- 12 minutes ago
Southeast Asia is at the heart of global power rivalry, from the South China Sea to shifting U.S. alliances and regional political shifts. Gregory B. Poling from the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) shares his insights on what this means for the region.
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00:00Hello and welcome to the program. I'm your host, Fahyana Shea.
00:14Now, Southeast Asia sits at the center of global power competition.
00:18From the South China Sea to shifting US alliances and the evolving politics in the region.
00:23Now, joining me is Gregory B. Poling, director of the Southeast Asia program
00:28and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
00:34He's one of the leading experts on the South China Sea and US policy in the Indo-Pacific
00:38and the author of On Dangerous Grounds, America's Century in the South China Sea.
00:44That's a mouthful. My Greg, thank you so much for being here. It's such a pleasure to have you.
00:50Right, I'm going to get straight into it so we don't waste any more time.
00:53Let's set the scene here.
00:55Southeast Asia is often described by, you know, described as wary of Washington's intentions here in the region.
01:03And over the last year, in your opinion, what stands out to you as the biggest continuity
01:08or the biggest change in US strategy towards Southeast Asia?
01:13I think that there's a spectrum.
01:16Obviously, economics has been the area of most turmoil, the President Trump's tariff policy,
01:22as well as all the cuts to longstanding US development programs and a lot of the people to people and diplomatic programs.
01:29On the other end of that, security ties and the overall US focus on the Indo-Pacific as the key theater,
01:37that's pretty much unchanged.
01:38We were worried about it, but we haven't seen a lot of shifts.
01:42Okay, we haven't seen a lot of shifts.
01:43And I think that's key, I guess, when we talk about President Trump's recent visit here during the ASEAN Summit.
01:52It's signaled that, you know, the US attention here is still forthcoming, still wants to be here.
01:58But, you know, in your view, you know, with the whole commotion that happened when Trump is here,
02:05did this latest trip do more to reassure allies of commitment or inadvertently sharpen anxiety about US policy predictability?
02:15I think across the region, there's been obviously varied responses, but on balance, it seemed reassuring,
02:22mostly because there was such a low bar.
02:24People were worried that the president would, you know, make some kind of radical changes to US policy while he's here.
02:32He's prone to do that.
02:33And that didn't happen.
02:34So that combined with the fact that President Trump and President Xi Jinping in Korea
02:38came to at least a temporary ceasefire in the US-China trade war,
02:42I think that's largely reassured the region.
02:46But again, from a low starting point of very high anxiety.
02:50Right.
02:50Now, if you touch a little bit about tariffs, because that has been sort of the key topic throughout this year,
02:57or throughout Trump's second administration, you know, you've written an analysis of this.
03:02Your analysis highlights that Southeast Asian states are rushing to secure the best possible bilateral deals.
03:09So is the current US strategy, you think, because of, you know, your analysis here,
03:15is it to focus on security and defense that it's not offering any compelling enough economic pillars?
03:21And you mentioned it is, you know, quite economic.
03:23The reason is here to truly compete for influence in the region, you feel.
03:28So I don't think there's an explicit US government policy to focus on security because there's not enough to offer on economics.
03:37I think what you're seeing is that the security arms of the US government are just those that are most able right now to pursue policy on their own.
03:44The White House doesn't tend to intervene there, whereas the president personally intervenes a lot on economic policy.
03:49What makes the US engagement in the region compelling is just the size of the US market, the interest from US private sector.
03:56Aside from what the US government does, the US is one of the two most important economic blocks on Earth next to China.
04:03So the region is going to be eager to engage the US no matter what.
04:07That's why regional states rush to secure short-term deals on the tariffs,
04:12because as much as everybody might hate the tariffs, the US market is too big to ignore.
04:19It would be economic self-harm to try to just write it off and not strike a deal.
04:25Right. So, I mean, that's part of the reason why everyone is sort of rushing into securing bilateral deals
04:31and, you know, sort of sidelining the effects of long-term relations with the US.
04:36Is that what you're saying?
04:36Well, I think every country in the region, or almost every country, is pursuing a two-track approach in economics.
