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Air Crash Investigation Series S24E08 Under Fire
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TVTranscript
00:00Soon after departing Riyadh, the pilots of Saudia Flight 163 get terrifying news.
00:09Fire. Fire in the cabin.
00:13A fire in the cabin has spread very, very rapidly.
00:17Fire equipment is in standby positions and ready.
00:20The passengers were probably terrified.
00:23They're able to return to the airport.
00:27Okay, we are shutting down the engines now and evacuating.
00:31But only minutes later...
00:33Saudia 163, do you read?
00:35Everyone on board is dead.
00:38None of it made any sense.
00:40Investigators discover critical evidence on the cockpit voice recorder.
00:45It's just smoke in the aft.
00:47He's continually downplaying the situation.
00:50If he had gone back to see for himself,
00:54then perhaps things would have been different.
00:57D-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d-d.
01:01It's 20 past nine on a hot evening at Saudi Arabia's Riyadh International Airport.
01:29Saudia 112, line up and hold.
01:32Clear to leave Riyadh via Derma.
01:35Climb and maintain 350.
01:38Left turn from takeoff.
01:40In the tower, controllers are handling a full roster of flights.
01:45Most are scheduled after sunset, when the heat dies down.
01:49Everything is running smoothly.
01:54Riyadh, Saudia 163.
01:57Until a recently departed Saudia flight calls in.
02:00Go ahead.
02:01163, we're returning back to Riyadh.
02:04Which changes everything.
02:06Clear to reverse course back to Riyadh.
02:09Request reason.
02:11Saudia 163, we've got fire in the cabin and please alert the fire trucks.
02:16This is extremely dangerous.
02:18It doesn't get any more serious than this.
02:22This is basically a pilot's worst case nightmare.
02:26Okay, cleared back.
02:28You can descend to any altitude you'd like.
02:30163, we can descend to any altitude.
02:33When an aircraft reports to the air traffic control tower that they have a fire on board,
02:41they clear other airplanes out of the way,
02:43and that airplane is given top priority to land and an evacuation should then ensue.
02:50The flight originated in Karachi, Pakistan, before stopping over in Riyadh.
02:56It was heading to Jeddah, but now must turn back.
02:59You're number one for landing.
03:02163.
03:08Saudia flight 163 is a tri-star L-1011.
03:14The L-1011 is a three-engine, wide-body, long-range transport airplane.
03:21It was designed to go very long distances, carry hundreds of people,
03:26had excellent performance, and mechanically reliable.
03:34There are 287 passengers on board,
03:37and some at the rear of the cabin are having difficulty breathing.
03:42The smoke is the first indication of a fire the pilots reported to air traffic control.
03:47The passengers were probably terrified, and the aircraft needed to be on the ground as soon as possible.
03:5438-year-old Captain Mohammed Ali Khawaita is the pilot flying.
04:00He's been with Saudia for 15 years, and is now responsible for getting the plane and passengers back safely.
04:0626-year-old First Officer Sami Abdullah Hassanane is the pilot monitoring.
04:15How many passengers on board?
04:17We've got a full load.
04:19I would declare an emergency.
04:26Yeah.
04:28American Bradley Curtis is the flight engineer.
04:33You really could not fly an airplane like the L-1011 without a flight engineer.
04:40To manage all of the aircraft systems that modern-day aircraft are all done by automation.
04:47Flight 163 is now less than four minutes from the airport.
04:52Ladies and gentlemen, please stay in your seats.
04:59Emergency crews are standing by.
05:01Riyadh, Saudia 163, 10 miles final. Runway in sight. Are we clear to land?
05:11163, clear to land. Wind 320 at 5.
05:16Clear to land. Can you confirm you alerted the fire trucks?
05:19Affirmative.
05:21Riyadh, Saudia 163.
05:25As the smoke in the cabin increases, the purser does her best to prepare passengers for landing.
05:30Place your hands behind your head. Head between your knees.
05:42Saudia 163 has been on fire for at least 17 minutes.
05:49A fire in the cabin can spread very, very rapidly.
05:53It can be very difficult to contain, so it becomes a race against time.
06:03Saudia 163, fire equipment is in standby positions and ready.
