I've Researched 9/11 For 15 Years. These Things Still Don't Add Up...

Name: I've Researched 9/11 For 15 Years. These Things Still Don't Add Up...
Uploaded: 2026-09-22T01:11:36+00:00
Duration: 24 min 15 s
Channel: Top5s

00:06I've researched the events of September 11th for more than 15 years, and even after all this time,

00:12there are still parts of the story that leave me with questions. Why did Mohammed Atta risk the

00:16entire operation by flying out of Boston, only to fly back into the city on the morning of the

00:21attacks? How did two future hijackers already known to American intelligence spend more than

00:26a year living openly in the United States without being found? Why were the flight recorders from the

00:31two planes that struck the World Trade Center never officially recovered? And why did every

00:36one of the hijacker pilots travel to Las Vegas in the months before the attacks? Some questions

00:41have reasonable explanations, others remain disputed or unresolved to this day. Now this is by no means

00:47an exhaustive list, and if you'd like to see more of these then let me know in the comments section

00:51below. The first one might be one of the strangest of all, because on the night before the attacks,

00:56Mohammed Atta deliberately put himself in a position where a single delayed flight could

01:00have changed everything.

01:08Why did Atta risk flying through Portland? On the afternoon of September 10th, 2001,

01:14lead 911 terrorist Mohammed Atta and fellow hijacker Abdul Aziz al-Omari left Boston and drove north to

01:21Portland, Maine. This decision was incredibly strange, considering that the following morning

01:27they needed to return to Boston, specifically to Logan International Airport to board American Airlines

01:32Flight 11, which was scheduled to depart at 7.45am. Now what was the reasoning behind introducing another

01:40airport, another flight, and a potential opportunity for something to go wrong? To this day there is no

01:47definitive answer. What we do know is that it wasn't a last-minute decision, as Atta had booked the

01:53Portland connection flight the month prior. On the evening before the attacks, at approximately 5.43pm,

02:00Atta and al-Omari checked into room 233 at the Comfort Inn in South Portland. To onlookers they appeared to

02:06be

02:06two ordinary travellers spending the night before an early flight. That evening the two men visited Pizza

02:11Hut for a short time, then around 8.31pm, a surveillance camera captured their rented car at a

02:17Keybank ATM. Ten minutes later, they used another ATM. Shortly after nine, they stopped at a gas station

02:24to ask for directions, and afterward they went to Walmart. Atta was caught on surveillance footage at

02:309.22pm in a Walmart in nearby Scarborough, where he stayed for about 20 minutes. That night, members of the

02:37hijacking group were making phone calls, and while the specifics of each call are unclear,

02:42it is likely final arrangements were being made. Eventually, Atta and al-Omari returned to their

02:48hotel room to prepare for the next day. At 5.33am on September 11th, they checked out at their hotel

02:54and drove their rented Nissan the short distance to the parking area of Portland Airport. At 5.43pm,

03:01they checked in for their flight, where Atta was selected by the airline's computer-assisted

03:05passenger pre-screening system for additional security procedures. As a result, his checked

03:11luggage was supposed to be held, until the airline confirmed that he had boarded the flight.

03:16This might seem significant, but in 2001, it wasn't as alarming as we might think today.

03:22The CAP system did not automatically trigger the intensive screening we associate with modern airport

03:27security, and as a result, Atta was still able to board the flight. There was a brief issue,

03:33because Atta believed he would be checked to Boston and wouldn't need to interact with the airline

03:37again. However, upon arriving in Portland, an agent informed him that he would need to check in

03:42again at Boston to receive his boarding pass for the connecting flight. At this point, Atta became

03:48visibly angry, as he clearly wasn't expecting this. At approximately 6am, the small commuter aircraft

03:54departed from Portland heading to Boston Logan Airport. The scheduled arrival time was 6.45pm,

04:00which left Atta and Al Omari with about one hour to navigate through the airport and board flight 11.

04:07Any delays, problems or missed connections could have jeopardized the entire plan.

04:12Fortunately for Atta, the aircraft arrived on time, and he and Al Omari were back in Boston.

