- 10 hours ago
Air Crash Investigation Series S23E01 Deadly Exchange
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TVTranscript
00:00When I woke up, we were suspended up in trees.
00:07Corporate Airlines Flight 5966 crashes on final approach to Kirksville, Missouri.
00:13I just thought, I need to get out of this plane before it blows up.
00:18Only two people survive.
00:20If you went to the accident site, you wouldn't recognize it as an airplane.
00:24The wreckage provides no clues.
00:26Instruments all checked out. It was good to fly.
00:29And the cockpit voice recorder reveals a team working well together.
00:34No flags except for the vertical.
00:36Keep it slow.
00:37Until the flight's final seconds.
00:40No!
00:41Trees!
00:44Things went bad real fast.
00:46So the question became, what happened?
00:50B-B-B-B!
00:52...
00:57...
01:02If we have to go missed, we'll set max power.
01:22Flaps 10 positive, break, gear up.
01:23The pilots of Corporate Airlines Flight 5966 complete their approach briefing into Kirksville, Missouri Regional Airport.
01:32Then we'll climb 3,000 feet, then direct Kirksville VOR.
01:36Captain Kim Sassy has been a pilot since the late 1980s, but only started flying professionally in the last five years.
01:45I'll ask you to walk me through that if we need it.
01:47After that.
01:48I will categorize Kim as a bon vivant with a colorful language.
01:56He was very calm when he was flying, and his knowledge was excellent.
02:01First officer Jonathan Palmer has three years' professional flying experience with regional airlines.
02:08The pilots viewed your time with the regionals as somewhat of the dues you pay to get to the airlines or the high-end corporate jobs.
02:16This is where you built your time. It's where you got your experience.
02:21There are 13 passengers on tonight's flight.
02:25That flight was actually a pretty smooth flight.
02:28I don't remember any turbulence or bouncing or anything. It was a nice flight.
02:34Wendy Bonham is with a group of doctors traveling to a medical conference.
02:38Do you have another copy? I left mine at home.
02:53The topic of the conference was compassion in medicine, which was a great topic.
02:58So I was kind of excited to go.
03:00I'm really looking forward to some of these panels.
03:04I had only started at Kirksville College a few months before that.
03:08So I wasn't familiar with all the people who were on board.
03:11But they all knew each other really well, and they were all chatting with each other.
03:16So it was kind of fun to watch.
03:18Tonight's flight is a short 50-minute trip from St. Louis to Kirksville, Missouri, where visibility is reduced.
03:30The workload on short flights is intense because as soon as you get the airplane squared away from the takeoff,
03:38you've immediately got to start preparing it for the landing.
03:41We're going into the crap.
03:42Look, it's so eerie and creepy.
03:50These pilots have flown multiple times together over the last week and encountered a lot of bad weather.
03:56I got a suffocating feeling every time I see that.
04:01I'm drowning.
04:03The office in which pilots work is quite small.
04:08It's got a wonderful view, but it is actually a quite tight working environment.
04:12And you're in that environment for 6, 8, 10 hours during a day.
04:18You have to find ways to get along.
04:20The pilots are flying at Jetstream 32, a twin-engine, high-performance turboprop aircraft built for short-range flights.
04:29The Jetstream was designed for this type of work.
04:32It was an economical airplane.
04:34It was reasonably comfortable for the passengers.
04:36But it was capable of going in and out of smaller airports and still being able to make a profit for the airline.
04:43The Jetstream is fuel-efficient and reliable.
04:49But this particular model has no autopilot.
04:54The Jetstream not having any autopilot made our days very long.
04:59You had to constantly flight your plane.
05:02And autopilot would be nice on those long sequences we were doing.
05:06But on a positive part, the Jetstream made you a very good pilot.
05:12Flight 5966 is being monitored by a central controller in Kansas City, as there is no controller at Kirksville Airport.
05:21Corbex 5966, turn right heading 330.
05:26Maintain 3000 until established on localizer.
05:30Clear runway 36, approach at Kirksville.
