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00:00The launch of Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union on the 22nd of June 1941,
00:21was Germany's most desperate gamble of the Second World War.
00:24It was a gamble Hitler felt compelled to take, if his ambition of the complete subjugation of Europe were to become a reality.
00:34Four-fifths of Germany's total armies, three million troops, were committed to the most appalling conflict in the history of warfare.
00:44In little more than one year, Hitler's armies had reduced vast areas of western Russia to dust and rubble,
00:52and subjected the Soviet peoples to unimaginable brutality.
00:57While the Allies looked on, Russia was in agony at being dragged through a nightmare of slaughter to the edge of extinction.
01:06ORCHESTRA PLAYS
01:11ORCHESTRA PLAYS
01:20ORCHESTRA PLAYS
01:27ORCHESTRA PLAYS
01:32In 1941, the conquest of Russia
01:55would not only have provided Germany
01:57with the agricultural and industrial supplies
02:00to ensure Hitler's mastery of Europe,
02:03it would have simultaneously rid him
02:05of the only military power
02:06capable of challenging his domination.
02:10The deaths of tens of millions of Russians
02:13was not simply an economic necessity.
02:17Their destruction would pave the way
02:18for the Großraum,
02:21a concept already under development
02:23by Heinrich Himmler
02:24as the culmination of Hitler's call
02:26for Lebensraum.
02:28The Großraum was envisaged
02:31as a gigantic Germanic state
02:33stretching from the Atlantic Ocean in the west
02:36to the mountains of the Urals in the east.
02:42The Großraum would be ruled
02:44by the master race of Germans,
02:46served by the more acceptable
02:48of the subhumans within its borders,
02:50but eliminating those like the Slavs
02:52and the Jews,
02:54who were too unredeemably decadent
02:55to be allowed to survive.
02:59Once established,
03:01this superstate would provide Hitler
03:03with the ideal platform for his ultimate aim,
03:06complete domination of the world.
03:10His vision was of a world
03:11in which nationalism would cease to exist,
03:14replaced by a universal society
03:16of masters and slaves.
03:18Standing between Hitler
03:22and the realisation of this vision
03:23were the armies of the Union
03:26of Soviet Socialist Republics,
03:28a fighting force
03:29whose condition of unpreparedness
03:32paid tribute to the paranoia
03:34of its political leadership
03:35and the excesses of a state
03:37which vied with Germany
03:38in the extent of its totalitarian oppression.
03:41The whole ideological thrust
03:45of the German plan for war,
03:47which was not just a nominal war of conquest,
03:51it was intended to be a war of extermination.
03:54It was intended first and foremost
03:56to root out what they called
03:57the Jewish Bolshevik gang
03:59who ran Russia.
04:01It was designed to destroy
04:03the political structure
04:04both of the Soviet Union
04:05and of the Red Army.
04:06So the degree of barbarisation
04:09which set in at a very early stage
04:11in the Soviet-German war,
04:14the Great Patriotic War,
04:16was a feature which persisted
04:18until the very last day of that war.
04:20While Hitler,
04:21having dealt with his political opponents
04:23during the Night of the Long Knives,
04:26was by the late 30s
04:27industriously nurturing the leadership
04:29of Germany's armed forces,
04:32Stalin was busily destroying Russia's.
04:36In 1936,
04:37Tukachevsky,
04:39chief of staff of the Russian army,
04:41was executed for treason
04:43following a trial
04:44which lasted only a single day.
04:48Six of the eight generals
04:49forming the court-martial
04:51which condemned him
04:52were themselves
04:53to follow suit soon after.
04:56By the end of the purge,
04:58the Russian army
04:59had lost three
05:00of the five remaining marshals
05:01of the Soviet Union,
05:03all 11 deputy ministers of defence,
05:0675 of the 80 members
05:09of the military Soviet,
05:11all the commanders
05:13of the military districts,
05:1413 of the 15 army commanders,
05:18more than half the corps commanders,
05:20and approximately 30%
05:22of the officers below brigade level.
05:27Stalin, however,
05:28controlled the balance of power in Europe.
05:30And when a German-Soviet
05:33non-aggression pact
05:34was announced in August 1939,
05:37the world was shocked.
05:40Cynically burying
05:41their ideological differences,
05:43fascist Germany
05:44and communist Russia
05:46agreed to take
05:47no military action
05:48against one another
05:49for the next 10 years.
05:52In a secret additional protocol,
05:54they also agreed
05:55to divide the independent states
05:57of Eastern Europe between them.
06:12The Soviet Union
06:13then threatened
06:14the Baltic states
06:15with invasion
06:16unless they allowed
06:17Soviet armies
06:18to be stationed
06:18within their borders.
06:21The Balts
06:21had little option
06:22but to comply.
06:25Rigged plebiscites
06:26gave a gloss of legitimacy
06:27to this invasion.
06:30Stalin now controlled
06:31Eastern Poland
06:32and Galassia,
06:33Lithuania,
06:34Latvia,
06:36and Estonia.
06:39Stalin's overall strategy
06:41was to create
06:42a barrier of Russian territory
06:43between the Soviet Union
06:45and Germany.
06:47Snug behind
06:48this defensive wall,
06:50he planned to allow
06:51the Allies
06:51to fight
06:52a mutually destructive war
06:53in the West.
06:54One year later,
06:56however,
06:57Stalin's hopes
06:58of a protracted war
06:59seemed to have evaporated
07:01with the brilliant success
07:03of Hitler's
07:03blitzkrieg tactics.
07:16The failure
07:17of the Luftwaffe
07:18in the Battle of Britain
07:19only made
07:20the Soviet position
07:21more vulnerable.
07:22An invasion of Britain
07:24had been postponed
07:25indefinitely.
07:27It would still be
07:2818 months
07:29to two years
07:30before Britain
07:30would be capable
07:31of mounting an attack
07:32on the mainland of Europe.
