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00:00Si vivías antes de nuestra época, ¿quién serías?
00:04¿Qué si pudieras elegir de mil estrellas de hoy, cuando el pasado era hoy y el nuevo?
00:11¿Quién serías? ¿Cómo serías? ¿Quién serías? ¿Quién serías?
00:19Viviendo cada generación antes de nosotros, recordando por generaciones a venir.
00:24El canal de Historia, donde el pasado viene al vivo.
00:30La United States Navy recently celebrated a century of its silent service,
00:35the term for submarines and their crews.
00:37The Navy bought its first sub in 1900 for $160,000.
00:42Today's nuclear submarines cost about $2 billion.
00:46Along with advancing technology, there's been a constant evolution in tactics.
00:50Our program looks at the strategy of submarine warfare,
00:53especially during World War II when American commanders pursued Japanese warships and merchant vessels.
00:59Every new piece of equipment coming out of the lab had to be incorporated into battle plans beneath the sea.
01:05The Pacific Theater was witness to some of the most desperate fighting of the Second World War.
01:28Intense battles raged to dislodge tenacious Japanese forces whose warrior code commanded death before dishonor.
01:40The slow and painful Allied advance toward the Japanese homeland was marked by a crescendo of furious combat.
01:49But far removed from the epic battles that were burned into the American consciousness,
01:59a much different war was being waged.
02:02One that demanded its own unique attack plan.
02:05A plan that emphasized stealth and surprise.
02:10A plan that would ultimately strangle Japanese shipping.
02:14Operating alone and on the surface and beneath the waves, often in the dark of night,
02:24this relatively small force became known as the Silent Service,
02:30distinguishing itself from the battleship-dominated surface fleet.
02:33Fleet action was entirely a different thing.
02:40Big ships shooting guns at great range.
02:43The submarine would mix it with the enemy.
02:46Get in close.
02:47We would try to fire from a thousand-yard range.
02:50The idea was that you're in there, you're hitting them very quickly by surprise,
02:55and you're getting out of there quickly so that they can't pursue you.
02:59America's deployment of the submarine in World War II represented a rare dichotomy in naval warfare,
03:08an instance where technical innovation helped define an effective strategy.
03:14The creation of that strategy was impeded by an outdated pre-war doctrine
03:18and a command structure unwilling to release the submarine from its cautious constraints.
03:24Consequently, it took many months of trial and error for a winning attack plan to emerge.
03:33And when it did, its lethal effectiveness against tankers and freighters
03:38was as unexpected as it was instrumental to the defeat of the rising sun.
03:43The strategy developed between World War I and World War II called for submarines to support the surface fleet,
03:55scouting ahead and clearing the way for battleships.
03:59The priority targets for submarines were strictly military.
04:05Commercial shipping was considered off-limits.
04:07Historically, the attack on an unarmed merchant vessel by an armed warship was known as commerce raiding.
04:16This most ancient of naval strategies, a form of guerrilla warfare at sea,
04:22had fallen into disrepute by the time of the Second World War.
04:28Ironically, the origins of U.S. naval strategy were founded on commerce raiding.
04:33This tactic was used by the colonies during the American Revolution
04:37and later by the Confederacy during the Civil War.
04:44Fast frigates and privateers became the weapons of choice for the weaker naval power.
04:50These swift vessels could seize cargo from unarmed merchantmen
04:53and still outrun warships sent in hot pursuit.
04:56One commerce raider, the Alabama, was known as the shark of the Confederacy during the Civil War.
05:06In one famous 22-month cruise, her captain, Raphael Sims, ravaged the Union's seaborne trade.
05:15Raphael Sims was a skipper of the Alabama.
05:18She was a Confederate vessel, of course.
05:20The Alabama took 60 Union merchant vessels.
05:23He nonetheless killed not a single person and thereby set a very, very humane precedent.
05:30And that's why I think he's the greatest commerce raider in American history.
05:34Certainly 60 vessels taken as a record.
05:38The Alabama was taken by American naval officers after the Civil War
05:42as the model for future warfare.
05:46That model dictated naval tactics until the late 19th century
05:50when the Industrial Revolution transformed the United States.
05:55A book by an American naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan,
05:59captured the imagination of the era.
06:03He came up with this conception of sea power,
06:06that is to say capital fleet engagements for command of the sea
06:09to break the enemy's will,
06:11and if that doesn't work, then you'll invade the enemy if you have to.
06:14And he very consciously tried to disassociate himself and the U.S. Navy
06:19from the legacy of Raphael Sims.
06:23This book was the right book at the right time,
06:25and so he became the man for his time,
06:27and his ideas were adopted by the Navy, by the nation,
06:31by the industrialists who saw a great profit to be made, of course,
06:34in building these big ships,
06:36and spurred forward by Teddy Roosevelt when he became president.