05:333000 until established, cleared for the approach.
05:37Cleared for the approach.
05:3916 miles south of the airport, the pilots begin to configure the aircraft for landing.
05:45Course alive, cross-check.
05:48No flags except for the vertical.
05:50Keep it slow, all the time we need.
05:53Let's go flaps 10 and we'll configure early, too.
05:58Give ourselves as much time as we can.
06:01All right, flaps 10.
06:03The crew is flying a non-precision approach.
06:07They don't have vertical landing guidance.
06:11Configuring early reduces the workload as they near the airport.
06:17One of the things that, in any approach, but particularly in a non-precision approach,
06:22you want to minimize the number of variables.
06:24And one of the ways you do that is you get the airplane in a position to land earlier than normal.
06:33Let's make sure the lights are up, please.
06:36All right.
06:37The lights at Kirksville are pilot-activated.
06:40The airport's without a lot of traffic that goes in and out of them.
06:45One of the ways that they reduce the cost of running the airport is they don't have the lights on all the time.
06:52The pilots have the ability to control those lights with a series of microphone clicks on a specific radio frequency.
06:59If those lights are not on, particularly when you fly with low visibility and at night, you won't see the runway.
07:09So if you don't see the runway, you can't land.
07:12Seven times I clicked it.
07:14I did it.
07:17They're still too far out to see the lights.
07:20Captain Sassy wants to avoid surprises.
07:22All we can do is we can call Kirksville Ops and ask them to confirm they're up.
07:28The pilots confirm with airline operations on the ground.
07:32Kirksville Ops, Corbex 5966.
07:365966?
07:37Yeah, could you tell me if the approach lights are up?
07:41I would do that when I didn't see the airport.
07:43I'd say, hey, did you see the lights coming on for the approach?
07:47It's a good technique.
07:49Lights are up.
07:50Cool, thanks.
07:52There was one doctor up in the front who didn't put her seatbelt on, and I wanted to call out to her and say, put your seatbelt on, but I didn't.
08:12I wasn't afraid, but I just, I'm a rule keeper and thought she should have her seatbelt on.
08:17Two and a half miles from the airport, the pilots search for the runway.
08:25400.
08:29It's very critical to maintain that altitude because if you don't see the runway, you've got to go missed, because you cannot land without seeing the runway.
08:35Flight 5966 emerges from the clouds.
08:45350, here we are.
08:47Two miles from the runway, the pilots are still looking for the approach lights.
08:51You are flying 336 feet above the ground, so there's not a lot of room for error.
09:01What do you think?
09:04I could see ground there.
09:07I don't see anything.
09:09Oh yeah, there it is.
09:11Approach, I'm in sight.
09:12But just as the pilots appear to have the runway lights in sight.
09:17Flaps 35.
09:18Something goes wrong.
09:20No, no!
09:21Jeez!
09:25What's going on?
09:27I just remember thinking, I can't believe this is happening.
09:31No, stop!
09:32Oh my God!
09:33Oh, holy crap!
09:34Oh my God!
09:36Corporate Airlines Flight 5966 has crashed into a wooded area 1.2 miles south of the airport at Kirksville, Missouri.
09:58When I woke up, it was dark and it was quiet.
10:01And the only sound that I could hear then was just the sound of fire.
10:09We were suspended up in trees.
10:12Wendy Bonham and her colleague, Dr. Krog, struggle to escape.
10:19I just felt like I needed to move.
10:22I have always had a fear of blowing up.
10:25And there was a fire in the back of the plane and I just thought, I need to get out of this plane before it blows up.
10:31I don't remember walking from my seat to the side of the plane.
10:44It was a ways down and there was fire down there.
10:49There is no other way out of the plane.
10:53I don't remember falling from the plane down to the ground.
10:56I remember before and after and I stood up and I could see Dr. Krog pretty close to the plane and he was laying down.
11:08The other 11 passengers and both pilots are dead.
11:11They were all really incredible people that did incredible things for their communities.
11:19And that's hard for me.