07:35The German submarine
07:36blockade of her shores
07:37and the relentless bombing
07:39of her war industries
07:40might delay
07:41such preparations
07:42even further.
07:43on the 18th of December 1940,
07:54Hitler's manic gaze
07:55turned firmly
07:56towards Russia.
08:00The first Barbarossa directive
08:02ominously stated
08:03that the USSR
08:04might be invaded
08:06even before the war
08:07with Great Britain
08:08was over.
08:08What was built
08:12into Barbarossa
08:12was not just
08:13the German operational
08:14military plans
08:15but a huge deception scheme
08:16and the aim
08:18of this deception scheme
08:19was actually very simple.
08:20It wasn't to introduce
08:22into Stalin's mind
08:23or the Russian mind
08:24uncertainty.
08:25It was to introduce
08:26certainty
08:27and the certainty
08:28was as follows
08:29that this is how
08:30the Russians proceeded.
08:31Yes, they knew
08:31there was going
08:32to be a German attack.
08:33The Germans produced
08:35various bits of information
08:36or leaked information
08:38and that was
08:39certainly clear.
08:41Stalin was well aware
08:41that sooner or later
08:42the Germans would attack.
08:44There was also
08:45the assumption
08:45very deftly introduced
08:47by the Germans
08:48that in fact
08:49before this attack
08:51there could well
08:52be negotiations.
08:54There might even be
08:55and the Russians
08:55now have disclosed this
08:56there might even
08:57have been
08:58a personal meeting
08:59between Hitler and Stalin.
09:01There were two elements
09:02to this German position.
09:03One was
09:03that the massive
09:04German military build-up
09:05was in fact
09:06if you like
09:07not an inducement
09:09but a form of coercion
09:11to force them
09:11into a negotiating position
09:13and on June the 14th
09:15he made this
09:15perfectly plain
09:16by the famous
09:17task statement
09:18saying look
09:18we know what you're up to
09:19we know all about
09:20these concentrations
09:21but there is nothing
09:22to prevent
09:23a settlement
09:24of Soviet-German relations.
09:26That was the first thing.
09:27The second thing
09:28was a certain element
09:29of self-deception
09:30on Stalin's side
09:31to the effect
09:33that one
09:33he strongly believed
09:35that Hitler
09:36would never embark
09:37on a two-front war.
09:39It would be folly.
09:41Actually what he didn't realize
09:42was Hitler was embarking
09:43on a one-front war
09:44because the war
09:44in the West
09:45though not wound down
09:46wasn't all that active.
09:48And the second thing
09:48was again
09:49Stalin's great concern
09:51actually
09:51and I think
09:52this went back
09:52to the First World War
09:54that although
09:55the Soviet general staff
09:56Zhukov and Vasilevsky
09:58and others
09:58particularly Timoshenko
10:00were urging Stalin
10:00to mobilize
10:01Stalin argued actually
10:03and he shouted
10:04at Timoshenko
10:05what do you want
10:05a war?
10:07Because the act
10:08of mobilization
10:09full formal mobilization
10:11essentially
10:13would trigger war.
10:15And the final thing
10:16was an important element
10:17of his strategy
10:17was not to provoke
10:18the Germans
10:18and indeed
10:19even on the morning
10:20of the 22nd of June 1941
10:22when the German armor
10:24is advancing
10:24he's still partly persuaded
10:26of what he thought
10:28was a provocatia.
10:30He even imagined
10:30it was some
10:31breakaway German generals
10:32who were trying it on
10:33as it were.
10:34This wasn't the real thing.
10:36As the German build-up
10:38toward Operation Barbarossa
10:39continued
10:40Stalin's attempts
10:42to pacify Hitler
10:43grew more desperate.
10:47He had already stated
10:48in an interview
10:49with Pravda
10:50in November 1939
10:51that it was not Germany
10:53who had attacked
10:54Britain and France
10:55but Britain and France
10:57who had attacked Germany.
11:01Stalin now forbade
11:02any criticism of Germany
11:03to be printed
11:04in the newspapers.
11:06When Hitler successfully
11:07invaded Greece
11:08and Yugoslavia
11:09Stalin expelled
11:11the Yugoslavian ambassador
11:13to Moscow
11:13and refused a request
11:15to recognize
11:16the Greek government
11:17in exile.
11:18Stalin felt
11:21he was continuing
11:22to buy time
11:23by these unrequited
11:24concessions
11:25but his use
11:26of the breathing space
11:28which he had already obtained
11:29was totally devoid
11:30of any worthwhile attempt
11:32to remedy
11:32his military disadvantages.
11:35By May 1940
11:37170 Soviet divisions
11:40were stationed
11:41in newly occupied territory
11:42with the result
11:44that over half the army
11:45were occupying positions
11:47whose fortifications
11:48and rearward communications
11:49were incomplete.
11:52Indeed, by June
11:54with a German attack imminent
11:56Western's special military district
11:59was a shambles.
12:02Many formations
12:03were between 6,000 to 7,000 men
12:06short of wartime establishment.
12:07levies of experienced personnel
12:11had been hived off
12:12to build new tank
12:13and aviation units.
12:16Only one of six mechanized corps
12:18had received their full complement
12:19of equipment.
12:21Three of the four motorized divisions
12:23had no tanks
12:24and four out of every five vehicles
12:27in the tank fleets
12:28were obsolete.
12:31Four of the corps
12:32had only one quarter
12:33of their designated motor vehicles
12:35and in another four
12:36one in three motor vehicles
12:38needed repairs.
12:41Therefore,
12:43although the opposing forces
12:44had amassed vast amounts
12:46of weaponry
12:46along their common borders
12:47the Soviet Red Army
12:49and the German Wehrmacht
12:51were anything but
12:53equal adversaries.
12:55The Red Army consisted
12:57of about 5 million men
12:58that is in the western part
13:00of Russia
13:00never mind those
13:01who were in the far east
13:02and the tank strength
13:04of the Red Army
13:04on the 21st of June 1941
13:07was 23,108
13:09of which you can argue
13:11possibly that 8,000 tanks
13:14were battle ready
13:16and in good condition.
