04:14We'll keep you advised.
04:16Illinois 710,
04:17do you intend to return
04:17to Springfield?
04:19Negative.
04:20Continuing to Carbondale.
04:213,000 feet.
04:24The captain decides
04:25it's safe
04:26to continue the flight.
04:27I understand
04:28you are continuing
04:29to Carbondale.
04:30Roger.
04:34There's dense cloud cover
04:36this evening.
04:37The conditions
04:39at Carbondale
04:40were what is called
04:41IFR,
04:42instrument flight rules.
04:43They would have been
04:44operating in the clouds
04:45and needed their instruments
04:47to be able
04:47to fly the airplane.
04:50They were flying
04:51into deteriorating
04:52weather conditions.
04:53It's something
04:54that every airline pilot
04:55is trained to handle.
04:57But it doesn't give you
04:58much room for error.
05:02Four minutes
05:03after takeoff,
05:04the first officer
05:05checks the status
05:06of the generators.
05:08Zero voltage
05:09and amps
05:09on the left side.
05:11He discovers
05:12that the left generator
05:13is dead.
05:15The right generator
05:15is putting out
05:1627 and a half volts.
05:18The right generator
05:19now appears
05:20to be working.
05:22But the first officer
05:23is unable to reconnect
05:24it to the electrical system.
05:26Can't get it
05:26to come online.
05:27The right generator
05:29is as good as dead.
05:31With both generators out,
05:33all the systems
05:34are feeding off
05:35the batteries
05:35instead of the generators.
05:37It's not a good situation.
05:42The aircraft
05:43has four nickel-cadmium batteries.
05:45With no generators,
05:47the batteries are now powering lights,
05:50instruments,
05:52navigational equipment,
05:53and everything
05:54in the passenger cabin.
05:58How are the bats there?
06:02We're down to 22.5 volts.
06:04So now that we're operating
06:06on only battery power,
06:07the primary problem
06:09is that the batteries
06:10are only designed
06:11to operate
06:12for about 30 minutes
06:14under the best-case scenario.
06:18Illinois 710
06:19is now 32 minutes
06:21from its destination.
06:23If they don't reduce
06:24the drain on the batteries,
06:26it will be almost impossible
06:28to land
06:29without lights,
06:30instruments,
06:30or a radio.
06:33Okay.
06:34Beacons off.
06:36Okay.
06:39Nav lights are off.
06:41Are you using
06:42these lights here?
06:44I'll get that one down.
06:49The pilots quickly
06:50shut down
06:51non-essential systems.
06:53The sooner they start
06:55shutting things down,
06:56the longer the battery
06:58is going to last.
07:00How are the batteries?
07:02Pretty good.
07:04They're at 21.5.
07:07The efforts
07:07to conserve battery power
07:09seem to be paying off.
07:12Should last to Carbondale.
07:14Yeah.
07:18Midway to their destination,
07:20the weather deteriorates.
07:24The weather that
07:26Frank and Les encountered
07:27trying to get down
07:28to Carbondale
07:29was much stormier
07:30than Springfield.
07:32There were level
07:33two and three
07:34thunderstorms.
07:37Want me to tune in
07:38to Cabby real quick?
07:40Sure.
07:40Not going to use
07:41that much power.
07:4545 miles
07:46from Carbondale,
07:47the crew
07:47tunes in
07:48to a signal
07:48that will provide
07:49a precise bearing
07:50to the airport.
07:54Meanwhile,
07:54air traffic control
07:55transfers the flight
07:57to the approach frequency
07:58for southern Illinois.
08:01Air Illinois,
08:02flight 710,
08:03contact Kansas City Center
08:04on frequency 125.3.
08:0725.3,
08:08Roger.
08:09Air Illinois,
08:09710.
08:13They were getting close
08:14to the airport
08:15and that approach control facility
08:18would have lined them up
08:19for an instrument approach.
08:21after contacting
08:24approach control,
08:26the situation worsens.
08:30I don't know
08:30if we have enough juice
08:31to get out of this.
08:33The radios
08:34and transponder
08:35on flight 710
08:36have shut down.
08:39The pilots
08:39are now
08:40on their own.
08:44Illinois 710,
08:46I've lost radar contact.