11:21For the pilot community, this is something that is touching us because that could be us.
11:33That could be me.
11:34We want to know why, what happened.
11:36It's up to the National Transportation Safety Board to investigate.
11:44But there's not much left of the plane for them to examine.
11:49Most of the aircraft itself was consumed by the fire.
11:53There wasn't a lot left.
11:54I mean, there's engines, propellers and other things.
11:57But if you looked at the action site, you wouldn't recognize it as an airplane.
12:11What a mess.
12:14This is what we have from structures.
12:18Although the plane was almost completely destroyed, an on-site team is able to analyze the debris.
12:24I'm amazed that we were able to get this much data from that heap.
12:30Investigators turned to the wreckage analysis to determine if the plane had any mechanical problems that could have caused the accident.
12:39We've gone through that wreckage with a fine-toothed comb.
12:42Engines, controls, instruments all checked out.
12:45Looking at all the data we had from the accident site, it appeared that the airplane was fully functional at the time it hit the ground.
12:51So the plane's working fine.
12:55It might still have lost control.
12:59They examined the direction of the plane's trail of debris.
13:06They first hit the trees here, just over 1.3 miles short of the runway.
13:13They fly another 775 feet and hit another set of trees here.
13:19The plane was headed straight for the runway the entire time.
13:25We had enough information that looking at all the pieces, this accident started to look like it was a human performance issue and not an airplane issue.
13:35What kind of an approach were they flying that night?
13:37Unfortunately, the accident rate for non-precision approaches is dramatically higher than on those approaches with an instrument landing system.
13:53What do we know about the weather that night?
13:58Wind was nominal.
14:00No turbulence or rain to speak of.
14:05Hold on a sec.
14:10Cloud ceiling was low, 300 feet.
14:12The cloud ceiling is the distance between the base of the clouds and the ground.
14:26Visibility was 3 to 5 miles.
14:29So they're flying blind through the clouds.
14:38It's misty, visibility is poor.
14:41Those are bad conditions for a non-precision approach.
14:44The question is, are they bad enough to cause this accident?
14:46Well, let's find out.
14:52In low visibility conditions, a non-precision approach is very challenging to fly.
14:58Because you come down to the lowest altitude, you have to level off there.
15:03And you fly along looking for the runway environment.
15:10Investigators speak to a pilot who landed in Kirksville ahead of flight 5966.
15:14Why did flight 5966 crash when other aircraft flew the same approach safely that night?
15:44So the question became, what went wrong that day?
15:47And that takes time to put together.
15:51We've got the performance data ready to go.
15:54Let's see how they handled the approach.
15:58Using a combination of data from the flight recorder and radar,
16:02investigators analyzed the flight's descent profile.
16:04It was important for the team to take a look at the descent profile.
16:09How did it wind up where it did?
16:12So we start backing up during the whole approach, where it was during these segments.
16:17So they come in like this and continue straight to the ground.
16:24Can we see their MDA?
16:25So the plane was supposed to level off at the minimum descent altitude
16:38before continuing to descend to the runway.
16:42Why would they blow right past the MDA like that?
16:46If they didn't level off at the minimum descent altitude, why not?
16:51What didn't they see or what didn't they do?
16:56How fast were they descending?
16:571,200 feet per minute.
17:05What should they have been doing?
17:10Below 300 feet of altitude, the max is 900 feet per minute.
17:15Once you get to minimum descent altitude,
17:18you should stop your descent altogether and continue on.
17:22Why did flight 5966 descend so low and so fast?
17:28They continued that descent speed right up until they crashed.
17:34Why didn't they slow down before striking the trees?
17:41Investigators listened to the cockpit voice recorder
17:43to understand why the pilots of corporate airlines 5966
17:47crashed short of the runway in Missouri.
17:51Ready?
17:52Okay, let's take it back to five minutes before the accident
17:56when they're lined up for the runway.
18:00The cockpit voice recorder is one of the most critical elements
18:04in the investigation.
18:06It's your most direct evidence on how the crew is interacting,
18:09on how they're following procedures,
18:11on exactly what happens on the human side.