13:18On the German side
13:19the German strength
13:20was roughly about
13:20three and a half million men
13:21possibly with their allies
13:23the Finns, the Slovaks,
13:25the Hungarians and so on.
13:26You can bring that up
13:27to let us say
13:27about four million.
13:29In terms of armor
13:30the Germans were able
13:32to employ something
13:33like 3,300 tanks
13:34but numbers don't tell
13:36the whole story.
13:37Indeed, numbers
13:37are extremely misleading.
13:39The interpretation
13:39has really got to be
13:40on A, the operational
13:42readiness of the armies
13:43in which the Wehrmacht
13:44was clearly absolutely superior
13:46and ready to go
13:47and was well prepared
13:49and briefed for its task.
13:50If you look at the Red Army
13:51there were severe problems
13:52of manning, organization,
13:54training, logistics, supply.
13:57Even more important
13:58the Germans were operating
14:00according to a plan
14:01and indeed the work
14:02I've done
14:03and many of my Russian colleagues
14:04showed this
14:04that the Red Army
14:06was in an extraordinary position.
14:07There was no plan
14:08in spite of what people say.
14:10The Red Army
14:10could neither defend
14:11nor attack.
14:12The awesome German armies
14:24which the 170
14:26understrength divisions
14:27of the Russian troops faced
14:28were divided
14:29into three large groups.
14:32These consisted of
14:33148 fully manned
14:35and equipped divisions
14:36of which 19 were Panzer
14:38and 15 Panzer Grenadier divisions.
14:42The Army Group South
14:43was commanded by
14:44Field Marshal
14:45Gert von Rundstedt
14:47and was charged
14:48with seizing Kiev
14:49and taking control
14:51of the Ukraine
14:51as far as the river Dnipr.
14:55Field Marshal von Bock's
14:56Army Group Center
14:57was to strike
14:58towards Smolensk.
15:01Army Group North
15:02under Field Marshal
15:03von Lieb
15:03was to attack
15:04through the Baltics
15:05and seize Leningrad.
15:08The three German Army Groups
15:10were supplemented
15:11by 500,000 Finnish troops
15:13advancing from their homeland
15:15in 14 divisions
15:16and 150,000 Romanians
15:19attacking along the Black Sea
15:21toward Edessa.
15:25These forces,
15:27together with the Luftwaffe
15:28which had devoted
15:2980% of its operational strength,
15:322,770 aircraft,
15:34to the build-up
15:35for Barbarossa,
15:37fielded over 3,350 tanks,
15:41over 7,000 artillery pieces,
15:4360,000 motor vehicles
15:45and 625,000 horses.
15:53The Russian Army
15:54still clung
15:55to its peacetime structure.
15:58Should war occur,
15:59then each military district
16:01would be transformed
16:02into army groupings
16:03similar in structure
16:05to the Germans.
16:09The North Soviet Front
16:10was to repel advances
16:12through the Balkans
16:13and defend Leningrad
16:14from Finnish attack.
16:16The Northwest,
16:18West and Southwest Fronts
16:19would engage
16:20the three main
16:21German Army Groups
16:22and the Southern Front
16:24would deal with
16:25any advance
16:25toward Edessa.
16:29Behind these lines,
16:35the contrast between
16:36the warring nations
16:37could not have been greater.
16:39While Germany boasted
16:41one of the finest
16:42industrial infrastructures
16:43in the world,
16:45Russia had still not completed
16:46its Industrial Revolution.
16:51Stalin had declared
16:52in 1931
16:53that one feature
16:55of the history
16:56of old Russia
16:57was the continual beatings
16:59that she suffered
16:59for falling behind
17:01for her backwardness,
17:03for military backwardness,
17:05for agricultural backwardness.
17:07We are 50 or 100 years
17:10behind the advanced countries.
17:12We must make good
17:13this distance in 10 years.
17:15Either we do it
17:16or they crush us.
17:21By 1941,
17:23a generation of upheaval
17:25had left its mark
17:26economically
17:26and psychologically.
17:29Revolution and civil war
17:31had been followed
17:31by the destruction
17:32of the peasantry
17:33and their enforced
17:34collectivization.
17:36Whole segments
17:37of the population
17:38had been uprooted
17:39and transported
17:40to work
17:41the new industries
17:41set up
17:42in the mineral-rich regions
17:43of Siberia,
17:44the Urals,
17:45and Kazakhstan.
17:50The Russian people,
17:52deprived of news
17:53of the build-up
17:54on their borders
17:55and subject to a media
17:56devoid of any mention
17:58of the increasingly
17:59anti-Soviet rhetoric
18:00of Hitler,
18:01were totally unprepared
18:03for the latest disaster
18:04which was about
18:05to descend on them.
18:15At 0400 hours
18:17on the 22nd of June 1941,
18:19the maelstrom
18:21which was Barbarossa
18:22finally erupted.
18:24The German armies
18:25of the Blitzkrieg
18:26sliced through
18:27the Russian forces
18:28on every front.
18:30Faced by the results
18:31of his intransigent
18:32refusal to act,
18:34Stalin panicked.
18:41While his army headquarters
18:43desperately tried
18:44to piece together
18:45the most rudimentary picture
18:46of what was happening,
18:48he ordered an immediate
18:49counter-offensive
18:50on all fronts.
18:54As the first reports
18:55of the devastation
18:56his own command
18:57had helped to create
18:58filtered through,
19:00he was shattered.
19:03All that Lenin created,
19:05we have lost forever,
19:07he declared.
19:09He finally retreated
19:10to his dacha,
19:11not to emerge
19:12until the 3rd of July.
19:14That what stunned
19:16the Red Army commanders
19:18was that the German army
19:20proceeded
19:20without any artillery support.
19:23It simply sliced through.
