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00:00Oh
00:30The world holds Adolf Hitler to account for the rearmament program which allowed Germany
00:45to precipitate the Second World War.
00:49To a large extent, this is certainly true.
00:53It was Hitler who gave the priority and impetus to develop the drive for the military power
00:58which was unleashed upon the unwary nations of Europe in 1939.
01:05But Hitler only came to power in 1933, and by that time the German army was already a long way
01:12towards rebuilding the armed forces which Germany had been denied by the harsh conditions
01:17of the Treaty of Versailles, imposed after her defeat in World War I.
01:22The Versailles Treaty specifically forbade Germany from developing armoured cars, tanks
01:30or any other form of tracked armoured vehicles.
01:34It was designed to leave the field clear for the Allies to continue the development of the
01:39descendants of these French light tanks, which had shown promise in the closing months of the Great World.
01:45Well, basically the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, which blames Germany in its entirety for the
01:54outbreak of World War I, forbade the German army to use tanks in any capacity whatsoever.
02:01However, in the late 1920s, the German army, fully conscious of the increasing technological
02:07sophistication and usefulness of tanks, got round the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles
02:14by striking a bargain with the Soviet Union.
02:18Germany and the Soviet Union were both, in many respects, the pariahs of the international community
02:23of the late 1920s.
02:25The Soviet Red Army wished to tap into the military expertise of the German army.
02:30At the same time, the German army wanted to be able to use Soviet tanks at the Soviet tank
02:38school in Kazan, out of sight of the prying eyes of the Western powers, namely France and
02:43Great Britain.
02:45The secret German-Soviet experimental station took the first steps in the development of
02:51modern battle tanks.
02:53These tanks would later equip the panzer divisions of World War II.
02:57Ironically, they would be pitched against the Soviet Union as their greatest foe.
03:04Two tanks eventually emerged from this clandestine development program.
03:10Firstly, there was the tiny Panzer I, a small, lightly armed and armoured machine designed as
03:15a training and command vehicle.
03:18It was armed with two machine guns and had space for a crew of just two men.
03:23Slightly more impressive was the prototype for what would become the Panzer II.
03:31The Panzer II was a light reconnaissance tank.
03:34It was only marginally more efficient than the Panzer I, but it did at least have a 20mm gun
03:40in its turret.
03:40The Panzer II had been designed as the first German tank in the early 1930s, and as such
03:50it had actually been designed as a training tank only, and thus it really had never been
03:56envisaged as a battle tank.
03:58And you can see this from the fact it was only armed with two machine guns and had very light
04:03armour.
04:03So really the Panzer I was not an effective battle tank at all.
04:09The Panzer II was in some ways a transitional design and was slightly more battle worthy than
04:17a Panzer I.
04:18It had a 20mm cannon and better armour protection, but it really can only be seen as a reconnaissance
04:24tank or a light tank, and really couldn't match either the firepower or the armour of most
04:31Allied tanks.
04:33When Hitler came to unfettered power in 1933, these two tanks unexpectedly had to be used
04:40to equip the new Panzer Divisions for front-line service.
04:44Thanks to Hitler, the next war would arrive far sooner than the generals could have imagined
04:50in their worst nightmares.
04:55Adolf Hitler was a driven man.
04:57He did not intend to heed the pleas of the high command, who knew that a modern war would
05:02need the next generation of medium and heavy tanks, which were then still in development.
05:07They would not be ready in numbers before 1940, and a protracted war without them was unthinkable.
05:15But a long war was exactly the opposite of what Adolf Hitler had in mind.
05:23In the next war, he was determined that Germany would not be brought to her knees by a long,
05:28drawn-out war of attrition.
05:29It was unthinkable that the horrors of the trenches should ever be repeated, so future campaigns
05:36would need to be swift and decisive.
05:42In this, at least, he had the support of some sections of the high command, who agreed that
05:48mechanisation was the answer.
05:51The Reichwehr, the German army, had been collaborating with the Russians secretly during the 1920s and
05:57the early part of the 1930s, and it was there, in Russia, and certainly not in England or in
06:01Great Britain, that the Germans saw, for example, for the first time, the organisation of the first
06:06large-scale mechanised brigade, then a mechanised division, and finally a mechanised corps.
06:12And the other thing the Germans were able to do was actually to exercise with their tanks,
06:17which was not possible elsewhere because of the Treaty of Versailles.
06:21In parallel with the development of the first tanks, came the new tactical doctrine which
06:29would transform the face of warfare, blitzkrieg.
06:33In the 20s and 30s, Germany developed a new approach to battlefield tactics.
06:38During the Great War, the attacking frontage of the armies during major offensives
06:49could be as wide as 60 miles.
06:53Even the successful Kaiserschlag defensives, launched by Germany during the last year of the war,
06:59saw the troops deployed over a 20-mile-long attack sector.
07:03Using blitzkrieg tactics, the new armoured forces were to be concentrated together
07:10for a single thrust through a very narrow sector of the front.
07:15Once they had broken through the opposing front lines, the panzers were instructed to keep going
07:20further and further into the enemy rear areas, spreading panic and confusion.
07:26The new tank forces were to be supported by a force of dive bombers to spread fear and panic
07:33both at the point of penetration, then further into the rear areas as the tanks advanced.
07:41To further facilitate the new tactics, the old inventory divisions were augmented by a new formation
07:47called a panzer division.
07:49These divisions had their own tanks, motorised inventory, motorised artillery and full support and logistics.
