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00:00I
00:30They say necessity is the mother of invention.
00:44Time and time again, the forces unleashed by modern warfare
00:48have been shown to be the catalyst for massive change.
00:53These changes are often achieved in very short timescales.
00:56Under peacetime conditions, normally a new fighting vehicle would be designed,
01:03built and tested over a period of something like five years.
01:08Between 1941 and 1945, some very successful designs were produced in as many months.
01:16They had to be.
01:17The war in the East was a demanding and remorseless taskmaster,
01:21which consumed every new offering as soon as it was ready for action.
01:26The price of failure was unthinkable.
01:32From 1943 onwards, German engineers were driven by the desperate demands of a voracious front line,
01:39which threatened to consume their very homeland
01:42if they did not supply exactly the right technology in the shortest possible timescales.
01:48Despite the vile excesses of the regime under which they toiled,
01:58German factories produced an outstanding variety of armoured fighting vehicles
02:02in an incredibly short period of time.
02:05It has often been said that the German armaments industry placed the best possible weapons
02:12in the worst possible hands.
02:16That is certainly true of the armoured fighting vehicles.
02:23Obviously, there were many failures.
02:25But against the odds, there were also a large number of successful vehicles
02:29which shaped the face of armoured warfare for years to come.
02:37During the Second World War, what happens with the German army
02:41is that they have a lot of vehicles that rapidly become obsolete,
02:45like the Panzer II, the Panzer III.
02:47And what they do is they take the chassis of those vehicles
02:50and they marry it up with a gun and turn them into assault weapons.
02:55And they also take a lot of captured weapons that they have
03:00and turn them into mobile artillery,
03:03like the Czechoslovakian T-35, that sort of thing.
03:07So it's an evolutionary type of thing that the German army does.
03:11Sturm artillery is nothing more than tracked artillery
03:14that was designed to keep up with the Panzers,
03:18to give them ready and quick transport.
03:32One successful new breed,
03:35born out of desperation by the demands of the Russian front,
03:38were the self-propelled artillery vehicles,
03:41which were rushed into production
03:42from the war-ravaged German factories,
03:45to shore up the desperate defensive battles
03:48of that terrible conflict.
03:50A mobile artillery force,
03:51which could be rushed from place to place
03:53on the crumbling front,
03:55they were to supply the needs of a military situation,
03:58which was declining on an almost daily basis.
04:01Only two short years earlier,
04:17no one in their right minds would have believed
04:19such a situation could prevail so soon.
04:22In the glory days of 1941,
04:35Adolf Hitler had appeared invincible.
04:39Hitler was a gambler.
04:41For nine years, he was also a highly successful gambler.
04:45He made the right calls in the cutthroat political world
04:48of the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany.
04:50He gambled on the annexation of Austria
04:53and of Czechoslovakia,
04:55and he called the bluff of Britain and France
04:58over the Treaty of Versailles.
05:00And his inspired combination of guesswork and aggression
05:03precipitated the spectacular fall of France in 1940.
05:08Hitler's luck ran out when he began to believe
05:17in his own invincibility
05:19and to ignore the lessons of history.
05:23In the 18th century,
05:25the invincible Swedish army of Charles the Bold
05:28had been destroyed in Russia.
05:30In the 19th century,
05:32Napoleon had seen his grand army wither and die
05:35at the infamous campaign of 1812.
05:38And even the all-conquering British army
05:40of the Victorian era
05:41had received one of its few reverses
05:44with an unsuccessful, dismal campaign in the Crimea,
05:48marked by disease, hardship, and despair.
05:51But spurred on by the great successes in the West
05:56during May 1940,
05:58Hitler drove his forces on into Russia.
06:03They were to come unstuck
06:04on almost exactly the same battlefields
06:07as Napoleon had before Moscow.
06:09And in 1944,
06:11the Crimea was to spell disaster for German troops,
06:14with losses on a scale
06:16which the British army
06:17could not have believed possible.
06:22In late 1941,
06:24Operation Typhoon ground to a halt
06:26on the very outskirts
06:28of the great city of Moscow,
06:30near the site of Napoleon's
06:31battlefield of Borodino.
06:33And in 1944,
06:35a whole German army was lost
06:37in the same Crimea
06:38which the British had failed to take
06:40during its own campaign.
06:42The lessons of military history
06:46were there for all to see.
06:48But Hitler chose to ignore them.
06:51One of the reasons for his arrogance
06:53was his irrational belief
06:55in the power of particular new weapons
06:58to achieve decisive results
06:59where others had failed.
07:02This was a trait
07:03which was to take on
07:04a fantastical quality later in the war
07:06where there was a tiny element
07:08of rationality in his thinking.