08:48Flight 710
08:49has disappeared
08:49from air traffic control's radar.
08:52Illinois 710,
08:53Kansas City.
08:55They had no capability
08:57at this point
08:58to get help.
09:01It was probably
09:03the most
09:04sickening feeling
09:05for both of them
09:06that you or I
09:07could imagine.
09:10Watch my altitude.
09:12Going down
09:12to 2,400 feet.
09:13Concerned
09:16their instruments
09:17are about to fail,
09:19the captain
09:19attempts to get
09:20below the clouds.
09:23He was desperately
09:25hoping that he could
09:26see the airport beacon
09:28or some runway lights
09:29and land that airplane
09:30visually.
09:32Just eight minutes
09:33from landing.
09:36You got a flashlight?
09:38Yeah.
09:39The batteries
09:39are almost depleted.
09:41Here we go.
09:41You want to shine it up here?
09:43Trying to illuminate
09:44the instruments
09:45with a flashlight
09:45and a dark cockpit
09:47that is very abnormal.
09:50And is he pointing
09:51out an instrument
09:51that's functioning
09:52or one that's not?
09:55We're losing everything
09:56down to 13 volts.
09:59Watch my altitude, Frank.
10:01It would have been
10:02a total panic situation
10:04in realizing
10:06that they were
10:08out of options.
10:09Okay, 2,400.
10:16Rapidly losing
10:17electrical power
10:18and operating
10:19in total darkness,
10:21the pilots of
10:22Illinois Flight 710
10:24desperately try
10:25to land their plane.
10:26The conditions
10:29at Carbondale
10:29were such
10:30that one mile
10:31visibility
10:31and light rain
10:32and fog.
10:33His chances
10:34of seeing anything
10:35were minimal
10:37at best.
10:39Do you have any instruments?
10:41Do you have a horizon?
10:44Uh...
10:45They're in a dark cockpit.
10:48Instruments are failing.
10:49They can't see
10:50anything outside.
10:51They were now
10:52into a critical emergency.
10:54Okay.
10:56Your bank had left.
10:57Six degrees.
10:58Okay.
10:59Correcting to the right.
11:04A little more.
11:05Illinois 710,
11:26Kansas City.
11:26Do you read?
11:28I would be very surprised
11:29that they knew
11:30that they were going to hit.
11:31I would be very surprised
11:32they saw the ground at all.
11:33Air Illinois Flight 710
11:37crashes 25 miles north
11:40of Carbondale Airport.
11:43The wreckage is scattered
11:44across farmland
11:46near the town of Pinckneyville.
11:48All seven passengers
11:50and three crew members
11:52are dead.
11:57The National Transportation
11:58Safety Board,
11:59or NTSB,
12:01begins an investigation
12:02to determine
12:03what happened
12:03to Flight 710.
12:06Let's see what we got here.
12:10They begin by reviewing
12:11the debris pattern.
12:17That's a half a mile long
12:19and...
12:21roughly 200 feet wide.
12:26Investigators get a sense
12:28of the vast impact area,
12:29which extends across two small wooded areas,
12:33a field and a pond.
12:34They came in at a shallow angle.
12:37The wreckage pattern
12:38gave us the idea
12:40that this was a fairly high speed,
12:42low angle impact
12:44to be able to spread the wreckage
12:46like this over a half a mile.
12:48The first point of impact is right here,
12:51with ground scars and debris heading north.
12:59Carbondale Airport is 25 miles to the south.
13:03Investigators determined
13:04that at the time of the crash,
13:06Flight 710 was flying in the opposite direction
13:09to its destination.
13:10With the aircraft traveling the way it was
13:14at that speed
13:15and in a wrong direction,
13:17it made us wonder,
13:19was the aircraft actually under control?
13:21So first ground scar here,
13:23followed by a few more,
13:26and then 200 feet in front of that,
13:29the right wing tip.
13:31Near the first impact marks,
13:35investigators discover fragments
13:37of a green navigation light
13:38from the plane's right wing tip.
13:41It was banked to the right
13:43when it hit the ground.
13:45We had the right wing tip.
13:46We knew that was the first thing
13:48that hit the ground,
13:49and we could measure
13:50approximately 30 degree right bank.
13:54Did the crew report any issues
13:56to air traffic control?
13:58Yeah, they did.