07:57It was designed to be a highly mobile miniature army, capable of supporting itself on the move.
08:04The reason the panzer division was such an effective fighting formation
08:08was due to the combined arms element contained within it.
08:14A panzer division contained, yes, it had tanks, but it also contained a brigade of infantry,
08:21anti-aircraft guns, artillery pieces, its own supply columns, and this whole unit was glued together,
08:29you might say, with modern voice radio communications.
08:34This made it a very flexible formation, and given the fact that the entire formation was motorised,
08:41it meant it was a very fast formation.
08:43Blitzkrieg evolved from a reassessment of war tactics that took place not only in Germany,
08:50but in Russia and Britain as well.
08:53Two perceptive British military theorists, Major General J.C. Fuller and Captain B. Littleheart,
09:00understood that the introduction of the tank during World War I
09:03had opened up hitherto undreamt of military possibilities.
09:07Both Littleheart and Fuller, in their writings, they described the kind of battle which they had in mind
09:15as the play of lightning, and the German word for lightning is blitz, of course.
09:20So that was taken up when considering that.
09:23The first time that the term panzer, panzer army, panzer division was used,
09:29was used by an Austrian general called General Eimansberger.
09:32And some of Hitler's remarks, his own remarks, about 1936, he's tending to use the word blitz with respect to war,
09:44and then you get the combination of blitzkrieg.
09:46So it slipped in, if you like, into military parlance and general usage round about the mid-1930s.
09:53There are a number of claimants to the title of the father of blitzkrieg.
10:00It is generally accepted that Littleheart and Fuller's experiments with the British tank were important,
10:06but at the same time the Germans had worked on the application of motorization and tanks in breakthrough battles.
10:13Many of these new ideas came from the work of General Heinz Guderian.
10:18A man of acute and perceptive intelligence, Guderian had devoted much thought to the question of how tanks might best be used in a modern battle.
10:27Plans and tactics were tried out in war games and maneuvers,
10:31which soon convinced Hitler that he had discovered the way to make his dreams of conquest become a reality.
10:40Guderian was a great publicist of the tank.
10:43He wrote a very famous book called Achtung Panzer,
10:47which was, if you like, required reading for all the practitioners of tank warfare
10:53and what later came to be known as the blitzkrieg.
10:57So from the point of view of being, I think, both the protagonist and the publicist of the tank,
11:04of the armoured fighting vehicle, and also of the initial concept of the blitzkrieg,
11:09Guderian plays a very important part indeed.
11:12During the Great War, Guderian had worked extensively with wireless
11:17and gained invaluable experience in the deployment of infantry, artillery, and aircraft.
11:23With the addition of the tanks, Guderian had a clear vision of the force he wished to create.
11:29His tanks would be solely concentrated in the panzer and panzer grenadiers' armoured divisions,
11:35not dispersed in small numbers throughout the army.
11:38They would be spearheads of a single, large military formation,
11:44which also included aircraft, artillery, and mechanised infantry.
11:49Crucially, the commanders of these new formations would not be stationed far in the rear,
11:54but would operate near the front, moving forward with the panzers,
11:57and responding instantly to changing situations and issuing orders by wireless directly to his units.
12:07Making the most efficient use possible of available technology was only part of Guderian's work.
12:13He also had a clear understanding of the value of proper training,
12:17and that it was vital to encourage drive and initiative, even in the lowest ranks.
12:22The German army as a whole had incomparable standards.
12:28The men of the tank arm were trained to an even higher pitch,
12:31and expected to make decisions in action, rather than simply waiting for orders.
12:38With this new system at his fingertips,
12:41Hitler would plunge Europe into years of barbarity and turmoil on an unprecedented scale.
12:47In early 1939, Germany's rearmament was still far from complete.
12:54But Hitler knew if he delayed his plans any longer,
12:57Germany's enemies might yet grow too strong for her.
13:01To be successful, he needed easy, quick, and decisive victories.
13:06Because the new Panzer 3s and 4s were only available in small quantities,
13:11he pressed the Panzer 1 and 2 tanks into service.
13:14But even then, the numbers were far from adequate.
13:20At this uncertain juncture, Hitler had a stroke of luck.
13:25When Germany annexed Bohemia and Moravia in 1938,
13:29it was found that the tanks produced in Czechoslovakia by Skoda and CKD
13:34were available in sufficient numbers to bolster the numbers of the Panzer divisions.
13:38I think it's true to say that in May 1938, there was a genuine danger of war.
13:46The Czechoslovak armed forces were properly mobilised,
13:50and threats which appear to have been realistic threats
13:53were made by the British and the French in particular,
13:56that seemed to have deterred Adolf Hitler from ordering the commencement of the operation.
14:00In September 1938, however, it appears, as one author has remarked,
14:05that the British and French, having looked over the precipice
14:09and seen the possibility of war,
14:12decided for reasons to do with their unpreparedness
14:15not to make the same threats that they had made in May 1938.
14:19And this led, of course, to the rather disastrous agreement made at Munich,
14:24and indeed precipitated, many historians argue,
14:27the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939.
14:31The Czech light tank, the LT-35, was renamed the Panzer 35T,
14:38and served alongside their Panzer 1 and 2 tanks and the light companies,
14:42where it outperformed its German counterparts.
14:44Of even greater use was the LT-38 light-medium tank,
14:52which was now taken into German service and renamed as the Panzer 38T.