06:07Please advise the fire trucks to be at the tail of the airplane after touchdown, please.
06:11Yes, will do.
06:12The L-1011 touches down, 16 minutes after the crew first called in the fire.
06:28Tower, could you advise if there's any fire in the tail of the aircraft?
06:35Stand by.
06:37Guys, do you see a fire in the tail?
06:39The controller checks with the fire team on the ground.
06:43Negative. We don't see flames.
06:45No, no fire.
06:47They say no, nothing they can see.
06:48One, six, three.
06:49Saudia 163 now turns onto a taxiway and comes to a stop.
07:00Once the aircraft comes to a full stop, it theoretically should be able to be evacuated in under 90 seconds.
07:09Saudia 163, do you want to continue to the ramp or do you want to shut down?
07:13Stand by.
07:15Okay, we are shutting down the engines now and evacuating.
07:18Okay, Saudia 163, understand you are holding and shutting down.
07:22Affirmative and evacuating.
07:24When you have a fire in the cabin, the available oxygen is being eaten up very quickly.
07:28Passengers cannot breathe.
07:30They are being overcome by smoke and fumes.
07:33And you have to get the doors open and get people out.
07:50The plane's doors remain closed.
07:53The fire is spreading.
07:54There's fire in the tail. Tell them to turn the engines off.
08:00Firefighters are unable to approach the plane.
08:04With an aircraft of this size, even with those engines at idle speed, they can actually still suck individuals into the engines.
08:14Captain said he's switching off the engines and evacuating now. Put the fire out, please.
08:18We can't because the engines are still running. The engines are still running. I can hear them.
08:28So as these toxic substances continue to build, such as carbon monoxide, eventually you lose consciousness and you die.
08:39Saudia 163, do you read? Saudia 163, do you read? Saudia 163, if you read, shut down the engines.
08:51There's no response from the cockpit and no signs of an evacuation.
08:59So none of it made any sense.
09:01Three minutes and fifteen seconds after stopping on the taxiway, flames consume the aircraft.
09:15Not a single person escapes.
09:20Heart breaks for them.
09:25The next morning, the scale of the devastation is clear.
09:28The fire has obliterated the upper fuselage from tail fin to cockpit.
09:38All 301 people on board are dead.
09:42It's the second deadliest single aircraft disaster to date.
09:47It was a very tragic situation.
09:50It was just inconceivable to everyone.
09:54It's now up to investigators to sift through the smoldering wreckage to find out what happened.
10:01Flight 163 had two main questions to present to the investigators.
10:06One was why the aircraft came to a stop and didn't evacuate the passengers.
10:13And the other was why was there a fire on this aircraft in the first place?
10:18The National Transportation Safety Board, or NTSB, and the aircraft manufacturer Lockheed, send investigators to Riyadh to help the Saudis determine the cause of the catastrophic fire on Flight 163.
10:35The Saudis were in charge according to international rules, but they didn't have a lot of major aircraft accident experience.
10:45So the US NTSB supported them and helped them with the investigation.
10:50Just some soot. Black box should be fine.
10:57Crew were found in their seats.
11:00Look at where the passengers and some of the flight attendants were found.
11:04Investigators discover that passengers had moved forward and gathered near the doors.
11:09After the airplane came to a stop, there must have been mass confusion.
11:17Did they try to open the doors?
11:20Doesn't look like it. None of the emergency handles were pulled.
11:23The fact that no one attempted to open the doors from the inside of the aircraft leads me to believe that they were already incapacitated and could not open their doors.
11:40They examine the devastated cabin to figure out how the fire started.
11:46Looks like someone tried to put out the fire.
11:48The roof was totally gone. The sides were gone. Everything was burned away.
12:01The seat frames, but the fabrics were all burned away.
12:08Total destruction in the cabin area.
12:14There's something at the back you're going to want to see.
12:16Well, what do we have here?
12:29When we got to the back part of the airplane, on the left side, in the aisle, was a hole in the floor.
12:38Looks like the fire came up through the floor.
12:40Mm-hmm.
12:41Mm-hmm.
12:42The hole is the investigator's first clue about the origin of the fire.
12:46Yeah, we need to get down there.