18:17Course alive.
18:19Cross check.
18:19No plagues except for the vertical.
18:23Keep it slow.
18:24All the time we need.
18:28Let's go flaps 10 and we'll configure early too.
18:31Give ourselves as much time as we can.
18:33All right, flaps 10.
18:34They're configuring the plane to land early.
18:42The team hears evidence of a cautious and prepared crew.
18:47Smart move and low visibility.
18:49The crew on this flight knew that the weather was going to be challenging.
18:53And one of the ways that they tried to mitigate that or to improve their chances of a successful landing was to get the airplane configured early.
19:03Let's make sure the lights are up, please.
19:10All right.
19:13There are cases where the captain does an exemplary job, where he goes beyond the requirements.
19:20He asked the first officer to call ahead to make sure from the ground that the lights are working and that they're turned up fully.
19:26It's not required.
19:27It's an excellent idea, especially in these conditions.
19:30I'm hearing an organized crew here.
19:34Take it to when they near the MDA.
19:36If there's a big mistake, it'll likely be then.
19:41The minimum descent altitude is the lowest altitude you're permitted to fly at until you see the runway environment.
19:49400.
19:52350.
19:53Here we are.
19:55Okay, now the MDA.
19:56It's decision time.
19:58So?
19:59What do you think?
20:01I could see a ground there.
20:03Minimums.
20:04Minimums.
20:04Minimums.
20:05I don't see anything.
20:07Oh, yeah.
20:08There it is.
20:09Approach sites inside.
20:11Hold it there.
20:13They're two miles out.
20:16300 feet up.
20:17They've just come out of the clouds.
20:18With the mist that night, they probably couldn't see the runway lanes.
20:22There's only farmland from here to the airport.
20:24I can't see anything the captain could have mistaken for runway.
20:29Why is the captain even looking for the approach lights?
20:31So the captain's the first one to say, I see something outside the airplane.
20:38He sees the ground.
20:39He sees lights.
20:40He shouldn't be doing that.
20:42He should be totally focused inside the airplane.
20:44The first officer is supposed to see the approach lights and call out approach lights in sight continue.
20:50But the CVR recording tells a different story.
20:55Instead, they're both looking for the runway.
20:57And nobody is paying attention to the plane's descent speed and altitude.
21:04The flying pilot should have been monitoring exclusively instruments.
21:10And what sadly occurred was that the normal flight path continued below the minimum descent altitude and neither one of them caught it.
21:21No.
21:21No!
21:22Trees!
21:22And that is very apparent when you hear this trees.
21:28And it shocked both of them.
21:30They did not expect to see that.
21:33They spent four and a half minutes following procedure.
21:36They configured the plane early for landing.
21:43Here they make sure the runway lights are on early.
21:47First officer calls out minimum descent altitude.
21:52And from this point, 23 seconds from impact, it all goes wrong.
21:59Captain's looking outside when he shouldn't.
22:01The first officer doesn't challenge him.
22:04Next thing, they're crashing.
22:06It's surprising how much the captain's performance suddenly fell apart at the end.
22:17That even listening to it, he sounded like he was much better than that.
22:21It's a surprise for me professionally that this can happen.
22:24Investigators need to find out how a crew that seemed to be flying so well.
22:29Flaps 35?
22:31No.
22:31No!
22:32Trees!
22:33Made such crucial mistakes in the last seconds of the flight.
22:37Oh!
22:37Oh, crap!
22:39Oh, my God.
22:45Take it back 30 minutes before I'm packed.
22:48Investigators return to the cockpit conversation for clues to explain why the crew ignored established procedures in the final 23 seconds of their flight.
22:59There!
23:02My hair was out of my breast pocket.
23:06Are you serious?
23:07Right here.
23:07You can hold my hair like this.
23:10I cannot see you with long hair like that.
23:13I used to wear a black derby with the rim turned down.
23:17It was my concert hat.
23:21I had a Fu Manchu.