14:57Better still, almost 220 of the 35T and 60 of the 38T tanks were immediately available.
15:06With this windfall addition to his tank forces,
15:10Hitler was able to carry out his attack on Poland with greater confidence.
15:15The Czech tanks, the Panzer 35 and 38T,
15:21were very, very important to the German war effort in 1940.
15:25Over a third of the German tanks used in the campaign in France
15:30were in fact Czech tanks,
15:32which had been seized by the Germans
15:35after the annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939.
15:39The Panzer 35T was a fairly old design, but relatively battle-worthy.
15:48The Panzer 38T, on the other hand, was an extremely effective light tank in 1940
15:54and gave much more fighting power to the panzer divisions than either the Panzer 1s or 2s.
16:02The Germans liked the design so much that, in fact, the Panzer 38T,
16:08although it was replaced as a battle tank after 1940 and 1941,
16:13it remained in production until 1945
16:16and was used as the basis for many German fighting vehicles.
16:21Although the Polish campaign was predominantly a conventional war of encirclement,
16:28the German battle plan did include some elements
16:31of what was to become standard Blitzkrieg doctrine.
16:34In the case of Poland, Hitler made no declaration of war.
16:40This flagrant disregard for the usual rules of war
16:43caught his victims off guard every time he used the same ploy.
16:48It gave him the vital advantage of surprise
16:51and kept the initiative which was so vital to the success of Blitzkrieg.
17:04What we now understand as the classic forms of Blitzkrieg
17:07was rehearsed against Poland in September 1939
17:11by 26 German infantry divisions, 6 panzer divisions,
17:16and 4 light divisions, and 4 motorized divisions.
17:20The most important supporting element was, of course, the Luftwaffe.
17:25In the initial stages of the attack,
17:28the Luftwaffe pounded the Polish defenses
17:30and destroyed the Polish air force on the ground.
17:33Even more importantly, it wreaked havoc with Polish mobilization.
17:38The cooperation between air and ground,
17:41which became an essential element of the Blitzkrieg technique,
17:44was perfected in Poland.
17:49Although brilliantly conceived and executed,
17:52the overall German strategy was still largely based
17:55on the classic German tradition of encirclement and envelopment,
17:59which could be carried out by conventional forces,
18:01but with the strong influence of the Blitzkrieg elements.
18:06By the 16th day of the campaign,
18:08Poland's situation was already beyond hope.
18:14Endeavoring to hold a thin and overextended front of 2,000 kilometers,
18:19the Poles fought with selfless bravery.
18:21Even in 1939, the elite of the old-fashioned Polish army was considered to be the mounted cavalry.
18:29Galloping fearlessly across the battlefield like ghosts from a lost age,
18:34these cavalrymen were committed to the impossible task of charging the German tanks with their lances and sabres.
18:40In Germany, there was jubilation and a sense of restored national pride.
18:48The nation's virile leader acquired new prestige and laurels from the fatherland,
18:53and the Third Reich sensed that it was entering into a glorious new world of its own making.
18:58When Hitler visited the tank corps soon after the invasion,
19:04it was the achievements of the panzer divisions that delighted him most.
19:09In return for his huge success, Guderian had lost only 150 men and 700 wounded.
19:16The Blitzkrieg elements were falling smoothly into place.
19:21The success of the Polish campaign fired Hitler's pride, aggression, and vanity.
19:28In the late spring of 1940, it also gave him the confidence for the successful military conquests of Denmark and Norway.
19:37By May of that year, Hitler was ready for his greatest gamble to date, the invasion of France.
19:45Case Yellow had been repeatedly postponed.
19:47The delays, however, were put to good use,
19:51and the intensive study of the lessons from the Polish campaign were undertaken.
19:56The role of the armoured divisions and the other Blitzkrieg components came under particular scrutiny.
20:02One of the men eager to discover what improvements could be introduced was Heinz Guderian,
20:08one of Hitler's most capable generals.
20:10In the short Polish campaign, the Germans had lost a disproportionately high number of the vulnerable Panzer I and II tanks,
20:22which accounted for 172 losses from a total of 217.
20:28This was clearly cause for concern, but the flow of replacements was beginning to speed up.
20:34With the German and Czech works at full stretch, Guderian now had a larger, far more modern tank force.
20:41Crucially, the new Mark III and IV tanks were available in good numbers,
20:46and the first full-scale experiment in Blitzkrieg tactics could begin.
20:51It was to lead to the fall of France.
20:54Early in the morning of the 10th of May 1940, Fall Gelb was activated.
21:02German forces swung down into the Low Countries,
21:05and the term Blitzkrieg was burned into the pages of history.
21:11Despite the increase in the number of German tanks,
21:14the French still enjoyed a great superiority in military material.
21:18The French Air Force was bigger than the German Air Force,
21:21and had it been properly deployed,
21:24it could easily have blunted the German invasion sufficiently
21:26for the Germans to run out of fuel.
21:29The huge number of tanks and support vehicles in the Panzer Divisions
21:33consumed enormous quantities of fuel,
21:36and the Germans knew that the backup to that first Blitzkrieg thrust
21:40would be stretched to its limit.
21:43The generals also knew that if they were held at bay for even a couple of weeks,
21:48they would run out of both fuel and ammunition.
21:52Fuel, and not just fuel, but oils and all the kinds of lubricants
21:57which motorised vehicles need,
22:00were absolutely essential for armoured divisions
22:03and mechanised divisions in the Second World War.
22:06Without them, they simply could not go anywhere.