04:43Short-term is get the best deals that one can, and pretty much all of Southeast Asia has landed now in that 19% to 20% baseline range,
04:51but with a pretty large amount of carve-outs that reduce that tariff.
04:56And then the long-term strategy is diversification,
04:58because I think all regional states want to maximize their own independence, their own agency from both the US and China.
05:06And so that leads to new agreements with Europe, EU and Malaysia have begun FTA negotiations,
05:12new agreements with the Gulf, we have Malaysia GCC, FTA negotiations.
05:17I think the region is waking up to the fact that the US and China are too big to ignore,
05:22but they still only account for about 40% of global GDP.
05:26There's another 60% out there to go after.
05:28And I think, I mean, rightly so, a lot of critics or analysts are saying that, you know,
05:33because of, you know, this whole trade war or trade tensions or reciprocal tariffs that the Trump administration is going,
05:40a lot of countries or blocs are looking into diversification because it's being pushed into looking into it
05:48because of the whole imbalance or the whole instability that is happening right now.
05:52And I think, I think you're right looking into it.
05:56Talking about threats of tariffs again, you know,
05:58the recent flare up in the longstanding border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia
06:03and with subsequent US intervention as well, as we see during the ASEAN summit,
06:08you know, there have been reported use of threats of tariffs there.
06:11And it is highly unconventional use of diplomacy by the Trump administration.
06:17So what does this reveal actually about the current administration foreign policy playbook?
06:22And what risks comes with tying security and security mediation with trade pressure?
06:31Well, number one, it shows that the president has one tool that he likes to use a lot, right?
06:36And that is tariff.
06:37It's his favorite word.
06:38He has said repeatedly that it's his favorite word.
06:41You know, what's the saying?
06:42If you're a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
06:44So he assumes that the solution to every problem is tariffs.
06:49The bright side, the president doesn't actually intervene in 99% of the things that go on in the world.
06:54So that's not what the State Department and DOD are always doing.
06:56But on issues like this, where I think, frankly, the president was interested
07:00because he wanted to add to the number of wars he claims to have stopped
07:04in order to get another Nobel Peace Prize nomination.
07:07But the danger is evident in the response,
07:11particularly from Thailand, right?
07:12When countries and particularly long-standing partners feel that they have been browbeaten
07:17and coerced into what Thailand at least views as a disadvantageous ceasefire,
07:24it makes that deal even more fragile.
07:26Because now Prime Minister Anutin's government faces considerable pressure
07:30to show that it's not going to be bullied by the Americans.
07:35It makes it even harder now to patch over this latest flare-up between Cambodia and Thailand.
07:42Yeah, I mean, it's definitely interesting to see, even as journalists or media,
07:46to see Trump's diplomacy at work, especially when it comes to all this security mediation.
07:51It's definitely something that we don't see every day.
07:53Like you mentioned, the word tariffs being put to use almost every time.
07:57It's interesting, and I can't find another word to describe it,
08:02but it's definitely interesting to see Trump's diplomacy at work,
08:06at least for the second administration.
08:07Yeah, and sometimes it works.
08:08I mean, I will say that the president's intervention,
08:11so Prime Minister Anwar obviously took the lead on mediating the details of the ceasefire in July.
08:17The president's intervention probably did bring Thailand to the table
08:20much more quickly than Bangkok was prepared to.
08:22So there's an upside.
08:23But the downside is also pretty significant.
08:26Okay, all right.
08:27Let's talk a little bit about conflicts in this region,
08:30since we already have an opening there.
08:35South China Sea, which is one of your expertise,
08:38one of the areas that you looked into very much so.
08:41Now, you've described the South China Sea as entering one of its most dangerous periods in years.
08:46What has fundamentally changed on the water?
08:50Nothing radical.
08:52It's the steady accumulation of mostly China's presence.
08:58So China built these massive artificial island bases that everybody's familiar with,
09:02and then it started using them.
09:04And since at least 2018, we've seen a steady increase as a result in the number of Chinese ships
09:10and aircraft throughout the exclusive economic zones of the Philippines and Malaysia and Vietnam.
09:16So the run-ins between local law enforcement and Chinese counterparts happen more and more and more often.
09:21It becomes a numbers game.