07:10He had certainly been proved right
07:12when the new panzer divisions
07:14had sliced through the Ardennes
07:16to capture France.
07:18And who could blame him
07:19for believing the same thing
07:20was possible in Russia,
07:22especially with weapons
07:23like the mighty Karl Supermortar
07:25at his disposal?
07:26In 1855,
07:41the British and French forces
07:43fighting in the Crimea
07:44had laid siege to Sevastopol.
07:47Ninety years later,
07:48the German forces fighting in the Crimea
07:50were to do exactly the same thing.
07:52the siege mortars fired
07:58in the 1854 campaign
08:00by the British troops
08:01were later echoed
08:03in the mighty Karl series,
08:05monsters deployed
08:06by Hitler's forces in 1942.
08:10At the time of Hitler's siege
08:12of Sevastopol,
08:14six of these enormous
08:15self-propelled guns
08:16could be called up.
08:17This time,
08:19there would be no protracted siege
08:21or stalemate.
08:22The massive artillery support
08:24from the Karls
08:25helped shatter
08:26the Russian defences,
08:28and Sevastopol
08:28fell into German hands
08:30in 1942.
08:34These monster machines
08:36rolled around
08:37on fully tracked chassis
08:38with 11 road wheels
08:40on each side,
08:41and their massive
08:4254-centimetre guns
08:44fired a shell
08:45which weighed
08:45an astonishing
08:461577 kilograms.
08:51Only six were ever built,
08:53but these six were enough
08:54to secure Sevastopol
08:55for Hitler,
08:56where the British had failed.
08:59Each of these massive guns
09:01were given a name.
09:02The first four were called
09:03after the Norse gods
09:05of mythology.
09:06Thor, Odin,
09:08Loki, Zui,
09:09and the last two,
09:11rather bizarrely,
09:13after the biblical figures,
09:14Adam and Eve.
09:17The Karl was a gigantic
09:1960-centimetre mortar
09:21mounted on tracks,
09:22self-propelled mounting.
09:24It weighed 124 tons
09:26and really was completely
09:28out of court
09:29as far as a fighting vehicle
09:31is concerned,
09:31and you'd have to consider it
09:32more or less a piece
09:34of fixed artillery
09:35that could just about move
09:36rather than self-propelled artillery
09:38in the conventional sense.
09:40What had happened was
09:40that in the First World War,
09:42the Austrians had demolished
09:44some enormous Belgian fortresses
09:46by using horse-drawn
09:47and tractor-drawn artillery
09:49and mortars
09:50of a very heavy calibre,
09:51and the Germans were clearly
09:53trying to emulate this,
09:54and they started it
09:55about 1937
09:56by developing this massive mortar,
09:58building a tract carriage for it,
10:00and then using it,
10:02I think, only in Russia
10:03against some of the fortresses
10:04at Sevastopol
10:05and this sort of thing.
10:06There are cases
10:07during the assault
10:08on Sevastopol
10:08where it blew open
10:09some enormous concrete defences,
10:12but really,
10:13a thing like that
10:14is a very specialist weapon.
10:15It had to be taken to bits
10:16in order to be moved anywhere
10:18on special carriers
10:19and was probably
10:20in more trouble
10:21than it was actually worth.
10:26In many respects,
10:28the summer campaign of 1942
10:30was the high watermark
10:32for the Wehrmacht.
10:32After the siege of Sevastopol,
10:35there was little work
10:36for the Karls to do,
10:38as it was now the turn
10:39of the German armies
10:40to come under siege.
10:42But the Karl class
10:43of self-propelled siege gun
10:45had proved itself
10:46successful in action.
10:48Unfortunately,
10:50the same could not always be said
10:51for Hitler's other innovations.
10:53The Karl represented
10:57the very large end
10:59of weapons development.
11:01These men are training
11:02with the other extreme,
11:04both in size and success.
11:07This was Goliath,
11:08one of three of the so-called
11:10demolition tanks
11:11made by Germany in the war.
11:13It was a miniature
11:14remote-controlled tank,
11:15which was designed
11:16to be guided up
11:17to enemy tanks
11:18or pillboxes,
11:19then detonated.
11:21Although this footage
11:22shows troops training
11:23with these weapons,
11:25it is obvious,
11:26even from this,
11:27that the operators
11:28had to expose themselves
11:29to hostile enemy positions
11:31in order to have
11:32any prospect
11:33of guiding the suicide weapon
11:35onto its target.
11:39In consequence,
11:40casualties were very high,
11:42and this job
11:43was very unpopular
11:44among the troops'
11:45operating machines,
11:46such as the Borgvord B-4,
11:48or the Goliath.
11:50Nonetheless,
11:51over 7,500
11:53remote-controlled
11:54demolition tanks
11:54were built
11:55and used by the troops
11:56in the field.