12:59It appeared to me that's where the fire started, under that hole, because a fire burns up, not down. So that made us want to know what was beneath that hole.
13:12Be careful there.
13:13Investigators examined the cargo compartment below the rear cabin.
13:26Looks like the fire burned a hole in the compartment ceiling, right here.
13:30The fuel lines are scorched. The throttle and flight control cables are damaged, too.
13:39On a tristar, the control cables, throttle cables, and fuel lines run through an eight-inch space above the rear cargo compartment.
13:50Did a burst fuel line cause the fire?
14:00When investigating any fire, you're looking for the clauses that may be very obvious. Engineering things, mechanical things, that you look at to try and see if you can eliminate those sources of fire and ignition.
14:15Investigators also discover a burned-out hole on the left side of the compartment.
14:25Looks like a burst hydraulic pipe, some melted wires.
14:28Maybe an electrical short, and a hydraulic leak caused the fire.
14:35When we looked inside that cargo compartment, there were all kinds of possibilities of what could have caused the fire.
14:45They removed the charred mechanical components for further testing.
14:54As part of the investigation, there were several things we wanted to eliminate at the start, including, was it an electrical failure?
15:03Was it a hydraulic systems failure? Or some other mechanical failure?
15:08If there is a fault in one of the systems on this plane, then the tristar fleet, nearly 200 planes flying worldwide, could be at risk as well.
15:23We've got the results.
15:27Lab tests have been performed on the fuel, electrical, and hydraulic systems from Saudia Flight 163.
15:32No detectable evidence that the fuel system leaked.
15:39What about the electrical system?
15:45No, there were no shorts.
15:47And the hydraulic systems were also fine.
15:50The tests we conducted indicated that all the failures that occurred with the systems were caused by the fire.
16:02They did not cause the fire.
16:06So the fire must have started inside the cargo bay.
16:10We need to rule out a bomb.
16:17A bomb expert from the UK was brought in, and his expertise is determining if there was explosives or incendiary devices.
16:29Nine months earlier, the great mosque in Mecca was seized by insurgents who called for the overthrow of Saudi Arabia's rulers.
16:40Hundreds of worshippers were killed.
16:43Did extremists plant a bomb in the luggage compartment of this flight headed to Mecca?
16:48No evidence of a timing device, no structural damage suggesting an explosion, no small fragments in the structure.
17:01So no bomb.
17:02The bomb experts did an exhaustive search and examination of the wreckage, including was it electrical.
17:13His investigation revealed no explosives, no incendiary devices.
17:27Let's check previous cargo fires for patterns.
17:29Good idea.
17:33Are there any clues from cases similar to that of Saudia Flight 163?
17:40We looked at previous in-flight fires and fires on airplanes and cargo compartments to see what caused those, to see if it would point us in a direction.
17:54Matches.
17:55Matches?
17:56Look.
17:58Last year, British officials identified three different incidents in which matches had started a fire in luggage being loaded onto a plane.
18:07Hard to believe this is even possible.
18:10We had one incident where the luggage was thrown into the cargo pit.
18:16It started smoking and then caught fire.
18:18And the matches in those days were not safety matches.
18:19Today, it will not ignite unless it's on a special fabric.
18:30You ready?
18:32Investigators test how easily matches could ignite.
18:35I hit it with something hard and poof, it would catch fire.
18:36That was the non-safety matches.
18:45It surprised us that the matches could catch fire so easily.
18:46So it was a serious hazard.
18:47The theory that matches were the source of the fire seemed possible.
19:00Passengers on this particular flight were likely to pack them in their luggage.
19:01Many of the passengers on the airplane were pilgrims heading to Mecca and they would have had stoves with them to cook when they were camping out.
19:18They would have had matches to start the stoves.
19:19Matches seem like the most likely cause.
19:20Mm-hmm.
19:21We didn't find any evidence of matches causing the fire, but obviously that evidence would have been destroyed.
19:22heading to Mecca, and they would have had stoves with them
19:25to cook when they were camping out.
19:28They would have had matches to start the stoves.
19:36Matches seem like the most likely cause.
19:38Mm-hmm.
19:41We didn't find any evidence of matches causing the fire,
19:45but obviously that evidence would have been destroyed.
