- há 2 dias
Discover how Henry Kissinger's anti-Communist zeal would shape U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam, China, Chile, and the Soviet Union in the second half of the 20th century, through the voices of historians and colleagues.
Categoria
📚
AprendizadoTranscrição
00:00:00A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:00:30A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:00A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:02A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:04A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:06A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:08A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:10A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:12A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:14A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:16A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:18A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:20A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:22A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:24A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:26READS THIS STORY
00:01:28IN THE NEW YORK TIMES
00:01:30AND GOES BALISTIC
00:01:32CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:34A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:36A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:38CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:40A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:42CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:44CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:46B A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:48developing
00:01:50CaraGarden
00:01:52The president of the United Nations
00:01:53RALT
00:01:54A CIDADE NO BRASIL
00:01:56loving
00:01:5810 years in prison
00:01:59It was very cheap
00:02:00if they could contribute
00:02:01to ending this war
00:02:02Ellsberg was the Kissinger
00:02:04protege
00:02:05And so, Kissinger
00:02:06is worried
00:02:07that the finger
00:02:08is going to come back
00:02:08at him
00:02:10Kissinger describes Ellsberg
00:02:11as unhinged
00:02:12Então, é Kissinger que gins up Nixon
00:02:31about Ellsberg.
00:02:32Kissinger's frantic, self-protective reaction to the exposure of the Pentagon Papers
00:02:43drives Nixon to a place which eventually becomes the first step towards work.
00:03:02AVAILABLE NOW
00:03:32Transcrição e Legendas Pedro Negri
00:04:02Transcrição e Legendas Pedro Negri
00:04:32Vietnam to Kissinger and to Nixon was a thorn in their side.
00:04:36They wanted it off page one so they could get to all the kind of things that Nixon had on his very expansive and aggressive foreign policy plate.
00:04:45You couldn't do those until you had the Vietnam question settled.
00:04:48The United States seemed hemmed in in Vietnam.
00:04:54We seemed unable to do anything right.
00:04:58But Kissinger recognized that there was a lot of power in taking the initiative.
00:05:03He was willing to take risks and he was able to manufacture opportunities where they did not exist before.
00:05:10Before they came to power, both Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger thought what might be done with China.
00:05:27I think it took the two of them spending time together contemplating the great chessboard of the Cold War to realize that if we can only establish some communications with China, that could be helpful in a number of ways.
00:05:45It could help you with the Vietnam problem, but could also help you with the Soviets.
00:05:51We had, for the last few decades, assumed that communism was a seamless hold.
00:05:57Well, suddenly not so much.
00:05:59In the late 60s, you started to see friction and then clashes between the Soviets and the Chinese along border areas.
00:06:05And you had people in the intelligence community saying, hey, rather than being on the same team, these guys are in different teams.
00:06:13There's actually a split, which we began to call the Sino-Soviet split.
00:06:17A disputed frontier between the dragon and the bear.
00:06:22A war broke out, a border dispute between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.
00:06:30More importantly, there was an ideological battle for leadership of the communist world.
00:06:35This was the setting within which Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger developed perhaps the boldest ploy in all of Cold War statecraft.
00:06:53Mao's China was probably the most closed country in the world.
00:06:58There were very few people who went in there.
00:07:00So it really was this place on the moon.
00:07:04Nobody really knew what was going on inside.
00:07:08Mao's policies had reduced China to one of the lowest standards of living in the world.
00:07:15Wretched poverty enforced by the draconian measures of communist rule.
00:07:20I was born in late 1959, 10 years after the communists took over China.
00:07:30Mao was our red sun, was the savior of China.
00:07:35We were schooled on all this anti-Western propaganda.
00:07:39I grew up seeing these famous Korean war movies called Heroic Children.
00:07:47And in it, you see American soldiers played by Chinese actors with fake noses and white powder.
00:07:59And they were incredibly ridiculous creatures who would be mauled down by Chinese machine guns.
00:08:05So that was the very cartoonish picture of Americans that we had in our head.
00:08:16As we came into office, one week after his inauguration...
00:08:21You, Richard, Milhouse, Nixon...
00:08:23Nixon sent a memo to Kissinger and said, get in touch with the Chinese, see what we can do.
00:08:28One week, you can see his priority.
00:08:29This is where the story gets the most cloak and the most dagger.
00:08:36The process of trying to get in touch with Beijing started almost immediately in 1969.
00:08:43But it was extremely difficult because the Chinese were extremely hard to get to.
00:08:48The Chinese had no diplomatic representatives anywhere in the world.
00:08:51Even having an address where you could confidentially and reliably communicate with the Chinese didn't exist.
00:09:01So what they had to do is find discreet intermediaries who could play that role.
00:09:07Of all countries, it turned out to be Pakistan that made the connection happen.
00:09:15Today's highlight is the new ambassador from Pakistan and his family.
00:09:19Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier, were great believers in the subtle approach.
00:09:46And so the faintest of signals were sent out from Beijing to the effect that there might possibly be a conversation worth having.
00:10:01April of 1971, in Japan, an American ping-pong team was playing in international ping-pong matches.
00:10:10And one of the participants in that was the People's Republic of China.
00:10:14What happened was there was a young, sort of a hippie ping-pong player with long hair and tie-dyed shirts.
00:10:22And he got on the wrong bus.
00:10:25It was the Chinese bus.
00:10:27And met their star player.
00:10:30And they kind of got to be friends.
00:10:32And on the basis of that, I think Zhou Enlai saw a little flash of light.
00:10:39One of the coaches from the People's Republic approached the Americans about the possibility of them coming to China to play exhibition.
00:10:49This was an extraordinary moment and received incredible coverage in the American media.
00:10:55The first films are now coming out of red China of the visit by the first U.S. group ever invited by the Chinese communists.
00:11:03Today, Premier Zhou Enlai met the visiting players.
00:11:06He told them their visit opens a new door.
00:11:08It was a signal that, yes, there was an opportunity to send an American representative to Beijing.
00:11:18The question was, who would that be?
00:11:22Secrecy was crucial.
00:11:23And that meant that Nixon could only really entrust it to the one person who already knew that this was his cherished goal.
00:11:33And that was Henry Kissinger.
00:11:34I knew nothing about China.
00:11:38That's a great qualification for a secret mission, but it happens to be true.
00:11:43I had the same thought in the 50s that everyone else did, that the Chinese were revolutionary near-madmen.
00:11:56We had to set up what the cover store would be.
00:12:01So we go on a public trip to four countries.
00:12:07And we stop, of course, in Pakistan.
00:12:11Henry's cover was going to be that he's got a stomachache.
00:12:14Presidential advisor Henry Kissinger is staying an extra day in Pakistan because of an upset stomach.
00:12:19And at 2 a.m. we're driven to the Islamabad airport by the defense minister.
00:12:27The four of us get on the plane.
00:12:31And so here we are flying toward Beijing.
00:12:34None of the world knows where we are.
00:12:37We were exhilarated and anxious.
00:12:39I mean, this was a gamble.
00:12:40This is no sure thing.
00:12:47He landed in a military airport in Beijing.
00:12:50And, of course, we drove in automobiles where the curtains were down.
00:12:54Nobody could see us.
00:12:58Kissinger was deeply impressed by Chou En-mai, the Chinese premier.
00:13:02And this was one of the great meetings of minds that happened in his career.
00:13:09He was a man of extraordinary intelligence.
00:13:13One of the most intelligent people I've ever met.
00:13:16He had an extraordinarily expressive face.
00:13:20He understood English, though he did not admit it.
00:13:23So his face registered while you talked to him.
00:13:26The driving force was hopes that if we could pull China more into our orbit,
00:13:34we could resolve the Vietnam War.
00:13:38Most of the military equipment going to North Vietnam was coming through China.
00:13:44I remember him telling Chou En-mai,
00:13:46we don't want to wake up in the morning in the second term
00:13:49reading battlefield reports from Vietnam.
00:13:52One term was enough.
00:13:54The Chinese had two major goals.
00:13:57One was to balance the Soviet Union, which is increasingly threatening them.
00:14:02And the other was coming out of diplomatic isolation.
00:14:06The key issue, of course, we had to get around was the Taiwan issue.
00:14:10And so Kissinger made it clear to the Chinese
00:14:12that the United States would withdraw some of its forces from Taiwan
00:14:16if the Vietnam War came to an end.
00:14:18Toward the end of the talks, it was finally raised that President Nixon would come to China.
00:14:31I think Kissinger did have a recognition something big had happened.
00:14:35After all, he had gotten to the top of China.
00:14:39And he had, in effect, triggered an invitation for Nixon himself.
00:14:44I do remember how jubilant he was when he returned from his secret trip.
00:14:53I had never seen him like that before.
00:14:56He was just vibrating with excitement.
00:14:59Kissinger briefs Nixon, and Nixon schedules a national television speech.
00:15:06Good evening.
00:15:07The secrecy was such that people thought it was about Vietnam.
00:15:12It hit the nation on a Sunday night as a complete surprise.
00:15:16I have taken this action because of my profound conviction
00:15:21that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions
00:15:27and a better relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China.
00:15:34The tales of Henry Kissinger's secret trip which led to that announcement
00:15:38were spelled out today in a factual account
00:15:40which makes most detective story fiction seem bland.
00:15:43Henry, can you just tell us, do you feel encouraged as a result of your trip to Peking?
00:15:49I think we made some progress.
00:15:53The Taiwanese ambassador was visibly upset.
00:15:56I got a 20-minute notice last night.
00:16:00I couldn't believe it.
00:16:01We think that's not the kind of thing a friend and ally should do to another.
