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00:00To be continued...
00:30Hermann Göring ominously summarized German policy towards the Soviet Union
00:44when he made a typically sinister speech late in 1941.
00:50Many tens of millions in the industrial areas will become redundant
00:54and will either die or have to emigrate to Siberia.
01:00In little more than one year, Göring's promise had been made good.
01:04Hitler's armies had reduced vast areas of western Russia to dust and rubble
01:09and subjected the Soviet peoples to unimaginable brutality.
01:14Russia experienced an agony of brutality
01:17as she was dragged through a nightmare of slaughter to the edge of extinction.
01:21The launch of Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union on the 22nd of June 1941,
01:30was Germany's most desperate gamble of the Second World War.
01:34It was a gamble Hitler felt compelled to take
01:37if his ambition of the complete subjugation of Europe was to become a reality.
01:42Three million German troops were initially committed to the most appalling conflict in the history of warfare.
01:50In the course of the next four years, she would need to find three million more.
01:55The whole ideological thrust of the German plan for war was different.
02:02This was not a conventional war of conquest.
02:05It was intended to be a war of extermination.
02:08It was intended to root out what Hitler called the Jewish-Bolshevik gang who ran Russia.
02:14It was intended to destroy the political structure both of the Soviet Union and of the Red Army.
02:22In consequence, the terrible barbarization which set in at the first stage in the Soviet-German war
02:28was to become the overriding feature which persisted until the very last day of that war.
02:36Standing between Hitler and the realization of this vision
02:40were the armies of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
02:43a fighting force whose condition of disorganization
02:46was mirrored by the paranoia of its political leadership.
02:51The disarray in the ranks of the Red Army
02:53was a direct result of the excesses of Stalin
02:57who had carried out a systematic purge of the Red Army.
03:01In 1936, Trukhachevsky, chief of staff of the Russian army
03:05was executed for treason following a trial which lasted only a single day.
03:09Six of the eight generals forming the court-martial which condemned him
03:14were themselves to follow suit soon after.
03:17By the end of the purge, the Russian army had lost three of the five remaining marshals of the Soviet Union.
03:25All 11 deputy ministers of defence, 75 of the 80 members of the military Soviet,
03:31all the commanders of the military districts, 13 of the 15 army commanders,
03:36more than half the core commanders, and approximately 30% of the officers below brigade level.
03:44The performance of the Russian tank forces was affected by three major considerations.
03:49The first one was that during the purges in the late 1930s, early 1940s,
03:53well over 90% of all the tank commanders were shot.
03:56And so there was a dearth of experienced tank commanders.
04:01A lot of the senior commanders who were actually replaced after the fiasco in Finland in 1940,
04:08they were actually reinstated, even though they had a poor track record.
04:11They went back in and commanded these units.
04:14The units, because they were so large, because there was over 24,000 tanks,
04:17the Russians really couldn't afford to spend a great deal of time training the crews.
04:21And most of the training that the crews had had was for the exercises more for the Politburo
04:28and for propaganda purposes, rather than actual tactical exercises.
04:32And the third factor was there was very little in the way, or almost no spare parts.
04:36So when a vehicle broke down, unless they cannibalised another vehicle,
04:39there was no spare parts for that vehicle.
04:41This great offensive, codenamed Barbarossa,
04:45had been fermenting for a long time in Hitler's mind.
04:48Firmly rooted in national socialist ideology was the conviction that Germany's destiny lay in the East.
04:56Once more, Hitler needed a quick war.
05:00Once more, he needed it soon.
05:03It was his instinct that Germany would never stand so strong as she stood then.
05:08His gambler's instinct told him that if he delayed even one year,
05:12the crowds that cheered the latest successes so fervently
05:16might no longer be willing to follow him into so hazardous an adventure.
05:21And there was no greater military adventure than the invasion of Russia.
05:29As the German build-up towards Operation Barbarossa continued,
05:34Stalin's attempts to pacify Hitler grew more desperate.
05:37Stalin felt he was continuing to buy time by these unrequited concessions.
05:45But his use of the breathing space, which he had already obtained,
05:48was totally devoid of any worthwhile attempt to remedy his military disadvantages.
05:54Stalin was well aware that sooner or later the Germans would attack.
05:57But what accompanied this was as follows, actually.
06:00There was also the assumption, very deftly introduced by the Germans,
06:04that in fact, before this attack, there could well be negotiations.
06:10There might even be, and the Russians now have disclosed this,
06:13there might even have been a personal meeting between Hitler and Stalin.
06:17And Stalin, therefore, became persuaded that there were two elements to this German position.
06:21One was that the massive German military build-up was in fact, if you like,
06:27not an inducement, but a form of coercion to force him into a negotiating position.
06:32And on June the 14th, he made this perfectly plain by the famous task statement,
06:36saying, look, we know what you're up to.
06:38We know all about these concentrations,
06:40but there is nothing to prevent a settlement of Soviet-German relations.
06:45That was the first thing.
06:46The second thing was a certain element of self-deception on Stalin's side,
06:50to the effect that, one, he strongly believed that Hitler would never embark on a two-front war.
06:57And the second thing was, again, Stalin's great concern,
07:01that although the Soviet general staff, Zhukov and Vasilevsky and others,
07:05particularly Timoshenko, were urging Stalin to mobilize,
07:09Stalin argued, actually, and he shouted at Timoshenko,
07:12what do you want, a war?
07:14Because the act of mobilization, full formal mobilization,
07:19essentially would trigger war.
07:21Indeed, even on the morning of the 22nd of June, 1941,
07:25when the German armor is advancing,
07:27he's still partly persuaded of what he thought was a provocation.
07:32He even imagined it was some breakaway German generals
07:34who were trying it on, as it were.
07:37This wasn't the real thing.
07:38So that the explanation of Soviet unreadiness is much more complex
07:43than the fact that, yes, they knew about it,
07:45be they did nothing about it.
07:46And it was certainly plain from Stalin's statements
07:49that he did expect a war,
07:51which he hoped, through his diplomacy
07:52and his general political initiatives,
07:56to postpone to 1942.
07:58The reality of it was that Hitler meant every word he said
08:01he would attack on the 22nd of June, 1941,
08:03and he did attack.
08:06By June, 1941, with a German attack imminent,
08:10the Western Special Military District
08:11on which the blow would fall
08:13was nothing short of a shambles.
08:15Many divisions were between 6,000 to 7,000 men
08:20short of wartime establishment.
08:23Levies of experienced personnel had been hived off
08:25to build new tank and aviation units.
08:28Only one of six mechanized corps
08:30had received their full complement of equipment.