22:09One example of this came from the 1940 campaign in France,
22:14when French tanks, particularly the Char B,
22:18which actually ran on aviation fuel,
22:21kept running out of fuel before they could reach the battlefield
22:25and had to be constantly refuelled.
22:27The Germans, on the other hand, using petrol for their engines,
22:32were able to actually pull up at French petrol stations
22:35and refill their tanks that way.
22:37So improvisation could be used to keep an armoured division on the go
22:43in certain circumstances,
22:45but in other campaigns, such as the desert campaigns or in Russia,
22:51fuel could become very short very quickly,
22:55and it needed a great deal of logistic planning
22:59to enable armoured divisions to continue to advance.
23:03Setting aside the supply concerns,
23:05the strategy that had eventually been settled upon for the attack
23:09was of glittering audacity.
23:11A surprise offensive was launched through Holland and Belgium,
23:16which it was hoped would draw the British forces northwards
23:19away from their French allies,
23:21who would hold their defensive positions in the famous Maginot Line.
23:25Then, a powerful concentration of German armour
23:28would crash through the weakly defended Ardennes region.
23:32Without real opposition,
23:34this arm of the attack would thrust into France
23:37to divide the Allied armies in half.
23:41From the outset,
23:43the great stratagem worked immaculately,
23:46and when Hitler was told,
23:47he almost wept for joy.
23:51On the tenth day of the campaign,
23:53Guderian reached Amiens.
23:56The last link between the Allied forces
23:58to the north and south was severed,
24:01adding still further to the already dire confusion
24:03in the chain of command.
24:07On the 24th, four days later,
24:09Hitler issued one of the most controversial orders of the war.
24:14For two days,
24:14he had halted the German tanks outside the town of Dunkirk,
24:18where the British army was encircled.
24:21This respite prevented a massacre taking place,
24:24and the evacuation of the British from Dunkirk was the result.
24:28This decision was taken by Hitler mainly because of the fright
24:35given to Rommel's 7th Panzer Division on the 21st of May
24:39by a British counter-attack at ARA.
24:43Combined with that fact,
24:45or with that rather frightening episode for the Germans,
24:49was the fact that Hitler did not want to waste his Panzer Divisions
24:53in heavy street fighting,
24:55which was already beginning to develop around Calais.
24:58And thus, in some ways,
25:00the decision was rational
25:01to allow the Air Force to bomb the BEF into submission.
25:07It's also important to remember
25:08that Hitler really did not believe
25:10that the BEF could be saved by sea.
25:13He wasn't a naval man
25:15and didn't understand what the Royal Navy could actually do.
25:18Because of his love of detail,
25:23Hitler demanded daily reports from the front line.
25:26From there,
25:27it seemed that Hitler had gained the mistaken impression
25:30that German tank losses were higher than they actually were.
25:34He had, it seems,
25:36mistaken the number of broken-down vehicles in the report
25:38as total losses.
25:41He therefore decided to allow the Luftwaffe
25:43to finish off the British,
25:45while his precious tank forces
25:47were saved for the final attack on France.
25:52On the 20th of June,
25:54after just six weeks of war,
25:56France agreed to sign a demeaning armistice.
26:01It was a very successful blitz campaign.
26:04Yes, they broke through in the south.
26:06They were able to bring great pressure on the Allied armies.
26:09They forced the withdrawal of the British expeditionary force
26:12to Dunkirk.
26:13They encircled the French armies.
26:14So from that point of view,
26:16it was a success.
26:17And it was a success for two reasons.
26:19A, it was very carefully planned and brilliantly executed.
26:22But there,
26:22the logistics problem was not so serious.
26:25Where the German army came up against logistics problem,
26:27as it did in Russia,
26:28then the blitzkrieg didn't work.
26:31It was what it was meant to be,
26:33a short, sharp, rapid, brutal penetration.
26:36Hitler was overjoyed at this astounding vindication
26:41of the methods of blitzkrieg.
26:43Germany rejoiced with him.
26:46The nation's honour had been restored,
26:48German prosperity assured by the new order in Europe,
26:51and the ignominy of Versailles was lost in the past.
26:55Under their revered leader,
26:57this transformation had been achieved
26:59at a cost far below all expectation.
27:01Germany had every reason to thank its armed forces,
27:06as the posters exhorted them to do.
27:10Hitler was pleased,
27:12but not content.
27:14He wanted much more.
27:18A declaration of war against Yugoslavia and Greece simultaneously
27:22was the signal that blitzkrieg was about to be unleashed again.
27:26It burst over Yugoslavia on the 6th of April, 1941.
27:33The same day, Belgrade was heavily bombed,
27:36and the Germans tore through the country.
27:39Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Skopje fell in quick succession,
27:44and just 12 days later, Yugoslavia was completely occupied.
27:48Greece was now the front line.
27:51With the Balkan flank now secured,
27:56the unprecedented military build-up in progress
27:58all along Germany's eastern borders continued.
28:01Hitler had resolved to invade the Soviet Union.
28:07This great offensive, codenamed Barbarossa,
28:11had been fermenting for a long time in Hitler's mind.
28:15Firmly rooted in national socialist ideology
28:17was the conviction that Germany's destiny lay in the east.
28:21But Soviet Russia was just too vast
28:23to hope that it would fall in 30 days like Poland.
28:27Once more, Hitler needed a quick war.
28:31Once more, he needed it soon.