00:16:06Observers may argue over whether Dr. Henry Kissinger is a secret swinger
00:16:15or a square masquerading as one,
00:16:18but there's no doubt he is the deputy president on this trip.
00:16:21The brilliant, elusive intellectual who has structured the substance of the top-level talks
00:16:26will be at the president's side throughout.
00:16:28We heard this official announcement that Nixon was coming to China.
00:16:35I still remember rounds of school briefings to prepare
00:16:40in case you should encounter any Americans on the street.
00:16:46The correct attitude is not too arrogant and not too obsequious.
00:16:52And I remember when Nixon actually landed,
00:16:59somehow I have a sense this was a super important moment
00:17:04that's going to, in some ways, change your life.
00:17:08The first American president ever to do so steps onto Chinese soil.
00:17:12The meetings with Mao Zedong took place in an area adjacent to the Forbidden City
00:17:23called Zhongnanhai, and that's where Mao held court.
00:17:27The fact that Chairman Mao arranged an immediate meeting
00:17:30with the American chief of state in his home
00:17:32is considered significant by diplomatic observers.
00:17:35Just to be there was to be in the most forbidden, inaccessible place on earth.
00:17:42I think it must have been quite exhilarating.
00:17:46It's one of those few experiences you have when you are an adult
00:17:51which have some of the quality of childhood about them
00:17:54that everything is totally new.
00:17:58We were used to these elegant Mandarin discourses by Zhou Enlai.
00:18:04What we got from Mao was laconic phrases, allegories,
00:18:08either that were brilliant and we stupid Westerners couldn't understand
00:18:12or he was slightly senile.
00:18:15Mao was a great performer.
00:18:18He said a Chinese phrase.
00:18:21He said,
00:18:21The wind and rain are coming, so the swallows are busy.
00:18:27Kissinger's reaction was,
00:18:29Oh, that was so deep, it would take me several days to fully grasp that.
00:18:34But in fact, there's a very tacky, trite Chinese, you know, sort of saying.
00:18:41Kissinger ate it right up.
00:18:44Joe and Nixon sit down for conversations which last for more than 30 hours.
00:18:48You can see the mastery of Kissinger's diplomacy by looking at what's called the Shanghai communique,
00:18:57which is how do you get around the problem that the United States basically thinks Taiwan is the real China.
00:19:03So what did they do to put the Taiwan question aside?
00:19:07They agreed on this very guileful solution where the United States,
00:19:13there's a word in Chinese, they said it was,
00:19:16We acknowledge, we take note of the fact that China says Taiwan is part of China.
00:19:26It's masterful in its obfuscation and vagueness, but it somehow satisfied everyone.
00:19:33It was a dream come true for Richard Nixon himself and also for Henry Kissinger.
00:19:45This was good news after an unremissing diet of bad news over Vietnam and over Cambodia.
00:19:54It felt as though they were changing the subject of the American conversation.
00:19:59We have witnessed through the miracle of satellite television the sights and sounds of a society
00:20:09that has been closed to Americans for over two decades.
00:20:15Opening to China was maybe in the 20th century the most strategic move that any president has ever made.
00:20:23It was the height of the Cold War.
00:20:24China and the Soviet Union were allies, and we peeled off China.
00:20:31It was that simple.
00:20:33I think to see the real politic played out was very sobering.
00:20:40The whole thing was part of a geopolitical game to balance the Soviet Union.
00:20:45Nixon and Kissinger had no interest in helping improve the political situation in China.
00:20:55They had no thoughts, not a iota of thoughts about human rights.
00:21:02At one level, how could I expect anything more?
00:21:06I think it's a mistake to see Kissinger's realpolitik as an absence of morality.
00:21:14What he sees as the moral good is the preservation of American security.
00:21:21Where I think we begin to enter into a moral grey area for Kissinger is
00:21:27what means are acceptable in order to achieve that end.
00:21:31Every president, every national security advisor, takes decisions in which there are priorities
00:21:45accorded to countries, and in which evils are ranked, not just according to their moral magnitude,
00:21:52but more importantly, according to their strategic magnitude.
00:21:56The East Pakistan crisis erupted at the time that Pakistan was our only channel of communication
00:22:12to China.
00:22:13We were in the process of arranging my secret trip in the precise period that West Pakistan
00:22:22was trying to put down the uprising in East Pakistan.
00:22:28The partition of British India had produced a strange situation in which there were essentially
00:22:34two parts to Pakistan.
00:22:37What we know today as Pakistan was West Pakistan.
00:22:41What we know today as Bangladesh was East Pakistan.
00:22:45East Pakistan and West Pakistan did not share a language, they did not share culture, they did
00:22:50not share history, it's a complete recipe for conflict.
00:22:56In 1970, the residents of East Pakistan voted overwhelmingly for a different government from the West Pakistanis.
00:23:06The Eastern portion is beginning to revolt against the authority of the West Pakistani government.
00:23:11It's got its own elected parliament, its own elected leadership, a man named Mujib, and it's on the verge of civil war.
00:23:20Yaya Khan is the channel through which Nixon and Kissinger are communicating with China, and it's absolutely vital that he remain in power.
00:23:36President Yaya Khan of Pakistan flies to East Pakistan tomorrow to try to talk his opposition into obeying the central government.
00:23:44In Dhaka, I was the junior political officer.
00:23:50At 1.26 in the morning of the 26th of March, all hell broke loose.
00:23:58The West Pakistani military were unleashed with a vengeance.
00:24:03Automatic weapons right outside of our bedroom.
00:24:05The Pakistanis murdered large numbers of the opposition politicians in their beds at night, killed their families, raked Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan, with artillery, wantonly killing innocent civilians.
00:24:24The Pakistani army went into Dhaka University and just rounded up academics, including my uncles, and disappeared them.
00:24:38I mean, what was happening was genocide before our very eyes.
00:24:44We are in the process of attempting to negotiate a ceasefire in the Dhaka area in order to be able to evacuate the Americans.
00:24:52The Nixon administration had lots of information about what's happening.
00:24:59They're getting real-time reporting from the U.S. consulate in Dhaka.
00:25:04These Foreign Service officers have seen that kind of violence before, and they're saying,
00:25:09this is in a completely different category.
00:25:13We've never seen anything like this.
00:25:15There's enormous pressure on Nixon and Kissinger to cut aid and military support for Pakistan, but they choose not to do that.
00:25:27We were absolutely mortified that our government was not responding in what was a humanitarian disaster inflicted by a government that we supported.
00:25:39So, a number of us, especially younger officers, felt that we needed to send in an expression of dissent.
00:25:47Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy.
00:25:53Our government has failed to denounce atrocities.
00:25:57Our government has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy.
00:26:03We've been in touch, of course, with the Pakistanis through messages that were sent to President Yahya.
00:26:08And incidentally, he's been very forthcoming.
00:26:11We can't be blamed for it.
00:26:12There are many, many areas in the world that we just can't, we can't be responsible for it.
00:26:20I was shocked by the lack of reaction from Kissinger and Nixon.
00:26:25They seemed unaffected by it, except in the sense that they wanted it to go away.
00:26:33As far as Kissinger was concerned, these lives in South Asia, they just didn't matter.
00:26:42We've never covered the bodies of my uncles.
00:26:47There could have been an arms cutoff.
00:26:49There could have been stronger measures taken against Pakistan, which were not taken.
00:26:55Ultimately, it comes down to Kissinger's assessment that what matters is China.
00:27:00And what happens in East Pakistan is almost a footnote relative to these larger objectives.
00:27:09There are governments in power that may not meet all our criteria for democratic principles.
00:27:18But the alternative to which are likely to be positively hostile to our interests,
00:27:23to manipulate the domestic politics of another country is always an extremely complicated matter.
00:27:32And you can start a process which you cannot control, and you may not know how to do it.
00:27:36My first encounter with the great man was when there was a luncheon at our residence.
00:27:49My father was foreign affairs minister, and in this luncheon, there was a big debate.
00:27:57And Kissinger says, look, I don't care about Latin America.
00:28:01I don't care about your development.
00:28:04History doesn't go through the South.
00:28:07History comes from Russia to Japan to Europe and to the United States.
00:28:12The South has no importance.
00:28:13Kissinger called Chile a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica.
00:28:23He did not think that Latin America was important.
00:28:26He, in fact, said Latin America is not important.
00:28:30Chile was probably the country that first had a stable democracy in the region.
00:28:36We had a democracy even before some European countries.
00:28:39Salvador Allende was a person who had represented the hopes of the poor in Chile for decades.
00:28:48And poor people felt that he was their leader.
00:28:53Allende was head of the Socialist Party.
00:28:55He believed in the need for social change, redistribution of wealth,
00:29:00and that this could be done through the ballot box.
00:29:03There is a sense in Kissinger that Allende's example could proliferate all over the continent.
00:29:12And he considers that one must stop the contagion.
00:29:16Allende made no secret of his determination to bring about a revolutionary transformation.
00:29:25Nobody wanted another Cuba.
00:29:27And so when any left-wing leader showed signs of coming to power in a Latin American country,
00:29:34the red lights started flashing on the dashboard in the Situation Room.
00:29:42In the Cold War, every inch of territory matters.
00:29:47It's a zero-sum game.
00:29:49Any victory for the communists is a loss for the United States.
00:29:53And so all eyes were on Chile on September 4th, 1970, as this election took place.
00:30:09The presidential election in Chile in 1970 is a three-way race
00:30:13in which Salvador Allende wins 36.6% of the vote.
00:30:18But this must be ratified by Congress.
00:30:23So there is a chance for those who are against Allende
00:30:26to try to find a way to stop Allende from becoming president.
00:30:32Kissinger talks to CIA Director Richard Helms on the phone
00:30:35and basically says, we cannot let Chile go down the drain.