04:18Atta made a telephone call before they proceeded towards their connecting flight, American Airlines Flight

04:2311, which was set to depart at 7.45pm. Atta had checked two bags in at Portland, but when he

04:29reached Logan,

04:30the bags apparently didn't make it onto flight 11 due to the hurried transfer. Inside those bags,

04:36investigators would later discover crucial physical evidence related to the plot.

04:41This included important documents, identification, personal materials, and handwritten instructions

04:47known as the last night. Ironically, the detour that nearly caused a major complication for Atta

04:53that morning, ultimately provided investigators with crucial evidence that would have otherwise

04:57vanished along with flight 11. But the question is, why would the operational leader of 9-11 deliberately

05:04introduced a separate 90-minute flight into the morning of the attack? If the connecting flight

05:09was late, he wouldn't have made flight 11, and if his bags had been searched, he would have been

05:14stopped from boarding at all, and the whole plot would have unraveled. One possible reason Atta and

05:19Al Omari drove away from Boston, only to return, was to avoid drawing attention to themselves. They might

05:25have wanted to separate their check-in process from that of the other hijackers, to decrease the chance

05:30of detection. But who knows? Regardless of their reasoning, their choice was incredibly risky,

05:36and we may never know the true motivation behind their actions. Investigators are still to this day

05:41searching for answers, but are unable to uncover anything.

05:50Who helped the hijackers establish themselves in America?

05:54On January 15th, 2000, two men stepped off of a plane at Los Angeles International Airport.

06:00They were young and spoke little, if any, English. With almost no experience in life in the West,

06:05they faced significant challenges. Yet within months, they would become two of the most important

06:10members of Al-Qaeda's developing 9-11 operation. Their names were Hawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar.

06:17More than a year before the attacks, these two men were already in the United States,

06:21but they needed assistance. They required a place to live, transportation, bank accounts,

06:27and identification. They also needed to understand how America worked, and most importantly,

06:33they needed people to help them. The question is, who helped them, and what did they know?

06:39It has never been established exactly where Hazmi and Midhar went after clearing immigration at Los

06:44Angeles, but it's believed the two men likely had some kind of pre-arranged assistance for their arrival.

06:49Their instructions were unusual. According to Khalid Sikh Mohammed, the mastermind behind the plane's

06:55operation, Hazmi and Midhar were supposed to pose as Saudi students, and seek help from local Muslim

07:01communities. They were also instructed to learn English, so that they could eventually begin flight

07:06training. Soon after arriving in Los Angeles, they spent time at the King Fad Mosque in Culver City,

07:12and formed acquaintances in the area. The commission investigated whether anyone associated with the

07:18mosque had assisted the two men in establishing themselves. One individual examined was Fahid al-Thamari,

07:25an eye man at the mosque, and an accredited Saudi diplomat. However, after reviewing the available

07:31evidence, the commission concluded that it did not find any evidence suggesting that he provided assistance

07:36to Hazmi or Midhar, and the identity of the person who may have assisted the two men during these early

07:42days in Los Angeles remains unknown, or hidden. On February 1st, Hazmi and Midhar met Omar al-Bayomi

07:50at a halal restaurant on Venice Boulevard. Bayomi, a Saudi national living in San Diego,

07:56supposedly overheard the two men speaking Arabic and approached them. Hazmi and Midhar introduced

08:01themselves as Saudi students who had recently arrived in the United States to study English.

08:06They mentioned that they were having difficulty settling into Los Angeles, and in response,

08:11Bayomi suggested that San Diego would be a better place for them to live, and offered his assistance

08:15in helping them get settled there. Within a few days, Hazmi and Midhar travelled to San Diego.

08:21On February 4th, the two men visited the Islamic Center of San Diego to look for Bayomi, and they accepted

08:27his offer for assistance. Bayomi helped them find an apartment, completing the lease application on

08:32their behalf, and co-signed the lease when the real estate agent would not accept their cash deposit.