19:47But it was a pretty good hunch on our part.
19:54But if some luggage actually caught fire,
19:57would it be enough to bring down a sophisticated jetliner?
20:01Fire in a cargo compartment isn't supposed to be able to spread.
20:07The compartment should have sealed off and starved the fire of any oxygen.
20:09Maybe the compartment's fire suppression system failed.
20:25Unlike the airtight cargo holds at the front of the airplane,
20:29which were designed to hold cargo containers,
20:32the aft hold was designed for passengers' baggage
20:35and any pets they were traveling with.
20:37The aft cargo compartment was different
20:42than all of the other cargo compartments on this aircraft
20:45because it was designed to be able to hold live animals.
20:51So it was pressurized and it had a source of fresh air.
20:55An inlet fan and three valves allow for air flow.
21:02But if smoke sets off one or both detectors,
21:06the fan stops and the valves close,
21:09sealing the compartment and cutting off the supply of oxygen.
21:12In the case of Flight 163,
21:19obviously something in that self-extinguishing system
21:22did not take place and the fire continued.
21:29Okay, let's see if they work.
21:32Investigators test both of the cargo compartment's smoke detectors
21:36to determine if they are functioning properly.
21:47Okay, that one's working.
21:49What about the other one?
21:56Smoke detectors were working.
21:58There must be another reason why oxygen continued to fuel the fire.
22:04Maybe there was something wrong with the compartment itself.
22:08Good point.
22:10Let's find out.
22:12Smoke detectors were working correctly,
22:14but the fire spread,
22:17even though it was supposed to have been self-extinguished.
22:20And we needed to find out why.
22:24Let me check the specs.
22:27Investigators examined the specification
22:29of the rear cargo compartment
22:31on board Saudia Flight 163
22:33to better understand how it's designed to contain a fire.
22:38According to this,
22:39it's considered a Class D cargo compartment.
22:45Designation states
22:46that a Class D compartment
22:48is 500 cubic feet.
22:52What's the size of the L-1011 compartment?
22:56The L-1011's cargo compartment
22:58is 700 cubic feet.
23:03The cargo compartment
23:05on the L-1011
23:06is 200 cubic feet
23:08bigger than its original design.
23:11We determined
23:12that the original certification
23:14of a Class D cargo compartment
23:17was based on
23:19smaller airplanes.
23:21Over the three decades
23:23since 1950,
23:24the aircraft design changed.
23:27It grew in size,
23:28including the Class D cargo compartments.
23:32If the compartment was larger,
23:35that means there's more oxygen.
23:38Maybe that fueled the fire
23:39instead of extinguishing it.
23:40It appears that
23:43the bigger the aircraft got,
23:44the bigger compartments got.
23:46There was no modification
23:48of the self-extinguishment
23:49of the compartments.
23:53Investigators recreate
23:54a cargo compartment
23:56that matches the specifications
23:58of Saudia 163's
24:00aft cargo bay
24:01to test its ability
24:02to self-extinguish.
24:05Matches and an igniter
24:07are placed inside the compartment
24:09to start the fire
24:10from a safe distance.
24:15Okay.
24:17Let's see what happens.
24:33Let's see if the fire extinguishes.
24:35It's progressing quickly.
24:42As investigators expected,
24:44the fire does not burn out.
24:47A small fire
24:48that in a normal
24:50Class D compartment
24:52would extinguish
24:54and burn all its oxygen up
24:56in a large compartment,
24:58it wouldn't do that.
24:59It had too much oxygen.
25:01It's burning through
25:02the fire-resistant liner.
25:03The L-1011 construction
25:08of the cargo compartment
25:09included the use
25:11of a Nomex liner
25:13that's used for fire suits
25:15and it was thought
25:16that that would protect
25:17the compartment
25:18and allow for
25:20this self-extinguishment.
25:22instead of burning out
25:34it burned through the liner
25:35in
25:35two minutes
25:38and 59 seconds.
25:42That explains
25:43why the fire
25:44wasn't contained.
25:46Well, we were quite surprised
25:48by the findings
25:48of our tests
25:49of the Nomex.