00:30:39And Helms says, I'm with you.
00:30:41And they start to plot out how they are going to keep Allende
00:30:44from actually being inaugurated as president.
00:30:48Kissinger says, I don't see why we should let a country go communist
00:30:55just because of the irresponsibility of its own people.
00:31:02President Nixon called in to Richard Helms
00:31:04and Kissinger to the Oval Office.
00:31:06And Helms took handwritten notes on Nixon's orders.
00:31:11Save Chile.
00:31:12Don't tell the ambassador.
00:31:14Make the economy scream.
00:31:1548-hour game plan.
00:31:17Nixon authorizes two tracks
00:31:20and then Kissinger carries these out.
00:31:23Track one is essentially an attempt to bribe
00:31:26the Chilean members of Congress from ratifying Allende.
00:31:30Track two is what becomes infamous.
00:31:33It is an effort to help the Chilean military
00:31:36institute a coup against Allende.
00:31:39The Chilean consultants that the CIA had and Kissinger had at the time
00:31:47recommended the kidnapping of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
00:31:53That meant General Schneider.
00:31:55General René Schneider, head of the Chilean armed forces, was pro-Constitution.
00:32:02He was the principal obstacle to any coup plot involving the military.
00:32:07And so he had to be removed, neutralized, eliminated.
00:32:11They sent machine guns through the pouch of the American embassy
00:32:16and $30,000 for the general who was in charge of the Santiago.
00:32:22On October 22nd, General Schneider got into his car.
00:32:29The car drove three or four blocks.
00:32:31It was intercepted by several other vehicles filled with thugs.
00:32:36One thug got out with a sledgehammer and started smashing in the windows.
00:32:40General Schneider had a gun and he tried to defend himself and they killed him.
00:32:48Henry Kissinger gets on the phone with Richard Nixon
00:32:51as General René Schneider lies dying in a military hospital.
00:32:56And he says, the first step of the coup plot took place,
00:33:00but such an incompetent bunch, these Chilean military officers,
00:33:04that the rest of the plot is not going forward.
00:33:10The shock that this murder produced in China society,
00:33:17instead of weakening Allende,
00:33:20gave an enormous strength to the election of Allende.
00:33:25Allende, therefore, was proclaimed president 10 days later.
00:33:31Kissinger does not give up.
00:33:33He wants Allende out of there.
00:33:35So there's an American effort to undermine his government.
00:33:40And that includes cutting off loans and aid,
00:33:44funding opposition parties, opposition media,
00:33:48and fomenting strikes.
00:33:51The first thing that Nixon said after the election of Allende was,
00:33:55make the economy scream.
00:33:56In fact, the economy screamed.
00:33:58A country becomes tense, becomes polarized,
00:34:03and then you have a society which was a healthy society in political terms
00:34:08that becomes absolutely out of control.
00:34:14Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Police
00:34:17stage the coup that ends 46 years of democratic rule in Chile.
00:34:21The military moves in.
00:34:23The palace is surrounded.
00:34:24September 11th, 1973,
00:34:29the Chilean military undertook a very violent coup.
00:34:33They launched rocket attacks,
00:34:35bombarding the Moneda Palace.
00:34:46Allende was there in the presidential palace.
00:34:49He began talking on the radio.
00:34:52Viva, chief.
00:34:53Viva, power.
00:34:54He persuaded the rest of the people who were inside to leave the palace.
00:35:00When they were leaving the palace,
00:35:02one of the doctors of Allende decided that he would come back
00:35:06to where the office of the president was.
00:35:09And he saw Allende sitting with the machine gun here,
00:35:13and he shot himself.
00:35:14There is no direct evidence
00:35:19that Nixon and Kissinger knew about that coup in advance,
00:35:24and there's no evidence that they helped plan it.
00:35:28But they were thrilled that Allende was gone,
00:35:31and they immediately threw U.S. support behind Pinochet.
00:35:36Augusto Pinochet was the commander-in-chief of the army
00:35:39at the moment in which the coup happened.
00:35:40Pinochet came late to the conspiracy to organize a coup.
00:35:48And in order to persuade those who had been
00:35:51from the first moment in favor of the coup,
00:35:54he had to be more brutal than them when he took power.
00:36:01Pinochet began rounding up leftists and suspected subversives,
00:36:07gathered them up in a series of detention centers,
00:36:09including the National Soccer Stadium,
00:36:12and it began the process of executing many of them.
00:36:17Many were tortured for information.
00:36:20Many more were tortured simply for the purpose
00:36:23of instilling the Chilean population with fear.
00:36:25There were thousands of people killed,
00:36:30thousands of people tortured,
00:36:31thousands of people who had to live abroad forever.
00:36:34I would say that it is incomparable
00:36:36to any other event in our history.
00:36:41After the coup, Nixon seems preoccupied
00:36:44that the United States might be exposed.
00:36:47And Kissinger says,
00:36:48You would think that as a refugee from Nazi Germany,
00:37:01that Kissinger would be deeply committed to democracy.
00:37:04But he seemed to think that it was not a problem at all
00:37:07to have dictators be on the side of the U.S.
00:37:10in the struggle against communism.
00:37:12And in cases like Chile,
00:37:14he was clearly willing to subvert democracy.
00:37:18The argument that Kissinger makes
00:37:20is that everything that he is doing
00:37:22is in the service of the best outcome for the world.
00:37:24He's thinking about the global chessboard.
00:37:27And the fact that there are going to be people
00:37:29suffering, dying on the ground,
00:37:32that to him is a necessary consequence
00:37:34of pursuing policies
00:37:35that are going to result in global stability.
00:37:43Russia puts on its annual May Day show of strength
00:37:46in these just-released films from Moscow.
00:37:50The Soviet Union,
00:37:52at the beginning of the Nixon administration,
00:37:54had good reason to think
00:37:56that they were winning the Cold War.
00:37:58The United States was bogged down in Vietnam,
00:38:02but that wasn't its only problem.
00:38:04With every passing year,
00:38:06the Soviets built more nuclear weapons
00:38:09until they achieved parity
00:38:10and then overtook the United States
00:38:13in terms of the size of their nuclear arsenal.
00:38:16From 1945, from Hiroshima,
00:38:20until the early 70s,
00:38:22it's a breakneck race
00:38:23to build more nuclear weapons.
00:38:26This was a very unstable situation
00:38:27and there was no obvious end to it.
00:38:31When the decision of peace and war
00:38:33involves the survival
00:38:34of tens of millions of people,
00:38:36you are no longer playing power politics
00:38:38in the traditional sense.
00:38:40to conduct confrontation politics
00:38:43when the stakes are going to be determined
00:38:46by nuclear weapons.
00:38:47It's the height of irresponsibility.
00:38:49This is what we mean by detente.
00:38:53Detente is a French word
00:38:55that really just meant improving relations.
00:38:58It was about buying some time,
00:39:02reducing the risk of World War III
00:39:04and trying to recover
00:39:06from what was becoming
00:39:08the insolvable problem of Vietnam.
00:39:13Kissinger definitely saw a role
00:39:16for the Soviet Union
00:39:17in the resolution of Vietnam.
00:39:19And he is very clear
00:39:22that he's interested in getting help from them
00:39:26in bringing this to a close.
00:39:28Kissinger would creatively suggest
00:39:30the possibility of a summit meeting
00:39:32and the Soviets would say,
00:39:35Njet.
00:39:37This changed with the opening to China.
00:39:41When we opened to China,
00:39:43the Soviets suddenly realized
00:39:45that we had a bigger canvas to paint on
00:39:49than they had calculated.
00:39:51And in that sense, there was leverage.
00:39:53The Soviets who are looking at the world stage
00:39:57are saying, wait a minute,
00:39:58we've just been outflanked.
00:40:01And if we don't get into talks
00:40:03with the Americans
00:40:03and strike a deal
00:40:05that makes us an equal superpower,
00:40:08the Chinese are going to replace us.
00:40:11Good evening.
00:40:12President Nixon has announced
00:40:13that he'll be going to Moscow next May
00:40:15for a summit conference with Soviet leaders.
00:40:18It will be the first trip
00:40:19to the Soviet Union
00:40:20by an American president
00:40:21since Franklin Roosevelt journeyed to Yalta
00:40:23in the waning days of World War II.
00:40:29Kissinger and Nixon
00:40:30accepted an invitation
00:40:31to stay in the Kremlin.
00:40:35I mean,
00:40:35whether you as president of the United States
00:40:37would have wanted everything you did
00:40:39in your guest room
00:40:41bugged and photographed,
00:40:43I don't know,
00:40:43but that's what Henry agreed to do.
00:40:46So they stayed in the Kremlin.
00:40:52The Soviet leadership
00:40:53had installed Leonid Brezhnev,
00:40:55not the sharpest knife in the drawer intellectually,
00:40:58let's put it that way.
00:41:00Brezhnev is a classic Communist Party
00:41:02apparatchik who's risen to the top
00:41:05by being very careful
00:41:07at playing all sides
00:41:09against each other.
00:41:11He's not a thug.
00:41:13He's not very far from a thug.
00:41:15The most surreal moment
00:41:23in their relationship
00:41:24must have been
00:41:25when Brezhnev treated Kissinger
00:41:27to a visit to his hunting lodge.
00:41:30Henry Kissinger
00:41:33was not the kind of person
00:41:34who goes shooting wild boar
00:41:37as a recreational pastime.
00:41:40They put out the food.
00:41:41You sit in the tower
00:41:42and shoot the poor bastard
00:41:44as they come by to feed.
00:41:47When he got killed
00:41:48about three poars
00:41:49and can't help what else,
00:41:51he uptracked the picnic
00:41:53and said,
00:41:54look, I'm going to talk to you privately.