06:41Fast frigates were now eclipsed by heavily armored cruisers and battleships.
06:47At the same time, improvements in diesel engine technology and torpedoes
06:52had turned the once experimental submarine into a true warship.
06:57On both sides of the Atlantic,
07:00it was largely believed that submarines, like destroyers,
07:03would play a supporting role to the fleet.
07:07The war of the submarine prior to World War I was very ambiguous,
07:11and apparently the Germans, the Kaiser,
07:14had studied Raphael Sims in Alabama to some extent.
07:18There apparently was some tendency within the Germans
07:21to think in terms of using the submarine as a commerce raider,
07:23but by and large, the thought was that the submarine
07:27would be a scout for the fleet,
07:30and it might protect the coast,
07:32which is a historic role for smaller vessels against invading fleets.
07:39Ultimately, it was the Germans who truly grasped
07:42the versatility of the submarine as an ocean-going weapon,
07:46one that could attack both military and commercial targets.
07:50During World War I,
07:55Germany's undersea boats, or U-boats,
07:59hobbled Britain's powerful fleet.
08:02By late 1916,
08:04unrestricted submarine warfare,
08:06in effect, commerce raiding,
08:08had practically starved the British out of the war.
08:10The island nation was saved from the U-boat menace
08:17by implementing the convoy system,
08:19which provided relative safety in numbers.
08:24But when the war ended,
08:26Germany's U-boat successes were quickly forgotten.
08:31England and the United States
08:32reverted to their pre-war fascination
08:34with large surface warships,
08:37dreadnoughts.
08:37In many circles,
08:40the submarine became an object of great loathing,
08:43outside the accepted norms of warfare.
08:48Its strategic importance was downplayed,
08:52or purposely ignored.
08:54During the early stages of the next war,
08:57this neglect would severely hamper the efforts
08:59and the attack plan of the silent service.
09:05Since the turn of the century,
09:08the rise of Imperial Japan
09:09had been the cause of increased concern in the West.
09:13Following World War I,
09:16the United States dusted off
09:17and revised a long-existing blueprint
09:19for a naval war with Japan,
09:23Plan Orange.
09:24Created at the height of the dreadnought era,
09:29Plan Orange had little consideration for submarines.
09:33Inspired by Alfred Thayer Mahan's naval philosophy,
09:37it envisioned a climactic battle
09:39between surface fleets
09:40for command of the Pacific.
09:42The Americans would be forced to fall back
09:45from the Philippines
09:46and then regroup in Hawaii
09:48and fight their way west,
09:50seeking out a major fleet engagement
09:52between themselves and the Japanese.
09:56The Japanese pretty much bought into
09:58this Mahanian prescription themselves,
10:00and up through World War II,
10:02they were looking for this ultimate Mahanian battle.
10:04The destruction of the enemy's economy
10:08was a central theme of Plan Orange,
10:11but using submarines as a weapon
10:12to achieve this goal
10:13was a sensitive issue.
10:18The German U-boat campaign
10:20was viewed as brutal and uncivilized.
10:24The British even lobbied unsuccessfully
10:26for the submarine to be outlawed.
10:28The United States was a signatory
10:32to the London Naval Conference of 1930
10:35that prohibited unrestricted sinkings.
10:39As Plan Orange evolved,
10:41the role of the submarine was marginalized.
10:45So what do you do with the submarine then?
10:471920 to 1939-40.
10:50The answer is that you treat it again
10:52as a scout of the fleet,
10:53an auxiliary of the fleet,
10:55but the idea of using it as a commerce radar
10:57was specifically outlawed.
10:58Even as the submarine reverted
11:02to its pre-World War I mission
11:04of scouting and support,
11:07the vessel itself
11:08was undergoing a remarkable transformation.
11:12The strategic and tactical requirements
11:15of Plan Orange
11:16produced what would become
11:17the long-range, highly capable,
11:20and technologically advanced
11:22fleet submarine of World War II.
11:26As envisioned,
11:27U.S. submarines would form a scouting line
11:30in front of the fleet,
11:31sweeping the sea of Japanese destroyers
11:34and clearing the way for the battleships
11:36to engage the main enemy force.
11:40Fire control,
11:42the process of tracking targets
11:44and aiming torpedoes,
11:45was critically important
11:47to the success
11:48of the emerging attack plan.
11:49During the 1930s,
11:54torpedo fire control
11:56consisted of looking through the periscope
11:58and estimating the target's bearing and range.
12:03The process was slow and imprecise.
12:06If there were errors,
12:08which were frequent,
12:09angle changes had to be recalculated manually.
12:11It was more of an art than a science.
12:15Plan Orange demanded a better approach.
12:19What was needed
12:21was the submarine equivalent
12:23of a battleship fire control system,
12:25something that could continuously track the target
12:30and provide angle solutions for the torpedoes.