14:01Springfield, Illinois 710.
14:04We have experienced
14:05a slight electrical problem.
14:07We'll keep you advised.
14:10Investigators learned
14:12that 90 seconds after taking off
14:14from Springfield,
14:15the crew reported an electrical problem.
14:18Anything else?
14:20That's it.
14:22Just the electrical problem.
14:25We'll need to take a good look
14:27at all the electrical components.
14:29The pilot reported
14:30a slight electrical problem,
14:33and it was up to us
14:35to figure out
14:35what his problem was
14:37and why they crashed.
14:44Is this everything?
14:47Investigators examine
14:48electrical components
14:49for evidence of malfunctions.
14:53The wires are clean.
14:55There's no short circuit.
14:56These inverters are in bad shape.
15:06Hard to tell
15:07if they were working or not.
15:11What about the batteries?
15:16Four NICAD batteries
15:18are powered by two generators.
15:20Each battery contains
15:2118 individual battery cells.
15:24No signs of arcing
15:26or short circuit
15:27as a result of impact.
15:30We were able to recover
15:31a total of 10 cells
15:33from the batteries,
15:34and they were all
15:35in decent shape.
15:36Let's see if they can
15:37hold the charge.
15:40Under normal conditions,
15:41the batteries should
15:42be fully charged.
15:46Wow.
15:47They're dead.
15:48The batteries were able
15:51to hold a charge,
15:52but for some reason
15:53they were run down.
15:56Did the generators
15:58malfunction
15:58and fail to charge
16:01the batteries?
16:03The left generator?
16:06Aircraft engines
16:07power a generator shaft
16:09to rotate a metal core
16:11wrapped in copper coil.
16:13This is known
16:14as an armature.
16:14The armature spins
16:17rapidly between the poles
16:18of a magnet
16:19to generate electricity.
16:24Banding wires come off.
16:27Banding wire is used
16:29to hold the armature together
16:30as it spins
16:31inside the assembly.
16:33If the banding wire
16:34comes loose,
16:35the armature could jam.
16:37Soldering is melted.
16:47The motor must have
16:48overheated.
16:51Investigators discover
16:52evidence that the
16:53left generator failed.
16:56This happened
16:56before the crash.
16:59We know that there
17:00was no fire
17:01on the aircraft,
17:03so we believe
17:03that the solder
17:05melted due to
17:06internal heating.
17:07But we don't know why.
17:10They then inspect
17:11the right generator.
17:13The banding wire
17:14is intact on this one.
17:17Looks fine.
17:19We did a resistance test,
17:21checked the brushes,
17:22and we looked at all
17:23the mechanical work
17:24into the generator.
17:25We were not able
17:25to find any reason
17:27why the right generator
17:28would not charge
17:28the batteries.
17:30How did they crash
17:32with four working batteries
17:33and one working generator?
17:35from examination of the wreckage,
17:38we were not able
17:39to find any reason
17:41for the accident.
17:43We were hoping
17:44that the voice recorder
17:45would give us clues
17:46as to what really happened.
17:51The recording starts
17:52around four minutes
17:53after takeoff.
17:57Investigators turn
17:58to Flight 710's
17:59cockpit voice recorder
18:00to determine how
18:02an aircraft with one
18:03functioning generator
18:04crashed short
18:06of its destination.
18:12Zero voltage in amps
18:13on the left side.
18:19Just like we suspected.
18:20The CVR recording
18:23confirms that the left
18:25generator failed
18:26shortly after takeoff.
18:29The right generator
18:30is putting out
18:3027 and a half volts,
18:32but I can't get it
18:34to come online.
18:36Investigators can't understand
18:38why the right generator
18:39was disconnected
18:40from the electrical system
18:42if it was operational.
18:44Then they hear
18:45an astonishing statement
18:46from the first officer
18:48to the captain.
18:48When we lost
18:50the left one,
18:51I reached up
18:51and shut off
18:52the right generator
18:53because I assumed
18:53the problem
18:54was the right side.
18:57Isolating it now?
19:00There are two
19:01shut-off switches
19:02for the generators.
19:04One for the left generator
19:05and one for the right.
19:07The first officer
19:08disconnects the right one
19:10to protect the rest
19:11of the aircraft's
19:12electrical system.