11:58Their success rate
11:59is not recorded,
12:00but the ratio of failures
12:02to successes
12:02was high.
12:04The Carl and the Goliath
12:06represented very much
12:07the unconventional end
12:08of the military spectrum.
12:10Now, the Goliath here
12:11was another
12:12rather fancy idea.
12:14It's basically
12:15a tiny tracked vehicle
12:16packed with high explosives
12:18which is directed
12:19onto its target
12:19by remote control.
12:21The Germans actually
12:22built a number
12:22of these things,
12:23either worked by radio
12:24or, in this case,
12:25by wire,
12:26reeling out from the vehicle,
12:27like a little child's toy
12:28with a battery box
12:29at the back,
12:30and the men
12:31would guide it
12:32onto its target.
12:33Again,
12:34you could only really
12:35expect to use
12:35a thing like this
12:36against fixed defences,
12:38and it was the very nature
12:39of German warfare
12:40to keep mobile,
12:41so one wonders
12:41where they anticipated
12:43using it
12:44half the time.
12:44I've seen film
12:46of Goliath
12:47in which the thing
12:47is virtually incapable
12:49of staying the right way up
12:50on anything
12:51but dead-level ground,
12:52and of course,
12:53the further away
12:54it is from the operator,
12:55the more difficult
12:55it is for him to aim,
12:57and once the opposition
12:58figure out what it is,
12:59they're going to do
13:00all in their power
13:00to stop it.
13:01It only requires a shot
13:02cutting the wire
13:03to finish it.
13:04We developed similar things
13:06in Great Britain.
13:06They were all considered
13:07to be a completely
13:09useless effort.
13:10None of them
13:11ever worked properly,
13:12and I would say
13:13the same must be said
13:15for poor old Goliath.
13:16There is a famous photograph,
13:17I think taken in Italy,
13:18of a US Army soldier
13:20standing on a mountain
13:21of the darn things,
13:22and I can imagine
13:23the German army
13:24saying to hell with it,
13:25these things are simply
13:26not worth bothering with.
13:28All the trouble
13:29of carrying to the site,
13:30setting them up,
13:31probably to be wasted
13:32the minute the thing
13:33breaks down halfway to target.
13:36Today,
13:37the rusting hulks
13:39of the armoured
13:39fighting vehicles
13:40of the Wehrmacht
13:41lie still and silent
13:42under a summer sun.
13:44This is the US Army
13:46Ordnance Museum Foundation
13:48in Maryland, USA,
13:50final resting place
13:51for many of the survivors
13:52of the titanic struggle
13:54on the Russian front.
13:58The white winter camouflage
14:00contrasts incongruously
14:02with the green summer grass
14:03and blue skies.
14:05These machines,
14:06which once brought terror
14:07to the continent of Europe,
14:08now lie rusting silently away.
14:13Among the well-known tanks
14:14such as the Panther
14:15and the Tiger
14:16are a few less familiar names.
14:19The Hummel,
14:20the Vesp,
14:21and the Grasshopper.
14:25But in their day,
14:26when these drab,
14:27white colour schemes
14:28served a real purpose
14:29on the snow-covered
14:30steppes of Russia,
14:32their contribution
14:32was every bit as vital
14:34as the famous tanks
14:35and the spearhead.
14:41The use of tracked vehicles
14:42to support the objectives
14:44of the Wehrmacht
14:44had grown exponentially
14:46since the start
14:47of World War II
14:48in 1939.
14:52Even in 1941,
14:54only 19 of the 140
14:56German divisions
14:57deployed for the invasion
14:59of Russia
14:59were panzer divisions.
15:00The army of 1942
15:05was much more mobile.
15:08Panzer grenadiers
15:09moving swiftly
15:10around the battlefield
15:11in armoured half-tracks
15:13were much more numerous.
15:16But even mobile inventory
15:19still required artillery support
15:20to achieve many
15:21of their objectives.
15:23That artillery support
15:24needed to be as mobile
15:26as they were.
15:27The Sturmgeschütz assault gun
15:34had originally been designed
15:35to provide the support.
15:37But by 1942,
15:38battlefield necessities
15:40meant that they were
15:41often hijacked
15:41into the role
15:42of tank destroyers.
15:44This deprived the troops
15:46of close artillery support,
15:47which the Geschütz
15:48were originally designed
15:50to provide.
15:51It left a gap
15:52which could not be filled
15:54by the medium
15:54or heavy artillery.
15:55These heavier guns
16:01often lagged
16:02behind the motorised troops
16:03across the huge distances
16:05which had to be covered
16:06in Russia.