12:35Here on San Francisco's Fisherman's Wharf,
12:39the fleet submarine USS Pomponito
12:41houses one of the most remarkable secrets
12:44of the silent service,
12:46the Torpedo Data Computer,
12:49or TDC.
12:51Pomponito's is the only functioning
12:53World War II era TDC in the world.
12:56It was restored by computer engineer
13:00and TDC historian Terry Lindell.
13:05The key idea behind the Torpedo Data Computer
13:08was to allow this U.S. submarine
13:10to stand further away from the target
13:12and still destroy the enemy.
13:15Well, the further away you can hit a target
13:16before they know you're there,
13:18the more chance you have of surviving the attack.
13:22The TDC,
13:23a complex bundle of electromechanical gears and cams,
13:28was key to developing an effective attack plan.
13:32It provided the American submarine captain
13:34with unrivaled situational awareness,
13:38a running overview of the course and positions
13:41of both the target and his own submarine.
13:45Angle settings for the torpedoes
13:47were continuously generated and updated.
13:50The goal of the Torpedo Data Computer
13:53was to both track the target
13:55and the submarine simultaneously
13:57and solve the equations of motion in real time.
14:01Whenever the captain wanted to fire,
14:03the torpedo had to be ready to go.
14:05One, two, and three.
14:07The first TDC, the Mark I,
14:11was produced in great secrecy
14:13by the Armour Corporation of Brooklyn, New York,
14:16in 1936.
14:18This is the only known picture
14:20of the Mark I TDC.
14:24Don Gittens, newly graduated from MIT,
14:28got his first job at Armour,
14:30working on TDCs.
14:32He was 25 years old.
14:33When the computer was installed
14:38in a number of submarines,
14:39I supervised the installation of each one.
14:42And then I had to go down to Panama,
14:45where they had a submarine school,
14:49and instruct the various submarine skippers
14:54in how to use the torpedo data computer.
14:57And then when they were ready to go out to sea,
14:59I'd go to sea with them,
15:00and we'd actually operate the computer.
15:04I'd stay in there and operate it
15:05while they stood at my side
15:07and watched how I did it.
15:09The TDC Mark I was so large and complex
15:13that it could only be installed in pieces
15:15through a hole cut in the side of the hull.
15:19It was then assembled
15:20in the submarine's control room.
15:22It was very successful.
15:26Oh, yeah, it worked very well.
15:27The big problem with it was
15:29that the skippers didn't like the fact
15:30that they were up in the conning tower
15:32and the Mark I was down in the control room.
15:34They couldn't see what was going on.
15:40And they had to keep yelling down,
15:42have you got a solution yet?
15:43You know, that sort of thing.
15:46Gittens was given the job
15:47of designing a smaller version of the TDC,
15:49the Mark III,
15:51to fit inside the submarine's conning tower.
15:56It is a relatively small computer
15:58by the day's standards.
16:01Internally, it's very, very compact.
16:04It's built with a tremendous amount
16:06of consideration with regard
16:08to its survivability,
16:09its toughness,
16:11the fact that it could be depth-charged
16:13and shaken and disturbed
16:15and still keep right on running,
16:18true to course,
16:19producing perfect answers,
16:21no matter how many times
16:22it went through those kinds
16:24of tremendous physical trauma.
16:25And the captains reported
16:27over and over again
16:28that when many other systems
16:31in the submarine would break down,
16:33the torpedo data computer
16:35kept right on running.
16:37The TDC Mark III
16:38gave a tremendous edge
16:40to the U.S. submarine fleet.
16:42It remained highly classified
16:45until well after World War II.
16:48Thanks to Plan Orange,
16:50the Bureau of Ordnance,
16:52and Don Gittens,
16:53it had been developed
16:54and was being installed
16:55in fleet submarines
16:56before the Japanese
16:58struck Pearl Harbor.
17:01Probably the most important
17:03single instrument
17:04in the submarine
17:04was the TDC.
17:06We had other instruments
17:07for other purposes.
17:08But this was the thing
17:09that enable us
17:10to carry out our mission,
17:11namely aim the torpedoes
17:13and shoot them.
17:15But for all
17:16the submarine's capability,
17:18its attack doctrine
17:19stressed caution
17:20instead of aggressiveness.
17:23This was due primarily
17:24to the U.S. Navy's
17:26lack of recent combat experience.
17:30The sense of vulnerability
17:31was so pervasive
17:32that pre-war training
17:34stressed remaining submerged
17:35during daylight hours,
17:37surfacing only at night
17:38to recharge batteries.
17:41Running on the surface
17:43during the day
17:44was deemed as irresponsible.
17:48In the Asiatic submarine squadron
17:50based in the Philippines,
17:52captains were threatened
17:53with instant loss of command
17:54if their periscopes
17:56were even sighted
17:57during an exercise.
18:00Neither night surface
18:02nor group tactics
18:03were practiced.
