- 2 weeks ago
Air Crash Investigation Series S22E01 Holding Pattern
Category
📺
TVTranscript
00:00security footage of fly dubai flight 981 captures its final moments i was diving hard
00:17the level of violence for the impact was catastrophic 62 people are killed in the
00:24fatal dive investigators soon discover the pilots had aborted two landings we're going around
00:31a go-around is done just when conditions are not perfect did they say why they were going
00:37around a second time they just said going around check your speed
00:40the next thing i knew the plane was diving towards the runway investigators needed to find out how
00:48the two go-arounds were different one turns to disaster why
01:18fly dubai flight 981 closes in on rostov-on-don international airport in southwest russia
01:27rostov tower sky dubai 9081 we're at 2600 feet 2300 feet is our next target altitude
01:3811 miles out captain aristos socrates and first officer alejandro alva cruz prepare the boeing
01:47737 800 for touchdown both pilots had a pretty good amount of flying hours in the 737 specifically
01:56these were experienced pilots
01:58flight 981 rostov tower wind 240 degrees gusts 30 knots you're cleared to land on runway 22
02:09the controller reports the weather conditions at the airport thick clouds cover rostov on don
02:18high winds are battering the runways the weather in rostov at that time was pretty low cloud with wind gusts
02:29it was uh typical for that time of year for rostov if you look at the geography with the sea and the hills
02:37around it then yes you you can expect some challenges fly dubai flight 981 departed dubai international airport at 10 37 pm
02:47it's a four-hour flight northwest to rostov on don it's a bumpy ride for the 55 passengers
02:56on board the flight is expected to land in minutes 150 knots eight miles out the pilots reduce speed as they
03:09they begin the final descent on approach pilots know exactly what the airplane is doing they know the
03:17conditions that they're flying in flaps 30 flaps 30 they're going to drop the flaps bit by bit when
03:25they drop their landing gear it's a very gradual process it should be a bit bumpy and then later
03:31should be calm the pilots expect turbulence on approach but anticipate a smooth landing
03:41the runway is just four miles away but there's a threat ahead
03:49the onboard radar has detected dangerous winds
03:52wind shear is a rapid change in direction and speed of wind if a pilot experiences a strong headwind
04:04that suddenly changes to a tailwind the aircraft might not have enough lift to remain airborne especially
04:11at low altitude the wind shear alert is built into the aircraft's avionics to tell you you're going into
04:18the wind currents that uh it could be problematic wind shear ahead wind shear go around just 1 000
04:25feet above the ground landing at rostov on don becomes too risky
04:33rostov tower this is 9 or 8 1 we're conducting a go around due to wind shear the pilots aboard their approach
04:43every pilot is prepared to make it go around on every approach
04:47it's something that pilots do off the top of their heads there's no manual involved
04:54they have no limit the amount of approaches that they can try as long as they have enough fuel so
04:58why not go around and just try it again flight 9081 copy
05:04flight 981 is one of four incoming flights controllers are managing as high winds delay landings
05:11the air traffic controller's workload was definitely increased in this environment and they have to
05:23start juggling all those cards in the air as flight 981 climbs
05:28air flight 1166 you're cleared to land on runway 22 an aeroflot flight prepares to land
05:42captain sokratus pays close attention to its communications i want to see what this guy will do
05:49the crew at this point is hoping that the crews of other flights are able to give them some information
05:54that they might be able to use to make some decisions about what to do next
05:59that flight can't land at rostov-on-don either
06:09the aeroflot pilots also encounter wind shear on final approach they're forced to abort
06:15that kind of seals the deal fly device they're going to have to either wait or they're going
06:20to have to go to an alternate airport high over rostov-on-don passengers on flight 981 are restless
06:31the pilots are holding at 15 000 feet circling near the airport waiting for a chance to land
06:39the pilots sit in a holding pattern since they had enough fuel to be able to do so
06:43to wait for weather conditions to improve three other planes are also in a holding pattern
06:49the storm-pounding rostov-on-don isn't passing
07:01we're going
07:05guided by 9081 for your information previous traffic going to alternate airports
07:11all the other flights decide to divert to alternate airports instead
07:19the problem with diverting is that it's expensive and it's it's inconvenient the passengers don't end
07:25up at the destination they have to be put up in hotels and with a low-cost airline it's the last thing
07:32it wants captain sokratus continues monitoring the weather radar finally he spots a clearing
07:40i think i'd like to give it a try i agree let's try it's not unusual for crews to take advantage
07:48if there happens to be a break in the weather pattern that provides safe conditions to land the aircraft