19:14But he soon realizes
19:16that it's the left one
19:17that has the issue,
19:18not the right.
19:22Why doesn't he
19:22just reconnect it?
19:25He tries,
19:26but it doesn't work.
19:28The right generator
19:29was not charging
19:29the battery
19:30so that we know
19:31all they had
19:32to power the aircraft
19:33was the charge
19:34remaining on the battery
19:35shortly after takeoff.
19:38Maybe there was
19:38a problem
19:39with the switching unit.
19:41If the generated
19:42switching unit
19:42is not working,
19:43then the generator
19:44will not come back online,
19:45so we were quite interested
19:46in learning what we could
19:47about this component.
19:52It's in pretty rough shape.
19:55Looking for signs
19:56of a malfunction,
19:57investigators examine
19:58the right generator
19:59control switch.
20:00I can't tell 100%.
20:06It's possible it failed
20:08before the crash.
20:11The switching unit
20:11was heavily damaged
20:12from the crash.
20:13We were not able
20:14to determine
20:14if that's even why
20:16the generator
20:16would not come online.
20:17even if the switch
20:22was broken,
20:23it doesn't explain
20:24the pilot's actions.
20:28The first officer says,
20:29I assumed the problem
20:31was with the right side.
20:33Why would he assume
20:34something like that?
20:35It made us wonder
20:36if there was a problem
20:37with that generator
20:38in the past.
20:41Take a look
20:41at these maintenance reports.
20:42The team reviews
20:44the maintenance records
20:45for the Hawker Sidley's generators.
20:48Check it out.
20:49No less than eight
20:49separate pilot complaints
20:50and repairs
20:51on the right generator.
20:55There were voltage fluctuations,
20:57recurring problems
20:59at the regulator,
21:00causing the right generator
21:01to shut down.
21:02Two weeks before the crash,
21:07there were issues
21:08with the right generator
21:09almost every day.
21:11They were doing maintenance,
21:13they were troubleshooting it,
21:14they were changing parts
21:16and they couldn't fix it.
21:18Air Illinois
21:18had one Hawker Sidley
21:20and three flight crews
21:21flying that plane.
21:24I'm sure that they all knew
21:26that the right generator
21:27had had problems
21:28in the past
21:28and they probably all experienced
21:30it at one time or another.
21:32The first officer
21:33had been on some
21:35of those flights
21:35where the right generator
21:37had actually disconnected.
21:39Thank goodness
21:40I was not.
21:42The most I ever saw it do
21:43was flicker a time or two.
21:45That would explain
21:47why the first officer
21:48disconnected the right generator
21:50instead of the left one.
21:54Investigators suspect
21:55that on the night of the crash...
21:57It's the generator again.
21:59...the first officer
22:00made the immediate assumption
22:02that the right generator
22:03had malfunctioned.
22:06The reaction
22:07that the first officer
22:08had about taking
22:09the right generator offline
22:10probably falls into
22:12a phenomenon
22:12that's called
22:13expectation bias.
22:15He has experienced this
22:16in the past
22:17and assumed
22:18that that was going
22:19to be the problem
22:20without really looking
22:22at the indications
22:23he had available to him.
22:24It still doesn't explain
22:26the crash.
22:26Even though both generators
22:29were offline
22:30investigators know
22:32the aircraft's batteries
22:33were in working order.
22:34How are the batteries?
22:37Pretty good.
22:39They're at 21 and a half.
22:42Should last a carbonyl.
22:44Yeah.
22:45It was really important
22:46to know
22:47did the batteries
22:47have enough endurance
22:48to get to the airport?
22:49Let's see how they manage
22:55their battery power.
22:57Investigators return
22:58to the cockpit voice recorder
23:00to determine
23:02why Flight 710
23:03ran out of battery power
23:04before reaching Carbondale.
23:06How are the bats there?
23:11We're down to 22.5 volts.
23:14Okay.
23:15Beacons off.
23:16Okay.
23:19Now the lights are off.
23:22Just minutes after discovering
23:24both generators are down
23:25the pilots turn off
23:27non-essential systems
23:28to save their batteries.
23:32They were doing the right thing
23:34turning things off
23:35to reduce the load.
23:37But is it enough?