08:38Bayomi assisted them in opening a bank account. He then obtained a certified cheque from his own

08:43account for the deposit, and Hazmi and Midhar reimbursed him. They moved into the apartment on

08:49February 5th, and for a period they lived in an apartment complex where Bayomi himself resided.

08:55While living in San Diego, Hazmi and Midhar relied heavily on the local Muslim community for support.

09:01One of the most significant connections they made was with Modhar Abdullah. Abdullah was a Yemeni

09:07university student in his early twenties, who spoke both Arabic and English. This bilingual ability

09:14made him especially valuable to Hazmi and Midhar. Abdullah assisted the men with several practical tasks.

09:20He helped them obtain California driver's licenses, guided them through applications for language and

09:26flight schools, translated between Arabic and English, and introduced them to his group of friends.

09:32The two men were trying to learn English because their ultimate goal was to fly.

09:35However, their attempts at flight training were challenging. They supposedly struggled with the

09:40language, with their instructors later noting that Hazmi and Midhar seemed particularly interested in flying the

09:45aircraft, while showing little concern for standard takeoff and landing procedures.

09:51By the end of May 2000, Hazmi and Midhar had given up their attempts to learn to fly.

09:56However, Abdullah continued to be one of their closest associates in San Diego.

10:01Following the events of 9-11, there were allegations that Abdullah had prior knowledge of their terrorist plans.

10:06These claims stemmed from statements he allegedly made to fellow inmates after the attacks.

10:11Abdullah himself denied having any prior knowledge of the events, and he was deported to Yemen in 2004.

10:17He now supposedly lives in Sweden.

10:20But Hazmi and Midhar's support network in San Diego extended beyond just Bayoumi and Abdullah.

10:26They connected with many individuals through local mosques and the broader Muslim community.

10:31When they bought a used car with cash, the Salah permitted them to use his address for registering the vehicle.

10:36On another occasion, Hazmi needed to receive money from overseas.

10:41The administrator of the Islamic Center of San Diego allowed Hazmi to use his bank account to receive a $5

10:47,000 wire transfer from Dubai.

10:50Another important figure was Omar Bakar Bashat, who confirmed that he helped Hazmi improve his English skills.

10:58They also formed a relationship with Anwar Al-Qui, an ayman at the Rabat Mosque.

11:03Eventually, Hazmi and Midhar moved out of their first apartment and found a room in the house of a man

11:08they met through the San Diego Muslim community.

11:12Midhar stayed there for about a month, while Hazmi remained until December 2000.

11:17According to the commission, the man who rented the room was apparently law-abiding and had long-standing friendly connections

11:23with local police and FBI personnel.

11:25He did not observe anything unusual in their behavior that warranted reporting them.

11:30But perhaps the most extraordinary part of Hazmi and Midhar's time in America is not the amount of help they

11:35received,

11:36but the fact that American intelligence had already obtained information linking the two men to Al-Qaeda,

11:41after they had been identified at an Al-Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000.

11:47The CIA were also aware that Midhar had a valid American visa.

11:52However, this crucial information was not effectively communicated to the FBI at the time.

11:57As a result, Hazmi and Midhar were able to enter the country and establish themselves in California.

12:03It wasn't until the summer of 2001 that someone began to piece the puzzle together when CIA and FBI personnel

12:10started revisiting old intelligence.

12:12On August 21st, a CIA officer discovered crucial information indicating that Hazmi had traveled to Los Angeles in January 2000,

12:21and that Midhar had entered the United States in January, and had returned on July 4th, 2001.

12:27Hazmi's records suggested that he had not officially left the United States since January 2000.

12:32Suddenly, the question changed from where are these men, to are they still here?

12:37On August 24th, both men were finally placed on the tip-off terrorist watch list.

12:42However, there was still a problem.

12:44The FBI needed to locate them.

12:46Surprisingly, the search didn't start with the urgency you might expect.

12:50On August 28th, a lead was sent to the FBI's New York field office.

12:54However, it was marked as routine.

12:57This classification gave the receiving office 30 days to respond, and the attacks were just 14 days away.

13:03On September 11th, 2001, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mindhar were no longer just names on an intelligence report.

13:11They were passengers aboard American Airlines Flight 77.