25:51It failed
25:52visibly
25:53and permit
25:54the fire to spread
25:55much quicker
25:56than we had suspected.
25:58The extra oxygen
26:00in the larger compartment
26:01fuels the fire
26:02intensely
26:03and long enough
26:04to penetrate
26:05the Nomex liner
26:06progressing
26:07into the side wall,
26:09ceiling
26:09and damaging
26:10the plane's components.
26:12At the same time,
26:14smoke escapes
26:15the cargo compartment
26:16and seeps
26:17through the air vents
26:18into the cabin.
26:19eventually flames
26:21penetrate the cabin floor.
26:28Why the pilots
26:29didn't stop
26:30and shut the engines
26:31down sooner,
26:32which would have
26:33prevented the fire
26:34from spreading
26:34throughout the plane,
26:36now remains
26:37Saudi A163's
26:38biggest mystery.
26:40Why there was not
26:41an immediate stop
26:42and an attempt
26:43to evacuate
26:44the passengers,
26:45all these things
26:47make no sense.
26:50What was your first
26:51indication
26:52that there was
26:52a problem?
26:55Investigators
26:56turned to the
26:56air traffic controller
26:57for further details.
27:00Twelve minutes
27:00into the flight,
27:01the crew reported
27:02a fire in the cabin
27:03and asked to turn back.
27:04Riyadh,
27:06Saudi A163.
27:09Go ahead.
27:11A163,
27:12we're returning
27:12back to Riyadh.
27:15Clear to reverse
27:15course back to Riyadh.
27:17Request reason?
27:20Saudi A163,
27:21we've got fire
27:22in the cabin
27:23and please
27:23alert to fire trucks.
27:26From there?
27:27The approach
27:27back was normal.
27:28So was the landing.
27:30How did they sound?
27:32The communication
27:33seemed normal.
27:35Even after
27:35they stopped
27:36on the taxiway.
27:38Saudi A163,
27:39do you want
27:39to continue
27:40to the ramp
27:41or do you
27:41want to shut down?
27:45Stand by.
27:46Okay,
27:47we are shutting
27:47down the engines
27:48now and evacuating.
27:50And you
27:51couldn't see the fire?
27:53Not until
27:53after they had stopped.
27:55The plane just
27:55sat there
27:56with the engines
27:56running for another
27:57three minutes.
27:58When they finally
27:59shut them down,
28:01I guess it was
28:02too late.
28:04it's still
28:06not clear
28:07why the engines
28:08were not
28:08shut down sooner
28:09or why the plane
28:12wasn't stopped
28:13on the runway
28:14right after
28:15touchdown.
28:16The captain's decision
28:18not to stop
28:19the aircraft
28:19immediately
28:20after landing
28:20and evacuate
28:21was reckless
28:22and irresponsible
28:23in my mind.
28:25it is imperative
28:26that you get
28:27the passengers
28:28out as quickly
28:29as possible.
28:32While investigators
28:33will never know
28:34why the engines
28:35weren't shut down
28:36in time,
28:37could something
28:38have prevented
28:38the pilots
28:39from stopping
28:40the plane
28:40earlier
28:41on the runway?
28:44Nothing unusual
28:45here.
28:46They scrutinize
28:48the recorded
28:48flight data.
28:49Looks like a normal
28:50flight.
28:51Do we have
28:52the data
28:53on the braking
28:53system?
28:54Maybe the brakes
28:55failed.
28:57Here it is.
29:00Did the brake
29:00hydraulics fail,
29:02preventing the pilots
29:03from stopping
29:03the plane?
29:05See for yourself.
29:07Our examination
29:08of the airplane
29:09revealed that the
29:10braking system
29:11was working fine
29:12and the pilot
29:13could have easily
29:14stopped the airplane
29:15on the runway.
29:16It's as if the crew
29:17was flying a plane
29:18that wasn't even
29:20on fire.
29:23Why did they
29:24allow the aircraft
29:25to roll to the
29:26end of the runway
29:27and then to taxi
29:29onto a taxiway
29:31and then take
29:32over three minutes
29:34to shut the
29:35engines down?
29:36All of these
29:37behaviors are
29:38not consistent
29:39with how most
29:41crews, if not
29:42all crews,
29:43would handle
29:44an emergency
29:45like that.