23:22Yeah, it was fun.
23:28I cannot imagine you like that.
23:31Corp X 5966.
23:34Climb and maintain one, two, thousander.
23:38Twelve, thousander.
23:41One, two, thousand.
23:42Corporate X 5966.
23:48Twelve, thousander.
23:49I detect a bit of an attitude there.
23:52I might have to call him a jerk.
23:57Does that seem a bit casual to you?
24:00Yeah, but they're above 10,000, so the cockpit doesn't have to be sterile at this point.
24:08The philosophy of the sterile cockpit rule is below 10,000 feet.
24:12The flight crew is engaged in only what's required to basically fly the airplane.
24:19No non-pertinent conversations.
24:21Keep going.
24:27I have a good time flying with you.
24:30Yeah, me too.
24:31Just letting you know that.
24:33You gotta have fun.
24:35That's truth, man.
24:36You gotta have fun.
24:37Too many of these jerks take themselves way too seriously in this job.
24:41I've flown with them, and it sucks.
24:43A month of freaking agony.
24:44All you want to do is strangle the jerk when you get to the ground.
24:47No.
24:48Oh.
24:49The conversation raises a major concern for investigators.
24:55Sure, they're joking, but the captain is essentially telling him how he wants the first officer to behave.
25:04That's disturbing, and it sets a disturbing atmosphere.
25:07It's a bad setting for the captain in terms of priorities.
25:10Okay, what's next?
25:28Cruise check, power check.
25:30You push his foot away.
25:30Yes.
25:32It's a relatively compact airplane, and the passengers in the front of the airplane can sometimes put their foot into the cockpit area.
25:44Cruise power, cruise check.
25:45All you gotta do is, you open the curtain a little bit.
25:50It's like, man, some people I invite their feet up to make them more comfortable, but damn.
25:57I dropped my book on him purposely one time.
26:00Right on top of the arch of the foot.
26:02Oh.
26:02Okay, stop it.
26:06The captain starts his cruise power checks, but then interrupts himself to tell a story about hurting a passenger.
26:15Mm-hmm.
26:16It's really inappropriate.
26:19The lack of respect for passengers is striking in his conversation.
26:24Your power levers.
26:25Right on top of his foot.
26:28The power spiked up a bit.
26:29Yeah.
26:29The first officer has to tell the captain twice to adjust his power levers, but he insists on telling this irrelevant story.
26:43All right, well, let's see if the first officer can get him back on track.
26:49All I'm thinking about is a Philly frickin' cheesesteak and an iced tea.
26:54Sounds good.
26:56Cruise power is set.
26:59Contimeters 2, 9, or 9, or 0, set and cross-checked.
27:04Now the captain interrupts their checklist to discuss his dinner plans.
27:13How'd he get 2, 9, or 9, or 0?
27:16Is he an idiot?
27:18There should be 2, 9, or 9, or 2.
27:22You never said it when they cleared to the runway?
27:23What?
27:25Investigators hear the captain mocking the first officer while confirming their altimeter setting.
27:31And I've been sitting here living alive for the last 20 minutes.
27:34Yeah, you lying scum bucket.
27:37Okay.
27:38Damn boost pumps are off.
27:40Pressurization is set.
27:41And external lights.
27:43External lights.
27:44External lights.
27:44Your blustering, scabby pustule.
27:46Are externalized.
27:48Your damn cruise checklist is frickin' done.
27:51The captain's jokes have totally eroded procedure.
27:58Even the first officer has given in and turned his checklist into a joke.
28:04There would be pressure on the first officer.
28:06He does go along with the joking.
28:08But the captain is still the pilot in command, and he has to set the tone.
28:13There's a danger that the first officer will not focus to the extent that's required.
28:18Did a breakdown in the cockpit command structure affect the first officer's actions at a critical moment?
28:29350, here we are.
28:37What do you think?
28:38I can see a ground there.
28:44I don't see anything.
28:46Oh yeah, there it is.
28:47Approach nice inside.
28:52You gotta have fun.