13:15When the plane struck the Pentagon, the haunting question of why they had never been found,

13:19and why they were allowed to board that plane,

13:22became one of the most pressing inquiries of the entire 9-11 investigation.

13:26The clues were there all along.

13:28The names were known.

13:30The photos existed.

13:31However, the system failed to connect these dots.

13:34By the time the FBI began searching for Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mindhar,

13:38the clock was already ticking.

13:40And on September 11th, it reached zero.

13:49What happened to the flight recorders?

13:52Both recorders from Flight 93 were supposedly recovered,

13:55and those from Flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon were also located,

13:59although the cockpit voice recorder was too damaged to produce usable audio.

14:03However, officially, none of the four recorders aboard Flight 11 and 175 were recovered from the World Trade Center debris.

14:11But because flight recorders are specifically constructed to survive severe crashes,

14:15their absence continues to invite questions,

14:18especially when one of the terrorists' passports survived the initial impact,

14:22and was found partially intact on the street in New York.

14:27When an airline crashes, investigators typically have two crucial pieces of evidence to examine.

14:32The first is the Flight Data Recorder,

14:34which documents information such as altitude, speed, and aircraft performance.

14:39The second is the Cockpit Voice Recorder,

14:41which captures sounds and conversations from the flight deck.

14:45Although these devices are commonly referred to as black boxes,

14:48they are actually painted bright orange for easy identification.

14:52Furthermore, they are designed to withstand extreme conditions.

14:55So what happened to the recorders from the two aircraft that struck the World Trade Center?

15:00Well, on September 20th, 2001,

15:03FBI Director Robert Mueller was asked directly about the recorders,

15:07and his answer was this.

15:09The FBI did not have the voice or flight data recorders from the World Trade Center.

15:14Three years later, the 9-11 Commission reached the same conclusion.

15:18Its report states that the cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders

15:22from American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 were never found.

15:27However, what has sparked so much speculation

15:30is that during the cleanup operation at Ground Zero,

15:33reports began circulating that recovery workers had seen the flight recorders.

15:38Firefighter Nicholas DeMassi of Engine Company 261

15:41shared his experiences in the 2003 book,

15:44Behind the Scenes, Ground Zero,

15:45which compiled stories from recovery workers.

15:49Nicholas claimed that while operating an ATV to escort federal agents through the ruins,

15:54they discovered three of the four missing black boxes,

15:56and in October 2001,

15:58he personally transported these agents into the wreckage,

16:01where they retrieved the devices.

16:04He noted,

16:05At one point, I was asked to take federal agents into the pit

16:08to look for the black boxes of the planes.

16:10We were fortunate enough to find three of the four.

16:14DeMassi reported witnessing the agents place the black boxes onto his ATV,

16:18after which they were driven out of the debris fields

16:20and taken away by authorities.

16:23Additionally,

16:24Kurt Sonnenfeld,

16:25a videographer for the Federal Emergency Management Agency,

16:28who was granted unrestricted access to film Ground Zero during the recovery efforts,

16:33also claimed to have seen the black boxes.

16:35He later moved to Argentina and made his claims public,

16:39asserting that while he did not personally see the black boxes embedded in the rubble,

16:44he observed a specific area being locked down by federal authorities

16:47who had discovered the flight recorders.

16:49He reported seeing federal agents carrying boxes

16:52that matched the descriptions of flight data and cockpit voice recorders.

16:57Sonnenfeld claimed he was explicitly instructed not to film the section where the recorders were found.

17:02He alleged that the total denial of their existence by the FBI

17:05and the National Transportation Safety Board

17:07indicated that the government was actively hiding

17:10or destroying critical evidence from the public.

17:13Despite these detailed accounts,

17:15the FBI, NTSB, and the 9-11 Commission

17:18consistently dismissed them as cases of mistaken identity,

17:23arguing that workers likely found orange compressed gas canisters

17:26or rather industrial debris common to the construction site

17:29rather than the actual flight recorders.

17:32Now, I'm not going to dive into conspiracy theories here,

17:35but I'd love to hear your thoughts on this one in the comments section below.