29:46We need to find
29:48out what went
29:49on in that
29:49cockpit.
29:51I'll check on
29:52the progress
29:52of the CVR
29:53download.
29:56The investigation
29:57now hinges
29:58on the cockpit
29:59voice recorder
30:00or CVR.
30:02Can it explain
30:03why the pilots
30:04treated the landing
30:05like a normal
30:06flight instead
30:07of an emergency?
30:08You review
30:17the recordings?
30:18Oh, yeah.
30:19You need to hear
30:19this for yourself.
30:23Investigators
30:23listen to how
30:24the crew
30:24of Saudia
30:25Flight 163
30:27dealt with
30:27the onboard
30:28fire.
30:29Let's start
30:30from when
30:30the smoke
30:31alarms go off
30:31seven minutes
30:32into takeoff.
30:38BF cargo.
30:46Smoke detection
30:47BF cargo.
30:55Now it's A.
30:57That's both of them.
31:00Hold on.
31:02The alarms go off
31:04long before
31:04they record a fire.
31:05They got two
31:09smoke warnings
31:10and then there
31:10was a five-minute
31:11and 30-second delay
31:14before they
31:15turned around.
31:17By the way,
31:20we are smoking there.
31:24The captain
31:25sounds skeptical.
31:27I would say
31:28so, yeah.
31:30What's the procedure
31:31for it in the
31:31checklist?
31:35There isn't
31:38anything about it
31:39in the abnormal
31:39procedures, huh?
31:45Nothing about it.
31:46Pause the recording.
31:50They waste time
31:51going through
31:52the smoke alarm
31:52procedures
31:53before deciding
31:53to turn around.
31:54And on top of that,
31:55they're looking
31:55in the wrong place.
31:56They should be looking
31:57in the emergency section.
32:00There was
32:01obvious confusion
32:02between checklists.
32:04The emergency
32:05checklists need
32:06to be immediate
32:07action.
32:09And the abnormal
32:09checklists are
32:11actions that you
32:12take to avoid
32:14getting into
32:15some sort of
32:16an emergency
32:16condition.
32:18There's a lack
32:19of urgency here.
32:26Shall I go back
32:27there and see
32:27if I can smell
32:28something?
32:30Okay.
32:31Sure.
32:31Sure.
32:34Okay.
32:34If I can
32:35see or smell
32:37anything,
32:37I think we
32:38better go back.
32:40Okay.
32:40Sure.
32:49Forty seconds later.
32:54Yeah.
32:54We got a fire
32:55back there.
32:56We do?
32:57Yeah, we do.
32:58It's okay.
33:03Tell control
33:03we're heading back.
33:05The captain
33:06is surprised
33:07to learn
33:07there's a fire.
33:09Only then
33:10does he turn
33:11the plane
33:11back to Riyadh.
33:13It's been
33:13five and a half
33:14minutes
33:15since the
33:15first alarm.
33:17I would
33:17declare an
33:17emergency.
33:21Yeah.
33:21Yeah.
33:22Clear to reverse
33:23course back to
33:23Riyadh.
33:25Request reason?
33:25Declare
33:27an emergency.
33:31Fire.
33:32Fire in
33:33the cabin.
33:37The engineer
33:38has already
33:38told him
33:39there's a fire
33:39and his
33:40purser
33:40has corroborated
33:41that.
33:48Captain
33:49doesn't
33:50declare
33:50an emergency
33:51and it
33:52happens
33:52again.
33:54Cue it
33:55up to
33:552250.
33:5715 minutes
33:58into the
33:58flight.
34:02Did we
34:03declare an
34:03emergency?
34:06Negative.
34:08Okay.
34:10The fire
34:10trucks will
34:11be waiting
34:11for us
34:11though.
34:12Yes.
34:15The captain
34:16is ignoring
34:16his crew.
34:17In the
34:191980s
34:20the captain
34:21was God
34:22on the
34:23airplane.
34:24There was
34:24never any
34:25discussion
34:25about
34:26including
34:28any other
34:28crew members
34:29in his
34:30decision making
34:30process
34:31and
34:33arrogance
34:34and hubris
34:35may very
34:35well have
34:36played a
34:36large role
34:37in this.