08:34Three of the four motorized divisions had no tanks,
08:36and four out of every five vehicles
08:38in the tank fleets were obsolete.
08:41Four of the corps had only one quarter
08:43of their designated motor vehicles,
08:45and in another four,
08:47one in three motor vehicles needed repairs.
08:52Although the two opposing forces
08:54had amassed vast amounts of weaponry
08:56along their common borders,
08:58the Soviet Red Army and the German Wehrmacht
09:00were anything but equal adversaries.
09:04Russian armored warfare was inhibited
09:06by Stalin's disenchantment with tank divisions,
09:09which had led him in the 30s
09:11to utilize his armor only in the support
09:14of infantry formations.
09:15After witnessing German successes
09:19on the Western Front in 1940,
09:22Stalin changed his mind.
09:24But the reorganization of Russian armor
09:26was not completed before the launch of Barbarossa.
09:31Even though Russian tanks outnumbered German
09:33two to one at the front and six to one overall,
09:37tactical ineffectiveness, obsolete models,
09:39and widespread disrepair
09:41tipped the advantage overwhelmingly
09:43in favor of Germany
09:44during the first stages of the conflict.
09:49In the western part of Russia,
09:51the Red Army consisted of about five million men.
09:55The tank strength of the Red Army
09:57on the 21st of June, 1941,
09:59was 23,108,
10:02of which possibly 8,000 were battle-ready
10:05and in good condition.
10:08Typical of the Russian tank forces
10:10in the early part of the war
10:11was the T-26.
10:14The T-26 was built under license
10:17from a design that was originally created
10:20by Vickers Armstrong in about 1928.
10:22So it was a British tank.
10:24You can always tell it was a good tank
10:26because the British Army never ordered it.
10:27It was purely a commercial offering
10:29and the Russians took to it in a big way.
10:31And they got a license.
10:32It was all done above board
10:34and then put a much better gun in it
10:36than the British had done.
10:37They had a 45mm anti-tank weapon,
10:39which was actually quite effective
10:40against contemporary tanks.
10:42So from that point of view,
10:43it was an excellent little vehicle.
10:45It was reliable,
10:46but it was very, very rough.
10:48The actual suspension,
10:49the wheels and tracks that it runs on,
10:51gave people a very hard ride.
10:53And of course,
10:53like all tanks of the pre-war period,
10:55it's of bolted construction.
10:57So it's weak when it comes to defending itself
11:00against incoming rounds.
11:01But generally speaking,
11:03for its day,
11:04an excellent little tank.
11:05Just on a historical note,
11:06what makes this tank interesting
11:08is that it was captured
11:09from the Russian army
11:10by the Finns during the Winter War.
11:13They did some minor modifications,
11:15used it for a while in their army.
11:17And then latterly,
11:18they buried all these tanks
11:20in their defensive regions,
11:22particularly what was known
11:23as the Mannerheim Line.
11:24And the tank was buried,
11:25so in its turret was showing
11:26it became part of the fixed defences.
11:29Back in the 70s and 80s,
11:31they started digging up the Mannerheim Line,
11:32suddenly produced all these tanks.
11:34And we were able to do an exchange with them
11:37to get it for the Tank Museum,
11:38which is great,
11:38because it means we have
11:39a representative example,
11:41not only of a pre-war Russian tank,
11:44which is quite something to have,
11:45but also something which derived originally
11:47from a British design.
11:48And we have the British design
11:50from which it came also in the museum.
11:52So historically, it's interesting.
11:53I should point out, of course,
11:55that the swastika on the turret
11:56has absolutely nothing to do with the Nazis.
11:58It is a Finnish symbol,
12:00one of the runic symbols that they employed.
12:02So in this case,
12:04there's no Nazi association at all.
12:06On the German side,
12:08the field strength was roughly
12:09about three and a half million men.
12:11With the addition of the German allies,
12:13the Finns, the Slovaks, and the Hungarians,
12:16the figure rises to nearly four million.
12:18In infantry, the Germans were therefore outnumbered
12:21by one million men at the outset.
12:23In terms of armour,
12:25the discrepancies were even larger.
12:28The Germans were able to employ
12:29something like 3,300 tanks
12:32to face the Russian 8,000.
12:34But numbers don't tell the whole story.
12:38In the case of Barbarossa,
12:40numbers are extremely misleading.
12:43Considering the operational readiness of the armies,
12:46the Wehrmacht was clearly superior.
12:48It was also battle-hardened,
12:51experienced,
12:52and it was well-prepared and briefed for its task.
12:56By comparison,
12:57the Red Army suffered severe problems
12:59of manning, organisation, training, logistics, supply.
13:04Even more importantly,
13:05the Germans were operating
13:06according to a carefully conceived master plan.
13:08The Red Army was in an extraordinary position.
13:15There was no recognisable military plan.
13:19The Red Army could neither defend nor attack.
13:23Many of its tanks were not suitable
13:24for the demands of World War II.
13:27The tank army, by 1936,
13:29was probably the biggest in the world.
13:32They not only had these little fellas,
13:34they had a series of tanks
13:35known as the BT series,
13:37which had been derived
13:38from the American Christie machine,
13:40some of the fastest tanks on Earth.
13:42And this massive army of tanks
13:44wiped out,
13:46largely in the initial stages of Barbarossa,
13:48meant that the Russians
13:49had to rethink their designs
13:50and start again.
13:52So you almost,
13:53and it would be a dream
13:54to some tank armies,
13:55get a clean sweep of the board.
13:56And the Russians then come back
13:58with the T-34,
13:59arguably one of the best tanks
14:00of the Second World War,
14:02and the heavy KV series tanks,
14:03which they then fitted into their army.
14:06So really what you're seeing
14:07is the Germans
14:08kindly clearing up for the Russians
14:10a load of old junk
14:11which they'd had on their hands
14:12since the mid-30s.
14:14The first part of the war
14:15was really not an occasion
14:16for praising tank commanders.
14:18That was the martyrdom
14:19of Soviet tank troops.
14:22Though one or two people did emerge
14:23which were very important.
14:25For example,
14:27Chernyovsky,
14:28who was very young,
14:29he must have been about,
14:30yes, he was just in his very early 30s.
14:33He commanded a tank division
14:35in the terrible days of 1941
14:37and really proved himself
14:38to be a very capable commander.
14:40He in fact went on
14:41to become not only an army commander
14:42but a front commander.
14:44That gives you some idea
14:45of the caliber of these people.
15:00The awesome German armies
15:04which the 170 understrength divisions
15:06of the Russian troops faced
15:08were divided into three large groups.