16:11In Europe,
16:12during the campaigns
16:13of 1939,
16:1440 and 41,
16:16where roads were good,
16:18it was found
16:18that conventional artillery
16:20could be moved
16:21and deployed
16:22reasonably easily.
16:25in Russia,
16:30the dirt roads
16:31turned to rivers of mud
16:33with the arrival
16:33of spring
16:34and autumn rains,
16:36and they were frequently
16:37covered in deep snow
16:38during the winter months.
16:39The best possible solution
16:59for the provision
17:00of heavy artillery support
17:01for the mobile battles
17:02now being fought in Russia
17:04was the deployment
17:05of large-caliber,
17:07self-propelled guns
17:08on fully tracked carriages.
17:11These vehicles
17:13could stick reasonably close
17:14to the fast-moving
17:15panzer divisions
17:16and provide them
17:18with the same heavy
17:19artillery support
17:20which would normally require
17:21horse-drawn
17:22or motorised transport.
17:24They were collectively known
17:26as Sturm artillery
17:27or self-propelled guns.
17:38These troops
17:40seen here
17:40during the German advance
17:41into the Caucasus
17:42in 1942
17:43are towing their gun
17:45into action.
17:51But to get into action,
17:53the gun has to be
17:54first unlimbered.
17:55At this point,
17:56the crew will be exposed
17:57to enemy fire.
18:00The heavy 15-centimetre
18:02infantry gun
18:03could be mounted
18:03on a tracked chassis
18:05to produce a vehicle
18:06which was always
18:07ready for action
18:08and which gave the crew
18:09a measure of protection
18:10against artillery fire
18:12and which could keep pace
18:13with the spearheads
18:14over the worst
18:15possible terrain.
18:18The self-propelled
18:19artillery units
18:20had been born.
18:21The first self-propelled guns
18:23proved effective
18:24but as the war wore on
18:26and Germany's situation
18:28grew increasingly desperate,
18:30her hard-pressed armies
18:31found themselves
18:32facing superior firepower
18:34from increasingly heavy
18:36enemy artillery.
18:39To combat this,
18:41the Wehrmacht needed
18:42a variety of mobile gun platforms
18:44capable of moving
18:45heavy artillery
18:46to hard-pressed sections
18:48over the vast battlefields
18:50of Russia.
18:51Ultimately,
18:52thousands of self-propelled guns
18:54in a bewildering variety
18:56of variations
18:57would see action.
18:59Although it was
19:00the insistent demands
19:02of the Russian front
19:03which provide
19:03the real catalyst
19:04for the development
19:05of self-propelled guns,
19:07there were a number
19:08of earlier precedents.
19:10Limited numbers
19:11of self-propelled guns
19:12called
19:12Schwer Infantry Geschutz
19:14or SIG for short
19:16had been successfully deployed
19:18in the 1940 campaign
19:19in France.
19:22Initially,
19:23these vehicles
19:23used the ridiculously
19:25light Panzer I chassis
19:26to carry the heavy
19:2815-centimeter
19:29infantry gun.
19:31The troops advancing here
19:32are using the gun
19:34to blast infantry
19:35from buildings
19:35and strong points
19:36and despite the obvious
19:38limitations
19:39of these first
19:40self-propelled guns,
19:41it was actions
19:42like these
19:43that convinced
19:44the high command
19:45that there was a role
19:45for fully mobile
19:47heavy artillery
19:47carried on a tracked chassis.
19:49The Panzer I
19:57was Germany's
19:58first and smallest tank.
20:00Secretly developed
20:01as an agricultural tractor
20:02during the years
20:03when Germany
20:04was prevented
20:05from developing tanks
20:06by the Treaty of Versailles,
20:08it was very much
20:09a starting point.
20:13It was a two-man machine,
20:15smaller than many
20:16modern saloon cars.
20:18It soon proved
20:19to be hopelessly
20:20inadequate
20:20under combat conditions.
20:23The armor was too thin
20:24and the two-machine gun
20:26armament was ineffective
20:27but the chassis itself
20:29was a good one
20:30and German engineers
20:31immediately set to work
20:32to produce specialist variants
20:34for other battlefield tasks.
20:38The Germans,
20:39as a race,
20:40have long been famous
20:42for the quality
20:42of their engineering work.
20:45They are also justifiably
20:46renowned for their
20:47meticulousness.
20:48A demonstration of this
20:50can be seen
20:50in the thorough manner
20:52in which every tank chassis
20:53manufactured during World War II
20:55was methodically exploited
20:57with uniform thoroughness
20:59and regularity
21:00to produce a wide array
21:02of specialist vehicles
21:03to cater for every need
21:05on the battlefield.