07:55sky goodbye 9081 request to send for another approach 15 000 feet over rostov-on-don the pilots again
08:04prepare to land
08:07skydubai 9081 rostov tower you're clear to land on runway 22
08:15good evening
08:16no first officer here we will be landing shortly once again we apologize for the good
08:2013 miles from runway 22 the pilots line up for a second approach
08:32headwind 53 knots light icing even though winds are strong controllers aren't reporting wind shear at
08:40the runway
08:46flaps 30 but as they approach they soon realize something's not right check your speed
08:54okay go around the pilots execute another go around
09:16keep it at 15 degrees nose up just 2 000 feet in the air captain sokratus is wrestling with the
09:21the boeing 737
09:28seconds later
09:37flight 981 is diving straight at the runway
09:47oh my god
09:51fire and emergency crews rush to the end of runway 22
10:04the aircraft punched a crater in the runway about a meter and a half deep
10:09with wreckage wreckage thrown everywhere
10:16firefighters battle the flames through the night
10:18but there's no one to be rescued
10:24all 62 people on board flight 981 are killed in the crash
10:32grieving families and the world demand answers
10:40hours after fly dubai flight 981 crashes on the runway at rostov-on-don
10:46investigators from the iac the interstate aviation committee arrive on the scene
10:55the iac is the lead air accident investigation agency not just for russia but for several of the former
11:03soviet states
11:03the iac must find the cause for the horrific tragedy
11:11okay that's great uh that belongs over here
11:15wreckage from flight 981 is laid out in a nearby hangar for closer inspection
11:23a team from the united arab emirates assists in the investigation
11:26so how fast did the plane hit the ground
11:39the size of the debris would tell whether there's a high-speed impact where there's a low-speed impact
11:45there are clues in pieces of wreckage there's not much left of it
11:55it was all small pieces it describes a very high-speed and violent impact with the ground
12:02it makes us question what really happened
12:11let's see it
12:14investigators wonder how the plane could have gathered so much speed during an attempted landing
12:21i was diving hard security footage gives them a look at the last moments of flight 981
12:32flight 981's angle of descent leads investigators to wonder if the pilots were having problems
12:40controlling their plane maybe it's their flight controls
12:46no i've seen it before boeing 737 flight controls have a problematic history
12:52march the 3rd 1991 united airlines flight 585 banks hard right and crashes while attempting to land
13:06killing all on board three years later it happens again us air flight 427 rolls left and crashes near pittsburgh
13:18investigators were tearing their hair out trying to figure it out
13:22two years past without incident then while on approach to land the pilots of eastwind airlines flight 517 lose control
13:33this time the pilots regain control of their plane and land safely in richmond virginia
13:42the plane is intact investigators get their best lead yet
13:47after a five-year investigation the national transportation safety board concluded
13:52that a power unit in the rudder had been responsible for what's called a rudder hard over
14:00the rudder had moved to one side and that caused the aircraft
14:05to roll over and then dive into the ground movements of rudder and other control surfaces occur
14:13when pilots push their rudder pedal or pull the yoke
14:17power control units turn those commands into actual movements of the control surfaces
14:23it's similar to the power steering on a car
14:29hey there um did you recover the pcus
14:33investigators want to know if any of flight 981's control units failed
14:38yeah they're here great we need to test them much of the boeing 737 was destroyed during high speed
14:47impact but two of the power control units have survived they could provide crucial information
14:55pcus are the heart and soul of the flight controls of the airplane and one of the first questions if you
15:00have an airplane that came screaming out of the sky at a 50 degree angle is did we have a pcu problem
15:06in the flight controls investigators carefully examine the pcus of flight 981
15:15they look for signs of a malfunction
15:26nothing wrong with the pcus they were extensively examined and found to have had absolutely no
15:33connection to what brought this airplane out of the sky with flight control issues ruled out the team
15:40turns to the controller for insight take me through what you saw they were on final approach
15:51flight 981 rostov tower you're cleared to land on runway 22
15:55then they aborted their first attempt to land
16:03they reported wind shear
16:04sky dubai 981 make holding pattern at your convenience
16:17they climbed and began holding how long were they holding for a long time investigators learned that the
16:25pilots held for almost two hours waiting for the weather to improve
16:29sky dubai 981 request to send for another approach
16:36then they asked to land but something went wrong when the pilots made their second approach
16:45sky dubai 981 we're going around