28:34His gambler's instinct told him
28:36that Germany would never stand so strong as she stood then.
28:39And if he delayed, even one year,
28:42the crowds that cheered so fervently
28:44might no longer be willing to follow him
28:46into so hazardous an adventure.
28:49He gambled that the war would last three months.
28:52It was the biggest and most mistaken assessment
28:55of his ramshackle career.
28:58The coming war would last almost four years
29:00and claim 30 million lives.
29:03At 0300 hours on the morning of June 22, 1941,
29:10the codeword, Dortmund, crackled down the wires.
29:15Three million men stood in battle readiness.
29:18The ground along the Russian borders
29:20vibrated to the thunder of massed artillery.
29:23High above, hundreds of bombers flew steadily eastwards.
29:28The theory of blitzkrieg was about to be tested
29:30on a far grander scale than anything yet undertaken
29:33and in an arena of frighteningly vast proportions.
29:40The German forces were disposed
29:42in three great army groups.
29:45The topmost, Army Group North,
29:47swung away northwards aiming for Leningrad.
29:50The third army group, known as Army Group South,
29:54moved sharply down towards the Ukraine
29:56with the oil fields of the Caucasus as its ultimate goal.
30:01Guderian was with the principal German offensive
30:04in Army Group Center.
30:06Their objectives were Smolensk
30:07and beyond that,
30:08the industrial and administrative heart
30:10of Soviet Russia, Moscow.
30:14As usual, the invasion forces scythed
30:18through hopelessly disorganized opposition
30:20and moved rapidly onwards.
30:23The well-honed blitzkrieg pattern
30:25was being repeated
30:26and the Soviet defenses whirled away
30:29like chaff in the wind.
30:31The number of prisoners taken
30:33seemed too immense to be true.
30:35But it was.
30:37Almost three million Russian soldiers
30:39fell into German hands
30:40in the opening phases of Barbarossa
30:42and the scale of destruction was terrifying.
30:46As the news of Barbarossa
30:48reverberated around a stunned and disbelieving world,
30:51even Germany was awestruck.
30:56Despite the successes,
30:58Guderian was at odds with the overall plan.
31:02He was acutely aware
31:03that the one guiding principle of blitzkrieg,
31:06the concentration of maximum force
31:08against a single objective,
31:10had already been neglected.
31:12Even worse,
31:13as the army groups advanced,
31:15they would diverge away from one another
31:17instead of coming closer together
31:18in an enveloping movement.
31:22In addition,
31:24Guderian was not being allowed
31:25to develop the technique
31:27he had exploited so masterfully in France.
31:29A short, sharp campaign
31:31which kept a close eye
31:33on the practical issues of supply.
31:37The Polish campaign
31:38took place in 36 days.
31:41The campaign in the West
31:42lasted 42 days.
31:44But the campaign in Russia
31:46lasted 1,000 days.
31:52In the autumn of 1941,
31:54the blitzkrieg technique was failing.
31:57The reasons
31:58were the logistical problems
32:00which beset the German army as a whole,
32:02but were especially severe
32:04for the German tank columns.
32:06There had always been a fear
32:08in the German high command
32:09that the panzers might run out of fuel,
32:12or they might run out of ammunition,
32:13or that they might outstrip
32:15the ability of the army
32:16to keep them supplied
32:17and in working order.
32:19At that point,
32:21Germany would become embroiled
32:22in a war of attrition
32:23with a bigger adversary.
32:26This is exactly what happened in Russia.
32:30And with that,
32:31the blitzkrieg floundered.
32:35The Soviet Union had relatively few roads.
32:39A very small proportion
32:40of the roads that existed
32:41were paved.
32:41This meant that
32:43the German army's
32:45logistical system,
32:47which was heavily dependent
32:48upon the roads,
32:49was going to face severe problems
32:51in sustaining any advance
32:53into the interior
32:54of the Soviet Union
32:55once the weather deteriorated.
32:58Incredible numbers
32:59of prisoners had been taken,
33:01and huge quantities
33:02of tanks and guns
33:03captured or destroyed.
33:05Despite this sustained progress,
33:08Guderian was increasingly conscious
33:09of grounds for unease
33:11in the development of the campaign.
33:13The unending immensity of the land
33:16depressed many soldiers.
33:18Lack of mobility,
33:20particularly of tracked vehicles,
33:21was a severe drawback.
33:24There continued to be
33:25a huge haul of prisoners,
33:27but the German pincers
33:28were closing too slowly,
33:31allowing large numbers
33:32of Red Army troops
33:33to get away,
33:34and the Red Army
33:35appeared to command
33:36endless reserves.
33:38Most roads were of dirt,
33:39which, with the sudden rains,
33:41turned quickly to mud,
33:42halting entire columns.
33:44The terrain itself
33:47was not particularly difficult
33:48for the German army
33:49to negotiate
33:49when the weather was good.
33:51Once the weather deteriorated
33:53in the autumn and winter of 1941,
33:55the nature of the terrain,
33:56the forests and the swamps,
33:58and the poor infrastructure
33:59of the Soviet Union
34:00ensured that the terrain,
34:01the sheer size of the country,
34:03would come to work very heavily
34:04against the successful advance
34:05of the German army.
34:07Meanwhile,
34:08Hitler was vacillating.
34:10Having failed to annihilate
34:12the Red Army,
34:13his interest turned
34:14towards securing
34:15the economic prize
34:16of the Ukrainian oil wells.