21:06Each of the tank chassis
21:10produced by German manufacturers
21:12or by her Czechoslovakian
21:14satellite suppliers
21:15was systematically altered
21:16to produce
21:17not just the main battle tanks
21:19themselves
21:19but in almost every case
21:21there was also
21:22a tank destroyer variant
21:23and a self-propelled
21:25artillery variant.
21:27In most cases
21:28there were also
21:29command tanks,
21:30armored ammunition tanks,
21:32armored recovery vehicles
21:33and even
21:34flamethrowing tanks.
21:36In the case
21:37of self-propelled artillery
21:38this systematic approach
21:41to the design possibilities
21:42of each model
21:43was first seen
21:44in the Panzer I.
21:47As we have seen
21:48it was the successful adaptation
21:50of the Panzer I chassis
21:51which allowed the Sig 33
21:53to carry a heavy
21:5415 centimeter gun
21:56to give a heavy
21:57self-propelled artillery piece
21:58which could be moved
22:00right up to the front line.
22:03However,
22:04there was one major drawback
22:05in the arrangement
22:06of such a big gun
22:07on such a small chassis.
22:09It was so top-heavy
22:10that the gun
22:11was very liable
22:12to topple over.
22:14This undignified trait
22:16led to the search
22:17for a better alternative.
22:19Naturally,
22:20the first step
22:20was to examine
22:21the larger chassis
22:22of the other
22:23German light tank
22:24in service
22:24the Panzer II.
22:28Like the Panzer I
22:29the Panzer II
22:31battle tank
22:31was found to be woefully
22:33inadequate
22:33under combat conditions
22:34and like the Panzer I
22:36the outdated
22:37Panzer II chassis
22:39was successfully developed
22:40as a self-propelled
22:41gun carriage
22:42in an attempt
22:43to extend
22:44the life of the design.
22:47In this respect
22:48the Panzer II
22:49worked only a little better
22:51than the Panzer I.
22:52Although it gave
22:53a slightly lower profile
22:54and hence better stability
22:56and a greater measure
22:57of protection
22:58to the crew
22:58it was only manufactured
23:00in tiny quantities.
23:02Only twelve were made
23:03and all appear
23:04to have been dispatched
23:05to Africa
23:05to equip the Africa Corps.
23:11In practice
23:12neither the Panzer I
23:13or the Panzer II chassis
23:14could really deal
23:16with the requirement
23:16of the heavy
23:1715 centimeter gun
23:18which they were being
23:20adapted to carry.
23:22The lateral solution
23:23to the problem
23:24was found by reducing
23:25the weight of the gun
23:26from 15 centimeters
23:28to 10.5 centimeters.
23:31This produced
23:32the VESP
23:32or WASP
23:33which combined
23:34the lighter
23:3510.5 centimeter gun
23:36on a Panzer II chassis.
23:38The VESP
23:40was an excellent design
23:41which was light enough
23:42to keep up
23:43with the troops
23:43but heavy enough
23:44to produce
23:45an effective barrage.
23:48682 of these machines
23:49were produced
23:50from 1942 and 1944.
23:51They were welcomed
23:53with open arms
23:55by the hard-pressed troops.
23:57One thing
23:58which did not find favor
23:59was the name.
24:02It did not suggest
24:03power and presence
24:04and was dropped
24:05on the personal orders
24:06of Hitler in 1944.
24:09However,
24:10they continued
24:11to be known as WASPs
24:12to the troops
24:13who did value
24:14their considerable sting
24:15in battle.
24:19It was the most important
24:21of the German
24:22self-propelled
24:23armoured artillery types.
24:25It was a very neat-looking
24:26piece of equipment
24:27and the strange thing is
24:29that although
24:30they utilized the chassis
24:32by the time
24:33the German army
24:34used the chassis
24:35it was obsolete.
24:36The unfortunate thing
24:36about this
24:37is there was not sufficient
24:38accommodation space
24:39in this vehicle
24:40and this is,
24:41I think,
24:41as most soldiers
24:43will tell you,
24:44this is very important.
24:45You have to have places
24:46where you can put things
24:47and this is one of the
24:48great drawbacks
24:48of this particular vehicle.
24:50It operated
24:51with the light batteries
24:52you know,
24:52the smaller batteries
24:54of armoured artillery
24:55battalions
24:56of armoured
24:57artillery regiment.
24:58These are quite
24:59versatile vehicles
25:00and really quite
25:00important ones.
25:01But that's a good
25:02example,
25:02as I say,
25:03of a really
25:03obsolete piece of equipment
25:04being brought back
25:05into service
25:06and yes,
25:08more or less
25:08performing the role.
25:09But with all
25:10obsolete vehicles,
25:12as I've said,
25:12you've got crew complaint
25:14about lack of accommodation.