16:49did they say why they were going around the second time
16:51no they just said going around that's all the next thing i knew the plane was diving towards the runway
17:06did they report any problems with the plane no nothing
17:11iac investigators still can't explain why flight 981 suddenly banked and then dived into runway 22
17:19something had gone wrong on the second go around but investigators didn't know what
17:24was there a problem with the airplane did the pilots make a mistake there was no knowing it yet
17:34okay two go-arounds one turns to disaster
17:40why let's take a look at the first one investigators turn to fdr data
17:46to better understand why fly dubai flight 981 performed one successful go around but crashed during
17:53the second investigators need to figure out how the two go-arounds were different from each other
17:59zoom in a bit
18:04look they confirm the pilots reacted to a wind shear alarm during the first approach
18:12and how did they respond thrust jumps up to 102
18:25so he applied max power what about the flaps flaps at 30 and gear they remain down
18:42the first go-around was pretty routine they responded appropriately they did exactly what they should have done
18:44the first go-around was pretty routine they responded appropriately they did exactly what they should have done
18:56this is the second go-around investigators analyzed the second attempt at landing focusing in on the last moments before the crash
19:12now did they get another warning the second time
19:28time? No, nothing. Look, there's a leap in airspeed from 153 to 176 in seconds. 10 seconds before the
19:46pilots abort, a sudden increase in the plane's airspeed was recorded. Investigators saw the
19:52airspeed fluctuating for more than 20 knots within a few seconds. It's a pretty strong
19:58gust of wind. They can see that on the flight data recorder. Investigators determined that
20:05a strong gust of wind struck the plane. You can feel the wind increase on the nose of the
20:12airplane. It's probably also moving the airplane a little bit left or right. It's not a pleasant
20:17position to be in. How did the pilots respond this time? Let me see. Well, they added max
20:26power. Okay, go around. And what about the flaps and landing gear? Flaps are retracted. Gear
20:44retracted. The data reveals that on the second go around, the pilots performed a different
20:53procedure. They didn't fly the wind shear escape maneuver during the second go around. Well,
21:00it looks like they were doing a standard go around. On a standard go around, the flaps and
21:07landing gear are retracted. Except they did it at max power. Given how streamlined the aircraft is,
21:15with the landing gear up and the flaps largely retracted, the use of maximum power is very much
21:22overkill. Investigators conclude that on the second attempt, the crew flew a hybrid of two procedures.
21:29They used the power of a wind shear escape maneuver with the gear and flap settings of a traditional
21:39go around. So what would that do to the plane? We'll need to take a look at all the factors at play.
21:52They're holding on for nearly two hours. That's four tons of fuel they burned. The weight of the
22:08Boeing 737 is a critical factor in the plane's performance. Adding the weight of the plane.
22:14Total weight, that's 54 tons. That's a light plane. Yeah.
22:27At this weight, you know, the crew would feel a faster acceleration.
22:38Max power, no drag from flaps or landing gear, low weight.
22:44This plane could have been accelerating dangerously fast. This is really an accelerated situation. This
22:55is a very powerful airplane doing something that feels like you just went into afterburner.
22:59How much quicker did this plane pick up speed on the second go around?
23:04We need to do modeling on this.
23:10It was really incumbent upon the investigators to look further into the question of the acceleration.
23:21Investigators turn to computer modeling to answer a crucial question.
23:25Here's all the data for the first and second go around.
23:28Yeah.
23:30How did the rate of acceleration differ at the start of the two attempts?
23:36The first go around, speed increased by 17 knots.
23:47And the second?
23:48Second go around.
23:48Second go around.
23:4925 knots increase.
23:50That's a difference of eight knots between the two go arounds.
23:51Yeah.
23:52It was a key part of the findings when they realized that over 40% difference existed between the acceleration from the first go around to the second go around.
24:13Could the increase in acceleration have affected the pilots themselves?
24:21They calculate the impact of the second go around.
24:27That faster acceleration on the second go around would have pushed him back into the seat.
24:40The team also examines the impact of vertical acceleration.
24:48The chief force would have lifted the pilots upwards.
24:55The pilot would have felt a slight unweighting.
24:57He would come up out of the seat.
24:59So, sudden acceleration like this, both horizontal and vertical, that'll play tricks on your mind.
25:11Were Captain Sokratus' senses his worst enemy?
25:15Maybe he experienced a somatographic illusion.
25:18Check your speed.
25:23Okay, go around.
25:26A somatographic illusion is a dangerous form of spatial disorientation.