18:04And due to the prohibition
18:05against unrestricted warfare,
18:07submarine crews received
18:09no training
18:09in attacking
18:10either convoys
18:11or solitary merchant ships.
18:14The caution that gripped
18:16the U.S. submarine service
18:18in the 1930s
18:19was made even worse
18:20by the flawed development
18:22of its primary weapon,
18:24the Mark 14 torpedo.
18:25It had never been tested
18:27under real
18:28or simulated
18:30battle conditions.
18:33Incredibly,
18:34the World War II
18:35attack plan
18:36would be initiated
18:37with an entire generation
18:38of submarine crews
18:39who had never seen
18:41or heard
18:42the detonation
18:43of a torpedo.
18:46December 7, 1941.
18:48The Japanese attack
18:53on Pearl Harbor
18:54began at 7.55
18:55on a quiet Sunday morning.
18:59Six hours later,
19:00a message was flashed
19:02to the Pacific Fleet
19:03from Admiral Harold Stark,
19:05chief of naval operations.
19:08Execute unrestricted air
19:09and submarine warfare
19:10against Japan.
19:13As a young naval officer,
19:15Stark had been stationed
19:16in London
19:17during World War I.
19:20Harold R. Stark
19:20issued the order
19:21to the Pacific Fleet
19:23commence unrestricted
19:24submarine warfare.
19:26And that's using
19:27the same phrase
19:27which had been used
19:28to damn the Germans
19:29in World War I.
19:30Very, very clear statement
19:32that we are now
19:33going to do
19:34what we said
19:35we wouldn't do
19:36that was outlawed
19:37throughout the
19:38interwar period.
19:39And we're going to do it
19:40against the Japanese
19:42because I know,
19:44I, Harold Stark,
19:45know how effective
19:46it was against the English
19:48in World War I
19:50because I was there.
19:52But it was an order
19:54more easily given
19:55than followed.
19:57The submarine force
19:58was suddenly deprived
19:59of its cautious
20:00pre-war mandate.
20:02Submarines were to attack
20:03anything Japanese afloat,
20:06including commercial shipping.
20:08But a comprehensive
20:09attack plan
20:10did not exist.
20:12At least the submarines
20:14themselves,
20:15which the crews
20:15affectionately called
20:17boats,
20:18were up to the task.
20:20The diesel electric fleet
20:21submarine
20:21was strong,
20:23fast,
20:24and lethal.
20:25The many new
20:26electrical systems,
20:28including the torpedo
20:28data computer,
20:30motivated an attempt
20:31at climate control.
20:32This resulted in what the
20:35Navy called
20:35increased habitability.
20:39They were wonderful boats.
20:41I know they were small,
20:42but they were excellent.
20:44Air conditioning
20:44was put in submarines
20:45to take care of the
20:46grounds from
20:47electrical systems.
20:49The people profited
20:50from it, of course.
20:51All the instrumentation
20:54on board
20:55is better off
20:56in a controlled
20:57environment
20:58because the original
20:59boats that I went out on
21:00had no air conditioning
21:01and, boy,
21:02it was just wet
21:03inside all the time.
21:06You couldn't wait
21:06to get up on the surface
21:07and get some fresh air.
21:10In a brilliant stroke
21:12of pre-war foresight,
21:14submarine captains
21:14had insisted
21:15on moving all sensor systems
21:17into the conning tower
21:19with the periscope.
21:20to better manage
21:21the task of tracking
21:22and sinking
21:23enemy ships.
21:26In the submarine service
21:28of the U.S. Navy,
21:29the captains were given
21:30tremendous latitude
21:32with regard to how
21:33their ship was organized.
21:34And one of the most
21:35personalized parts
21:36of the entire process
21:38was how the attack
21:39operated in the
21:40conning tower.
21:42It's a key idea.
21:44It's the key reason
21:45why the ship is out there.
21:47And each captain's technique
21:48was a little different.
21:50The commanding officer
21:52of the submarine
21:53always formed his own team
21:54just the way he wanted it.
21:56Some skippers
21:56stayed in the conning tower
21:58and had their executive officers
21:59run the periscope.
22:02Other skippers
22:02didn't do it.
22:04So everyone made
22:05his own decisions
22:06in this connection.
22:09Moving the sonar
22:10or sound detection equipment
22:12into the conning tower
22:14with the TDC
22:15required lengthening
22:16the small compartment
22:18by one foot
22:19to 15 feet 8 inches.
22:24It became a cramped
22:26and busy place.
22:28But the conning tower
22:30represented a level
22:31of technological integration
22:32that was truly amazing.
22:35The fleet boats
22:36were the stealth bombers
22:37of their day.
22:40The attack functions
22:41were effectively isolated
22:43in the conning tower
22:44which became home
22:45to what was called
22:46the fire control party.