17:43Why did every hijacker pilot travel to Las Vegas?

17:47Now, this is a strange one.

17:49In the months leading up to September 11th,

17:51all four pilot hijackers,

17:53Mohamed Atta,

17:54Marwan Al-Sheehy,

17:56Hani Hanjur,

17:57and Ziad Jara

17:57traveled to Las Vegas,

17:59and some made multiple trips.

18:01But the question still remains,

18:03why?

18:04They lived thousands of miles away from Las Vegas

18:07and had no obvious reason to be there,

18:09yet time and time again they visited the city.

18:12The first hijacker to visit it

18:14was Marwan Al-Sheehy.

18:16On May 24th, 2001,

18:18he flew from New York to San Francisco

18:20and then continued on to Las Vegas,

18:22traveling first class.

18:24Notably, the aircraft he used for the transcontinental segment

18:27was a Boeing 767,

18:29the same type he would pilot on September 11th.

18:32Next was Ziad Jara.

18:34On June 7th,

18:35he flew from Baltimore to Los Angeles

18:37and then to Las Vegas,

18:38also in first class.

18:40Again, he traveled on a Boeing 757,

18:43the same aircraft type he would eventually hijack.

18:46Just three weeks later,

18:48Mohamed Atta followed suit.

18:49On June 28th,

18:51he flew from Boston to San Francisco

18:52and then on to Las Vegas.

18:54He too traveled first class

18:56and flew a Boeing 767.

18:58In August 2001,

19:00another pair of hijackers,

19:02Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Hani Hanjur,

19:04purchased tickets for surveillance flights

19:06while Atta was in New Jersey.

19:08They traveled first class,

19:10flying on a Boeing 757

19:11and their itineraries

19:13were again linked to Las Vegas.

19:15On August 13th and 14th,

19:18Atta, Hazmi and Hanjur

19:19were all in Las Vegas simultaneously,

19:21just weeks before the attacks.

19:23At this stage,

19:25the operation was entering its final phase.

19:29Now supposedly,

19:30these trips were not merely vacations

19:32but rather surveillance flights.

19:34The three men were supposedly

19:35testing the American aviation system

19:37from the passenger cabin,

19:39learning how the journey felt,

19:40how the airports functioned,

19:42the duration of the flights

19:43and what it was like to travel

19:44aboard the very types of aircraft

19:46they intended to hijack.

19:47But the more perplexing question

19:49was why Las Vegas?

19:51Early reports cited the possibility

19:53that some of the hijackers

19:54drank alcohol,

19:56gambled,

19:56hired escorts

19:57and visited strip clubs.

19:59There were early reports

20:00that Atta and Al Sheehy

20:01visited Florida strip clubs,

20:03including the Pink Pony,

20:04as well as venues in Las Vegas.

20:06These claims came from

20:07staff recollections

20:08made after Atta's face

20:10became internationally recognizable.

20:12Now the Las Vegas strip club sightings

20:14have never been conclusively verified

20:16and police reportedly doubted

20:18at least one dancer's identification.

20:20So could Las Vegas

20:21have been a secret

20:22operational headquarters?

20:24Was it simply a convenient place

20:25for surveillance flights?

20:27Or were the terrorists

20:28having one last party

20:29before the mission

20:30they knew would lead to their deaths?

20:3225 years later,

20:33we still lack a definitive answer

20:35as to why they went to Las Vegas.

20:43How did Hanny Hanzor

20:44execute the Pentagon maneuver?

20:46The maneuver executed

20:47by Hanny Hanzor

20:48on American Airlines Flight 77

20:50is one of the most discussed

20:52aspects of the Pentagon attack.

20:53Many say that the final dive

20:55was an impossibly complex stunt,

20:57suggesting that an inexperienced

20:59pilot like Hanzor

21:00would have found it

21:00nearly impossible to perform.

21:03This suggestion has been reinforced

21:05by accounts from flight instructors

21:06following the attacks

21:07who described Hanzor

21:09as a mediocre pilot.

21:11One instructor even characterized

21:13him as a poor pilot.