34:39It gets
34:39even more
34:39disturbing
34:40when the
34:40captain
34:41is asked
34:41about
34:41evacuating.
34:42Playless
34:43elections.
34:43Shall we
34:48evacuate?
34:51It's the
34:52purser in
34:52the cockpit
34:52again.
34:53Can we
34:53evacuate all
34:54the passengers?
34:55Flaps 10
34:56please.
34:58The captain
34:58ignores the
34:59purser's
35:00question.
35:02When we're
35:03on the
35:03ground.
35:04Yes.
35:06Flaps 10?
35:08The captain
35:09was asked
35:09a total
35:10of seven
35:11times.
35:13If an
35:14evacuation
35:15was going
35:16to happen
35:16and each
35:17time he
35:19ignored the
35:19request.
35:20There were
35:21two other
35:21people in
35:22the cockpit.
35:22What were
35:22they doing?
35:23First
35:24officer,
35:24not much.
35:27I would
35:27declare an
35:28emergency.
35:30Yeah.
35:32Declare to
35:32reverse course
35:33back to
35:33Riyadh.
35:34Request
35:35reason?
35:36Declare
35:36emergency.
35:37he never
35:43once challenged
35:44the captain's
35:44stubbornness.
35:46The first
35:47officer was
35:48silent and
35:49passive.
35:51The captain
35:52just left the
35:54first officer
35:55completely out of
35:56the picture and
35:57continued to fly.
35:58What about the
36:02flight engineer?
36:04Reviewing the
36:05transcripts,
36:06investigators discover
36:07a troubling
36:08pattern.
36:09If anything,
36:10he made the
36:10situation worse.
36:11How so?
36:12By repeatedly
36:13downplaying the
36:14situation,
36:15continually saying
36:15things like,
36:16no problem.
36:18Less than a
36:19minute after the
36:20flight engineer
36:21reports fire in
36:22the cabin,
36:23the captain asks
36:24him to do
36:24another check.
36:25This time,
36:27he returns with
36:27a different
36:28assessment.
36:31It's just
36:31smoke in the
36:32aft.
36:34Okay.
36:35We're going
36:36back to
36:36Riyadh.
36:36Okay.
36:37No problem.
36:41Everybody's
36:42panning in the
36:42back, though.
36:44No problem.
36:46No problem.
36:48No problem at
36:49all.
36:51Downplaying the
36:52severity of the
36:53situation,
36:54can most
36:56certainly affect
36:57the captain's
36:58perception of
37:00what exactly is
37:01going on.
37:03What happens
37:04on the ground?
37:05Well, it's
37:06hard to know.
37:07Play from the
37:07500-foot alert.
37:12500.
37:13And 500?
37:15Hydraulic.
37:16You've got low
37:17pressure on number
37:18two.
37:18Looking good.
37:20Tell them to not
37:21evacuate.
37:22Evacuate.
37:24Place your hand
37:28behind your head.
37:30Head between
37:31your knees.
37:33No need for that.
37:34We're okay.
37:36No problems.
37:37No problem.
37:42Minimums.
37:42Minimums.
37:43One hundred.
37:47One hundred.
37:48One hundred.
37:50Fifty.
37:51Fifty.
37:52Forty.
37:53Forty.
37:54Thirty.
37:55Thirty.
37:55Thirty.
37:55The fire is so
38:06severe at this point
38:07that it burns
38:07through the CVR's
38:08electrical.
38:10Just before
38:11touchdown, the fire
38:13destroys the wiring
38:14that powers the
38:15cockpit voice recorder.
38:17It's a setback for the
38:18investigation.
38:19We have no idea of the
38:22chaotic nature of what
38:24was going on in the
38:26cockpit at that time.
38:29He wasted five minutes
38:31of signing to turn
38:31around.
38:32He wouldn't declare an
38:33emergency even though
38:34he's been told there's a
38:35fire in the cabin.
38:37He failed to evacuate
38:38everybody on that plane.
38:40And the other pilots did
38:41nothing to change his
38:42thinking.
38:44What kind of emergency
38:45training did this crew
38:46have?