28:55Too many of these jerks take themselves way too seriously in this job.
29:01Flap 35.
29:03The kind of atmosphere he set up earlier in making fun of other pilots,
29:07and making fun of the passengers sets up the wrong tone.
29:10It doesn't encourage the first officer to object.
29:14When things were falling apart, he could have stepped in and done something.
29:18It looks like a complete breakdown in command structure led to this accident.
29:28The question is, why?
29:31Got their personnel files?
29:43It's very important.
29:44It's very important to get a broad sense of what the pilot's like from previous flights.
29:49What is their reputation?
29:50Have any of the problems that show up in this accident shown up before?
29:54Is this a recurring problem?
29:55Captain left a well-paying job to become a pilot.
29:56Plenty of hours.
29:57Passed all the checks.
29:58He had an interview lined up with a major airline.
29:59You have a capable pilot who's devoted to aviation, and a very skilled crew.
30:11You have a capable pilot who's devoted to aviation.
30:16plenty of hours pass all the checks he had an interview lined up with a major
30:23airline you have a capable pilot who's devoted to aviation who gave up a
30:30computer industry job that paid several times as much money because he wanted to
30:35be a pilot first officer checks out to 10 years experience squeaky clean record
30:40no incidents they were joking a fair bit almost punched drunk do you think they
30:52may have been overtired fatigue can greatly impact performance you get more
31:01tired and all of a sudden your level of precision can go downhill the team turns
31:08to other corporate Airlines pilots for more insight into the crew
31:17hi did you see any unusual behavior from these pilots that would suggest they
31:23were tired actually captain sass did try to take a nap here in the pilot's lounge
31:28before the flight they noted that he's six foot four very tall and the couch was
31:35actually quite small he he didn't quite fit on it so it couldn't have been ideal
31:40for sleeping any idea how long he was asleep maybe an hour
31:47thank you fatigue is insidious and that you get an increasing performance
31:57degradation once you are at a higher level of fatigue and performance
32:03impairment it can be somewhat like alcohol these are the classic signs of
32:10fatigue this is what we're looking for when I have a case that involves fatigue I go
32:17back to the cockpit voice recording again to see do they sound tired here's
32:24something an automated weather update notifies the pilots of the poor
32:37visibility in Kirksville we're not getting it crap all this damn way
32:48let's try it yeah we're gonna try it I don't want to come all the way out here
32:54for nothing tonight they haven't even gotten into the bad weather yet and the
32:59captain's determined to land in it yeah he's fixated on landing
33:04it had not been an easy duty day and so they're probably getting towards the end of like we
33:18would like to get this flight over but there's more than just fixation going on here the pilots
33:26discussion provides more evidence of fatigue when they find out the weather's bad the captain
33:33should be talking about options other than landing well he has the opportunity to discuss options
33:39now what does he do I'll be so happy when we have an ILS the next job everywhere we go we'll have an
33:49ILS yep the captain complains about not having automated landing assistance an ILS at the airport
33:56the only options he's talking about our future job prospects instead of discussing options if they
34:04can't land the captain is talking about his ambitions of flying for a bigger company
34:09we're going into the crap look it's so you're even creepy
34:1710 minutes earlier they're upset about the bad weather but when they're actually in it they're cracking
34:27jokes the crew isn't responding fast enough to the changing situation that can be a sign of fatigue
34:36people start to become giddy and are not critical enough or or or enough careful of their behavior
34:43after this they don't discuss the weather again for three minutes how's crooksville looking weatherworks
34:55visibility three miles sky condition overcast 300 still overcast 300 feet
35:06now when they do check again the visibility is still bad and they don't discuss options besides landing
35:15they discover that the crew ignored multiple warnings about conditions on the approach
35:21in fatigue you don't respond to warnings that there are warnings that this is not working but that
35:28you're slow to respond to it just missing one piece you already have it the risky decision is to try to land when they can't decide if they can see the runway
35:41so they're fixated on landing
35:45uh-huh
35:46i don't see anything
35:47oh yeah there it is
35:49approach that's inside
35:50it's a decision the pilots regret almost immediately