22:48Our problem
22:49was to get the information
22:51to the TDC
22:52and keep it accurate.
22:54And this required
22:54good observation
22:55through the periscope
22:56or from the bridge
22:58depending on whether
22:59it was a submerged
23:00or surface attack.
23:01Contrary to popular perception
23:04firing torpedoes
23:05required more
23:06than just looking
23:07through the periscope
23:08and aiming.
23:10Bearing mark
23:11target bearing
23:13106 degrees
23:14106 degrees
23:16Sound
23:19Sound bearing
23:21106
23:23Angle on the bow
23:256 degrees port
23:26Range mark
23:28target range
23:291500
23:301-5-double-0
23:32The immediate problem
23:35in the attack plan
23:36was to estimate
23:37the target's course
23:38and speed.
23:41The target's bearing
23:42was read from
23:43a graduated ring
23:44around the periscope.
23:47Bearing mark
23:48target bearing
23:49106 degrees
23:51106 degrees
23:52The captain
23:54or executive officer
23:56also gave
23:57the angle on the bow
23:59an estimate
24:00an estimate
24:00of the angle
24:01between the target's heading
24:02and the observer's
24:04line of sight.
24:05Angle on the bow
24:066 degrees port
24:07Range was estimated
24:09by reading the angle
24:11between the water line
24:12and the target's masthead
24:13or bridge
24:14usually by a split image
24:16range finder
24:17built into the periscope.
24:20Range mark
24:21target range
24:221-5-double-0
24:241-5-double-0
24:26The target's speed
24:28was deduced
24:29from counting
24:30propeller revolutions.
24:33A plot was started
24:35incorporating
24:36all the available data
24:37on the target's
24:38and the submarine's
24:40own movements.
24:43As the attack developed
24:45the TDC provided
24:46increasingly accurate
24:48directional instructions
24:49to the torpedoes.
24:50The torpedo data
24:52computer will itself
24:53calculate the target's
24:55course
24:55and target's speed
24:56so if your estimates
24:57are wrong
24:58it will show
24:59the error
25:00and then you put
25:00in a different estimate.
25:02Fire two!
25:03No other submarine
25:04in the world
25:05could match
25:06the American fleet boat
25:07for its superior
25:08capabilities.
25:09Yet during the first
25:11two years of war
25:12these advantages
25:13were all but negated
25:14by the absence
25:15of a comprehensive
25:16attack strategy
25:17and defective torpedoes.
25:21Despite the declaration
25:22of unrestricted
25:23submarine warfare
25:24in the aftermath
25:25of Pearl Harbor
25:26most senior submariners
25:28had not abandoned
25:29their disdain
25:30for commerce raiding.
25:32There was a mixed feeling
25:33what do you do
25:33with the submarine
25:34and despite
25:35what I consider
25:36to be Stark's
25:37great vision
25:38the entire Navy
25:39hadn't bought into it
25:40nor was it structurally
25:41prepared
25:41to concentrate
25:43all of its submarine assets
25:45the way the Germans
25:46did in both
25:47World War I
25:47and World War II.
25:49Once again
25:50Britain's lifeline
25:52to America
25:52was nearly severed.
25:54Off the eastern seaboard
25:55of the United States
25:56the Germans sent
25:57400 merchant ships
25:59to the bottom
25:59exceeding 2 million tons
26:01and the loss
26:03of no less
26:03than 5,000 seamen.
26:07In the Pacific
26:08by comparison
26:0944 American fleet boats
26:12hamstrung
26:13by the lack
26:13of centralized control
26:14and planning
26:15was scattered
26:16in an indiscriminate
26:18and piecemeal way
26:19despite individual feats
26:21of bravery
26:22and sacrifice
26:23by the summer
26:24of 1942
26:25the fleet boats
26:27were averaging
26:27less than half
26:28an enemy ship
26:29sunk per patrol
26:30but the silent service
26:33would soon reverse
26:35this dismal record
26:36and with it
26:37the fortunes of war.