23:41According to the manufacturer
23:43they needed to reduce
23:44their load to 70 amps.
23:47Amps measure the strength
23:49of an electrical current.
23:50The more amps drawn
23:52on a battery
23:52the faster the battery
23:54will discharge.
23:56If the crew
23:57would have reduced
23:57the load to 70 amps
23:58that would have given them
23:59a minimum of 30 minutes
24:01of endurance.
24:02That might have been
24:03enough time to get them
24:04to the Carbondale airport.
24:05Let's see if
24:07they got their load
24:08down to 70 amps.
24:10Well
24:11we know they turned off
24:13the beacons
24:13navigation lights.
24:17Investigators make
24:18an inventory
24:19of the instruments
24:20the crew turned off
24:21and what they left on
24:22in order to calculate
24:24the load on the batteries.
24:25What else?
24:30Are you using these lights here?
24:33I'll get that one down.
24:35We were not able
24:36to determine
24:37what was powered up
24:38or on or off
24:40based on the flight recorder.
24:42Should last the Carbondale.
24:43So we had to rely
24:44on the conversations
24:45between the two pilots
24:47what to leave on
24:48and what to turn off.
24:50Want me to tune in
24:51to Cabby real quick?
24:52Sure.
24:53I'm not going to use
24:54that much power.
24:58DME instruments
24:59weather radar
25:01main cabin lights
25:03one of the main radios
25:07cooling fan
25:08and the transponder.
25:12The weather radar
25:13and the radios
25:14draw a lot of power
25:15and so shedding those
25:17if you can
25:18is a prudent thing to do.
25:20Looks like they kept
25:21the rest of the flight
25:22instruments on
25:22and that's it.
25:29They used 110 amps.
25:32Investigators discover
25:33the crew did not
25:34properly reduce
25:36the draw
25:36on their batteries.
25:38No wonder
25:39they didn't make it
25:40to Carbondale.
25:41This importance
25:42with load shedding
25:43and getting down
25:44to 70 amps
25:45seems to be lost
25:47on the crew
25:47as there seems
25:48to be no discussion
25:49whatsoever
25:50about amperage
25:51to determine
25:52if their changes
25:53in the electrical system
25:54were actually making
25:55a difference
25:56in the longevity
25:57of the batteries.
26:00So why did the pilots
26:02believe they had
26:03enough power
26:03to reach their destination?
26:06The team checks
26:07to see how the pilots
26:09monitored the state
26:10of their batteries.
26:11It says here
26:12fully charged.
26:13The batteries are 24 volts.
26:16Let's see how they did.
26:21How are the fats there?
26:25We're down to 22.5 volts.
26:27Eight minutes into the flight,
26:31they used up 1.5 volts.
26:37Seven minutes later,
26:39how are the batteries?
26:42Pretty good.
26:44They're at 21 and a half.
26:46The battery charge drops
26:47another volt to 21.5.
26:49The first officer says
26:55the battery should last
26:56to Carbondale.
26:59They're halfway
27:00through the flight,
27:00he's feeling good.
27:02And then nine minutes later,
27:04he checks again.
27:05It's 20 volts.
27:12So they think
27:13they're doing all right.
27:15And then minutes later,
27:16the radios go dead.
27:22We're losing everything
27:23down to 13 volts.
27:25They're talking about
27:27having 20 volts,
27:28and then they all of a sudden
27:30they have 13 volts.
27:32So they're monitoring the volts,
27:34but it's as if the sudden drop
27:35caught them by surprise.
27:37The reason this is significant
27:38is because NICAD batteries
27:40will maintain their voltage
27:43almost right until the end
27:44that the batteries are dead.
27:46Much different
27:47than lead-acid-type batteries,
27:49which is where you see
27:50a gradual decline in voltage.
27:55That characteristic
27:56of NICAD batteries
27:58may explain
27:58why there was such a sudden drop
28:00in the battery voltage.
28:03I don't know if we have enough
28:04juice to get out of this.
28:06If they would have known
28:08the characteristic
28:08of a NICAD battery,
28:10it might have sent them
28:11a message saying,
28:12we better get on this right away
28:13and get this load reduced.
28:16Investigators find
28:17another reason
28:18why the crew may have missed
28:19how fast their batteries
28:21were discharging.