00:41:55And he said,
00:41:56look, you would be our partners.
00:41:58You would be our general advocate.
00:42:00I participated in a meeting
00:42:02with Brezhnev at his dacha.
00:42:04It was an evening
00:42:05devoted to Vietnam.
00:42:07The meeting was just
00:42:08three or four top Soviet leaders,
00:42:11including Brezhnev,
00:42:11took turns lambasting Nixon
00:42:13about his Vietnam policy,
00:42:17all of which was to show Hanoi
00:42:19how tough they were.
00:42:20And we met for four hours.
00:42:23And I remember Nixon
00:42:24leaning over to Kissinger saying,
00:42:26you know, Jesus Christ,
00:42:27we've got to get out of here.
00:42:28At that point,
00:42:29and Brezhnev says,
00:42:30well, now we're going upstairs for dinner.
00:42:34The whole mood changed.
00:42:36Everyone got half drunk.
00:42:38And then toward the end of that dinner,
00:42:41Brezhnev says to Nixon,
00:42:42I think Kissinger should go off
00:42:43and negotiate with my people
00:42:45on the SALT agreement.
00:42:48SALT was the first treaty
00:42:52ever negotiated
00:42:53to limit the growth
00:42:55of what were euphemistically called
00:42:57strategic arms.
00:43:02We go back to Moscow.
00:43:05We needed to Xerox the SALT treaty
00:43:07because it was being signed.
00:43:09And suddenly,
00:43:10the Xerox machine
00:43:11wouldn't work anymore.
00:43:12And so Henry goes
00:43:14to the Xerox machine.
00:43:15He grabs the treaty.
00:43:17He holds it up
00:43:17to the chandelier.
00:43:19And he says,
00:43:20General Antonov.
00:43:21Antonov was our KGB minder.
00:43:23He said,
00:43:23General Antonov,
00:43:25can I have six copies
00:43:26of this, please?
00:43:30SALT 1 was signed.
00:43:32One of the results
00:43:33was the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,
00:43:36an agreement to shell
00:43:37the elaborate and expensive
00:43:38anti-ballistic missile apparatus
00:43:40in the US and the Soviet Union.
00:43:43The first SALT agreement
00:43:45was not a trivial achievement.
00:43:48Of course,
00:43:49it didn't stop the Soviets
00:43:51building nuclear warheads.
00:43:53But I think
00:43:54from Kissinger's point of view,
00:43:56you created a new basis
00:43:57for the relationship
00:43:58and you'd at least created
00:44:00a mode within which
00:44:02arms limitation
00:44:03could be achieved.
00:44:08The psychological impact
00:44:10was powerful.
00:44:11Powerful because
00:44:13we're acknowledging
00:44:14we're vulnerable to each other
00:44:15and we're saying,
00:44:17hey, this is crazy
00:44:18to keep spending money this way
00:44:20and threatening each other.
00:44:23My recollection is
00:44:25they let Nixon go
00:44:26on Soviet television,
00:44:28which was unheard of.
00:44:29We couldn't believe it.
00:44:30Dobervechur.
00:44:33I deeply appreciate
00:44:34this opportunity
00:44:35your government has given me
00:44:37to speak directly
00:44:38with the people
00:44:39of the Soviet Union,
00:44:41to bring you a message
00:44:42of friendship
00:44:42from all the people
00:44:44of the United States.
00:44:45The SALT agreement
00:44:46at the time
00:44:47was seen almost
00:44:48as the end of the Cold War.
00:44:50To many Americans,
00:44:51the idea that the Soviets
00:44:52and the Americans
00:44:53could actually meet
00:44:55and negotiate
00:44:56about their arms
00:44:57signaled that
00:44:58we were not headed
00:44:59toward nuclear destruction.
00:45:02What it really did
00:45:03was establish
00:45:04a relationship of trust.
00:45:06They weren't two enemies
00:45:08on either sides
00:45:09of the barricades anymore.
00:45:11but detente did not
00:45:14end the Vietnam War.
00:45:16The Vietnamese Communist Party
00:45:17was not going
00:45:18to abandon the idea
00:45:20of reunifying Vietnam
00:45:21simply because
00:45:22Moscow said so.
00:45:24I think Nixon
00:45:25and Kissinger
00:45:25and a lot of other people
00:45:26saw the North Vietnamese
00:45:28as being linked to
00:45:30and run by
00:45:31the Russians
00:45:32and the Chinese
00:45:33and they weren't.
00:45:33they were running
00:45:34the war themselves
00:45:36for their own
00:45:37national mission.
00:45:43This was the 17th
00:45:45private meeting
00:45:46and the fourth time
00:45:46in the last two months
00:45:47that Kissinger
00:45:48has met secretly
00:45:49with Lei Duc-Tho
00:45:50and Zhuang Huy.
00:45:51He left the meeting
00:45:52grim-faced and solemn
00:45:53without answering questions
00:45:55giving no indication
00:45:56of what happened inside.
00:45:57The pace of negotiation
00:46:01with the North Vietnamese
00:46:02picked up
00:46:04in 1971-72.
00:46:07A big question
00:46:08was what exactly
00:46:10Kissinger was playing for.
00:46:12Was he playing for
00:46:14the long-term survival
00:46:16of South Vietnam
00:46:17or was he playing
00:46:20for a decent interval,
00:46:21a respectable amount of time
00:46:23that South Vietnam
00:46:25would survive
00:46:26long enough
00:46:27for, say,
00:46:29Richard Nixon
00:46:30to get re-elected?
00:46:33Mr. Nixon
00:46:34is running
00:46:34for a second term
00:46:35but as he does,
00:46:37what happens in the war
00:46:38is his responsibility.
00:46:42Nixon and Kissinger
00:46:43could sometimes sound
00:46:45as if they were
00:46:45focused on
00:46:46getting through
00:46:47the 72 election
00:46:48and after that
00:46:49the fate of South Vietnam
00:46:50would really not
00:46:51be their problem.
00:46:53If you read
00:46:54some of the tapes
00:46:55there's one place
00:46:57where Nixon and Kissinger
00:46:58are talking
00:46:58and Kissinger
00:46:59says to Nixon,
00:47:00well, Mr. President,
00:47:01if Saigon collapses
00:47:03before the election
00:47:04you really have a problem
00:47:05but if it collapses
00:47:07afterwards
00:47:07it doesn't really matter.
00:47:09The question is now
00:47:11how can we maneuver it
00:47:12so that it can look like
00:47:14a settlement
00:47:14by election day
00:47:15but if the process
00:47:17is still open
00:47:17we can get that done
00:47:20and we can screw them
00:47:22after election day
00:47:23if necessary.
00:47:23The North Vietnamese
00:47:26worried about Nixon
00:47:27getting re-elected.
00:47:29Their latest offensive
00:47:30had been blunted
00:47:31by our military response.
00:47:33They thought Nixon
00:47:34might be anxious
00:47:35for a settlement
00:47:36before the election.
00:47:38The breakthrough came
00:47:40in early October
00:47:41when Le Docteau
00:47:42handed us
00:47:43a counter-proposal
00:47:44which essentially
00:47:45left the South Vietnamese
00:47:46government in place.
00:47:47As soon as
00:47:50late October
00:47:50read out his proposal
00:47:51to us
00:47:52we called for a break
00:47:54in the negotiations
00:47:55and Henry and I
00:47:56went outside
00:47:57in the Paris garden
00:47:58and we shook hands
00:48:00and smiled at each other
00:48:01and said
00:48:01we've done it.
00:48:04Kissinger was overjoyed
00:48:06and he was
00:48:07absolutely convinced
00:48:08that the October agreement
00:48:10was a real achievement
00:48:11for American diplomacy.
00:48:12Kissinger went back
00:48:15to Washington
00:48:16and on the 26th of October
00:48:19had a famous
00:48:19press conference
00:48:20where he said
00:48:22peace was at hand.
00:48:24Months of secret meetings
00:48:25days of persistent rumors
00:48:27reached their climax
00:48:28as presidential advisor
00:48:30Henry Kissinger
00:48:31met with reporters.
00:48:33We believe
00:48:34that peace
00:48:36is at hand.
00:48:37What he overlooked
00:48:40of course
00:48:40was whether he could
00:48:41get the South Vietnamese
00:48:42to agree.
00:48:45Henry and I
00:48:45were quite optimistic
00:48:47that with some nudging
00:48:48and reassurance
00:48:49about support
00:48:50in the future
00:48:51that President Thieu
00:48:52would be so pleased
00:48:53that we'd get him aboard.
00:48:55But we went in there
00:48:57and we ran into
00:48:57a buzzsaw.
00:48:59The Saigon government
00:49:00controlled radio
00:49:01says any separate
00:49:02agreement
00:49:03between North Vietnam
00:49:04and the United States
00:49:05were not concerned
00:49:06South Vietnam
00:49:07and in any way.
00:49:09There were about
00:49:09100,000 North Vietnamese
00:49:11troops in South Vietnam
00:49:13at the time
00:49:14and the South Vietnamese
00:49:15government wanted them out.
00:49:17But the agreement
00:49:19did not insist
00:49:20that North Vietnamese troops
00:49:21withdraw from South Vietnam.
00:49:24The South Vietnamese
00:49:26government blows up.
00:49:27They're absolutely furious
00:49:28and they make that clear
00:49:30immediately
00:49:31that this is
00:49:33completely unacceptable.
00:49:34It's a sellout.
00:49:35We excluded them entirely
00:49:38from the negotiation
00:49:40of their own fate.
00:49:42I mean, this is a negotiation
00:49:43about the future
00:49:44of South Vietnam.