34:18To Guderian's dismay,
34:21he was diverted from his plan
34:22to drive hard and fast
34:23for Moscow
34:24and ordered south
34:25to the Ukraine.
34:28His divisions
34:29performed outstandingly,
34:31helping to take
34:31well over half a million prisoners
34:33and nearly 1,000 tanks.
34:36But the crucial moment
34:37had passed.
34:42The advance to Moscow
34:43was resumed
34:44at the end of September,
34:45but the delay proved
34:46to be fatal.
34:48Fuel and supplies
34:49were delivered
34:50through a system
34:50that had become
34:51stretched beyond its limit,
34:53and the lines of communication
34:55were enormously over-extended.
34:58Shortages of every kind
34:59impaired the fighting ability
35:01of the frontline forces.
35:03The vague fears
35:05of the generals,
35:06who had initially harbored doubts,
35:08were beginning to take
35:09the shape of a massive,
35:10impending disaster.
35:13The advance
35:14had been over areas
35:15so vast
35:16that it was impossible
35:17for comprehensive
35:18mopping-up operations
35:19to be undertaken.
35:21Behind the Germans,
35:22there lay the huge expanses
35:24of territory
35:25in which tens of thousands
35:27of Red Army troops
35:28roamed uncaptured.
35:32The blitzkrieg
35:33was a very limited technique,
35:35and it could not be universally
35:37or permanently applied.
35:41And when the blitzkrieg,
35:43in a sense,
35:44ran out of steam,
35:45ran out of capability,
35:46then I think Hitler
35:47and the German command
35:48faced very serious problems.
35:53Blitzkrieg's lifeblood
35:54was rapid movement,
35:56and the spearheads
35:57were now being reduced
35:58to a perilously slow crawl.
36:01The autumn rains
36:02were heavy.
36:03In France,
36:04there had been proper roads.
36:05Here, the highways
36:06were vanishing
36:07into impassable tracts of mud
36:09in which men,
36:10vehicles, and horses
36:11floundered more
36:12and more helplessly.
36:15Breakdowns increased,
36:16and repairs became
36:17extremely difficult
36:18to carry out.
36:20Guderian had started
36:22Barbarossa
36:22with 600 tanks.
36:25By the middle of November,
36:26he was left with just 50
36:27that were operational.
36:31As the temperature
36:32continued to fall,
36:34and the unforgiving
36:35Russian winter arrived,
36:37soldiers now paid dearly
36:39for the arrogance
36:40that had refused
36:40to admit the possibility
36:41of anything other than
36:43a quick, decisive campaign.
36:46Few men had more
36:47than summer clothing,
36:49and frostbite
36:49took an agonizing toll.
36:51towards the end of October 1941,
36:58many German troops
37:00were praying for the weather
37:02to become colder,
37:03because once the roads froze,
37:05the ground would harden,
37:07and this would enable
37:07the German panzers
37:08to continue rolling.
37:10Nevertheless,
37:11most German troops
37:11did not anticipate
37:12the kind of temperatures
37:14they began to encounter
37:15in late November 1941.
37:17cold of the magnitude
37:19of minus 20,
37:20minus 25 degrees centigrade,
37:22completely undermined
37:23the ability
37:23of the German soldier
37:24to fight effectively
37:25and the ability
37:26of his equipment.
37:28Most German tanks,
37:31artillery,
37:32simply did not have
37:33the capacity
37:33to withstand temperatures
37:35of this kind.
37:36In the artillery,
37:37recoil systems froze.
37:39Some German commanders
37:40reported that it took
37:4112 hours of heating
37:43simply to thaw out
37:44the engine of a German tank.
37:46Once the German army
37:47stopped moving,
37:48it then became involved
37:49in positional fighting.
37:52Positional and defensive fighting
37:53against the Russian formations
37:55increased the demand
37:56for supplies
37:57at a time when the demand
37:58for supplies could not be met.
38:01The mighty offensive
38:02in Russia
38:03had run its course.
38:05German armoured divisions
38:06lay shattered
38:07in the frozen wastes
38:08before Moscow,
38:10together with Hitler's
38:11dreams of glory.
38:13The golden days
38:14of Blitzkrieg
38:15were at an end.
38:20An angry Hitler
38:22proclaimed himself
38:23Supreme Commander
38:24and dismissed
38:26many of his
38:26highest generals.
38:28On Christmas Day, 1941,
38:31Heinz Guderian
38:32was relieved
38:32of his command.
38:34A shameful way
38:35to treat such a committed
38:36and successful soldier.
38:38another great soldier
38:43who would later
38:44be treated even worse
38:45by Hitler
38:46was Field Marshal
38:47Erwin Rommel.
38:49While Guderian
38:50was in disgrace
38:50after the failures
38:51in the snows of Russia,
38:53Rommel had risen
38:54to prominence
38:55under the beating sun
38:56following a string
38:57of remarkable successes
38:58in North Africa.
38:59The wide open spaces
39:03of the North African desert
39:04would at first glance
39:06appear to have been
39:07ideal tank country.
39:09In practice,
39:10much of this huge arena
39:12was actually impassable
39:13to tracked vehicles.
39:15The soft sand
39:16of the deep desert
39:17was very difficult
39:18to negotiate
39:18and played havoc
39:20with the vehicles,
39:21which were essential
39:22for desert warfare.
39:23The war in the desert
39:27was therefore fought
39:28on a narrow coastal strip
39:30of passable terrain
39:31between the desert
39:32and the sea.