15:11These consisted of 148
15:14fully manned and equipped divisions.
15:16The German armor was grouped
15:18into 19 panzer
15:20and 15 panzer grenadier divisions.
15:24The army group south
15:25was commanded by field marshal
15:27Gerd von Rundstedt
15:28and was charged with seizing Kiev
15:31and taking control of the Ukraine
15:32as far as the river Dnieper.
15:36Field marshal von Bock's
15:37army group center
15:38was to strike towards Smolensk.
15:41Army group north
15:42under field marshal von Lieb
15:44was to attack through the Baltic states
15:46and seize Leningrad.
15:49Army group center
15:50was a larger formation
15:51than the forces
15:52which comprised the other two army groups.
15:54It had 50 German divisions
15:57as opposed to 39
15:58in army group south
15:59and only 29
16:01in army group north.
16:03It could deploy 910 aircraft
16:06as opposed to 684
16:07army group south
16:08and 434
16:10army group north.
16:12The two panzer groups
16:13under von Bock's control
16:14in army group center
16:15also claimed the lion's share
16:17of the tanks
16:18which were allocated
16:19to the greater tank.
16:21Some 1,700 machines
16:22were available to von Bock
16:23as opposed to 1,000
16:25for von Rundstedt
16:26with army group south
16:27and 650 in army group center
16:29with von Lieb.
16:32The three German army groups
16:34were supplemented
16:35by 500,000 Finnish troops
16:37advancing from their homeland
16:39in 14 divisions
16:40and 150,000 Romanians
16:43attacking along the Black Sea
16:44towards Odessa.
16:46These forces
16:47together with the Luftwaffe
16:48which had devoted
16:4980% of its operational strength
16:51with 2,770 aircraft
16:53to the buildup of Barbarossa
16:55fielded over 3,350 tanks
16:59over 7,000 artillery pieces
17:0160,000 motor vehicles
17:03and 625,000 horses.
17:07The Russian army
17:09still clung
17:10to its peacetime structure.
17:12Should war occur
17:13then each military district
17:15would be transformed
17:16into army groupings
17:17similar in structure
17:18to the Germans
17:19which mirrored
17:20the German intentions.
17:23The North Soviet front
17:25was to repel advances
17:26through the Baltic states
17:27and defend Leningrad
17:29from Finnish attack.
17:31The Northwest,
17:32West and Southwest fronts
17:33would engage
17:34the three main German army groups
17:36and the Southern front
17:38would deal with any advance
17:40towards Odessa.
17:42Behind these similarities
17:44the contrast between
17:46the warring nations
17:47could not have been greater.
17:49While Germany boasted
17:50one of the finest
17:51industrial infrastructures
17:52in the world
17:53Russia had still not completed
17:55her industrial revolution.
17:59Stalin had declared
18:00in 1931
18:01that one feature
18:02of old Russia
18:03was the continual beatings
18:05that she suffered
18:05for falling behind
18:06for her backwardness
18:08for military backwardness
18:09for agricultural backwardness.
18:11We are 50 or 100 years
18:13behind the advanced countries.
18:15We must make good
18:16this distance in 10 years.
18:18Either we do it
18:19or they crush us.
18:23Ironically,
18:24the enemy
18:25which might now
18:26attempt to crush
18:27the Soviet Union
18:28was to rely heavily
18:29on tanks
18:30which the Russians
18:30had helped to develop.
18:33Between 1926 and 1933
18:34the Red Army
18:35and the Reichswehr
18:36collaborated in secret
18:38on the development
18:39of weapons,
18:39on the development
18:40of tactics,
18:40on the development
18:41by the way
18:42of chemical weapons.
18:44And the Russians
18:45were very interested
18:46in German ideas
18:47and the Germans
18:47were very interested
18:48in Russian ideas
18:49obviously.
18:50And there was certainly
18:51a form of exchange there.
18:55And by the way
18:55many Russians today
18:57say that
18:58what really happened
18:59was early German successes
19:02were actually based
19:02on Soviet theory.
19:04Well,
19:05that's a little bit
19:06of national pride
19:07being thrown in.
19:08undoubtedly both sides
19:10were interested
19:10in the potentialities
19:12of the tank.
19:13That's very true.
19:14And the second thing
19:14they were interested in
19:15was the relationship
19:16between air-ground cooperation,
19:18between the tank
19:18and the dive bomber.
19:19Yes,
19:20that was true.
19:22But I don't think
19:22that's a justification
19:23for arguing
19:25that the blitzkrieg
19:26and Soviet operations
19:27in depth are the same
19:28because they're not.
19:29They're really not.
19:31Partly in the way
19:32in which they are practiced,
19:33they are different.
19:34and partly the manner
19:35in which
19:36what objectives
19:37they set themselves
19:38are also different as well.
19:40By the early 30s,
19:4210 prototype tanks
19:43had been designed
19:44and built in secret.
19:46The initial development
19:47of what would become
19:48the most technically accomplished
19:50and cost-effective
19:51tank program ever seen
19:52took place
19:54at the German-Soviet tank school
19:56at Kazan
19:57in Russia.
19:58The firm grip
20:01of the party
20:02on the state
20:03meant that the Russian people
20:04were deprived
20:05of any suspicion
20:06of the huge build-up
20:07along their borders.
20:09The state-controlled media
20:10was devoid
20:11of any mention
20:11of the increasingly
20:12anti-Soviet rhetoric
20:14of Hitler,
20:15which may have provided
20:16a clue.
20:19They were totally
20:20unprepared,
20:21therefore,
20:22for the latest disaster
20:23which was about
20:24to dissimble.
20:28At last,
20:43at 0400,
20:45on the 22nd of June 1941,
20:47the code word
20:48Dortmund
20:49crackled down the wires
20:51and the maelstrom
20:52that was Barbarossa
20:53finally erupted.
20:55The German armies
20:56of the Blitzkrieg
20:57sliced through
20:58the Russian forces
20:59on every front.
21:01Faced by the results
21:02of his intransigent refusal
21:04to act,
21:05Stalin panicked.
21:07While his army headquarters
21:08desperately tried
21:09to piece together
21:10the most rudimentary picture
21:11of what was happening,
21:13he ordered an immediate
21:14counter-offensive
21:14on all fronts.
21:17As the first reports
21:18of the devastation
21:19his own command
21:20had helped to create
21:21filtered through,
21:22he was shattered.
21:23All that Lenin created
21:26we have lost forever,
21:28he declared.
21:29He finally retreated
21:31to his Dachar,
21:32not to emerge
21:33until the 3rd of July.