25:15So although
25:16you may get it
25:17rapidly into service,
25:18you have the disadvantage
25:19of its shortcomings.
25:21It has to be improved
25:22or adapted.
25:35With the introduction
25:36of the VESP,
25:37the possibilities
25:38for the Panzer II chassis
25:39appeared to have been
25:40exhausted.
25:40The ceaseless demands
25:44of the Russian front
25:45called for heavier
25:46and heavier guns.
25:55So German engineers
25:56moved on to examine
25:57the possibilities inherent
25:59in the Panzer III,
26:00which was Germany's
26:02main battle tank
26:02in the early years
26:04of the war.
26:05This proved
26:06to be a much more
26:07fertile hunting ground.
26:09The main variant
26:13produced using
26:14the Panzer III chassis
26:15was the famous
26:17Sturmgeschütz,
26:18the assault gun variant,
26:20which went on
26:20to become one of the
26:21most successful
26:22designs of the war.
26:24By dispensing
26:25with the turret
26:25to mount a long
26:2675-centimeter gun,
26:28the resultant vehicle
26:29was efficient
26:30both in the role
26:31of assault gun
26:31and tank destroyer.
26:33But the Sturmgeschütz
26:35was a compromise machine.
26:36It was not really designed
26:38as a specialist
26:39tank hunter,
26:40although it could
26:41do the job.
26:42Nor was it capable
26:43of supplying
26:44a heavy artillery barrage.
26:47Both of these demands
26:49took the Sturmgeschütz
26:50away from its role
26:51supplying close
26:52artillery support
26:53to the troops
26:54in the front line.
26:55To supplement the assault guns,
26:58it was now obvious
26:59that the Wehrmacht
27:00needed both a dedicated
27:01purpose-designed
27:02tank killer
27:03and a separate vehicle,
27:05purpose-designed
27:06for heavy artillery support
27:07and mounted
27:08on a mobile
27:09tracked chassis.
27:13The solution
27:14was to adapt
27:15the Panzer IV chassis
27:16to produce
27:17two specialist machines.
27:19In the tank hunter role
27:22came the Nashorn
27:23or rhinoceros
27:24produced from 1943 onwards.
27:27Its 8.8 centimeter gun
27:29was what was needed
27:30to deal with Russian tanks
27:32at longer ranges.
27:35There was a German
27:36assault piece
27:37called Nashorn,
27:38the rhino.
27:38I mean,
27:39this was an extraordinary
27:40beast,
27:41literally well-named,
27:43I must admit.
27:45It had a short life.
27:47It had a very limited function.
27:49I don't know,
27:50but looking at it,
27:50it must have been
27:51very difficult to handle.
27:52And above all,
27:52what you don't want to be
27:53on the battlefield
27:54is a target
27:54for other enemy projectiles.
27:57You have to think
27:58about that as well.
27:59The German side
28:01developed very good,
28:03standard,
28:05stable designs
28:06and the German tank program
28:08continued to be
28:09extremely cost-effective.
28:13With a deadly punch,
28:15the Nashorn was clearly
28:16a major step
28:17in the right direction.
28:18Although its high
28:19profile and lack
28:20of crew protection
28:21did give severe grounds
28:23for reservation.
28:24But its main gun
28:25was sufficiently powerful
28:26and some 500
28:27of these excellent
28:29tank destroyers
28:29were manufactured.
28:31The vehicle behind me
28:33is the Nashorn,
28:35the rhinoceros,
28:37and it's also the chassis
28:39of the Panzer IV,
28:40but it has an 88-millimeter gun.
28:42And this is the anti-tank
28:44hunting version of the vehicle.
28:48The vehicle was also used
28:49as the chassis
28:50for a gun,
28:54a regular fuel artillery piece,
28:56which was also used
28:57by the German army.
28:58These experiments yielded the Hummel,
29:03or Bumblebee.
29:05The Hummel used the Panzer IV chassis
29:07to carry a heavy 15-centimeter gun
29:10for mobile artillery bombardment.
29:13This vehicle overcame all the drawbacks
29:16of the previous self-propelled guns.
29:18It carried a much heavier punch,
29:21could be very rapidly deployed,
29:23and of course,
29:24it could be easily moved
29:25to avoid counter-barrages
29:27by enemy guns.
29:30666 machines
29:31eventually entered service.
29:33There was a huge demand
29:34for the front-line units,
29:36and there were never enough
29:37to go round.
29:41Now once again,
29:42I mean, this is an example
29:43of the Germans using their chassis.
29:45You know, they used the chassis
29:46of, you know, the Panzer,
29:47the Panzers III and IV,
29:49which is a very good idea.
29:50You've got a basically good chassis.
29:51Why not get on with it?