19:25And what the Red Army command
19:26had expected
19:27was there would be
19:27a meeting of engagements,
19:29you would have
19:29opening actions,
19:31that would develop over,
19:32let us say,
19:33something like 10 days,
19:34you would have
19:34large, complex frontier engagements,
19:37and then the real war
19:38would be done.
19:39When in 48 hours,
19:41in Army Group North,
19:42the German panzer columns
19:43were actually
19:43approaching Riga.
19:45So this technique,
19:48if you like,
19:49of the Germans
19:50and the use of their armor
19:52in that respect
19:53came, as I say,
19:54as an extraordinary
19:55and totally disorganizing surprise
19:59even to senior
19:59Russian commanders.
20:01And within 48 hours,
20:02if you read
20:02the Russian general staff reports,
20:05it's perfectly plain,
20:06they have totally lost
20:07control of the situation.
20:09The thing is chaos,
20:10they don't know
20:11where their troops are,
20:11they don't know
20:12what's happening,
20:12they don't have accurate reports
20:13of German movements,
20:14they're not quite sure
20:15where the German thrust
20:16is going to be.
20:17All that they did know,
20:18actually,
20:19was to the south,
20:20in Army Group South
20:21under Rundstedt,
20:23that was being
20:23slightly delayed.
20:25And there,
20:25the Russians had
20:26a little more time
20:27to prepare.
20:28And if you compare
20:29the operational narrative there,
20:31yes, the Germans
20:32are somewhat held up,
20:33not for very long,
20:34but in the northwest
20:35and in the west,
20:37there's total collapse.
20:38And of course,
20:39the consequence was
20:40that Stalin
20:40operated his usual practice.
20:42He took out the front commanders
20:43and shot them.
20:45At the front,
20:47the rapier thrusts
20:48of the German panzer divisions
20:49were skewering through
20:51the chaotic Russian defenses.
20:54The panzer groups
20:55created deadly breaches
20:56in the Soviet line,
20:58slicing the Red Army forces
20:59into isolated segments.
21:01The supporting German divisions
21:07then moved forward
21:09in encircling advances
21:10which surrounded
21:11these pockets of defenders.
21:14The ferocity and effectiveness
21:16of the panzer attacks
21:17was so great
21:18that some of the pockets
21:20were gigantic.
21:22Groups of up to 15 Russian divisions
21:24were surrounded
21:25and mercilessly pummeled
21:27into surrender.
21:28The encirclement of Minsk
21:35by the right flank
21:36of Army Group North
21:37and the left flank
21:38of Army Group Center
21:39yielded 300,000 prisoners,
21:432,500 tanks
21:44and 1,400 artillery pieces.
21:4932 of the 43 Russian divisions
21:51were gutted within a week
21:53and the road to Moscow
21:55penetrated to a depth
21:56of 300 kilometers.
22:09The remainder of Army Group North
22:11scythed into the Baltics
22:13capturing Riga,
22:14the Latvian capital.
22:17Only in the south
22:18were the German forces
22:19limited to shallow advances
22:20towards Luov and Rauno.
22:22In the skies,
22:30the Soviet air force
22:31was faring worse
22:32than the land army
22:33if that were possible.
22:35The mainly obsolete
22:36Russian fighters,
22:3820 to 100 miles per hour
22:40slower than the Messerschmitt 109s,
22:42were constantly outfought.
22:45Many of them
22:46never got the opportunity
22:47of aerial combat.
22:49The Luftwaffe claimed
22:50to have destroyed
22:511,500 aircraft
22:53on the ground
22:54during the first day
22:55of Barbarossa.
22:56On the ground,
23:12chaos reigned.
23:14The Luftwaffe
23:14were pulverizing
23:16the road and rail links
23:17behind the Russian lines.
23:19Many officers
23:20were not even bothering
23:21to use code
23:22in their desperate pleas
23:23for instructions
23:24from their headquarters.
23:25struggling masses
23:27of uncoordinated troops
23:29were being slaughtered
23:30by the German troops
23:31as they attempted
23:33to obey Stalin's orders
23:34to counterattack.
23:36Others were being
23:37machine-gunned
23:38by their own military police
23:40for fleeing from positions
23:42which were worse
23:42than hopeless.
23:43The reality was
23:47that they were left
23:47leaderless.
23:49First of all,
23:49they really had no orders.
23:51Sometimes they had guns
23:52but no ammunition.
23:53Sometimes they had,
23:54on many occasions,
23:55they had tanks
23:56but no fuel.
23:57Or they had tanks
23:57which broke down.
23:58Or they had orders
23:59which were contradictory.
24:01And there was
24:02the usual situation
24:04whereby the order
24:06simply was advance.
24:07But you mean advance
24:08against cracked German divisions.
24:10And many of the Red Army divisions
24:13simply broke up.
24:15And what you got
24:16were very large pockets
24:17of Red Army troops.
24:20For example,
24:20within a matter of
24:21four or five days,
24:23the Wehrmacht,
24:24the German army in the east,
24:25had managed to encircle
24:26350,000 Red Army soldiers.
24:28350,000.
24:30That was the first
24:30of the beginning, actually,
24:32of a number of huge encirclements.
24:34By the 3rd of July,
24:38the battle for the frontier
24:39was over.
24:41The German armies
24:42had advanced along a line
24:43from the river Davina
24:44in the north
24:45to the Dnieper in the south.
24:49General Holder,
24:50chief of German general staff,
24:52declared that the war
24:53against the Soviet Union
24:54had taken only 14 days to win.
24:57But the German intelligence
25:01had totally underestimated
25:02the reserves
25:03which Russia could command.
25:06By July the 1st,
25:085,300,000 men
25:10had been mobilized.
25:12Stalin had emerged
25:13from his isolation
25:14to broadcast a message
25:16of patriotism
25:17and resistance to the nation.
25:18For once,
25:21the Russian people
25:22were told the truth.