09:23That's why we basically can't go a week without seeing a news story about a collision or a near collision
09:29or a near collision in the air, which is even more dangerous.
09:32And we've seen a number of very serious injuries, mainly between China and the Philippines,
09:37but also between China and Vietnam over the last year.
09:40If that continues, eventually there will be a fatality.
09:43And that, I should say, a fatality between China and another party,
09:48because we did have two fatalities this summer when China killed two of its own men on accident.
09:53But that presents really dangerous escalation risks.
09:58Yeah, I mean, definitely there has been a lot more skirmishes and there has been a lot more confrontations,
10:03especially when you mentioned Philippines and China in the waters.
10:08Now, your book, On Dangerous Grounds, America's Century in the South China Sea,
10:12actually argued that the U.S. interests in the South China Sea have long centered on maritime rights
10:18or freedom of the seas and also alliance commitments.
10:21So let's unpack that a little bit.
10:23So how do you see China's increasingly sophisticated gray zone tactics, for example,
10:29complicates this kind of interest for the U.S.?
10:31So, one, the, quote, gray zone tactics, right?
10:37Using violence and coercion and the threat of violence,
10:40but trying to stay just below the level of military force,
10:44that's a very dangerous balancing act.
10:46As we saw in August of this year when China collided with its own vessel and killed two men,
10:52July of 2023 when China severed the thumb of a Filipino sailor who nearly bled to death,
10:58we've had incidents of bones breaking and other severe injuries because of water cannon use.
11:03So gray zone can easily tip over into a fatality that could trigger mutual defense obligations under the U.S.-Philippine treaty.
11:13And so the gray zone stuff worries the U.S. because it's very easy to see how that accidentally becomes an issue
11:20in which the U.S. feels compelled to fulfill its alliance obligations.
11:24It also is meant, the reason China does it, is to try to force Southeast Asian claimants to back down,
11:31to unilaterally surrender their maritime rights.
11:34And from the perspective of the U.S. and all the other countries who speak up about this,
11:38in Europe, Japan, Australia, Canada,
11:42their belief is that the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea is a hole.
11:46You can't pick apart parts of it, and you can't carve out a giant section of the earth and say it doesn't apply here.
11:52So if Malaysia is not allowed to drill for oil and gas, if Vietnam is not allowed to fish,
11:57if the Philippines isn't allowed to conduct law enforcement operations,
12:00at the end of the day, that weakens the entire treaty regime.
12:04But, okay, so, you know, one of the initiatives that we're looking into with China as well,
12:11ASEAN as a bloc, is the Code of Conduct.
12:12And it has been quite a journey for the Code of Conduct.
12:16It's still continuing.
12:18There's, you know, Prime Minister Anwar says that we're hopefully going to get into completion in 2026.
12:25But skepticism is obviously growing for a Code of Conduct that has been there for quite some time.
12:31Do you still see the COC as a meaningful pathway to de-escalation,
12:35or has it become, you know, more of a symbolic talk shop right now?
12:38I think the COC is mostly about keeping China talking.
12:42You know, as Churchill said, jaw-to-jaw is better than war-to-war.
12:47But I think we have to appreciate that it's a process that probably doesn't have an end.
12:52I mean, so ASEAN, all the states of ASEAN at the time,
12:57endorsed the idea of a Code of Conduct in 1997,
13:02tasked the Philippines with writing the first draft.
13:04ASEAN accepted that draft internally in 1998 and then took it to China.
13:09And the process has been ongoing since 1998, which means that the Code of Conduct is older than Google.
13:16When the Code of Conduct was first envisioned, Titanic was the number one movie in the world.
13:21The Code of Conduct is a relic of a bygone era.
13:23Okay. If you put it that way, if you put Titanic into the mix, then it's kind of hard to argue with you.
13:31But yeah, you're right.
13:32But, you know, it's mediation.
13:35It's, like you said, getting China on the table and getting to a level that we are not, you know,
13:40at war or confronting each other aggressively, right?
13:42So I think it serves its purpose for what it is right now.
13:47As long as we accept that it's not the totality of the effort, that's the problem.
13:50If claimant states feel handcuffed, the idea that they are not permitted to do anything except the Code of Conduct,
13:57it becomes harmful.