25:31When a plane accelerates quickly with no visual reference of the horizon,
25:36the gravitational forces cause a pitch-up illusion in the inner ear.
25:41The little hairs in the inner ear bend backwards, tricking the brain into thinking the head is tilting up.
25:48You might be going level, but if you cannot see outside, that sensation on your vestibular system is overwhelming,
25:57and, you know, you would really feel that you're climbing up.
26:01The somatographic illusion is one of the most lethal traps in aviation.
26:06Keep the nose up. 15 degrees.
26:09It's an extremely convincing illusion.
26:16What was the actual pitch of the plane after it accelerated during the second go-around?
26:20Almost 20 seconds after the actual pitch was 8.8 degrees nose up.
26:30Investigators look for evidence that the pilots of Flight 981 became severely disoriented in the dark.
26:40If you imagine that this glass of water represents the fluid in your ear,
26:45if you accelerated this along a smooth surface, the water would be pushed up against the back of the glass,
26:51very much like this.
26:54In other words, it's the same effect as if you'd simply tilted the glass.
26:59If you take visual information away, what tends to happen is that the pilot forgets about the acceleration
27:08and assumes that everything he's feeling is due to the pitch.
27:13And what was the pilot's perceived pitch?
27:17Combining the horizontal and vertical acceleration experienced by the pilot,
27:22we can calculate the pitch that is perceived by the pilot.
27:26This is called the illusionary pitch.
27:29The pilot's perceived pitch was 21.6 degrees.
27:34They compare the plane's actual pitch to the pilot's illusionary pitch during the second go-around.
27:43Ten seconds later, the plane is pitched up 3.9 degrees.
27:53And the pilot perceived it to be 26.7 degrees nose up.
28:07Wow.
28:08That's a huge difference.
28:16This puts the captain into a situation that he potentially will be experiencing a somatogravic illusion.
28:22The captain is feeling one thing, but the aircraft is doing something else.
28:26Get this.
28:27Near the end of the flight, the actual pitch is 7.6 degrees.
28:37And the perceived pitch becomes well over 40.
28:42Investigators discover three instances where there was a dramatic difference between the plane's actual and the pilot's perceived pitch.
28:54Keep it at 15 degrees, nose up.
28:56It's evidence that the pilots may have experienced a somatogravic illusion during the second go-around.
29:03Could the feeling of the rapid acceleration have affected how the pilots flew the plane?
29:10They dig deeper into the flight data.
29:12Well, the captain pushed forward on the yoke.
29:17He was trying to pitch the plane downward.
29:19That's what his senses were telling him to do.
29:21The captain responding more to his feelings than to what he was seeing on any instrumentation in front of him.
29:29He decides that he needs to push the airplane forward and counteract this massive pitch-up.
29:34He's trying to save them by pitching down.
29:36Wow, check this out.
29:39He pushed the stabilizer trim down.
29:44From the data, investigators see the captain didn't just push the yoke.
29:49Be careful!
29:51The captain applies the stabilizer trim because he's pushing, trying to push the nose of the aircraft down.
29:59For how long?
30:01Hmm.
30:02Yeah, he held the trim switch for 12 seconds.
30:09Holding the switch for 12 seconds is unheard of.
30:14That should never be held for that amount of time.
30:17The team discovers that instead of pitching the plane up to climb, the captain is pitching the plane towards the ground.
30:25No, no, no, no, no, no, no.
30:27Eventually putting the plane into a fatal dive.
30:30The sudden change in direction is jarring.
30:36At that time, you would feel like you're on a roller coaster.
30:40You know, when you're coming up to the peak as you were diving at speed, it's similar to that sensation.
30:45The pitch down has another disorienting effect on the pilot's senses.
30:51Pitching down of the aircraft would have caused both the captain and the first officer to experience a dramatic change in the G-Forces.
31:00Oh, my God!
31:01That would increase the confusion in the cockpit as to what's going on.
31:09Investigators conclude that the various G-Forces on Captain Sokratus caused his complete spatial disorientation.
31:16The captain pushing and pulling on the yoke, stomping on the rudder, in the dive, you know, that shows confusion.
31:24He's probably disorientated.
31:27Oh, my God!
31:28You know, he's trying desperately to get out of that sensation that he's feeling.
31:32But there's one question that still troubles investigators.
31:38Was the first officer feeling the illusion as well?
31:42Even though the accelerations experienced by both pilots was the same, the perception of what is happening can differ.
31:52And that can be due to many different factors.
31:55Expectation, what are they looking at, their age, their experience.
32:00Uh, start it at the second go-around, please.