21:35But what really stunned
21:37the Red Army commanders
21:38was that the massive
21:40German assault
21:41proceeded without
21:41any artillery support.
21:44It simply
21:44sliced through.
21:46The Red Army command
21:48had expected
21:49that there would be
21:49meeting engagements
21:50and opening actions
21:52that would develop
21:53over a period of days.
21:55Next would come
21:56a large series
21:57of complex frontier engagements
21:59and then
22:00the real war
22:01would begin.
22:03What actually happened
22:04was that in 48 hours
22:06in Army Group North
22:07German panzer columns
22:08were approaching Riga.
22:12At the beginning of the war
22:13Soviet tank training
22:14was terrible.
22:15It was awful.
22:16The tank drivers
22:17had very little
22:18experience,
22:19probably maybe
22:20two, three hours
22:20if they had that
22:21by the way.
22:23The level of actually
22:24handling a tank
22:25and fighting a tank
22:25was extremely low
22:26and it showed
22:27in the disaster
22:29which was visited
22:30on the Red Army's
22:32tank forces.
22:33The level of
22:34the training
22:34of the commanders
22:35was very poor
22:36and that changed.
22:38It changed importantly
22:39that the Soviet
22:39training methods
22:40were completely
22:42overhauled
22:43at the end of 1942
22:44and 1943.
22:46It was no good
22:47just pushing people
22:48in tanks
22:48and saying
22:49get on with it
22:49and do this.
22:50They realized
22:51that for
22:52the tank force
22:53they had
22:54and what the tank
22:54force had to do
22:55you really need
22:57highly trained crews.
22:59In the opening days
23:00of the campaign
23:01the two panzer groups
23:02of Army Group Center
23:03under Hoth
23:04and Guderian
23:05completed the encirclement
23:07of a huge hall
23:07of confused
23:08and virtually leaderless
23:09Russians
23:10near Bialystok
23:11then surged onwards
23:13towards Minsk.
23:14this refined
23:16blitzkrieg technique
23:17of the Germans
23:17and the use
23:18of their armor
23:19in that respect
23:20came as an extraordinary
23:21and totally
23:22disorganizing surprise
23:24even to the senior
23:25Russian commanders.
23:28Within 48 hours
23:29general staff reports
23:31made it perfectly plain
23:32they had lost control
23:33of the situation.
23:34They were in complete chaos
23:36and many didn't know
23:37where their troops were
23:38or what was happening.
23:40They certainly didn't have
23:41accurate reports
23:42of German movements
23:43and they were not quite sure
23:44where the German thrusts
23:45were aimed at.
23:47All that they did know
23:48was to the south.
23:50Army Group South
23:51was being slightly delayed.
23:53But in the northwest
23:54and in the west
23:55there was total collapse.
23:58In consequence
23:59Stalin operated
24:01his usual practice.
24:03He took out
24:03the front commanders
24:04and shot them.
24:08At the front
24:09the rapier thrusts
24:11of the German panzer divisions
24:12were skewering through
24:14the chaotic Russian defences.
24:16The panzer groups
24:17created deadly breaches
24:18in the Soviet line
24:20slicing the Red Army forces
24:22into isolated segments.
24:24The supporting German divisions
24:26then moved forward
24:27in encircling advances
24:29which surrounded
24:29these pockets of defenders.
24:32The ferocity
24:33and effectiveness
24:33of the panzer attacks
24:35was so great
24:36that some of the pockets
24:37were gigantic.
24:38groups of up to 15 Russian divisions
24:41were surrounded
24:42and mercilessly pummeled
24:44into surrender.
24:46The encirclement of Minsk
24:48by the right flank
24:49of Army Group North
24:50and the left flank
24:51of Army Group Center
24:52yielded 300,000 prisoners,
24:552,500 tanks,
24:571,400 artillery pieces.
24:5932 of the 43 Russian divisions
25:02were emasculated
25:03within a week
25:03and the road to Moscow
25:05penetrated to a depth
25:06of 300 kilometers.
25:10The remainder
25:11of Army Group North
25:12scythed into the Baltic states
25:15capturing Riga,
25:16the Latvian capital.
25:18Only in the south
25:19were the German forces
25:21limited to shallow advances
25:22towards Luov
25:24and Rauno.
25:25On the ground,
25:29chaos reigned.
25:31The Luftwaffe
25:31were pulverizing
25:33the road and rail links
25:34behind the Russian lines.
25:36Many officers
25:37were not even bothering
25:38to use code
25:39in their desperate pleas
25:40for instructions
25:41from their headquarters.
25:43Struggling masses
25:44of uncoordinated troops
25:45were being slaughtered
25:46by the German troops
25:47as they attempted
25:48to obey Stalin's orders
25:50to counterattack.
25:52Others were being
25:54machine-gunned
25:54by their own military police
25:56for fleeing from positions
25:58which were worse
25:59than hopeless.
26:01The reality was
26:02that the Soviet forces
26:03were left leaderless.
26:05They had no orders.
26:07Sometimes they had guns
26:08but no ammunition.
26:09Sometimes they had tanks
26:10but no fuel.
26:11Or they had tanks
26:12which broke down
26:13with no prospect of repair.
26:15Or they simply had orders
26:17which were contradictory.
26:19The usual situation
26:21was that if in doubt,
26:22Red Army commanders
26:24would simply order
26:25advance.
26:28Many of the Red Army divisions
26:29simply broke up
26:30and formed very large pockets
26:32of Red Army troops.
26:34For example,
26:36within a matter of four
26:37or five days,
26:38the Wehrmacht,
26:39the German army in the east,
26:41had managed to encircle
26:42350,000 Red Army soldiers,
26:45the first of what was to prove
26:47a number of huge encirclements.
26:50By the 3rd of July,
26:52the battle for the frontier
26:53was over.
26:54The German armies
26:55had advanced along a line
26:56from the river Dvina
26:57in the north
26:58to the Niepry
26:59in the south.
27:02General Halder,
27:03chief of German general staff,
27:05declared that the war
27:06against the Soviet Union
27:07had taken only 14 days
27:09to win.
27:11But the German intelligence
27:12had totally underestimated
27:14the reserves
27:15which Russia could command.
27:17the Red Army
27:19had a great number of men.
27:22But the equipment
27:23that it used
27:23tended to be outdated
27:25and obsolete.
27:27This was particularly
27:28with regard to tanks
27:29and aircraft.
27:30In terms of signals equipment,
27:32the Red Army's position
27:33on the Western Front
27:34was quite appalling.