35:54flaps 35
35:56no
35:58no
35:59trees
36:00investigators conclude that fatigue played a major role in the crash of flight 5966
36:07so they're fixated on landing
36:10uh-huh
36:11right
36:12they don't consider any of the other options
36:14and they make the risky decision to land anyways
36:17all the signs are there
36:19i personally feel that fatigue is the largest human performance area that we can address as an industry
36:28to prevent accidents from happening
36:30it's not always obvious when someone is tired and it's not obvious to them
36:34that scientific evidence is that people typically under report how tired they are
36:39now how much did these guys work before the accident flight
36:47investigators analyze the pilot's duty hours leading up to the flight
36:53to study fatigue we look at the person is getting the amount of sleep that they normally get
37:00we look at how long they've been awake
37:02uh we look at the time of day
37:04uh those are scientifically worked out and we can get an idea from that
37:09the night of the flight they had worked three days straight
37:13that'll tire you out
37:14yeah well they had seven and a half hours of available rest time the night before the flight
37:18that day they flew six flights an hour each and they were on duty for
37:2314 hours straight starting at 5 45 a.m
37:27the team discovers that the crew of flight 59 66 worked an extremely long day before the accident flight
37:34the day of the accident was very busy they had to get up about four in the morning
37:41their first flight was around five in the morning
37:43they were originally scheduled for eight flights and they would have been on duty for about 14 hours
37:48it's it's it's quite a long day
37:51so it was an extremely long day not enough rest at that plane with no autopilot
37:57to the faa regulations i have to say about working in those conditions
38:02were the pilots made to work too many hours without sufficient rest
38:08check this out pilots can't fly more than eight flight hours in a day but that's it
38:17i flew in those days and you had a maximum number of flight hours in a day but the number of duty hours
38:25and the time of day was not even taken into consideration
38:28isn't there data out there that says it isn't safe to fly if you've been up that long
38:32a 2003 study of data from 55 accidents concluded that pilots who worked 13 or more duty hours
38:48had an accident rate several times higher than those working shorter days
38:52why isn't this information reflected in the regulations
38:58this might have something to do with it
39:02investigators discover the reason why the faa's rest and duty regulations don't reflect the latest research
39:10last time these regulations were updated
39:131964
39:15you had a dedicated and very capable crew
39:22you had a company that was trying to do a good job
39:25really the regulations needed to be updated according to scientific principles
39:31to improve the safety for everyone
39:34the team now has a comprehensive picture of the accident of corporate airlines flight 5966
39:42at the end of a 14-hour day two tired pilots attempt one final landing in challenging conditions
39:51i got a suffocating feeling every time i see that
39:59the captain's joking and casual tone in the cockpit undermines the command structure between him and the first officer
40:05you gotta have fun that's truth man you gotta have fun too many of these jerks take themselves way too seriously in this job
40:13the pilots roles break down so much that in the critical 23 seconds before crashing neither of them is doing his job
40:21so what do you think the captain ignores protocol and takes his eyes off his instruments
40:29i can see ground there
40:31i i don't see anything
40:33and the first officer doesn't challenge him
40:37flaps 35
40:39the pilots fatigue likely contributed to poor decision-making and fatal preoccupation with landing
40:45no no trees
41:04the ntsb recommends an overhaul of the faa's flight and duty time regulations
41:13to consider elements like length of duty day start time workload and other factors that can affect pilots alertness
41:22the ntsb had been advising changes in the regulations and the flight and duty time regulations for decades before this happened
41:31but i think with this accident really focused to a point that industry realized that this was necessary
41:38this was a push from the major airlines first that then trickled down into other operations that were smaller like the regional airlines and corporate operators
41:47for wendy bonham the change came at too high cost
41:54i'm comforted to hear that there were changes made in the length of time that pilots can fly
42:01um because of this crash
42:08i suppose it's something good that came out of something that wasn't good at all
42:14i love you
42:15i love you
42:17i love you
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