32:04The cockpit voice recorder could tell investigators if the first officer was also under the influence of the somatographic illusion.
32:13Okay, go around.
32:17Careful!
32:21No, no, no, no, no, no, no!
32:25Don't... don't do that!
32:28You see something wrong.
32:31No! Pull it! Pull it! Pull it!
32:34He's telling him to pull back the yoke.
32:36Pull it!
32:38If he's feeling the same illusion as the captain, it sure doesn't seem like he was affected by it.
32:44The first officer knew how much trouble the aircraft was in.
32:48He knew the captain wasn't responding the way he should.
32:50Oh, my God!
32:51Oh, stop!
32:52Oh, stop!
32:53Oh, stop!
32:58Investigators are left wondering why the first officer didn't intervene.
33:02You look at this first officer trying his best and wonder, why didn't you just take control? I say, I've got the airplane.
33:11He's been flying the 737-800 for nearly two years. He's fully certified.
33:17Investigators look into the first officer's background to understand why he didn't take control of Flight 981 when he saw that the captain was making grave mistakes.
33:30Look, his trainer wrote notes on his assessment. And this one's telling.
33:33They find notes left by one of his flight instructors that alarmed them.
33:36One thing that could have possibly saved this aircraft was discovered in a note that was left behind by a flight instructor.
33:39He needs to be a bit more assertive in what is needed from the captain. And it continues.
33:40He needs to be a bit more assertive in what is needed from the captain. And it continues.
33:41Tell him what you want done, and do not wish to be the captain.
33:42Tell him what you want done, and do not wish to be the captain.
33:43The captain was making grave mistakes.
33:44Look, his trainer wrote notes on his assessment. And this one's telling.
33:50They find notes left by one of his flight instructors that alarmed them.
33:55One thing that could have possibly saved this aircraft was discovered in a note that was left behind by a flight instructor.
34:02He needs to be a bit more assertive in what is needed from the captain. And it continues.
34:09Tell him what you want done, and do not wait for the captain to inquire with you or direct you in this regard.
34:18He's not the type to take control.
34:23No! Pull it! Pull it! Pull it! Pull it!
34:26The first officer could see that the captain was experiencing enormous problems trying to control the go-around.
34:34He really should have taken some decisive action and intervened.
34:38Oh, my God!
34:44I still don't understand something. Why did they try to land the plane in the first place?
34:50The big mystery was, why was this crew so determined to land at Rostovondon when every other flight had already diverted?
34:57A storm was pummeling Rostovondon Airport as flight 981 circled above.
35:06Why didn't the pilots divert to another airport?
35:10Investigators look for answers in the cockpit voice recording.
35:15Guided by, 908-1. For your information, previous traffic went to alternate airports.
35:21Until their flight's diverted? There's no need. I'm gonna keep flying.
35:30Investigators just couldn't understand why they wanted to fly in circles for almost two hours.
35:36I'm gonna try this approach, and if I can't make it, I'll have a go-around, and I will head to Minerali Vaudi, okay?
35:45Okay, Captain. Understood.
35:47Who's he talking to?
35:48Oh, the dispatcher in Dubai.
35:50Investigators finally get an indication of the captain's rationale for attempting another landing.
35:56As the captain decides whether to divert, he contacts Fly Dubai's flight dispatcher in the United Arab Emirates.
36:04We would like to recommend you hold max as possible.
36:09Dispatchers manage the entire fleet's operation for a specific airline.
36:14The dispatcher and the captain are co-equally responsible for the safety of the flight.
36:18There is a very delicate dance that goes on between and among the dispatchers and the captains.
36:25The captain follows with the dispatcher's recommendation.
36:29Minutes turn to hours as the pilots wait for a chance to land.
36:34I don't know, man. If we divert, we're gonna exceed our flying hours.
36:41What are you looking at?
36:43Maximum duty hours.
36:45He's calculating his duty hours.
36:48Regulations limit how many hours pilots can fly during a duty period.
36:54I've been in the air for five and a half hours now.
36:58The team learns that the pilots were concerned they might exceed their duty hours.
37:03Stop.
37:06Roll the map.
37:10They've been flying for at least five hours.
37:12We'll take another hour to reach their alternate airport, wait out the storm.
37:16Then they still have to get back to Rostov on dawn before returning to Dubai.
37:20Diverting would put them over their duty hours for the day.
37:23Right.
37:25I think it'll be clear by the time we do this approach now.
37:28Even if we start now, I think we'll be good.
37:32We'll be good.