00:49:46Henry Kissinger
00:49:46confirming Radio Hanoi's
00:49:48claim that October 31st
00:49:49had been tentatively
00:49:50agreed upon
00:49:51as the date for signing
00:49:52of Vietnam ceased fire.
00:49:53But Kissinger went on
00:49:54to say Saigon's president
00:49:56Thieu declined to go along
00:49:57until more guarantees
00:49:58were given.
00:50:00I think he believed
00:50:01that we had such leverage
00:50:03on the South Vietnamese
00:50:04and that they didn't
00:50:06really have a choice.
00:50:11Richard Nixon,
00:50:13re-elected president
00:50:14by one of the largest
00:50:15margins in history.
00:50:17The mandate he sought,
00:50:18he got.
00:50:19After the election,
00:50:23we re-engaged
00:50:24the North Vietnamese
00:50:25in negotiations.
00:50:27And not only
00:50:28did we not make progress,
00:50:29but they began
00:50:30to slip back
00:50:31on some of the concessions
00:50:32they'd made.
00:50:34So I was extremely depressed
00:50:36because things had reached
00:50:37a point where we were
00:50:38so close to settlement
00:50:39and the thing blew up again.
00:50:41I want Hanoi
00:50:42that we would do something.
00:50:44I didn't tell them what
00:50:45because I didn't know
00:50:46what we were going to do.
00:50:47Kissinger said repeatedly,
00:50:50this raggedy-ass
00:50:50fourth-rate country
00:50:51has a breaking point.
00:50:53I'm going to find it.
00:50:54Nixon was of the view
00:50:57that something shocking
00:50:58had to be done.
00:51:01And I think Nixon
00:51:02turned out to be right.
00:51:07Nixon and Kissinger
00:51:08decide on a massive
00:51:10bombing campaign,
00:51:12the so-called
00:51:13Christmas bombing.
00:51:17North Vietnam
00:51:20has gone through
00:51:21another day
00:51:22of the most intense
00:51:23bombing in the history
00:51:24of the Indochina War.
00:51:25North Vietnamese
00:51:26officials claim
00:51:27that thousands
00:51:28of civilians
00:51:28have been killed
00:51:29or wounded
00:51:29and that large sections
00:51:31of Hanoi
00:51:31have been wiped out.
00:51:34The Christmas bombing
00:51:35inflicted tremendous damage
00:51:38not only to their soldiers
00:51:39but to civilians.
00:51:41It was just inflicting
00:51:42as much damage
00:51:43as you could.
00:51:44A lot of people said,
00:51:47oh, this is heartless
00:51:48and lots of innocent
00:51:49people were killed.
00:51:51Now, I'm sure there was
00:51:52some collateral damage
00:51:54but basically we did
00:51:55hit military targets.
00:52:00Kissinger believed
00:52:01the Christmas bombings
00:52:02actually drove Hanoi
00:52:04back to the bargaining table.
00:52:05Good morning from New York.
00:52:08Peace is not only at hand,
00:52:09it is here.
00:52:11There is to be issued
00:52:12a new order
00:52:12on the ceasefire
00:52:14which is to go into effect
00:52:16roughly 36 hours from now
00:52:20and which we hope
00:52:21and expect
00:52:23will be implemented
00:52:25fully.
00:52:28The Paris agreement
00:52:29to end the war
00:52:30and restore the peace
00:52:31failed to do either.
00:52:32It did not end the war,
00:52:33it did not end the fighting
00:52:34and it did not bring about
00:52:36peace and stability
00:52:37to Vietnam.
00:52:39All that it achieved
00:52:40was allowing
00:52:41the United States
00:52:42to withdraw militarily
00:52:43from Vietnam.
00:52:46Kissinger knew full well
00:52:47that the fighting
00:52:48would resume
00:52:50even before the ink
00:52:51would dry
00:52:52on the piece of paper.
00:52:55Nixon and Kissinger
00:52:56definitely knew
00:52:57the deal they signed
00:52:58in January 1973
00:53:00would condemn
00:53:01South Vietnam
00:53:02to eventual defeat.
00:53:14Ladies and gentlemen,
00:53:16the President
00:53:17of the United States.
00:53:18We stand on the threshold
00:53:25of a new era
00:53:26of peace
00:53:27in the world.
00:53:301972 was
00:53:32the landslide victory
00:53:33but Watergate,
00:53:36of course,
00:53:36begins to sink Nixon
00:53:37despite the massive
00:53:39re-election
00:53:39and begins to erode
00:53:42that landslide support
00:53:44almost immediately.
00:53:45There's this
00:53:48tick-tick-ticking
00:53:49coming from
00:53:51closets
00:53:51in file cabinets
00:53:53in the White House
00:53:54because a bunch
00:53:55of ding-dongs
00:53:56had been caught
00:53:57burglarizing the
00:53:58Democratic National
00:53:59Committee headquarters.
00:54:00The Watergate
00:54:01bugging case
00:54:02involves a bizarre
00:54:03break-in
00:54:04at Democratic Party
00:54:05headquarters
00:54:06in which two men
00:54:07connected with the
00:54:08Nixon re-election
00:54:09campaign
00:54:09were arrested.
00:54:11From that point on,
00:54:13everything else
00:54:14goes on backburners
00:54:16while Nixon
00:54:16focuses almost
00:54:17exclusively
00:54:18on dealing
00:54:20with this
00:54:20threat
00:54:21to his presidency.
00:54:24When he came
00:54:25under attack
00:54:26for Watergate,
00:54:27Richard Nixon
00:54:28hoped that his
00:54:29way out
00:54:29was yet more
00:54:31foreign policy
00:54:31success.
00:54:33And if Kissinger
00:54:34could deliver success,
00:54:36somehow Nixon
00:54:37could extricate
00:54:38himself from
00:54:39the scandal.
00:54:39This was the moment
00:54:42when Nixon decides
00:54:43to appoint Kissinger
00:54:44to Secretary of State.
00:54:46The Senate today
00:54:47approved the nomination
00:54:49of Henry Kissinger
00:54:50as Secretary of State,
00:54:51so a country boy
00:54:52from Firth, Germany,
00:54:53becomes the first
00:54:54American Secretary of State
00:54:56ever born
00:54:57in another country.
00:54:58The time I became
00:55:00Secretary of State,
00:55:01the executive authority
00:55:02of the president
00:55:03was eroding
00:55:04at an alarming rate.
00:55:05One of my jobs
00:55:08was to give
00:55:08the impression
00:55:09that we were capable
00:55:10of a purposeful
00:55:11foreign policy
00:55:12in this miasma
00:55:13of a president
00:55:14who was on the verge
00:55:15of being indicted
00:55:16or impeached.
00:55:19If you're going
00:55:20to have a crisis
00:55:21in which you face
00:55:22the possibility
00:55:23of impeachment,
00:55:25Kissinger is
00:55:25the one firm thing.
00:55:27He becomes
00:55:28the indispensable man.
00:55:31October 6, 1973,
00:55:34a surprise attack
00:55:35and the holiest
00:55:36of days.
00:55:38With the outbreak
00:55:40of the Yom Kippur War,
00:55:42Kissinger faced
00:55:43the most complex
00:55:44problem of his career.
00:55:49The Yom Kippur War
00:55:51began with an attack
00:55:52by the Egyptian army
00:55:54crossing the Suez Canal
00:55:56and the Syrian army
00:55:57attacking in the Golan Heights.
00:56:00The Israelis had an inkling
00:56:02that something might occur,
00:56:03but they did not realize
00:56:05how effective
00:56:06the Egyptian
00:56:07and Syrian assaults
00:56:08would be.
00:56:09of the U.S.
00:56:126.30 on October 6, 1973.
00:56:15My assistant secretary
00:56:17woke me up and said
00:56:19there's some trouble
00:56:20on the Suez Canal.
00:56:22And if you get on the phone
00:56:23right away,
00:56:24you can get it under control.
00:56:27We're in the situation room
00:56:29with the Secretary of Defense
00:56:30and the Director of CIA
00:56:32and everybody's wringing
00:56:33their hands,
00:56:34including me
00:56:35and the back bench.
00:56:36Henry,
00:56:38chairing the meeting,
00:56:39says,
00:56:39there's an opportunity here.
00:56:42Henry always was looking
00:56:43for the opportunity.
00:56:45He immediately saw
00:56:47that we could use this
00:56:48if we'd play our cards right
00:56:49to begin negotiations
00:56:51between Israel
00:56:52and some of its neighbors
00:56:53and also to begin
00:56:55to displace Soviet influence
00:56:57in that region.
00:57:02There was panic
00:57:03inside the Israeli government.
00:57:06The Israelis were running
00:57:07short of ammunition,
00:57:08and so they appealed
00:57:09desperately for resupply
00:57:12from the United States.
00:57:14Kissinger wanted to ensure
00:57:16that Israel got the upper hand.
00:57:18We would try to prevent
00:57:22a military victory
00:57:24achieved by Soviet arms.
00:57:26So we started an airlift
00:57:28and put in overwhelming
00:57:30amounts of arms.
00:57:33Now the counteroffensive
00:57:34has begun.
00:57:36Israelis claim to have
00:57:38knocked out most of the bridges
00:57:39the Egyptians laid
00:57:40across the canal.
00:57:42By the middle of October,
00:57:44the momentum had shifted
00:57:45in favor of Israel.
00:57:48The Israelis had struck back
00:57:51and they had surrounded
00:57:52the Egyptian army.
00:57:55Kissinger knew
00:57:56that if we could freeze
00:57:57that moment,
00:57:58you might have
00:57:59a psychological impetus
00:58:01on both sides
00:58:01to finally talk to each other.
00:58:04Kissinger said to the Israelis,
00:58:06you're in a very strong position
00:58:08right now,
00:58:10but don't overdo it.