27:35It simply did not have
27:37the communications equipment
27:38to enable it to fight
27:39the fast-moving battles
27:40the German army
27:41specialised in.
27:43And they would be required
27:44to fight effectively
27:45in order to defend
27:46their country properly
27:47and to achieve
27:49the initiative.
27:51Therefore,
27:52it can be concluded
27:53in terms of leadership,
27:55position,
27:55and equipment,
27:56tanks, aircraft,
27:57and communications,
27:59the Russian forces
28:00facing Army Group Center
28:01was no way a match
28:03for their German counterpart.
28:05The invasion forces
28:13scythed through
28:14hopelessly disorganised
28:15opposition
28:16and moved rapidly onwards.
28:19Well honed,
28:20the blitzkrieg pattern
28:21was being repeated
28:22and the Soviet defences
28:24whirled away
28:25like chaff in the wind.
28:28The number of prisoners
28:29taken seemed too immense
28:31to be true,
28:32but it was.
28:32And the scale of destruction
28:34was terrifying.
28:36As the news of Barbarossa
28:38reverberated around
28:39a stunned and disbelieving world,
28:42even Germany
28:42was awestruck.
28:46Not all the German generals
28:49joined the celebration.
28:51General Heinz Kuderian,
28:53who still held
28:54relatively junior rank,
28:55had been appalled
28:56by the headlong advances
28:57against two far-flung objectives.
29:00He was acutely aware
29:02that the guiding principle
29:04of blitzkrieg
29:04was the concentration
29:06of maximum force
29:07against a single objective.
29:10This had already been neglected,
29:12and where there should be convergence,
29:14there was divergence.
29:16As the Army Groups advanced,
29:17they moved further away
29:19from one another
29:19instead of coming closer.
29:23Audacious,
29:24though he undoubtedly was,
29:26Hitler balked at the thought
29:27of his precious armoured units
29:29racing too far
29:30or too deep
29:30into the Soviet hinterland,
29:32and settled instead
29:33for a compromise
29:34with the more traditional
29:36grand strategy
29:37of envelopment.
29:38By the end of June,
29:58Guderian and Hoth's tanks
29:59had joined near Minsk
30:01to complete a huge encirclement,
30:03and by mid-August,
30:04Army Group North
30:05was approaching Leningrad.
30:07The Germans continued
30:09to achieve extraordinary success,
30:11and the Wehrmacht surged on
30:13with undiminished impetus.
30:15Incredible numbers
30:16of prisoners were taken,
30:18and huge quantities
30:19of tanks and guns
30:20captured or destroyed.
30:22Despite this sustained progress,
30:25Guderian was increasingly conscious
30:27of grounds for unease
30:28in the development
30:29of the campaign.
30:31The unending immensity
30:32of the land
30:33depressed many soldiers.
30:34Lack of mobility,
30:36particularly of tracked vehicles,
30:38was a severe drawback.
30:40There continued to be
30:40a huge haul of prisoners,
30:42but the German pincers
30:44were closing too slowly,
30:46allowing large numbers
30:47of Red Army troops
30:48to get away,
30:49and the Red Army
30:50appeared to command
30:51endless reserves.
30:53Most roads were of dirt,
30:55which,
30:55with the sudden rains
30:56turning quickly to mud,
30:58halted entire columns.
31:00Meanwhile,
31:02Hitler was vacillating.
31:05Having failed
31:06to annihilate the Red Army,
31:07his interest turned
31:08towards securing
31:10the economic prize
31:11of the Ukrainian oil wells.
31:14To Guderian's dismay,
31:16he was diverted
31:17from his plan
31:18to drive hard and fast
31:19for Moscow.
31:20The capture
31:21of the Russian capital
31:22would have been
31:23a profound psychological shock
31:25for the Soviets.
31:26Instead,
31:27Guderian was ordered
31:28south to the Ukraine
31:30to link up with Hoth.
31:32His division
31:33still performed
31:34outstandingly,
31:35helping to take
31:36well over half a million
31:36prisoners
31:37and nearly 1,000 tanks,
31:39but the crucial moment
31:40of the campaign
31:41had already passed.
31:44The Germans
31:45were confronted
31:46with another
31:46and equally unpleasant
31:48surprise at this time.
31:50The first Russian
31:52T-34 tanks
31:53appeared during
31:55the Battle of Vyazma.
31:57At Vareya,
31:58the Russian tanks
31:59simply drove
31:59straight through
32:00the 7th Infantry Division
32:01onto the artillery positions
32:03and literally
32:04ran over the guns.
32:06The effect
32:07on the infantryman's morale
32:09was devastating.
32:11This marked
32:12the beginning
32:12of what came to be called
32:14the Tank Terror.
32:16We've come here
32:17to North Norfolk,
32:18to the Muckleborough collection,
32:20to have a look at this,
32:21the T-34.
32:23In many respects,
32:25this is the vehicle
32:27that actually won
32:28the Second World War.
32:30They were manufactured
32:31in such quantity
32:32that they swamped
32:33the German forces
32:35and they really had
32:36no answer
32:37to the sheer numbers,
32:38the T-34s,
32:40which appeared
32:40on the battlefield.
32:42There were something
32:42like 50,000 of these
32:44that were manufactured
32:45during the war period.
32:47It's by no means
32:48a beautifully finished machine,
32:49but it was solid
32:51and it was very,
32:52very workmanlike.
32:54When you consider
32:54that there were only
32:55something like
32:561,700 Tigers
32:58which were manufactured,
33:00they had to face
33:0150,000 of these
33:02and on the Allied side,
33:0450,000 Shermans
33:06allied to all
33:07the British types.
33:08So you can appreciate
33:09that it didn't have to be
33:11the best tank
33:12in the world,
33:13but in many respects
33:14it was a very,
33:15very solid performer.
33:17It was made
33:18with the Russian conditions
33:19in mind.
33:20It had wide tracks.
33:22It had the simple suspension
33:24based on the Christie model
33:25and this tank
33:26really had everything
33:28that was needed
33:28to allow it to be
33:29mass produced
33:31in the Russian economy
33:32in the kind of numbers
33:34that arrived
33:35just in time.
33:37There's no doubt
33:37that a tank like a Tiger
33:39was a far better machine.
33:41It was better engineered.
33:42It had a bigger,
33:43harder hitting gun
33:44and it was better protected.
33:46But what they couldn't cope with
33:48were the numbers
33:49of these medium tanks
33:50which weighed in
33:51at around 30 tons
33:53but could move quickly
33:54and above all
33:55could deal with
33:56the Russian mud
33:57and the snow
33:58in a way that
33:59until the advent
34:00of the later German tanks
34:01none of the early models could.