28:22They never mentioned
28:23their amps.
28:26Looks like the only thing
28:27they monitored were the volts.
28:30Volts measure
28:31the potential output
28:32of a battery,
28:33not how long it will last.
28:35Amps tell you
28:36how much electricity
28:37is being drawn.
28:39It was very surprising
28:40that they weren't monitoring
28:41the amperage
28:42because that was going
28:43to tell them
28:43how much longer
28:44they had on the batteries.
28:47Did the crew
28:48have the proper training
28:49to monitor
28:49the endurance
28:50of the batteries?
28:57Investigators interview
28:58other Air Illinois pilots.
29:00So what did you find out?
29:01To determine their ability
29:03to monitor
29:03and calculate
29:04battery endurance.
29:08Well,
29:09we know that they're all
29:10trained on battery management
29:11for a dual generator problem.
29:13But,
29:14when I asked them
29:16how long they thought
29:16the batteries would have
29:17lasted on the flight,
29:19some calculated
29:2030 minutes,
29:21others,
29:23less than an hour.
29:24five pilots
29:26gave us
29:26five different answers
29:27and they were
29:28not all correct.
29:31It became obvious
29:31to us
29:32there was definitely
29:32a training issue
29:33involved here.
29:35Are you using
29:35these lights here?
29:38I'll get that one down.
29:40The lack of training
29:41explains why
29:42the pilots thought
29:43they had enough power
29:44to reach Carbondale.
29:46But that doesn't solve
29:48a bigger mystery.
29:49This is their flight path.
29:54Why didn't the pilots
29:55land the plane
29:56at another airport
29:57before completely
29:58running out
29:58of battery power?
30:00One,
30:01two,
30:02three,
30:02four,
30:03five different airports.
30:06They were only
30:07five minutes away
30:07from Streamingfield
30:08yet they elected
30:09to go 40 minutes
30:10to Carbondale
30:11and there were
30:12several airports
30:13in between
30:13that they missed.
30:15They could have
30:15landed any time
30:16along the way.
30:18Their decision
30:18not to land
30:19calls the pilot's
30:21judgment into question.
30:23It's time to look
30:24into their backgrounds.
30:32Here's the captain's file.
30:35Investigators dig
30:36into the backgrounds
30:36of Flight 710's pilots
30:38for clues that explain
30:40their unusual reaction
30:41to an electrical failure.
30:45The captain
30:46was perfectly qualified.
30:47The two pilots
30:55were among
30:55the most experienced
30:56flight crew
30:57on the roster.
30:58Gear is up.
30:59With a combined
31:005,000 flying hours
31:01between them
31:02on the Hawker Sidley.
31:05Here's something.
31:08The captain lived
31:08in Carbondale.
31:11Maybe he wanted
31:12to get home.
31:12In aviation,
31:14what we describe
31:15as get-home-itis
31:17is when we try
31:19to make it
31:19to the destination
31:20because of our
31:21strong desire
31:22to do so.
31:23And it plays
31:24a significant role
31:25in our decision-making.
31:28Investigators
31:29talk to other pilots
31:30at the company,
31:32including First Officer
31:33Janine Urban.
31:34How well did you
31:35know the pilots?
31:38I flew with the captain
31:39and I was good friends
31:40with the first officer.
31:44I thought very highly
31:45of the first officer,
31:47Frank.
31:48I knew the flight
31:50attendant, Barbie,
31:51and liked her a lot.
31:54It was a very emotional
31:56thing to hear
31:57that both of them
31:58had been killed.
31:59What sort of pilot
32:02was the captain?
32:04I'd say average.
32:07In the aviation community,
32:09when someone is characterized
32:10as an average pilot,
32:11that usually means
32:12he's not too good.
32:15Why's that?
32:16The captain really
32:17prided himself
32:18on getting there
32:19on time.
32:20It was not uncommon
32:22for him
32:23to take risks.
32:27Looks like we've
32:28got some weather.
32:28Shall I call
32:29for deviation?
32:31Doesn't look too bad.
32:33We'll be fine.
32:37According to
32:38Air Illinois pilots,
32:39the captain would
32:40often fly too close
32:41or through
32:42dangerous storms
32:44to save flight time.