13:59If claimant states can accept, okay, let's continue the Code of Conduct process,
14:03but in the meantime, let's have a separate discussion on fisheries management, for instance.
14:07Fish stocks are collapsing across the South China Sea.
14:10Fish are not going to wait for the Code of Conduct to complete before they go extinct.
14:16So why aren't other parallel tracks being pursued while the Code of Conduct process continues potentially, you know, into perpetuity?
14:26Right. I mean, I think I've discussed this with a few other analysts or guests here on the set.
14:31You know, there is the territorial claims, you know, that is being sort of, you know, in the mix right now.
14:39But there's also others shed interest in the waters, right?
14:42You talk about fisheries, for example, environment, for example.
14:45There are ways for people to sort of still work together to solve some of the issues.
14:49And I think there have been works within the bloc or within even the claimant state looking into all this.
14:56Yeah, constantly looking.
14:57In, you know, Indonesia launched what's called the Workshop for Managing Conflicts in the South China Sea in 1990.
15:04They've met every year since, and they've come up with dozens and dozens of proposals for things like joint marine science or fisheries management.
15:11And not a single one of those proposals has been pursued on the water because China has opposed every single one.
15:17The only successful on-the-water efforts were the Vietnam and Philippines for a few years pursued a joint scientific research cruise.
15:26And there was for three years a very brief joint seismic survey of the seabed between Philippines, Vietnam, and China.
15:34But all of that happened now more than 15 years ago.
15:37Otherwise, what we've seen are conferences and proposals, but nothing actually moving into the real world.
15:45Right.
16:07Okay, so if we talk about Southeast Asian politics dynamics, because we mentioned a lot about China here,
16:12and we want to talk about, you know, China, the U.S., and the future of ASEAN Bloc when it comes to these two superpowers.
16:19Now, foreign policy of many Southeast Asian states have often been described as hedging between the U.S. and China.
16:26For a country like Malaysia, for example, do you think this is a sustainable long-term strategy,
16:31or will it intensify pressure and eventually force a clearer alignment?
16:36I think this is a favorite topic here in this region.
16:39I mean, the academic debate about hedging and bandwagoning and balancing can go on in perpetuity.
16:45I think the key is Malaysia and every other state in the region wants to take care of its own national interests,
16:52and that means maximizing its own freedom of movement, its own agency within an international system
16:57that is heavily weighted by China and the U.S.
17:00So if hedging means not picking one side or the other on every issue, that's sustainable.
17:07And that is what countries should do.
17:09They should decide on any given issue what is in my interest.
17:12Sometimes that will be to align with China.
17:15Sometimes that will be to align with the U.S.
17:16Hopefully on some things that choice is the same, right, that the U.S. and China can cooperate.
17:22But if hedging is taken to mean a strict neutrality, a refusal to choose on any issue, that becomes problematic.
17:30Because sometimes Malaysia's interest will lie in the direction of the U.S.
17:34Sometimes it will lie in the direction of China.
17:37Sometimes it will be a third path that's ASEAN-centric or Europe-centric.
17:41And Malaysia and every other state in the region has to be able to make that choice, whatever it may be, on any given issue.
17:48Yeah, I mean, it's this balancing act that all the states in this region are doing, right?
17:53You know, sometimes we lean a bit more here, a little bit more there.
17:57But I think I can agree with you.
18:00I can understand the sentiment that true neutrality is a bit hard to sustain in the long term.
18:06Because, you know, it's, I think a lot of the superpowers sometimes, they are a bit more outspoken as to where, you know, which country's interest should lie.
18:18So I think true neutrality, I guess I can agree with you that it will be a bit difficult in the long term.
18:23Yeah.
18:23And if I can just say, I mean, particularly in a world now where both the U.S. and China seem destabilizing in different ways in different areas,
18:31it requires smaller middle powers to exercise some leadership over the international system if they want to preserve it.
18:39Which means refusing to make choices is in itself a choice, right?
18:44A refusal to make any choice means accepting that the system is in disarray.
18:50Yeah.
18:50I mean, there's a lot of school of thoughts when it comes to this.