34:03It was absolutely different
34:05to everything else
34:06that was available then.
34:08Strong armour,
34:09sloping armour.
34:12machine guns fitted
34:14one here
34:15for the radio operator
34:17to fire from
34:18another coaxial one
34:20to be fired out of that hole
34:22and that this other hole
34:23is for the gun layer
34:25to look through
34:26and lay the gun.
34:28Driver sits here
34:29and next to the radio operator
34:32as I said
34:33who will fire the gun
34:35and the other three men
34:36the commander
34:38the early one
34:38did not have a commander
34:39or such.
34:40The commander at the top
34:42with a vision all around
34:43the gun layer
34:44and the loader
34:45which was a
34:46quite a difficult job in there.
34:49The T-34
34:52embodied everything
34:53as close as possible
34:54to perfection
34:55which could be expected
34:56from a tank at the time.
34:59Speed,
35:00protection,
35:01firepower
35:01and most of all
35:03reliability
35:03because that's the worst thing
35:05which could happen
35:06on a tank
35:06especially on
35:07a modern German tank
35:09at the time
35:10to break down
35:11somewhere,
35:12miles from anywhere
35:13and not be able
35:14to get going.
35:15This as I said earlier
35:16is a 85mm gun
35:18which was very, very good
35:20but the Russian optics
35:22perhaps were not quite as good
35:23as the Germans
35:24which meant
35:25lesser shells
35:27hit their target
35:29than they might have done
35:30on the German Tiger
35:30for instance.
35:32One of the best things
35:33on this tank
35:34well everything is good
35:35as I said earlier
35:36but one of the best
35:38reliable things
35:38is the engine itself.
35:40Now this tank
35:41was made in 1943
35:42but the engine
35:44hasn't changed very much
35:46to this very day.
35:47Actually the very same
35:48engine with a slightly
35:49higher power output
35:50is put in the T-55.
35:53The very same engine
35:54develops about
35:5530 or 40 more horsepower
35:57that's all.
35:57designed in the very early 40s
36:00and still up to date.
36:02If you look closely
36:03on this edge
36:04you see how rough
36:06the manufacture
36:07of the tank was.
36:08I mean it's unbelievable.
36:10Here
36:10the hole didn't quite line up
36:12so with the burner
36:13they cut the hole
36:14a bit bigger you see.
36:16But they turned out
36:1745,000 of these things
36:19you see.
36:20They knew very well
36:20it hasn't got a long
36:22life expectancy
36:22so a little bit rough edge
36:24or the above
36:25didn't matter.
36:26The enormous turret
36:27if you take a look
36:27at that
36:28it's very heavy
36:29you wouldn't think
36:31anybody could move it
36:32but let me tell you
36:33if that tank
36:34gets a direct hit
36:35a penetrate
36:36armor penetrating
36:37shell inside
36:38and sets off
36:40its own ammunition
36:40by it
36:41the whole turret
36:42as it is
36:43will be blown sky high
36:44and sail through the air
36:4510 or 12 yards.
36:48That's the force
36:48of an exploding tank
36:50its own ammunition
36:51and its own petrol
36:52and diesel
36:53what have you.
36:54In 1941
36:55the T-34
36:56was impervious
36:57to the infantry's
36:58anti-tank weapons.
37:00At that time
37:00the German infantry
37:01was equipped only
37:02with 37mm
37:03and 50mm
37:04anti-tank guns
37:05but they had no effect
37:07on the T-34.
37:09A gun of at least
37:1075mm caliber
37:12was needed
37:12but it first
37:14had to be designed
37:15and built.
37:17In the meantime
37:17only 88mm
37:19anti-aircraft guns
37:20could be relied upon
37:21and those were
37:22hurriedly pressed
37:23into the anti-tank role.
37:26Still
37:27Russia was not defeated.
37:29By the end of August
37:305,300,000 men
37:33had been mobilized.
37:34Stalin had emerged
37:36from his isolation
37:36to broadcast
37:37a message of patriotism
37:39and resistance
37:39to the nation.
37:41For once
37:41the Russian people
37:42were told the truth.
37:43Stalin now took
37:46direct control
37:47of the Red Army.
37:48The pre-war complacency
37:50which he himself
37:50had done so much
37:51to foster
37:52had now rapidly
37:53to be undone.
37:55But the general
37:57mobilization
37:57of Russian troops
37:58failed to curtail
37:59the German advance.
38:01Four reserve armies
38:03of 37 divisions
38:04were dispatched
38:05to bolster
38:06the West Front
38:07in the general area
38:08of Smolensk.
38:10The Germans
38:10countered
38:11with yet another
38:11encirclement
38:12and the panzer groups
38:13of Generals
38:14Hoth and Guderian
38:15smashed through
38:16the Soviet line
38:17and maneuvered
38:18300,000 Russian troops
38:19into an indefensible pocket.
38:22Another 150,000 prisoners,
38:252,000 tanks
38:26and 2,000 artillery pieces
38:27fell into German hands.
38:30Drunk with anticipation,
38:32Goebbels announced
38:33that the eastern continent
38:35lies like a limp virgin
38:36in the mighty arms
38:38of the German Mars.
38:39Spurred on
38:41by the successful actions
38:43of their commands,
38:44the men of Army Group South
38:45finally broke through
38:47the Russian Southwest Front
38:48and another pocket
38:49yielded a further toll
38:50of 100,000 prisons.
38:53At the outbreak of war in the east,
39:11the backbone of the panzer corps
39:13was the panzer Mark IV.
39:15Designed by Krupp
39:16and weighing 17.3 tons,
39:18the panzer Kampwagen IV
39:20carried a crew of five
39:22at a maximum speed
39:23of 18.5 miles an hour.
39:25Its armor varied in thickness
39:27from 8 to 30 centimeters
39:29and it was armed
39:30with a 75 millimeter turret gun
39:32and two machine guns.
39:34Supported by the lighter Mark III,
39:36which was similar
39:37in size and appearance,
39:38the Mark IV swept all before it
39:41until the Russian T-34 tank
39:43made its appearance in numbers.
39:45Despite the confusion
39:48which surrounded her armed forces,
39:50the Red Army had tried
39:51in 1940 and 1941
39:53to bring in two new tanks.
39:56The T-34,
39:58which had been successfully tested
39:59in 1939,
40:01and the heavier KV-1 tank.
40:04But so far,
40:05they only produced
40:05about 1,000 of each.
40:08The T-34s and KV-1s
40:10were distributed
40:11in very small packets
40:12on a battlefront
40:14about 2,000 miles long.