25:24The pre-war complacency
25:26which Stalin had done
25:27so much to foster
25:28had now rapidly
25:30to be undone.
25:33In Leningrad,
25:34when news of war
25:35reached the factories,
25:37the general consensus
25:38was that it would be over
25:39within the week.
25:41Well, it won't necessarily
25:43be over in a week,
25:44one Russian worker
25:45was reported as saying.
25:46It will take them
25:48three or four weeks
25:49to get to Berlin.
25:52Stalin now took
25:53direct control
25:54of the Red Army.
25:58But the general mobilization
25:59of Russian troops
26:00failed to curtail
26:02the German advance.
26:04Four reserve armies
26:06of 37 divisions
26:07were dispatched
26:07to bolster West Front
26:09in the general area
26:10of Smolensk.
26:13The Germans countered
26:14with yet another encirclement.
26:16And the panzer groups
26:17of generals Hoth
26:18and Guderian
26:19smashed through
26:21the Soviet line
26:22and maneuvered
26:23300,000 Russian troops
26:24into an indefensible pocket.
26:29Another 150,000 prisoners,
26:322,000 tanks,
26:33and 2,000 artillery pieces
26:35fell into German hands.
26:38Goebbels announced
26:39that the eastern continent
26:41lies like a limp virgin
26:43in the mighty arms
26:44of the German Mars.
26:47Army Group South
26:48finally broke through
26:49the Russian Southwest Front
26:51and another pocket
26:52yielded a further toll
26:53of 100,000 prisoners.
26:57Now the scale
26:58of these encirclements,
26:59half a million men,
27:01and by the last week
27:03in November,
27:04Red Army strength
27:05dropped to a level
27:07which was its lowest
27:09during the war
27:10because the Germans
27:10had taken
27:113.1 million prisoners.
27:143.1 million prisoners
27:15is an enormous number.
27:16Indeed,
27:16that was basically
27:17the pre-war
27:19Red Army destroyed.
27:21More than 30 divisions
27:23had been completely
27:23wiped out.
27:25What astonished
27:26the Germans,
27:26of course,
27:27was as these divisions
27:28were literally wiped out
27:29from the order of battle,
27:30more and more divisions
27:31took their place.
27:32And while the Germans
27:33were calculating
27:34on the fact
27:34that they thought
27:35they knew
27:36the Russian order of battle,
27:37what came as an astonishing
27:38and disturbing shock to them
27:40was that more and more
27:41divisions are coming
27:42into the line.
27:43Not all was fully manned,
27:44but the Russian order of battle
27:45was in fact
27:46being steadily built up.
27:48The devastating speed
27:50of the German advance
27:51was due to the power
27:53and tactical brilliance
27:54of its panzer divisions.
27:57The concept
27:58of an integrated armor force
27:59had intrigued
28:00the German military
28:01since the close
28:02of the First World War.
28:04By the early 30s,
28:0610 prototype tanks
28:07had been designed
28:08and built in secret.
28:11Ironically,
28:12the initial development
28:13of what would become
28:14the most technically
28:15accomplished
28:16and cost-effective
28:17tank program
28:18ever seen
28:19took place
28:20at the German-Soviet
28:21tank school
28:22at Kazan in Russia.
28:25At the outbreak
28:26of war in the East,
28:27the backbone
28:28of the Panzer Corps
28:29was the Panzer Mark IV.
28:32Designed by Kup,
28:34and weighing 17.3 tons,
28:37the Panzer Kampfwagen IV
28:39carried a crew of five
28:40at a maximum speed
28:42of 18.5 miles per hour.
28:45Its armor varied in thickness
28:46from 8 to 30 centimeters,
28:49and it was armed
28:50with a 75-millimeter turret gun
28:52and two machine guns.
28:55Supported by the lighter Mark III,
28:58which was similar in size
28:59wasn't appearance,
29:00the Mark IV swept all before it
29:03until the Russian T-34 tank
29:05made its appearance in numbers.
29:07What the Russians had tried to do
29:09in between 1940 and 1945
29:11was to bring in two new tanks,
29:13the T-34,
29:14which actually was the tank
29:16which had been tested in 1939,
29:17and a rather heavier tank,
29:19the Klimvor of Schilow.
29:20But it only produced
29:21about a thousand of each.
29:24So therefore,
29:24these T-34s
29:26were distributed
29:27in very small packets.
29:30Remember,
29:30the battlefront
29:31is about 2,000 miles long.
29:33So what do you do
29:33with a thousand tanks?
29:34On the other hand,
29:36it did come as an enormous shock
29:37the first time
29:38that the Germans
29:39encountered the T-34
29:40because the T-34's armor,
29:42mobility, speed,
29:43and gun power
29:44was something
29:44they simply hadn't suspected.
29:46And Guderian,
29:47as you will remember,
29:48actually,
29:49in November 1941,
29:50ran into a T-34 ambush
29:52and was completely destroyed.
29:57Russian armored warfare
29:58was inhibited
30:00by Stalin's disenchantment
30:01with tank divisions,
30:03which had led him
30:04in the 30s
30:04to utilize his armor
30:05only in the support
30:07of infantry formations.
30:10After witnessing
30:11German successes
30:12on the Western Front,
30:14Stalin changed his mind.
30:16But the reorganization
30:17of Russian armor
30:18was not completed
30:19before the launch
30:20of Barbarossa.
30:23Even though Russian tanks
30:24outnumbered German
30:25two to one at the front
30:27and six to one overall,
30:30tactical ineffectiveness,
30:32obsolete models,
30:33and widespread disrepair
30:34tipped the advantage
30:36overwhelmingly in favor
30:37of Germany
30:37during the first stages
30:39of the conflict.
30:41But it wasn't just
30:42the quality of the German tank.
30:43It was the capability
30:45of the panzer commanders
30:46to do with their armor
30:48what was essential.
30:49That is,
30:49they had excellent
30:50command and control facilities.
30:52At that time,
30:53they had very good support
30:54logistical facilities.