18:52And I think ASEAN centrality has been one of the bedrock of our architecture here in the region.
19:00But, okay, if we look at critics of ASEAN centrality, for example, it has been called a bit ineffective or slow in response to issues like South China Sea, for example, or even Myanmar.
19:11What do you think is the single best or most important reform or mindset shift that ASEAN needs to stay effective in today's strategic environment?
19:22Yeah.
19:23ASEAN centrality is difficult because nobody knows what it means.
19:26I have sat through hour, two hour long sessions with the Secretary General of ASEAN on ASEAN centrality and at the end said,
19:33I still don't understand what this term means.
19:39ASEAN has been very successful on economic issues, particularly intra within the 10 members, now 11, and had some success with the convening part of what ASEAN does, right?
19:50It's the only place, things like the ASEAN Regional Forum or the East Asia Summit are the only place where you can get the Russians and the Chinese and the Americans to sit down together because trust is so low between them.
19:59Where ASEAN centrality has not worked, and I want to be very clear, I can't think of a single issue where it's worked, is on the political security pillar of ASEAN's three pillars.
20:09Whether it's Myanmar or the Thai-Cambodia conflict, piracy in the Malacca Strait and the Sulu Sea, the South China Sea, the Mekong River,
20:16there's not a single security issue in Southeast Asia in which ASEAN has been the vehicle to manage it.
20:23The vehicles are always sub-regional.
20:25It's the Malacca Strait patrols, the Eye in the Sky patrols, it's the Mekong River Commission.
20:31And so this kind of talking point that if anything is resolved that's not through an ASEAN mechanism, it somehow undermines ASEAN centrality, that's never been true.
20:43But I think if people come to believe it, it does become quite dangerous because ASEAN is not equipped to deal with something like the South China Sea.
20:52Laos does not care where Malaysian oil and gas rates are in the South China Sea.
20:57It's never going to stand up to China on behalf of fellow claimant states.
21:00And Malaysia is never going to weigh in on damming on the Mekong River in a way that would resolve that issue.
21:06I mean, but what do you suggest then?
21:07What do you suggest for us to move forward, especially in this very tension-rising strategic environment?
21:16Because we as a bloc, you know, that's our nature or the ASEAN way is to deal with problems head on this way.
21:24So what do you suggest, you know, something new or something, some reform that we could look into?
21:29ASEAN's most effective role on politics and security has always been the norm-setting part, right?
21:36ASEAN agrees on how disputes should be resolved.
21:39So, for instance, on the South China Sea, since 1990, ASEAN has consistently said disputes must be resolved peacefully and they must be resolved in accordance with the UN Conventional Law of the Sea.
21:51ASEAN does not then need to take the next step of saying, OK, we must be the one, the organization, all 11, must be there at the table when the exact details are written out.
22:01So ASEAN's role is agree upon the norms and then endorse follow-up work just by the claimants.
22:09Let the Philippines and Vietnam and Malaysia and Brunei sit down and decide how they want to pursue fisheries management or marine scientific research or seabed resources without needing to ask Cambodia and Laos for permission, which is the way the system currently works.
22:25Right. So you're saying to move away a little bit from sort of the regional focus and go a little bit more niche or mini-laterally solve things.
22:34Yes. Having the states who are most directly impacted, whose national interests are actually at stake, having them decide how these issues are supposed to be resolved is not in conflict with the idea of ASEAN norms and ASEAN centrality.
22:48As long as they're not violating the norms that ASEAN's already laid out.
22:52Now, if, you know, Vietnam or the Philippines were to suddenly say we're going to throw unclose aside, then ASEAN steps in and says, no, no, no, we all agreed that there are certain rules that have to be followed here.
23:04But as long as they are consistent with ASEAN statements and ASEAN norms, there's no reason that you can't take the exact same approach that you took, for instance, on the counter-piracy problem in the Malacca Strait in the 90s and 2000s.
23:14Nobody went to the Philippines and asked for permission to launch the Malacca Strait patrols.
23:19Right. But I think it's easier said than done, no, because, you know, especially in today's sort of high tension grounds, you take Myanmar, for example.
23:27You know, Myanmar is an issue that we have been trying to solve for such a long time, even South China Sea, for example, such a long time.