40:16Nonetheless,
40:17when they did meet German armor,
40:19it did come as an enormous shock
40:21the first time
40:22that the Germans encountered them,
40:23particularly the T-34.
40:26The superior quality
40:28of the T-34's armor,
40:29mobility, speed,
40:30and gun power
40:31was something
40:32they simply hadn't suspected.
40:35Guderian himself
40:36ran into a T-34 ambush
40:38in November 1941
40:39and his force
40:41was almost completely destroyed.
40:44Guderian was pushing forward
40:45to Moscow
40:46and swung around
40:47from the south
40:48and was approaching Tula.
40:49And for the first time,
40:51he was met
40:51not by one of two T-34 tanks
40:54but a perfectly organized,
40:56competently commanded
40:58Soviet tank brigade
41:00commanded by a man
41:01called Katukov.
41:02And this is where
41:03the Germans really learned
41:04what the T-34 could do.
41:07And the alarm bells
41:07rang throughout Germany
41:09and for the first time,
41:10one began to see
41:11how these tank forces
41:13could be handled.
41:14But it wasn't just
41:15the quality of the tanks
41:16which counted.
41:18It was the capability
41:19of the panzer commanders
41:20to control their armor
41:21that was essential.
41:23They had excellent
41:24command control facilities
41:26and also at that time,
41:28they had very good support
41:29and logistical facilities.
41:31So that although
41:32German Mark II
41:33and Mark III's
41:34might run up
41:35against a huge KV-1,
41:36the big heavy tank,
41:38such was the haphazard
41:39and untrained manner
41:40in which the Russians
41:41handled their armor
41:42that the Germans
41:43soon learned to defeat them,
41:45even with inferior armor.
41:48But there were a few
41:49hard lessons
41:50to be learned first.
41:52One of these
41:53was the emergence
41:53of the KV-1.
41:57After a month
41:57of victorious progress,
42:00the German high command
42:01were disconcerted
42:02by the rapidity
42:03of their own advance.
42:05Their armies
42:05were now fighting
42:06on a front
42:071,000 miles wide.
42:09The Stukas
42:10could no longer deliver
42:11the concerted hammer blows
42:12which had punched
42:13the holes in the Russian lines,
42:15which the panzers
42:16had so mercilessly exploited.
42:19The lengthening supply lines
42:21were also affecting
42:22the German ground forces.
42:24Tank commanders,
42:25hundreds of miles
42:26from their Polish depots,
42:28nevertheless pressed
42:29for the final thrust
42:30towards Moscow.
42:32They argued
42:33that only the continuation
42:34of the offensive
42:35would prevent the Russians
42:36from organizing
42:37a fresh line of resistance.
42:40While many of Hitler's generals
42:42disagreed
42:43that such an attack
42:44should be launched immediately,
42:45they were almost unanimous
42:47in recommending
42:48that Moscow
42:48should become
42:49the primary objective
42:50of the next phase of the war.
42:53Hitler, on the other hand,
42:55was worried about
42:56the possibility
42:57of the gaps
42:58between the panzer divisions
42:59and the main armies
43:00being exploited
43:01by Russian reinforcements.
43:04Hitler had never
43:05been fully convinced
43:07of the importance of Moscow
43:08and continued to regard it
43:10as a secondary objective.
43:12The debate stretched out
43:14until mid-August.
43:16A vital month
43:17of summer weather
43:18was wasted.
43:19The Russians
43:20had the breathing space
43:21to throw reserve divisions
43:22into the gaps
43:23in their defenses.
43:24barely trained,
43:26poorly equipped,
43:27some in the battered remnants
43:28of their civilian clothing.
43:30Their stubborn ferocity
43:32meant that they were still
43:33a force to be reckoned with.
43:36A rapid campaign
43:37to crush Russia,
43:39which should have been over
43:39by August,
43:40had not achieved
43:41its objectives.
43:43The German high command
43:44had to think again,
43:46and the first thing
43:47that they had to think about
43:48was logistics and supplies.
43:50No great preparation
43:52had been made
43:53for a winter campaign.
43:54in Russia.
43:55Neither were their tanks
43:56equipped for the job in hand.
44:00Eventually,
44:01the objections
44:01of the generals
44:02were overruled,
44:03and not one,
44:04but two major objectives
44:05were prioritized
44:06by Hitler,
44:08who demanded
44:08the simultaneous capture
44:09of Moscow
44:10and the fall
44:11of the Ukraine.
44:13He decided
44:14that the general
44:15Heinz Guderian
44:16and his second
44:17panzer group
44:18should be diverted south
44:19to assist the German army group
44:21fighting there
44:22instead of concentrating
44:23on the final drive
44:24towards Moscow.
44:26With hindsight,
44:27it was to prove
44:28a disastrous intervention,
44:31although at the time
44:32Hitler appeared
44:32to have been vindicated.
44:35As seen here,
44:36in the newsreels
44:37of the time,
44:38Guderian and his tanks
44:40were able to penetrate deep
44:41into Soviet territory.
44:44They were to contribute
44:45to the huge victory
44:46when they combined
44:47with the panzer forces
44:48of Army Group South
44:49under von Kleist
44:50to produce
44:51a stunning encirclement
44:53which produced
44:54a vast hall of prisons.
44:56This footage
44:57shows the link-up
44:58between the tanks
44:59of Guderian
45:00with the white G
45:01and von Kleist,
45:03whose vehicles
45:03are marked
45:04with the white K.
45:06It was not just
45:07in the ranks
45:08of the German army
45:09that strategic errors
45:10were being made,
45:11as the Russians, too,
45:12made some costly blunders.
45:15The giant pincer movement
45:17involving half
45:17of Army Group Centre
45:18and the left flank
45:20of Army Group South
45:21began to close its jaws
45:22on a huge pocket
45:23of Russian forces
45:24to the rear of Kiev.
45:27Field Marshal Zhukov,
45:28the Soviet Chief of Staff,
45:30pleaded with Stalin
45:31for a strategic withdrawal
45:33of the troops
45:33defending the city.
45:35He was dismissed
45:36from his post.
45:38Marshal Timoshenko,
45:39the newly appointed
45:40South-West commander,
45:41arrived just in time
45:43to see the trapped
45:44Soviet divisions
45:45march into captivity.
45:49With the help
45:50of Panzer Group 2
45:51from Army Group Centre,
45:53von Kleist's Panzer Group 1
45:54was able to complete
45:55the encirclement
45:56of a further huge pocket
45:58of dazed Russian prisoners
46:00outside Kiev.