39:34This small area
39:36saw the bulk
39:36of the fighting
39:37as the campaign
39:38in the desert
39:39seesawed backwards
39:40and forwards
39:41between Egypt
39:42and Libya.
39:44Under Rommel's
39:45inspired leadership,
39:47the outnumbered
39:48German forces
39:48were able to achieve
39:49some spectacular victories.
39:53In many respects,
39:54these were classic
39:55blitzkrieg battles,
39:57like those in which
39:58the Germans had enjoyed
39:59such spectacular success
40:01during the French campaign.
40:03Rommel, of course,
40:04had taken part
40:05in that campaign,
40:07where he had achieved
40:08outstanding success
40:09as the leader
40:10of the 7th Panzer Division,
40:12which had gained
40:12the nickname
40:13the Ghost Division.
40:18Rommel applied
40:19his experience
40:20from France
40:20to the Desert Theater.
40:23Despite the enormous
40:24difficulties
40:24of a very tenuous
40:25supply situation,
40:27he was able
40:27to record
40:28some of the most
40:28audacious victories
40:29of the war.
40:31But in so doing,
40:32he did create
40:33the opportunities
40:34for later critics
40:35to question
40:36some of the aspects
40:37of his famous legacy,
40:39and in particular,
40:40his habit
40:40of leading
40:41from the front.
40:44Rommel was much
40:45criticized
40:45for using
40:46one of the
40:47most important parts
40:48of the blitzkrieg technique,
40:49which was to have
40:50the commander
40:51very far forward
40:52handling the battle,
40:53not from a core headquarters
40:54or a divisional headquarters.
40:56He was very much
40:56criticized for that,
40:57although Rommel,
40:58of course,
40:59had commanded
40:59the Panzer Division
41:01in 1940.
41:02Rommel was the first
41:03to break through
41:04in the Ardennes
41:05and get to the Meuse.
41:06So when he is
41:07in North Africa,
41:08you get, again,
41:10virtually classic
41:11blitzkrieg technique
41:12adapted to desert
41:14warfare conditions.
41:15but the essence
41:16of that
41:16was the command
41:17and control system,
41:18highly flexible,
41:20movable,
41:21up with the front,
41:22up with the troops,
41:23taking account
41:24of the situation.
41:26Eventually,
41:27even the unexpected
41:28victories won
41:29by Rommel
41:30were overcome
41:31by the superior weight
41:32of Allied arms
41:33ranged against him,
41:35and the Africa Corps
41:36was finally defeated
41:37in 1943.
41:40In Russia
41:41at that time,
41:43the whole course
41:44of the war
41:44was about to be decided.
41:47On the eve
41:48of the Battle of Kursk,
41:50Hitler knew
41:50the moment of decision
41:51had arrived.
41:53He had little option
41:54but to recall Guderian,
41:56who was reappointed
41:57to the new position
41:58of Inspector
41:59of the Tank Forces
42:00in time
42:01for that cataclysmic battle.
42:05With Guderian
42:06back at the front,
42:08Hitler may well
42:09have been trying
42:09to recapture
42:10some of the earlier flair
42:11which had produced
42:13the successes
42:13of 1939
42:14and 1940.
42:17He sensed
42:18that he was playing
42:19his last card
42:21on the Russian front.
42:22The Battle of Kursk
42:23was an all-or-nothing
42:24attempt
42:25to win the war
42:26in Russia.
42:27As a gamble,
42:28the stakes
42:29were enormous,
42:30and Hitler
42:31was conscious
42:31of the benefits
42:32which a successful
42:33blitzkrieg campaign
42:34had once produced.
42:36There's a justifiable
42:38argument to say
42:39that the huge
42:40German offensive
42:40in 1943
42:41at Kursk,
42:43which was to bite off
42:44and destroy
42:45the Red Army's salient,
42:46was a blitzkrieg attack,
42:47was a blitz attack
42:48in that sense.
42:49On the other hand,
42:51the Battle of Kursk
42:52degenerated
42:53into virtual
42:54a slugging match,
42:55which is what
42:56the blitzkrieg
42:57was not supposed to be.
42:58It was meant
42:59to forestall
42:59and indeed
43:00to eliminate
43:01that kind of battle.
43:03And I and some
43:04of my colleagues
43:04have reservations
43:05about describing
43:07that battle
43:08as a blitzkrieg attack
43:10in that sense.
43:12With the defeat
43:14at Kursk,
43:15the writing was
43:16clearly on the wall
43:17for the Wehrmacht.
43:18The fears
43:19of those generals
43:20who had opposed
43:21the blitzkrieg concept
43:22in the first place
43:23now proved
43:24to be hauntingly correct.
43:25Even Hitler
43:29must now have known
43:30that any hope
43:31of final victory
43:32was gone.
43:34Hitler had wanted
43:35to avoid a war
43:36on two fronts
43:36at all costs.
43:38He now had a war
43:39on three fronts,
43:40as the Allies
43:41were engaged
43:42against the German forces
43:43in Italy,
43:44France,
43:44and Russia.
43:46With the exception
43:47of the Italian front,
43:49which had been stabilized
43:50under Kesselring,
43:51there was a remorseless
43:52stream of bad news
43:53from both east
43:54and west.
43:56I think it's fair
43:57to say it would have
43:58taken a miracle
43:59for Germany
43:59to win in 1944.