23:34And yes, there are claimant states that are involved, but at the same time, even with just claimant states that are involved, it's still an issue that we cannot solve because government states are pretty set in their ways in terms of solving this issue.
23:47Yeah. I will say, so I think Myanmar, and to a degree Thailand and Cambodia, are different issues than the issues that involve outside parties like the Mekong River or the South Tennessee.
23:58Because in that case, you have member states violating terms of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, right?
24:05So ASEAN should, and I think does have to play the leading role, if any, outside organization is going to in mediating, say, between Thailand and Cambodia.
24:14I mean, preferably those two do it by themselves.
24:16But it is very important, and it was very important, that Prime Minister Anwar was the one who mediated the details of that agreement, not the U.S. or China.
24:24Because if ASEAN can't do that, then it does lose credibility.
24:28But I, you know, same with Myanmar.
24:31ASEAN cannot accept rule by a military junta that only actually controls 25 percent of the national territory.
24:39And ASEAN should not allow, say, China, Russia, or the U.S. or anybody else to dictate what the bar is for recognizing a new government in NAPIDAL.
24:48Those issues have to be managed within the organization.
24:51Right. Okay. That's fair.
24:53So we only have time for one last question.
24:56Let's look at the future a little bit, the future of ASEAN bloc here, looking ahead, maybe five, seven, ten years ahead.
25:02How would you rate the chances of the region moving towards, you know, deeper alignment or deeper alliances in this region?
25:11Let's look at, you know, probably the U.S. or greater accommodation of China, for example, or maintaining today's hedging equilibrium.
25:19Where do you place your bets and why?
25:22I think that on security and political issues, each member of ASEAN will continue to make their own decisions, as they always have.
25:31And so one can assume that in all likelihood, say, the Philippines, maybe Vietnam, maybe Singapore, align with the U.S. more often than some other members, like Cambodia, Laos.
25:43And that's fine.
25:44On economics, I'm more hopeful.
25:46And I think this has always been where ASEAN has had more success, because it's where the organization actually provides value to the member states.
25:53So I do think there's a good chance that ASEAN can help lead on, say, forging new economic ties with the GCC and with Europe, and therefore helping to mitigate the threat of U.S.-China competition on the economic front.
26:07Yeah, I don't think it has been doing that, especially, you know, we have seen this past couple of years, there's been a bit more pushback.
26:13Sorry, not pushback.
26:14There's been a bit more momentum when it comes to, you know, ASEAN, intra-trade between ASEAN.
26:20And there's been a bit more momentum, you know, to renewing some trade agreement within ASEAN as well, and involving China, and also recently involving the U.S. as well.
26:32So I think we're pretty hopeful in this region, but we can't ignore the big superpowers, unfortunately.
26:39And that's just the way the world works.
26:42And I think, like you mentioned, ASEAN neutrality is still going to stay, no matter, or ASEAN's neutrality even is still going to stay, no matter if you don't understand it.
26:53It's still going to stay for a little while.
26:56So, yeah, I mean, you didn't say where you placed your bets, but I guess that's a very diplomatic answer from you.
27:03But, okay, it's good to know.
27:05I mean, it's good to know that, you know, a lot of stuff that happens in the region will work and will stay as it is because it has been sort of like the framework that we've been trying to set up here in this region.
27:18And it has worked in a way that it doesn't come to a confrontation or come to a war, at least within this region.
27:28Yeah, yeah.
27:28And ASEAN might be slow and frustrating and all the things people say.
27:31But if we didn't have it, we would wish we did.
27:34Yeah, I agree.
27:35I agree.
27:36Slow and frustrating.
27:37Okay.
27:38Thank you so much, Gregory, or Greg, Director of the Southeast Asia Program at CSIS.
27:45Thank you for your insights.
27:47And, you know, the region is evolving very quickly and understanding the forces that shape Southeast Asia has never been more important.
27:54So we thank you for your analysis and for your thoughts on the issues that are at hand.
27:59I think that's all from me.
28:00Thank you so much for joining us.
28:02That's all from me.
28:03Thank you so much.
28:04And stay tuned for more on Awani International.
28:07Bye.
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