21:14Another at Air Fleet Training Systems

21:16in New Jersey

21:17reportedly refused Hanzor's request

21:19to fly the Hudson Corridor

21:20a second time

21:21due to concerns

21:22about his piloting abilities.

21:24Furthermore, in early 2001,

21:27instructors noted

21:28that his performance

21:29during simulated training

21:30was substandard

21:31and advised him

21:32against continuing his training.

21:34Now this has led some

21:35to question if Hanzor

21:36was even at the controls

21:37that day.

21:38The sequence of events

21:40was supposedly as follows.

21:41At 9.29am,

21:43about 35 to 38 miles

21:45west of the Pentagon,

21:46the autopilot on Flight 77

21:48was disconnected

21:49when the aircraft

21:50was at an altitude

21:51of around 7,000 feet.

21:53Hanzor then made

21:54relatively minor course corrections

21:56as he descended

21:57towards the Washington area.

21:58At approximately 9.34am,

22:00when the aircraft

22:01was about 3.5 to 5 miles southwest

22:04or west-southwest

22:05of the Pentagon,

22:06he initiated a right-hand turn

22:08of 33 degrees

22:09while descending.

22:10The aircraft then

22:11performed almost

22:12a complete circle

22:13just shy of 360 degrees.

22:16By the conclusion of the turn,

22:18it was roughly

22:182,000 to 2,200 feet

22:20above the ground

22:21and heading

22:21towards the Pentagon.

22:23Once the turn

22:24was complete,

22:24the aircraft

22:25was directed

22:26towards the Pentagon.

22:27The NTSB reconstruction

22:29indicates that

22:30over the next 30 seconds,

22:31power was increased

22:32to near maximum

22:33and the aircraft's nose

22:34was pushed down,

22:36leading to a dramatic

22:36increase in speed.

22:38At the moment of impact,

22:40the NTSB calculated

22:41the speed

22:42to be approximately

22:42530 miles per hour

22:44and the impact occurred

22:46at 9.3745.

22:49What is striking

22:50is that this turn

22:51was executed

22:51while descending

22:52at high speed

22:53in a large Boeing 757

22:54before transitioning

22:56into the final dive.

22:58Now,

22:58Hani Hanjul

22:59did hold

23:00an FAA

23:00commercial pilot certificate

23:02and had received

23:03substantial flight training,

23:04including multi-engine training.

23:07Investigators

23:07characterised him

23:08as possibly

23:09the most experienced

23:10and highly trained pilot

23:11amongst the hijackers,

23:12despite what

23:13the instructor said.

23:14It was later discovered

23:16that Hanjul

23:17participated in

23:17extra flight training

23:18in 2001.

23:20He also rented

23:20small aircraft

23:21and on July 20th,

23:232001,

23:24flew from

23:24Fairfield,

23:25New Jersey

23:25to Gaithsburg,

23:27Maryland,

23:28a route that

23:28would have taken him

23:29near Washington,

23:30D.C.

23:31It's believed

23:31that this flight

23:32likely allowed him

23:33to survey the area

23:34to ensure he could

23:35complete his mission.

23:37Now,

23:37like all of the

23:389-11 hijackers,

23:39Hani Hanjul

23:40was a coward

23:40and a mass murderer

23:41and should never

23:42be recognised

23:43as anything else,

23:44but whether he was

23:45behind the controls

23:46or not that day,

23:46we'll never know.

23:49So that's it

23:49for this video.

23:50Now,

23:51we didn't want to

23:51go into too many

23:52conspiracies here,

23:53as we've talked

23:53about many of them

23:54in previous videos,

23:55which you can check out

23:56via the links

23:57in the description,

23:58but what things

23:59about 9-11 to you

24:00just do not add up.

24:02I would like to

24:03just take a moment

24:04to pay my respects

24:05and a heart

24:06to all of those

24:07affected by that

24:07tragic day.

24:08thanks for watching,

24:09everyone.

24:10Stay safe,

24:11and I'll see you next time.

I've Researched 9/11 For 15 Years. These Things Still Don't Add Up...

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