30:55And indeed,
30:56essentially,
30:57they knew what
30:57they were doing.
30:59So that,
31:00although German
31:02Mark II,
31:03Tanks and IIIs
31:04might run up against
31:05a huge,
31:06elephantine,
31:07Klimvoroshilov tank,
31:09the KV-1,
31:10the big heavy tank,
31:11and German shells
31:12might bounce off them,
31:14nonetheless,
31:14such was the,
31:16I must say,
31:16the haphazard
31:17and untrained manner
31:19in which the Russians
31:19handled their armor anyway
31:21that the Germans
31:21soon made short meat of them.
31:33After a month
31:34of victorious progress,
31:36the German high command
31:37were disconcerted
31:39by the rapidity
31:39of their own advance.
31:42Their armies
31:42were now fighting
31:43on a front
31:441,000 miles wide.
31:47The Stuckers
31:47could no longer deliver
31:48the concerted hammer blows
31:50which had punched
31:50the holes in the Russian lines
31:52which the Panzers
31:53had so mercilessly exploited.
31:56Even though
31:57the Soviet Air Force
31:58had by now
31:59lost approximately
32:005,000 aircraft,
32:02the supply of replacements
32:04seemed endless.
32:06The factories in the east,
32:08which were churning out
32:09more effective fighter models,
32:11were out of
32:12Luftwaffe bombing range.
32:14The German air assault
32:16began to run low
32:17on fighters.
32:18The Luftwaffe also had
32:21serious supply problems.
32:23The distance from home base
32:25and the destruction
32:27of the transport infrastructure
32:28meant that aircraft
32:30replacement parts
32:31had to be flown
32:32to forward airfields.
32:36The lengthening supply lines
32:38were also affecting
32:39the German ground forces.
32:42Tank commanders,
32:43hundreds of miles
32:44from their Polish depots,
32:46nevertheless pressed
32:47for the final thrust
32:48toward Moscow.
32:50They argued that
32:51only the continuation
32:52of the offensive
32:53would prevent the Russians
32:55from organizing
32:56a fresh line of resistance.
32:59While many of Hitler's generals
33:01disagreed that such an attack
33:03should be launched immediately,
33:05they were almost unanimous
33:06in recommending that Moscow
33:08should become
33:09the primary objective
33:10of the next phase
33:11of the war.
33:14Hitler, on the other hand,
33:16was worried about
33:16the possibility
33:17of the gaps
33:18between the panzer divisions
33:19and the main armies
33:20being exploited
33:21by Russian reinforcements.
33:24He also feared
33:26that the hundreds of thousands
33:27of Soviet troops
33:28left behind the German lines
33:30in the wake of the advance
33:31might coordinate their actions
33:33into an effective guerrilla movement.
33:35According to the account
33:38of one witness
33:39to the disarray
33:40behind the German advance,
33:42he need hardly have worried.
33:44One Russian soldier reported,
33:48Thousands of mobilized men
33:50from various places
33:51which have already been captured
33:52and from near the front line zone
33:54roam from place to place.
33:57They lack any purpose,
33:59any sense of order.
34:01They have no uniforms.
34:03Twenty percent are barefoot.
34:05The leaders are leaving
34:07and they are abandoning us
34:09to ruin.
34:14Hitler had never been
34:15fully convinced
34:16of the importance of Moscow
34:18and continued to regard it
34:20as a secondary objective.
34:22The debate stretched out
34:23until mid-August.
34:25A vital month of summer weather
34:27was wasted.
34:29The Russians had the breathing space
34:31to throw reserve divisions
34:32into the gaps
34:33in their defenses.
34:35Barely trained,
34:37poorly equipped,
34:39some in the battered remnants
34:40of their civilian clothing,
34:42their stubborn ferocity
34:43meant that they were still
34:45a force to be reckoned with.
34:47A rapid campaign
34:48to crush Russia
34:49should have been over
34:50by August wasn't.
34:52They had to think again
34:53and the first thing,
34:54of course,
34:55that they had to think about
34:56were logistics and supply.
34:57No great preparation
34:58had been made
34:59for a winter campaign in Russia.
35:00The second thing was
35:02that the German high command
35:04and German intelligence
35:05and the German military
35:06as a whole
35:07had vastly underestimated
35:08the ability of the Red Army
35:11to resist.
35:12Their aim was to destroy
35:14the Red Army
35:15west of the Dnieper,
35:16but they hadn't done it.
35:17Whatever they did
35:18to the Red Army
35:18and they battered it mercilessly,
35:21they didn't destroy it.
35:22It was still basically there
35:23at the end of December.
35:25And when you compare
35:27both the Red Army
35:28and the German Army
35:29at that time,
35:29you will see the Germans
35:31pushing their very last battalion
35:33down to the line.
35:35And the Red Army
35:36on the other side
35:37is desperately trying
35:38to push its final
35:40and important reserves
35:42into position as well.
35:42So it was two armies
35:43which were desperately stretched.
35:46But in terms of,
35:48if you like,
35:48survivability,
35:50in terms of responsiveness,
35:53the Red Army
35:53just had the edge.
35:55Only just,
35:56but they had that vital
35:57and important edge.
36:00Eventually,
36:01the generals were silenced
36:02and two major objectives
36:04were prioritized.
36:06The capture of Leningrad
36:07and the fall of the Ukraine.
36:11A giant pincer movement
36:13involving half
36:14of Army Group's center
36:15and the left flank
36:17of Army Group's south
36:18began to close its jaws
36:20on a huge pocket
36:21of Russian forces
36:22to the rear of Kiev.
36:24Field Marshal Zhukov,
36:29the Soviet Chief of Staff,
36:31pleaded with Stalin
36:32for a strategic withdrawal
36:33of the troops
36:34defending the city.
36:36He was dismissed
36:37from his post.
36:39Marshal Timoshenko,
36:41the newly appointed
36:42Southwest commander,
36:43arrived just in time
36:45to see the trapped Soviet divisions.