29:53And that what happened
29:55with the Hummel,
29:56which is the Bumblebee,
29:57it proved to be,
29:58and I think most German soldiers
30:00will tell you this,
30:00was an extremely,
30:02both a very powerful weapon
30:03and actually a very successful weapon.
30:06And it was actually brought
30:08into full service in 1943
30:10and was used largely
30:13by tank battalions.
30:15But it's again this business,
30:16I think, of having
30:17a very particular capability
30:18on the battlefield.
30:19And really, the Hummel
30:20seems to have fitted very well
30:22into German Panzer Divisions.
30:24And if, I think,
30:25altogether,
30:26the German army
30:27took delivery
30:28of over more than 600 of them,
30:30which is really quite good
30:31and really had
30:32a very good record.
30:33Indeed, it was a very useful
30:34piece of field artillery
30:36to be used
30:36in close proximity
30:40with the tank divisions
30:42as such.
30:43A very successful
30:44piece of equipment.
30:47The Hummel and the Vesp
30:49were to prove highly successful
30:51under battlefield conditions.
30:53Both could give mobile artillery support
30:55to the hard-pressed Panzer Divisions,
30:58then quickly move location
30:59before they could be targeted
31:01by the superior numbers
31:03of Allied artillery.
31:06In total,
31:07some 1,300 of these two types
31:09of self-propelled guns
31:11were made from 1942
31:12to 1945,
31:15during which time
31:16they provided essential
31:18artillery support
31:19to the great advances
31:20of 1942
31:21and covering fire
31:23for the desperate
31:23Wehrmacht Divisions
31:24during their headlong retreat
31:26into Germany
31:27during 1944.
31:29The U.S.
31:59Let's go.
32:29Let's go.
32:59In the case of the Hummel, there was only enough room for 18 rounds.
33:04A constant round of resupplying was therefore required during any significant bombardments.
33:09However, by 1944, ammunition supplies were strictly limited in the German forces, and unlike the glory days of 1941, even these limited stocks had to be shepherded very carefully indeed.
33:25In line with the German factories, the tank producing Skoda works in Czechoslovakia also produced self-propelled artillery, using the chassis from the Czech manufactured tanks.
33:39The Czech-made Panzer 38T equipped many German units during the early years of the war, and when the tanks were withdrawn from frontline service, it made sense to convert the highly serviceable chassis into a self-propelled artillery role.
33:54The resultant machine, which combined a 10.5cm howitzer with the 38T chassis, was known to the Germans as the grill, or cricket.
34:04Never as popular as the VESP or the Hummel, nevertheless, 282 machines were manufactured, and they saw action mainly in Russia.
34:15A few were also used in the campaign in the West, after the Allied landings.
34:33By this stage of the war, time was beginning to run against the Germans, and in the limited time available, the late war Panzer 5 and 6 chassis did not produce as many conversions
34:45as previous vehicles, but the Panzer IV produced one of the most successful designs, in the form of the Panzer-Jager IV, a superb tank hunter.
34:59Unlike the Panzer I, II, and III, the Panzer IV remained in service throughout the war, so there was never likely to be a surplus of redundant vehicles for conversion.
35:09In any case, the successful introduction of the VESP and Hummel solved the technical problems of mobile heavy artillery support.
35:19In consequence, further attempts to use the Panzer IV chassis for self-propelled artillery were limited to a few experiments which produced this machine, nicknamed the Grasshopper.
35:30This is the Grasshopper.
35:41It is undoubtedly one of the worst ideas ever.
35:45What it is, it's the chassis of the Panzerkampaggen Mark IV, but you see that it has this turret and a gun.
35:52But you notice that it has a superstructure on the back of the vehicle.
35:58The idea was this.
36:00You dig a hole.
36:02The engineers would come and line it with concrete.
36:05Then you would use the superstructure on the back to dismount the turret and put the turret in the hole.
36:11Now, this makes no sense for a mobile weapon to be fixed into position. It's dumb.
36:22With regard to the Grasshopper, what the Germans did, they took the chassis of the Panzer IV, which was a very good chassis, and which lasted, by the way, throughout the length of the war.
36:32And they exploited it this time in a very different manner. What they did, as you know, they had a system whereby the turret was removable.
36:42If you look at the side of the turret, you'll see the two bolt holding positions where this vehicle, if you like, self-propelled artillery piece, really was basically a weapons carrier.
36:55It was carrying a weapon. That was the idea. The weapon being the turret itself, which, because of the capability of the tank, which had really its own lifting equipment, removed the turret, could be removed from the tank.
37:10You could do one of two things with that. You could either apply two wheels to the turret which you had removed and move it to whichever position you wanted.
37:19Or, in fact, you could then emplace it as a fixed firing point, as a, if you like, an immediately emplaceable strong point.