44:01Certainly on the
44:02Eastern front,
44:03Germany no longer
44:05held a strategic initiative
44:06and indeed
44:07throughout 1944
44:08the Red Armies
44:09was to inflict
44:10a series of massive
44:11defeats
44:11upon the German arm.
44:13Perhaps Germany's
44:14only chance
44:15of prevailing
44:16in World War II
44:17in 1944
44:17would have been
44:19if they had managed
44:19to successfully
44:20defeat the Allied
44:21invasion of
44:21northwest Europe
44:22on the 6th of June
44:24in 1944.
44:26D-Day didn't so much
44:27end the war
44:28in itself
44:29but it ensured
44:30that Germany
44:30would be defeated
44:31because Germany
44:32was struggling
44:32to contain
44:33the Red Army
44:34on the Eastern front
44:35with 75%
44:36of its available resources.
44:37What D-Day ensured
44:39was that the remaining
44:3925% would have
44:41to be devoted
44:41towards fighting
44:42the other enemy
44:43namely Britain
44:43and the United States.
44:45This was a task
44:46that Germany
44:46was simply
44:47not capable of.
44:48These terrible
44:50psychological blows
44:52further damaged
44:53Hitler's already
44:54paranoid personality
44:55and served to
44:57further cloud
44:58his deranged
44:58decision-making ability.
45:01In contrast
45:02to the strutting
45:03peacock of 1940
45:04he had become
45:05a complete fantasist
45:06and recluse.
45:08The effects
45:09of the failed
45:10attempt by his own
45:11officers to take
45:12Hitler's life
45:12by the bomb explosion
45:14in his headquarters
45:15in June 1944
45:16further hampered
45:18his ability
45:18to make any
45:19form of rational
45:20decision.
45:23It might be said
45:23that the significance
45:24of the failed
45:25assassination attempt
45:26on Hitler
45:26is that in some
45:28respects it actually
45:28increased the war
45:29rather than shortened
45:30it because it brought
45:31to power some of
45:33the more ideologically
45:33fanatical members
45:35of the German Reich
45:35who ensured
45:36that the Allies
45:37would have to fight
45:38right to the streets
45:39of Berlin
45:39in order to
45:40completely defeat
45:40Germany.
45:41It therefore
45:42completely ruled out
45:43the idea of any
45:44compromise surrender
45:45on Germany's
45:46behalf, Germany
45:47was going to fight
45:48to the death
45:48and force its
45:49opponents to do so.
45:52One last manifestation
45:53of the decline
45:54of Hitler's
45:55decision-making power
45:56was his disastrous
45:57decision to mount
45:59the ill-fated
45:59Ardenne offensive
46:00in late 1944.
46:03This enormous
46:04operation drew
46:05on the last
46:06reserves of manpower
46:07available to the
46:08Wehrmacht.
46:09There is little
46:10doubt that the
46:11high command
46:12would have preferred
46:12to see these
46:13precious forces
46:14which were deployed
46:15in the Ardenne
46:16thrown against the
46:17ominous advances
46:18of the Red Army.
46:22Now he really was
46:23clutching at straws
46:24but once again
46:26it seemed Hitler
46:27was harking back
46:28to the glory days
46:29of the Blitzkrieg.
46:30Once again
46:31he hoped that a
46:32powerful and
46:33unexpected thrust
46:34through the Ardenne
46:35region which had led
46:36to the former victory
46:37over France in 1940
46:38would again bring him
46:40glory from the jaws
46:41of defeat.
46:43This time he was
46:44to be disappointed.
46:47Desperately short
46:48of both fuel
46:49and ammunition
46:50the massive German
46:51assault was quickly
46:52brought to a standstill
46:53by the superior
46:54Allied ground forces
46:55and equally quickly
46:57it was ground
46:58into submission
46:59by the ever-present
47:00Allied air force.
47:01The German attack
47:04in 1944
47:06the so-called
47:07Ardennes offensive
47:08was meant to be
47:09a classic Blitzkrieg
47:11and again it ran
47:12out of steam
47:13if you like
47:14for two reasons.
47:15It ran out of steam
47:16because of logistical
47:18problems
47:19and secondly
47:20it ran out
47:21not of steam
47:21but was pounded
47:22to pieces
47:22because it did not
47:23have control
47:24of the air.
47:24Once the weather
47:25cleared
47:25and the Allied
47:26air forces
47:27got into action
47:28a key component
47:29of the Blitzkrieg
47:30technique
47:30was air control
47:32and the kind
47:33of air superiority
47:34that they needed.
47:37Without control
47:38of the air
47:38this last Blitzkrieg
47:40did not enjoy
47:41the remotest
47:42possibility of success.
47:45Blitzkrieg
47:45had been designed
47:46as a fast-moving
47:47surprise attack.
47:48It was not a doctrine
47:49which could survive
47:50the attritional demands
47:51of a long
47:52drawn-out war.
47:54Undaunted
47:55Hitler ordered
47:56a last offensive
47:57in Hungary
47:58but by now
47:59their writing
48:00was on the wall
48:00there would never
48:02again be a successful
48:04Blitzkrieg attack.
48:07Given the depraved
48:08regime from which
48:09the doctrine sprang
48:10we can all
48:12be thankful
48:13for that.
48:29the end of the day
48:42with a driving
48:42and a rick
48:43which
48:43was
48:43a
48:44having a
48:44and a
48:45and a
48:46and a
48:46and a
48:46and a
48:47and a
48:47and a
48:47and a
48:47and a
48:48and a
48:48so
48:49the end of the day