26:38The seven-month campaign
26:44for Guadalcanal
26:45from August 1942
26:46to February 1943
26:48was an epic battle
26:50of attrition
26:50fought on land
26:53in the air
26:56and on the sea
26:59it was also
27:01the turning point
27:02of the Pacific War
27:03Japan's failure
27:07to resupply
27:08its Guadalcanal forces
27:09was a somber
27:11realization
27:11that merchant shipping
27:13or the lack of it
27:14was the weak link
27:16in her defensive strategy
27:17by the end
27:20of 1942
27:21Japan's merchant fleet
27:22had suffered
27:23a net loss
27:23of 178,000 tons
27:25the beginning
27:27of a downward spiral
27:28from which
27:29the emperor
27:30never recovered
27:31American submarines
27:35while emphasizing
27:36Japanese warships
27:37according to their
27:38pre-war attack plan
27:39had nonetheless
27:40sunk 180 Japanese
27:43merchant ships
27:43in 1942
27:44totaling some
27:46725,000 tons
27:47had those ships
27:49been available
27:50to the Japanese
27:51they would not
27:52have been forced
27:53off of Guadalcanal
27:54but despite
27:57this early glimpse
27:57of success
27:58the prejudice
27:59against commercial
28:00shipping
28:00retained its grip
28:02on the silent surface
28:03for many more months
28:05why did it take
28:07so long
28:08for the submarine
28:09the American submarine
28:10to become the great
28:11commerce raider
28:12and destroyer
28:12of Japanese
28:13merchant fleet
28:14and tankers
28:15I don't know
28:16if there's any
28:16particular single answer
28:18and what
28:19the peculiar ironies
28:20I think
28:21of 1943
28:21is that's when
28:23the US submarine
28:23in the Pacific
28:24begins to become
28:26very very effective
28:27as a destroyer
28:28of the Japanese
28:29merchant fleet
28:30including tankers
28:31and it's that
28:32very same year
28:33that the U-boat
28:35in the Atlantic
28:36is defeated
28:37by means of the
28:38convoys
28:38and the other weapons
28:39used by the Allies
28:41Americans are starting
28:47to do the same things
28:48that the Germans
28:50had done
28:50and they're doing
28:51it very very well
28:52against the Japanese
28:531943 was a pivotal year
28:57for the submarine
28:58attack plan
28:59on many levels
29:00the problems
29:02that had plagued
29:03the Mark 14 torpedo
29:04had been identified
29:05and largely corrected
29:07by October
29:07perhaps more importantly
29:10a new generation
29:12of aggressive captains
29:13took command
29:14men who were not afraid
29:16to push the limits
29:17of their boats
29:18and crews
29:19the idea
29:21of running after
29:22a target
29:22on the surface
29:23in daytime
29:24was no longer
29:26thought to be
29:27a suicidal proposition
29:28it was called
29:30an end around
29:31well the problem
29:33with the fleet submarine
29:34in World War II
29:35was that
29:36submerged
29:37it travels
29:38at about walking speed
29:40so the only way
29:41you can do
29:41a submerged attack
29:42is to get in front
29:44of the target
29:44and wait for it
29:45to come to you
29:46you have to remember
29:47these submarines
29:47were speed boats
29:48they would go
29:4920 to 22 knots
29:51on the surface
29:52much faster
29:53than anything else
29:54they were trying to catch
29:55and so it would go
29:56at a distance
29:57where the target
29:58could not sight
29:59the submarine
29:59because it was
30:00so low in the water
30:01but the submarine
30:02could track the target
30:03because of the smoke
30:04and the height
30:05the target
30:06they would end
30:08around the target
30:08which means
30:09they would speed
30:10at a distance
30:10to get out
30:11in front of the target
30:12and then curve in
30:14in front of it
30:14and then submerge
30:16and wait for the target
30:18to come to them
30:19radar
30:21which had been
30:22in its infancy
30:23at the start of the war
30:24matured
30:25and became widely available
30:27during 1943
30:28with electronic beams
30:31scanning the darkness
30:32for miles ahead
30:33captains took to running
30:35on the surface
30:36at night
30:37it became
30:38the favorite means
30:40of attack
30:40most submarines
30:43will tell you
30:43that radar
30:44was by far
30:45the most important thing
30:46that was developed
30:48for submarine use
30:48during the war
30:49it enabled us
30:50to find the targets
30:51track them
30:52place them in
30:53context with each other
30:55decide how we were
30:56going to attack
30:57what direction
30:57we were going to attack
30:58from
30:58and so forth
30:59we of course
31:00added in such factors
31:01the moon
31:02the direction of the moon
31:03and the direction of the wind
31:04and all the other things
31:05but the radar
31:07was what told us
31:08where the enemy was
31:09the new radar
31:11type sj
31:12was a search radar
31:14for use on the surface
31:16it was capable of picking up targets
31:19at a distance of 10,000 yards
31:21over 5 miles
31:22targets could be electronically detected
31:25before being visually sighted
31:27the submarine would then use its surface speed
31:31to move into attack position
31:33without fear of being spotted by the enemy
31:36neither japanese submarines nor escorts
31:41had radar of any kind
31:42this electronic wonder
31:44put u.s. boats
31:45in a class of their own
31:47for fighting at night
31:48or in poor visibility
31:50night attacks
31:53had a special intensity
31:55a high speed run
31:56in the darkness
31:57culminating
31:58in a bright explosion
32:00and fire
32:00when the torpedo
32:02struck the target
32:03there was a huge
32:06ball of fire
32:07hit it
32:08and it stopped
32:09dead in the water