36:47The 600,000 prisoners
36:49taken by the Germans
36:51remain the highest number
36:52ever captured
36:53in a single engagement.
36:59The battle for the Ukraine
37:01now centered
37:02on the Crimean peninsula,
37:04where the right flank
37:05of Army Group South
37:06pressed the Soviet 51st Army
37:09back towards Sebastopol.
37:12While half of the German
37:14group's center
37:15were engaged
37:16in subduing the Ukraine,
37:18Marshal Zhukov,
37:19transferred to the reserve forces
37:21behind West Front,
37:23seized the opportunity
37:24to attack the German
37:25Fourth Army.
37:27Occupying a salient
37:29near Smolensk,
37:30the Germans were now
37:31themselves vulnerable
37:32to encirclement.
37:33The Fourth Army
37:36were thrown back
37:3612 kilometers,
37:38but without sufficient
37:39tanks and aircraft,
37:41Zhukov failed
37:42to tighten the noose
37:43he had made.
37:45However,
37:46in terms of morale,
37:48Zhukov's counterthrust
37:49was highly significant.
37:52His action was the first
37:53substantial Soviet
37:54counterattack of the war.
37:58Hitler's response
37:59was to regroup
38:01Army Group's center
38:02and prepare
38:03the most critical
38:04operation of the campaign.
38:07Operation Typhoon,
38:09the drive towards Moscow,
38:11was finally underway.
38:14Seventy divisions,
38:16spearheaded by 1,500 tanks,
38:19would race toward
38:20the Russian capital
38:21before the rains of autumn
38:22or the snows of winter
38:24could halt their progress.
38:29On September the 30th,
38:31General Guderian's
38:332nd Panzer Group
38:34almost inevitably
38:35broke through
38:36the Soviet line
38:37and had encircled
38:38the defending Bryansk Front
38:40by the 6th of October.
38:43Simultaneously,
38:45the Western Front,
38:46commanded by
38:46Marshal Timoshenko,
38:48fell into a similar trap.
38:51The pockets of
38:52Vyazma and Bryansk,
38:54containing nine armies
38:55of 71 divisions,
38:56were almost
38:57completely destroyed.
39:01Another 660,000 troops
39:03faced the grim hospitality
39:05that the German army
39:07meted out to prisoners of war
39:08and the road to Moscow
39:10lay open.
39:17In the Baltics,
39:19by the 16th of August,
39:21von Lieb's army group North
39:22had captured the city of Novgorod,
39:24a vital target
39:26in the approach
39:27to Leningrad.
39:28The beleaguered defenders
39:29had fought to the death
39:30following the German discovery
39:32of the city's
39:33defensive plans
39:34on the corpse
39:35of a Soviet officer.
39:38General Hopner's
39:394th Panzer Group
39:40resumed its drive
39:42towards Leningrad,
39:43but without supporting infantry,
39:45its progress was limited.
39:48Leningrad was a vital centre
39:50of the wartime production industry,
39:52and reserves and equipment
39:54were poured into
39:55the defence of the city.
39:58The citizens themselves
39:59formed into militia,
40:02divisions which were flung
40:03against the Germans
40:04more in despair than hope.
40:07Following a basic training period,
40:09averaging 16 hours,
40:11the 1st Militia Division
40:13was sent to the front
40:14six days after being formed,
40:16the 2nd two days,
40:20and the 3rd
40:20the same day
40:22it was established.
40:24There certainly was
40:25a surge of patriotism,
40:26but there was also,
40:27as the war went on,
40:28a deepening vengeful feeling,
40:30a feeling of revenge,
40:32and there was also a sense,
40:34and I think whatever artificiality
40:36there may be about it,
40:37it is true,
40:37there was a sense
40:38of the kind of morality of this.
40:39This is something you had to do.
40:40Well, why otherwise
40:42did you get kids of 14
40:43working 12, 14 hours a day
40:46in ammunition plants?
40:48Why did you get
40:49a lot of these
40:51extraordinary sacrifices
40:53on the part of ordinary people
40:54who didn't have to do it,
40:56and yet under a really
40:57ferocious Soviet system
40:59which either abandoned
41:00the population
41:01or brutally coerced them?
41:03I mean,
41:04they were caught
41:04between two fires.
41:05I do remember
41:06talking to one
41:07senior Soviet officer
41:08and asking him,
41:09what really happened
41:11in terms of a choice.
41:14He said,
41:14we were faced
41:15with a choice
41:15between two dictators,
41:18Hitler on the one hand
41:19and Stalin on the other,
41:20but we preferred
41:21to pick the one
41:22who spoke Russian.
41:24Despite such
41:25gargantuan efforts,
41:26the first shells
41:27began to pour down
41:28on Leningrad
41:29early in September.
41:32With the arrival
41:34of the 18th Army
41:35to reinforce the panzers
41:36on the 8th,
41:37the German stranglehold
41:38on the city
41:39tightened further.
41:41The capture of
41:42Schlüsselburg
41:43to the east
41:44signaled the end
41:45of rail transport.
41:48When Marshal Zhukov
41:49arrived to take over
41:50the defense of the city
41:51on the 10th of September,
41:53he found the defenders
41:54in an advanced state
41:56of disorganization
41:57and the inhabitants
41:58close to panic.
42:01Undaunted,
42:02he briskly set about
42:03bolstering its defenses.
42:04A shortage of anti-tank guns
42:07was dealt with
42:08by converting
42:09anti-aircraft artillery
42:11to the task
42:11of attempting
42:12to halt the panzers.
42:14Six brigades
42:15of naval infantry
42:16and students
42:17were formed
42:18and reinforcements
42:19drafted in
42:20from the Karelian Isthmus.
42:24Zhukov began
42:25to take the fight
42:26to the Germans
42:26through raids
42:27and counterattacks.