32:47If I made
32:48any comments
32:49or suggestions
32:51about a safety issue
32:54like the thunderstorms
32:56or anything else,
32:57he would do
32:58something spiteful
32:59just to prove
33:01that he was
33:02the captain.
33:03In order to keep
33:05the schedule,
33:05he'd also speed up,
33:06which would set off
33:07the overspeed alarm.
33:12Pull the circuit breaker,
33:13would you?
33:14What?
33:15Really?
33:18Pilot said
33:19he would order them
33:19to disable the overspeed warning
33:21so that they could fly faster.
33:25It was always
33:26about getting there faster.
33:29The captain's behavior
33:31is troublesome.
33:34We wanted to know
33:35if the company,
33:37the airline,
33:38was putting undue pressure
33:39on the pilots
33:40to make the schedule.
33:42This pressure
33:43to get there on time,
33:44was it from management?
33:46No.
33:47It was all
33:48the captain.
33:49The interviews
33:50with the other pilots
33:50indicated
33:51that there was
33:52no undue pressure
33:53to skirt the rules.
33:55In the case of the captain,
33:56that pressure
33:57was self-imposed.
33:59Investigators conclude
34:00that Captain Smith
34:01often stretched the rules.
34:03What about
34:04the first officer?
34:08Frank
34:09was the best.
34:10And he knew
34:13the plane
34:13and its systems
34:14really well.
34:16So why didn't
34:17the first officer
34:18speak up
34:19when Captain Smith
34:20made the decision
34:21to carry on?
34:23On I-710,
34:24do you intend
34:24to return to Springfield?
34:26Negative.
34:27Continuing to Carbondale,
34:283,000 feet.
34:31And at no time
34:32did we hear
34:32the first officer
34:33challenge the captain's
34:34decision to go
34:35on to Carbondale.
34:36We found this
34:36very perplexing.
34:38I asked how he could
34:39fly with the captain
34:39because he took
34:40so many chances.
34:42And he said,
34:43oh, I just
34:44try to keep
34:46an eye on the situation
34:47and not let him
34:49get us into anything
34:50that I can't get us out of.
34:52We're losing everything
34:53down to 13 volts.
34:55Watch my altitude, Frank.
34:57Boy, that didn't
34:58work out very well
34:59at all.
35:00The captain
35:01should have made
35:02the decision
35:02to return
35:03to the Springfield airport.
35:05And if so,
35:06none of this
35:06would have happened.
35:12Investigators conclude
35:14that the risk-taking
35:15captain
35:15and an unassertive
35:17first officer
35:17was a dangerous
35:19combination.
35:21Let's pick it up
35:22from where they realize
35:23they don't have enough
35:24power to make it
35:25to Carbondale.
35:26The team returns
35:27to the cockpit
35:28voice recording
35:29to see if they can
35:31uncover why the plane
35:32ended up so far
35:33off course.
35:34watch my altitude
35:37going down
35:38to 2,400 feet.
35:40Okay.
35:43Stop the tape.
35:46Why would the captain
35:47decide to drop down
35:48to 2,400 feet?
35:52The cloud ceiling
35:54near Carbondale
35:55was almost 2,000 feet.
35:57So maybe he was
35:58popping in and out
35:59of the clouds
35:59to see something
36:00on the ground.
36:02Play on.
36:03You got a flashlight?
36:09Yeah.
36:11Here we go.
36:12You want to shine
36:13it up here?
36:14Just as the captain
36:15tries to see the ground,
36:18the cockpit lights
36:18go out
36:19and plunge them
36:21into total darkness.
36:23We're losing everything
36:24down to 13 volts.
36:27Watch my altitude, Frank.
36:29They make it to 2,400 feet.
36:40The captain plans
36:41to level off,
36:42spot the runway
36:43and continue his descent.
36:46But that's not
36:47what happens.
36:47Okay.
36:49You're banking left.
36:51Six degrees.
36:53Okay.
36:54Correcting to the right.
36:55Just minutes later,
36:56they ended up crashing
36:57in completely
36:58the opposite direction.
36:59A little more.
37:01So the question is,
37:02what happened?
37:03What happened?
37:08How do you go
37:09from leveling off
37:10at 2,400 feet
37:11to then hitting the ground
37:13in the opposite direction?