32:10you could see men
32:12jumping over the side
32:13we passed so close
32:16that our bridge
32:18the paint on there blistered
32:21that's how close we were
32:22the full drama
32:25of a night surface attack
32:26was difficult to document
32:28that scene is best conjured
32:30by historical artists
32:31like tom freeman
32:32after painstaking research
32:35this is the u.s.s. harder
32:38during one of her night attacks
32:40in 44
32:41right now
32:43what i'm just trying to do
32:44is highlight
32:44an area
32:46that you wouldn't normally see
32:48at night time like this
32:50if you have an explosion at night
32:52especially a large one
32:53especially on a ship
32:54you have fuel oil
32:55you have ammunition
32:56you have all the paint
32:58that would be on that ship
32:59what i try to do
33:02is to show that movement
33:04that feeling
33:05i want the individual
33:06to see the heat
33:07feel the heat
33:08and just say
33:10this is something
33:12that i did not want to deal with
33:13or i have been there
33:15i've seen it
33:15but a painting
33:18no matter how lifelike
33:19barely hints at the experience
33:21of such an attack
33:22only those who were there
33:25can know the true intensity
33:27of the moment
33:28during an attack
33:30i always had a very strong
33:33emotional response
33:34i felt as if i were actually
33:35firing the torpedo personally
33:38shooting it out the tube
33:39shoving it out with my right arm
33:40in fact
33:44it was a sort of euphoric feeling about it
33:50i've got here
33:51i've done it
33:51i'm beating them at their own game
33:53i'm here
33:53and i'm doing my job
33:54and they can't stop me
33:56and i'm going to sink that ship
33:57so help me
33:58i used to feel that i was
34:00a remorseless
34:02function of the ship
34:04i had no emotions of my own
34:06but the fact was
34:07i'm looking back on it now
34:08i was very emotional
34:09in 1944
34:12the silent service
34:14hit its stride in the pacific
34:16over 600 japanese commercial ships
34:18were sent to the bottom
34:19more than a combined total
34:22for the two previous years
34:23more importantly
34:26tankers were single
34:28held out as priority targets
34:29blocking japan's supply of oil
34:31from the east indies
34:33the attack plan had finally combined
34:36the operational capabilities
34:38of the submarine
34:39with the strategic requirements
34:41of the war
34:42the stage was set
34:43for final victory
34:45during four years of war
34:51the fleet submarine's ability to attack at night
34:54and in any weather
34:55was continuously enhanced
34:57the boats displayed many subtle exterior changes
35:01a succession of mast and antenna arrangements protruding from atop the conning tower
35:07suggested an ever-changing electronic environment
35:12yet the most secret tool of the attack plan
35:14yet the most secret tool of the attack plan
35:17more secret even than the torpedo data computer
35:19remained relatively unchanged during the course of the war
35:23questions regarding its operation were not tolerated
35:27advances and improvements to its capabilities were unannounced
35:32even its name like the hebrew god was unspeakable
35:38alluded to only by a symbolic reference
35:41it was special intelligence
35:44otherwise known as ultra
35:48the deciphering and exploitation
35:50of japanese coded communications
35:54this was a weapon of such staggering importance to the attack plan
35:58that few even knew of its existence
36:01and those who did
36:03were sworn to protect its secrecy
36:06for the most part they didn't know that it was
36:09it came from the breaking of the enemy's codes
36:11that was a very special secret
36:13some of the captains knew
36:15some of them kind of figured it out on their own
36:17some of them for special reasons knew
36:19but most of the crews didn't
36:20they just knew there was this special
36:22form of really reliable intelligence
36:27at least one member of the silent service
36:30captain john cromwell
36:32went down with the stricken submarine sculpin
36:35rather than be captured
36:38and risk betraying ultra under japanese torture
36:44the u.s. navy used special intelligence from the beginning of the war
36:49this was an invaluable asset to the submariners
36:54on january twenty seventh nineteen forty two
36:57returning from the first war patrol in japanese home waters
37:02the u.s.s. gudgeon sank a japanese submarine underway on the surface
37:07this first ever sinking of an enemy warship by an american submarine
37:12was the result of an ultra message
37:17by november nineteen forty three
37:20the code used by the japanese merchant marine
37:23the so-called maru code had also been broken
37:26this was significant to the attack plan
37:30because the japanese had belatedly formed multi-ship convoys
37:34the silent service employing ultra in conjunction with group formations called wolf packs
37:44swept the seas of japanese merchant ships
37:49the further into the war we get
37:51the more brazen the more aggressive
37:53the more on the surface the approaches are
37:56so this idea of continually hounding the convoy until every last ship is sunk
38:01became part of what the captains did
38:04the idea of introducing wolf packs into the attack process
38:08where there was more than one submarine involved
38:11that was something that developed as the war went on
38:15as important as ultra was to the attack plan
38:18maintaining its secrecy was equally critical
38:21in the radio room of san francisco's uss pomponito