42:28But by now,
42:30the German troops
42:31had pierced
42:32the inner circle
42:32of defenses
42:33and were rampaging
42:34through the suburbs.
42:37After a furious exchange
42:39of advances
42:39and retreats,
42:41at the end of the month,
42:42the defenders
42:43were still hanging
42:43onto their city
42:44by their fingernails.
42:46It seemed inevitable
42:48that Leningrad
42:48would capitulate.
42:51But as Zhukov
42:52awaited a renewed assault,
42:54the 4th Panzer Group
42:55suddenly departed
42:56to join the battle
42:57for Moscow.
42:58And the remaining
42:59German forces
43:00began to build defenses.
43:03Leningrad would not
43:04now be taken by force.
43:06It would be starved
43:07into submission.
43:11All normal rules
43:12of warfare,
43:13insofar as they apply,
43:14were abandoned.
43:15This applied on both sides.
43:16For example,
43:17as the Soviet partisan
43:18movement grew up.
43:19Then the war
43:20became very savage.
43:21But I have asked
43:22many, many Russians,
43:23whom I know very well,
43:24really, what really happened?
43:25I mean, why did the war change?
43:27And basically,
43:29their explanation was this.
43:30Both soldiers
43:31and civilians,
43:32and indeed,
43:32many of my contemporaries,
43:35they said,
43:35in the first three months
43:36of the war,
43:37that's from June
43:37until December,
43:38it seemed to be a war
43:40like anything else.
43:41They realized
43:42something terrible
43:43had happened.
43:44And they heard
43:44the Soviet government's
43:46statements about
43:47German atrocities,
43:48but they didn't really
43:49believe them.
43:49But when the survivors
43:51came back
43:52and back into
43:54Soviet territory
43:55and told the real truth
43:56about what was happening,
43:57I mean,
43:58the ghastliness of this,
43:59then it suddenly dawned
44:00on the Russians
44:01that something quite,
44:02quite unbelievably
44:03terrible had happened.
44:05And then you get
44:05a change in Russian propaganda,
44:07not just government propaganda,
44:08not just Stalin on the
44:09July the 3rd, 1941,
44:11beginning his broadcast,
44:12brothers and sisters,
44:13and half the Soviet population
44:15nearly fainted,
44:16I mean,
44:16coming from Stalin.
44:17Then you get propaganda
44:18about kill,
44:19you get propaganda
44:20about destroy the Germans,
44:23you get propaganda
44:24about really
44:26the full ferocity
44:28of this kind of thing
44:29on a purely personal base.
44:30It is your responsibility.
44:32I mean,
44:32I've talked to women
44:34soldiers in the Red Army
44:36who were tank commanders,
44:37who served in artillery battalions,
44:40and you ask them,
44:41why did you go?
44:43Women,
44:43why were you there?
44:44Why were you handling
44:45100-pound shells,
44:46many anti-aircraft guns
44:47because they said,
44:49my mother and father
44:50said you should go.
44:53The German invaders
44:55controlled all of Western Russia
44:57on a line from Leningrad
44:58in the north
44:58to Rostov on the Black Sea,
45:01and the Red Army
45:02was still retreating before them.
45:05The countryside they left behind
45:07was a wasteland.
45:10The first few months
45:11of the war
45:12had robbed the nation
45:13of nearly 50%
45:15of her grain-producing lands.
45:18Where the armies
45:19had fallen back,
45:21vast tracts of crops
45:23lay ruined in the fields.
45:26The rotting carcasses
45:27of livestock,
45:28slaughtered to deprive
45:29the Germans of food,
45:31mingled their stench
45:32with the corpses
45:33of soldiers and peasants.
45:35villages tumbled into ruins,
45:40became the silent memorials
45:42of their former inhabitants.
45:44The mangled wreckage
45:46of sabotaged industries
45:47smouldered beneath the skies.
45:51Amid the ruin,
45:52thousands of starving,
45:54orphaned children
45:55searched vainly
45:56for their parents.
45:57But the fighting spirit
46:02of the Russians
46:02was far from crushed.
46:05It had been inflamed
46:06by accounts
46:07of the slaughter
46:08of prisoners of war
46:09and the murder
46:10and torture
46:11committed by the German invaders.
46:14Even the constant series
46:16of military reverses
46:17failed to dampen
46:18the ardor of defenders
46:19whose motherland
46:20had been ravaged.
46:23Their system wasn't perfect.
46:24It had sacrificed
46:25millions of men.
46:26It wasn't all that efficient.
46:27But when it was all boiled down,
46:30what are they left with?
46:33I mean,
46:33this barbarous,
46:34murderous,
46:35genocidal regime
46:36which exploited the country
46:38and even more, actually.
46:41And this is a point
46:41which has never much
46:42been explored,
46:43but which actually humiliated
46:45the Russians,
46:46denigrated them as a people.
46:47And this coming
46:48from the Germans,
46:49whom they'd always respected
46:50as Beethoven,
46:51Goethe, Heine.
46:52What kind of people
46:53were these?
46:54It wasn't just the SS.
46:55It was the whole
46:57German impress of this
47:00which I think
47:01shocked the Russians
47:02tremendously.
47:03It's also a shock
47:04from which I think
47:05they haven't recovered
47:05even to this day.
47:07Who could have foreseen
47:08that the siege of Leningrad
47:10was not the final stage
47:11of a bitter struggle
47:12that would bring
47:13Hitler domination
47:14over the Soviets
47:15and Europe?
47:16only in later years
47:19could it be recognized
47:20as the first move
47:21in a conflict
47:22of inhumane savagery
47:24that had brought Russia
47:25to the edge of annihilation,
47:28but which eventually led
47:29to one of Hitler's
47:31greatest failures,
47:33the total collapse
47:34of the Grossraum.
47:36of the Grossraum.
47:36the Grossraum.
47:37the Only
47:41scholar
47:42of the Gentiles
47:44and the
47:45hundreds of
47:46hospitals
47:46over the74
47:47of the
48:01world.
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