00:58:11Take your win,
00:58:12and then we get serious
00:58:15about the diplomacy.
00:58:15Kissinger gets a ceasefire
00:58:20just in time
00:58:22for the Egyptian position
00:58:23not to collapse.
00:58:25He can then embark
00:58:26on a negotiation.
00:58:32You get this phenomenon
00:58:33that becomes known
00:58:35as shuttle diplomacy.
00:58:38Kissinger is going
00:58:39back and forth
00:58:40between various
00:58:41Middle Eastern capitals
00:58:42to meet separately
00:58:43with Middle East leaders.
00:58:47He knew
00:58:48you could only make progress
00:58:50if you talked to each side,
00:58:51understood its needs,
00:58:53that it wouldn't work
00:58:54just through cables.
00:58:55This was too emotional,
00:58:57too precarious.
00:58:58You had to go in person
00:59:00to Sadat
00:59:00and go in person
00:59:02to go to Meir
00:59:03and then go back
00:59:05to the other
00:59:05and explain
00:59:06where they were willing
00:59:08to move ahead
00:59:09and where they really
00:59:09had a need
00:59:10to dig in.
00:59:13They negotiated
00:59:14with Kissinger.
00:59:15They didn't negotiate
00:59:16with each other.
00:59:18And Kissinger
00:59:18frequently used
00:59:20American guarantees
00:59:21to get the parties
00:59:22to agree.
00:59:25Were you ever so tired
00:59:26you couldn't remember
00:59:27whether you were talking
00:59:27to Sadat
00:59:28or Barbara Walters?
00:59:29That distinction
00:59:30I never lost.
00:59:32But...
00:59:32there's one thing
00:59:37that keeps you going
00:59:38which is
00:59:40that you know
00:59:40there's nothing
00:59:41more important
00:59:41you could possibly
00:59:42be doing.
00:59:43And that
00:59:44has an exhilarating effect.
00:59:49Kissinger literally
00:59:50spends most of two years
00:59:52going from Damascus
00:59:54to Cairo
00:59:55to Tel Aviv
00:59:56and Jerusalem
00:59:57meeting with one leader
00:59:59after another
00:59:59cajoling them
01:00:00negotiating at a
01:00:02detailed level.
01:00:03And as he himself says
01:00:05it's literally
01:00:05a Middle Eastern bazaar.
01:00:07Henry
01:00:08when I met him
01:00:09for the first time
01:00:10in November 73
01:00:12I found him
01:00:13quite acquainted
01:00:15with the
01:00:16minute detail
01:00:17of all the dimensions.
01:00:19For that
01:00:20we didn't spend
01:00:22except one hour
01:00:23and after that
01:00:23we felt that
01:00:24we are friends
01:00:25since years
01:00:26and years before.
01:00:29The massive achievement
01:00:30for Kissinger
01:00:31was Sadat's decision
01:00:32to essentially
01:00:33throw the Soviets
01:00:34out of Egypt
01:00:35and to take Egypt
01:00:37the most important
01:00:38the biggest Arab state
01:00:39essentially
01:00:40out of the conflict
01:00:42and into
01:00:43friendship with
01:00:44the United States
01:00:44and eventually
01:00:45a few years later
01:00:46into peace with Israel.
01:00:48Now
01:00:49that came
01:00:50at the expense
01:00:52of
01:00:52the Palestinian question.
01:00:55He left this issue
01:00:56of the Palestinians
01:00:57to kind of
01:00:58fester away
01:00:59unaddressed.
01:01:02Whatever you solve
01:01:03in foreign policy
01:01:04is not final.
01:01:06It's simply
01:01:07an admissions ticket
01:01:08for some other crisis.
01:01:12Good evening.
01:01:13The news
01:01:14is dominated tonight
01:01:15by one explosive story.
01:01:17White House
01:01:18mounted an elaborate
01:01:19cover-up operation
01:01:20in the Watergate affair.
01:01:22There was
01:01:22of course
01:01:23the projects
01:01:24including
01:01:24wiretap
01:01:26tapping
01:01:26electronic surveillance
01:01:27and photography.
01:01:29The number two man
01:01:29in the Nixon
01:01:30re-election campaign
01:01:31today
01:01:31admitted his own guilt
01:01:32in the planning
01:01:33and cover-up
01:01:34of Watergate.
01:01:35Sources say
01:01:35there is no question
01:01:36that the president
01:01:37knew of the cover-up
01:01:38operation
01:01:38which may be
01:01:40the most damning
01:01:40accusation of all.
01:01:44As the Watergate
01:01:45scandal dragged on
01:01:46it seemed like
01:01:47the president
01:01:48and his closest aides
01:01:49were being drawn
01:01:50into the mire
01:01:51and Americans
01:01:53were relieved
01:01:55to see
01:01:55that at least
01:01:56Kissinger
01:01:56was untainted
01:01:57by the scandal.
01:01:59He survived
01:02:00Watergate
01:02:01largely because
01:02:01he was seen
01:02:02as the only adult
01:02:04in the room.
01:02:08This was the height
01:02:09of Kissinger's fame.
01:02:11This was when
01:02:12he was like
01:02:12a kind of
01:02:13diplomatic version
01:02:15of Superman.
01:02:18Kissinger was
01:02:18the most admired man
01:02:20in the United States.
01:02:21He was
01:02:22tremendously popular.
01:02:26The world
01:02:26was so happy
01:02:27that the United States
01:02:28was finally getting
01:02:29out of Vietnam
01:02:30that Henry Kissinger
01:02:31received the Nobel Peace Prize.
01:02:34But his Vietnamese
01:02:35colleague,
01:02:37Le Duc Toh,
01:02:37said,
01:02:38this is not
01:02:38the end of the war
01:02:39and I'm not accepting
01:02:40the Peace Prize.
01:02:44In Oslo,
01:02:45several thousand
01:02:45Norwegian students
01:02:46demonstrated today
01:02:47against the awarding
01:02:48of the Nobel Peace Prize
01:02:50to Secretary of State
01:02:51Henry Kissinger.
01:02:51I was on the playground
01:02:57and some kid
01:02:58came up to me
01:02:59and said,
01:02:59you know,
01:03:00my parents
01:03:01don't think
01:03:01your father
01:03:02should have won
01:03:02the Nobel Peace Prize.
01:03:04And I apparently
01:03:06replied,
01:03:07that's okay,
01:03:08neither does my mother.
01:03:11Perhaps the most
01:03:12important goal
01:03:13any administration
01:03:14can set itself
01:03:15is to work
01:03:16for a world
01:03:17in which
01:03:18the award
01:03:19will become
01:03:21irrelevant
01:03:21because peace
01:03:24will have become
01:03:24so normal.
01:03:26Of course,
01:03:27he was deeply honored,
01:03:29but I think
01:03:30it also presented
01:03:31a huge headache
01:03:32for him
01:03:33because he knew
01:03:34that it would not be
01:03:36well received
01:03:37by President Nixon.
01:03:40Knowing Richard Nixon,
01:03:42it must have
01:03:43driven him crazy
01:03:44that Kissinger
01:03:45was the one
01:03:46awarded the
01:03:47Peace Prize.
01:03:49He managed
01:03:50to keep his
01:03:51jealousy
01:03:52under control
01:03:53to a great extent,
01:03:54in part because
01:03:55he needed Kissinger
01:03:56more and more.
01:03:59The relationship
01:04:00between Nixon
01:04:01and Kissinger
01:04:02begins to reverse.
01:04:03There is a way
01:04:04in which Nixon
01:04:05now is almost
01:04:06pleading for reassurance
01:04:07and support
01:04:08from Kissinger.
01:04:10I've even considered
01:04:11the possibility
01:04:12of, frankly,
01:04:13just to
01:04:14throwing myself
01:04:16on the sword.
01:04:17No, nothing.
01:04:17I think I can't take it.
01:04:19What the hell?
01:04:20That is out of the question.
01:04:22With all due respect,
01:04:23Mr. President,
01:04:23that cannot be considered.
01:04:26You have saved
01:04:27this country,
01:04:28Mr. President.
01:04:29The history books
01:04:29will show that
01:04:30when no one
01:04:32will know
01:04:32what Watergate means.
01:04:34Henry Kissinger
01:04:37often said to me
01:04:39that there was
01:04:39a Shakespearean
01:04:41quality
01:04:41to Richard Nixon's
01:04:43presidency.
01:04:45The culmination
01:04:46of the tragedy
01:04:47is
01:04:48Nixon's
01:04:49final
01:04:50agonized
01:04:51decision
01:04:52to resign.
01:04:55One day,
01:04:56Kissinger goes over
01:04:56to the White House
01:04:57and they talk
01:04:58and there's
01:05:00this moment
01:05:01where
01:05:02Nixon says,
01:05:03Henry,
01:05:03I'm not a
01:05:04praying man,
01:05:05but pray with me.
01:05:07And you have
01:05:07this amazing scene
01:05:09of the two of them
01:05:10on their knees
01:05:11praying in the
01:05:12White House.
01:05:14I remember him
01:05:15coming home
01:05:16that night
01:05:17and this sense
01:05:18of sorrow
01:05:19and compassion
01:05:21that he had
01:05:22for Nixon
01:05:23at that moment.
01:05:24The human problem
01:05:26of a man
01:05:27who had spent
01:05:28all of his life
01:05:29trying to become
01:05:31president,
01:05:32whose personality
01:05:33really
01:05:35did not lend
01:05:36itself to politics.
01:05:37He didn't like
01:05:37to meet new people.
01:05:39He didn't like
01:05:40to give direct orders.
01:05:41He made himself
01:05:42do all these things
01:05:44and
01:05:44everything
01:05:46collapsed on him.