38:28is an electromechanical cipher machine or decoder
38:32carried on board every u.s. submarine during world war ii
38:36this is the only such decoder outside the federal government
38:40this one was located in a basement storeroom
38:43of the super secret national security agency
38:47after extensive research by technology historian
38:50richard pakelny
38:53it was only declassified in 1995
38:57and loaned to the pomponito
39:00this machine is called the ecm mark ii
39:04it was used in world war ii to protect our communications
39:08so that we could send messages to our submarines and other ships at sea
39:12and to our armies in on the land as well
39:15without our enemies the japanese and the germans the axis powers
39:19being able to understand the messages
39:22when a signal sent out on a radio anybody can receive the signal
39:26by encrypting it running it through this machine using a special key
39:31a password if you will
39:33they were able to make it so that only the people that had the machine
39:37and the key and knew how to use it would be able to read those messages
39:44the ecm mark ii employed throughout world war ii was used for all coded message traffic including ultra
39:52it was the most secret piece of equipment on the boat
39:55subject to a shallow water operating procedure called the 100 fathom rule
40:03submarine historian john alden was the communications officer on the uss lamprey
40:09when we had to cross the 600 foot line the 100 fathom curve
40:16we were told to jettison our electric coding machine
40:22because the waters there were considered to be possibly salvageable
40:29and they didn't want the japanese to to have any chance of getting hold of our coding machine
40:35so we actually had to break up the coding machine and throw it overboard
40:40and burn all of our registered publications that went with it the coding tables and things
40:46in july 1945 a machine like this one decoded an urgent message regarding an allied submarine in distress
40:56it led to a remarkable mission that strayed far from the typical attack
41:01but one that vividly demonstrated the bond shared by allied submariners
41:08at that time the uss cod was on patrol off the coast of southeast asia
41:14she was ordered to assist a dutch submarine
41:17which was stranded in the south china sea
41:21on board the cod was a young motor machinist mate norm jensen
41:25who had been assigned to help document on film
41:28the once secret exploits of the silent service
41:34i went to the captain i says captain
41:36what's he doing is he making any signal signs he says yes he is
41:40i said i'd like to get some shots of it he's get your hindquarters up above there and do it
41:45when we first approached it all we saw was a blinking light
41:48we came up to it and here was this vessel
41:52all i could see was that thing at an angle probably about a 35 degree angle
41:56it had hit the reef and gone boom right up and then sunk down
42:00it hit it at low tide surprisingly enough
42:03and at high tide it couldn't get off
42:06jensen captured the cod's desperate attempts to tow the 019 off the reef
42:12all of them failed
42:15finally the dutch crew abandoned ship
42:18and were brought aboard the american submarine
42:20that was the saddest thing you ever saw in your life
42:24those guys coming aboard
42:26they'd been aboard that thing for five years
42:28hadn't even been home for over five years
42:30one of the fellows had a little doll
42:33kind of like a kachina doll that they have in the hopies
42:36that doll had been with them had been their good luck one
42:39to keep the dutch boat out of enemy hands
42:43it had to be scuttled
42:45demolition charges whacked its frame
42:47then what had begun as a rescue mission
42:51took a surreal turn
42:53as the cod attacked the dutch submarine
42:57with her deck cannon
42:59torpedoes administered the coup de gras
43:02the 019 clings to lad reef to this very day
43:15a cautionary beacon to all passing vessels
43:18the uss cod survived the war
43:23and can be found in cleveland ohio
43:25on her bridge there is a distinctive emblem
43:29a remembrance of a celebration
43:31given in her honor
43:33by a very appreciative dutch crew
43:35the cod and the pomponito
43:39are among the few remaining examples
43:42of a weapon that rewrote naval history
43:45developed in the shadow of the battleship
43:49the fleet submarines of the silent service
43:52brought japan to her knees
43:54through an innovative and fluid attack plan
43:56that evolved not through the precepts of plan orange
44:00but rather the commerce raiding legacy
44:03of confederate captain raphael sins
44:06who decimated union merchant shipping
44:08during the civil war
44:10today
44:15the boats of the silent service are nuclear powered
44:18incredibly fast
44:19and lethal
44:20but the spirit of the attack
44:23that almost indefinable quality
44:25of aggressive independence
44:27has not changed since it was born
44:29in the pacific
44:30half a century ago
44:32during the second world war
44:39the final american submarine lost
44:41was the uss bullhead sunk by depth charges
44:44dropped by a japanese plane
44:46the date august 6 1945
44:49the very day an american b-29
44:51dropped the atomic bomb on hiroshima
44:53too late to save the uss bullhead
44:56and the eighty-four american sailors
44:58who went with her to the bottom of the pacific
45:00of the pacific
45:06the
45:24of the
45:25of
45:28Gracias por ver el video.
45:58Gracias por ver el video.
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