46:02This time,
46:03a staggering 650,000 men
46:06marched into captivity.
46:07Army Group South
46:13had played its part
46:15in the largest victory
46:16in history.
46:18The unfortunate captives
46:19had nothing to celebrate.
46:22The 650,000 prisoners
46:24taken by the Germans
46:25remains the highest number
46:27ever captured
46:28in a single engagement.
46:29The battle for the Ukraine
46:33now centred
46:34on the Crimean Peninsula,
46:36where the right flank
46:36of Army Group South
46:38pressed the Soviet 51st Army
46:40back towards Sebastopol.
46:42While half of the German
46:44Group Centre
46:45were engaged
46:45in subduing the Ukraine,
46:48Marshal Zhukov,
46:48transferred to the reserve forces
46:50behind West Front,
46:52seized the opportunity
46:53to attack
46:54the German 4th Army.
46:55Occupying a salient
46:58near Smolensk,
46:59the Germans were now
47:00themselves vulnerable
47:01to encirclement.
47:03The German 4th Army
47:04were thrown back
47:0512 kilometers,
47:07but without sufficient
47:07tanks and aircraft,
47:09Zhukov failed to tighten
47:10the noose he had made.
47:12However,
47:13in terms of morale,
47:15Zhukov's counter-thrust
47:16was highly significant.
47:18His action
47:19was the first substantial
47:20Soviet counter-attack
47:21of the war.
47:25The advance to Moscow
47:39was resumed
47:40at the end of September,
47:41but the delay
47:42proved to be fake.
47:44Fuel and supplies
47:45were delivered
47:46through a system
47:47that had become
47:47frequently inefficient,
47:49if not corrupt,
47:50and the lines of communication
47:51were enormously
47:52overextended.
47:54Shortages of every
47:55kind impaired
47:56the fighting ability
47:57of the front-line forces.
47:59The vague fears
48:00of the generals,
48:01who had initially
48:02harbored doubts,
48:03were beginning
48:03to take the shape
48:05of a massive problem.
48:07The advance
48:08had been over areas
48:09so vast
48:10that it was impossible
48:11for comprehensive
48:12mopping-up operations
48:14to be undertaken.
48:16Behind the Germans,
48:18there lay
48:18the huge expanses
48:19of territory
48:20in which tens
48:21of thousands
48:22of Red Army troops
48:23roamed uncaptured.
48:27Blitzkrieg's lifeblood
48:28was rapid movement,
48:30and the spearheads
48:31were now being reduced
48:32to a perilously slow crawl.
48:34There was something
48:35seriously wrong
48:37with the Blitzkrieg technique.
48:38It didn't fit in Russia.
48:40From the Soviet side,
48:42they began to realize
48:43that there were
48:44these shortcomings
48:45in the German
48:46Blitzkrieg approach,
48:48and that the first job
48:50that the Russians
48:51had to do
48:51at an immense cost
48:52was actually
48:52to halt this,
48:54to stop the Blitzkrieg,
48:55literally to stop
48:56its movement.
48:57This was a very difficult
48:58lesson they had to learn.
48:59And the first thing
49:02was that they really had,
49:04this was a very painful
49:05lesson for them,
49:06they really had to learn
49:07the lessons of active
49:08and effective defense.
49:10It was no good
49:10setting up a system
49:12of constant
49:13and continued
49:15counterblows
49:16and counterattacks.
49:17All that happened there
49:18was you simply incurred
49:20very heavy casualties,
49:21and you really didn't
49:22do anything
49:22as the Germans
49:23regrouped and reorganized.
49:25The autumn rains
49:26were heavy.
49:27In France,
49:28there had been
49:28metalled roads.
49:30Here,
49:30the highways
49:31were vanishing
49:32into impassable
49:33tracts of mud
49:34in which men,
49:35vehicles and horses
49:36floundered more
49:38and more helplessly.
49:40Breakdowns increased
49:41and repairs
49:42became extremely
49:43difficult to carry out.
49:46One of the disadvantages
49:47of a tank
49:49like the Panzer III
49:50can be seen
49:51down here
49:52in the tracks.
49:53Compared to the T-34,
49:55for example,
49:56they're comparatively
49:56narrow,
49:57and the reason
49:58for that
49:59is that these machines
50:00were designed
50:01with Western Europe
50:02in mind.
50:03The Great War
50:04was still fresh
50:05in the minds
50:05of everybody
50:06who was designing
50:07these tanks.
50:09And as a consequence,
50:10no one had really
50:10given serious consideration
50:12to the possibility
50:13that they might have
50:14to operate in Russia.
50:17And when they did,
50:18particularly in the winter
50:19of 1941,
50:21it came as a severe
50:23surprise to the German
50:24to find that the conditions
50:25were just so extreme.
50:27You had these
50:28bottomless seas of mud
50:30and you had these
50:31extensive snow conditions,
50:34which meant that really
50:35a vehicle needed
50:36wide tracks
50:37to be able
50:38to negotiate
50:39conditions like that.
50:41Guderian had started
50:42Barbarossa
50:43with 600 tanks.
50:45By the middle of November,
50:47he was left
50:48with just 50
50:49that were operational.
50:50By the end of October,
50:53Army Group South
50:54held a line
50:55which ran from
50:56approximately Kharkov
50:57in the north
50:58to the Black Sea
50:59in the south.
51:01The limit of the advance
51:02in that first year
51:03of the war
51:04proved to be
51:05the city of Rostov
51:06on Don.
51:08The forces of Army Group South,
51:11with their supply lines
51:12massively overstretched
51:13and the troops exhausted,
51:15could at present
51:16do no more
51:17for Adolf Hitler.
51:18It was not enough
51:21for the Fuhrer.
51:23During the bitter winter
51:24of 1941,
51:26fierce Russian
51:27counterattacks
51:28began to push
51:28the German forces
51:29backwards.
51:31Rundstedt,
51:32for the first time
51:33in the campaign,
51:34asked for permission
51:35to withdraw.
51:37Hitler refused
51:38and Rundstedt resigned.
51:41But it made no difference
51:42on the ground.
51:44The withdrawal
51:45from Rostov
51:45had to be carried out
51:46as a matter
51:47of military necessity.
51:49The situation
51:50was just too difficult
51:51and the German forces
51:53withdrew in good order
51:5540 miles west
51:56of Rostov.
51:58It was the first retreat
52:00of the war
52:01in the south.
52:02in S.
52:04The last retreat
52:18of the M.
52:19of Rostov
52:20and the last retreat
52:21of the M.
52:22of Rostov
52:23in the 19th
52:24of S.
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47:35
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