01:05:54And repeat after me,
01:06:00I, Gerald R. Ford,
01:06:01do solemnly swear
01:06:02I, Gerald R. Ford,
01:06:04do solemnly swear
01:06:05that I will support
01:06:06and defend
01:06:07the Constitution.
01:06:08Gerald Ford
01:06:09was as different
01:06:10in personal,
01:06:12temperamental terms
01:06:13from Richard Nixon
01:06:14as it's possible
01:06:15to imagine.
01:06:19And yet,
01:06:21when Ford
01:06:22became president,
01:06:23one of the very
01:06:25first decisions
01:06:25that he took
01:06:26was to keep
01:06:27Kissinger on
01:06:29in both roles,
01:06:30National Security Advisor
01:06:31and Secretary of State.
01:06:35Somebody said
01:06:36that as soon
01:06:37as Nixon was gone,
01:06:38Kissinger would lose
01:06:39his Teflon position
01:06:41and become
01:06:42the lightning rod
01:06:43in turn.
01:06:45And so it proved.
01:06:47Good evening
01:06:48to all of you
01:06:49from California.
01:06:50Within a relatively
01:06:51short time
01:06:52of Nixon's departure,
01:06:53the attacks
01:06:54on Kissinger
01:06:56began.
01:06:58Dr. Kissinger
01:06:59is quoted as saying
01:07:00that he thinks
01:07:01of the United States
01:07:02as Athens
01:07:03and the Soviet Union
01:07:04as Sparta.
01:07:06The day of the U.S.
01:07:07is past
01:07:07and today
01:07:08is the day
01:07:09of the Soviet Union.
01:07:11But peace
01:07:11does not come
01:07:12from weakness
01:07:13or from retreat.
01:07:14and my father
01:07:16had played
01:07:17such a dominant role
01:07:18for six years
01:07:19that in the nature
01:07:21of American politics,
01:07:23it's almost inevitable
01:07:24that you become
01:07:25a focal point
01:07:26and that the
01:07:27worm turns.
01:07:29at 7.30 a.m.
01:07:38on April the 17th,
01:07:391975,
01:07:41the war in Cambodia
01:07:42was over.
01:07:44It was a unique war
01:07:45for no country
01:07:46has ever experienced
01:07:47such concentrated bombing.
01:07:49On this,
01:07:50perhaps the most gentle
01:07:51and graceful land
01:07:52in all of Asia,
01:07:54President Nixon
01:07:55and Mr. Kissinger
01:07:56unleashed 100,000 tons
01:07:58of bombs,
01:08:00the equivalent
01:08:01of five Hiroshima's.
01:08:04Then out of the forest
01:08:05came the victors,
01:08:06the Khmer Rouge,
01:08:08whose power had grown
01:08:09out of all proportion
01:08:10to their numbers.
01:08:12The Khmer Rouge
01:08:13was essentially
01:08:14an insignificant movement
01:08:17up until 1970.
01:08:20And the question is,
01:08:21how is it that
01:08:21this relatively marginal force
01:08:23were able to seize power
01:08:25in five years?
01:08:27The bombing did not
01:08:29create the Khmer Rouge,
01:08:30but it was a powerful
01:08:31recruitment tool.
01:08:34A horror began
01:08:35almost immediately.
01:08:37Phnom Penh,
01:08:37a city of two and a half
01:08:38million people,
01:08:40was forcibly emptied
01:08:41within hours
01:08:41of their coming.
01:08:43Within 24 hours,
01:08:45they announced
01:08:46that the city
01:08:47would have to be evacuated.
01:08:49They emptied the hospitals
01:08:51while people were still
01:08:52in the middle of surgery.
01:08:53patients were left to die
01:08:55on the gurneys.
01:08:57And that was just
01:08:59the beginning
01:08:59of the killing.
01:09:01The Khmer Rouge
01:09:02interrogated
01:09:04and then exterminated
01:09:05anyone they suspected
01:09:07of opposing them.
01:09:07I have yet to find
01:09:14anyone who have not
01:09:16been affected
01:09:16by a loss.
01:09:19We have a Khmer word
01:09:20which is
01:09:20it's a broken spirit.
01:09:23It's that
01:09:24when the spirit
01:09:24has been so broken
01:09:26under fear,
01:09:27under terror,
01:09:29that it doesn't recover.
01:09:30I think the tragedy
01:09:33of Cambodia
01:09:34is directly attributable
01:09:36to the policies
01:09:38of Kissinger and Nixon.
01:09:40There's no question
01:09:41that our continued
01:09:42bombing of the countryside,
01:09:44which was savage
01:09:45and relentless,
01:09:46led to the rise
01:09:47of the Khmer Rouge.
01:09:49The North Vietnamese
01:09:50had bases
01:09:51in not only Cambodia
01:09:53but Laos.
01:09:54They were coming over,
01:09:55killing American troops
01:09:56and South Vietnamese
01:09:57and then retreating.
01:09:59So they spread the war
01:10:00to these countries.
01:10:01We did not spread it.
01:10:02You say in your book
01:10:03that you considered
01:10:04bombing North Vietnam
01:10:05so that you had
01:10:06the alternative
01:10:07of bombing North Vietnam
01:10:08and not embroiling
01:10:10Cambodia.
01:10:11Cambodia was embroiled.
01:10:12It is an absurdity
01:10:13to say that a country
01:10:15can occupy
01:10:16a part of another country,
01:10:17kill your people
01:10:18and that then
01:10:19you are violating
01:10:20its neutrality
01:10:21when you respond
01:10:23against the foreign troops
01:10:25that are on
01:10:25that neutral territory.
01:10:27It is total hypocrisy.
01:10:29They were all supposed
01:10:30to be well-intended decisions.
01:10:32My father who died,
01:10:34my oldest brother
01:10:35who is still missing
01:10:36to this day,
01:10:37are they the victims
01:10:38of geopolitics
01:10:39and of decisions
01:10:40made with good intentions
01:10:42but that led to disaster?
01:10:44Yes, absolutely.
01:10:47Sometimes it makes me wonder
01:10:48about the hierarchy
01:10:50of suffering
01:10:50and the unequal value
01:10:52that's attributed
01:10:53to people's lives.
01:10:55Some lives are worth
01:10:56more than others, right?
01:10:58Some countries
01:10:59are worth sacrificing
01:11:00in order that others
01:11:01can prosper.
01:11:02Good evening.
01:11:08The fighting is over
01:11:09for American ground soldiers
01:11:10in Vietnam.
01:11:12The extraction
01:11:13of the last combat soldiers
01:11:14is a slow process.
01:11:17While the men wait,
01:11:18they happily donate
01:11:19some of their
01:11:20leftover ammunition
01:11:21to their South Vietnamese
01:11:23replacements.
01:11:24It is now
01:11:25their war.
01:11:27Ultimately,
01:11:28when the United States
01:11:29extricated itself
01:11:30from the Vietnam War,
01:11:32the South Vietnamese government
01:11:33hobbled along
01:11:35for two years.
01:11:36So great was
01:11:37the South Vietnamese
01:11:38entire dependence
01:11:39upon the United States
01:11:40that in no way,
01:11:41shape, or form
01:11:42could it stand
01:11:42on its own.
01:11:45I'm still hopeful
01:11:46that the United States
01:11:49could respond positively
01:11:50to our request for aid.
01:11:52Sir, Mr. Kissinger
01:11:53said today
01:11:53that that aid
01:11:54is not approved.
01:11:55The collapse
01:11:55of your country
01:11:56is inevitable.
01:11:57Can you share
01:11:57that assessment?
01:11:58I still think
01:12:02that the aid
01:12:02would be forthcoming.
01:12:09If my father
01:12:10had one regret
01:12:12that he often
01:12:12expressed to me,
01:12:14it was that
01:12:15Congress prevented
01:12:17the United States
01:12:18from having
01:12:19an ongoing military
01:12:21role after
01:12:22the peace accords.
01:12:24He believed
01:12:25that there was
01:12:26a path
01:12:27for at least
01:12:28preventing
01:12:29the human
01:12:30catastrophe
01:12:31that occurred
01:12:31in Vietnam
01:12:32after we withdrew
01:12:34and that we
01:12:36failed to do that.
01:12:38We consider
01:12:39we have
01:12:40a moral obligation
01:12:41to the tens
01:12:42of thousands
01:12:43of people
01:12:43who worked with us,
01:12:45relying on us
01:12:46for 15 years,
01:12:48and we are positive
01:12:49that the American people
01:12:50will fulfill
01:12:50that obligation.
01:12:51Thank you,
01:12:52Mr. Secretary.
01:12:52When the North Vietnamese
01:12:57began the final
01:12:58assault in April
01:12:59of 1975,
01:13:01the regime
01:13:01basically disappeared
01:13:03overnight.
01:13:04Saigon,
01:13:05April the 30th,
01:13:068 o'clock.
01:13:07The last American
01:13:08helicopter on the roof
01:13:09of the American
01:13:10embassy prepares
01:13:11to lift off
01:13:12the last of the
01:13:13evacuees,
01:13:14fleeing before
01:13:14the advancing
01:13:15communist armies.
01:13:16I felt
01:13:20great anger
01:13:21at the United States
01:13:23government.
01:13:24We had deceived
01:13:25and misled
01:13:26not only ourselves,
01:13:28but we had deceived
01:13:29and misled
01:13:30a whole people
01:13:31in South Vietnam.
01:13:37There was a chance,
01:13:39given his talents,
01:13:41that Henry alone
01:13:41might have been able
01:13:43to end that war
01:13:44much, much earlier.
01:13:47That he did not,
01:13:49I find that,
01:13:50like the rest of the war,
01:13:52rather unforgivable.