37:30This is a very rare machine, indeed, of which only a very few were produced.
37:37Some sources put the figure as low as two machines. Others say 14 were made.
37:43With the warped logic which led to its creation, that's no great surprise.
37:49In order to allow for the turret to give the protection the crew needed, the gun size had to be reduced to 10.5 centimeters, when what was actually demanded were heavier caliber guns.
38:00By 1944, the Allied air forces in the west enjoyed almost total air superiority.
38:12In Russia, the air force had recovered from its early defeats, and was now almost as effective as the British and Americans.
38:20Vehicle losses reached catastrophic proportions, as the fighter bombers rolled over the front, looking for targets.
38:27I think initially it was just a big idea.
38:28Now the real priority was for anti-aircraft protection, which could move with the tanks.
38:58and give some cover against the relentless attacks of the Allied fighter bombs.
39:03It was in this role that more Panzer IV conversions were made.
39:14These self-propelled anti-aircraft guns were produced in three forms.
39:19Firstly, there was the Mobilwagen, which the troops nicknamed the Furniture Van because of its resemblance to a peacetime removals truck.
39:28It was followed by two later machines, the Verbalwind, or Whirlwind, and Ostwind, or Eastwind.
39:37In the case of the Mobilwagen, this was very much a wartime contingency measure rather than a purpose-designed vehicle.
39:46As damaged Panzer IVs were brought back for repair from the Eastern Front, they were converted to an anti-aircraft role by the simple expedient of taking off the turret and replacing it with a 20mm flank gun,
39:58which was protected, when in transit, by four collapsible sides which were lowered when the flank gun was in action.
40:06To say this was an unsuccessful design is an understatement.
40:10The 20mm gun was soon found to be woefully inadequate for the job of anti-aircraft defense.
40:16Of even greater concern was the fact that the sides of the Mobilwagen had to be lowered to allow the gun to fire.
40:24This left the crew with no protection whatsoever and defeated the whole purpose of mounting the gun on a tank chassis in the first place.
40:31The frontline troops were quick to point out that, in action, the same result could have been achieved by placing an anti-aircraft gun on the back of a truck.
40:41The pilot to storm, who had been buried in the state of Missouri's
40:44because of the seventy- capitalize diamonds.
40:45The olmas Пяти-an guerre, theyкая theion vessel.
40:47This wasésus-owned and misgotら studies.
40:48They announced that, in general, some of their superiorений could have been destroyed.
41:02At the top of the ship's dep东ancy in the same way.
41:04As soon as the rays areåt'ии, the same�ли SAS which can simply take theần g sebenar to build into this unit.
41:11Miraculously, 240 conversions had been made before this glaring design flaw came to light.
41:30Effectively, 240 precious tanks had been wasted.
41:34A measure of effectiveness was achieved by increasing the size of gun from 20mm to 37mm, but the Mobilwagen was deemed a fatal.
41:46It was obvious that what was required was an anti-aircraft vehicle that gave the crew the benefits of armour protection while they were in action.
41:56The solution was a specialist vehicle known as the Verbalwind.
42:00It used the Panzer IV chassis and used four 20mm flank guns in a quad arrangement, now mounted on a fully rotating turret, which gave the crew some measure of protection.
42:11The Verbalwind was nothing more than anti-aircraft artillery.
42:17It had four 20mm cannon on it.
42:21And because the Allies had air superiority, the Germans had to have a way to keep mobile anti-aircraft artillery up with their tanks.
42:31It had to protect not only their tanks, but things like their trains, the logistics trains that any army has.
42:39And this was a very, very effective way to do it because we had four very fast-firing cannon that were used on anti-aircraft mode
42:50and could take out low-flying Allied aircraft like the Typhoon, which was a rocket-firing aircraft used against tanks.
43:01Very difficult to take out German tanks using our equipment on the ground, the American Enforced Sherman being a perfectly awful tank.
43:08But a rocket-firing Typhoon could certainly take out a Tiger, no problem.
43:13So the Verbalwind, the whirlwind, was a way to keep the Allied aircraft off your tanks.
43:28Even mounted in groups of four, the 20mm gun was still ineffectual.
43:34So the Verbalwind was discontinued after 100 had been built.
43:43The successor to the Verbalwind was known as the Ostwind.
43:47But the end was now in sight, and only 43 machines were made to combat an Allied air force,
43:54which was flying 20,000 aircraft in the skies over Germany.
44:13Despite the revolutionary quality of many of the machines produced for Hitler's armies,
44:22they could never hope to match the sheer weight of numbers ranged against them.
44:28Given the depraved nature of the regime which brought them into existence,
44:33every civilized person should give thanks for that.
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