37:34Okay.
37:36Is he landing because it's clear or because he wants to get on the ground?
37:41The conversation on the flight deck before the second approach clearly showed that they weren't really thinking so much about the safety of the landing.
37:50Just the fact that they wanted to land.
37:54I think I'd like to give it a try.
37:56I agree.
37:57Let's try.
37:59Stop the recording.
38:00So they decide to circle for two hours after a four hour flight in the middle of the night.
38:14Did the long flight affect the pilot's ability to land the plane safely?
38:20Two hours a whole, six hours total time.
38:22Aren't we seeing a decline in the decision making capabilities because of fatigue?
38:27Tired?
38:29No.
38:34As investigators break down Flight 981's journey from Dubai to Rostov-on-Don, they identify a glaring problem.
38:41They were actually in the air for more than six hours.
38:45It's almost 5 a.m. their time when they're landing.
38:49The circadian rhythm is the body's natural alignment with the day and night cycle.
38:55The quiet period is roughly for a four hour period between two in the morning and six in the morning.
39:02That's the point at which your mental ability is pretty much at its lowest.
39:07I think I'd like to give it a try.
39:11I agree.
39:12Let's try.
39:15Investigators determined the crew was suffering from operational fatigue as they launched their second approach.
39:21Good evening, the first officer. We will be landing shortly. Once again, we apologize for the delay.
39:30The decision to make a second attempt to land at Rostov-on-Don triggers a chain of events that ends in catastrophe.
39:37Check your speed.
39:41As the aircraft is hit by this sudden wind, the crew is forced into executing another go around.
39:48Okay, go around.
39:49And this time, it was all going to go wrong.
39:53Captain Sokratus executes a wind shear go around, pushing the throttle to maximum power.
39:59The first officer performs a standard go around, retracting the flaps and raising the landing gear.
40:05Both pilots were essentially flying two different airplanes from there.
40:11This blunder factors heavily into the catastrophe that followed.
40:15Flight 981 climbs from Rostov-on-Don at high speed.
40:20When you're light on field and you put the maximum thrust, you will accelerate.
40:26It's what happened in the last few seconds that doomed flight 981.
40:30Keep it at 15 degrees, nose up.
40:36At this moment, Captain Sokratus fights an inner battle.
40:40The acceleration of the aircraft makes the captain feel as though the aircraft is pitching up a lot more than it actually is.
40:49His spatial orientation deteriorates rapidly.
40:54Your vestibular senses and your middle ear are all telling you the wrong thing.
40:58The captain counters the pitch-up feeling of a somatographic illusion by pushing the yoke forward.
41:05The captain has lost touch with the reality of what's happening to the airplane.
41:12Then the final blow.
41:13The captain holds that stabilizer trim button down for about 12 seconds.
41:19With the sudden forcing of the aircraft's nose down and stabilizer trim, the aircraft transitions from a climb very suddenly into a dive.
41:31The aircraft is now in a very dangerous situation, which the captain is unable to overcome.
41:38My God!
41:40They're accelerating rapidly, and the first officer finally gets on the yoke and tries to pull, but the controls on the left side govern where the airplane is.
41:52And you get to a certain point, and there's no recovery.
41:57Nose diving at full throttle towards the runway, Captain Sokratus is completely disoriented.
42:04When he adds rudder at the last moment, he's lost all awareness of how the plane is flying.
42:10The pilots in this case were conducting the flight very well, right up until those last few moments.
42:26And then it all really just fell apart.
42:29The IAC investigation into the crash of Flight 981 is a landmark case of how spatial disorientation can end in disaster.
42:45This accident, this wake-up call for the industries, is one of the accidents that paved the way into increased training in spatial disorientation.
42:53In their final report, investigators blame the captain's string of errors on his diminished psychological state.
43:03The IAC recommends that Fly Dubai provide better training on the manual operation of stabilizer trim.
43:10So their pilots don't make the same mistake again.
43:14Research into human factors, including situations like this where disorientation likely occurred,
43:20is at the forefront of aviation safety research.
43:24We are training our pilots on simulators to experience these illusions before they experience them in there,
43:30so they can recognise those situations.
43:36I think the Fly Dubai accident shows how quickly your senses can overtake you.
43:42And one of the key lessons is for pilots to trust in their instruments,
43:48to take a step back from what they may think they're experiencing,
43:53to actually understand what the aeroplane is doing.
43:57You've got to keep the aeroplane flying.
43:58You've got to keep the aeroplane flying.
44:01Remember that?
Be the first to comment