01:13:55At the end of the day,
01:13:57when Kissinger was alone
01:13:58with his own thoughts,
01:13:59I think he would have
01:14:01admitted to himself
01:14:02that South Vietnam
01:14:04did not have the ability
01:14:06to defend itself.
01:14:08I think all of the allegations
01:14:10to say that Congress
01:14:12lost the will to fight,
01:14:13that the American people
01:14:14lost the will to fight,
01:14:15that the media
01:14:16misreported that war
01:14:17was a way for him
01:14:19to assuage his guilt.
01:14:22The collapse
01:14:23of South Vietnam
01:14:24and the evacuation
01:14:26of Saigon
01:14:26was without doubt
01:14:29the saddest moment
01:14:31of my governmental experience.
01:14:33I am un-reconstructed
01:14:38in my conviction
01:14:38that Vietnam
01:14:40did not have to fall,
01:14:42that we did that
01:14:43to ourselves.
01:14:46He was not a monster,
01:14:48but he was wrong,
01:14:50and the result was
01:14:52millions of people,
01:14:53not just American soldiers,
01:14:5455,000 plus,
01:14:56but millions of
01:14:57Indo-Chinese,
01:14:58Laos, Cambodia,
01:15:00South Vietnam,
01:15:01and North Vietnam
01:15:01died as a result
01:15:03of this horrendous,
01:15:04horrendous mistaken effort.
01:15:10With 272 electoral votes,
01:15:14James Earl Carter,
01:15:16the next president
01:15:16of the United States.
01:15:20A new president
01:15:21and secretary of state
01:15:23deserve the understanding
01:15:25and the support
01:15:26of all Americans.
01:15:28I expect
01:15:29to lead
01:15:31a happy
01:15:32and full life
01:15:34once I leave
01:15:36the government.
01:15:39One of Kissinger's
01:15:40most impressive achievements
01:15:42was staying famous
01:15:44for 50 years.
01:15:45Secretary of state,
01:15:47Dr. Henry Kissinger,
01:15:49do you have any final words
01:15:51for the American public?
01:15:53No.
01:15:53He institutes
01:15:55this kind of remarkable
01:15:56self-levitation feed
01:15:58where he stays
01:15:58in the public eye
01:15:59for nearly half a century,
01:16:02partly because
01:16:03he devotes his entire life
01:16:04to foreign policy.
01:16:06He's advising leaders.
01:16:08You know,
01:16:09I'm here as a private citizen.
01:16:11I'm here as a private citizen.
01:16:13I'm not speaking
01:16:13of my personal view,
01:16:14not necessarily
01:16:16Governor Reagan's.
01:16:17He's giving speeches,
01:16:19going to conferences.
01:16:20He's a ubiquitous
01:16:22presence on television.
01:16:24He's always invited
01:16:25to opine
01:16:26on whatever crisis
01:16:27is happening
01:16:27at the moment.
01:16:29I think that the warning
01:16:30of the president
01:16:30that a continuation
01:16:31of repression
01:16:32could harm
01:16:33U.S.-Chinese relations
01:16:34was correct.
01:16:35He publishes
01:16:36hundreds of articles
01:16:37and op-eds
01:16:38and many books,
01:16:40putting out his own
01:16:41version of history.
01:16:42Dr. Kissinger
01:16:43has a new book
01:16:43hitting bookstores
01:16:44tomorrow.
01:16:45If you looked
01:16:47at his schedule
01:16:48on any given day,
01:16:49it was packed
01:16:50with meetings,
01:16:52breakfasts,
01:16:53lunches,
01:16:53TV interviews.
01:16:55He stayed in the game
01:16:56because he loved
01:16:58international relations
01:16:59and he loved power.
01:17:04Throughout the long years
01:17:06out of government,
01:17:07Henry Kissinger fought
01:17:09to uphold his reputation
01:17:11against all comers.
01:17:13If an Allende
01:17:13were to come to power
01:17:14tomorrow,
01:17:15you would not feel
01:17:17that you could
01:17:17recommend such action
01:17:19as you thought
01:17:20appropriate in 1970.
01:17:21No, I'm not saying
01:17:22that.
01:17:22No criticism
01:17:23went unanswered.
01:17:25The statement
01:17:26Henry Kissinger
01:17:26is a war criminal
01:17:27is not a piece
01:17:28of rhetoric.
01:17:29It's not a metaphor.
01:17:30It's a job description
01:17:31and it might feature
01:17:33an indictment.
01:17:34I want to know
01:17:35how you would amend
01:17:36your testimony today.
01:17:39Why should I amend
01:17:40my testimony?
01:17:41He was determined
01:17:44that he would be
01:17:46the one to write
01:17:47his own history.
01:17:49But it really was
01:17:50a double-edged sword
01:17:51because he kind of
01:17:52made himself
01:17:53a big target
01:17:54and in many ways
01:17:56became a kind
01:17:57of scapegoat
01:17:58for all the failures
01:17:59of American foreign
01:18:00policy.
01:18:00Arrest Henry Kissinger
01:18:02for war crime!
01:18:04Arrest Henry Kissinger
01:18:06for war crime!
01:18:08When people attack
01:18:09Kissinger
01:18:10by saying
01:18:11you're dealing
01:18:12with tyrants
01:18:12or you're ignoring
01:18:14human rights,
01:18:15they don't remember
01:18:17the agonizing choices
01:18:18that have to be made.
01:18:20After all,
01:18:20preserving civilization
01:18:21is a human right
01:18:23as well.
01:18:24The average person
01:18:25thinks that morality
01:18:27can be applied
01:18:28as directly
01:18:30to the conduct
01:18:31of states
01:18:32to each other
01:18:33as it can
01:18:34to human relations.
01:18:36That is not always
01:18:38the case
01:18:39because sometimes
01:18:40statesmen
01:18:41have to choose
01:18:42among evils.
01:18:44I think he thought
01:18:46whatever he was
01:18:47sacrificing
01:18:47of American values,
01:18:49he was doing so
01:18:50for American interests.
01:18:52my view of that
01:18:54is that
01:18:54the sacrifice
01:18:55of values
01:18:57was intrinsically
01:18:59a sacrifice
01:18:59of interests.
01:19:02One of the sources
01:19:03of strength
01:19:03that the United States
01:19:04has is the story
01:19:05that we've been telling
01:19:05around the world,
01:19:06which is a story
01:19:07about freedom
01:19:08and equality
01:19:09of peoples
01:19:10and nations.
01:19:12I think Kissinger's
01:19:13theory was
01:19:14it's the credibility
01:19:15of being willing
01:19:16to use power,
01:19:18being willing
01:19:18to kill a lot
01:19:19of people,
01:19:19being willing
01:19:20to destroy countries,
01:19:21to send a message
01:19:23to other potential adversaries,
01:19:25this is what happens
01:19:27if you challenge
01:19:27the will
01:19:28of the United States.
01:19:30I think the fundamental
01:19:31problem with that
01:19:32is it just obliterates
01:19:34the credibility
01:19:35of the story
01:19:35that we tell.
01:19:36my father
01:19:38was a realist,
01:19:40but it was realism
01:19:41in the cause
01:19:43of principles
01:19:44that he believed
01:19:45in deeply.
01:19:47He was not
01:19:48just trying
01:19:48to advance
01:19:49the power
01:19:50of the United States
01:19:51in some kind
01:19:52of Darwinian struggle.
01:19:55He was advancing
01:19:56the strength
01:19:57of the United States
01:19:58in his mind
01:19:59because America
01:20:00was the last,
01:20:02best hope
01:20:03of humanity
01:20:04and he had experienced
01:20:05that personally.
01:20:08The final days
01:20:10of his life
01:20:11were deeply revealing.
01:20:14He was transported
01:20:15back to the trauma
01:20:16of his childhood.
01:20:18He was right back there.
01:20:21He was speaking German.
01:20:23He was afraid
01:20:25that pogroms
01:20:26were at the door.
01:20:27He was showing
01:20:29the deep-seated injury
01:20:31that he had experienced
01:20:33as a child.
01:20:34But there was also
01:20:36a tremendously moving
01:20:38final
01:20:40hallucination.
01:20:44He was lying
01:20:46in a bed
01:20:47looking out
01:20:48on this garden
01:20:48that he loved
01:20:49in Connecticut
01:20:50and he imagined
01:20:52that his brother
01:20:53who had died
01:20:54a couple of years earlier
01:20:55was outside.
01:20:57building a platform.
01:20:59It wasn't clear
01:21:00whether this was
01:21:01some kind of train stop
01:21:02or a platform
01:21:04for my father
01:21:06to ascend onto
01:21:07but it seemed
01:21:08to give him
01:21:09a great deal
01:21:10of peace.
01:21:12At an early age
01:21:14I have seen
01:21:16what can happen
01:21:16to a society
01:21:17that is based
01:21:19on hatred
01:21:20and strength
01:21:22and distrust
01:21:23and that I
01:21:25experienced then
01:21:26what America means
01:21:29to other people
01:21:30its hope
01:21:32and its idealism.
01:21:34and I
01:21:36what can be
01:21:45and I
01:21:45and I
01:21:45have seen
01:21:46a dream
01:21:47and I
01:21:48them
01:21:48and I
01:21:48have seen
01:21:49a dream
01:21:49that is
01:21:49American Experience Kissinger is available with PBS Passport and on Amazon Prime Video.
01:22:19American Experience Kissinger is available with PBS Passport and on Amazon Prime Video.
Recomendado
6:41
|
A Seguir
46:31
1:37
46:31
46:32
59:28
59:30
51:35
1:28:50
54:13
1:22:49
Seja a primeira pessoa a comentar