37:14Investigators examine
37:17the final moments
37:18of Flight 710
37:19to determine
37:20what ultimately
37:21brought the plane down.
37:24How does the recording end?
37:30Do you have any issues?
37:33The recording eerily
37:35slows down.
37:37Do you have a wrong?
37:40And then silence.
37:44Their batteries just died.
37:50The captain is asking
37:51for a horizon reading
37:53on the Attitude Directional
37:54Indicator, or ADI.
37:58The ADI uses
37:59an electrically-powered
38:00gyroscope
38:01to indicate the aircraft's
38:02pitch and roll
38:03relative to the Earth's horizon.
38:07It's nighttime,
38:09no discernible horizon,
38:11low visibility.
38:12Your ADI is everything
38:14that you need
38:15to be able to keep
38:16the airplane wings level.
38:18They've lost the lights
38:20on their instruments.
38:22Some of them
38:23are starting to fail.
38:26He asked the first officer
38:28to shine a light
38:29on their ADI.
38:31Okay, you're breaking
38:35left, six degrees.
38:37Okay, correcting
38:38to the right.
38:40Investigators
38:41can only surmise
38:42what happened next.
38:44Even if all the instruments
38:45had failed,
38:46the ADI would still
38:48look like it's working.
38:49The ADI gyroscope
38:52spins at about
38:5315,000 RPM.
38:56Even after the power
38:57shuts down,
38:58it will continue
38:59rotating for several minutes.
39:01So it looks like
39:02it's working,
39:03but it really is not.
39:05As the ADI winds down,
39:07it slowly tilts
39:09to one side.
39:10Imagine that ADI
39:12starts slowly falling
39:15to the left.
39:15and correct
39:18by rolling
39:19to the right.
39:22Okay,
39:23you're banking left,
39:24six degrees.
39:26Okay, correcting
39:27to the right.
39:30A little more.
39:33It may have appeared
39:34to them that the ADI
39:35was working correctly,
39:36but they're really banking
39:37to the right
39:38and losing altitude.
39:40They probably followed
39:42that failing ADI
39:43right into the ground.
39:45They couldn't see
39:49where they were,
39:50they couldn't see
39:50any lights,
39:51and it would be
39:52over in an instant.
40:07In their final report,
40:09investigators conclude
40:10that the fatal accident
40:11was a consequence
40:12of the captain's decision
40:14to continue the flight
40:15towards Carbondale
40:16instead of returning
40:17to the nearby
40:18departure airport
40:19after the loss of power.
40:22The cause of this accident
40:23was not a catastrophic failure
40:25that suddenly
40:26caused the airplane
40:27to crash.
40:28It was the decision
40:29by the captain
40:30to continue flight
40:31on battery power
40:33after they lost
40:34the generators.
40:36Also adding to the problem
40:38was a lack
40:38of crew resource management
40:40or CRM.
40:42Now part of crew resource
40:45management training
40:46is that crews
40:48are trained
40:49to act as a team
40:50and first officers
40:52are taught
40:52and encouraged
40:53to question the captain's
40:55decision making
40:56and actions
40:57if they do not agree.
40:59Speak up.
41:00Don't worry about
41:01if it upsets
41:02somebody's ego.
41:03It's not worth dying over.
41:05Investigators cite
41:08inadequate crew training
41:09to assess battery endurance
41:11as another
41:12contributing factor.
41:14It should have been
41:15discussed in their training.
41:16It should have been
41:17in their training materials
41:19and in the flight manual.
41:21As a result
41:22of this accident
41:23the NTSB
41:24also recommends
41:25independently powered
41:27ADIs
41:27on all transport airplanes.
41:30So that if all power
41:31was lost
41:32they still had the ability
41:33to keep the airplane
41:34straight and level
41:34for at least 30 minutes.
41:36This recommendation
41:38was implemented
41:38in 1997.
41:43Flight 710
41:44brought national attention
41:45and increased scrutiny
41:47of small commuter airlines.
41:50Six months after the accident
41:52Air Illinois
41:53filed for bankruptcy
41:54and ceased operations.
41:56It's something where
41:57we learn by our mistakes.
42:00The first priority
42:01is the safety
42:01of the passengers
42:02is got to be
42:04the most important factor.
42:09is got to be
42:17the most important factor.
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