38:46Let's pull their files
38:48and see.
38:56Investigators examine
38:57the pilot records of
38:58Saudia 163's crew
39:00members to determine if
39:02they were properly
39:03trained to deal with a
39:04fire.
39:05Hmm.
39:06This does not look
39:08good.
39:09The first officer was
39:10dropped from pilot
39:11training, but reinstated
39:13two years later as a
39:14result of committee
39:15action.
39:16committee action.
39:17I have a different term
39:19for committee action.
39:21It's friends or family.
39:23He wanted to be a pilot.
39:25He was going to be a
39:26pilot.
39:27And someone helped him
39:28become a pilot.
39:32It's nothing compared to
39:33the flight engineer.
39:34Listen to this.
39:35Failed to qualify as a
39:36captain and first officer.
39:38Was only hired by the
39:39airline as a flight
39:40engineer after paying for
39:41his own training.
39:43The flight engineer was
39:44also another incompetent
39:46person.
39:47He flunked previous
39:49training and he paid for
39:50it out of his pocket to
39:52become certified as a
39:54flight engineer.
39:55The captain's training
39:57history is no better.
39:59The records show that the
40:00captain's qualifications
40:01were also questionable.
40:03Slow to learn, needed more
40:06training than normally
40:07required, difficulty varying
40:09from a set pattern.
40:10The captain's training
40:14record indicated that he
40:16was indecisive and slow.
40:18And that was all reflected
40:20in the events of this
40:21accident.
40:22All three of these guys
40:24were extremely weak.
40:28None of them should have
40:29been in the cockpit.
40:32And certainly not three of
40:33them together.
40:35It was literally a crew
40:37pairing of an accident
40:38waiting to happen.
40:39If anything unusual was
40:42going to occur, these
40:44people were going to
40:45descend into some state
40:48of confusion, which is
40:50exactly what happened.
40:55Because the cockpit voice
40:57recorder failed just before
40:59the TriStar landed, the
41:01investigation was unable to
41:02determine why the captain
41:04didn't order an evacuation.
41:06But they did point to his
41:08actions as contributing
41:09factors.
41:12It is possible that the
41:13captain was in denial about
41:15the severity of the fire
41:16and the situation in the
41:19cabin.
41:21But if he had gone back to
41:23see for himself, then
41:25perhaps things would have
41:26been different.
41:28The other thing to consider
41:29is that air crews realize
41:32that if they shut an
41:33airplane down on a runway,
41:35that that effectively closes the
41:39airport, these are things that
41:43could put your job in
41:44jeopardy.
41:45So who really knows what his
41:47logic was?
41:49But what is certainly clear
41:51was this captain was
41:53definitely not in command of
41:55this emergency.
41:56even though investigators are
42:00unable to confirm that matches
42:02with a source of the fire, they
42:04do recommend improvements for
42:06all cargo compartments.
42:07To make the cargo compartment safe, he had to put a fire extinguisher in there, detectors
42:15and extinguishers.
42:17And that's what we recommended they do.
42:19They also recommend removing the
42:23Nomex liner.
42:25The investigation went back to the
42:27manufacturer.
42:28They identified a way to improve the
42:32resistance of the compartment to
42:34replace the Nomex and return the
42:37compartment to a full idea of
42:41self-extinguishment.
42:42The Federal Aviation Administration, or
42:47FAA, considers the
42:49recommendations.
42:51But it's not until 1998, almost two
42:54decades later, that the FAA changes the
42:57regulation.
42:59Now all cargo compartments on
43:01commercial airliners must contain both
43:03fire detection and fire suppression
43:06systems.
43:07In the aftermath of the tragedy, Saudia asks
43:11Bob McIntosh to revamp its safety
43:13training and procedures.
43:15I was hired to form a corporate
43:19safety department.
43:20And it was my pleasure to do that
43:23for my six years there.
43:27There were numerous lessons that we
43:29learned from how cargo compartments are
43:33designed and much better designed
43:36flame-retardant materials are now used
43:40throughout the cabin.
43:42Our aviation system is safer because of
43:45this accident.
43:49All those things are wonderful
43:52takeaways from a very, very tragic
43:55situation.
Recommended
44:03
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